他们正把股市向所有人开放。真正含义是什么
Jason Calacanis × Chamath Palihapitiya × Paul Atkins × Michael Selig
Atkins 希望让 IPO 回归融资轮,而不是内部人套现事件。 美国上市公司数量约为30年前的一半,成熟企业上市前的上行收益更多被私募股权、风险投资、员工和公司内部人拿走。他的解决方案是对监管进行“春季大扫除”,更聚焦重大信息披露,减少集体诉讼和无理诉讼,降低被武器化的股东治理要求——“让 IPO 再次伟大”(make IPOs great again)。
SEC 计划重新审视季度报告制度和基于财富的合格投资者认证。 SEC 1934年成立时实行年度报告,1955年改为半年度报告,1970年改为季度报告;Atkins 个人并无明确立场,希望听取市场意见,评估较慢的披露节奏是否更有利于小型发行人。他还支持探索知识测试——类似驾照的资格认证、CPA、CFA,或更简单的 Series 7 等效路径——因为一名金融学教授可能被排除在外,而一位缺乏经验却继承了1000万美元的女继承人反而符合资格。Jason 则用一组数据说明问题:风险投资支持的公司贡献了 GDP 的20%和标普500指数的40%。
Selig 的 CFTC 议程,是用与业务目的匹配的规则取代“执法式监管”,覆盖加密货币、预测市场和 AI。 如果正在审议的加密货币法案获得通过,该机构预计将获得现货市场监管权;Selig 表示自己正与 David Sacks 合作推进立法。无论法案结果如何,CFTC 都在为区块链网络、智能合约和链上系统准备规则。Atkins 和 Selig 还在推动跨机构备忘录和替代合规机制;从更长期看,Atkins 希望建立覆盖证券与大宗商品的“超级应用模式”。
代币化可能实现 T+0 结算,但自主交易代理也带来了监管机构此前极少遇到的风险。 Chamath 描述了以代理为基础的对冲基金,它们可能实质取代 Citadel 或 Millennium,并追问:“关机开关在哪里?”Selig 的回答是“去建设,不要先来问我们许可”,同时配套部署区块链节点、能够读懂代码的监管人员和必要的护栏;Atkins 补充说,全天候市场可能需要设置减速带,监管机构也必须重新思考流动性以及最佳买价和卖价的定义。
预测市场合约属于受监管的衍生品,不只是赌场下注;其信息价值也不能为内幕交易或可操纵合约开脱。 Selig 称市场是“真相机器”,但表示交易所必须证明合约不容易受到操纵,CFTC 则可以拒绝合约或惩罚违规行为。实际边界可以从超级碗冲入场内者、佳得乐颜色,以及 MrBeast 员工利用未公开视频信息交易等例子中看出。
杠杆和衍生品透明度将按市场逐一校准,方向是简化规则,而不是全面放松监管。 现有的交易所保证金权限、券商和银行控制机制、互换交易数据库以及每日报告制度,已经提供了较强的可见性;但 Selig 表示,加密货币互换不应要求企业花高价请律师,去判断它们究竟对应牛还是小麦。对既有规则,他的标准是“最低有效剂量”。
两位主席都认为,核心取舍是在不牺牲市场完整性的前提下,把创新留在本土。 Selig 不希望区块链、AI 或预测市场创业者逃往开曼群岛、巴哈马或俄罗斯,但同样拒绝重演 FTX;Atkins 则提到由 CFTC 监管的 LedgerX,其客户资金隔离,因此没有客户因该平台遭受损失。他们最后担心的是,监管不能筑起另一条“马奇诺防线”,同时还要教育年轻交易者。Jason 随后引用数据显示,18至30岁的男性中,45%表示自己在博彩或下注方面存在问题,10%符合成瘾标准,三分之一曾下注。
1. IPO 不再为增长融资,而成了内部人的退出通道
Atkins 回顾历史时对比称,Apple、Microsoft 和 Advanced Micro Devices 都是在较早阶段上市,因为公开市场资本曾为研发和增长提供资金。内部人持股相对有限,而 IPO 买家拿走了长期回报中的“大头”。
Atkins 表示,如今美国上市公司数量约为30年前的一半,成熟的私募市场让企业一直留在私有市场,直到发展成熟。Chamath 的概括是:过去 IPO 更像一家成立4至5年的公司进行 Series C 或 D 轮融资;如今主要功能则是提供流动性。
Atkins 认为,阻碍上市的因素反复出现,主要有3个:成本高昂且逐渐偏离重大性的披露要求;股价每次下跌后随之而来的集体诉讼;以及将公司治理武器化的股东提案行动。他在2026年的计划是进行一次“春季大扫除”——“清空阁楼、地下室和车库”——同时研究仲裁和费用转移机制;他称,特拉华州最近已禁止上市公司采用这两种安排。
2. 报告频率和合格投资者认证都将接受审查
季度报告制度并没有其支持者所说的那么古老。SEC 1934年成立时确立的是年度报告制度;1955年改为半年度报告,1970年改为季度报告。英国后来在2014年前后恢复半年度报告,同时允许企业提高披露频率。
Atkins 表示自己“有点无所谓”,计划通过拟议规则征求意见。小型发行人采用半年度报告可能节省成本,但也可能需要季度数据来吸引稀缺的分析师覆盖;Barry Diller 给出的答案则相反:每月披露会计数据,放弃围绕季度预测展开的博弈。
关于合格投资者认证,Atkins 表示,现行制度的核心定义应包括知识,而不只是资产。他希望探索考试、CPA 或 CFA 认证,或者类似 Series 7 的简化路径:“为什么一名年薪10万美元的金融学教授”会被排除,而一位缺乏经验却继承了1000万美元的女继承人反而符合资格?
Jason 认为,风险投资支持的公司贡献了美国 GDP 的20%和标普500指数的40%,因此基金设立本身就是资本形成的重要议题。
Jason 还说明了对风险投资基金的实际影响:他的上一只基金获得了超过1亿美元的合格投资者认购需求,但受100名投资者上限约束,最终只能接受1000万美元。Atkins 表示,许多限制来自法律条文,但通过豁免,以及与劳工部和财政部就401(k)计划进行协调,可以在设置护栏的同时扩大参与范围。Selig 支持扩大准入,并称 ICO 已经证明,当投资者被排除在外时,市场会寻找替代路径。
3. CFTC 正以目的匹配型规则取代执法优先
Selig 表示,他的议程可以追溯到2021至2022年。当时,他在私营部门的客户“每周都会”收到传票,加密货币、预测市场、AI 和传统金融企业都面临“执法式监管的围攻”。他进入政府,是为了“扭转航向”。
Selig 表示,如果正在审议的加密货币法案最终通过,CFTC 将获得现货市场监管权,该机构正在与 David Sacks 合作准备实施方案。即使法案未能通过,他也希望为区块链网络、链上软件、数字资产和 AI 制定面向未来的规则,而不是把新业务硬塞进为其他产品设计的监管框架。
Atkins 认为,美国市场的全球优势来自法治、可执行合同以及股权投资文化,而后两者在欧洲和日本大体缺位。更灵活的监管、扩大投资者准入,以及允许新产品在美国本土建设,都可能“加速”资本形成。
4. T+0 结算遇上自主金融尚未解决的风险
Chamath 描述了全天候跨市场运行的自动化代理对冲基金——这些项目可能实质取代 Citadel 或 Millennium。他认为这种模式更民主,也更具吸引力,但直接提出了系统性问题:“关机开关在哪里?或者说,断路器在哪里?”
