第183期——2026年5月15日
Sam FazeliJosh SchimmerEric SchmidtTess Cameron
- Bristol Myers与Hengrui的新交易带有主持人此前未见过的一项结构性安排:Hengrui可选择共同开发部分资产,并与Bristol Myers在全球开展特定商业化活动,而不只是保留中国内地、香港和澳门的权利。交易条款涉及最高9.5亿美元付款——首付款6亿美元、1周年付款1.75亿美元、2周年付款1.75亿美元——对应最高152亿美元总潜在价值,覆盖4项Hengrui肿瘤/血液学资产、4项BMS免疫学资产,以及5项双方共同发现的项目。Sam Fazeli指出,这甚至不是今年最大的中国交易,AstraZeneca与CSPC的交易规模更大。
- 刚结束中国巴士考察之旅的Josh Schimmer,用一句话概括了竞争格局:“创新是风险所在,优化是价值所在。”当前中国仍是“低成本、高速度、价格可负担、经过验证、属于顶尖水平的创新”的“非常有吸引力的来源”,把资产授权出去“现在可能机会多于风险”。问题在于5—10年后:届时中国公司将在美国药价体系下实现商业化,同时此前一直将这类价格挡在本土市场之外。
- Tess Cameron将推演推向最悲观的终局——美国生物科技只剩“制造和销售代表”——Eric Schmidt则给出了反向护城河:美国资本市场。“世界上没有任何地方的资本市场能像美国这样”,他不相信每年投入数千亿美元的大多数基金会跟随资产进入中国市场。Sam对中国的看空版本是:当前优势在于围绕PD-1、PD-L1和CTLA-4等相近方向进行“蛮力式”迭代,真正从0到1创新所需的风险偏好仍然缺位。
- Isomorphic约20亿美元的B轮融资引发了公开质疑,Eric援引IBM和Amazon的先例,称它们“像这家公司现在这样轰轰烈烈地起步,最后却有些无声无息地收场”。Sam表示,自己没在这一轮看到生物科技类投资者——是被估值挤出,还是被排除在外尚不清楚——而公司在去年3月之后此前仅融资5.79亿美元。Tess认可其募资能力,但认为这“更像科技公司的思维”,价值来自资产,而不是平台。
- 谈到Marty Makary辞职,Eric的判断最为绝对:“他担任委员期间,什么该做的事都没做。”委员的职责是支持审评团队、保护FDA免受政治干预,并推动一个更强的FDA,而不是登上CNBC讨论UniQure或Replimune。Tess认为,这一变化对RA投资“完全没有影响”,理由是2月公布的任命人选可信,包括Chris Klomp、Kyle Diamantas、Grace Graham和John Brooks;她也不认为政府会在中期选举前主动引发一场充满争议的确认战。
- REGENXBIO决定在FDA明确监管路径前暂缓DMD申报,集中暴露了Elevidys先例的困局,Josh对此直言不讳。数据方面,9名患者显示microdystrophin与NSAA之间存在相关性,研究总体约30人,公司目标是在2027年寻求潜在加速批准——投资者想看到的是另外约20人。“我们被一个本来可能就不该获批的药物审批困住了……现在我们一边批评FDA没有批准所有药物,一边又在切身承受批准过度的后果。”
- Biogen在前瞻性设定的剂量—反应主要终点未达标的情况下,仍推动tau ASO进入Phase 3,再次引发了资本配置的可信度问题。Josh评价Eric的备忘录称:“Biogen在阿尔茨海默病上像一只飞蛾扑火,尽管已经被同一团火烧伤了多次。”Tess认为,这款药显然能打到tau,但降低tau是否能改变疾病进程,可能还要4年才能知道。Sam的辩护是:管理层已经更换,tau作为致病机制背后可能有更严格的科学依据,而市场规模“可能与肥胖产品处在同一量级”。
- Inhibrx的OX40激动剂在头颈癌随机Phase 2中将响应率提升至Keytruda的2倍,但Eric认为行业门槛已经越过了这一水平。Merus(已被Genmab收购)的pedicicimab和Cara的ficaserapus相对Keytruda“将响应率提升了不止1倍”,且已深入Phase 3。“我就是不知道该如何看待Inhibrx。”Josh补充称,该公司的DR5激动剂此前在软骨肉瘤中响应率较低,但PFS获益极其显著,因此本次低ORR读数并不能单独决定结论。
1. BMS–Hengrui交易打破中国授权交易在商业化权利上的常规模板
- Sam Fazeli认为真正的新意在于:协议覆盖4项Hengrui肿瘤和血液学资产、4项Bristol Myers免疫学资产,以及5项由双方共同发现和开发的创新资产;关键是,“Hengrui拥有选择权,可以共同开发部分资产,并可能与Bristol Myers在全球开展特定商业化活动”。他此前从未见过这种安排。常规结构是本地公司保留澳门、香港和中国内地权利,全球权利则交给制药合作方。
- 经济条款是分期向Hengrui支付最高9.5亿美元——首付款6亿美元、首个周年日支付1.75亿美元、第二个周年日再支付1.75亿美元。Sam称,这一结构让他想起BMS与BioNTech围绕Pemetrexed达成的交易;Pemetrexed是Bristol约1年前授权的一款PD-L1/VEGF药物。加上里程碑付款,交易总潜在价值为152亿美元。需要放在正确框架下看的是:这不是2026年规模最大的中国交易,AstraZeneca与CSPC的交易更大。
- Sam认为,除科学进展之外,推动这股趋势的因素是早期临床开发仍然“明显快于世界其他地区”——这也正是本期后半段讨论FDA领导层时反复回到的同一个问题。
2. Josh中国之行的结论:窗口就在当下,问题在第5至第10年
- Josh Schimmer参加了同事Lee Watts每年组织的中国巴士考察团,其中包括访问Hengrui;创新的节奏、速度、质量、层次和可负担性由此“变得具体可感”。他对当下的判断是:中国是高质量、经过验证的资产来源,且往往是本土创新者已经做出的产品的“me-better版本”——他将此称为“一种财富转移”:注册地在美国的公司和投资者低价买入中国资产,再带到美国市场,便可能获得非常可观的回报。
- 真正改变交易逻辑的是,考察中多家公司表示,计划在3—5年时间框架内成为全球商业化公司。因此,Bristol这笔交易是战略布局,而非机会主义交易——“他们会与Bristol合作,从中吸取经验,并建立自己在全球商业化方面的能力,包括在美国市场商业化的能力”。与此同时,中国似乎也很可能开放本土市场,并为创新支付更高价格;“除了中国自己的生物科技公司,还有谁会比它们更有条件从中受益?”
