《随想杂谈》:2025年4月
Walker认为,KROS的战略评估没有缩小估值缺口,反而暴露出投资者对董事会保护股东资本的信任有多低。 Walker持有KROS多头仓位。公司承诺60天内给出进展后,股价从约10美元涨至12美元;但Walker估算,KROS每股拥有16-18美元净现金,另有他认为显然具备正NPV的Takeda版税。市场实际上是在说,KROS会“把手里的每1美元都变成66美分”(“turn every dollar they have into 66 cents”),因此股东必须持续施压。
商业化前生技正经历一场“绝对核冬天”(“absolute nuclear winter”),许多公司的估值只有净现金的零头。 Walker举例称,有些公司账上有3亿美元现金,市值却低于1亿美元;KROS则持有约7.5亿美元现金,而公告后的估值约为5亿美元。这些本质上是公司治理交易:预期回报取决于董事会能否在投机性项目吞噬现金前合理化运营。Walker还持有Sage多头,并提到其他生技持仓以及一些他并未持股的公司。
大型生技投资者不愿成为激进股东,可能是在保护其进入一个Walker认为实际上已经无法使用的融资市场。 这些基金告诉Walker,他们避免公开施压,是因为管理层可能把他们排除在未来的PIPE融资轮之外;他的回应是,当新投入的资金会“立即……只剩净现金的50%”时,没人应该继续注资。如果几笔现有仓位通过清算或合理化实现翻倍,这些投资者不仅会拥有更多资本,也能为未来参与交易提供更站得住脚的解释。
股价崩塌后,股权薪酬的破坏性会急剧增强,因为名义奖励不会随市值同步下降。 市值4亿美元时,年度1000万美元股权薪酬意味着2.5%的稀释;市值降至2亿美元后,稀释率就变成5%。一家生技公司若从10亿美元跌至2亿美元,却继续发放3000万美元股权薪酬,每年会稀释股东15%,甚至可能是在以现金价值一半的价格发行股票。
市场波动说明,投资者应保持研究节奏、持续重估机会成本,而不是盯着屏幕不动。 Walker说,如果一个投资组合从2024年4月到2025年4月完全没有变化,无论投资者口头上的信念多强,都说明其翻找新机会或更新判断的力度不够。他给出的比较很明确:一只股价10美元、下行空间5美元、上行空间20美元的股票,应当被另一只同样10美元、下行空间8美元、上行空间30美元的股票取代。
关税即使整体损害经济,也可能在局部造就赢家。 Walker用水泥做简化假设:一家靠近加拿大的美国工厂,原本若因运距劣势输给距离更近的加拿大工厂,在10%或25%的关税抵消这一运费优势后,就可能拿下此前由加拿大工厂供应的边境城镇市场,从而提升产能利用率和定价能力。更广泛的研究方向,是寻找拥有美国本土或非中国供应来源的公司,而竞争对手则要承担可能极高的对华关税。
延迟采用AI的投资者,可能会放弃一种不断累积的流程优势,其代价相当于几十年前拒绝使用电子邮件或Google。 Walker为研究一种生技药物花了1天半,并进行了3次专家通话;随后ChatGPT的Deep Research约15分钟就给出了更好的研究报告。除了更好的提示词、上传内部文件和梳理想法之外,他目前还没看到太多应用,但结论非常明确:“你很快就会掉队”(“You’re falling behind pretty quickly”)。
1. KROS战略评估反弹后仍是治理交易
Walker在上一期节目中认为,KROS因“相对现金大幅折价”交易,应该直接清算解散。次日,公司宣布启动战略替代方案评估,并承诺60天内给出进展。Walker另称,有人——不是他——因此买入了超过11%的股份。
股价从约10美元涨到12美元,单看涨幅似乎不小;但Walker估算,KROS每股拥有16-18美元净现金,且尚未计入Takeda应付的、他认为显然具有正NPV的版税。换言之,股票只是从约现金价值的50%重估至60%。
对于认为自己已经错过机会的投资者,他的答案是:“没有。”市场仍在假设公司会严重损耗资本,因此他敦促股东告诉董事会自己支持哪条路径,并要求任何不以股东价值最大化为目标的方案拿出“真正有说服力的证据”。
2. 生技行业的核冬天要求股东更深度介入
Walker将商业化前生技描述为“绝对核冬天”:许多公司账上有3亿美元现金,市值却低于1亿美元;即使KROS宣布启动评估后,仍是约7.5亿美元现金对应约5亿美元市值。Walker称自己同时持有KROS和Sage;他讨论的其他案例中,有些是自己的持仓,有些则不是。
一些大型、专业机构投资者私下认同Walker关于清算的论点,甚至可能多年持有4%的仓位,却因为担心被贴上“激进投资者”标签而拒绝公开行动。顾虑是商业性的:得罪一家公司的董事会,可能让他们失去参与未来PIPE或私募融资轮的机会。