Selig 的操作立场是“去建设,不要先来问我们许可”,之后再研究并设置护栏,而不是事先禁止。可能的监管工具包括运行区块链节点,以及聘用能够检查智能合约和代码的技术人员。
Atkins 认为,分布式账本可以让市场迈向 T+0,实现链上即时交割付款和收款付款。但全天候交易可能需要用于防范欺诈的减速带,也必须回答流动性问题,以及当市场永不收盘时“最佳买价和卖价”究竟意味着什么。
在杠杆问题上,Atkins 拒绝采用一个适用于所有市场的统一数字。银行、券商、期货交易所和证券市场已经使用不同的保证金和控制制度;监管机构需要为新市场找到对应机制,既保留交易功能,也不能放任风险“在我们面前爆炸”。
5. SEC 与 CFTC 正试图消除监管无人区
Atkins 将两家机构比作“中间隔着一片无人区的两座堡垒”,大量产品就在这片区域里因管辖权交火而夭折。他举出的例子包括单一股票期货和投资组合保证金,这些结构本可能有用,却受到机构间摩擦阻碍。
两位主席正在制定一份谅解备忘录,涵盖信息共享、工作人员协调,以及更清晰的产品和注册处理方式。Selig 倾向于采用替代合规机制:由一家监管机构作为主监管方;当预测合约、协议或智能合约同时涉及证券和大宗商品时,再通过协调统一处理。
Selig 认为,如果证券和大宗商品使用彼此隔离的区块链,而“中间什么都没有”,这种安排将无法运转。Atkins 对未来几年的目标是建立“超级应用模式”,利用 SEC 的豁免灵活性,为同时注册的企业减少摩擦,即使两套制度的法律基础仍然不同。
两位主席也都希望从对方的规则体系中借用工具。Atkins 欣赏 CFTC 的自我认证机制:框架获批后,重复性产品可以自行认证;Selig 则希望引入 SEC 的另类交易系统模式,即一种“轻交易所框架”,允许券商运营交易场所,而无需完成完整的交易所注册。
6. 只有当合约抗操纵时,预测市场才是真相机器
Chamath 通过 Reg FD 刻画了其中的冲突:公开市场的前提是重大信息应当触达所有人,而部分预测市场之所以准确,恰恰是因为参与者掌握了差异化甚至秘密信息。Chamath 转述 Brian Armstrong 的观点称,某些市场“只有依靠内幕信息才能繁荣”。
Selig 回应称,预测市场可以追溯到1990年代的爱荷华政治市场。交易所作为自律组织和第一道防线,必须证明每份衍生品具备可互换性、标准化,且不容易受到内幕交易、操纵或欺诈;CFTC 则可以在事后拒绝合约或查处违规行为。
这些例子揭示了边界:球队内部人士可能知道超级碗上场时佳得乐的颜色;下注者可能人为制造“冲入场内者”这一结果;甚至“独裁者被处决”还是“仅被推翻”这样的措辞,也会影响合约是否可被操纵。这些并不只是“在赌场里找庄家下注”。
Selig 表示,Kalshi 最近对参与者提起了2项执法行动,其中一项涉及一名 MrBeast 员工利用 YouTube 视频何时上线、或视频包含何种内容的信息进行交易。商品市场内幕交易与证券市场违规行为一样,都会受到监管。
Selig 还表示,上一届政府曾试图在2024年大选前禁止这些市场;据他所述,这些市场提高了投票率,准确度也超过了虚假民调。他为受监管的预测市场辩护,称其为“真相机器”,同时强调内幕交易仍属违法。
7. 代币的发行和代币本身需要分别定性
Jason 提出的问题是,$TRUMP、$DOGE 等 meme coin,以及 NFT 和实用型代币,都有 ticker、走势图和类似股票的交易方式,导致散户把它们“当成鸭子一样”交易,即便证券保护并不适用。Jason 认为,Gensler 在概念层面的担忧或许有其逻辑,只是执行出了问题。
Atkins 将失败归因于定义模糊:谨慎的律师把项目送到海外,另一些人则在 SEC 执法到来前大肆“说好话”。代币化证券仍然受证券法约束;数字商品、工具或收藏品可能归 CFTC 监管,也可能不属于任何一家机构,但欺诈行为仍需要一个可信的“警察在场”。
Selig 将用于筹集企业资本的承诺,与之后交易的对象区分开来。类似 Ethereum 或 Solana 网络的输入可能属于数字商品,NFT 可以是收藏品,代币则可以执行指令。此前的证券案件涉及用栗鼠或威士忌桶融资,但 Selig 表示,这并不意味着这些商品后来就在数字资产市场中作为证券交易。
8. 衍生品基础设施需要简化,但不能重新打开系统性盲区
Selig 将期货市场参与者分为套期保值者、投机者和做市商,三者都在提供流动性。交易所和 CFTC 会监测对敲交易、市场操纵及其他可疑活动,要求交易者提供信息,并在活动引发担忧时维护市场完整性。
《多德-弗兰克法案》之后,互换交易数据库每天都会接收大多数双边场外互换数据,使风险敞口远不如过去不透明。问题在于数据是否可用:过多字段迫使企业花钱请律师,把 Bitcoin 和加密货币互换映射到原本为牛和小麦设计的分类中。Selig 希望将每条规则都压缩到“最低有效剂量”。
两位主席最后担心的是失去平衡。Selig 希望把建设者从开曼群岛、巴哈马和俄罗斯吸引回来,但不能允许另一个 FTX 出现;Atkins 指出,由 CFTC 监管的 LedgerX 之所以在 FTX 事件中存活,是因为账户隔离,没有客户因该平台遭受损失。他随后警告监管机构,不要因为“总是在应对上一场战争”,就再筑起一条马奇诺防线。
Jason 最后谈到博彩带来的二阶成本,引用数据显示,18至30岁的男性中,45%表示在下注或赌博方面存在问题,10%符合成瘾标准,三分之一曾下注。Selig 强调平台教育和适当性控制;Atkins 补充了家长和学校的责任;Jason 则提到 Robinhood 要求复杂交易者完成教学向导,可作为现实中的参考模式。
Today, we are delighted to have 2 of the most important individuals shaping capital markets over the next couple of years. SEC Chair Paul Atkins is with us, as is CFTC Chair Michael Selig. Welcome to the show, gentlemen.
