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Yet Another Value Podcast · · 31 分钟

2025年8月的随机杂谈

Andrew Walker

YouTube
TL;DR
  • Walker看到的市场分裂,一边是与AI绑定的“黄金神祇”,另一边是交出衰退式业绩的企业。 他估计截至8月中旬,S&P 500年内上涨了两位数,Russell仅上涨低个位数;但Deere业绩公布后跌了10%,Crocs下跌20%,电信股集体崩塌,Chipotle同店销售同比约为-4%。Mag 7约占S&P 500的35%,且大多与AI相关,这让持有传统经济股的主动管理人面临异常残酷的基准考验:“我不知道该如何解释这个经济。”
  • 在业绩不及预期前回购股票的公司,释放的信号方向仍高度含混。 Crocs在每股接近100美元时回购了约1亿美元,随后股价跌向80-85美元,这可能体现了真正的信心;Vivid Seats则是在业务恶化的同时“一路回购,把自己买进了财务困境”。Walker过去通过这一筛选通常只能找到3-5家公司,如今却有约15家,这让他怀疑关税及其他所谓“一次性”因素并不能解释全部情况。
  • 明星主导的“辣妹营销”可以制造注意力,却不能证明带来了增量需求。 Sydney Sweeney被任命为Crocs旗下Hey Dude的创意负责人,但在Walker看来并未带来任何实质改变;她参与的American Eagle营销确实大幅出圈,而他看到的报告显示,活动上线后客流同比仍在下降。他至今没有得到答案的问题是,管理层如何区分真正的ROI、资源通道、热度,以及“满足管理层的虚荣心”。
  • 在Walker看来,Paramount的UFC版权交易同样体现了财务逻辑与所有者排场之间的张力。 他引用了一项自己认为规模约为77亿美元的协议:UFC与ESPN的年度合同金额将从约5.5亿美元升至与CBS签约后的11亿美元——对于一个他认为价值低于NFL或NBA的资产而言,价格高得惊人。他强调体育版权确实有价值,但这笔交易也可能是一次“虚荣消费”,买到的是场边席位和接近名人的机会。
  • 当差异化信息改变投资逻辑时,Walker认为投资者应重新评估仓位,而不是让仓位继续自动运行。 他回忆说,自己曾获得一条几乎确定利好某个大仓位的信息,却没有继续加仓,后来被反问:“你对这条信息有真正的优势……为什么不加大仓位?”投资包含“未知的概率”,但真正的优势极其稀缺,投资者应明确决定是加仓、减仓、做空一篮子相关资产,还是买入看跌期权。
  • John Paulson买入Carl Icahn约10%的BHC持股,是一笔罕见且高度可见的挑战交易,交易双方都是老练、信息充分的内部人士。 两人都曾担任董事,但Paulson仍以每股9美元、超过3亿美元的价格买入,而BHC当时的交易价约为7-8美元——这一溢价远高于普通大宗股权交易可能在4.50-5美元附近成交的水平。Icahn可能出于与BHC价值无关的原因卖出,但Walker指出,如果显而易见的BLCO资产价值释放即将到来,他不会在9美元卖出;反过来,如果一切看起来都将陷入灾难,Paulson也不会心甘情愿地以这一价格买入。Walker没有BHC仓位,但称这笔交易是“非常有意思的信号”。
摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. AI的黄金神祇掩盖了衰退式市场

  • Walker的出发点不是宏观预测,而是困惑:截至8月中旬,他估计S&P 500年内上涨了两位数,Russell上涨了低个位数,尽管4月曾经历剧烈波动。与疫情时期的恐慌市场不同,如今是“截然不同的两个世界”,他反复承认:“我不知道该如何解释这个经济。”

  • 任何沾上AI的公司都成了“黄金神祇”(“a golden god”):业绩超预期会抬高市场预期,业绩不及预期也能得到市场宽待,在手订单看起来更是异常亮眼。Mag 7约占S&P 500的35%,且大多与AI相关,持有传统经济股的主动管理人因此在结构上低配了指数的主引擎,几乎“不可能跟上”。

  • AI之外的盘面惨烈得多。Deere业绩公布后下跌约10%;Crocs下跌20%,跌向80-85美元;Lululemon的走势图让Walker直呼:“你会忍不住吐在自己身上”;那些被视为稳定资产的电信和有线电视公司则“彻底崩塌”。零售业疲软也不再局限于传统周期行业中的金属、矿业、汽车或卡车运输。

  • 餐饮行业让这道谜题更加复杂:Chipotle同店销售同比约为-4%,Cava和Sweetgreen也遭到重挫。Walker形容许多公司底层业务报告的数据已经是“深度衰退式数字”,但宏观经济统计看起来大致持平,与AI相关的公司仍然一路向右上方走、完全停不下来。他的结论刻意保持开放:“奇怪的市场,什么都很奇怪。”

2. 业绩暴雷前的回购,可能体现信心,也可能暴露预测失误

  • Walker设计的筛选条件,是找出那些在回购股票后、因业绩公布下跌约20%,同时又将业绩不佳归因于暂时性因素的公司。核心问题在于:管理层究竟是在短期挫折中看到了非凡价值,还是在没有看懂眼前恶化的情况下大举买入——“这家公司到底会不会做预测?”

