USV新设9亿美元基金:Fred Wilson、Rebecca Kaden与Mike Mignano
Fred WilsonRebecca KadenMichael MignanoMolly O'Shea
USV的9亿美元基金周期,是对更大轮次、更高扩张成本和更分化结果的自下而上回应,而不是为了凑够10亿美元的炫耀目标。 公司预计投资约30-40家,A轮单笔支票通常在1000万至3000万美元之间,种子期投资明显增加。Kaden说,几位LP反而让她意外地问:“你确定不应该再多募一些吗?”
USV认为,AI正进入2003年前后互联网基础设施建设完成后、应用层机会打开的阶段。 其明确押注的4个方向是AI应用、AI基础设施、物理AI和能源,最后一项目前已占组合约20-30%。核心判断是“结果更大,波动也更大”,而真正具有决定性的应用仍大多尚未出现。
软件开发变便宜了,但把软件做成一家拥有防御性的公司,所需资本可能比过去更多。 创业公司需要购买算力、在OpenAI、Anthropic和Gemini提供免费产品的情况下补贴推理成本,还要大举投入以摆脱大量易于复制的竞争者。Wilson给出的历史参照是:Twitter的融资从500万美元升至2500万美元,再到1亿美元;放到今天的市场,“乘以10”。
收入增长速度不是USV判断产品市场匹配的首选证据,使用留存和持续的产品创新更重要。 年度订阅可以在用户尚未证明真正喜欢产品之前,就制造出亮眼的ARR。Kaden和Wilson的判断很直接:“试用行为处于绝对高位”,但“参与行为处于绝对低位”,投资人只能结合不完整的用户群数据、产品判断和团队迭代能力,推断行为是否可持续。
USV正在形成的护城河判断,结合了个人Agent、多人协作行为、开放基础设施和受信任的消费品牌。 Wilson预计Amazon、Shopify和Etsy都会推出服务专属Agent,但用户也会需要一个由自己控制、能够协调这些Agent的个人Agent;Kaden认为,多人协作行为可能补上今天单人工具缺失的网络效应。她不认同一切最终都会坍缩为聊天:“用户界面不会消失。”
“彻底取代,不要自动化”,意味着替代在位者的服务,而不只是向其出售提高生产率的软件。 USV称,自身20-30%的法律工作已经不再涉及人类律师;Doctronic、SuperTakes等产品,则试图把医疗、投资和专业服务知识直接交到消费者手中。机会最强的领域,是在位者若要应战,就必须牺牲现有业务赖以生存的人力和收入。
USV不需要每个赢家都做到1万亿美元,因为在个位数十亿美元退出中持有早期股权,仍足以带来极高的基金回报。 但公司仍要求市场不断扩张,并越来越偏好排名前1-2的公司,因为价值聚集的速度更快,而不是押注第三或第四名。Wilson给出的校准是:USV很多最大赢家最终达到约100亿美元,少数离群值达到500亿美元或1000亿美元,而这已经带来了“巨额回报”。
1. 9亿美元基金是从组合向上倒推出来的
USV在新基金周期中募集了9亿美元,“远超USV此前任何一个新基金周期的募资规模”。合伙人称,这一数字来自目标持股比例、支票规模、投资阶段和公司数量,而不是为了跨过心理上颇具吸引力的10亿美元门槛。
计划中的组合仍将保持集中,约覆盖30-40家公司。USV仍预计会在重要的早期轮次中领投或联合领投,但公司创立之初、从接近300万美元起步的A轮支票,如今已经“从1000万美元起步”;预计区间约为1000万至3000万美元。
Kaden说,这支基金对USV而言规模很大,但相较许多同行仍然偏小。这保留了自下而上的投资流程:公司可以挑选符合强假设的企业,而不必为了部署资金,先按预定比例获得整个可投资市场的敞口。
长期的LP沟通,让这一转变没有几年前那么容易引发争议。USV每季度讨论战略、组合公司的成功与失败,投资人因此一直在观察市场变化;有人听到募资方案后的反应是:“你确定不应该再多募一些吗?”
2. AI正处于定义性应用出现前的互联网时刻
Wilson的历史类比从2003年开始:商业互联网和大量基础设施已经存在,Google、Amazon、Yahoo和eBay也已出现,但Facebook、Twitter、YouTube和iPhone尚未问世。今天的AI基础设施同样已经相当成熟,而定义这一时代的应用公司仍在涌现。
Kaden认为,Granola和Suno是早期信号,随后又出现了Instinct、Muse和Grockbot。她的判断是,Agent将推动“全新类型的应用层”,覆盖消费市场和企业市场。
USV把这一机会归纳为4个公开投资论点:AI应用、AI基础设施、物理AI和能源。合伙人认为,明确表达立场能够有效收窄进入的项目流:专注这些方向的创始人会主动找上门,而其他方向的创始人也知道USV不是自己的天然目的地。
3. 产品创建变便宜,不等于公司做大变便宜
Mignano区分了“做出来”和“突围”两件事。AI可以让原型开发速度大幅提升、成本显著下降,但这也会带来更多可信的竞争者;资本随后会转向定位、营销、分发,以及从噪声中脱颖而出所需的投入,尤其是在消费市场。
算力构成第二个成本模块,其最终“渐近线”仍然未知。Mignano说,公司面对的基础算力成本处在“完全不同的半球”;Kaden则表示,物理AI、传感器、机器人和能源企业的资本需求,比传统软件更加多样化,也更高。
推理成本也可能成为一种主动的获客补贴。与ChatGPT、Claude或Gemini的免费核心产品竞争时,创业公司未必能在证明价值前收费,因此可能需要为大量使用量提供资金支持,直到用户增长达到可以自我维持的规模。
Wilson拿Twitter作比较:公司最初融资500万美元,约1年后融资2500万美元,随后又融资1亿美元。2007年时这些数字看起来都很大;他对当下市场的粗略换算是:“乘以10”,而且还没有计入20年来的通胀。
4. Agent会大量涌现,但界面和网络效应仍然重要
Wilson预计Amazon、Shopify和Etsy都会各自提供一个Agent,但他认为,用户也会需要一个代表自己、并与这些服务型Agent谈判的个人Agent。今天的Agent往往通过直接登录来冒充用户;最终,他预计市场会形成Agent之间交互的标准。
眼下的冲突已经出现:Wilson提到Amazon告诉Manus,Manus不被允许访问Amazon。他的结论不是服务型Agent会直接胜出,而是市场仍处在定义权限、代表关系和互操作性的“早期局面”。
Kaden关于产品耐久性的判断借鉴了社交网络时代。规模和分发能力可能在初期拉开类似消费型Agent之间的差距,但要形成长期留存,可能需要把今天的单人行为转化为真正的多人行为:“不是说我们不再需要网络效应了,只是我们需要找到通往网络效应的路径。”
Kaden反对界面消亡的观点同样重要。Agent可以替用户购物或报税,但不会替用户观看Netflix或YouTube;界面仍然是人们建立信任、通过视觉理解概念,以及进行真正享受的活动的地方。“用户界面不会消失。”
5. USV进一步押注种子、创始人和受控孵化
原型开发变容易,正推动USV在传统证据尚未出现之前就进行投资。Mignano预计,“纯粹的创始人押注”会增加,尽管这对一家以投资论点驱动的机构而言并不传统;在合伙人足够确信的情况下,公司也会有选择地进行内部孵化,亲自搭建并测试初始产品。
Wilson描述了一条从真正孵化到“专有种子轮”的连续谱。USV可能提出一个想法、招募创始人、帮助塑造公司,并提供最初的2笔支票;他称之为“完全掌控球权”,但并不会真的成为创始人。
Venture Partners Jared Hec和Scott Belsky,加上Mignano的产品背景,扩大了USV围绕一个想法进行构建的能力。Wilson估计,孵化项目、创始人押注和专有种子轮,最终可能占USV种子期投资的1/3至1/2。
6. 使用留存比表面ARR更重要
Molly O’Shea重新谈到自己上次参加Sourcery时提出的那句话——“ARR是个假指标”(“ARR is a fake metric”),但这次讨论给出了更精确的解释。年度订阅和付费墙可以在用户证明喜爱产品或形成习惯之前,快速制造收入,因此USV会穿透收入数据,观察日、周、月维度的使用留存。
Kaden把当前消费市场描述为试用与留存的分化:“试用行为处于绝对高位”,而“参与行为处于绝对低位”。AI主导了市场讨论,用户都想试用每一个热门新产品,但真正融入生活的产品会非常少。
因此,消费项目的尽调会把直接的产品判断与用户群数据结合起来。最好的信号,是体验和数据彼此印证:用户主观感受到产品有留存力,数据中也能看到用户持续回访;或者某个看似合理的流失原因,最终确实在留存数据中表现为问题。
完美证据通常要到太晚才会出现,无法匹配USV希望的进入价格。因此,公司会寻找替代指标:能够识别让产品重新焕发生命力的小钩子的创始人、具备持续迭代能力的团队,以及在更大一笔支票让答案变得明显之前,就已显示出行为持久性的早期数据。
7. 最好的公司和创始人很少走直线
Abridge最初的想法是让患者记录医疗问诊;这条消费市场路径没有跑通,团队随后找到了正确的产品、买方和市场。Kaden的教训是,USV真正押注的并不是最初的客户假设,而是Shiv把一个方向正确的内核,带向正确产品和市场路径的能力。
Abridge在连续5-6年几乎依靠一款产品获得全部收入后,又在12个月内推出了2条新产品线。Wilson称其为“三条腿的凳子”:不同产品相互强化,客户在采用第二和第三款产品后,逐步与公司形成更深的绑定。
Wilson认为,每支创投基金通常由2-3个、甚至4个明星项目驱动。在USV的历史上,他提到了Twitter、Etsy、Indeed、MongoDB、Twilio、Stripe、Coinbase、Duolingo和Abridge;Coinbase自身也是经过长期平台期和间歇性突破,而非一路平滑增长。
Kaden用Stedi创始人Zach Kanter说明耐力的重要性:总共投入10年,前7年业务才真正开始加速,随后3年在市场、团队和产品对齐后取得强劲表现。Suno的Mikey Schulman也体现了类似的成熟过程——创始人最终开始“看见Matrix”,并在完全不同的层级上运转。
8. “Rebel Alliance”押注开放技术栈、反对依赖
Wilson用“Rebel Alliance”形容反抗OpenAI、Anthropic、Grok或Gemini封闭式AI技术栈的开发者。他们的担忧有历史依据:过去有公司建立在Facebook之上,却在Facebook进入其市场后被切断;如今的构建者也担心Claude或其他供应商做出同样的事。
可投资的技术栈不止开放权重模型。Mignano还提到模型对齐、记忆、路由、harness,以及企业为满足自身需求而操控系统所需的工具;这使“Rebel Alliance”成为USV完整的投资论点,而不是一次单一的开源押注。
在USV的CEO峰会上,Mignano从Coinbase的CTO处得知,公司已经不再使用Claude,而是在开源产品Pi之上搭建了编程Agent harness。Mignano说自己此前并不知道这一采用情况,并指出USV投资的一家、在谈话记录中被称为Arendelle的组合公司,正是把Pi推向市场的公司。
9. “彻底取代,不要自动化”直击在位者商业模式
USV将此前的软件时代与AI时代区分开来:前者是自动化既有工作流,后者则通过把原本由昂贵机构控制的智能交给终端用户,重构整个市场。Molly提到,Wilson早在2014年就使用过“Obliterate, Don’t Automate”这句话;AI为这一延续多年的论点提供了强得多的工具。
Mignano以医疗领域的Doctronic为例:它不是单纯销售软件来提升医生效率,而是“装在你口袋里的医生”。它可以在Utah开具处方,但嘉宾提醒说,管制药物大概不包括在内,这既体现了其野心,也说明边界仍在演变。
Wilson把这一论点说得很直白:“不要雇律师,使用AI律师。不要雇会计师,使用AI会计师。”他说,USV自身20-30%的法律工作已经不再涉及人类律师;常规的条款清单可以直接根据公司此前的文件生成,不需要外部律师参与。