Glad to be here.
Thank you very much. Great to be here.
Also with me is my bestie, Chamath Palihapitiya, who is known to participate in capital markets. I think there's a great structure here for us to talk about the many opportunities, and then guardrails and things that we should be concerned about in such a dynamic time. Chairman Atkins, this is your 3rd tour of duty since the '90s. Things have changed dramatically, so maybe just to start us off here—and Chamath has a lot of great questions ready to go—I'm curious: in your time, let's say the last 40 years or so, what have you noted about capital markets and how they've changed, and what's important for us looking forward?
Thanks. It's great to be here and see both of you today. I started out as a young lawyer in New York City doing corporate finance work—new offerings and that sort of thing—in the mid-'80s. To be a startup company and build your products, do R&D, and all that, you had to go public. Apple, Microsoft, and Advanced Micro Devices—all of those companies started off as IPOs.
Andreessen Horowitz has a really good bar chart where they compare the companies of the early and mid-to-late '80s to today. It basically demonstrates, through the ROI enjoyed by insiders versus buyers of the public stock in those early companies, that insiders—officers, directors, and whatnot—had a relatively thin slice of the entire pie. Everyone made out well, obviously, but the public purchasers in the IPO made out very well over the years and had the lion's share of that.
You look at today, the current situation, where we have robust private capital markets, and we have today half the number of public companies that we had 30 years ago. It's completely reversed. The return on investment is mainly enjoyed by insiders—private equity, venture capital, corporate officers, and employees—versus the public, because they're mature companies when they actually go public. So that's a huge change. The private markets are very robust and strong, but American capital markets are very healthy, I think.
When you look at that, back then there was a real requirement for everybody to do an enormous amount of work because, to your point, these companies were quite young. You'd be a 4- or 5-year-old company and you'd go public because going public was not about monetizing anything. It was actually a fundraising moment. It was like a Series C or a Series D.
I guess the reason it changed was probably because, to your point, there were all these returns, and so investors said, “Well, let's go capture these in the private markets for us and our LPs.” But what it also does is change the nature of how these markets behave. Can you just comment on the amount of time companies are staying private, the dearth of IPOs because it has become a liquidity-defining moment and is much more so than the financing moment, and whether things should change and, if so, how you want to change that and why?
Yeah, well, it's a free market, obviously, so investors should be allowed to let the market develop as it will, but you're exactly right. Now it's more of a liquidity event for insiders. What we are seeing now is that in the private markets, there's a lot of capital, and people are willing to deploy it to companies at early stages and then stay on.
At the same time, there are inhibitions for private companies to go public, and 1 of them is the cost of complying with our rules, especially the disclosure requirements, where you have all the annual-report requirements, proxy statements, and all of that, and then quarterly reporting and so forth. That is 1 big inhibition, where things are not necessarily focused on materiality anymore.
Are you allowed to convene a group of people and start to line-item these rules out or change them, or does it have to go through some much more robust process where there are a lot of competing reasons why some people—some lobbies, maybe—may want these rules?
Oh, for sure. There are vested interests in everything, but that is part of my program for this year and going into next year: to go through our rulebook. We need a spring cleaning. We need to clean out the attic, the basement, and the garage, and really look at things unlike the agency has ever done before, with a real focus on materiality.
The 2nd thing is to make IPOs great again by focusing on litigation. That is another key inhibition, I think, for people to go from the private markets to public: the threats of class-action lawsuits and vexatious litigation with every dip in the stocks. You have issues like mandatory arbitration and fee shifting—loser pays, that sort of thing—both of which Delaware has recently outlawed for public companies. But there are other states out there.
The 3rd is the weaponization of corporate governance around shareholder proposals, that sort of thing. It becomes a pain to deal with the annual general shareholders' meeting and that sort of thing. Those 3 are maybe not the only inhibitions, but they're 3 key ones that I've heard over and over and over again over the last 30-some years from venture capitalists, private equity folks, investment bankers, lawyers, and et cetera.
Mike, what are your top priorities for 2026 at the CFTC?
Well, like Paul, I started off working in private practice at a law firm, and right around 2021 or 2022, every week my clients would get a subpoena from Gary Gensler or the CFTC and were faced with this onslaught of regulation by enforcement. They were faced with regulations that did not work for their business models, and these were crypto firms, prediction markets, artificial intelligence firms, as well as our traditional financial market participants. They were just relentlessly attacked by the federal government under the prior administration.
So I really came into government to help right the ship, to help make sure that we have purpose-fit rules and regulations for new, innovative technologies and financial products. A big piece of my agenda has been crypto. Our crypto asset markets—as I'm sure you all are tracking—are the subject of some legislation that we're really hopeful about, and we're working with David Sacks to get it across the finish line and to the president. That's going to be a key piece.
The CFTC would have authority over the spot markets, and we're getting ready to implement those rules should the legislation get across the finish line. Another key piece of our agenda has also been modernizing and upgrading our rules and regulations for on-chain software systems, blockchain networks, and other types of digital asset products, regardless of legislation.
It's really important that we have future-proof rules and regulations that are ready to accommodate the innovations of both today and tomorrow. That's blockchain, but that's also artificial intelligence and other areas of technological innovation. So there are a lot of things we need to change within our regulatory framework to make sure that we're ready to accommodate that.
Let me ask both of you a question. This sits at the intersection of tokenization, crypto, and what I would call systemic risk. If everything becomes tokenized and digitized and 24/7, what do you think needs to happen to make sure that the systemic risks to the system are managed?
Here's what I mean. If you go on X, I've gone down the automated-trading rabbit hole. I don't know if you guys know, but there are these incredible, young, vibrant projects that are basically replacing a Citadel, replacing a Millennium, and building these automated, agent-based hedge funds that are transacting across all kinds of markets all the time.
On the 1 hand, I'm completely attracted to it. I think it's totally democratic. It's the free market. It's like, let's figure out what's going on there. On the other hand, I ask the question: Where's the kill switch? Or where's the circuit breaker, if you will? I just want to give you both the chance to talk about how you see these markets converge, and both the positives and the negatives of it.
Absolutely. We need to be considering these risks as we're developing rules, and this, to me, is the whole reason we need to have a purpose-fit regulatory framework for these products, autonomous agents, and all of that. Up until now, I think the approach has always been, “Let's apply the old rules and regulations, and that's going to work out,” and make sure that nobody can actually innovate and create something new.
We are embracing these opportunities in the market. We need to study them and make sure that we understand the risks, but we can develop rules that accommodate that. We need to have a regime in place that says, “Go build. Don't ask us for permission,” while we study that, work with the market participants, understand the risks, and, on our end, set up guardrails.