  • Crocs是他眼中的正面案例。一家市值约45亿-50亿美元的公司,在股价接近100美元时于当季回购了约1亿美元股票,随后股价跌向85美元。根据公司过往记录及业绩电话会上的措辞,Walker表示,如果Crocs停止回购,他会“感到非常震惊”;不过他没有持有Crocs,也没有建立仓位的计划。

  • Vivid Seats则展示了相反的结果。其背后的私募股权控股方看起来相当老练,但公司业务走弱时仍“不计代价地”回购股票,随后公布的第二季度业绩远低于预期。如今公司已经“一路回购,把自己买进了财务困境”,资金能力所剩无几,以至于分析师甚至不再询问回购是否会继续。

  • Walker过去通过这一筛选只能找到3-5家公司,如今结果约有15家,其中许多零售商把问题归咎于关税及其他一次性因素。他认为关税解释符合直觉,但也在怀疑“是不是还有别的东西”,甚至猜测——同时承认自己无法量化——驱逐出境可能改变人口结构,边际上压低餐饮需求。

3. 明星制造的注意力,可能掩盖糟糕的营销经济性

  • Sydney Sweeney的营销活动让Walker进一步思考所谓“辣妹营销”(“hot girl marketing”)。她被任命为Crocs旗下Hey Dude的创意负责人,但据他所知,“完全没有带来任何改变”。American Eagle的活动制造的宣传声势远超预期,但Walker看到的报告显示,活动上线后客流同比仍在下降。病毒式传播最终可能带动销售,但他看不出管理层如何衡量其中的增量效果。

  • 这个担忧既适用于推广审美、健身产品、能量饮料和蛋白粉的网红,也适用于有钱人收购电影制片厂。Walker怀疑,一些规模较小的网红营销项目ROI“绝对为零,甚至为负”;而收购制片厂,可能只是为老板获得项目审批权和与明星见面的机会提供正当性。对外呈现的总是财务逻辑,但底层驱动可能只是“满足虚荣心”。

  • 他对David Ellison在Larry Ellison支持下控制Paramount,以及随后宣布的UFC交易,也抱有同样的怀疑。Walker称,这份协议规模约为77亿美元,将UFC与ESPN的年度合同从约5.5亿美元提高到与CBS签约后的11亿美元。他强调体育版权确实有价值,但考虑到他认为UFC的价值低于NFL或NBA,这个价格也可能反映了所有者想要炫耀实力、坐在场边并与名人社交的欲望。

4. 真正的优势要求重新决定仓位大小

  • Walker曾考虑询问播客嘉宾:一只被推荐的股票,是月度级别的想法、年度级别的想法、5年期想法,还是巴菲特式的“打孔卡机会”。他最终没有这么做,因为每个人的投资组合结构不同,而且没有嘉宾愿意把自己的推荐说成只是平均水平;但这个问题确实能迫使投资者量化,自己声称的优势到底有多不寻常。

  • 他自己的尴尬案例是:一条新信息让他相信,某个最大仓位之一几乎确定会迎来利好,但他因为“仓位已经很大”而没有加仓,后来听到这样的质问:“你对那条信息有差异化判断……为什么不加仓?”他承认,按照凯利准则模型,概率发生变化后,理应建立更大的仓位。

  • 21点提供了一个对照:手里11点、庄家明牌6点时,下一步如何行动在数学上很清楚。投资却只有概率,缺少已知答案——“这份8-K对你意味着什么?那份新闻稿对你又意味着什么?”因此,重新评估仓位需要判断,也可以借助另一个人来追问:这条信息究竟是否构成真正的优势。

  • 当信息更新偏负面时,同样的纪律也适用。如果投资者比分析师更早发现周期下行,却拒绝调整一个大规模长期仓位,他在内在价值判断上可能仍然是对的;但Walker认为,新信息无论如何都应改变交易方式——可以减小仓位、做空一篮子具有相似beta的资产,或买入看跌期权。“真正的优势很少出现。”

5. Paulson溢价买入BHC,是一笔高度可见的挑战交易

  • Walker借梦幻橄榄球定义挑战交易:两名经理交换跑卫,是因为双方都认为对方手里的是更好的球员。不同于用跑卫换外接手这种互补型交易,挑战交易中必然有一方相对判断错误。公开市场交易通常也是同一场较量,只是匿名性掩盖了卖方身份、动机以及双方相互竞争的投资逻辑。