当匹配新产品会摧毁在位者当前的经济模型时,在位者就很难应战。律所无法轻易免费提供支撑员工生计的工作;Google则是一个部分例外,因为YouTube、Waymo、Gmail和Android给了它足够空间,可以用Gemini蚕食搜索业务。Kaden补充说,更难的问题不仅是为什么在位者无法回应,还包括“为什么别人也做不到?”
10. 信任与安全可能成为面向消费者的AI品类
Kaden提出的最简单安全警告与密码重置有关:一个能够访问用户邮箱的Agent,可能自动拥有其他所有账户的恢复路径。这会让网络安全从主要面向企业的问题,转向普通消费者把敏感数据和权限交给Agent的问题。
Kaden提到组合公司Common Fabric,这是一个试图调和“他们想要的安全性”和“他们需要的能力”的沙盒。她补充说,隐私产品过去缺少足够的消费者激励,但随着端侧模型和私有模型、生物识别以及人类身份认证出现,市场可能会打开更大的空间。
Mignano说,他和Molly刚看到一家在手机上运行本地模型的公司:“我们已经走到这一步了。”
加密货币提供了一个警示性类比。Wilson持有加密货币15年,被黑客攻击过4次,但他说自己仍保有约99%;Molly曾与一名诈骗者通话约15分钟,直到妻子制止她。Coinbase的优势在于,通过冷存储、双因素认证、延迟提现和信任机制,让一个危险的市场变得像普通市场一样。
11. USV需要扩张中的市场,而非万亿美元公司
Wilson区分了公司的最终规模与市场潜力。USV会根据机器人、传感器普及或核能市场在2030年、2040年或2050年可能达到的规模来进行承保;如果只用投资时的加密货币支出来评估Coinbase,就会错过后来发生的市场扩张。
Wilson认为,如今价值会更快聚集到排名前1-2的玩家手中,留给长尾公司的空间变小;过去可能积累出可观价值的第三或第四名公司,未必还能符合USV的回报模型。
Wilson否定了必须以万亿美元公司为承保目标的做法,这对USV的持股比例和基金规模而言并无必要。个位数十亿美元规模的赢家就能为基金带来丰厚回报,而USV历史上的许多成功项目最终达到约100亿美元;500亿美元和1000亿美元的结果确实存在,但属于离群值,不是基本要求。
估值仍会过冲。主持人提到,零利率时代(ZIRP)一些估值曾达到110亿美元或150亿美元的公司,后来却以接近10亿美元或20亿美元的价格被收购;Wilson认为,这正是Bending Spoons的理想猎场:在“创投旅程结束后”收购公司,再用不同的资本结构推动其增长。
完整逐字稿
1. USV's biggest fund ever: $900M
We raised $900 million in new funds for USV, which is by far the most USV has ever raised in a new fund cycle.
I don’t think a trillion is what we need to underwrite at USV. I think if our biggest winners are in the single-digit billions, given our fund size and our ownership, we can produce really, really healthy returns for our partners. There have been some outliers at $50 billion or $100 billion, but a lot of our biggest winners are in the $10 billion range, and that’s produced enormous returns for us.
It’s also a bigger number than we’ve raised before, somewhat significantly, and marks a new strategy for us. The market has evolved, the outcomes are bigger, and the swings are bigger.
I was a little surprised how many of them said, “Are you serious?” We are here at Union Square Ventures, USV, in New York City with Mike Mignano, and we’re about to go on a bit of an office tour. After that, there’s more. We’re going to sit down with Fred Wilson, Rebecca Kaden, and Mike to go over what we’re about to announce.
We just raised a new fund. We raised $900 million in new funds for USV, which is, I would say, by far the most USV has ever raised in a new fund cycle. But there’s a reason for that, and I think we’ll get into that in a little bit.
So why not $1 billion?
We’ve always been extremely intentional about fund strategy—not just fund size, but fund composition: how many companies, roughly; what size checks we plan to write; stages; and the number of companies. The $900 million really comes from that strategy and that model. We don’t raise funds as vanity metrics. It’s not like we’ve got to hit $1 billion or we’ve got to hit $2 billion.
“I want to be a unicorn fund.”
The $900 million really comes from the strategy, bottoms up, which I think we’ll probably get into.
Yeah. Okay. So maybe we can do what you do best and walk backwards to hide all the equipment.
Okay.
And then we can pick it up around the corner.
2. Inside USV's New York office
Sure, let’s do it.
All right. So we are here at Union Square. We’re going to walk into the kitchen. These are some of the main areas. It’s very active today.
Lots of people here today. This is a bit of a seating and living room area. Obviously, we’ve got the kitchen. My favorite feature of this kitchen is this xBloom pour-over machine. Have you seen this thing?
No. What is this?
It’s basically a pour-over robot. If you like pour-over coffee, this is a robot that makes—
An investment?
I don’t know. No, it’s not. But it’s really cool. I’ve seen these in a few offices—a couple of startup offices and a couple of VC offices—so it’s not like USV is the only place that has this. But if you like coffee, it’s pretty good.
It’s cool. I’ve never seen that.
Yeah. We’ve got our little dining room table here. We’ve got a board from one of our portfolio companies. Do you know what it is?
No. What is this?
Gameboard is the world’s first tabletop gaming console.
Founded by Brynn Putnam, who founded Mirror.
This is an amazing product. Every game comes with its own set of unique pieces that the screen reacts to. They also have a platform to make it really, really easy for developers to build games for this. It’s an awesome product. I would definitely recommend it.
Do you play chess on this?
They don’t have chess.
They don’t? They have all their own games that developers are writing. I guess you could do chess if you shaved off the edges or something, but it’s awesome. Highly recommend.
This is what we call the pit.
The pit.
The pit is where we all work and hang out. This is my desk. It’s very cluttered, so I hope you don’t get a shot of it.
There’s nothing bad on the screen.
We talk about deals. We talk about whatever might be going on on X that day. There’s also a group chat for the pit, so the conversation that happens here very actively every day just continues right when we leave here.
So no one has an office, or do they?
No, no one has an office except—well, actually, Tyranny, Carrie, and Christine have offices.