- Josh回到公司后给其覆盖名单的建议是:“你需要制定China strategy”,即便当下还没有可执行的策略。对0到1的创新者来说,这意味着要比过去更认真地思考如何用me-better创新蚕食自己的产品,甚至可能直接去中国完成这件事;而中国公司仍依赖外部资本、融资和验证的窗口还没有关闭。
3. 悲观终局——美国资本市场是否才是真正的护城河
- Tess Cameron明确给出了一个悲观推演:将时间拨到5—10年后,假设Hengrui、Hansoh、CSPC等公司都实现全球化,再问出于安全原因,美国还必须保留什么——为供应安全保留制造,以及美国销售代表。“美国生物科技最后会变成什么?基本上就是制造和销售代表。”她希望看到的是另一种结果:竞争压力推动美国推进拟议的CTN路径立法,以及IRB和其他必要工作,让真正不经过IND的早期临床路径能够在美国本土落地。
- Josh认为,美国仍能守住的阵地是创意生成;他认为美国的想法生成能力“远胜世界其他任何地方”,而中国擅长在这些创新之上继续搭建。因此才有那句概括:“创新是风险所在,优化是价值所在。”部分抵消因素包括AI帮助拉平竞争,以及更多美国公司与中国合作开发,以更快达到概念验证。在成本、规模和速度上,他直白承认:“我不认为美国未来任何时候都能匹配。”
- Tess进一步追问:如果投资者靠优化获得回报,优化本身是否也会商品化,从而让稀缺的0到1创新者可以选择自己的优化方?她承认,在现行专利制度下,“这可能很难做到”。
- Eric Schmidt将防御逻辑重新定义为资本市场:“这实际上可能是保护美国生物科技生态最好的防线。世界上没有任何地方的资本市场能像美国这样。”RA或许愿意投资中国的私营公司,但每年向生物科技投入数千亿美元的绝大多数基金不会进入中国市场。真正悬而未决的问题是,美国投资者是否永远会要求管理团队必须住在美国、说英语,并且“亲自出面建立关系”。
- Sam刻意站到中国一侧来论证:当前优势是“蛮力”,大量公司围绕PD-1对PD-L1、PD-1和CTLA-4等相关方向反复迭代,“单靠数学概率”就会有一个最终进入最佳梯队。若美国加快速度,这一优势就会被削弱;他认为这一过程已经随着Makary推动临床试验提速而启动。中国真正缺少的是对绝对早期创新的风险承受力——“那边的人脑和美国人的脑一样好”,而且中国已经在材料科学和化学领域完成过类似创新。
4. Isomorphic巨额融资遭遇科技进入医疗的质疑
- Sam先介绍背景:Demis Hassabis创办的AI生物科技公司刚完成略超20亿美元的B轮融资,加上去年3月的5.79亿美元,公司累计融资达到25.8亿美元。他的疑问是:“我没看到里面有生物科技类投资者”,原因可能是这些投资者被排除在外,也可能是不愿意支付这一估值。他还提到Zehra从ARCH Venture Partners及另一位自己忘记名字的投资者处获得的10亿美元融资,以及Insilico Medicine。
- Tess的承销逻辑区分在于:专业投资者关注资产,而“太多生物科技投资者,包括我们自己,都经历过这样的情况:我们把大量价值放在平台和技术上,最后却未必能转化成可以商业化的资产”。她认可团队吸引资本的能力,但认为这是一种科技公司的思维——用可扩展技术提高发现和开发效率——因此属于“非常不同类型的交易,也需要非常不同的承销方式”。
- 自称更爱讽刺的Eric搬出了先例:IBM、Amazon以及其他大型科技公司进军医疗的尝试,“像这家公司现在这样轰轰烈烈地起步,最后却有些无声无息地收场”。从一个有趣的平台跨越到真正的药物发现与开发业务之间的鸿沟,“此前还没有任何人真正跨过去”。
- Sam给出了一部分辩护:Hassabis是神经科学家,也为自己聚集了一批具备生物学知识的人;AlphaFold和AlphaGenome均向外部公开,“我接触到的几乎每一位化学家”都在使用;此外,这支团队也是AI领域最重视安全的团队之一,“有点像Anthropic”。
5. Makary离任:4种视角,4种诊断
- Sam对Makary的评价有加有减:加分项包括推动临床试验提速、减少动物试验,以及提出基于合理机制的思路,从而让单臂试验具备可行性;减分项包括疫苗处理、Vinay Prasad事件、最终没有产出的罕见病关注、可能成为其辞职重要因素的米非司酮,以及调味电子烟之争——“作为4个孩子的父亲,我简直无法相信这件事曾经被纳入考虑”。此外,他还“可能做了太多播客、演讲和视频”。
- Josh认为,问题的根源具有结构性:如果Makary离任是因为没有遵从RFK Jr.的“各种心血来潮、信念和观点”,那么“如果接任者仍然必须向RFK Jr.汇报并对他唯命是从,我们为什么会期待有谁比Makary更适合领导这个机构?”Josh还单独指出,政府的一些想法更像心血来潮和偏执,而不是基于科学依据。另一种报道则称,白宫正加强对FDA领导层的控制,因为医疗政策可能在中期选举前对其不利,这反而指向由有资历的人领导、让机构趋于稳定。Josh更尖锐的问题是:既然审批决定“相对合理”,Makary到底做错了什么?“我们想要一个不管怎样都会批准一切的人吗?”还是说问题只是机构士气,而士气“显然已经大幅恶化”?
- 这件事对投资组合的影响在于:大多数药物的判断是黑白分明的,但更多经由CBER而非CDER审评、且患者规模更小的药物会落入灰色地带,“而我们必须让这个灰色地带与政策和决策者保持一致。当政策和决策者发生变化时,灰色地带也会随之变化”。
- Tess认为这次变化对投资“完全没有影响”,并指出委员之下还有一层制度性安排——Kennedy在2月任命的Chris Klomp、Kyle Diamantas、Grace Graham和John Brooks等“可信的人”,正在FDA管理和接班安排中发挥重要作用。她还提到No Patient Left Behind支持Rick Pazdur的公开信,并认为政府不会希望在中期选举前陷入一场需要参议院确认、且会分散注意力的斗争——“我以后可能会后悔自己这么说”。
- Eric的判断绝对且毫不留情:“他担任委员期间,什么该做的事都没做……我们不该让一个人登上CNBC,去谈论UniQure、Replimune或者类似的任何事情。”委员的职责是支持审评团队、保护机构免受政治干预,并推动一个更强的FDA——“据我所知,这些他一件都没做”。
6. REGENXBIO暂缓申报,暴露Elevidys先例的代价
- Tess对数据的解读是:主要终点已经达成,公司称正在为2027年潜在加速批准做准备。在9名患者中,microdystrophin表达与NSAA之间显示出相关性,NSAA是DMD的功能性终点。推动股价反应的缺口在于,完整数据集中约有30名患者。“这就像,是的,但另外那大概20人呢?”此外,副作用的背景解读,以及FDA会要求随机对照试验还是接受外部对照,仍未解决;投资者“希望对后续路径有更多确定性”。
- Josh的框架是本节核心:既然Elevidys已经获批,怎么能不批准这个药——但Elevidys当初是否本来就不该获批?当FDA“真正运转正常时”,它会不断讨论如何设定先例,因为批准一个药物就意味着被锁定在批准类似药物的路径上,而后者可能有效,也可能无效。“我们被一个本来可能就不该获批的药物审批困住了。现在我们一边批评FDA没有批准所有药物,一边又在切身承受批准过度的后果。”
- Eric补充了来自另一侧的压力:据其同事Chris Terkluska判断,Solid Bio可能拥有更优的构建体和更优的数据,而且已经显示出CK下降——这是“非常重要的客观生物标志物”,而他认为REGENXBIO目前还没有展示出这一点。“我们被困住的方向不止一个,可能是多个角度同时施压。”
- Sam提醒,在监管争论中,如果一款好药明明存在却无法通过审批,最终可能是患者受损。
7. Biogen重返阿尔茨海默病:飞蛾、火焰与资本配置
- Eric介绍这款tau ASO时称其为“BIB80”:在Phase 1以及目前的Phase 2中,它都能降低脑脊液中的tau,并在PET上显示tau下降,因此药物按设计发挥了作用;相较对照组,疾病进展和认知可能已有早期改善——当然,前提是“小规模阿尔茨海默病Phase 2研究能够显示出任何东西”。但它未达到前瞻性设定的剂量反应主要终点,Biogen仍将推进Phase 3。数据将于下月的阿尔茨海默病会议公布。
- 让Eric难以接受的是:在aducanumab之后,公司花了3—4年时间表示不会在神经退行性疾病上进行大规模、激进且高风险的押注,转而进入I&I,以追求更高的投入资本回报率。“仅仅在Phase 2研究的一个新终点上出现了某种有意思的信号,我们就又回到了……风险等级完全不同的事情上。所以坦率说,我很难消化这一点。”
- Josh称Eric的备忘录是自己很长时间以来最喜欢的一篇,并将其延伸为一条普遍原则:已经拥有获批药物且能够盈利的生物科技公司“现在已经是企业”,正确策略应是让创新和资本配置的风险容忍度“大幅下降,更像企业一样经营”——在不过度承担风险的前提下实现营收和利润增长。许多公司仍困在“我们是生物科技公司,我们要大量花钱、承担风险”的叙事里,最终伤害的是自己和整个行业。