  • BHC,也就是前Valeant,让这场较量变得异常透明。公司并购时代遗留的债务,使其股票变成一个金融工程命题:如果能把有价值的资产从债务端转移到股东手中,即便转移规模不大,也可能创造巨大的股权价值。关键资产是BLCO,即Bausch + Lomb;约19%的股份已经公开交易,剩余股份大多位于一家不受限制子公司内,若将其分配给BHC股东,可能释放可观价值。

  • John Paulson和Carl Icahn各自持有约10%的股份,也都担任BHC董事,因此双方都能接触到这场金融工程交易中的内部谈判、约束条件和机会。然而,Paulson仍以每股9美元、超过3亿美元的价格买下了Icahn的全部持股,而市场价格近期只有6-8美元;与此同时,Paulson还在公开市场继续买入。

  • 一名老练股东退出时出售10%的大宗持股,通常可能需要大幅折价——Walker设想的场景是以4美元出价、接近5美元成交,或由投行以4.50-5美元左右完成配售。因此,9美元的溢价让他非常着迷,但他也强调,Icahn的动机尚不清楚:Icahn可能因为基金存续期结束或其他原因卖出。反过来,假设双方都知道BLCO即将以每股100美元出售,所得资金归BHC股东所有,从而让BHC价值达到50美元,那么Icahn不会以9美元卖出,Paulson也不会在交易结构看起来注定失败时买入。Walker没有BHC仓位,但认为这笔交易格外有信息量,因为双方都拥有大量信息渠道。

完整逐字稿
Andrew Walker

You're about to listen to the yet another value podcast with your host me, Andrew Walker. Today's podcast is my monthly ramblings for the month of August 2025. Look, I say this every ramblings, but this is my every ramblings I hang up and I say this was my most rambling ramblings yet. And I I definitely feel it on this one. So, it gets rambly, but hopefully you enjoy it. I get good feedback on these, so hopefully you enjoy it. Let's see the topics today. We're going to start out talking about just what a weird market is. I love to talk about both on here and on the blog. I love to talk about the overall market just it really helps me clarify my thoughts and I will tell you these are strange markets you know co was obviously a strange market but that was a panic market right now is just it is such a tale of two cities it's really pulling me apart so I want to talk about that uh talk a little bit about companies portrait analytics I believe they're going to be the sponsor of this episode they've got some great screens that I like to use and one that I've really been looking at is companies that miss earnings and the the company buys back stock aggressively into the earnings miss I I think it's such an interesting weird signal. You know, does the company not get it or is the value so high that they just have to do it? Then we're going to talk about just Sydney Sweeney hot girl marketing and owning a media company. I promise you I'm not trying to get on as a talking head hot taker hottaker, but I think there's really interesting business insights and questions there I had and especially around the Paramount UFC Paramount Larry Ellison deal connect them all hopefully in a good way. So, we'll talk about that. swinging when you have an edge. Just a lot of thoughts that I've personally been thinking about when news updates and you think you've got insight into situation, how you push yourself, how you process it, how you change your position. So, just really ramble on that. And then close down with a really interesting challenge trade. Uh BHC, the John Paulson buying 300 million stock from Carl Icon. Both of them have board seats. Thought that was just so interesting I had to put something there. So, going to get to all that rambled in the opening, but first a word from our sponsor. This podcast is sponsored by Portrait Analytics. People ask me all the time, what's your favorite stock screen to run to look at for ideas? Is it low price to earnings, high dividend yield? What what is it? And my answer is simple. I don't run screens. I somehow doubt that there's serious alpha and sorting through stocks that are trading under 10 times price earnings on Yahoo Finance. But portrait analytics has completely changed the game on screening. It lets you create bespoke screens to generate actually unique ideas. Let me give you an example of one that I've been using recently. I wanted to look for stocks with greater than 200 million market cap where the company has publicly discussed trading at a discount to peers and both the companies and insiders have been buying shares on the open market in the past 12 months. To me, that's an interesting screen. It's unique ideas. It's a blend of quantitative and qualitative. It's pulling things that aren't, you know, just purely numbers based that the insiders are talking about and it's building something that kind of fits with my view of the world and my view of the types of stocks that would be interesting. Portrait let me find a handful of companies that meet that criteria. The last time I did the screen, by the way, the screens run every day if you want them to, every week if you want them to. The last time I did the screen, it had four or five stocks that exactly hit that criteria. And then boom, I had a list of really interesting things that I actually might buy that I could sort through. Uh they it also showed me exactly where the company was talking about, how their valuation compared to peers, so I could see, hey, was this a one-off or are they consistently talking about in a way I think it's interesting. Anyway, I think it's completely changed the game for screening and for generating new ideas. If you're looking to up your screening game, you should check out Portrait Analytics at portraitanalytics.ai. I'll include a link in the show notes. All right. Hello and welcome to yet another value podcast. I'm your host, Andrew Walker. Uh if you like this podcast, it would mean a lot if you could rate, subscribe, review, wherever you're watching or listening to it. With me today, I'm happy to have on myself.

