2026年10月随兴漫谈
- Walker 开场抛出一道关于 Solstice Advanced Materials(SOLS)的“脑筋急转弯”:这家分拆公司宣布对等合并,股价一两天内跌约20%,几个月后又取消交易、反弹约15%——该称赞管理层愿意听取意见,还是因为他们曾推动这笔交易而不再信任他们?他的纠结在于,没有哪支管理团队会认为股东会讨厌自己宣布的交易,因此其资本配置决策可能值得怀疑;而“下一次,你可能就没法脱身了”。他刻意不下结论:“我不觉得这事有对错之分。”
- Starbucks–Chipotle 并购传闻(10月11日 CNBC 上予以否认)是“我能想象到最离谱的合并”——两家公司毫无协同效应,厨房和供应链也各不相同;除非你相信这是一场围绕 Brian Niccol 的关键人物交易。唯一说得通的逻辑是 Steve Jobs 式的:由一位独一无二的优秀 CEO 掌舵,合并后的公司才更值钱。股价表现正反两面都能说明问题:Starbucks 在他获聘时从78美元涨到95美元,目前为93美元,计入股息后两年基本持平;他离开 Chipotle 后,后者股价则从55美元跌至30美元。
- 指数掩盖了“水面之下的惨烈行情”:S&P 年初至今涨约13%,Russell 涨约10%–11%,但 Walker 身边做小盘股、价值投资的朋友“几乎心灰意冷”。10个行业 ETF 中,除能源涨约45%、科技涨约35%(涨幅主要集中在半导体)外,其余年内涨跌都在约±5%以内;没持有这两类资产的人,就大幅跑输指数。Russell 2000 自6月30日以来跌约8%,接近回调区间。
- “Russell 是一只失灵的指数”这类批评——它“砍掉赢家,给输家浇水”——反倒成了 Russell 的优势。Russell 2024年坐上 SMCI 的10倍涨幅行情,随后将其剔除,避开了之后因会计指控引发的约80%跌幅;今年,它也在 Bloom Energy 等 AI 热门股接近6月高点时将其踢出,躲过了随后的回撤。
- 垄断企业若把定价推得太狠,就会招来意想不到的竞争:FICO 遭遇政府整顿;Dune 3 预订 IMAX 影院后,Disney 正试图推出“Infinity Vision”,并在《Avengers》档期周末向其他制片厂推介。给那些总说“真希望管理层把定价杠杆再推高一点”的投资者的教训是:推到一定程度,“总会有人想办法让供给或竞争以某种方式出现”——Walker 也用 Valeant 举了例子。
- Netflix 真正的威胁或许不是 Disney 或 HBO,而是中国制作的微短剧——这基本就是“稍微超前了时代一点”的 Quibi,如今已发展成依靠数据驱动、制作短小套路化视频的大生意。Netflix 股价约70美元,低于 Warner Bros. 收购竞价开始前的约110美元;看空者要问的不是它会不会跌到零,而是10年后人们是否会少看很多剧本类电视,转而消费便宜、精准推送的短内容。
- Oura 推迟 IPO,此前拟定的估值约150亿美元;Walker 认为,AI 时代独特可穿戴设备数据的变现前景,或许推高了这一估值。他寻找 AI 带来的二阶受益者时看上了住宅建筑商:Lennar 年初至今跌25%至约75美元,股价接近账面价值,Berkshire 正在买入。若 AI 公司付费在新社区安装设备,现有地块或能一次性增值约5%;但竞争会逐渐把这部分回报压掉。相比之下,Oura 的数据或能持续带来收益。