I do think there are unique risks when you have the ability for an agent to go out and deploy capital on basically an autonomous basis. That's going to be something that our markets have really never seen before as regulators, but that doesn't mean we have to stand in the way and block it.
I think we need to really understand the risks and make sure that we have the right guardrails, whether that is us operating nodes on blockchains or really having technologists who are studying the contracts in the code. But I don't think there's any reason we can't have this technology built here in America.
I agree with that. From my point of view, there's so many benefits to come from distributed ledger technology for the financial services industry. We're right at the cusp of achieving T+0—basically, immediate delivery versus payment, receipt versus payment on-chain—by digital assets, and so that's pretty exciting.
We may even have to build in speed bumps to prevent fraud and things like that. For many—and for some instruments—it might not be possible, but your discussion there with 24/7 and all that, I think, is really an exciting prospect. But there are challenges from the liquidity perspective: having the whole concept of best bid and offer, what does that mean? So that's one that we will be wrestling with.
But ultimately, at least our approach—and what Mike and I are striving to do in harmonizing the approach of our 2 agencies—is to hopefully get a statute out of the whole CLARITY Act discussions going on in the Hill right now. That's really necessary to future-proof what we're doing so there is no backsliding in the future.
We need to focus on the fact that if it's a security underneath and it's tokenized, it's still a security, and the securities laws still apply. But it's up to us to make sure that our rules are fit for purpose. As the whole purpose changes and as the delivery mechanism changes, we need to accommodate that.
Unfortunately, in the previous administration, we said, “Oh, come in and talk to us. We have a simple form for you to fill out. It's on our website.” Well, ha-ha, it's called an S-1, and it takes lots of lawyers and accountants to try to figure out how to do it for an existing company, much less for a new digital asset, a crypto sort of asset where the form is completely inapposite. There are no boards of directors, there are no offices around the country or around the world, or whatever. The thing needs to be adjusted so that it is fit for purpose.
So that's what we're striving to do, going through our rulebook to make sure it can accommodate the new technologies.
So let's build on Chamath's conversation here and his points. One of the key dangers and innovation opportunities in the market is leverage. We see it, obviously: hedge funds have been doing this for a long time. We're starting to see it in prediction markets, Mike, and we're seeing it in crypto.
What is the proper amount of leverage, and who should set those rules? Obviously, you have Congress making laws; you're responsible for executing them, Chairman, in order to make sure the markets are orderly and that you protect investors. So just walk us through what you think is the proper amount of leverage and your framework. You've been at this for a while, as we mentioned. How has that changed over time?
Educate us a bit on how we got to a world in which Bitcoin investors might be 100x or 50x and people might be leveraging their prediction market. It seems like it has a function, but it also seems like almost every story starts and ends with leverage.
Well, I think it depends on the marketplace and on the type, because obviously you have banks, and they're all about fractional deposits and all of that, and lending. We've gone through that back in 2008 and 2009 in the financial crisis, going all the way back to 1929 and even in the 1800s—obviously, all the repeated problems with financial disruption in financial markets. So we have to be careful about that.
There are all sorts of rules for broker-dealers, for banks, in the futures markets, for margin and all of that, to put a lid on some of this and to have some controls around it and transparency. In the futures markets, the exchanges have a lot of power over their members, over margin, and over closing things down. We saw that even during COVID and whatnot, when the markets got hairy. Those things are constantly looked at.
The Fed plays a role as well with margining in the securities markets. All that has to be adjusted, and now we need to look carefully at these new markets, see what's analogous, see what authority we have, and then make sure that we're not killing trading. But we also have to keep an eye out for the future to make sure that we're not allowing things to blow up in our face.
Here's a question that may sound dumb, so I apologize if it does, and this is to both of you. I think a lot of people don't understand—or at least I don't—where the SEC and the CFTC cooperate most effectively, but then, as with all things, where does coordination maybe break down?
Could you just explain that to people so that we understand and level-set about what the expectations of each organization are and how you actually work together day-to-day when you have to?
Having been around the 2 agencies now for 30-some years, I can really say that, unfortunately, the 2 agencies—not necessarily at the commissioner level, but certainly at the staff level—had a lot of sniping back and forth. I compare it to 2 fortresses with a no-man's-land in between.
The no-man's-land is littered with the bodies of would-be products. People were unsure: Is it CFTC? Is it SEC? The crossfire between the 2 just killed the products. They never went to market.
Single-stock futures and portfolio margining have so much potential benefit for making the financial markets safer and more efficient. But Mike and I are setting out to change that, and I'll let you go forth on that one, Mike.
Absolutely. The 2 agencies have unfortunately rarely worked well together, and we're really moving forward in a new direction with our harmonization efforts. We have a memorandum of understanding that the 2 agencies are working on, hammering out and getting in place, that will allow us to share information, coordinate on specific issues, and make sure that we don't have this turf battle between the 2 agencies going forward.
Part of that starts, of course, at the top. Chairman Atkins and I work very closely together to make sure that we're coordinated on policy, but also at the staff level. When exchanges, brokers, and market participants are coming in to register or to offer new products, we need to make sure that there's not this fighting over where they're supposed to be registered and what they're able to offer.
Some of these products cross jurisdictions. A great example is some of the prediction market products. Some involve public companies and securities, and others are related to things like sports and politics. That crosses jurisdictions, so we need to make sure that we have clear lines and that our market participants aren't subject to duplicative regulatory frameworks.
Chairman Atkins and I have talked about substituted compliance regimes, where you have a primary regulator at the SEC or the CFTC, but we work together to figure out the cross-jurisdictional products so that you don't get stuck with duplicative regulation or registration.
Another area is crypto, where we've got blockchain networks, smart contracts, and protocols that have both securities and non-securities trading on them across jurisdictions. We need to make sure that the standards are consistent, because it won't work if we've got one blockchain for securities and another blockchain for commodities and nothing in between.
I think this is really critical: that the agencies bury the hatchet and move forward with a harmonized and coordinated approach.
As we look towards the future, to build on the fact that there are 2 separate regimes, there are differences in approaches based on the statutes that govern us. But speaking for the SEC, we also have a lot of flexibility with respect to exemptive authority and whatnot.
My dream is, one day—and I hope we can achieve that here in the next couple years—to have a super-app approach where there are blurred lines between the 2, but we've coordinated our approach, coordinated to reduce the friction between dually registered companies, and made everything work very efficiently.
I want to ask a question around prediction markets. Let me try to set this up the way that I think about it.
I think that there is this inexorable tension that's always existed and will always exist between the investor protection that has to happen when you have publicly traded securities or commodities or derivatives, and the capital formation process on behalf of the company or whatever that wants to get access to this. There's always been this back-and-forth tension.
The best example of this is Reg FD, where we said at some point, “Hey, let's hold the trains. If 1 person knows something, every person needs to know that thing.” It makes a ton of sense.