- Sam的反驳是:这已经不是当初做出Aduhelm决策的管理团队;tau是一个新的机制,作为致病因素背后“可能有更严格的科学依据”;难点在于时间窗口,因为tau变化“非常接近症状开始的时间”。飞蛾之所以再次扑火,还有市场需求这一原因:如果药物做对了,市场规模“可能与肥胖产品处在同一量级”。Tess认为可能还要4年才能得到答案。
8. Inhibrx、不断抬高的头颈癌门槛,以及主持人对ASCO、ADA和ATS的关注清单
- Eric谈到Inhibrx的OX40激动剂:这是一项针对头颈癌、对比Keytruda的严格随机Phase 2,响应率翻倍,确实值得肯定;但样本量较小,而且头颈癌的响应“有些短暂,因为它们并不总是与PFS和OS等更强终点相关”。竞争问题在于,Merus的pedicicimab(Merus已被Genmab收购)和Cara的ficaserapus相对Keytruda将响应率提升了不止1倍,并且已经深入Phase 3。“我就是不知道该如何看待Inhibrx。”Sam补充称,随访时间尚不清楚,他希望看到HPV分层,因为这可能构成优势;他还将股价从10.84美元上涨至约14倍的走势形容为凤凰涅槃式复苏。
- Josh从同一个圣迭戈生态圈为公司辩护:其DR5激动剂在软骨肉瘤中,尽管响应率相当低,却在一次完整、规范且规模较大的随机对照试验中显示出显著PFS获益;这款药依靠蛋白质工程攻克了一个出了名困难的靶点。OX40资产是六价分子,与其他OX40激动剂“非常不同”,Josh认为这一背景对解读OX40数据“很重要”。PFS数据预计将在ESMO公布。
- Sam讲了一个Moderna的叙事风险案例:一场游轮上的汉坦病毒疫情因提及疫苗合作而推动股价上涨,专业投资者还来问他疫苗何时上市——“这种东西距离具备引发大流行的能力还远得不能再远”。Moderna已经回吐部分涨幅;真正的驱动因素是个体化新抗原黑色素瘤数据,可能在今年公布。他还指出,其他mRNA公司都没有参与其中。更广泛地说,mRNA仍然是应对大流行最正确、最容易实现、也最快扩产的技术,只要监管机构和医疗体系“不再不断诋毁”它,就应该获得一定估值。
- 会议关注清单方面,摘要将于21日发布:Summit的HARMONi-6将公布中国一线治疗研究中ivonescimab的生存数据,但这不是最终裁决,HARMONi-3的全球读数将在今年晚些时候公布;此外还有Revolution Medicines的胰腺癌数据、头颈癌Ribravant总生存数据,以及Johnson & Johnson多发性骨髓瘤MonumenTAL-3。在ADA,Sam关注AstraZeneca口服GLP-1药物的首次数据和retatrutide的详细数据。在ATS,Tess关注AstraZeneca的IL-33药物tozorakimab;摘要中的信号令人鼓舞,但仍要面对Sanofi的itepekimab令人失望的先例。Sanofi曾表示,COVID是那项结果的重要组成部分,但争议仍在。Josh则关注Endeavour及其CEO John Hood在IPF领域的进展;“你必须看fluida扫描”,因为它们可能是判断真实抗纤维化效应的最佳信号。
完整逐字稿
Looking at this week, we haven't had the busiest week in terms of news, but we've had some events that took place that we're definitely going to talk about, related to the FDA. We're going to start with deals and financing.
1. BMS Partners With Hengrui
We've had another big deal that involves a Chinese biotech company. This one is Bristol Myers Squibb with Hengrui. I'm going to call it a massive deal, but it's not the most massive because we've had bigger ones recently. It continues to show the trend of outsourcing some early drug development to what I would call a potentially still cheaper and faster country for early-stage drug development.
The agreement includes 4 oncology and hematology drugs from Hengrui, 4 immunology assets from Bristol Myers Squibb, and 5 innovative assets to be jointly discovered and developed by both companies. It uses Hengrui's technology platforms, and, of course, some of the assets coming from Bristol Myers Squibb were discovered at Bristol.
Hengrui has an option to co-develop select assets and the potential to conduct certain commercialization activities globally with Bristol Myers Squibb. That's the interesting part that I've not seen before. I've seen these deals where the pharma partner, often a US or European pharma partner, is working with the company, but the local company keeps the region—Macau, Hong Kong, and China—and usually leaves the global commercialization rights to others.
Part of the reason these deals are happening, aside from the good science taking place in China, is because early clinical development is still a little faster, or meaningfully faster, in China than it is in the rest of the world. Of course, this comes back to our conversations that we will have later about the FDA and the changes in leadership.
The deal terms are that BMS pays about $950 million, or up to $950 million, to Hengrui in a tranched investment or payment: $600 million up front, $175 million on the first anniversary, and another $175 million on the second anniversary. This reminds me of their deal with BioNTech, which is interesting. That deal, for Pemetrexed, the PD-L1/VEGF drug that Bristol licensed about a year ago, was also spread out over two years.
The total potential value, of course, is a big number: $15.2 billion, with all those milestones included. This is not the biggest China deal this year. The AstraZeneca-CSPC deal was larger. That was earlier this year, but also in 2026.
With all these details in hand, I want to pass it on to the rest of the team, starting with Josh, because Josh is relatively fresh from China. I want to get your perspective, and I'll have a couple of queries for you as well. Josh?