1. SOLS 脑筋急转弯:该不该因为管理层主动取消坏交易而给他们加分?
- Walker 凭记忆、即兴聊起 Solstice Advanced Materials(SOLS):这家公司约一年前分拆上市,“每个价值投资者都会看一眼”。它宣布对等合并后,投资者“有1000种理由不买账”,股价一两天内跌了约20%。几个月后,双方都退出了交易(据他回忆,没有分手费),股价随即涨约15%;不过,从公告时算起整体仍小幅下跌,“人们看这家公司时,眼神多少变得有点不一样了”。
- 看多的一面是:“他们试了一把,但愿意听取反馈。”经过数月尽调、合同也已签署之后还能灵活调整,这种心态难得且有价值。看空的一面是,没有管理层会在宣布交易时觉得股东会讨厌这笔交易,因此“你以后就不能再信任管理层了……这次你脱身了,但下一次可能就脱不了身”。
- Walker 把这个问题延伸到更小的场景:如果你在 Q1 告诉管理层,定价思路有问题,他们到了 Q2 回来告诉你:“我们认真考虑了你的建议……也已经落实”,那“你肯定会很乐意听到这句话”。至于 SOLS 本身:“我觉得看多或看空都没有标准答案,但拿出来琢磨很有意思。”
2. Starbucks–Chipotle:只有押注一位愿景型 CEO,合并才说得通
- Starbucks 在录制前一天通过 CNBC 否认了收购 Chipotle 的传闻,但 Walker 仍拿它来讨论,称这是“同一行业的两家公司能想象到协同效应最少的一种合并”:供应链不同、厨房也不同。Yum 旗下 Taco Bell 和 KFC 至少能共享肉类和奶酪采购,还可以同址经营;“Starbucks 和 Chipotle 甚至没法放在同一栋楼里”。
- 唯一说得通的理由是 Brian Niccol:他在2024年8月获任 Starbucks CEO,并于当年稍晚加入;此前他曾任 Chipotle CEO。“除非你认为 Brian Niccol 优秀到无可替代,觉得由他领导的 Chipotle 和 Starbucks 加起来比其他任何组合都值钱,否则这桩合并说不通。真是这样的话,那两家公司就确实有协同效应。”Walker 以 Steve Jobs 和 Pixar 作类比:Disney 收购 Pixar 时,Jobs 在 Pixar 董事会任职,这笔交易或许有助于留住一位独特的创意人才。
- 证据“见仁见智”:Brian Niccol 获聘消息公布后,Starbucks 股价从78美元涨至95美元,目前约93美元;计入股息后,两年下来基本持平。Chipotle 则在他离职消息传出后从55美元跌到50美元,如今只有30美元。要么“他能让 Starbucks 重拾势头”,股价仍有很大上行空间;要么“他只是搭上了趋势的顺风车……Starbucks 在他的领导下也谈不上表现多好”。
3. 市场近况:指数涨幅两位数,投资者却心灰意冷,“失灵”的 Russell 躲过子弹
- Walker 先解释自己所说的价值投资:他的意思是“理性投资……以低于内在价值的价格买入”,而不是通常所说的“买市盈率低于10倍的股票”。他身边的朋友大多偏向这类投资,也更关注小公司。尽管 Russell 年初至今涨10%–11%、S&P 涨约13%,他们仍“几乎心灰意冷”;如果蒙着眼猜,他会以为指数今年跌了15%。
- 背后有两个原因:Russell 2000 自6月30日以来下跌约8%;行业表现也极度分化。10个主要行业 ETF 中,除能源涨约45%、科技涨约35%(涨幅很大一部分来自半导体)外,其余大致都在±5%区间。“如果你没做多科技、半导体或能源……那就大幅跑输指数。”
- 多年来,人们批评 Russell“砍掉赢家,给输家浇水”:公司规模做大、涨出指数后就被剔除,反倒让市值数十亿美元、停滞不前的公司占比更高。近来这套机制反而发挥了作用。SMCI 在2024年初涨了约10倍,之后被 Russell 剔除,接着又遭遇会计指控、股价跌约80%。Walker 记得那封离谱的审计师辞职信:审计师只肯确认自己曾担任 SMCI 的审计师,不愿为公司财务报表中的任何内容背书。Russell 坐上了上涨行情,却躲过了暴跌。今年也出现了相似情况:Bloom Energy 等 AI 热门股在6月高点附近被 Russell 剔除;Bloom Energy 单独就为 Russell 的回报贡献了约1.5%,但在“situational awareness”风波爆发前后,这些股票随后已大幅下跌。“我不知道该从中得出什么结论,但我觉得这很有意思。”
4. 意外竞争:FICO、IMAX,以及微短剧对 Netflix 的威胁
- Walker 反复看到的规律是:近乎垄断的企业若把定价推得太狠,就会引来竞争或监管回应。FICO 市盈率高,又遭遇政府推动的竞争,“这可不是好组合”,今年股价跌了不少。Walker 说,IMAX 对真正的客户——电影制片厂——提高价格;Dune 3 预订了所有 IMAX 影院后,IMAX 实际上是在对 Disney 说:“Avengers 的事你们另请高明。”Disney 正试图推出竞争格式“Infinity Vision”,并准备向 Warner Bros. 以外的其他制片厂推介。Walker 还提到10年前的 Valeant,作为定价引发反弹的例子。他提醒那些总希望管理层“把定价杠杆推得更狠”的投资者:推到一定程度,“总会有竞争者作出回应”。
- Netflix 的潜在威胁,来自《New York Times》一篇关于微短剧的报道:这类视频短小、套路化、反转频出;Walker 举例说,一部作品由20段、每段90秒的视频组成。它们常被描绘成制作粗糙的肥皂剧,但其中一些演员越来越受欢迎。视频用英语拍摄,中国制作方则根据数据给演员提意见,比如“屏幕上得有血”。这基本就是 Quibi——Jeff Katzenberg 和 Meg Whitman 在2020年推出、当时遭到嘲讽的项目。它瞄准手机观看场景,但这一使用场景被 COVID 打乱;Walker 认为 Quibi 可能“稍微超前了时代一点”(a little bit ahead of its time)。Quibi 上线一两个月内就关门了。
- Netflix 自己说过:“我们的竞争对手不是 HBO……而是 YouTube,是睡觉。”Walker 的看法是,如今 Netflix 股价约70美元,低于 Warner Bros. 收购竞价开始前的约110美元;看多者认为它的发行护城河难以攻破,“他们大概没错”。但真正该问的是,10年后人们还会不会看这么多剧本类电视——“如果他们花更多时间看那些内容,看 Netflix 的时间就会更少……这种竞争一旦出现,就可能打破原有格局。”
- 最让 Walker 记住的一句话,来自一位演员讲述数据驱动的剧本:有次中国制作方发来台词“你这个卑贱的农民,竟敢这样对我!”,演员们不得不解释:“在美国,你不会用‘农民’来称呼一个人。”
5. Oura 推迟 IPO,寻找 AI 带来的二阶收益——他看上了住宅建筑商
- Oura 此前试图按“简直离谱”的约150亿美元估值定价 IPO,并计划募资22亿美元,之后推迟上市。最妙的玩笑是,它“刚刚测出自己的准备度分数偏低”。Walker 使用 WHOOP;他认为投资者看重 Oura 独特身体数据在 AI 时代的潜在用途,公司看起来也像是在借 AI 题材融资。同一门生意放在10年前,“根本不可能融到接近150亿美元”。
- 他承认自己一边闲聊一边想到一个此前没考虑过的风险:专用追踪设备能否胜过 Apple Watch 和 Google 旗下的 Fitbit?究竟是专业化更有优势,还是更便宜的通用设备胜出?“iPhone 出现之后,Kodak 会怎么看自己的专用相机业务?”