Walker的反驳并非道德判断,而是经济核算。如果5笔生技仓位都在清算或合理化后翻倍,投资者的资本就会翻倍,未来交易中也能开出更大的支票;当这些公司交易价格远低于现金、同时还有耗尽现金的风险时,继续维护关系反而违背了维护关系的初衷。
更根本的问题是,没人会愿意向这些公司投PIPE,因为新投入的资金一到账就会变成每1美元只值50美分。依Walker看,一家公司每股有10美元现金、股价却只有3-5美元,如果找不到合理化价值的办法,就没有未来。
3. 股权薪酬制造“反脆弱”的下行机制
Walker从价值投资者的立场出发,认为股权薪酬是一项真实费用;随后他追问,在压力环境下,这种机制的表现是否会让股票变得“反脆弱”。当奖励金额保持不变、支撑奖励的股权价值却崩塌时,原本意在实现利益一致的安排可能反过来。
他的简化案例从一家市值4亿美元、每年发放1000万美元RSU的公司开始,相当于2.5%的稀释。如果市场动荡让市值腰斩至2亿美元,Walker认为,管理层合同约定以及留住高级员工的现实需求,意味着公司不会简单地把薪酬也砍掉一半;于是,在薪酬不变的情况下,股权薪酬突然每年吞噬公司5%的价值。
生技公司的情况更严峻:一款核心药物被证明毫无价值后,公司市值从10亿美元跌至2亿美元,但3000万美元股权薪酬仍然继续发放,造成每年15%的稀释。如果股票此时已经以净现金一半的价格交易,稀释发生的价格也只有现金价值的一半。
Walker没有夸大这一框架:这“多少有点小众”,现有授予在短期内大多已经锁定,公司则可以在中长期调整成本。但波动越大,预期稀释就越可能被显著低估,而这恰恰发生在股东暴露度最高的时候。
4. 波动率奖励流程纪律与实时机会成本检验
4月11日录制节目时,Walker回忆称,特朗普关税冲击最激烈期间,股市一度连续每天下跌约5%;随后周三又从约下跌2%一路摆动至上涨8%。除新冠疫情时期外,他想不起自己何时感受过、或见过市场情绪变得如此悲观。
他自己的失败模式,是盯着屏幕看,研究笔记文件夹却异常空空如也。“这是人性,我也该感到惭愧。”他的应对方案是维持同一套方法论、系统和每日研究习惯:少做两天,就会落后两天,而这种落后还会不断累积。
在集中度和分散化约束下,一个投资组合应始终代表风险调整后最优的机会。如果一年后持仓和仓位大小与此前完全一致,Walker会怀疑投资者没有“翻够石头”、没有更新先验,也没有把当前仓位与新出现的风险回报机会进行比较。
他的数字化换仓测试是:一只现有持仓股价10美元、下行空间5美元、上行空间20美元,就应让位给一只同样10美元、下行空间8美元、上行空间30美元的新想法。反复做出这种比较后,所谓的组合稳定,可能只是分析已经过时。
5. 关税与AI为持续前进的投资者创造研究优势
Walker预计,关税会制造大量输家,大概率还会损害整体经济,但局部市场结构仍可能产生赢家。水泥是他用来说明问题的具体案例:产品重量使运输成本高昂,也让工厂成为地理覆盖范围受限的垄断或寡头。
在他的简化假设中,一家位于美加边境以南20分钟车程的美国工厂,要与边境以北5分钟车程的加拿大工厂竞争。一个美国城镇可能距离加拿大工厂6分钟,却距离美国工厂19-20分钟;叠加10%或25%的关税后,美国工厂就可能赢得这笔生意、提高产能利用率,并在此前两家工厂都把价格压向边际产能成本的市场中获得定价权。
当个股研究变得难以推进时,Walker建议做一些能长期积累的项目:改善想法来源、学习编程以定制关键词提醒、研究破产法及历史破产案例,或重新设计投资工作流。“没必要整天只读10-K。”
AI是他强调的长期流程项目。在一款失败生技药物的研究上,ChatGPT Deep Research用约15分钟产出的报告,比他花1天半完成的工作更好;而他的工作还包括3次专家通话。尽管他仍在寻找超越提示词、文件上传和梳理想法的应用,但他认为,尽早采用AI会形成累积性的优势。
完整逐字稿
It is just before market closes on April 11, and that’s a Friday. I normally do my random ramblings on Saturday morning, but, as I’ll discuss, I’m going on one of the worst-timed vacations and work trips over the next 2 weeks in the history of the world. So, I didn’t have time for that on Saturday. I’ll dive into that more later.