It’s time

It’s time for my monthly random ramblings for August. It’s August 15th or 16th—I’m not sure; it’s the middle of August. I’ve got a bunch of topics I’m going to ramble about today, and I hope you enjoy them.

I love doing these ramblings. The state of the markets that I publish at the end of every month in my monthly links helps me think about where we are in the markets and keep a clear head. I love talking about the markets and rambling about them, so we’re going to start by talking about what a weird market it is.

I’m not trying to become a talking news head or a clickbait artist, but I do have some thoughts on the Sydney Sweeney controversy, and I want to throw those out there. They’re not hot takes; they’re business takes. Then I want to talk a little bit about swinging when you have an edge. To wrap it up, I might talk a bit about Buffett’s longevity—I don’t know—and there was an interesting challenge trade that I’ve got a post about, which I’m about to put up. I’d love to talk about that as well.

Look, it is just a weird market. Markets are up. I’m guessing again, since I’m recording this in the middle of August, that the S&P is up double digits on the year. I think the Russell is up low single digits. It’s been a pretty good year for the stock market, albeit a very volatile one if you think back to the beginning of April.

I can’t get it out of my head: It is still just a weird market. If something touches AI, it is a golden god. The stock is up and to the right. It can do no wrong. They’re beating earnings every time. If they miss earnings, they’re getting the benefit of the doubt. It is just a golden god of a stock.

The curious thing about the market is that the largest companies—we’ve been saying this for a long time—just keep out-earning. A few years ago, Facebook, Google, and all these companies were just infinite growth at unlimited ROICs because they were capital-light businesses. Now they’ve all latched on to AI, and they’re all just generating huge returns, apparently through AI.

It’s kind of a shame for active investors because if the Mag 7 is, what, 35% of the S&P 500, and all of the Mag 7 is pretty much tied to AI, then if you’re an active manager dealing in the type of poor businesses—old-economy businesses with no AI exposure—you are underweight AI. It’s almost impossible to keep up if you’re underweight AI when those businesses are doing that.

If you are AI, you are a golden god. Your stock can’t go down. You’re beating earnings every quarter. Expectations are getting raised. The backlog looks incredible. It is nirvana for you.

But outside of AI, it’s just really weird. I’ll give you a few examples. Deere, good old Deere—farm equipment—reports earnings, and the stock is down 10%. Retailers—I mean, it has been a bloodbath in retail. Pull up the Lululemon stock chart; you’re going to barf on yourself if you look at it.

Crocs—I’m going to talk about Crocs a little bit in a second—reported earnings a couple of weeks ago, and the stock is down 20% on earnings and tariff hits. You’ve got people debating, “Hey, I thought it was cheap,” and I probably agree with them. I have no position and no plan to take one, but they thought it was cheap at 100, and the company thought it was cheap at 100. It was, like—I can’t remember—8 times earnings, and now it trades at 80 or 85, so it’s 6 times earnings. If you thought it was cheap then and you believe in the brand, it’s even cheaper now.

Telecom—my God. Telecom is supposed to be the stable sector, but every cable company is reporting numbers and just imploding. A lot of the telecom infrastructure companies are reporting numbers and absolutely imploding. We’re seeing implosions up and down the board.

Oh, food. I forgot to mention my favorite one: food. Chipotle, Cava, Sweetgreen—I guess they’re high-end fast-casual concepts—but all of them are reporting negative same-store sales. Chipotle reported negative same-store sales, if I remember correctly. All these stocks are getting absolutely hammered.

I’m looking at this as I pull it up: Chipotle reported negative 4% comps. I know there’s noise and everything, but it’s just this really weird economy where AI is up and to the right and can’t stop, while you look at fast casual, down 4%. You look at telecom blowing up, and you look at the retailers. What is going on?

I don’t know how to explain this economy. I don’t know how to think about it right now. I’m still really thinking about it. For the last year, I’d say, “You look at these cyclical companies—mining companies, metals companies, U.S. Steel, carmakers, whatever—and they’re going through a pretty deep recession, and the stock market is not, and obviously the Mag 7 isn’t.”

But now it’s spreading. It’s not just that. I think most of the cyclicals I follow are reporting pretty rough numbers. Trucking companies are saying it’s pretty rough out there now. It’s spreading to the retailers. It’s spreading to the restaurants. It’s very weird for all these companies to be reporting not just recessionary numbers, but what seem to me to be high-level, deep-recessionary numbers, while on the other hand you’ve got the AI companies at absolutely outrageous levels of growth.