- AI 的许多一阶影响已经显现:原本为“Bitcoin 要上月球”而建的加密货币数据中心,改为 AI 数据中心后,价值高出10倍;一家电动车充电公司原本有能力每天为约10,000辆卡车供电,也可以考虑把电力转供数据中心。他的二阶投资想法是住宅建筑商:受利率等因素拖累,Lennar 从100美元跌到75美元,接近账面价值;Berkshire 正在买入(但买入者已不是 Buffett)。
- 如果 AI 公司向建筑商支付相当于房屋价值约5%的费用,在新社区安装设备——“AI 数据追踪器之类的东西”——现有地块的价值就可能增加5%。Walker 强调,住宅建筑商获得的这笔收益只有一次:未来土地买家知道 AI 带来的回报后会出更高价,竞争会把收益抢走。相比之下,Oura 现有客户群和数据基础可能持续带来收益。
- 离开投资话题后,他和好友 Logan 在 Boston 参加 HYROX,玩得很尽兴。他大概会在3月下旬参加 Miami HYROX,还说自己另外有“6个不同的话题”没来得及聊。
完整逐字稿
What does liberal politician Josh Turek mean when he says “We need an easier pathway to citizenship”? Turek backs a bill that would grant amnesty to illegals convicted of serious crimes, like assault and indecent exposure. “We need an easier pathway to citizenship.” But not for people who break our laws. Liberal politician Josh Turek, he only shows up for illegals. Paid for by SLF PAC. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee. SLFPAC.org.
You're about to listen to the Yet Another Value podcast with your host, me, Andrew Walker. It is Tuesday, October 12th, and today is my monthly random ramblings for October. Before we get into that, a disclaimer: nothing on this podcast is investing advice. That’s true for every podcast, and particularly true for today, because it’s just me, a random guy alone in a very small office, rambling to you about things.
I can’t tell you why, but I just start talking into the mic and go. Maybe it’s because I like the sound of my own voice. Today, I think it’ll be a really interesting one—just some things on my mind.
The first is M&A. If somebody is considering a bad M&A deal, or announces one and then pulls back, how do you think about that? Do you give the company credit for pulling back from a bad idea, or do you ding them because they had a bad idea, almost executed on it, and were forced not to? That’s the first thing we’re going to talk about. We can discuss it through the lens of SOLS, Solstice, and the Starbucks–Chipotle rumors.
Then I’m going to talk a little bit about the indices, just a state-of-the-markets kind of thing. Indices are up broadly, in the double digits. Domestic indices are up double digits year to date. But that’s not how I feel when I talk to a lot of my friends. A lot of them are despondent. Maybe that’s because there’s been a big pullback, or because there’s a lot of churn and blood underneath those headline levels. I’ll talk about that a little bit.
Then we’re going to talk about unexpected competition through the lens of IMAX, FICO, and Netflix. There’s this really interesting piece on microdramas, which are becoming really popular in the U.S. I think they’re quite popular in a lot of overseas markets, too. If I said, “Hey, somebody’s going to film 20 90-second clips that are very formulaic, quick, and twisty,” you might say, “Okay, that sounds pretty cool, but I don’t think that’s going to be a big business.” Well, it is a big business, and I think it’s going to start cutting into legacy media. Netflix, in particular, is a really interesting one to think about.
Then we’re going to talk about how I ran a HYROX. I’m a WHOOP member. Here’s my little WHOOP on my wrist, for those of you watching. Oura pulled its IPO. I want to talk a little bit about that IPO, and in particular, the Oura business. If you’d thought about Oura four years ago, I don’t know if you’d have been thinking about this huge AI data play. Maybe you would have; I don’t know. I’m not an investor. But that really became a thing as they were approaching a $15 billion valuation, which just seems insane to me. I’m also thinking about other businesses that could have that kind of value—that could be one thing, but then have a big AI tailwind increasing their value. The one I think about, in terms of a tailwind that wouldn’t be continuous but would boost their current asset value, is home builders.