Look, it has been a wild, wild ride this week. You’ve had tariffs, no tariffs, the best day in stock market history on Wednesday, and some of the worst days in stock market history last week and earlier this week. I’ll talk about all that in a second.
The first thing I want to start talking about is KROS. The ticker is KROS. I am long. This is the last podcast I did; I published it on Wednesday. It was very, very well timed because I published a podcast on Wednesday saying, “Hey, KROS, you’re trading for a huge discount to cash. You need to wind this up.”
I think you need to do what’s right for shareholders. What’s right for shareholders, in my opinion, is to wind it up. I think I presented very compelling evidence why that was the most compelling thing to do, and I encouraged shareholders, whether they agreed with me or not, to reach out to the board and tell them to do that.
On Thursday, KROS came out and said, “Hey, we’re evaluating strategic alternatives. We’re going to provide an update on the strategic alternatives process in the next 60 days.” The stock was up a lot. It went from $10 to, as I’m recording this, about $12 per share. Do I prefer the stock at $12 versus $10 per share? Yeah, I don’t mind that. But I will say, here are a few things that are interesting.
I think it speaks to how bombed-out and how mistrusting investors are that KROS announces it’s reviewing strategic alternatives, and the stock goes from $10 to $12. Yes, that is a nice move, guys. This company has $16 to $18 per share in net cash on its balance sheet and at least 1 other asset that I think is clearly NPV-positive in the royalties that it is owed from Takeda.
So, yes, the market is up, but it speaks to how bombed-out and mistrusting the sector is that the company announces strategic alternatives, says, “Hey, we had someone—it was not me, I can assure you—acquire over 11% of the stock in response to that. We’re pushing, we’re doing a strategic review,” and the stock went from 50% of net cash to 60% of net cash, right?
I say this because a lot of you might have listened to this on Thursday morning and thought, “Oh, I missed it. The company announced strategic alternatives.” In my opinion—and I’m talking my own book; I’m long the stock—the answer is no. You did not miss it.
This is still a corporate governance play. The market is still hugely skeptical that KROS is going to do the right thing. If the market had no skepticism, the stock would be trading for—reasonable people can disagree—$17, $19, $16, $22. The stock would be a lot higher.
The market is still really concerned that KROS, again, with roughly $18 per share of cash, trades for $12. The market is saying, “Hey, ignore all the other assets. This company is going to turn every dollar they have into 66 cents of cash on the dollar. And it’s also going to burn all the other assets, too.” So, this is still a corporate governance play.
You might be thinking, “I missed it.” Look, I’m not a financial adviser. I can’t tell you if you did or not, but I’m just saying I don’t think you missed it. I think it is still absolutely critical that you lob in letters to this board.
Go contact IR. Whatever you think the right path is, they’re in a 60-day review period. Say, “I believe this is the right path. You need to show me, if this isn’t the right path, a lot of reasons why with really compelling evidence,” because there’s a path here to create shareholder value. It is a very easy one.
The market is very skeptical. I am a shareholder. I own this company. There are some big shareholders on the board, and there are some very small shareholders on the board. The board cannot allow this company to light this much money on fire. You have to rationalize. You have to maximize shareholder value.
I just wanted to say that. Let me turn to the next thing. Again, the big focus of my past month, fortunately or unfortunately, this year has been this busted biotech story. I’ve done the KROS podcast. I did the Sage podcast. I’m long Sage as well. I’ve put several articles on the blog, and I’ve got another one coming in the near future.
Basically, it is nuclear winter in the pre-commercial biotech market, right? There are just so many companies. I could show you so many companies with $300 million in cash trading for under a $100 million market cap. KROS has $750 million of cash trading for a $500 million market cap after they announced strategic alternatives, right? It is absolute nuclear winter.