This is special ops.
They don’t want to deal with the madness of the pit, which I don’t blame them. This is where a lot of board meetings happen, as well as some of our full partnership meetings. We also have another room in here that we use for these types of meetings. One of my favorite things about this office is that pretty much every room has really epic views.
Yeah.
You’ve got great views all the way to the Hudson River over here, and views uptown over here. There’s a really, really cool view from here where you can see straight up Park Avenue, which I really love. Actually, at my desk in the pit, if I turn to my left, it’s literally a perfect vertical view of Park Avenue, which I think is really cool.
I mean, this represents New York pretty well, if you can see all of it, if you’re coming as a founder from—I don’t know.
Totally. I’ll take you up to the roof in a minute, where we have literally 360-degree panoramic views of pretty much all of Manhattan, which is really cool.
So you guys have invested in 263 companies? That number sounds right.
Yes.
And how many do you expect to invest in with this fund?
3. Why great founders still fail
I think we try not to be too strict and specific about the number, but generally speaking, probably somewhere around 30-ish, maybe 30 to 40. It’ll be a mixture of both seeds and Series A’s. I think we’ll do probably a lot more seeds than we’ve typically done in the past. We can get into a little bit of the fund strategy later with Rebecca and Fred, but going earlier is becoming more and more important, given how many startups are emerging as a result of AI and how competitive the market is.
Yeah.
This is the library. This room is great. It’s beautiful, and we use it for a variety of reasons. We host events here with our founders and different people within the community. As you can see, we also have these desks where we often host portfolio companies or companies that aren’t in the portfolio that need a place to work. It also is a library, with lots of books on the shelves that many of us have read.
Do you have a favorite?
Let’s see. One of my favorites is The Messy Middle. Shout-out to USV product advisory partner Scott Belsky. This is his book, and it’s about the middle of the startup journey. There are many books written about the early days and the formation. There are also lots of books written about the success stories and what happens at the end, but I believe Scott’s vision with The Messy Middle was really about what happens in the middle, which is the hardest part, as most startups are not straight lines. That’s a great book. Let’s see what else. Shoe Dog is obviously a classic. There are a lot of good books on this bookshelf.
4. An AI agent that runs your portfolio
Speaking to your point about going earlier with this fund, you guys are also incubating companies. You just released one that you incubated yourselves, SuperTakes.
Yes. One of the things we’ve been talking about is that it’s getting easier and easier to build products, get them to market quickly, and test them quickly. One of the things we’ve been talking about as a partnership for a long time now is the idea that, as a result of AI, it’s never been easier for people to take control of their own financial independence.
We’re coming out of a world in which huge companies and a huge market have been built on paying people for financial expertise and financial services. With SuperTakes, we believe that regular consumers should be able to invest in their ideas without having to know anything about the stock market, picking stocks, building a portfolio, rebalancing, or actively managing a portfolio.
With SuperTakes, it literally does all that for you through an agent. You just give it an idea or belief you have about the world, and SuperTakes will go and invest in that idea directly through your Robinhood or Coinbase accounts or other brokerages. Then it will actively manage it for you. It will tell you how it’s doing, check the news for you regularly, and, if something’s broken in the portfolio, automatically rebalance it for you.
It really speaks to the types of companies that we look for and to the theme of “obliterate, don’t automate,” which we could talk about when we discuss our thesis. We think AI companies are not only making it easier and faster to achieve existing processes in the market, but are literally restructuring markets completely, because humans now have access to intelligence and expertise that previously they had to pay a lot of money for. SuperTakes is a great example of that and something that we were able to build ourselves, at least for the initial product.
That’s awesome. Did you build it in this room?
We did not build it in this room. We built it in lots of other rooms, though.
If it’s becoming so much easier to start companies, and you can do it with just one person, why do we need venture capital?
It’s still expensive for a startup to operate and scale a business. Obviously, things like inference are becoming more and more of a line item for startups. Great products are getting built, but to subsidize those products and make sure that customers can actually use them, maybe without having to pay themselves at first...
More and more startups are subsidizing inference on behalf of customers. The other thing I would say is, as it is becoming easier and easier to start a company, there are so many more companies, and therefore it’s probably harder than ever to actually stand out and break out from the pack. We’re seeing startups getting more and more aggressive about their go-to-market and marketing strategies and making sure that they can really break through the noise. I think startups are always going to be expensive to maintain, operate, build, and break out. It’s just building the actual product, I would say, that is arguably easier than ever before.
So, we just walked through the entire floor. This is the main floor, right?
Yeah. Yeah, this is the main floor.
What are your favorite parts about this office? You’ve worked at different offices not too far away. So, what’s your favorite vibe about this space?
I’ll tell you, one of the things I really love about the USV office is that there are lots of different vibes in the office. You come in, and it’s very comfortable. It’s very homey, with beautiful furniture, chairs, and couches. As you get further in, it’s more of a coworking space, with people working and talking. As you go in the back, you have a little bit more of an introspective place in the library, where you can get some quiet. Then, as we’ll see in a bit, the roof offers a whole different element. Whereas I feel like most New York City offices, especially small offices, just feel like you’re in a room, right?
There really are actual different personalities to this office, and we have light.
Yeah. As I said earlier, pretty much every corner of this office gives you a different view of New York City, which I think is really cool because it’s my favorite.
Do you have a good window cleaner? What’s the secret?
It’s a good question. I’m not sure who cleans the windows, but they clearly do a great job.
We’ve made it to the rooftop. What goes on up here?
This is just a really great place to work when the weather’s nice. We’ll come up here, and I’ll take some calls. People do lunch up here. We also occasionally have different get-togethers and meetups with founders. There’s a party that we often have here every fall that people really like.
Much like downstairs, as I mentioned, the nice thing about being upstairs on the roof is that you have an amazing view from pretty much everywhere. Right through this archway here, you can see a perfect view straight up Park Avenue, which I think is incredible. You can see the Empire State Building. If you walk over this way, you can see all the way across the Hudson River to New Jersey. On really nice days, the sunsets on this side of the roof are really spectacular. So, it’s a great roof, it’s a great feature of the office, and it’s something that I think we all really appreciate.
5. Agents won't watch Netflix for you
We’re experiencing some good fall weather today. Okay, what is your hottest take right now?
My hottest take, I would say, is that the user interface is not going away. I think one of the things we’re seeing all over X is that people love to say that the user interface is dead, and everything is being collapsed and folded into a chatbot. I don’t believe that to be true. I think the user interface is where people build trust with a product, where they gain comfort and know how to navigate different experiences. I think the user interface is how products convey different concepts and ideas visually.
I have a hard time imagining that we’re just going to be delegating all of our computing away to agents. Yes, I think agents will do many things for us, especially the things we don’t want to do. They might go shopping for us. They might file our taxes for us. But they’re not going to watch Netflix for us. They’re not going to watch YouTube for us. They might not even scroll X or Instagram for us, right? I think we’re going to want to do those things. So, I have a hard time imagining that the user interface is just going to turn into a chatbot everywhere.
Okay, pretty good hot take.
Thanks.
Thank you. Thanks for having us.
Thank you. Thanks for having us, Molly.
6. USV's new strategy for the AI era
So, we have Fred, Rebecca, and Mike. How are you guys doing?
We’re great. Yeah.
Feeling really good.
All right. So, we have a huge announcement we need to discuss. Who wants to take it away?
I think you should take it.
All right. Well, we’re excited. We closed our most recent set of funds and raised $900 million. In many ways, it’s a continuation of what USV has now been doing for many decades: a thesis-driven, great partnership with founders, backing businesses that we think are going to be leaders of their markets over the next decade.
But it’s also a bigger number than we’ve raised before, somewhat significantly, and marks a new strategy for us. The market has evolved. We think the outcomes are bigger, the swings are bigger, and the opportunity to leverage the new technology in the market and the applications that will be built on top is super significant. The rounds are bigger, more expensive, and faster, and we are evolving our strategy to keep up with that and really be able to attack that market.
Amazing. So, maybe we go back to the 2004 LP letter. What were you talking about then, and how is it different today?
Well, that was early on in the internet era. Commercial internet had arrived in ’95, and by 2003, a lot of the underlying infrastructure had been built. It’s not very different from where we are with AI. A lot of the AI infrastructure has been built, but we’re still waiting to see what the big applications will be that get built on top of it.
That’s where we were in 2003. The infrastructure was there. We had Google, Amazon, Yahoo, and eBay, but we didn’t yet have Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or the iPhone. We imagined that there were going to be all these new applications built on top of what we now think of as the web. I think the moment we’re in right now reminds me a lot of that, except now it’s AI.
Couldn’t agree more. I think we feel, like Fred said, that the AI infrastructure has been built. Obviously, it’s still getting built, and there’s going to be more and more opportunity, but we’re at this moment where we’re starting to see the beginnings of what feels like an explosion of the application layer of AI.
Obviously, there are products that we’ve all now been using for the past couple of years, like Granola and Suno and things like that. But just over these past weeks, everyone’s been talking about a whole new type of application layer with Instinct and Muse and Grockbot. It feels like we’re entering a new phase where agents will be powering a lot of new experiences, both for enterprises and consumers. That’s really exciting for us.