While I’m rambling, the other interesting thing with Oura and WHOOP is that they’re IPO-ing. I’ve got my WHOOP on one hand, and there’s an Apple Watch here. Dedicated fitness trackers have one overwhelming risk: Apple makes the watch, and Google has Fitbit. These big tech companies are competing with them. You’ve got a specialized thing that does one thing, versus this big thing—the Apple Watch—that’s always getting better at health. How do you compete with that? That’s interesting. You might say, “Hey, specialization wins out.” There are some cases where that’s worked, but how do you think Kodak feels about its specialized camera business when the iPhone comes around? Kodak might still be in business, but it’s not the Kodak of the ’80s anymore, right? So does specialization win, or does the general-use, cheaper option win? That’s another interesting thing to think about, which I didn’t even think about while I was rambling. I just rambled.
But first, a word from our sponsor, and our sponsor is Trata, T-R-A-T-A.com. If you've been listening to this podcast for the past year, 18 months, you know that Trata's been a great sponsor, and it's a product that I love, that I use frequently. Trata is two bystanders who hop onto an anonymized call, and they talk about stocks that they're long. They talk about the re... Or long, thinking about getting long, short, whatever it is. They talk about it, and they talk about why. They talk about the opportunity they see, the risk, what they worry about, what keeps them up at night, where they think the street is right, and where they think the street is wrong. They talk about all that, and then Trata takes the transcript of it, anonymizes it, and lets you read it. Whenever I'm looking at a company, I have my little Claude agent. I say, “Hey, Claude, today I'm looking at this company.” First thing it does: go to Trata, pull up any transcripts that mention it, and tell me what people are saying about the stock. I think it's just an awesome product. It's really unique. I think if you like this podcast, you're gonna like Trata too, so go to T-R-A-T-A.com to check 'em out. All right, let's jump into it. I said everything in the intro about what I’m going to talk about today. Let’s dive into it. I want to start off talking a little bit about mergers. First, I’ll start with a hypothetical, a little brain teaser. I don’t know if brain teaser is the right word, but that’s what I’m going to call it.
There’s a company—SOLS is the ticker. It was a spinoff about a year ago. Solstice Advanced Materials is the company. People really liked them when they spun off because every value investor is going to look at spinoffs. They had some exposure to semiconductors and all this sort of stuff. I haven’t done a ton of work on them, so I’m not going to claim to be an expert. I’m just giving you a broad overview off the cuff, from memory.
A couple of months ago, they announced a merger. It was a merger of equals, if I recall correctly, and the stock just got hammered. It was down 20% in a day or two. Investors hated the merger for 1,000 different reasons. This is a spinoff; they want a different capital allocation. A few months later, they called off the merger. Mergers have a contract, and both sides have to agree, but both sides said, “Hey, this isn’t working. The stocks are down,” and all that sort of stuff. So they called off the merger, and SOLS stock went up about 15% on that news.
Percentages can be funny, but if you do the math, the stock is down a little bit overall since the merger announcement. It hasn’t fully recovered, and that could be index-related or anything else. But I think it’s probably fair to say that after they announced the merger and the stock went down, people started looking at this company with a bit of a funny eye. It’s something I’ve been thinking about.
If SOLS announces a merger and investors hate it, and then they call it off, what do you think about the management team? If you’re looking at the company with fresh eyes, investors hated the merger and they called it off. In this case, they were able to call it off. If I remember correctly, there are no break fees. It was a merger of equals: both sides said, “Let’s merge,” and then both sides said, “Let’s not merge.”
So, if you’re looking at SOLS, what do you think about the management team after they do a merger investors hate and call it off? Is that a bullish sign? They took a shot, but they were willing to listen to feedback. Investors said, “We hate this,” and they said, “We hear you, and we’re going to do our best to get out of it.” Is that a bearish sign for them? I don’t think there’s any management team out there that’s going to announce a merger saying, “My shareholders are going to hate this,” right? Every management team thinks their shareholders are going to love it and that it’s a great deal. So, even though they got out of it, is the merger announcement a bearish sign because you can’t trust management anymore? Their capital allocation decisions are going to be extra suspect. They clearly wanted to merge. They got out of this one.
But the next one, you might not be able to get out of. There’s going to be a signed contract. You’re going to be forced to go through with it. I’ve just been thinking about that because, in general, if you said, “Hey, somebody did something and had the mental flexibility to do something: they spent months of work and diligence, all this sort of stuff, to get a signed contract. They think it’s great. They had the mental flexibility, when people were telling them this was a bad idea, to get out of it.” Generally, I’d say that’s great.
So it’s just been a little brainteaser. I don’t think there’s a right or wrong answer. We’re rambling, but I thought I’d start you off with that brainteaser because it’s something I’ve been thinking about. I think it is interesting. That’s a big example, right? That’s a merger of equals, but you could apply it to building a relationship with a management team.
You talk to them in quarter one and say, “Hey, guys, you talked in quarter one about taking pricing or not taking pricing, whatever it is. I’ve done a lot of industry research. I’ve talked to experts. I’ve talked to customers. I don’t think this is a good idea.” In quarter two, if they do something and come back to you and say, “Hey, we took your idea under advisement. We talked to customers, thought about it, implemented it, and stopped taking as much pricing in this situation,” you’d love to hear that. It’s something I’ve been thinking about, and you can apply it to all sorts of scenarios, big and small. Again, in Solstice’s case, I don’t think there’s a correct answer on whether it’s bullish or bearish, but I think it’s interesting to play around with.