Thanks, Sam. Our colleague, Lee Watts, does an annual bus tour to China, so I joined this year to get a sense of what all the hullabaloo has been about. It really is impressive seeing it firsthand, including Hengrui, and understanding that the pace, speed, quality, caliber, and affordability of innovation there really brought to life a lot of the discussions that I've been hearing about China being a competitive risk to the US, which it is and is going to increasingly be for all those aforementioned reasons.
In the moment, though, China still seems to be a source for high-quality, validated assets, often better versions of what some of the local innovators have come up with. That creates its own disruptive dynamic, but it is often a wealth transfer from Chinese innovation to US-domiciled companies or investors who can get these cheap assets from China and then bring them to the US, where they can be very lucrative.
That's its own separate dynamic, and it creates a different type of risk for the sector. You just worry: Is there something better that may be licensed out of China into a pharma company or a local biotech company?
What we also heard on the bus tour was that these companies do have plans to ultimately become global commercial entities. Hengrui indicated that its timeframe may be 3 to 5 years to accomplish that. This deal very much aligns with that strategy. They're going to partner with Bristol, find lessons, and develop their own capabilities for commercializing globally, including in the US market.
That's where it now becomes particularly tricky, because the value capture of the innovation may be increasingly shifting to China-based companies. At the same time, it sounds like China is going to open up its own markets for innovation and pay more for new innovative drugs. Of course, this comes at a time when who is better positioned to benefit from that than China's own biotech companies?
In the moment, China remains a very attractive source for low-cost, high-speed, affordable, validated, top-tier innovation. In the race to come up with the best of whatever—the best bispecific, the best monoclonal antibody, the best ADC, the best dual-warhead ADC—China has a clear advantage and remains an affordable, low-cost source of innovation.
But over a 5- to 10-year period, I think the global trade issues are going to be particularly problematic. The US is going to have to figure out what strategy it ultimately deploys to protect its markets and enable local innovators in a race that isn't really a fair race at all, given where China is and where it's headed with its speed of innovation.
Tess, you wanted to come in here, right?
It's a really interesting point. Maybe just extrapolating what Josh shared, roll forward 5 to 10 years, and let's say that Hengrui, Hansoh, CSPC, and a number of these other China innovators have really gone global. I think there's a question of what would still be in the US and what would need to be in the US from a security standpoint.
I think one would be manufacturing, because security of supply is really important. It's critical to have a certain amount of onshore, or very closely allied-country, manufacturing. And sales reps, right? You're still going to need US sales reps, aren't you?
Is that what US biotech will be in 5 to 10 years? Will it basically be manufacturing and sales reps? I think that's a bleak view. I like to think that US biotechs are really competitive, want to win, and want to make great drugs. We'll figure out ways to do that.
Maybe that means they're going to have to do more in China in order to be competitive, and maybe it means they're going to have to do more in India to be competitive. Hopefully, the big hope is that it means the US is actually going to have to do more things like the CTN pathway legislation that's being proposed.
There's a lot of work and a lot of changes at the IRB and other levels that would have to go in to actually make a non-IND path for early clinical development feasible in the United States. Let's hope it gets there, and that the US can be more than manufacturing and sales reps.
Josh, I'm interested in that vision of the future and how you think US biotechs can really compete in this new order.
It's ever-evolving, right? China's focus right now is in certain therapeutic categories and certain modalities. There are still areas where US bioinnovation is relatively insulated. Of course, the question is how long it's going to remain insulated.
One of the most challenging dynamics to me is that US innovation—the new ideas and new concepts—is, I think, far superior to anywhere else in the world.
Where China is really excelling is building on those innovations to take them to the next level, right? Innovation is where the risk is. Optimizing is where the value is. And that's kind of where, Tess, probably what you're seeing as you're painting that picture: How do we find ways for the US to not just be the innovator, but also continue to optimize?
Part of it will come from AI. Great efforts in AI will help level the playing field. Part of it may come from more US companies engaging in China for development so that they can move quickly as well to proof of concept, while we're waiting for the US ecosystem to hopefully speed up as much as it can. China's always going to have a cost, scale, and speed advantage. I don't think that's anything that the US will ever be able to match, and that's where it probably gets most tricky.
The idea that we want access to the best innovation means that, at some point, there may be tough decisions to be made in the US market about whether that also includes innovation in China. Again, balance-of-trade issues are going to be very important, and this is a very important sector now for both countries to defend. It's so hard to predict what the future is going to look like when it's moving so fast, and there are legislative considerations down the road that may change the landscape and the dynamic.
Maybe just building on that one layer more: If optimizing is now the way that investors get paid, is that something that becomes more commoditized? Is that something that becomes more commoditized, and zero-to-one innovators, which are scarce, can have their choice of optimizers because it's something that's more commoditized and can be done very efficiently?
With the current patent system, that's probably hard, but that's just another big-picture thought to throw out there about how things could evolve.
When I got back from China, I emailed all the companies that I cover or work with and basically said, “You need to have a China strategy,” even if there's no strategy to be had at the moment. But part of the strategy may be that if you are the zero-to-one, if you are the original innovator, you need to think about, more so than in the past, cannibalizing yourself with me-better-type innovation, and you can go to China.
There's still a window where China itself is split between the haves and the have-nots, and they're very dependent on external capital, funding, and validation. They are commoditizing innovation, absolutely, and potentially to the advantage of the US. Where it does, as I said, become challenging is when China now wants to commercialize into the US market at the high drug prices that we spend, after having basically shut their market off from high drug prices up until what may be the coming years.
You guys are both touching on a really important topic, which is the strength of the US capital markets, right? That may actually be our best defense in terms of protecting the US biotech ecosystem. There's no capital market in the world like the one in the US.
Tess, I know RA Capital might feel comfortable going over to China and investing in private companies. But for the great majority of funds that are willing to put literally hundreds of billions of dollars into biotech each year, they're not going to go invest in Chinese markets, right?
So maybe, in addition, in terms of your view of the future, in addition to having manufacturing capabilities and capabilities in sales and distribution, the future of US biotech is to have investor relations and analyst responsibilities, things like that. I know for all of our vocations, we'd probably enjoy that.
But I just wonder whether it is possible for Chinese companies to truly penetrate the US from a capital-market standpoint, and whether you guys see that evolving or changing—whether that hurdle, that bar, is going to become so low in terms of fund flows from Chinese listings in the US, or whether US investors will always want the management teams to be here, to speak English, to press the flesh, and to reside in the US.
I would say that's probably why I look at it as a 5-to-10-year consideration, right? Certain companies are really starting to thrive in China, and as China pays more for drug spending, their revenue and profitability are going to improve, and their resources are going to improve. They're going to be learning along the way from partners like Bristol Myers Squibb how to commercialize.
It's not rocket science. There are many different ways to approach that, and that is what they're gearing up to do. But they're not there yet, right? That's what creates this window where there's probably more opportunity than risk right now to license assets out of China and bring them into the US market or even globally and capture all that value in the process.
But over 10 years, that's where it becomes hard to anticipate, because China will have more and more capital to enable its commercial efforts and the expertise as it partners with companies like Bristol Myers Squibb.