7. The real cost of building in AI
So, I’m curious: how do you justify the round-size increases if models are—if it’s preferred now to go to open source and it’s cheaper? Where does all that capital go?
I think something we talk about often is how it is getting dramatically easier to build a product. We recently announced that we incubated a product that we built very quickly and very cheaply, and lots of other builders are doing the same thing. But what that means is that there are so many more startups that you have to stand out from and break through the noise from.
One area that a lot of the capital is going toward is doing just that: breaking out, marketing, messaging, and positioning. I think we’re seeing a lot more investment, especially in consumer, for startups trying to break through the noise.
We’re excited about open-source models, and we see the trend moving in that direction. There’s a lot of promise there. If you look at the fundamental cost that companies are spending on compute, it’s in a totally different hemisphere than it’s ever been. Even if you take something like Instinct, the numbers they’re talking about on what they’re going to have to spend on compute to service their needs are pretty wild. So, that’s a really different cost space.
There are a bunch of big questions out there. How much does that go down? I think we’re in this time, and we feel like we’ve been in this time, where we don’t know the asymptotes of things. We don’t know when models stall. We don’t know how low compute goes. One of the challenging and maybe exciting things is that you’re playing a little bit against an unknown field, but there’s a fundamental cost of compute that is part of the conversation and kind of a cost block for companies that really wasn’t there before.
8. Who protects you from your own AI agent?
The other thing going on is that the types of companies we are investing in and that are scaling in the market are different and more varied than probably at any other time in USV history. We have software applications that are emerging that we believe are going to leverage this new technology to totally transform how we live, how we work, how we are productive, and all these kinds of things.
But we’ve also had a robust energy portfolio, and we believe that programmable, cheaper, faster energy is the horizontal undercurrent of everything being built on top.
And the cost structures of those energy companies are totally different, as are our investments in physical AI and the physical world, right? We're investing in things that are really full-stack robotics companies that are building their own models, as well as the deployment on top, and sensor businesses. And so they have different cost structures that are requiring both different levels of capital and sometimes different types of capital than previous eras have justified.
One thing on inference: It actually reminds me of an earlier era of technology, maybe the mobile era or even the post-internet era, where you had these great consumer products and businesses subsidized usage to make sure these products could get adopted as far and as wide as possible before customers were forced to pay. I think right now we're coming out of a period where AI applications in the enterprise and consumer have been more paid for by customers. We're coming out of a lot of subscription businesses, but now products like agents—to your point about inference—we're seeing that startups actually want to subsidize the inference and pay for it on behalf of customers to reach that critical mass of adoption.
9. Betting on markets that don't exist yet
I do think it's actually going to be pretty expensive to build large-scale consumer businesses if you don't want your customers subscribing. OpenAI and Anthropic are still subsidizing core chat offerings, right? I mean, Claude will ask you to start paying at some point, but ChatGPT has been free for how long? Gemini is still free, right? A startup can't come in and charge for something that their competitor is giving away for free. And so I think you're right that inference, or compute, is going to be an expensive subsidy for fast-growing apps for a while.
10. The fight over monetizing Twitter
Yeah. I have a question. In the early days of Twitter or Facebook, they offered something for free to the market. And I think one of the things that USV believed in those days is that giving away a lot of value for free in order to back into an opportunity to create a network was a very good strategy. Did it feel like they needed more money than other companies had ever needed because they were doing that?
They did need a lot of money. I mean, Twitter's original financing was $5 million, and then a year later it was $25 million, and then a year later it was $100 million. At that time, those were big numbers, relatively speaking, right? We could multiply by 10 and you'd get to $50 million, $250 million, and $1 billion.
That's kind of what we're seeing now, right? And that was also 2007, so that's 20 years ago. Just pure inflation is going to give you a multiple too. I think what's also interesting about that era compared to this one is that a lot of these products, as people have pointed out, are not that retentive, because there aren't things like network effects. But back then, with Twitter and Facebook, I have to imagine that you all were seeing these and saying, "We need to scale these things as quickly as possible, because once we do, we're going to have this incredible network effect, and there's going to be this incredible lock-in." It feels like it—
What was different then, which I don't think is true anymore, was that not every VC saw that—
The network effect.
Yeah. In the early days of Facebook and Twitter, there were venture capitalists who were arguing, "We need to monetize this. We need to have a subscription so we can have a revenue line that will allow us to finance the company." And there were others—we were in the other camp—who were arguing that, no, if we can get 10 million, 50 million, 100 million users, we will be able to finance the company. We ended up winning that argument, and we were right about that. And that's really how that model emerged that companies used, even to this day, to get to network effects.
I wonder if one analogous thing is that there's the belief right now that if you look at these emerging consumer agents, the answer is scale, right? The functionality is not all that different among them, but if you hit breaking points of scale—or maybe distribution—you can win markets, and so it's a race to see if you can have the right compute and the right distribution to get there. There's another strategy, which is one that we've been talking a lot about, which is maybe more analogous to the Twitter era: You actually may still need a network effect in order to maintain longevity and have retentive behavior. And that network effect is going to come with who can really be the first and best at multiplayer behavior, taking these new single-player behaviors and figuring out how to make them truly multiplayer. It's not that we don't need network effects anymore; it's just that we need to get there, and we haven't seen a new way. We haven't really seen them yet.
11. Why Amazon is shutting out agents
I want to push back on the agent economy so much because it's kind of obvious every single company is going to have an agent of some sort. You'll probably have more secure sandboxing within those. I mean, we were joking about this earlier, but it's kind of true: You input all of your sensitive data, and it kind of roams free. But it's clear with Facebook and Muse. I mean, Deel even launched theirs for most of its management work and that kind of thing. Every company will have an agent of some sort. Obviously, it's one of the most cost-intensive things because it's running so many different programs at once, and nodes and that kind of thing, but I just have to push back on that. So, do you think that's a viable long-term category? How does that compare with years ago?
We do. We do. We think that Amazon will have an agent. So I'll have my Amazon agent, and I'll have my Shopify agent, and I'll have my Etsy agent. But I think I'll also want to have my shopping agent, or maybe just my agent that will talk to my Amazon agent, my Etsy agent, and my Shopify agent, so that I don't actually have to be managing conversations with each and every one of those agents. I can just have my agent go off and do a task.
Today, what's happening is the agents, as you point out, are logging into these services and kind of pretending to be me. Amazon doesn't like that. I think last week they said to Manus, "We're not going to let Manus access Amazon," right? We'll see more of that. But I think eventually what will happen is there will be some standard or some way of agents connecting to the agents that each service offers you and making it easier. So I think we're in the early innings of how this plays out, but we do believe that people will want their own agents that represent them, as opposed to Amazon only having my Amazon agent.
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Before we go too far, let's talk about USV's strategic positioning: where you guys are investing and what your typical check size is. And what was the pitch to LPs? Was it an easy one?
Yeah. So USV has always, for its history, really been focused on the early stage, mainly Series A, sometimes some seed, sometimes a little bit more than that. I think we're going to continue to play the same game, invest in the same stages, for the most part. But to Rebecca's point from earlier, we're going to be doing it with a slightly larger capital base—not so that we can do many more deals or fewer deals, but more because, as we talked about earlier, the shape of the market and the shape of the deals has changed.
As it's gotten easier to build, there's also much, much more demand flowing in in the form of capital, and startups are raising more. So for a fund like ours to stick to our strategy, to stick to our various ownership targets, and make the fund math work, we need to write slightly larger checks. It doesn't necessarily change the way we think about deals or the way we think about companies or our thesis-driven investing. It's more of a reflection of where the market is today.
I think USV has a long history with a group of LPs that have been very, very loyal to USV, and I think USV has been loyal and good to them as well. So there's a lot of trust established there.
We added some new ones. What was interesting to me was that LPs see the same thing we're seeing. They see it too.
We're not living in different worlds. They see it too. Maybe a few years ago, this would have been an edgier push than it was right now because the market has pretty clearly moved in a direction.
You cannot like things about the market, but you're unlikely to change the things about the market. We believe that it's a pretty unique time to be on the field investing, and we want to be on the field in the right way.
We have 4 areas that we talk a lot about in conversations like this, on our website, with our LPs, and with founders: physical AI, AI applications, AI infrastructure, and energy. Those are the areas that we're investing in, and we're consistent about that everywhere. Our LPs understand that.
There are other areas out there. Founders who are working in those areas have lots of places to go to, but they don't come to us because we're not loud about those things. The things that we are loud about, founders find their way to us.
I think that's what we mean when we say the strategy is kind of the same as it's always been at USV. We're thesis-driven. There are things we like, and there are things we don't like.
$900 million may represent a big jump up for us, but relatively speaking, it's still maybe considered small relative to a bunch of other funds. I think that size and this thesis-driven approach are what enable us to play the game that we want to play relative to the rest of the market.
12. Why smaller funds pick better
Well, to that point, I was an LP at one point in my career, and there are very few funds to invest in. You typically know which ones you're going to invest in a year before you invest. It's all dated and very organized.