1. A Merger Built Around One CEO
Speaking of mergers, the other merger I’ve been thinking a lot about is Starbucks. There was a rumor a week or two ago—I’m recording this October 12th—that Starbucks had looked at acquiring Chipotle. Yesterday, October 11th, Starbucks went on CNBC and said, “We’re not going to buy Chipotle.” So take that off the table. But it’s still really interesting to think about, because that is a merger with probably the least amount of synergies that 2 companies in the same industry could possibly have.
When you think about Starbucks and Chipotle, they’re both food companies, quote-unquote, but they have 2 completely different supply chains. The only thing they do is look for high-foot-traffic locations, but they’re kind of competitors in that sense. They’re not competitors in the sense that merging them creates a duopoly, because there are plenty of restaurant brands, retail brands, coffee shops, and others that want high-foot-traffic locations. Taking another competitor off the table doesn’t change the competitive dynamics for those locations at all. There are literally zero synergies between merging Starbucks and Chipotle.
But you know what there is? Brian Niccol, I believe, is the CEO of Starbucks. He was hired in 2024; he was announced in August 2024. He was the CEO of Chipotle, right? So he’s the Starbucks CEO now. You have a merger where there are no synergies. It’s a silly idea. If you gave somebody a fantasy draft and said, “Think of the top 1,000 mergers that could happen in the public-company space, the public restaurant space, whatever it is,” no one would think Starbucks and Chipotle belong together.
I know people are going to come at me with Yum! Brands and say, “Hey, you’ve got Taco Bell and KFC.” For a while, I believe Pizza Hut wasn’t in there anymore. I’d say, “Yes, that’s true, but at least Taco Bell and KFC are buying meat and cheese. There are a few supply-chain synergies.” Starbucks and Chipotle don’t even have that. A Taco Bell and a KFC can be under one roof; there are dual Taco Bell-KFC locations. You can’t even put a Starbucks and Chipotle under the same roof. They have completely different kitchens and completely different supply lines. Everything about the businesses is different.
No one would dream of putting these 2 together unless they knew the CEO. The CEO clearly wants to do this, at least in my opinion. I’m not in the boardroom, but it seems pretty logical that if he was the CEO 2 years ago, and they’re exploring this merger that makes no sense, it’s being driven by him. That’s interesting because, again, this merger doesn’t make sense unless you think Brian Niccol, the CEO of Starbucks, is so uniquely qualified that Chipotle and Starbucks under him are worth more than they would be under anyone else.
In that case, there actually are synergies, because if he’s so talented, so unique, such a visionary in the restaurant space or the fast-casual Mexican space with Chipotle, that it works under him, then there are synergies. That’s really interesting to think about. If you think about Steve Jobs when he came back to Apple, a lot of the mergers around Apple or Steve Jobs are Steve Jobs-centered. I’m blanking on what Apple buys, but Pixar comes to mind. When I read the Steve Jobs books, a lot of the mergers are around Pixar. There’s great creative talent at Pixar, and there are its own dynamics there, but a lot of it is about keeping Steve Jobs happy and involved.
When Disney buys Pixar, Steve Jobs is on the board. You’ve got this unique creative genius, and you’re kind of keeping him in line. With Starbucks buying Chipotle, that would be the only explanation. If you look at the stock prices and performance since Niccol left, you could see evidence either way. It’s kind of in the eye of the beholder.
Again, Niccol—I think it’s Niccol, actually—joins Starbucks in late 2024. Starbucks is at $78 per share the day before they announce he’s going to be CEO. It jumps to $95 per share when it’s announced he’s going to be CEO, and it’s trading at $93 per share today. You’ve got 2 years, and with dividends included, Starbucks stock is basically flat over that time frame.
Chipotle is at $55 per share before he leaves. It drops from $55 to $50 the day it’s announced he’s leaving, and as we’re talking, it’s at $30 per share today. You could look at that and say, “Hey, Chipotle was performing incredibly under his stewardship. Starbucks buys them, he brings the juice back, and there’s a lot of upside if this merger goes through and Starbucks can get that juice back.” The counter would be, “Hey, maybe he was riding trends. Starbucks is much more competitive now, and the restaurant environment is more competitive. Starbucks hasn’t exactly done great under his stewardship. Was this a one-time thing, a guy riding trends?”
I don’t know, but it’s really interesting to think about because that is the silliest merger I can possibly imagine. There’s probably one man driving it, and you could imagine a visionary scenario where you’d say, “Hey, Sol’s [?]—everyone hated it, and there was no reason for that merger to happen. Starbucks and Chipotle have no reason to make sense together, except for one man’s vision.” I think that’s really interesting.
2. Why Investors Feel Despondent
Let’s move on. The other thing—and I think this is what most people tune into Random Ramblings for—is my State of the Markets thoughts. I don’t do the posts anymore on State of the Markets. Maybe you tune in because I’m so handsome. Maybe you tune in for any number of reasons. But let’s talk about the indexes real quick.