When you get into prediction markets, I think this is going to stress-test this assumption to the nth degree. The reason is that there are just certain things that some people know. We see it now. Every other day there's an article about some prediction market that turned out to be right, or a bunch of other markets that were almost manipulated. It seems ripe for this question to come up all over again.
The corollary to this is Brian Armstrong tweeted something which I thought was quite an interesting comment about prediction markets: that certain prediction markets only thrive on insider information.
Which is to say that they know a secret. That's how the market can exist and actually conform to an outcome. That creates these two sides. I just want to get your thoughts on prediction markets: What role do they play? How do we balance the capital formation that the market creates against investor protection and the insider trading that may be happening? It's a very complicated space. I'm not going to hold you to any of it; I just want to think out loud.
Markets aren't new. We've had them since the '90s. They started off with the Iowa Electronic Markets, where folks were predicting political outcomes in elections. We've been surveilling, monitoring, and policing fraud and manipulation in these markets for a very long time.
To the extent that there are contracts in certain markets—for example, what color Gatorade is going to be dumped on the coach at the Super Bowl—some of this stuff is potentially at risk of being manipulated. There's a risk that somebody on the team could trade because they have special information about the Gatorade they put in the cooler.
We have standards to make sure those contracts should not be listed, with the exchanges as the first line of defense as self-regulatory organizations. They evaluate each contract and certify to us, the regulator—the CFTC—that those contracts are not readily susceptible to insider trading, manipulation, fraud, and the like.
We saw recently that Kalshi, one of the prediction markets, brought 2 enforcement actions against participants. One involved a contract related to MrBeast's YouTube channel, where one of his employees insider traded based on information about when a video was going to launch or what was in the video.
The same sort of authority that you have at the SEC around a duty of care to your employer is prevalent in our markets. To the extent somebody insider trades on information, we police that. It's really important for folks to know that it's not just securities insider trading; we've got it in the commodities world as well.
The exchanges are policing that, and we're policing that. To the extent folks are listing contracts that are susceptible to manipulation, there are consequences to that. We can reject those contracts, or we can police fraud on the back end. There is a cop on the beat there, and I do want to caution that insider trading is not necessarily allowed in our markets.
But we do believe that markets are truth machines. They create a really powerful source of information. We've seen hoaxes, fake news, and manipulation of the polls. The prior administration tried to ban these markets ahead of the 2024 election, and they really increased turnout. It showed that they were correct when a bunch of the fake polls were put out right ahead of the election.
We really have to foster these markets here in the United States and make sure that they don't flourish in Russia or somewhere else, where they really will turn out to be a source of disinformation. We do believe it's valuable to have that trading and information flowing through the markets, but insider trading is still not legal here in the United States.
Walk us through some examples there, Mike. It's very obvious and clear to people who work at Microsoft if a new version of software is coming out, or if sales are dynamic and the numbers haven't been released. Obviously, you can't trade on that. You're going to jail. It's insider trading.
If I am a reseller of Microsoft software, or if a friend of mine works at Microsoft and says, "Hey, things are going great with this new product we have," and I make a thoughtful wager on a prediction market, where do all those rules live? Or if I intentionally do something like being a streaker at the Super Bowl—that was one that came up recently—and I actually am the streaker, not that I'm planning any of this, and I make the bet, where do all those rules live?
Who's responsible? Is it the prediction market? Is it you? Or is it still to be determined? It does seem that there's a bit of a gray area, as Chamath was alluding to here. Does this need to be codified, and does there need to be a bit more education for the public on it?
A lot of the gray area started with the prior administration really trying to ban these markets and not facilitating proper rulemaking and guidance in the markets. Over the past year—I've been in the office for a couple of months now—a lot of these products have really exploded in popularity.
Now is the time to put out guidance and make sure that we're not regulating by enforcement, as the prior administration did, but that we are setting standards. We are making clear what our statute says, and that is that these contracts cannot be listed if they're susceptible to manipulation. We take that very seriously.
Standard. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
The exchanges are responsible for policing that and reviewing the contracts. They certify to us, the regulator, that they are free of the risk of manipulation. If there's manipulation in the markets, we're policing that, and the exchanges are policing that.
There are controls in place, but a lot of these questions about what's susceptible to manipulation are up for debate. I think there's some real responsibility here. Your example of the streaker—if somebody can just jump out of the stands, streak across the field, and collect on the contract, that's something that does seem potentially at risk of manipulation and fraud. We need to be careful about that. The exchanges need to be on the lookout for it, and if they're not, there are consequences with us as the regulator.
The markets should take the first step and make sure they're thoughtful about which contracts to fire up to begin with. We have seen that. They're not saying, "Hey, this dictator is executed." They're saying, "This dictator is deposed or is no longer in power." That seems to be a very tricky one as well.
Yes, Mike.
Well, there's got to be integrity in the contracts. Our rules require that the contracts have, for example, certain fungibility and standardization. They're derivatives contracts. This isn't simply betting with a bookie at a casino.
For each contract that's created, you would look for whether it's tied to an election or a very specific event, and whether there's a risk that the event can be manipulated or insider traded. The exchanges are evaluating that.
There are instances where something is insider traded and it wasn't something they could have foreseen. It wasn't readily susceptible to manipulation, and so they police that. They bring actions against the traders, and Kalshi did just this with some of its fines in the past few weeks.
Let me ask a question about quarterly reporting, because maybe that's where there was the most manipulation in the past, right? People would try to front-run these quarterly reports. They would try to make guesses. Invariably, you would find some people who had crossed the bright red line.
Recently, Paul, President Trump said maybe we should move to 6-month reporting or 1-year reporting, and it was really well received by a lot of people. Do you think that quarterly reporting has also killed the IPO? When we think about making the IPO great again, has the complexity and burden of such short-termism made the markets better or worse?
That's a great point. I just wanted to add one little note to the previous discussion: If something is a tokenized security, the federal securities laws apply. That goes for insider trading with respect to trading securities, wherever they may be—online, on an exchange floor, or wherever.
To your point about the cadence of reporting, I think that's an important one. We are going to come out with a proposed rule and seek comment on it. I'm frankly a bit agnostic myself, because we haven't always had quarterly reporting.
In fact, when the SEC was formed back in 1934, it basically codified the New York Stock Exchange rulebook, which at the time called for annual reports. Annual reports prevailed until 1955, when the SEC went to semiannual reporting. The UK did the same thing around the same time.
Then, in 1970, things went to quarterly reporting. The UK went quarterly as well, but in 2014 or so, it changed back to semiannual reporting. If you wanted to still report quarterly, God bless you, go ahead and do that.
We're still at quarterly reporting. The president did send out an electronic message about that, and we're looking at what we call filer status. There are all sorts of different categories of filers with different rules, like large accelerated filers, accelerated filers, emerging growth companies, and so forth.
We're looking to simplify all of this. Part of that is that perhaps smaller companies could benefit from a reduced cadence of reporting, but maybe not. They have trouble finding analysts to follow their stock. That's another thing that might be an inhibition to going public for small companies.