Were they waiting for you to raise larger? Did you have pressure for that over the years? One thing that I think USV has always done quite well—and I think Fred and Brad said this—is that we're very communicative with our LPs. We talk to them a lot. We don't take their support for granted.
We do quarterly calls. We update them on our strategy and our portfolio. We tell them what's working, what's not working, what we're thinking, and where our heads are. By the time we come and say, “Okay, we're going to shift the fund size from X to Y,” they've known it's coming. This is part of a conversation that's been going on for a long time.
I was a little surprised by how many of them said, “Are you sure you shouldn't raise more?”
Really?
Yeah. Again, we're not living in a bubble, right? They're seeing the same things in the world that we are, and they're seeing the landscape of what's advantaged.
Why have a small fund? I think there are a bunch of reasons. One, you can return it more easily, get into carry, and have the dynamics of the fund work the way you want them to. Two, you can be pickier, right?
We always want to manage a fund in a bottom-up way. When I say that, what I mean is there's a universe of companies. We don't want to say we need to be in X% of them for this math to work. We want to say we have strong hypotheses and ideas about what we want to do, and if we're right enough about the ones we do that are aligned with us, this fund is going to be a big success.
We don't want to get bigger than that strategy allows for. But that number has shifted, and so that was an ongoing conversation with the LPs.
It also aligns interests, right? When the funds are small, it focuses the results on the performance of the portfolio companies, and everyone rallies around that. When the funds are really big, it potentially distorts the incentives a bit. That's one thing that I've really appreciated about USV's small-fund strategy.
When you started USV, did you want it to stay a small fund, or did you ever want it to be a really big fund?
I like the earlier stage of investing. When we started, we were thinking of writing a $3 million Series A check. Obviously, that number has changed a lot over the years, but that's where we wanted to be, and that's where we still want to be.
13. What Series A looks like now
What is a typical Series A today?
I'd say it starts with 10.
I think 10 is now on the small side.
That's why I say it starts with 10.
Yes, 10. You're obviously seeing some Series A rounds that are $100 million or—
A billion.
A billion, right? We also know what's not in our zone. That's not in our zone.
Overall, we want to lead or co-lead investments. We want to make real bets in things and stand behind them. There might be a time when we break that and write a strategic check into something in a different way, but overall, that's really our strategy.
The Series A checks that we believe in this fund will probably be 10 to 30. They don't have to be the whole round, so the rounds could be bigger than that, but that's probably what we're looking at. Then we'll do a lot of seeds, and we'll even do some earlier than seeds. Maybe Michael can talk a little bit about that, too.
One of the things that we've been thinking a lot about at the seed stage is what new and different strategies we can pursue as a partnership that USV hasn't traditionally pursued to get real ownership at the seed stage.
One thing could be taking more pure founder bets. As a thesis-driven firm, we haven't done a ton of that in the past. Another thing could be that, earlier, we talked about how much easier it is to build something than ever before—how much cheaper and how much faster.
We have a lot of strong opinions about different categories and theses, and in some cases, we feel like it might make sense to actually build something inside the partnership as a bit of an incubation.
There's another slant on that. We have a couple venture partners, Jared Hec and Scott Bellski, who are really accomplished entrepreneurs, product thinkers, and builders. Working with them and Michael, who is also very much in that camp, we can do things that aren't really an incubation.
We have an idea, we go find somebody who maybe wants to start something, and we partner with them to get it off the ground. We're not the founder per se, but it's a situation where we have full ball control, if you will, and we'll provide maybe the first 2 checks into it before it goes out to market.
This is all a continuum between real incubation, founder bets, and what I would call proprietary seeds. I think those will make up as much as a third to a half of all the seed investments we make.
As Michael said, it's getting easier and easier to prototype something, take it to a small group of users, get real feedback, and see if you've got something or not.
That's a good point. So how has the way in which you diligence these companies, and the milestones and success metrics, changed over time? What do you look for now, or what do you overlook now, that you might have looked at before?
One of the things that I've been really excited by, coming in as USV's newest partner, is how much this team cares about products. It feels like the deals that we've dug in on sort of always require—not a hard requirement, but it feels like there needs to be somebody on the team who's really excited about the product.
Obviously, that can't always work, especially in today's market where, as we just mentioned, in some cases we want to go earlier and earlier and just bet on a founder—maybe somebody that's in our network that we really trust—but—
Or we're betting on micro nuclear reactors, you know.
Right, exactly. So it can't always be—
That's a little different. In the energy side of our business, it's different. But I would say in anything that touches the consumer, it's a combination of what Michael said, which is using the product and getting an instinctive feel for whether the product is good or not.
When you combine that with retention data and cohort data, the magic is when the thing you feel is the thing you see in the data. Either the retention that you feel and see, or maybe you're like, “I might churn off of this because of X, Y, Z,” and you see that in the data. Then you're like, “Oh, they're going to have a churn problem.”
It's a combination of using the product and a product-native mindset, combined with a lot of data and really looking at cohorts and understanding what real users are doing.
I think the other thing, though, is that team is, and always has been, the most important thing. No great company can be built or started without an A-plus-plus team.
We actually debate that sometimes because there are examples of crazy runaway network-effect businesses where the momentum of the network can carry it far enough that maybe team matters less. But I think in today's world, team always plays an important role. I would argue it's playing an even more important role than ever, for a bunch of reasons.
One is that I think great hiring is harder than it's ever been.
There's massive, massive talent competition, and so the ability to pull people away who are excellent from really, really strong other opportunities—sometimes where they're getting paid a lot of money by large labs or incumbents or whatever it is, or startups that have raised billions of dollars—you need the right founders who can really mobilize a world around that.
The other reason is that I think narratives and market narratives are aggregating faster than they ever have. The market is designating winners, right, and telling these stories in a way where value aggregates, often in a way that way, way, way precedes where the business is. So the ability to be the founder who drives that story, gathers that attention, breaks through the noise, and designates themselves as the owner of a market very early is super important, both for investors and raising money, for teams, for customers. That narrative piece and storytelling, I think, we are paying way more attention to now than we probably have in other markets.
14. Is ARR a fake metric?
Also, if it's easier than ever to build a product, we want to back founders that we believe can really go the distance, right? And that's, I think, more rare than ever.
I know this is—we're talking early stage—but as the companies mature, you guys are sophisticated investors. You are actually looking at performance metrics. It's clear which ones end up becoming scams because they're really good at marketing themselves, and which ones actually have performance, revenue, and that kind of traction.
So I'm trying to get below the layer of, "Yes, it's a great product; yes, it's a great team; yes, it's a great founder." What do you want that team to be focused on? Is it retention? Is it revenue? What do you care about?
So, last time I was on Sourcery, there's a clip now that I see on X all the time from that interview where I guess I said ARR is a fake metric. I said something like that. I see this.
I think ARR has become a metric that a lot of investors pay attention to, given how fast the revenue rate has ramped for so many of these companies. But I think one thing that we care a lot about is clicking a layer deeper than that.
So many of these products now are subscription-based. We talked a little bit earlier about how so many products are subscription-based. I think it's easier than ever before to get somebody to pay for a product via subscription without knowing if they actually like that product. A lot of the subscription plans are annual. A lot of the time, you have to pay just to try the thing.
And so we try to look often more at the true usage retention of the product. How often are people actually coming back to this product and using it? Are they coming back every day? Are they coming back every week? Do they churn out after a month? I think that's probably a more telling thing to look at than just revenue retention.
Yes, great, if the company can hold on to that revenue for a year or 2 years or 3 years. Obviously, that's going to show up in the business. But if the product isn't good, at some point they're going to churn and the business is going to fall apart. So I think people should be paying more attention to that, like we used to, I'd say, in an earlier era of investing.
I think it's user retention and product innovation. I think we're in a moment in the market, on the consumer application side, where trial behavior is at an absolute high. Totally.
And engagement behavior is at an absolute low. And that makes sense, right? We're getting thrown so many new things all the time in the market, and you have to pay to try them.
You have to pay to try them, and we want to. It's on the news. It's the main discourse in the world. Everyone's like, "Are you up to speed? Have you tried Instinct [?] Have you tried Muse? Have you tried Robinhood?" We want to try them all. We're going to stick with very few.
So the trial behavior is a little bit of a fake-out, right? Because we know you can get people to try, but it's only really going to have long-term value if you can get it to integrate into someone's life.
Totally.
And so figuring out how to tell that is, I think, the whole thing. Part of that is watching how someone iterates on product, right? I don't only think it's great product insight. It's what are the little hooks and things they do, and changes they make, that keep that product going and fresh and different?
Because realistically, the idea that we get full insight into retentive product behavior before we get to make a decision is not really true, right? If we really needed that, we'd be having to write way, way bigger checks than we would like to write here. So we're going to have to make an inference about that with less data than maybe we would like, and so I think you're looking for a proxy for that, both on the team and on the data side, that gives you the sense that that's to come.
But a lot of this that we've just been talking about, I think of as a seed, Series A, Series B kind of conversation. One of the hallmarks of USV is that we are very long-term investors. We're still, all of us, working on companies that we funded over a decade ago.