Again, I’m talking on October 12th. Most of the people I talk to tend to fit into a certain group. I don’t love the label “value investor.” Maybe I’m getting old and crotchety, fighting over definitions. When somebody says, “I’m a value investor,” what they mean is, “I buy stocks at under 10 times price-to-earnings.” That’s a lot of what they mean.
I consider myself a value investor, but 10 years ago I would’ve said, “Yes, I buy stocks under 10 times price-to-earnings.” Now I don’t say that about myself. I say I’m a value investor in that I want to invest rationally and think logically. I want to buy things for less than they’re worth or buy things that are going to underperform. Everybody would say, “Hey, I want to buy things for less than they’re worth. I want to invest rationally.” But when I hear people say “value investors,” a lot of times what they mean is, “I buy things really quantitatively cheaply,” and that is not what I mean.
Most of my friends I invest with, I think, are a lot more rational and logical. They’re the friends I talk to a lot, and they fall more into the value-investor camp. Why do I say that? Anyway, they tend to fall into that camp, and they tend to be on the smaller side.
It’s interesting because the indexes are up double digits year to date. The Russell is up 10% or 11%. The S&P is up 13% or so as I record this. When I talk to friends, that is not what I’m hearing from them. A lot of my friends are borderline despondent, I would say.
Not despondent in the depths-of-COVID way, but they’re really frustrated with the market. Maybe part of that is because of the Russell 2000 in particular. If you’re a smaller investor, you’re probably not invested in the super-large stuff. The Russell 2000 is down about 8% since June 30, so we’re approaching correction territory.
I think underneath the hood of the indices—and I’m going to talk about that in a little bit—there’s just a bloodbath. The indices in general have been really supported by tech, surprise, surprise, and energy so far this year. I pulled up 10 different big, sector-based ETFs: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, and all that sort of stuff. When you look at them, all of them are plus or minus 5% on the year except for 2. Energy’s up about 45%, and tech’s up about 35%.
If you weren’t long tech or energy—or, within tech, if you weren’t long semis—you are massively underperforming the indices. I think there are 2 things driving this despondency. One, if you weren’t long those sectors, you’re underperforming. Two, the indexes have been in correction territory over the past 4 to 5 months.
It’s really interesting. If I didn’t know what the indexes were doing year to date and was just relaying my thoughts based on the friends I’m talking to, I would have guessed the indexes were down 15% on the year or something. They’re not. They’re up pretty solidly. I think that’s interesting.
Speaking of interesting things about the indexes, a popular thing I heard probably in late 2021—and I’ve heard it off and on for the past 10 years, with its popularity waxing and waning—is that the Russell is a broken index. Why would people say that? They say, “Hey, over the past 25 years, the world has become a world where scale matters.” Returns to scale improve. Think about software companies, internet companies, and all that sort of stuff. As you get bigger, you gain scale and operating leverage, your business gets better, and you get a little bit of a moat. Who’s going to start the next Google? You can’t. You don’t have the data science and all that sort of stuff.
The argument was that the Russell is a broken index because it does the reverse of what you want: it cuts its winners and waters its losers. If a stock goes up enough, it gets booted from the Russell, so it’s selling its winners and over-indexing in its losers. If the average company in the Russell has a $1 billion market cap, let’s say, and you stay at a billion, you’ll have a really good weighting in the Russell. But you’ve just floated at a billion, with 0.000% returns year after year. The Russell waters its losers because it over-indexes in them, and they stay there. It kicks out the winners and waters its losers.
I think that’s really interesting because we saw this happen in 2021, and we might see it happen again now. Yes, it’s true that the Russell kicks out its winners, but sometimes it dodges a bullet with the winners it kicks out. SMCI, Super Micro: I believe we saw this happen in 2024, when the stock went up about 10x to start the year. It was the biggest winner on the Russell, and the Russell kicked it out. Then it got hit with all sorts of accounting allegations. There was this wild resignation letter where the auditor was basically saying—the only thing they would confirm was that they used to be the auditor for SMCI. They wouldn’t sign off on anything in the company’s financials. The stock went up 10x and then fell about 80%. The Russell rode it up 10x, booted it, and missed the 80% drop.
We could be seeing a little bit of that with the Russell today. Earlier this year, a lot of the AI winners—Bloom Energy and a few others—were kicked out of the Russell around June, right when they were peaking, just before the situational-awareness blowup and all that sort of stuff. The Russell rode them up, and Bloom Energy alone, I believe, added 1.5% of return to the overall Russell this year. These stocks went parabolic, the Russell kicked them out, and they’re all down quite a bit since then. It’s funny: the same reason people used to say the Russell was broken has helped it so far this year. I don’t know what to take away from that, but I think it’s very interesting.
3. When Monopolies Invite Competition
Let me go to something close to my heart. Actually, speaking of indexes, I want to talk about one other thing: unexpected competition in the bear case. Speaking of people being despondent, this came to me because of FICO. I’m sure a lot of people listening to this are investors, and you know FICO, the credit score. FICO has come under a lot of heat from the government recently, and the government is really trying to break them. The stock’s down quite a bit this year, starting from a high P/E. The combination of a high P/E, competition, and maybe government-induced competition coming in isn’t a great combo. The stock’s down quite a bit, though I think it’s bounced off the lows.