Economic stats seem pretty flattish, so there’s just this very strange dichotomy. I honestly don’t know how to think about it right now. If anyone has the answer…

I'd love to hear it. That's just where I am. Speaking of companies that got I I mentioned Crocs a few times and I guess they're a sponsor now, so I can mention it. Portrait Analytics, which I think is great for AI screening, AI tools. I I think it's a really interesting way to if you're looking for companies that, you know, you can do a price earning screen and get I I think you'll get if you say, "Hey, I want companies trading for under 10 times earnings." You're going to get 400 companies. A lot of them is going to be kind of the chaff. You're going to have to sort through the wheat. A lot of them are going to be outside your wheelhouse. It's a really dumb screen and I think it's probably been picked up by Quant. What I like about Porch is you can say specific stuff. So anyway, I guess no free plugs, but there are sponsors I can give it. Uh, One of the screens I find really interesting is: “Find me companies whose stock was down 20% on earnings, where they bought back shares and the miss was driven by one-time items.”

I think that's a really interesting screen. When I run it, a lot of companies show up; right now, I'm looking at 14 or 15. A lot of them are retailers, including Crocs and Lululemon. I mention that for 2 reasons. First, I wonder if there's a signal in there: Did the company see that its Q2 results weren't looking good, but its stock looked so juicy that it couldn't help buying back and retiring shares? Or is it the reverse?

How many times have you seen a company buy back shares and then barf a quarter, with its stock going down 40%, and the next quarter they're not buying back any shares? Then you look at it and say, “Does this company know how to forecast? What is going on here?” They were buying back shares when the results were terrible, and now the stock is lower and they're not buying back shares.

Not that if you buy back shares in 2021 at $100 and the stock goes to $10 and you're in distress, I'm not saying you have to buy back shares just because the stock is down. But it's really weird if you're about to barf the quarter, buy back shares, and then stop after that.

So I look at Crocs as the perfect example. They bought back $100 million of stock intra-quarter at about $100 per share, and now the stock is at $85. In Crocs' case, reading between the lines, looking at their history and what they said on the call, I think they're going to keep buying back shares. I'd be shocked if they didn't. Crocs is a $4.5 billion–$5 billion company, so $100 million of stock in a quarter is a big slug for them.

There are a lot of companies out there. I think Vivid Seats is one that I've looked at recently where the business has been falling apart over the past couple of months. They are controlled by private-equity owners who are sophisticated, and they were buying back stock hand over fist as the business was falling apart over the past few quarters.

Then they reported Q2 results that were way below where anyone thought they would be, and now the company has kind of repurchased itself into financial distress. They're certainly not repurchasing, and analysts aren't even bothering to ask if they are because it's so clear that they don't have the resources. It's just weird. I don't know how to separate the signal from the noise there. I find it very interesting. I'm just such a sucker for buybacks; I find it interesting.

The last thing I'll note is that this screen—companies down 20%, buying back shares, and management arguing that it's a temporary thing—I've looked at it a little bit historically. I didn't have access to this screen 5 years ago, but I've looked at it a little bit historically, and generally 3 to 5 companies would hit the screen. Right now, there are 15. I'm not saying it's crazy, crazy out of the norm, but that's really high.

It's really interesting to me that so many of the companies, especially the retailers, are saying, “Hey,” and blaming the tariffs for why they missed. “One-time” is one of the factors that's key there. I think that's one of the interesting things about using a screen that marries AI with quant: they're saying it's a one-time miss. Historically, you'd see 3 to 5 companies; there are 15 here. It makes sense with the tariffs, but it's interesting that so many companies are blaming one-time items.

Again, if I marry that back to the weird stock thing, they're saying it's one-time, but I can't help but wonder if there's other stuff there. On restaurants, we're deporting a lot of people, right? Is deportation just shifting demographic trends? I know that sounds silly. It's not like we deported 1% of the population, but I think you could write a story where you say, “Hey, you deport 5 basis points of the population, but it's 5 basis points who are working age and who would be eating at these restaurants.”

And by the way, restaurant stock overall has not changed, so now there's a little bit more of a knife fight for each customer because there are just that many fewer. I don't know; it's hard for me to describe. Weird market, weird everything. Weird world. Let's move on.

Speaking of Crocs, I mentioned Crocs a lot, and I told you I wanted to dive into the Sydney Sweeney debate. I don't mean that I want to take one side or the other; I certainly don't. But there were 2 interesting things about the Sydney Sweeney debate that had me thinking about the stock market.

First, Sydney Sweeney—the reason I mention her is that she was the sponsor for Hey Dude. Hey Dude is the brand that Crocs bought, and they said it was going to be this great acquisition that would diversify them and all that sort of stuff. It has not gone that way so far. She was named the head of creative for Hey Dude last year, or something like that. To my knowledge, it has not budged the needle one iota.

So I was kind of surprised when she hopped onto American Eagle. I guess she's a big brand. Where I'm trying to go with this is: Look, she already failed at Hey Dude, and Hey Dude is much different from American Eagle. But I do wonder—if I just step back from Sydney Sweeney for a second—there are lots of companies that have what I call hot-girl marketing.

I'll talk to some CEOs of fitness brands, and they'll be like, “Look at all these girls we've got pitching our things.” You talk to people in medtech, especially aesthetics—Botox, plastic surgery, that sort of stuff—and they'll say, “Hey, we've got the Kardashians sponsoring us,” or, “We've got these hot fitness Instagram girls sponsoring us.” Hot men, too, to be fair. It could be hot men. Energy drinks especially, and protein powders, are getting huge, jacked men to sponsor them. You'll sell to one guy right here if you do that.