Maybe analysts want quarterly reporting, maybe they don't. Maybe they would prefer semiannual reporting, too. I think this is a great debate to have right now. Barry Diller even took the other side of it. He said, "I'm just tired of giving predictions. I'm tired of playing this quarterly gamesmanship. I'm just going to release our accounting numbers every month, and you all can have fun with the numbers as much as you like."
But that's amazing, because you can do that now, right? You can have software that's so vibrant that it can just JSON-release a stream, and there'll be people who have developed agents and developed these AIs that will process all of that. They'll then publish a dashboard, and the whole thing will be almost real-time.
It could be real time. Yeah, there are services that do semi-interesting things already that you can buy, which maybe people with budgets for data streams can use.
Let’s talk a little bit, Chairman Atkins, about the history of accreditation in this country. When you brought up Microsoft and watching these companies go public early in your career, I did a little research while we were here and you were speaking. Microsoft and Apple went out with 1,000 and 1,200 employees each and about $400 million in revenue in today’s dollars—$120 million in those dollars. So obviously, there was this incredible opportunity for you to create and place a bet on these companies as an individual with a stock-trading account and maybe move from one tier in societal wealth to another. That’s a big part of the American dream.
But as we talk about private markets, the SEC has ancient rules, now going on close to a century old, to protect investors called accredited-investor rules. They apply to 95% of the country, apparently, and about 5% of us get to trade in some way in private companies where the value is created. The SEC has been challenged and charged with changing and evolving these, and it never seems to happen. My perception is: which SEC chair is ever going to take this on? Because, hey, it’s just easier to keep the status quo.
I know there is some legislation now to create a sophisticated-investor test. So instead of saying, “You inherited $1 million, so you’re qualified to buy stock in Uber when it’s a private company,” why not have a sophisticated test like a driver’s license, where you learn how to trade in private companies and get to participate in that market? Instead of just saying to people, “Well, you can only participate in sports betting or blackjack in Vegas, but if you were an Uber driver or an Airbnb host or an HR person using LinkedIn as a private company, you can’t buy those stocks.” You have an insight and an instinct into maybe purchasing. So talk about the accredited-investor test and sophisticated-investor tests, and your personal view on it.
Great point. Well, here’s one chairman who is going to tackle that issue. We intend to do that.
The accredited-investor definition is interesting. To your point, in the statute—in the Securities Act of 1933, I believe, or the Investment Company Act of 1940—there’s a definition of that, and it includes knowledge, not just wherewithal or the assets that you have. It includes—it has the word “knowledge” in it.
Why can’t we have an equivalent of a driver’s test, as people have suggested over time, or recognize somebody who has a CPA, a CFA, or whatever? Maybe a type of Series 7, but not so complicated as the one that FINRA administers. Part of the question is: who’s going to make the test, who’s going to administer it, and how do you get there? Anyway, those are issues that we want to tackle.
I remember when this issue came up when I was a commissioner back in the aughts. There was one comment letter that really struck me. It said, “Today I am able to buy a hedge fund or private asset or whatnot. But tomorrow, once you raise the standard so that I have to have X amount of assets or income or whatever, I won’t be able to. So what’s changed? Why are you going to take that away from me?”
Why is a finance professor who makes $100,000, lives in an apartment, and doesn’t have any other assets not able, to your point, to invest in some of these types of securities, whereas an heiress who just came into $10 million or something like that suddenly is able to? Now, she can hire people to advise her, but they could be dummies, too. I mean, who knows what they are?
Anyway, I think we have to take a fresh look at all this, and we are going to do that this year with a proposed rule to address that.
I have a question around the derivatives markets. Well, actually, before I ask the question about that, I want to ask about the futures markets. You have an enormous number of high-frequency trading firms that really dominate futures volume. Can you tell us what value these folks are providing? Is it truly liquidity, or, as there has been some speculation, very sophisticated market arbitrage? If it’s the latter, where do you think we need to do a better job?
I think the best example is if you look at the volume of futures activity and spot prices of certain commodities, the basis is starting to get out of whack. So tell me about the market participants in these derivatives and futures markets and what you think is going on.
Our markets have 3 core types of participants: hedgers, speculators, and market makers. The liquidity is really the result of all 3.
There are market participants that really rely on these markets. Whether it’s a cattle contract or a credit default swap product, they need to enter into these agreements to hedge key risks in their business. Then you’ve got folks who are willing to provide liquidity, whether they’re speculating and taking another position on that for their proprietary basis, or they’re doing so to make markets and earn a spread.
We’re regulating these markets and making sure that the trades going through have integrity, and that folks aren’t wash trading and trying to manipulate markets. There are some strategies that raise particular risks of manipulation or fraud, and we police that. We’ve taken actions in the past to make sure that the exchanges are not subject to illicit behavior and trading.
The exchanges, similar to my point earlier related to prediction markets, are the first line of defense here as well. They surveil their markets, and we’re in constant communication with them, as well as with the traders. We’re often sending information requests to traders about their activity. So I do believe that all 3 participants are very important to making sure that our markets are liquid.
On that last point that you just made, which I think is a very good one, post-GFC there were these central-clearing functions, right, to make sure that derivatives contracts were not getting out of control and that we had a good sense of systemic risk. But it turns out that one blind spot everybody has is these bilateral swaps. I’ve done certain bilateral swaps with certain counterparties, and it’s not clear to me what happens on the back end. Can you talk about that, how you think that should stay the same or change, and whether that keeps you up at night—whether it should keep us up at night?
Sure. Well, I’m not a huge fan of Dodd-Frank, but in the wake of Dodd-Frank, we got swap-data reporting, and these bilateral over-the-counter swaps are now generally all—there are some exceptions—sent to swap-data repositories, where we’re getting information on a daily basis, as well as from these third-party repositories that compile that information. So the markets are much less opaque. We have transparency today.
My concern about the swap-data-reporting regulations is that they have really been a tool for our enforcement divisions in the past. You’ve got so many different fields that it’s really difficult to characterize each different type of swap. I’ll tell you, when I was in private practice and folks started entering into Bitcoin swaps and crypto swaps, characterizing that as a type of derivative relative to cattle and wheat and other commodities really was a whole lot of legal advising and a lot of wasted money, frankly.
We need to simplify. We need to make sure that our swap-data-reporting regime is rational, coherent, and makes sense for the everyday participant in the markets. You shouldn’t have to hire a high-priced law firm just to enter into a risk-management tool.
These developments post-Dodd-Frank—some of them make sense, and some of them don’t. A big priority of mine is going through rule by rule to make sure that all of our regulations are really the minimum effective dose.
I have a question for both of you. Is there something that, if you could borrow from the other person’s regulatory toolbox—something they can do that you cannot—you would love to be able to do as well?