I’ve seen what I call unexpected competition popping up a lot. FICO gets a regulatory crackdown because they push pricing too hard. I’ve seen it in other places, too. Disney is releasing the new Avengers film, I believe, the same weekend as Dune 3. Dune 3 had reserved all the IMAX theaters, so there’s no Avengers IMAX release. Disney is trying to roll out this thing they’re calling Infinity Vision. They’re going to the other studios, except for Warner Bros., because Warner Bros. is releasing Dune, and saying, “Hey, why don’t you guys start releasing movies in Infinity Vision? We’re going to spin up a competitor to IMAX.”
We’ve seen that happen in the movie industry before. If I remember correctly—I don’t have my notes here—all the movie chains rolled out their premium theater offerings a few years ago. You could go see something in IMAX, or you could see it in one of their premium offerings, with bigger screens, better seats, and all that sort of stuff.
I just think it’s interesting. What do Infinity Vision and IMAX have in common with FICO? They have a kind of monopoly. IMAX has a great brand. When you think, “Hey, I want to go see a premium movie,” you think IMAX. They have a great offering and a near-monopoly. FICO—the FICO score—is also a near-monopoly. IMAX has pushed its pricing power both in terms of what it charges consumers and in what it charges movie studios. Its actual customers are the movie studios, and it’s pushed pricing there in a variety of ways, including saying, “Disney, go take a hike on Avengers.”
Investors are always looking for the next monopoly, the next business with a huge moat. It’s interesting to think about how, whenever you talk to an investor who’s investing in a company, a lot of times—especially if it’s a really good company—they’ll tell you, “I wish this silly management team would just pull that pricing lever harder. I wish they would push pricing more.” That pricing lever is great, but if you push pricing too much, there’s always going to be a competitive response. Push it enough, and somebody’s going to figure out a way to bring supply or competition online in one way or another. With FICO, or with Valeant 10 years ago, push pricing too hard, and yes, maybe you have a monopoly, but the government will come and crack down on you. There’s always a bear case. There’s always competition. There’s always risk.
I was thinking about that because there was a New York Times article on microdramas. I believe microdramas are very popular in some emerging and foreign markets, and they’re getting more popular here. The New York Times portrayed them as pretty low-quality, soap-opera-type shows with stars that are getting very popular. You watch a clip at a time, and the clips are very short and very targeted. They say the shows are being filmed in English, but all the producers are Chinese, and they’re sending notes to the cast as it’s happening.
They’re saying, “Hey, you need to hit this storyline. We’ve seen that this increases traffic.” They’re very quantitative: “We need to see blood on the screen,” or, “We need you to say this line. We need this twist to happen.” I thought that was interesting. The reason I bring up microdramas is twofold.
A lot of people, myself included, made fun of Quibi when it launched six or seven years ago. Quibi stood for “quick bites.” It launched in 2020, so the timing was unfortunate: they wanted people to consume the quick bites on their phones while standing in line for coffee, and then COVID happened, so nobody was standing in line for coffee. It was backed by Jeff Katzenberg and Meg Whitman, if I remember correctly. Quibi launched after hundreds of millions in investment, got mocked, and shut down within a month or two. That’s basically what these little microdramas are.
I thought it was interesting that something widely mocked seven years ago might just have been a little bit ahead of its time. The other reason I thought about it was Netflix. The stock has done pretty poorly over the past year. As I write this, it’s trading at 70. Before they started bidding on Warner Bros. about a year ago, the stock was around 110, so it’s down quite a bit.
I think Netflix is still by far the dominant player in streaming and all that sort of stuff. But everywhere I look, I see competition. Netflix used to say, “Our competition isn’t HBO, or Disney. It’s YouTube. It’s sleep,” is what they said. And everywhere I look, I see competition looming for Netflix, whether it’s YouTube hours continuing to grow or these quick bites on the small end.
A lot of bulls would say Netflix has such a moat from its distribution, size, and scale when it comes to TV viewership that no one can catch them. They’re probably right about that, but it’s interesting that competition can come from unexpected places. Maybe the competition they should be thinking about isn’t Disney or HBO or whoever. Maybe it’s whether, 10 years from now, people will be watching as much TV and as many scripted dramas as they do now. Or will people be spending more time on quick bites that satisfy quickly, can be spun up really cheaply, and are specifically targeted at them? If they’re spending more time there, they’re spending less time on Netflix.
I’m not saying Netflix is a terminal zero or anything, but that kind of competition is how something can break. It’s easy for competition to come in any form, whether it’s a regulatory crackdown with FICO, or, with IMAX, you piss off somebody big and they spin off their own technology and try to get going, or Netflix faces these cheap, Chinese-backed microdramas.