Yeah. To summarize this, I'm going to take the other side of the conversation and assume that I'm sitting in China right now, either in the government or running one of these companies. I think what I would want to watch is to make sure that my current competitive advantage, which I would classify as brute force, is maintained. You can call it whatever you want. It's cheaper, but also the number of companies that can iterate on the same idea—PD-1 versus PD-L1, PD-1, CTLA-4, whatever you want it to be—is so high that, by sheer mathematics or arithmetic, they'll end up with one of the assets being potentially one of the best out there.
If I were looking at the region, I would worry that that sheer-force capability will eventually erode, partly because the US catches up with the idea that it has to be able to do science faster. You mentioned AI, Josh. And then the fact that we eventually will wake up. I think that process started with Marty Makary trying to streamline clinical development so that drugs can get into early trials faster, so that we can catch up at least on that front as well.
The question I have is whether there's this risk appetite, and maybe some of these companies are now getting so well-funded that their risk appetite goes up to do that hardcore innovation. No question they can do it. Human brains over there are as good as the human brains in the US. Access to capital is the issue, which is what Eric brought up.
So will they be able to get to the absolute early innovation stage? We know for a fact that they've been able to do that in the materials-science world and the chemistry world. So there's nothing stopping them. It's just that this needs a different level of risk appetite, and that's what I think needs to evolve over there in China.
2. Isomorphic Raises Two Billion
Great conversation here, guys. Thank you. I think maybe on that particular front, and talking about AI and how it can make a change to the world, I want to talk about one of the largest fundraisings that I've come across: Isomorphic. Remember, this is the biotech—or, I would call it, an AI biotech company—that's run by Demis Hassabis as CEO, who is also the CEO of DeepMind, Google's AI business or segment.
They just raised just over $2 billion from investors. Now, this is Series B, right? Tess, you tell me how many Series Bs you've come across that are this big. They had only just raised $579 million in March last year, so this is $2.58 billion of cash going in here.
I'm assuming they're seeing development or evolution in their assets, which is what they're talking about in the press release that they put out, but these are huge numbers. The one little thing that worries me somewhat is that I don't see any biotech-type investors in there. Maybe they were excluded, maybe they couldn't put up with the valuation that was going in here, or a mix of both of these things.
I know Zehra had a billion dollars that came from ARCH Venture Partners and one other whose name I forget. Of course, I'm pretty close to Insilico Medicine. They're doing relatively well in the world of AI, and there's a whole host of other companies. This is where we're going to see whether they're going to be able to really, genuinely get the speed going.
Now, Isomorphic has proven part of its efforts, which is AlphaFold and AlphaGenome, et cetera, that are openly available and are everywhere. Pretty much every chemist that I come across is using them.
So I just wondered if Tess wanted to comment on the $2.1 billion that was raised. I'm sorry. I don't know why I'm laughing, but it's a huge amount of money for a Series B.
It absolutely is. It absolutely is a huge amount of money, and I think, for biotech specialists, we're going to be focused more on assets, right? What is the value of the assets that are being developed? I think too many biotech investors, including us, have been in situations where we put a lot of value on a platform and technology, and it ends up not necessarily translating into assets that can be commercialized.
Kudos to the Isomorphic team for attracting that capital. But I do think that is much more of a tech mindset: getting a technology that is scalable and can help make drug discovery and development more efficient. Let's hope that technology works and can help our companies compete better. But it's certainly a very different type of deal and type of underwriting than your biotech specialist would do.
I mean, just to put on more of a skeptical hat, Tess is such a nice, wonderful person. She's probably a little less snarky than I am. But Sam, Tess, and Josh, you all know this isn't the first time we've seen big tech wade into healthcare waters, right? Whether it's IBM, Amazon, or other initiatives in the past, they've all started with a bang, like this seems to be doing, and ended with a bit of a whimper.
The divide between tech and healthcare, I think, is still very great. I think it takes a certain mindset to develop drugs, and as Tess mentioned, that is where the value is coming from. It's not coming from platforms. Somewhere between an interesting platform, which Isomorphic has—the technology is certainly valuable, as you noted, Sam—and turning it into a drug discovery and development business is a huge, huge gap that just hasn't been breached by anyone else before.
Mm-hmm. The only thing I would say to finish on this is that Demis Hassabis is actually a neuroscientist, and he has surrounded himself with some true biotech-type, or at least biology-knowledgeable, folks. So let's hope it works out, because they are good people. They're among the more concerned people when it comes to AI, right? A little bit like Anthropic in terms of their attitudes toward the safety risks of AI, et cetera.
So let's hope that it works out for them, but I completely hear you, and you always worry about that when this volume of money goes into a company. With that in mind, let's talk about the other key subject of this week, which is Marty Makary's resignation. I had a conversation with a good friend early in the week who said to me, “I've met with Marty recently, and there's no way he's leaving.” So all these folks were wrong—or at least, he wasn't getting fired. And now that's what happened, right?
The issue isn't that anyone was misinformed, et cetera. I think it's probably still part of the ongoing difficulty of being able to judge where the administration will land on something here or there. Marty Makary did some great things and perhaps a few too many podcasts, presentations, and videos—I don't know. It's a value judgment that perhaps isn't my place to make. There were issues with vaccines and how they were being handled that were allowed to happen, although maybe that's because his ultimate boss was in charge of all those areas.
The story with Vinay Prasad was, in the end, whether you like him or not as a scientist—and, Josh, I've heard you talk about this several times—it wasn't necessarily a positive. Rare diseases were supposed to be a great focus, but nothing really ever came of it. Mifepristone was probably a major factor in what happened in the end, in terms of his decision to resign. And this flavored-vapes thing—I just can't believe, as a father of 4, that it was ever in the cards.
But he did say some great things: streamlining clinical trials, at least the idea of streamlining clinical trials; rare diseases; reducing animal testing; bringing in the plausible-mechanism idea for 1-arm, or single-arm, trials and faster trials; and, of course, this new streamlining of trials, which was quite important. So I'd love to hear from you all with regard to how you think this is going to play out, because it just increases the uncertainty. It's a little bit like the leadership contest in the U.K. government. It just creates uncertainty now: who's going to be in charge?
We do have somebody, Kyle Diamantas, who's in charge, and apparently he's a reasonably straightforward person in terms of how he's been engaging with folks at the FDA. Josh, you're unmuted, so I'm going to pass it on to you.
That's a sly trick right there. I'll take it. It's interesting, right? What you read in the press is a little hard to interpret. Was this him not following all of RFK Jr.'s whims, beliefs, and views, in which case why would we expect anyone better than Makary to come in to lead the agency if they still have to report and kowtow to RFK Jr., which is probably where all of the problems start and finish?
Even there, the frustrating part is that some of his ideas are actually very thoughtful, good ideas. Others seem to be more whims and paranoia than actual scientific merit. You almost have to go through on a case-by-case basis and figure out which is which.
On the other hand, there are also reports that maybe the White House is playing a more heavy-handed role in choosing FDA leadership, recognizing that with the midterms coming up, some of the healthcare policy may actually be working against them, so they kind of have to marginalize RFK Jr. to stay in control of the House. Depending on which of those you're going to follow, it either points to really starting to stabilize the agency with new, credentialed leadership, or to something else entirely.