I’ve publicly called out KROS and Sage, and I’m long both. On the blog, I’ve mentioned several more on the premium side. I’ve mentioned several more that I’m long. On the public side, I’ve mentioned several more that are interesting and trade at huge discounts, but for 1 reason or another, I don’t have a position in them.
When I’ve done these callouts, I have gotten calls and emails from small shareholders, large shareholders, and professional shareholders who own some amount of stock in these companies. I’ve talked to them, and they’ll say, “Hey”—they’re really encouraging me—“we agree with everything you say. We’ve owned 4% of this company for 2 years, and we are just talking to the board behind the scenes every time and saying, ‘Hey, rationalize all this,’ and doing all this.” So, they’re really encouraging me. I’m happy to go push these companies for what’s right because the inefficiency of a company having a $300 million market cap and $300 million in cash, $100 million market cap, weighs on me, but also the portfolio returns. If I can get them to rationalize it, I love that, right? I’m happy.
When I push them—“Hey, why aren’t you being more aggressive? Why aren’t you going out and making this publicly known? Why aren’t you applying more pressure to the board?”—a lot of these guys will say, “Hey, we don’t want to get the activist label. We’ve got a business, and we’re kind of thinking about our business long term, right? If we go activist on someone, then the next time a company does a PIPE round or a private fundraising round or something, we’re not going to get invited because people will be worried to bring us under the tent.”
Look, I get that. I totally get that, and I can’t tell anyone how to run their business. But I want to put this out there for all investors because, again, I know there are some—not to toot my own horn—large investors in these pharma companies who have listened to at least the pitches that I’ve done.
If you own 5 positions, 5 biotechs, and they’re all trading for half of cash, and you’re saying, “I’m not going to go push them to liquidate, to rationalize value, because I want to be invited to the next PIPE round,” what’s the point, right?
You know what would be better for the next PIPE round? If all of your positions had doubled, so you had 2× the amount of money and you could write a bigger check. When the PIPE round comes up, you can say, “Hey, yeah, we’d hate to go after this, but look, these guys were trading for 33% of net cash, and they were going to light it all on fire on silly science projects. You, Mr. Management Team, surely wouldn’t do that with my money, so you have no need to worry.”
So, that’s point 1. And then point 2: Every biotech company, every pre-revenue biotech company, is trading for 50% of net cash. What person is going to put a PIPE into any company? If you came with a PIPE tomorrow, why would you ever put a PIPE? Why would you put fresh money into any company when it’s instantly going to trade for 50% of net cash?
I understand people are saying, “I need to protect my ability to do PIPEs. I need to protect my ability to manage funds.” I just say, “There is no place where you’re putting PIPEs in this market.” Let’s go rationalize these things, and then PIPEs can be effective in the future.
But in this market, nobody’s going to do it. Anyway, I’m on a little bit of a rant. I completely understand. I’m not calling anyone out, but I would just say: If all of these things—I was pointing at them saying, “Look, they’ve got $10 per share of cash on their balance sheet. They trade for $9.50. I think they should liquidate.” I think they’ve got another one that’s $10 of cash and $2 of other assets. I think they should liquidate.
People were coming to me saying, “We can’t do that. We don’t want to ruin our relationship with the management team. We’re thinking about our future deals.” I can completely understand that. We’re not in that situation. All of these things are $10 per share of cash trading for $3, $4, or $5. This is not about, “Hey, let’s preserve the future.” There is no future if these companies don’t figure this out.
That’s my rant. All these guys are incredibly smart, but I just keep hearing the same line: “We can’t go activist. We can’t do this.” I’m just a small guy sitting in a closet of an office. I’m happy to push as hard as I can, but I think if you are an investor in one of these companies, particularly a larger one, it’s time to look and say, “This is so existential, and the upside is so high. Maybe it’s time to get our hands a little dirtier.”
Again, I’m happy to keep getting my hands as dirty as possible because I think the upside is enormous, and I think these are generational opportunities. That’s just my push that I keep hearing from people.
Let me go to the third thing. Let’s talk—and I think this will tie in well between both the below-cash biotech companies I was just talking about. I want to end by talking about how wild markets have been. One thing that I’ve been increasingly thinking about is all this conversation on stock comp. You hear lots of conversations on stock comp: Is it a real expense? Is it the same as a cash expense? All that sort of stuff.