But I do wonder, especially on the hot-girl side, if there's real ROI here. Did American Eagle really look at this and say, “Let's get a movie star to sponsor this and run this buzzy campaign”? Yes, their brand was in the news quite a bit, but I saw reports earlier this week that their foot traffic is actually down year-over-year since they launched the Sydney Sweeney ad.

Sydney Sweeney is an A-list-level movie star; I'm sure she doesn't come cheap. I'd be really interested to know how these companies judge the ROI, or if it's just Botox companies going and talking to hot-girl marketing or hot-guy marketing and saying, “Hey, we're going to give you some free Botox injections if you put it on your story.” How do they judge the incremental demand?

The reason I worry about this is that we've seen this in public companies, and I think you'll see the parallel very quickly. Movie studios are a hot item: Every decade or so, a rich guy comes along and buys a movie studio. Why do they buy the movie studio? There's always a business case. This dates back to Coke buying Columbia in the 1980s. There's always a business case for buying the movie studio.

Right now, David Ellison, backed by his father, Larry Ellison, is buying and taking control of Paramount. There's always a business case. But what is it actually? I suspect it's an ego-stroking thing.

With a movie studio, you could be the head of the movie studio. You get to approve or not approve movies; all the movie stars are coming up and hobnobbing with you, and all of them are sucking up to you. You can probably get a couple of pet projects that you want to approve that might—if you've got a worldview or something—speak to that. But they're not really financial purchases, in my mind. Yes, I'm sure they convince themselves they're going to be a financial purchase, but it doesn't really work out well for them.

How did it work for those guys with the hot-girl marketing? I wonder how much these people look at it and say, “Hey, we've got a financial case,” versus how much it's middle-aged, high-up men who just want access to—or want to be able to talk to—these hot girls, or anything. The Sydney Sweeney thing really brought it back to mind. I'd be pretty surprised.

Now, it did take off—it really took off. So maybe you say all marketing is good; all word of mouth, all news is good news.

Maybe it results in a lot of incremental sales. Obviously, it’s been hotly debated. I’m guessing it went way more viral than they would have hoped for in their wildest imagination, but does it translate to sales to run that huge campaign and pay a huge movie star? I don’t know.

When I go down the line of some of the smaller ones, I do wonder if they’re like, “Hey, you know…” A lot of the Instagram and TikTok influencers are smaller, so it’s smaller dollar figures, but I’m guessing the ROI is absolutely zero or negative. I wonder how much of it is just stroking the egos of the management teams and getting access to that.

Last one on movie studios, as I think about it: Larry Ellison bought control of Paramount, and then they announced a massive, massive deal to bring the UFC to CBS. I think it was $7.7 billion. Huge, huge deal. That is how much they’re paying. It is NFL-level. It is way, way bigger.

The UFC was making—I’m just looking at a news article—$550 million per year from ESPN. It’s going to $1.1 billion per year on CBS. It’s a big number. I wonder how much of that was, “Hey, I’m not saying sports rights don’t have value. No one believes they have more value than I do, but that is a huge number for the UFC, which is not as good a property as, to take two examples, the NFL or the NBA.”

I wonder how much of that was having a movie studio titan in there who wants to flex his muscles. He wants to sit ringside at UFC. He wants to hobnob with the celebrities. I don’t know if that’s a financial deal so much as an ego indulgence.

All right, I’ve rambled on long enough about that. Let me switch to something I talk about with my friends a lot. I don’t have an answer here, but one thing that I’ve tried, especially with my friends—and I’ve even tried this on the podcast now, although it’s difficult to do—is, when someone has an edge, when someone has something really unique, how do you push them to swing?

I think it’s really interesting. One thing I’ve thought about asking on the podcast before is: There’s the Buffett punch-card rule. If you had 10 stocks, and you could only invest in 10 stocks with a punch card—every time you invest money, you punch it—you would be a much better investor because you would be so selective.

I’ve thought about asking people, “Hey, this idea you’re pitching—most people are long the stocks they pitch on the podcast. I kind of have that requirement: you’re long it, you believe in it. But is this a once-a-month idea? Is this a once-a-year idea? Is this a once-every-5-years idea? Is this a punch-card idea?”

The reason I don’t ask it is because it’s an awkward conversation. People run portfolios of different sizes and everything. How is somebody going to come on and pitch a podcast and then say, “Oh, I think this is just an average, good idea”? You’re just putting them on the spot in a bad way.

But the reason I ask is that, when I talk to people and try to suss this out, and I hear them say, “Hey, this is a punch-card idea,” or they’ve got some information that’s really flipped it, I want to push them to say, “Hey, if this is such a good idea, why aren’t you bigger? If you’re at 10%, why aren’t you at 15%? Why aren’t you at 20%? Why aren’t you at 50%?”