I think we all saw the No Patient Left Behind advocacy for bringing back pastors as head of CDER, uh, head of the FDA, I should say. If we can start to regroup and re-enable the FDA with the right people in the right seats, then that should be a very good thing. But if we go down this path of more enablement of antiscientific whims, et cetera, that's not a good thing.
We've also debated what it was that Makary did wrong that got him in such hot water, even the same with Vinay Prasad. Their decision-making process for many of these drug approvals was relatively sound, right? So do we want someone who's just going to come in and approve everything no matter what? Do we want to go back to that framework that we used to all complain about?
How do you get the balance right? Or is it not even about any of this, and it's really just about agency morale, which has obviously eroded substantially? There's still a lot that we don't know, and we're just going to have to wait and see how it all plays out.
Josh, how does this feed into your current decision-making? How much do you worry about this when you're making investments? I don't know if these short-term issues impact your process at all.
For the most part, drugs are black and white, right? They work, and they should be approved. They don't work, and they shouldn't be approved. But particularly with drugs that go through CBER more than CDER, because of the smaller patient populations, it's harder to generate the same amount of substantial evidence of efficacy and safety, and you do wind up in much more of a gray zone.
We have to align that gray with the policy and the decision-makers. When those policy and decision-makers are changing, so does that gray zone and its alignment with those drugs that haven't been definitively proven to work, that are often considered for accelerated approval, and that are often judgment calls as to whether the data that a company has generated really does portend a meaningful clinical benefit.
You've seen it. The sector's been incredibly volatile based on commentary and leadership, particularly with Vinay Prasad. We're all trying to guess how he's going to look at the next data set. And then, whoever comes in, we're going to have to go through the same process of aligning the gray with the data and the unmet need.
Right. Right. Tess, Eric?
I would say the change really impacts our investing not at all.
Right? I think if anything, the extent to which Makary was in the news and being loud about what the FDA is doing probably worked against him more than for him. I'd be similar to what Josh shared: I think a lot of the approval decisions ended up being decisions where, hey, maybe they were hard. I'm sure not everyone agrees with all of the decisions he made, but they're also understandable, right? The things that weren't approved are things where there really was debate about whether they met the right evidentiary standard.
I would just highlight another really important thing, which is that in February, Kennedy announced several appointments to his team. That included Chris Klomp, Kyle Diamantas, Grace Graham, and John Brooks. These are credible people, right? They're playing a really important role in managing the FDA and managing succession, and I think that is really important and has contributed to some greater level of stability within the organization. That's really important despite the change with Makary.
The last question, I think, is that I don't think the administration wants to turn this into a Senate confirmation hearing process that could distract from the midterms, right? I think it'll be very interesting to see how that plays out. The good news is that there are some excellent candidates. Rick Pazdur certainly is, as NPLB highlighted in the letter, but there are others as well. I think the prospect of a very contentious confirmation hearing is probably not one that the administration really wants to pick right now. I may regret saying that, but at least maybe that is my hope, which would suggest a candidate who is not going to be extremely controversial.
Right. Eric, do you want to add anything before we move on?
Well, just quickly, Sam, thank you. Look, I think nobody's going to miss Dr. Makary. That's pretty clear, and maybe Josh is right. Maybe it's a higher-level issue with HHS that we're all bemoaning here. But let's be clear: he didn't do anything as commissioner that he was supposed to be doing.
When we're talking about an FDA commissioner making decisions about different drugs or raising or lowering the bar for approvals, that's not what we should be talking about. We shouldn't have a guy go on CNBC and talk about UniQure or Replimune or any of that stuff. The job of the commissioner is to support the review staff, to protect the agency from political intervention, and to advocate for a stronger FDA and be a leader. He did none of that, as far as I can tell.
I just hope whoever comes to lead this agency going forward reverts back to what traditionally has been the job of the FDA commissioner, which is to run the organization, not to decide FDA review decisions.
Mm.
I love the fact that you guys are literally in offices next to each other, and you have such interestingly—not massively different, but quite different—views on all this sort of stuff, especially when it comes to the regulatory—
Well, that's just because I'm always right, Sam.
3. REGENXBIO Faces FDA Uncertainty
So, actually, Tess, given that we're talking about this, we just had some data. Now, moving on to the company news and data conversations we're going to have, REGENXBIO had what seemed like, at least, a phase 3 trial that worked out. They talked about the percentage of muscle fibers that had expression of microdystrophin, et cetera, et cetera. But we're not going to file because we don't know who's going to be looking at our file, which is a direct result now—or potentially—of what's going on at the FDA.
Do you want to take that? Tell us about the data. The share price was down. Was it because of this, or was it because the news folks seemed to have latched on to 2 side effects, which the company appears to say were manageable? Over to you, Tess.
Thank you. This was a very interesting one. Indeed, they came out with data where they met their primary endpoint, right? They said they were preparing for potential accelerated approval in 2027. What they showed was a correlation in 9 patients between essentially 2 scores. They showed a correlation between microdystrophin expression and NSAA, which is the functional endpoint in DMD. Their argument is that these can serve as strong evidence for accelerated approval.
Now, they do have more patients. This is 9 patients. I think they will have 30 or so in the PR, and so I think there were some questions about, well, how about everyone else? What's going on with them, and what would the full data package look like? There was also a lot of discussion about how the FDA is going to be thinking about this. How about these side effects? What does this mean? There were also questions about what the complete data set would be.
When talking about messaging for the FDA, one key point was the correlation with clinical outcomes. They said, "Okay, well, we've shown that with the 9 patients." But it's like, yeah, but what about the other 20? Are you going to show it with the other 20? That's one key point of uncertainty.
Then there's the question of whether the FDA is going to recommend a randomized controlled trial or whether external controls are going to be sufficient. Together with some FDA uncertainty, I think there are probably a lot of investors who are not willing to give the benefit of the doubt and want to have more certainty on the path forward. They probably want to see a more complete data set before they really start giving a lot of credit for accelerated approval here.
I'm very interested in any other interpretations of the data. I think the correlation point is certainly strong, with strong data from the 9 patients so far. But I think many investors are simply interpreting that as, "Hey, strong data on the 9 patients. Maybe we need to see a bit more, maybe we need to understand the side effects in a bit more context and understand the regulatory path before giving credit for accelerated approval."
Yeah. What makes this so tricky is that Elevidys is approved, so how do you not approve this too? And should Elevidys ever have been approved in the first place? Back when the FDA was really functional, we heard them talk and opine a lot about setting precedent, right? There was concern about setting precedent, because if you approve one thing, then all of a sudden you're almost locked into approving things like it that still may or may not work.
It looks relative to Elevidys like a promising drug, but does that mean it's a promising drug for Duchenne? We got boxed in by a drug approval that probably shouldn't have happened in the first place. Again, here we are criticizing the FDA for not approving everything while we're literally dealing with the consequences of what happens when you do.
Hmm.
You know, there's another point here, which is that Solid Bio is coming. Solid Bio, at least according to our analyst, Chris Terkluska, who follows this space, may have an even superior construct with superior data. I know that the Solid Bio drug has shown some reductions in CK, which I find to be a very important objective biomarker.