The article is really good. One interesting thing it says is that an actor explained, “We have to stick to the scripts these guys are giving us, because often we’ll think something is silly, but then we’ll see the data, and it really causes a spike in viewership or signups.” So it’s very data-driven. But the actor also said, “Sometimes we’re dealing with Chinese people. They’ll send us a script and say, ‘You should yell at this person like, “How dare you, you lowborn peasant!”’ And we’ll be like, ‘Peasant isn’t really what you would call someone in America when you say that.’ So we’ll change that.” I thought that was really interesting. That peasant line stuck in my head.
4. Oura’s AI Valuation
All right. The last thing I want to talk about is Oura delaying its IPO this week. There were so many great jokes about Oura’s IPO. One of my favorites was, “Oura didn’t delay its IPO. It just has a low readiness score right now.” I’m a WHOOP person, so maybe I’m speaking as a customer of a competitor. For those who don’t know, your readiness score tells you when you wake up whether you got a good night’s sleep and your readiness to work out is really high, or you got a bad night’s sleep: “Screw that.”
I think Oura is interesting for a few reasons. It’s the ring that keeps track of your health. They tried to IPO at, I think, a $15 billion valuation, which is absolutely insane, and tried to raise $2.2 billion. If they had tried that 10 years ago, with the whole Oura business the same—subscription rings—they would have been raising nowhere close to $15 billion.
I think one reason they were valued so highly is that people looked at it and said, “This is a company with a wearable that has unique data. You could imagine a lot of ways that could come into play in an AI world.” I think they were at least trying to raise money on an AI play. It’s interesting to think about how a business whose customers love it, with unique data that’s on your body, can suddenly become much more valuable because of something tangential that happens. That could massively increase the value of the data, the customer base, everything the company has.
We’re very early in the AI revolution. What are other businesses that are going to see their value massively increase as AI takes hold? We’ve already seen a lot of them. The classic example would be crypto data centers. They had all this power, all this cooling, everything. They were built for Bitcoin to go to the moon. Bitcoin didn’t quite go to the moon, but it turned out those data centers were worth 10 times more running as AI centers.
To stick with AI, there have been a lot of articles recently about companies—I think there’s one that’s an EV charging company—that bought tons of power. It had enough power to charge something like 10,000 trucks per day. Well, they don’t charge 10,000 trucks, but they have that power allocated to them. So they say, “What if we charge 10,000 trucks’ worth of AI data centers instead?” I think we’ve seen a lot of that.
I was trying to rack my brain for the second-order effects that get more valuable as AI comes along and the world transforms. A lot of the first-order things have already happened. I don’t have great answers, but one that was really interesting to me, and that appeals to the value investor in me a little bit, is home builders.
I say home builders because there’s a bloodbath underneath the indices. A lot of home builders have sold off pretty heavily so far this year on rates concerns and every other type of concern you can imagine. Berkshire—not Warren Buffett anymore, but Berkshire—has been buying a lot of Lennar. Lennar started the year at 100 and is at 75 right now, so we can do the math: it’s down 25% for the year. It’s trading around book value, and Berkshire has been buying a bunch of it. I think home builders could be interesting.
You could imagine a world where AI firms start paying home builders, saying, “Install our AI equipment all over the new homes and communities you’re building, and we’ll pay you for that.” That way, the communities become more valuable. In that case, the returns wouldn’t be permanent. Because home builders are competitive, those returns would get competed away over time. Future builders buying communities or building lots would bid more, knowing there’s an AI return on the back end.
But all their current lots would be undervalued, because those lots were bought with the expectation of normal home-building returns. Then they find out AI firms will pay them 5% of a house’s value to install AI data trackers or whatever it is, so all their lots would be worth 5% more. That would be a one-time boost. I think that kind of windfall is interesting to think about. Is the windfall one-time, like with the home builder, because it gets competed away? Or with Oura, because they’ve already got all those customers, is it an ongoing benefit to the business?
5. Andrew Runs HYROX
Speaking of Oura, I did a HYROX race over the weekend and had a great time. My buddy Logan, who I think is also the number one fan of the Yet Another Value Podcast, came and did it with me. We did it in Boston and had an awesome time. Have I thought to myself, “Maybe I should become a fitness influencer instead of an investor?” Every now and then, when markets are rough or when I’m talking to despondent friends, maybe.
But I’m not. I love investing, so I’m not going to. But maybe I am. I don’t know. Anyway, I say that because I had so much fun, and if you’re into HYROX, you should just message me and we can talk about HYROX and stuff. But I don’t even know why I said it. I just said it because I wanted people to message me if they’re into HYROX and we can talk about HYROX.
It is something I’m going to keep doing, and I really enjoyed the training. I really enjoyed all of that. Probably going to do Miami HYROX in late March, so if you’re in the Miami area, you want to train, you want to talk, let me know. But anyway, I have so much to talk about, but I’ve had fun rambling.
I think it’s been about 30 minutes. Oh my gosh, I’ve got 6 other different topics I didn’t get to. Who knows when I’ll be able to get to those? But I’ve had a great time rambling. Hope you enjoyed it. We’ll talk to you soon, and we’ll go from there.
A quick disclaimer: Nothing on this podcast should be considered investment advice. Guests or the hosts may have positions in any of the stocks mentioned during this podcast. Please do your own work and consult a financial advisor.
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Thanks.