I’m kind of a value investor, so I fall into the “Yes, of course stock comp is a real expense” camp. But I’ve been increasingly thinking about whether stock comp makes you antifragile. Let me give a simple example. One of the things you love about stock comp is that it should create alignment among all parties, but I’ve been thinking about whether it creates an antifragile company.
Imagine you have a company that’s a $400 million market cap company, and they spend $10 million per year on stock comp—2.5% dilution per year in stock. It’s all RSUs. They just price them at 2.5%. No big deal, right? Alignment, all that sort of stuff.
Well, imagine the stock gets cut in half, and the stock goes from $400 million to $200 million. If it gets cut in half because of market turmoil—and I know plenty of companies that have been cut in half so far this year—are you going to go to your management team or your higher-level employees, your senior engineers, and say, “Hey, we’re going to have to cut your comp in half because our stock has been cut in half because the market’s wrong”? No. There’s no company that’s going to do that.
The executives literally have a contract, right? They have a contract that says how much they get. So the stock gets cut in half, goes to $200 million, and this year you’re paying them $10 million in stock still. Now it’s 5% dilution. You can imagine it going further and further.
Some of these net-cash biotech companies I’ve been talking about have seen their stock go down 80% because their lead drug has been proven to be worthless. All of a sudden, they go from a $1 billion company to a $200 million company. When they were a $1 billion company, they were spending $30 million per year on stock comp. Not a big deal—you’re a growth company, you’re aligning incentives. All of a sudden, you go to $200 million and you’re spending $30 million. All of a sudden, you’re diluting your shareholders 15% per year.
By the way, in all of these companies I’m looking at, they’re trading at a $300 million market cap with $600 million in cash. So, 15% dilution—30% dilution if you’re looking at it on a—I guess that’s not 30% dilution, but it’s a lot. You’re diluting 15%, and you’re doing it at half of cash value. It’s just absolutely insane.
I’ve been thinking: In a world that, in my opinion, is more volatile going forward, do you need to look at stock comp a little bit more skeptically? Because if things get rocky and stocks go down, the company is going to be a lot more dilutive than you were expecting. So it actually makes the stock antifragile. The further it goes down, the less upside there is because the employees are taking more and more of the comp.
I don’t have a great answer. Obviously, it’s a niche case. It relies on stocks going down quite a bit, and in the short term, most of the stock comp is actually pretty locked in. You can change any cost structure over the medium to longer term. But it’s just something I’ve been thinking about. I think it’s really interesting, particularly with the biotech companies I’m talking about. Most of them become net cash because the stock goes down 50%, 70%, or 80%.
Let’s use that to transition to wild markets. I’m recording this on April 11. I thought March was pretty damn negative in the middle of the month. I will tell you, personally, I have never felt as dejected as I was—outside of maybe COVID—as I was during last week and earlier this week, with the height of the Trump tariffs, the stock market down 5% every day, and some of the smaller liquid stuff I'm in. It was just crazy.
I will tell you, I’ve never seen things get this bearish. It’s the most bearish I can remember, so I wanted to give some commentary on wild markets. When markets get wild, it is really easy—and I certainly had several days where I was just staring at the screen—to pull back. I keep a big notes folder of everything I’m researching and reading, and my notes folder was a lot emptier than it generally would be. That’s human nature, and shame on me, right?
But you really have to try, when the markets are rocky—whether they’re flying high, choppy, or going down—to keep the same methodology, the same system, and the same practice every day. I’ll give you a few reasons why. Number 1, markets are rocky. I had 2 days there where I wasn’t doing much, and you’re kind of 2 days behind on research. If you think about the compounding, it’s not great to skip a couple of days of research.
The other thing is, if you stick to that process and you’re reevaluating, I think it’s easier to spot opportunities. Let’s talk about opportunities for a second. I also think you need to be reevaluating your portfolio in real time.
If you came to me and said, “Hey, Andrew, my portfolio today, right now, April 11, is the exact same as my portfolio was on April 11, 2024,” I would say, “Hey, man, that’s great. You’re convicted. You’ve got conviction, and you’ve done a lot of research on your projects.” But if it’s exactly the same, I don’t really think you’re evaluating opportunity costs.
Your portfolio should always be your risk-adjusted best set of ideas. Obviously, there are concentration and diversification implications and all that sort of stuff, but it should always really be your best set of ideas. If you told me, “My best set of ideas today is the exact same as it was one year ago, with the exact same sizing,” I’d say you’re probably not turning over enough rocks. You’re probably not updating your priors enough. You’re probably not thinking through it enough.