And so, as these companies grow, what you want to see is that the team can launch new products and new lines of business. We had all of our CEOs together last week at our annual CEO summit. One of the stars of our 2016 fund is this company called Abridge, which is an AI-for-healthcare company. Shiv was telling a bunch of us, just in a casual conversation, that they had made all of their money for the last 5 or 6 years on a single product, and he's most proud of the fact that in the last 12 months they've launched 2 new products—really, 2 new lines of business.
So now it's a 3-legged stool instead of a 1-legged stool. It's going to be a much more stable business. And the 3 products are very synergistic. When a customer adopts 1, they're kind of locked in. When they adopt the second one, they're more locked in. When they adopt the third, they're kind of all in on Abridge.
So that, to me, is the evolution of a company that's going from being a great company to being potentially a fantastic company. And the thing about venture capital, as anybody who studies it—you've been an LP, so you know—is that usually 2 or 3, maybe 4 companies per fund end up being the stars of that fund.
And to be 1 of those companies, 1 of 2 or 3 things has to happen. What's happening in Abridge is probably my favorite example of a company that can become something that could be like a 100×.
Well, one of the things I like about that, and I think, is that if you think about Abridge, or a bunch of the winners that have emerged, including Twitter, they're often not straight lines. It's not like they popped immediately and it was obvious, right? Abridge in 2016, you know—
And we're seeing a lot of companies now that feel like they are straight—
Lines. Obviously, it's unlikely that that's the story.
15. 20 years of USV's biggest wins
That's a good point. So, to dig into—I guess this pattern, if there is one, over time—is it obvious to see that in a company? Is it a straight line, to Rebecca's point?
If we go back, USV has probably now had over 10 early-stage funds in the life of USV, and every single one of them has produced 2 or 3 really great companies. If you just sit there and list them, in our first fund we had Twitter, Etsy, and Indeed.com.
Indeed.com—we still see ads on TV. We haven't been an investor in that company in 15 years, but I suspect that company is 50 or 100 times bigger than when we sold it a decade or more ago.
And then, in our second fund, we had MongoDB and Twilio, which were products that developers used. Then we had Stripe, Coinbase, and Duolingo. Now we're getting into the more recent era. Abridge is a 2016 company, and I've left off a few, but there are probably 20 or 25 companies that we've invested in over the last 20 years that I would consider to be extraordinary companies—not just in terms of the investment that we made, but in terms of what they've become.
Indeed is really interesting. We were there at the very beginning. It was Paul and Rony and a couple of engineers, and they had this idea. Today it's probably the largest job-hiring system in the world, and it just came out of nowhere to become that. You watch these things emerge that way, and it's remarkable.
Twitter—now we know what it is. It's one of the most important pieces of media infrastructure in the world. When we invested, it was 5 or 6 people, right? So that's pretty interesting.
And one of the things that we can give founders—and we're not alone in this, by the way—is that there are plenty of people here at USV who have that kind of perspective on what it takes to really build a generational type of company, and the fact that it's not a straight line, right?
Coinbase was a series of little moves and then flat for a long time, then a little move, flat for a long time, with a couple of big breakouts in 2017 and 2019 that led to it becoming a public company. So it's never a straight line to the top, and sometimes there are management changes. Twitter's sort of famous for having a revolving door of CEOs for a long time.
So that's its own set of things that you have to work through sometimes.
But if you take Abridge, for instance, the idea of the product was very similar, but it went down a very different go-to-market road for years. That didn't get them anywhere, and it turned out not to be the go-to-market road that made sense for that product at that time. What was it? Consumer.
Consumer.
The idea was that you would walk into a doctor's office and record the appointment.
And so you think you back a whole business, right? You think you back this idea that patients want to record themselves in their medical appointments for XYZ reasons, and you're backing this team to go after that. What you learn you're backing is not that. You're backing a team, a product sense, and a direction, right?
What you backed was the idea that Shiv could build the team that took this kernel of an idea that was directionally right and kind of wrong in the details to start, and navigate it to the place where the right product—and then, as Fred talked about, eventually the right series of products—met the right go-to-market at the right time. That sometimes happens right away, and sometimes it takes a while. You need teams that are going to be able to go on that journey and fight that out.
It's usually an extraordinary founder, though. Not always, but Shiv's an extraordinary founder, and the other startup that we backed in Pittsburgh, Duolingo, again had an extraordinary founder.
More of a straight line.
No, no. The first product—
What was the first product of Duolingo? It was translating foreign-language documents.
No, it had nothing to do with that.
He's amazing.
Founders, as Rebecca said earlier, who can combine a vision for something that they want to exist in the world with the ability to tell that story and galvanize the right people, the right investors, and the right product—that's what we've all seen. We know when we look at it, we're like, “Oh, that's a great founder.”
But it's easier to see it when they're the CEO of a public company than when they're just walking in our door with an idea. And we get that wrong more than we get it right.
How do you get it wrong?
We think somebody can be a Luis or a Shiv, but it turns out that they can't get out of their own way. They overthink things. They struggle recruiting. They struggle retaining. They're a micromanager.
They struggle making hard decisions to make the big changes early enough, right? To say, “This go-to-market isn't working. Let's try something really different.” It's hard to burn boats as startups.
Mike's been a founder, so he has a lot of empathy for this.
Not a straight line.
Yeah, it's never a straight line. But everything these two are talking about right now is what I love about USV being thesis-driven. All of the examples that they both just cited, if you think about them in the context of when the bets were made, were extremely early.
The Coinbase bet was very, very early in the history of crypto. The Abridge bet was very, very, very early in the history of AI and data capture. And I think Rebecca's framework that she just laid out a few minutes ago about a great team and a direction of an idea is so important and so key. I think that's how USV has been successful: these bets were early.
Another one that we've been talking a lot about is Radiant, which Fred is on the board of. That bet was made before it was obvious to everyone in the world that energy was going to need to be so abundant for AI. But this team had a thesis and a point of view about the importance of energy, which is what led to that investment. And now, sure enough, how many years later—
We backed Radiant in 2021, so we're 5 years into that one.
Anyway, it just speaks to the power of thesis-driven investments. But I think, to your point and to your answer, Fred, we don't always get it right. Sometimes not only is the team or the person wrong, but sometimes the thesis is wrong.
Sometimes the benefit of thesis-driven investing is that you can do a few things. One, you can bet on spaces that are more on the come or less obvious because you have a prepared mind and perspective that you're bringing to it—something you believe. You're not just seeing a company and seeing what they believe; you have a belief.
You can also start the conversation with a founder in a different place, right? Because you're saying, “I have a set of hypotheses on something, and you have a set of hypotheses on something. Where do we align?” Which I think is actually a lot more fun and probably sets you up for a relationship in a different way, but also tends to get us to a better outcome than otherwise.
The risk is that there are a lot of ways you can be wrong. You can be wrong about people. You can be wrong on the whole thesis. You can go down a road that isn't the right road to go down. But when you go down the right one, it's worth it.
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I guess, to distill this theme down, what are the key behaviors or actions that successful companies make that win each technological shift? We're in a major technological shift right now. How have you seen that throughout time? What are the key behaviors of those teams or of those founders, and maybe the key traits of those types?
It's getting the idea right. What I mean by that is everybody knows that we're all going to have personal agents. But if you look at each of the products that are out there, they're all a little different in terms of how they feel and how they work.
Getting it right is the right set of features stitched together in the right way and delivered with the right business model, and then also with a team that has the ability to access capital and scale against the opportunity if they actually catch fire.
So I think it's not just the ability to raise capital. There are lots of people who are great at raising capital, but they can't build a product that really wins. And there are people who build a product that really wins, but they can't galvanize a team or money, and so they get beat. It's the ones who can do both that ultimately really win.
Was identifying that aspect of fundraising ability as important maybe 10 years ago? Was it as obviously important 10 years ago?
The interesting thing, and Rebecca alluded to this earlier, is that sometimes if a product really catches fire, it can raise money even without the right team around it. And then you, the founding team, and the board have to scramble to figure out how to fix the team and get it right so that all the things can come together.
I would say that was true at Twitter. That was also true at Etsy. So it isn't always the case that the right product emerges from a team that has maybe the right stuff to make it a lasting business.
16. Will Anthropic compete with its customers?
Why is one of the categories called Rebel Alliance?
“Rebel” is just in the sense that there are now the established winners in AI, which would be OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, and Gemini—I guess all that's Google.
And then there's this open-source world out there of open-source models, open-weight models, open-source harnesses, and all this other infrastructure that you can stitch together to build something that looks like Claude or looks like Cursor or some sort of full-stack product.
We call it the Rebel Alliance because a lot of developers out there don't want to build on a closed stack. They're worried that if they build on top of Claude, for example, just to pick on Anthropic, somehow Anthropic will ultimately compete with them and then they'll get cut out.
And this famously sort of happened in the early days of social media. People built lots of businesses on top of Facebook, and Facebook ultimately decided they wanted to be in those businesses themselves, and they got cut out. So developers out there have this concern.