I don't think we've seen that from REGENXBIO yet, but they're probably going to be there too, with maybe even somewhat better data. So where do you draw that line? It's almost like we're getting boxed in from not just one side, but maybe multiple angles here.
Yeah. So it just makes you wonder whether that original... On the one hand, the Elevidys approval obviously enticed people to continue to invest and continue to develop drugs. That's one of the arguments the regulators, at least at the time, made.
On the other hand, with hindsight, it's created a vacuum, a difficulty, a hurdle, or a bar for people to try to get over. Pity. I hope that at some point, the best drug for these young, often very young patients—boys—gets over the line, because they need it, right? In the middle of all this, we mustn't forget that there are these patients who are potentially losing out if there is a good drug out there that's not making it through.
4. Biogen Bets On Tau
Actually, Eric, you were the last one to have the mic, so I'm going to pass it back to you to talk about Biogen's tau data, which has been a favorite of mine instead of amyloid in the Alzheimer's space. Maybe set the scene a little bit about what's different between tau and amyloid in terms of timing and impact on disease, and then tell us what happened and what your view on the data is.
I'll be really quick on the background here, Sam, because I think this is a juicy topic. It's certainly one that was debated to a great degree on Wall Street this week, and I'd love to hear your view, Tess's view, and Josh's view on whether Biogen's making the right decision here.
In essence, they've got an antisense oligonucleotide, or ASO, called BIB80. It's now shown in both a phase 1 study and, just this week, in a phase 2 study that it has the ability to reduce tau, not just in the CSF but in PET imaging as well. So the drug is working as it's designed. For the first time ever, they're starting to show, at least in smaller phase 2 studies—and to the extent that you can show anything in a small phase 2 Alzheimer's study—some potential improvements in terms of slowing disease progression and improved cognition relative to controls.
I say potentially showing that because, again, we've all been misled by early-stage Alzheimer's drugs in the past, and there's so much PTSD around this whole situation that I know we're going to talk about in a moment. Despite missing the prospectively identified primary endpoint, which had to do with dose responsiveness, Biogen made the decision to move into a phase 3, and that's where the fun started yesterday and a lot of the debate and discussion arose.
This company has been telling us for 3 or 4 years now, post-aducanumab, that it's not going to take big, aggressive, risky bets in neurodegenerative disease. It's moving into I&I, where there's a better return on invested capital, and moving toward more easily de-risked yet still high-value programs. At the first sign that they've got maybe something interesting from a phase 2 study on a novel endpoint, we're back to potentially something much different in terms of the risk quotient. I've had a tough time, honestly, trying to swallow that and come to grips with it.
Of course, we haven't seen any data yet. That will be presented next month at the Alzheimer's conference. But it's a big shift, or a big veering to the right, for this company, and I don't know. Not everyone is comfortable with it.
I think the drug is clearly having an impact on tau. Whether tau reduction will have an impact on the disease is still unknown, so I think we'll know in maybe 4 years or something like that.
I think there were a lot of groups hoping that this was going to unlock a lot more work in this space. We've seen incredible progress on blood-brain barrier shuttles, shuttle efficiency, and how much drug you can get into the brain. People were thinking, "Wouldn't this be another great target to be able to apply that technology to?" I think we're just not going to know until the phase 3 results.
Right.
Eric's note on this was one of my favorite notes I've read in a long time—just so blunt and to the point. Biogen seems to be a moth to a flame when it comes to Alzheimer's, despite getting burned multiple times by that same flame, which is interesting.
The only other thing I'd add is that, at the end of the day, biotech companies that are lucky enough to get drugs approved and become profitable are now businesses. As such, at least in my view, the right strategy for these companies is for their risk tolerance in terms of innovation and capital allocation to fall substantially, and for them to act more like businesses, really thinking about driving top- and bottom-line growth without excessive risk and without wasting excessive capital.
Many of these companies are just stuck in the mindset of, "We're biotech companies. We spend a lot. We take risks. We're not thinking like a real business." They do so not only at their own peril but at the peril of the industry in general.
The thing I would add here is that this is not the same management team that made the initial decision with regard to Aduhelm, right? I hear what you're saying about the fact that they were talking about I&I and so on. I could be flippant and say that Alzheimer's disease is potentially an immune disease, but put that aside.
It is a novel mechanism. In my view, at least, it probably has more scientific rigor behind it as a causative agent in the disease process. The timing is the tougher one here with regard to when tau comes on, because it's very proximal to the start of symptoms. We'll see what the data shows.
I don't cover Biogen. One of my other colleagues does. Still, again, it's a disease. Perhaps that's why this moth keeps going back to that flame, Josh—the fact that there's such a massive demand for it at the end of the day, right? If you get it right, you're potentially in the same ballpark as an obesity product. I don't know. That's just a commentary there.
5. Inhibrx Tests The Oncology Bar
Now, back to Eric to talk about Inhibrx. We had some data and some machinations there. This is a company whose story I love, as I've said several times before, in the world of biotech, where a stock that was trading at $10.84 at one point in the past month or so was 14X higher. It's like a Lazarus, a phoenix rising from the ashes. Tell us how much of a phoenix it is, Eric, in terms of the data that we saw in head and neck cancer.
Let's see where we start. They've got an OX40 agonist, and we've had some experience with OX40 drugs in the past. We've also had a lot of experience with novel I/O drugs, and they haven't really translated into much tangible benefit.
There's a good phase 2 study here, so give the folks at Inhibrx credit. They've done a randomized controlled phase 2 study in head and neck cancer against Keytruda, and they doubled the response rate, so that's not bad. The numbers are still a little small. Responses in head and neck cancer are a little ephemeral, in that they don't always correlate with stronger endpoints like PFS and OS, so we still have a ways to go here.
Maybe, from my standpoint, most importantly, we've now gotten to a next level of drug development in head and neck cancer, where we have companies like Merus, which was acquired by Genmab, and its drug pedicicimab, as well as Cara, which is developing a drug called ficaserafus. Those drugs are more than doubling response rates relative to Keytruda.
The bar is going up substantially in head and neck cancer, and it's nice to see yet another mechanism and yet another positive phase 2 study. But relative to some of those other candidates, the Merus and Bicara drugs are now much more advanced and deep into phase 3 trials. I just don't know what to do with Inhibrx. You're right, Sam: it's had a nice little rise, a phoenix from the ashes. That's always nice and wonderful to see. I don't know what the next steps are, to be honest.
The things we want to look at are follow-up and how long the follow-up was. Maybe with further follow-up, the responses could deepen. We'll see. I would also be interested to see the HPV stratification, because there could be an edge there.
At the minute, to our eyes, it looks potentially less competitive than the EGFR drugs at this stage, both from a time perspective and, so far, from a data perspective. As I said, there's a lot more to be known.
Go ahead, Josh.
Just to give them credit, they're a San Diego biotech company, and really wonderful people there. They've also got their DR5 agonist in chondrosarcoma, which showed a very dramatic PFS benefit in a full, proper, large randomized controlled trial, leveraging their protein-engineering expertise. DR5 was a very challenging target that they were able to crack.