If you’re continuing to research, there are a lot of benefits. One is that you can see, in real time, what some of the other opportunities are out there. Sometimes it’ll hit me when I’m researching a new company. I’ll say, “Oh, my God, this is great.” Then I’ll look at a company in my portfolio that I thought was a good risk-reward and say, “Hey, this company I own trades at $10. I think the downside is $5. I think the upside is $20. This new company I’m researching trades at $10. I think the downside is $8, and I think the upside is $30.”
Now I can say, “Hey, I’m seeing better risk-rewards in the market. Time to swap.” If you’re seeing that a lot, then your whole portfolio might be too stable.
The second reason I think it’s interesting to do this is that you can spot really interesting opportunities. I’ll give you one in volatile, changing environments—one quick example that’s been on my mind. Tariffs, right? There are clearly going to be tariff winners and losers. I think there are going to be a lot of losers. I think it’s more likely to harm the economy as a whole, but you could imagine a company that produces something where there are a lot of businesses that are natural monopolies or oligopolies because of distance.
A value-investor favorite is cement. Cement naturally concentrates into a few local hands because it is very heavy, so it’s very expensive to transport. When you build a cement plant, all of your sales tend to be—and I’m simplifying a little bit—within a 10-, 20-, or 50-mile radius, whatever it is. You’re not going to build a cement plant in southern Florida and be able to fill cement orders in northern Portland. It’s only going to be Florida.
So, it tends to be a really local market. I could imagine a scenario where you have a cement plant 20 minutes south of the Canadian border, and then you have a cement plant 5 minutes north of the Canadian border. Before all the tariffs go into place, the cement plant 5 minutes north of the Canadian border would service anyone who was right on the other side of the Canadian border. So, they’re 6 minutes away from the Canadian plant and 20 minutes away—or 19 minutes away—from the U.S. plant.
That’s a big transportation cost. I could imagine that all of that cement service is getting filled by the Canadian plant. Again, I’m simplifying everything here. I don’t know the time, the distance, or everything else; I’m just simplifying.
But you slap a 10% or 25% tariff on the stuff coming from Canada, and you could imagine that all of a sudden, maybe the U.S. plant is better equipped. It’s lower-cost for them to serve all those towns close to the border that are on the domestic side of the border. Maybe it’s not better for them to serve the ones that are right on the other side of the border, but at some point, I would guess there are some towns that were previously getting served better by the Canadian company that, because of tariffs, are better served by the U.S. company.
And what does that mean? That means better utilization for the U.S. company. They’re probably going to have a little bit better pricing. You could imagine there were some towns that were right in the middle where, before, every year they’d put up their pricing, and it would be a big battle between the U.S. and Canadian companies. They basically priced each other down to the marginal cost of capacity.
Well, guess what? Now, all of that capacity gives the U.S. firm a huge advantage. I just wanted to point out, look, it’s really easy to stare at screens, but try and stick to your process. Try to stick to your research. Keep turning over rocks, because if you do that, you might, A, see better opportunities than are currently in your portfolio, and, B, see really unique opportunities that have popped up because of the environment.
If you’re turning over the rocks, you’re more likely to see that in real time. It’s something that investors who aren’t still on it or who aren’t turning over rocks might not see in real time. I would just encourage you—and look, I ramble here because these are the things I’m telling myself and trying to do myself.
On Wednesday, when the markets go from down 2% to up 8%, I tell myself, “Hey, Andrew, this is nice. It feels nice to see green on the screen for once, but let’s not stare at the screen. That is an unproductive use of your time. Let’s go try to turn over some more rocks.”
Let’s try to find some companies that Chinese tariffs are going to benefit. I don’t know, are they at 400% now? If you’re going to set Chinese tariffs at 400% and 10% on everyone else in the world, maybe there’s a company you can find that is actually going to be a big beneficiary because all of its competitors source from China, and this company has better sourcing from Taiwan, domestically, or whatever it is.
Just keep turning over rocks. That’s what I’m telling myself. That’s what I’m trying to do: not stare at the screen, and make sure everything I’m doing is maximizing the opportunity. I think there was something else I was going to say, but I can’t remember.