It can be good or bad, but I think it’s a really interesting way of talking and thinking about ideas and quantifying the edge.

The reason it’s on my mind is that I’ve had a few recently where, for me personally—and I’m not going to name stock names—or for friends, there was a new bit of information. Sometimes the new bit of information had been out there for a month, and sometimes it had been out there for a day. But there was a new bit of information that materially changed the thesis, sometimes in a very positive way and sometimes in a very negative way.

I’ll just speak for myself: I have trouble when the new piece of information comes out, particularly if something is already a large position, increasing it and going for the jugular. I don’t know if that’s good or bad on my part.

I had one recently where a piece of information came out that I thought was almost certainly going to be good news. I already had a big position, but I didn’t increase it. In hindsight, I was talking to someone, and they were like, “Hey, man, you had a real edge. You had a differentiated view on that news. You knew what was coming, or you thought you knew what was coming. Why didn’t you increase it?”

To me, it was push and pull: “Hey, I was already huge here, man. This was already a big position—one of my biggest. How can you get bigger?” But on the other side, it was, “Hey, if you were running the Kelly criterion or whatever in your model, it would tell you to get bigger based on this new information.”

It’s about re-underwriting and talking to people. I do the podcast a lot, and I talk to a lot of friends. It’s one thing that I’ve tried to step back on. When I’m talking to a friend and they mention an idea to me one month, and then they mention something new the next month, I really do try to push them and say, “Hey, this seems like new, incremental information. Are you buying? Are you selling? Are you pushing?”

I don’t really have a conclusion there, but it’s just something I really think about. It’s one of the hard things about investing.

In blackjack, it’s very easy. You’re dealt 11, the dealer is dealt 6, and it’s very easy to know to double. The dealer is showing 6, and you get a 5; it’s very easy to know to hit again because you’ve got 11 now, right? It’s very easy to update because it’s very mathematical.

Investing isn’t mathematical. You’re always dealing with probabilities, but they’re unknown probabilities, right? What does this 8-K mean? What is that press release for you? You never really know. Having people to talk and think through it with can be really helpful.

Real edge comes along rarely. When you have it, sometimes having somebody push and say, “Hey, is this real edge? If you really believe that, why aren’t you buying?” can really help.

The counterpoint is that, a lot of times, especially my friends who know names really well, they’ll say, “I have this big position. I’ve got this check, right? I understand the industry. It’s starting to have a cyclical downturn, and analysts aren’t onto it yet.”

You might say, “Oh, cool. Are you selling or reducing the position?” They might say, “No, no, no, no. The long-term value is too great.” They might be right, but if you’ve got a check that the numbers are going down, you probably want to trade around that in some form.

That could be reducing your position. It could be shorting a basket of stocks with similar beta and saying, “Hey, this company is so good, I’ll short a basket with a similar beta.” It could be buying puts. Whatever it is, if you’re really following a company, often there is news where you will have an edge and insight into it, and I think updating the trade around that is critical.

Okay, that was rambly. I don’t even know where I was going with that, but I had notes. It’s obviously been on my mind. I’ve been thinking about it a lot, so I just wanted to rant on that.

Let me go to the last one. I’m about to put a post up on this, but I think it’s worth mentioning and discussing.

In fantasy football, normally when you do a trade, it’s, “I have 3 running backs, you have 3 wide receivers. I have 0 wide receivers, and you have 0 running backs. Let’s do a trade.” Obviously, there’s relative value and everything, but that’s the trade.

But there’s what I call a challenge trade. You have a running back, and I have a running back. I think your running back is better than mine, and you think my running back is better than yours, so we trade. That is a direct challenge trade.

In the wide receiver-running back conversation, a trade could work out well for both of us, right? My running back does great for you, and your wide receiver does great for me. We both got what we needed.

In this trade, we trade running back for running back. Either my running back does better than yours, or your running back does better than mine. One way or another, one of our teams improves, and one of our teams gets worse. There’s no getting around it.

You can relate. I know a lot of people might not listen to football, but I think you probably get what I’m saying.

In investing, all investing is basically a challenge trade, right? You buy a stock on the market, and you are challenging the anonymous seller on the other side. They’re saying, “I think there are better risk-adjusted opportunities elsewhere,” and you’re saying, “I think this is a good risk-adjusted opportunity.” Lots of different things can come into play, but at its core, that’s it.

What’s interesting is that most investing is anonymized. If you’re buying and someone is selling, you don’t know who’s selling, and you don’t know their thesis.

Every now and then, that’s not true. For instance, a private equity firm owns 20% of a company and announces a secondary. You know who’s selling, but you don’t know why. They could be selling because they’re at the end of their fund life, or they could be selling because they think the business is about to implode. So, you’re taking some risk there.