From my perspective, one thing the CFTC has for new products is called self-certification. For repetitive products, once you go ahead and approve the general type of framework for it, then it’s self-certification by the markets and by the people who are, of course, coming forward with the products.
We don’t necessarily have that kind of thing. We do for some things, like ETFs and whatnot, where we’ve come up with rules, and then it’s up to the market participants to abide by the rules and have their product conform. But on so many other products, we have a much more complex, labor-intensive—let’s just say—approach to it that requires approval by the staff and the Commission and that sort of thing. Whereas it’s much more streamlined on the CFTC side.
On our side, there’s one regulation that I think has been really effective on the SEC’s side, and that’s the alternative trading system. On both sides of the house, we have full-blown, very intensive exchange registrations. The SEC went ahead with a rulemaking that allows broker-dealers to set up an alternative trading system, and it’s really an exchange-light framework. I’d love to see that on the CFTC side as well.
Chairman Atkins, I want to talk about fund formation and the power of venture capital in the U.S. economy.
20% of the GDP of this country comes from venture-backed companies. It is 40% of the S&P. Obviously, with the Magnificent 7 contributing heavily, that comes from venture-backed companies whose products we all know and love.
But fund formation for venture capital is ancient, and there are massive limitations on it. There are 2 ways, obviously, to address this. One is the path to accreditation for people to become sophisticated. We just spoke about that. But the other is how many people are allowed to participate in a fund.
As one example, when I raised my last fund, I had well over $100 million in accredited investors who wanted to have a small bite of the apple and get into venture capital, but I could only accept 100. I could only accept $10 million. It doesn't make any logical sense because, in fact, it would be better if more people could put in smaller amounts. Many hands make light work, and more people could participate in this.
This would have a dual impact on the economy. One, more startups would get funded, and 2, more individual investors would get to participate in this very closed ecosystem known as venture capital. So, I was wondering about your thoughts on venture capital, specifically its formation, which is the driver of the U.S. economy.
Well, you raise a great point, but a lot of what you're talking about with funds is statutorily mandated. There are 2 big exemptions in the Investment Company Act of 1940 that are pertinent here. Those were adopted by Congress with a lot of debate and whatnot, so that is more difficult to change, and there are certain ways that we can change them.
We are going to look at this. You have a lot of different types of accredited investors. You have qualified purchasers. You also have qualified institutional purchasers and whatnot—or buyers, rather. All of these things need to be looked at anew, and where we have the authority through our exemptive power under the various statutes, we'll be able to use that.
I do think that, especially now, as we talk about opening up private funds or private types of products to a broader range of people, including 401(k) plans and whatnot, we're working with the Department of Labor and the Treasury Department to address this. We all feel very strongly that you have to have good guardrails. You just can't open up the barn door wide open. We have to have standards for what can go into these sorts of plans—401(k) plans, pension plans.
But retail investors are already exposed to the private markets through their pension funds, insurance companies, and all that. So, all of this needs to have a fresh look, and we need to come up with good new ideas to basically democratize it.
And just as a quick follow-up there, one that I think would be super easy is, hey, 10% of whatever your last 2 years' average income was, or no more than 5% or 10% of your net worth.
Michael, there are some common-sense ideas here that would increase participation. Can you think of any reason that we should restrict Americans from being able to participate in venture capital? Is there any argument here if there were some basic-level controls, as I've outlined here—sophistication, taking a test, or a cap? You can only put $5,000 in. You make $150,000 a year; you can put in $15,000 per year. What are your thoughts, Michael?
I'm a believer in free markets, and I really think that allowing more access to our capital markets is a powerful thing for everyday Americans. We saw the ICOs—the initial coin offerings—where things moved into crypto and you had all sorts of investments in different projects. They were attempting to get under the radar of the securities laws, even though they were capital raises with different tokens, and I think the market always finds a way.
Allowing for more access and decreasing some of the requirements around accreditation, I think, is a really great thing for the American people. It will allow people to have some skin in the game. Maybe they lose sometimes, but other times they really hit it big, and it's a great thing for everyone.
So, nature finds a way, right? Like, if you don't allow people to participate, they start doing ICOs. When I looked at ICOs, Chamath, I said, "Wow, 99% of these are white papers with spelling errors in them. These are not the real companies that you and I look at in our daily lives in venture capital."
It reminds me of what happened with crypto: "Hey, it went offshore. It went to another stream."
I want to talk about the capital markets globally. We're in this very unique moment where there just seems to be this separation. The American capital markets—and you 2 are tips of the spear—have enormous credibility. Then, when you look at some of these other capital markets, Paul, you mentioned the UK, but I hate to say it so bluntly: the UK's a disaster. It is impossible to raise money there. It's impossible to raise money or innovate on a European exchange. It's a little bit easier in Asia, but it's complicated.
But then you do see some of these upstart exchanges that are trying to push and innovate in Abu Dhabi and KSA, et cetera. If you just take a step back for a second, I'd love your perspective on what's going to happen to capital formation, and specifically, what does America need to do to get this next couple of trillion dollars to be brought onshore?
Well, first of all, I think our capital markets are the envy of the world. It really is amazing. When I travel through Europe, Japan, the UK, and the Middle East and whatnot, people really envy our huge capital markets, how robust they are, and how fair they are.
It goes back to our rule of law and enforceability of contracts, and that's the essence of the foundation of our freedom and our ability to innovate and have all these new products. They would love to have that. Plus, what they also really envy is our risk appetite here in the United States, where people have an equity-investment culture, and that is largely absent in Japan and Europe.
In a lot of ways, they can't get out of their own way because, through their regulatory systems and whatnot—I mean, ours is bad enough—they take it to a different extreme with a very narrowly constructed code that really hamstrings them and is not very flexible for the future.
As far as opening up our markets, some of the things that we've been talking about here—new products, allowing innovation to take place onshore, and fixing some of the things like the accredited-investor standard and that sort of thing—I think we can then, to your point, turbocharge it to continue our growth.
Crypto's been a bit of the Wild West, and we have things like NFTs, ICOs, and meme coins. They feel—[laughter]—they look like stocks to people. Whether it's $TRUMP or $DOGE, whatever it is, they have a ticker symbol, they have a chart, and they trade like a stock.
What do we need to do in regard to crypto? What should we do, and where is the line between launching a crypto token and protecting the public, Chairman Atkins, versus, hey, it's a publicly traded stock?
Because for a lot of them, they get into it and they're the suckers at the table. It feels, it looks, it quacks like a duck, it looks like a duck, and so they buy it like it's a duck, but it's not a duck, obviously. So, what do we do?
And this was Gensler's, I think, maybe logical point, although his execution was poor. There was a logical point to, hey, we have rules. We can't let you break these rules for your dollar-sign whatever if everybody else is doing their company properly and following this set of rules.
So, how do we evolve that to protect the consumer, which is the top mandate?