Look, it’s been a really rocky, volatile month. Keep your heads about you and keep the process going. The other thing I tried to do is—maybe I’m too caught up in the moment, and maybe stocks are whipping around too wildly to really research a company—the other thing I’ve been trying to do is longer-term projects.
I’ll give you one example. Step back and research, or reevaluate, my process for the pipeline. Can this be improved? How am I sourcing new ideas? Can this be improved? I look at my writings and my work over the year, and I’ve been banging the drums on improving how you use AI in your research process for 2 years, basically since ChatGPT came out.
If you’re thinking, “Hey, I can’t research companies for some reason. It’s just too volatile. I’m too lost in the market,” you can say, “Hey, I’m going to spend some time on a longer-term project, and maybe I’m going to spend more time learning how to better incorporate ChatGPT, AI, or whatever it is into my process.” Learn how to better incorporate it into your portfolio process, your research process, or whatever it is.
There are other examples. Maybe you’ve been meaning to learn how to code so you can build some custom scripts to better alert yourself when certain keywords or anything else pop up. Maybe it’s time to do that. Maybe there’s a book on—maybe you’ve been wanting to get smarter on bankruptcy code. Maybe you go read a book on bankruptcy code or do some case studies, some historical studies, on bankruptcies and how those played out for investors, so that the next time a bankruptcy pops up, you’re better prepared and better equipped to research it.
You don’t have to just read 10-Ks all day. If you’re having trouble looking at new companies, I think looking at new companies is really good to make sure your portfolio measures up against the opportunity cost elsewhere. But there are other things you can do: longer-term projects.
For me, that other thing is AI—figuring out new tools and new ways to use AI in my research process. I’ll probably do a post on this at some point. But if 20 or 30 years ago you had said, “I’m not going to use the internet. I’ve always used the library and snail mail. I’m not using email and Google,” within weeks, you would have been behind other people.
That kind of scales cumulatively, right? If you don’t use email and you adopt it 2 years later than other people, you can catch up to them a little bit, but your whole process is going to be about 2 years behind. You’ll catch up a little bit more because the ground has been blazed, but you’re always going to be a little bit behind the people who naturally incorporated email, Google, or whatever it is into their process.
With AI, if you’re just sitting there saying, “I refuse to use AI,” I think it’s so clear that AI is such a useful tool. You’re just going to be falling behind your investor friends. Yes, when you finally incorporate it, you’ll be able to incorporate it a little faster than the people who were trailblazers, because the best practices will have been laid out.
But if I’ve used it for 6 months and then you try to catch up, I’ve got a big head start. I’ve probably incorporated it better into my processes, understood it better, and learned how to use some tricks better. You’re falling behind pretty quickly, and the world is moving faster. So, you fall behind just a little bit, and that’s a cumulative edge.
I guess this last thing: I’ve been talking about AI for the past 2 years. I still haven’t had investors really ping me with ways to use AI that are much better than improving the prompts and questions you give it. Obviously, you can upload some files to it—some of your internal files—and have it work on some of your ideas, but I haven’t heard much better than that.
I’m always looking for new ways to incorporate, improve, and use AI, because I just think it’s such a revolutionary tool. Some of the stuff it does is mind-blowing to me. I keep mentioning these Busted Biotechs. There was one Busted Biotech where I spent a day and a half and had 3 expert calls trying to get up to speed on one of its drugs to see if there was any value there.
Then I just typed the drug into ChatGPT and said, “Hey, write a research report with me using Deep Research.” The Deep Research was better than the day and a half I had spent on it. I’m not a scientist or anything, but it picked it up like that: 15 minutes. You put in a good prompt, give it 15 minutes to run, come back, and boom. It was really good.
Anyhow, look, it has been rocky. Stay safe out there. I’ve got a vacation coming up next week—a working vacation, but I’m going on vacation to Austin with the family. I can’t tell you how poorly timed that feels, but I’m going to try and take my own advice, keep things normal, work a little bit in the mornings, and hang out with the family in the afternoon.
It does not feel like a fun time to take that vacation. Then I’ve got a work trip to Planet MicroCap in Vegas the week of the 20th. If you’re out there, ping me. I’d love to see you.
I’m really looking forward to those. That is my random ramblings for April 2025. I’m looking forward to the May 2025 random ramblings. May markets be in a better place than they were this month, and hopefully I’ll still have some interesting things to talk to you about.
As always, hit me up on Twitter/X, by DM, email, or wherever you want to. I’m always happy to chat, and we’ll go from there. Talk to you next month.