I need a stack that I can control and trust. We call it the Rebel Alliance because there are people who are kind of rebelling against the leading emerging stacks and trying to construct their own.
It turns out that stack is actually very large, and there are lots of layers—not only for opportunity, but for the different needs of developers. There are things like alignment with the models and making sure that the models are aligned with the needs of the enterprise or the customer. There are things like memory and routing, and there are the models themselves, making sure that they're open-weight so a developer can actually manipulate them the way they need to.
17. Why Coinbase moved off Claude
We feel like not only is there this uprising of developers who don't want to be beholden to one player or ecosystem, but it's also a very large space with lots of layers, which is why it represents an entire thesis for us. We had a moment onstage last week at the USV CEO Summit where I was interviewing the CTO of Coinbase about some of the changes they've made organizationally to become more AI-centric and how they do the work. He casually mentioned that they moved away from Claude and built their own harness—their own coding-agent harness—on an open-source product called Pi.
We're an investor in this company, Arendelle[?], which put Pi out into the market. I didn't even know that had happened. I was just like, "Yes, you know, it's great." But that's true of tons of developers.
Any other areas?
18. Your AI lawyer is the worst it'll ever be
I think energy in general was an area that we staked out early. We basically said, "Look, if you want a simple way to bet on AI and not have to think about all this other stuff, just bet on energy."
We're not just doing that, by the way. It's 20% to 30% of our portfolio, but we feel like it's a very levered bet on AI.
19. An AI doctor that writes prescriptions
It's a good one. We talk a lot about "Obliterate, Don't Automate," which is another phrase for the investments we're making at the application layer of AI. The way we think about that is the idea that a new—
AI is going to kill us all. No, no—
No, no. Opposite.
—that it may obliterate an existing market. There was an era of software over the past decade—SaaS, enterprise software—that was really about automating businesses and markets that already existed. But with AI, businesses and consumers can tap into intelligence that was previously gatekept by really large organizations or institutions, at a fraction of the cost.
We believe that through this, entire markets can literally be restructured through the democratization of intelligence. A great example is healthcare. We have an investment in a company called Doctronic, where they're leveraging AI not just to make the existing healthcare system more efficient or practical, but to literally give consumers a doctor in their pocket in the form of AI—
—that can actually write prescriptions in some states.
Really?
Utah, right now.
What kind of prescriptions?
You name it. What do you mean?
Oh, no.
Probably not.
Probably not controlled substances. It's not controlled right now, really.
But you can see—
—anything you want.
But you can see that if everyone had access to a doctor literally on demand, immediately, for virtually no cost, what that would do to the existing healthcare market in this country.
One of the things that I love about "Obliterate, Don't Automate" is that it's perfectly applicable to this moment in time, but it's probably the best articulation of the thesis USV has always had. Fred actually wrote a blog post in 2014 called "Obliterate, Don't Automate" about the USV thesis.
We've always believed in the opportunity to restructure markets and drive the value back to the end user, away from the centers of power in the middle. You can do that with a whole new tool set right now. The opportunity to restructure healthcare, education, manufacturing, or whatever gives us the opportunity to drive value out of the middle to the end user in a totally different way because of the tool sets at hand.
A simple way to think about this is: don't hire a lawyer; use an AI lawyer. Don't hire an accountant; use an AI accountant. Don't hire a doctor; use an AI doctor.
No human whatsoever in the loop. It's not about selling AI to doctors, lawyers, or accountants. It's like, "I'm not going to have an accountant. I'm literally going to tell my AI to prepare my tax return. I'm going to give it access to my bank, and it'll do the numbers and send the IRS my tax return." I don't need a human, and I don't need to pay a human.
I would say 20% to 30% of the legal work that we do here at USV is no longer touched by a human lawyer. We know what our AI lawyer can do and what our AI lawyer shouldn't do. That's increasing over time, but we're not careless about it. There are certain things, like issuing a term sheet, where we don't need a lawyer to do anything.
No.
How many of those have you issued?
Right. We can train a model on all our previous term sheets and issue them. The thing that's exciting now isn't where everything is; it's the slope. If you just play out that slope, it covers a lot of—
Your AI lawyer is as bad as it's ever going to be.
It will never be as bad as it is today. The company that we recently announced, which we talked about as sort of an incubation startup, is another great example of this. The whole idea of that company is that you don't need expertise around the stock market, and you don't even need to pay a financial manager to come up with a portfolio strategy for you and then deploy it. You can just have the AI do that.
That's another example of breaking down the barriers around gatekept institutional knowledge through AI.
The age-old question would be: Why can't incumbents do that?
They won't do it. They have people. A lawyer is a perfect example. We say to a lawyer, "You can issue the term sheet. We're just not going to pay you to do it." And they're like, "Well, why would I do that? I have people to pay." Fine. Then I'll just use an AI lawyer to do it.
Their business model depends on the people. The incumbents cannot—and I think it's particularly powerful in people-based businesses—offer something for free.
Our partner Brad, I think, always says this best: The best time to bet against an incumbent is when what you want them to do fundamentally threatens their current business. It's very hard for major incumbents to burn their own boats and take that kind of risk.
There is plenty of news about certain law firms hiring engineers and machine-learning talent—
—and JPMorgan is going into AI. Did you see that?
Yes, exactly. They're trying to build the models, and some of them will do it and some will try, but overall it will cannibalize their own business.
Right. Google has done, I think, an admirable job. They know that Gemini is going to cannibalize Google Search, and the numbers are staggering. I saw last week that search is way, way down. It's dramatic.
They are doing it, but they have all these other businesses. They've got YouTube, they've got Waymo, they've got Gmail, and they've got Android. They can literally kill the thing that funded all those other businesses because they now have all the other businesses. If all they had was search and they had never built those other businesses, they'd be in a world of hurt right now.
Yeah. A lot of publicly traded incumbents are going to have a really hard time doing this because they have to answer to their shareholders and keep revenues going up and to the right.
But I think your fundamental question is the one we're thinking about all the time. It's not only why incumbents can't do it; it's why anyone can do it.
Right.
Right. Why can't I build that agent to do my taxes? Why can't I train my own? We trained our own legal model; we didn't buy it. So what is going to create advantage in this moment, when building is faster and more efficient than ever?
That's something we're thinking about. It goes back to network effects, speed, team, and product decisions that are going to make these abstractions the ones people rely on, as well as categories like physical AI, data at the edge, energy, and things that operate in a somewhat different way than software.
So, an area where all of this is directing us—it’s part of the Rebel Alliance—is trust and security. How are you thinking about cybersecurity and all of those types of things as we obliterate and automate everything?
It’s definitely an area that I think is about to change. A lot of cyber focus over the past few decades has been focused on the enterprise. It’s probably going to undergo a lot of change at the consumer layer now, just because of how many consumers are going to be, I think you said earlier, handing over everything to their agent, whether it’s Instinct or Grockbot or Muse.
One of the things I was thinking about just this morning was the concept of password reset. That’s going to have to change. If you give your agent access to your email, which is where all your password-reset emails go, it will automatically be able to access literally every account you own. So, it’s definitely an area we’re thinking about. We haven’t traditionally made a ton of investments there, especially at the enterprise level, as we mentioned.
But it’s an area that’s going to change dramatically.
We have a portfolio company. They call themselves Common Fabric now.
They just announced, right?
Yes, Common Fabric. It’s a sandbox that’s focused on this very issue: How do you give users the security that they want, but also the power that they need? They have a particular approach. I think it will be interesting to see whether that approach or a different approach emerges, but we have a lot of conviction that users are going to need some new help with security around this stuff.
People get spooked by those AI videos all the time.
All the time. We’ve always been interested in this idea of security, privacy, and control with the user versus the platform. We’ve done that with more and less success over time, in terms of how much the end user actually cares about it.
There have been companies like DuckDuckGo that had enough of an audience that really cared about privacy and search, and that created a really, really strong business around it. There have been plenty of companies where we may want users to care about privacy and security, but there’s not enough of an incentive system for the end user to really care about it. That may be changing.
Right. It may be part of the conversation in a big enough way where things like on-device and private models, and these kinds of personal-security and more consumer-oriented products, may have a moment that they didn’t have in previous iterations because of the awareness, the scale, and all those kinds of things.
I also think things like biometrics may have a different kind of moment in terms of proving humanity. I think we may be entering a time where things that previously struggled to get attention have this moment to grow.
Molly and I saw a company this weekend that’s doing local models on your phone.
So, we’re there.
20. Fred Wilson's been hacked 4 times
Yeah, I think we’re there. Wow, surprise. Well, Fred, you’d know of all people, though, that it doesn’t just stop at that. Even in crypto, you could click a link and your whole wallet will be erased.
I’ve done it.
You’ve done it? Oh, wow. Do you have anything left?
No. No.
I should be worried.
So, what stops your agent from clicking the link? I have owned crypto assets for 15 years, and I’ve been hacked 4 times, but I still have about 99% of all my crypto.
Oh, not bad.
But I’ve been stupid and done things I shouldn’t have done, and not had my crypto as secure as it needed to be. I’ve learned the hard way, as most people in crypto have. If you talk to most people who have been in crypto for as long as I’ve been, they will tell you something similar to that. Hopefully, the ratio of losses to what they’ve kept is the same as mine, because I feel good about that.