Well, that's a great question. I think the real problem has been definitional, and the lines were very vague, so people weren't sure where they were. As Mike was talking about, people paid lawyers a lot of money to try to do it. Some lawyers just gave happy talk, and then people got in trouble with the SEC. Other lawyers just said, "Forget it. Go offshore. There's no use even trying here in the United States."
That's part of what Mike and I are trying to do—to harmonize. If it's a tokenized security, then that's one thing under the SEC's rulebook. But if it's things like a digital coin, a digital token—sorry—or digital commodities or digital collectibles, then those sorts of things fall under the CFTC's oversight. Their rulebook is really more apposite for these sorts of things than ours is.
But you have to have logical oversight over things like that to prevent fraud, because the one thing that really attracts people to our markets from overseas is that they perceive that fraudsters do get caught. We have protections around, as we've been talking about, insider trading and things like that—trading on material nonpublic information by insiders. We have robust protections for that.
Mike, unpack that for us, and maybe you could add to it the role of celebrities. Sometimes we see celebrities promoting these things, and it just felt like it was a bit out of control there for a bit. Your job is to make it controlled.
What should the crypto community that wants to release utility tokens and participate here know going forward?
We have to separate the capital-raising activity—selling something for the purpose of raising capital to form a business, when you're going out there and giving folks the white papers and the business plans and making promises to them—from the actual thing that people are buying.
The tokens themselves, in many of these cases, are just goods. As Chairman Atkins said, they could be a digital commodity—something that's an input for a network like Ethereum or Solana, or anything else where you're using it for a function within the network. But the capital raise is something separate, and they could be collectibles like an NFT or a tool that you're using to run a command on a network, that sort of stuff. They're commodities, goods, or things that potentially neither of us regulate. We don't go out and regulate widgets that are sold as part of a capital raising.
The SEC has brought many cases over the years related to fundraising with chinchillas and whiskey barrels and all sorts of things, but we've not had those traded as securities in our markets, and we don't want that for the digital world either.
As we start to wrap here, I have a final question. Both of you sit on top, again, as I said, of the most important capital market in the world, in my opinion. You guys are responsible for the well-functioning and pass-through of literally tens and tens of trillions of dollars. You are responsible for enabling, and not slowing down, the great vibrancy of the American economy as reflected in these markets. That's the upside.
The downside is that that also comes with a lot of pressure when you're in the bowels of the job. Obviously, I don't know what that's like every day, but what are the couple of things that the two of you think about at night? What are the critical risks to this experiment that you just know you have to get right, or the critical issues that in the next year or two you must get right for all of this to continue? Maybe Michael, start with you and then Paul.
Two big things concern me. The first has been this push of innovation offshore. We've got to get it back here in the United States. That's really what's built this country over the years. Thomas Edison didn't have to ask for permission to innovate. We need to make sure that our builders, our visionaries, and our entrepreneurs have the courage and the confidence to come and develop new things and build here in our financial markets.
And that means blockchain, artificial intelligence, and prediction markets. We'll set the rules for it and make sure that it's possible to do it, but we don't want everyone fleeing to the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and Russia to go do this stuff. So that's really concerning to me. I want to make sure that folks are back here in the U.S.
The second piece, of course, is the risk to our system. If we've got too much manipulation, insider trading, and fraud, why not trade elsewhere? And there's real risk to our investors. So making sure that we have the right controls and customer protections—we can't have another FTX in the United States where funds are lost and there's an absolute fraud on the American people. So that's a really critical concern. Balancing innovation with our financial system and the integrity of our markets—we're going to do it, but it's definitely hard work ahead of us.
And for me, I agree completely with the innovation point: We need to make sure that we are allowing people to innovate here onshore. FTX is a great point, where there was 1 part of FTX that didn't implode with the rest of it, and that was their investment in a swaps trading platform called LedgerX, which was supervised by the CFTC and examined. They had their accounts segregated and all that. So no customers lost any money through that, and it still lives on today.
So my worry is that we're always fighting the last battle. The French built the Maginot Line, and that didn't work very well. Then we had the same thing coming out of the financial crisis. So we have to think ahead. We're confronting a lot of new challenges.
Artificial intelligence, of course, is developing very quickly. But we're also seeing it on the fraud side. I hear horrible stories about people who've lost their entire retirement nest egg through fraud, where there are confidence artists who, through all sorts of manipulative types of communications, draw people in and get them to send off their money elsewhere, or even their Coinbase account or things like that, where they give passwords away to these confidence artists out there.
We have to be attuned to that. We have to be the cop on the beat, because that's the real threat that will lead people not to necessarily invest their money here. But I think we are a cop on the beat, and we're out to make sure that we can find the bad guys. We can't put overwhelming restrictions on the good guys so that they can't innovate and can't come out with new products.
Those are great answers. I think this is both about opportunity and policing. I just want to end with a final thought. As these markets open up—wagering, stocks, crypto—we do have a second-order effect that's happening. Young men 18 to 30: 45% report that they've had a problem with wagering or gambling, and 10% meet the addiction criteria. 1/3 have placed a bet.
The upside to this, in my mind, is we have a generation—Generation Bet—that understands capital formation, markets, and how to participate in them. But we do have a downside.
Outcomes, yeah.
Outcomes, yes. And to really think about that, there's obviously a downside here, which is that a very young, developing brain might not be ready for that. So, Mike, and then Chairman Atkins, what are your thoughts on how to protect these young men who are excited about participating in these markets, but maybe their brains aren't fully formed and ready to take on that responsibility?
I think education's critical here. We need to make sure that our market participants are providing information to participants. We don't regulate the casinos and the gambling and all of that, but I do believe that that's a key piece of their initiative as well, to make sure that folks are informed when they're coming into the casinos.
We should do the same at the federal level and make sure that our participants voluntarily—of course, this isn't necessarily something that we mandate on our derivatives exchanges—are informing the public. Of course, we've got really robust standards on brokers and on our exchanges, and they're making sure that the persons participating in the markets have the ability to participate, that they're suitable to invest and participate in our markets. I think those controls, combined with some education, are really going to be important here.
Chairman Atkins.
I agree with that, but it's not just education of, in many cases, children or young adult men and women, too. It's also their parents, especially for the children, where I think there is a large ignorance on the parents' part as to what their kids are doing with their phones or elsewhere and getting involved in these things.
I hear that from a lot of my friends, just anecdotally, but we shouldn't forget that. The schools are important as well, but the signs of that sort of addiction are really important to recognize and then take action. But we have the same thing with other sorts of gambling, lotto or lotteries and that sort of thing. So it's not just in the securities markets or crypto markets or elsewhere; it's also in everyday things that we have to really watch out for.
I love your suggestion, Mike, because I noticed Robinhood now, if you want to go trade something complex—puts, calls, spreads, everything—it forces you to go through a little wizard to make sure you understand it and to teach you what exactly you're doing. So I think education is so critical, and it can exist at the platform level.