Why do I mention this? Bausch Health Companies, or BHC, is a stock I own nothing in, for full disclosure, so I don’t have a position. I think it’s very interesting that this is the former Valeant. They’re overlevered, and I believe they’ve paid their shareholder lawsuits from the Valeant days out, but Valeant went on an acquisition binge, and they’ve got all the debt from that acquisition binge. Obviously, the company exploded.

It is now a creature of financial engineering, and there are 2 sophisticated shareholders who are in here: John Paulson and Carl Icahn. Both own roughly 10% of the stock. For the past 2 years, maybe longer, the key thesis on BHC has been pretty simple: it’s a financial engineering story. They’ve got tons of debt, but the debt is cleverly structured, and if you can get assets out of the debt and into equity holders’ hands, then you can shift value from the debt to equity. Because they’ve got so much debt, any value you can shift from debt to equity creates a fortune. I’m simplifying a little bit, but this is basically right.

The 1 big asset they have is BLCO, Bausch + Lomb, and that is worth quite a bit per share. Most of it sits in an unrestricted subsidiary. The thesis for the past 3 years—and the company has said this—is that they want to get it to shareholders, right? The best way would probably be to spin out the remaining shares of BLCO to BHC shareholders. They IPO’d BLCO about 3 years ago, and 19% of it trades on the public stock exchange. You can see it.

The remaining shares are worth—some days, they’ve been worth more than BHC’s share price; some days, they’ve been worth most of it. But if you could do that, it would create enormous value. Why do I mention all that? Well, Icahn and Paulson both sit on BHC’s board, and both own 10%, so both of them are very privy to all the internal negotiations: Are there risks that we can’t do any of the spin-off stuff Andrew just talked about? What are the opportunities? What are the other factors? They are privy to all of that.

On Friday, Paulson bought all of Icahn’s stake—over $300 million—from Icahn. Not only did he buy all of Icahn’s stake, but he did it at $9. The stock was trading at $7. It had been trading as low as $6 a couple of days before, but there was a rally, and Paulson was actually buying stock on the open market as well. He did it at $9. That is just a fascinating, challenging trade to me, right? Normally, if you’re selling 10% of a company in a block, you have to take a huge discount.

What were Paulson and Icahn seeing that made them get together? Icahn said, “Hey, I want to sell this block,” which could be for any reason, and Paulson said, “Based on what we both know, I think I will generate a fantastic return if you give me $9.” Because if you came to me and said, “I own 10% of a company. The stock trades at $7. I’d like to sell it to you,” I’d say, “Okay, my first bid is $4.” Then we’d probably negotiate and settle around $5.

If you went to an investment bank and said, “Hey, I want to unload this 10% block. I’m a sophisticated shareholder with a board seat. I’d like to blow out of this stock,” the investment bank would probably say, “Cool. We think we can get it done for $4.50 and maybe $5,” right? You’d be trading at a huge discount. So Icahn goes to Paulson—or maybe Paulson goes to Icahn; I don’t know. We don’t know the whole story here—but something they say gets them to say, “Hey, yes, if Icahn wanted to exit this, normally he’d be taking a huge discount, but both of us think it should go for $9.” What did they know? What was going on there?

Because here’s the other thing: Icahn has to sell, right? If they know tomorrow they’re going to sell BLCO for $100 per share and all the proceeds will go to BHC shareholders, and the stock is worth $50, Icahn’s not selling for $9. He’s holding on for that. On the contrary, if they know everything’s terrible, Paulson’s not buying at $9. He’s taking a huge discount, or he’s not doing the trade at all.

I just think it’s such a fascinating, challenging trade. I’ve been looking at it. I have no position, but the stock spent most of Friday trading in the high $7s range. It looks like it kind of ticked up to the mid- to low-$8 range at the end of the day. You’re buying a stock where a sophisticated shareholder who sits on the board just bought 10% of the company—$300 million at $9 per share. Normally, I’d say, “Hey, sophisticated shareholders—anything could happen.” But here, it’s such a financial engineering story, and the person has so much insight into the financial engineering stuff. I think that’s a very interesting signal, and buying at a discount to that—very, very interesting.

Okay, anyway, I’ve rambled enough. These ramblings are always hard because I’m like, “Hey, man, I’m rambling, but I don’t know if I’m making any sense. Do people want to hear this?” People generally give pretty good feedback, but every one I do, I hang up and then I say, “That was the rambliest one I’ve ever done.” Then the next one I hang up and I say, “I feel like that was even more ramblier.” So, thank you for listening to my ramblings.

I’ve got a couple of great podcasts coming up, especially my friend Art Boken, who is coming on for one on process improvement and stuff that I think people are really going to enjoy. There are some really interesting ideas on the podcast coming up as well. Thank you for listening. I’m looking forward to sharing those with you guys, and we will talk next month.

A quick disclaimer: Nothing on this podcast should be considered investment advice. Guests or the hosts may have positions in any of the stocks mentioned during this podcast. Please do your own work and consult a financial adviser. Thanks.