As we think about the OX40 data, it's a hexavalent, very different approach to a number of the other OX40 agonists out there. I think it's important to have a little bit of that perspective and acknowledge that, at least with 1 hard target, they were really able to get it to work.
And by the way, on the DR5 data, there was a fairly low response rate, but it turned out to have a very meaningful PFS benefit. So there is a little bit of context, I think—
Absolutely.
Relevant to interpreting the OX40 data.
Absolutely right. That's the PFS data that, I think, they indicated is coming at ESMO, where, of course, I will be. And, of course, San Diego is one of my favorite cities in the United States, so that's an additional positive.
I just wanted to quickly touch on the Moderna story this week. We had a hantavirus outbreak, and I just want to hark back to the days when I couldn't talk about anything but COVID, which, of course, is gone. My colleagues in Bloomberg Media and News always call on me when there's pain and misery in the world, which was the hantavirus outbreak on this cruise ship.
The company said what was going on, which is that they are working in collaboration with somebody on a hantavirus vaccine. The share price popped. I even had some professional investors asking me, “What is it? Do we need a vaccine? When can we get a vaccine? When is the vaccine out?” And I'm thinking, “Wow, this thing is so far from being capable of causing a pandemic.”
Of course, it's a virus. It does mutate, and it does cause issues if you get it to enough people and allow it to jump from person to person. But it's very hard for it to jump from person to person. So it was interesting to see that. Now I think Moderna has given up some of those gains, and we're back to the story of when we're going to get the data for the melanoma vaccine they're developing, or individualized neoantigen therapy that we're going to get. That's potentially sometime this year. That is the driving story here.
It was also interesting that none of the other mRNA companies, which, of course, have the technology to deal with wanting to be prepared for the next pandemic or another awful virus to hit us—which is the last thing we need in the middle of everything else we're dealing with—were involved. That need never goes away. That is the right technology to be using, and it's the easiest and most rapid to scale up. So I'm assuming it's not unfair to say there has to be some value ascribed to that, as long as the regulators and healthcare bodies don't keep trashing the technology. Time will tell.
6. The Next Clinical Catalysts
So that was that story. Now, for the rest of the call, if everybody's okay, we just want to—We've only got about 5 minutes left. ASCO's coming up, and we're going to be enjoying the abstracts released on the 21st. Does anybody want to pick 1 thing that they're super excited about and looking for? Excited by, not necessarily thinking the data would be superb, but that you're really excited to see the data. I'm going to go to Josh first, and you can do a hospital pass to Eric if you want.
I pride myself on spending fairly little time in oncology because it is so hard to get ahead of anything and invest around it. So I don't really have much exposure to ASCO. But I know Eric does.
All right. So, Eric.
Yeah. Well, those of us who are a little bit more intellectually inclined, we like looking at data and trying to parse out competitive landscapes. So I don't know, Sam. I guess we're all keen to see the Summit HARMONi-6 results, right?
Yeah.
This will be the survival data from a frontline study. It's being done in China, and it's certainly not going to be the ultimate arbiter of whether the drug works. We still need to wait for HARMONi-3 and the global readout later this year for that. But certainly, there'll be a lot of interest in whether, in addition to the very strong PFS benefit we saw for ivonescimab in frontline lung cancer, we may also see a strong survival benefit.
Yeah, yeah. And then, of course, we've got the pancreatic data from Revolution Medicines coming. There are a whole bunch of companies snapping at their heels, but they have a good drug from an efficacy perspective. People can raise issues with the side-effect profile, but this is an awful cancer, and you have to remember that. That comes up with other mechanisms of action, like PRMT5, which seems to be 1 that people keep going on about because it causes infections.
A lot of cancer drugs cause neutropenia, lymphopenia, and all sorts of issues. We've also got some data coming for Ribravant in head and neck cancer—overall survival data. So that's what we're looking for. And maybe if that OS data looks really competitive with the bar that's set by Genmab's PITO, then maybe people will start thinking a little bit more about perhaps the first-line setting could also be good, although the data we saw in the phase 2-ish arena didn't look that great.
There's a bunch of myeloma data coming out, which, of course—and remember, myeloma is 1 of those diseases that keeps going through revolutions, right? We had the IMiDs, then we had Darzalex, the CD38 antibody, and then we have Carvykti and bispecifics. So here we've got some combination data coming out that we're looking forward to, which, of course, will also be at EHA. There's more there: MonumenTAL-3 from Johnson & Johnson, which seems to be leading and owning this space.
And then we have ADA, quickly. Is it just—should it not be called ADBA or ADOA? I can't remember now. American Diabetes and Obesity Association, right? We've got a bunch of data coming out there. My colleague Mike Shaw is really keen to see the data, especially the first view of AstraZeneca's oral GLP-1. Let's see what that looks like. And retatrutide, for which the detailed data is going to be there—that's going to be fun to see.
And lastly, we have ATS coming. Does anyone want to highlight 1 or 2 things that they're excited about at ATS? The American Thoracic Society used to be a conference where I used to go, and then after a while, I started thinking, “Why am I going?” because it was all about LAMAs and LABAs, combinations, and so on. Now, of course, the world's changed. We have all these biologics. Tess, do you want to take a stab at that, or Eric or Josh, given that it's not oncology? Or some science.
Well, I guess I'm just going to pick up for the less intellectual of us, Eric, in the non-oncology space. People have been talking about this big whole thing.
I wasn't putting you in Josh's bucket, Tess, just to be clear.
Josh has his own special place.
So, yeah. I think there should be some interesting data coming in IPF that we'll be looking at, which will give an understanding of some different combinations. We have data from AstraZeneca on a drug they've been developing, which is an IL-33 antibody, where the abstracts looked pretty interesting.
This is a drug called tozorakimab. I think everyone probably recalls itepekimab, which Sanofi had been developing and which disappointed a year ago or so. Sanofi had shared that COVID was a big part of that. I think there's still some debate about it, but it was certainly very encouraging to see some of the tozorakimab data in the abstract.
A lot is happening now in COPD, asthma, and other respiratory diseases, and it's great to be following some of these new targets and target combinations as they get unearthed.
Yeah. Now, Tess, it feels like it's going down the same road as psoriasis, RA, and some of these other I&I spaces. Maybe I'll start going back to ATS again and have some intellectual stimulation.
I'll just ask quickly—
Do you want to defend yourself a bit?
Do you want to defend yourself a bit?
It's going to be too complicated, and then we'll just have to have Eric do it.
Oh, no, no. I'm not defending myself. Eric is the intellectual. I just focus more on generating strong returns for portfolios.
Love it.
When it comes to IPF, 1 thing I would flag: there's, again, a San Diego company, Endeavour. John Hood, 1 of the legends of bioinnovation here, is the CEO. They're showing some really incredible data, and if you're looking at IPF at all, you have to look at fluida scans, because they are probably the best signal of a real antifibrotic effect.
There's also some interesting drug-delivery technology that's come along as well, which is quite interesting. There are other things happening in respiratory disease that I think are quite fascinating.
Right. So we need to end here. All 3 of the co-hosts are absolutely brilliant. They're all super intelligent, which is why they're on here.