There are some stories out there that are horrible, where people have lost everything. But I think most people got hacked, and it scared them enough to take the proper measures.
I almost lost all my crypto once. I got very close to being scammed. I was on the phone with a scammer for about 15 minutes, thinking they were legitimate.
Yeah, it was bad. My wife was like—
“You need to hang up the phone right now.” Sure enough, she was right. But I came very close to losing all of my crypto.
21. Coinbase: A security company in disguise
I mean, Coinbase—a company that I’m still on the board of, and one of our really great investments over the years here at USV—that’s a big part of what they do. They have cold storage, where they store assets super securely for their customers. There are 2-factor authentication, delayed withdrawals, and all these things that they do to protect those assets and literally protect their customers from their own stupidity, which I’m guilty of, by the way.
Yeah. In many ways, it’s a security company more than anything else, right?
Yeah. I mean, that’s an interesting analogy because people wanted to get into crypto and were interested in it, but it felt dangerous because you could get scammed all the time, and there was a big privacy risk. Coinbase came along and said, “Just give it to us, and we’re going to handle that part of it for you”—a trusted brand.
No offense.
Exactly.
Marketing.
Yeah, and most—
They’re the most trusted brand in the sketchiest industry ever.
That should be their tagline.
No, they make it literally seem so normal. It’s awesome. I’ve talked to them about it. Even Kate—they do a great job marketing.
And most people don’t know exactly how they’re keeping it safe, right?
Well, that’s on purpose.
Totally. Probably.
Yeah. Also, they don’t really care. As long as you trust that it’s safe, you don’t really need to know. I wonder if we’re at that tipping point or moment in AI as well, where everyone’s interested and we know it’s going to provide a lot of utility, but we’re looking for these trusted brands and platforms that can give us the comfort that things are in good hands.
I went to their last product launch in New York, just a couple of blocks away, and that was one of the questions that I asked both Kate and Brian: “You guys built the most trusted brand in one of the toughest markets. What do you think all these AI companies are getting wrong?”
What did they say?
Well, they’re telling people they’re going to lose their jobs and die, so that doesn’t help.
That doesn’t help.
It definitely doesn’t help.
It’s a good way to destroy trust.
Yeah.
I hope you don’t mind—I went over a bit because this dynamic just works really well. It’s awesome. We might not have that much time for solo questions, but I figured this is just awesome.
Maybe we just do the quick office thing. The 3 of us can just do that. You have to go in a few minutes. What time is it?
9:52.
Yeah, I’ve got 8 more minutes.
Okay, cool. I figure just 2 or 3 more questions. This is awesome.
Great. So, then maybe we’re—
You guys are so fun to talk to.
The vibe and the dynamic are great.
This is the vibe. What you’re seeing is the vibe among our partnership and, frankly, the entire team. I don’t mean to make it just about the partners. It’s a very conversational kind of back-and-forth, wanting to hear what the other person thinks and collectively coming to ideas together. That’s how we work.
Okay, so I’m going to ask you the hard question now.
Sure.
Do you expect every company to become a trillion-dollar company?
No, of course not. If you expected every company to become a trillion-dollar company, you would not be taking enough risk, right? Venture is based on an outlier mechanic, but we don’t invest in companies where we don’t see the opportunity ahead of us.
Do you think it’s realistic to think that these companies right now will become—I mean, obviously, Anthropic is not that old. We have ChatGPT, which is a little bit older—OpenAI—but I maybe have 2 takes on the question. One part of your question is: Does every market have to be a trillion dollars, right? Can you get into a market that you don’t see today?
I think one of the things that USV has done quite well historically is be willing to bet on markets that aren’t yet there but are on the come. Crypto was maybe the best example of it, and energy right now as well, along with education—these markets where, if you were underwriting exactly the dollars spent in crypto at the moment of a Coinbase investment, you would never get close to being able to underwrite the value of what that became, nor what that market became.
So, you need to bet on markets that you’re excited about today, but even more excited about where they’re going. We’re certainly doing that right now.
We've been talking about things like robotics and what can happen because of sensor proliferation. None of that is particularly interesting today in terms of what is live in the market. But when we look at 2030, 2040, or 2050, do we think those can be trillion-dollar markets? Absolutely.
Radiant Nuclear, right? The market for nuclear energy today is almost zero. It doesn't really exist. But we believe it's going to be one of the most essential energy sources out there. So we have an interest in and ability to write forward on markets—on what we think markets can become—versus only what they are today, which I think is really important to our strategy.
I think there was a time when we could underwrite businesses of different scale. Part of it was fund size, and part of it was market dynamics. There was a time when number 3, 4, or 5 in the market could still accrue a lot of value. I am not as sure that's where we are today.
Others may disagree, but I actually think value is aggregating to the top players faster than it ever has before. Interest isn't really there in the longer tail. So we're less interested in saying, “Well, we're not in the number 1 or 2 player, but maybe this number 3 or 4 player can get enough value that it's a great investment.” I think there was a time when that worked. I'm not sure that time is now.
In many ways, every USV investment has to be one where you almost believe it's a TAM expansion opportunity. If you're evaluating the size of the TAM as a fixed TAM when you make the investment, it's probably not going to make sense.
But I also think that if there was a time when we felt that if a company could be worth $500 million, we could make an investment, then I think the number grew to $1 billion. I don't think a trillion is what we need to underwrite to at USV. I think if our biggest winners are in the single-digit billions, given our fund size and our ownership, we can produce really healthy returns for our partners.
And that's where it's been. There have been some outliers at $50 billion or $100 billion, but a lot of our biggest winners are in the $10 billion range, and that's produced enormous returns for us.
I asked this also because I just came from Bending Spoons, and they're obviously buying up a lot of companies. They're doing it in the low-$1 billion range. They did some earlier ones and that kind of thing, but it was remarkably like the ZIRP era of funded companies that were at $11 billion or $15 billion and got written down to around $1 billion or $2 billion.
But how do you think about that valuation sensitivity today, and where does it get irrational?
If we get into companies early enough, at the earliest stages and with the right ownership size, as Fred just said, even exits in the single-digit billions can still be enormous for us, given the small fund size of our strategy.
This will always happen. There will be some companies that overshoot what they're really worth, and they'll come back to Earth. Not all companies—some companies are just rocket ships. But some companies have a moment where the world thinks they're worth $5 billion or $10 billion, but they really are worth $1 billion.
And that's perfect for Bending Spoons, right? Their model is really interesting. They can pick things up when the venture journey's over and grow those businesses with a different kind of capital structure.
22. From first-time founder to Suno
So, as we close out, this is my partner question, but my partner, my favorite partner, I don't know where my camera is. There's like 500 cameras here, but Sorcery is sponsored by Brex, and so they think a lot about performance, spending smart, or moving faster. I think about this, you've gotten this question before in terms of who you surround yourselves with, and performance is a measure of maybe the 5 closest people to you. Without pumping your book too much, I will try to get you to think outward of that. It could be an author, a historical figure, or just a longtime mentor of yours. Who are the people who really keep you inspired or keep you challenging yourself?
Founders. I mean, it really is founders. At our CEO summit last week, we all went around the room and said who inspires us the most. Our partner Brad got up and said, “Entrepreneurs.” And I thought to myself, “Damn, he did it again.”
That's why it's great to be a venture capitalist. Every day, someone walks in and you're like, “Oh, wow. That person is thinking about things in a completely different way and changes the way you think about something.” So I have to say, most venture capitalists will probably tell you the same thing: founders are the real inspiration for us.
I love when you see an outlier founder start to chug and hire that talent.
Are there any particular names that you guys have?
Yeah, I've been thinking a lot about this. I have a founder I work with named Zach Kanter. He's the founder of a company called Stedi. He sent an update yesterday. He's been at this for 10 years, which is a long time.
The business is cranking. That really happened in the last 3 years. He fought it out for 7 years, and then he got there and knew exactly how to take advantage of the moment when the stars aligned for him. Some of it was the external market. Some of it was a really high bar for the team, even through really hard times. Some of it was just getting the product to exactly the right place so that when it was useful, it was there.
That kind of intensity and lining up the puzzle pieces is so hard. And I think about the haves and have-nots in the portfolios I work with. A lot of it is that: Can you make these things line up so you're really ready at exactly the right time, and keep that intensity at full charge even when the wind's not at your back? I find that really inspiring to work with.
A thing I always say about the best founders is that, at a certain point, they reach this level where it's almost like they see the Matrix and can do anything. A great example—you and I know this, and we've talked in the past about Suno and Mikey Shulman. Suno is a USV portfolio company.
When they just started out, they were obviously so excited about the opportunity ahead of them in music, but they had never founded a company before, and they had never operated in music before, which is such a challenging market to operate in. After going through the paces for a couple of years and having a tremendous amount of success, Mikey is operating at an insane level.
If you met him when he had just started, it's just a world of difference. We learn a lot from him and from all of our founders.
Thank you very much, Fred, Rebecca, and Mike. I really appreciate it, and congratulations.