JD Vance 的 AI 演讲、技术乐观派与末日派、关税,以及与 Naval Ravikant 讨论的 AI 诉讼
JD Vance 在巴黎的演讲,将美国 AI 政策重新定位为机会、技术领先和劳动生产率,而非预防性安全监管。 Sacks 将其归纳为4项承诺:让美国 AI 保持“黄金标准”,抵制可能扼杀行业于起步阶段的监管,消除意识形态偏见,以及“让 AI 沿着有利于劳动者的增长路径发展”。战略重点是在芯片、模型、应用和能源上提速,因为落后同业国家6个月,可能远比假设性的消费者安全规则更关键。
Naval 认为,AI 最可信的系统性风险是控制权集中,而非机器灭绝人类。 前沿模型训练偏向集中式超级计算机集群,现有实验室则可能借安全之名“在自己身后把梯子收起来”;一方面声称 AI 可能捕获“未来所有价值的光锥”,另一方面却认为它可以被1家私人公司安全拥有,这本身就是矛盾。他的检验标准是:“如果你真的认为自己要创造上帝,你会想把上帝交给1个实体,由它给上帝套上缰绳吗?”
讨论嘉宾的基准判断是,AI 创造机会的速度将快于摧毁工作岗位的速度,尽管 Jason 一直追问司机、收银员及其他显性受冲击岗位。 Friedberg 已经看到,分析师原本需要数小时完成的工作被压缩到几分钟,但他们并没有因此闲下来;产出提高,新的项目也变得可行。实际上的就业判断,集中在 Richard Baldwin 那句话上——“AI 不会抢走你的工作,真正会抢走你工作的,是使用 AI 的人”——因为这些本质上是自然语言计算机,“新的编程语言就是英语”。
Naval 和 Sacks 区分了少数高技能、能够融入社会的移民通道,与开放边境和低工资劳动力替代。 Naval 希望人才向“世界上最自由的国家”流动,但坚持宣誓入籍和社会融入必须有实际意义;Sacks 则认为,不受限制的劳动力供给帮助资本拿走了过去30年的生产率增长。Friedberg 否定了“AI 导致的失业应当决定移民政策”这一前提,保留了本期最核心的分歧。
Jason 的关税论点是,在规模经济、迟滞效应和网络效应主导的行业里,教科书式比较优势并不成立。 1个国家可以补贴半导体、无人机或社交平台,排除外国竞争者,再利用规模优势击垮任何后来者——“网络效应、网络效应、网络效应统治着我身边的世界”。但 Chamath 警告,关税到来之际,通胀仍在持续、逾期还款率正在上升,未来6至9个月还约有1万亿美元需要融资,融资利率可能达到5%-5.5%。
Thomson Reuters–ROSS 判决将 AI 版权风险从抽象争论推进到替代经济学。 Naval 认为 OpenAI 输给 The New York Times 的概率为5%-10%,结果可能是禁令,以及类似 Spotify 的收入分成,让内容所有者拿走二分之一至三分之二;Jason 自己使用 Wirecutter 的经历展示了这一机制:AI 订阅替代了出版商订阅。技术争议仍在于,模型究竟像人类一样学习,还是执行“有损压缩”;但 Naval 的兜底原则很明确:如果模型消费了开放互联网,就应当开源。
Naval 正从风险投资转向更难的产品,减少市场风险,承担更多技术风险。 Airchat 是他喜欢的产品,但“没有真正火起来”;他帮助团队找到新的归宿,退还投资人资金,并把产品经验带进1家尚未披露的软硬件公司,但他还不确定自己能否把它做成。对创业者而言,教训异常清晰:先做1个交付后能够明确证明有人需要的东西,再让“如何交付”本身成为最难的部分。
1. Airchat 没有真正火起来后,Naval 选择了技术风险
Naval 不愿被投资人的身份定义:投资只是“副业”或爱好,而他现在的身份很简单,就是“做东西”。金钱的意义,在于让人有自由去追逐仍然有趣的工作。David Friedberg 提到的投资案例包括 Twitter、Uber、Notion 和 Postmates。
Airchat 将异步音频、AI 转录和翻译结合起来,让没有主持人的同侪式播客对话变得更容易参与。Naval 喜欢这个产品和团队,但社交网络“必须真正火起来才能运作”,喜欢本身无法挽救疲弱的用户增长。
他对结果的描述非常具体:团队拿到了报酬,也找到了“很好的归宿”;参与投资人收回了资金;相关经验则被带进1个更难的软硬件项目。现在,他更偏好“更多技术风险、更少市场风险”。
这种转向做产品的选择,呼应了他早期经历的压力周期。AngelList 最初的匹配邮件列表停止扩张,SEC 指控他在没有牌照的情况下从事经纪交易商业务,他于是前往华盛顿推动修改法律;在那段压力时期,他公开写下的“真理、爱与金钱”,最终成了人们记住的那套哲学。
2. 让孩子早一点承担后果,才能获得自主权
Naval 的育儿框架来自 David Deutsch 的“认真对待孩子”:给予孩子成年人应有的自由和尊重,不要依赖“父母可以把你关起来、不给你晚饭或以其他方式强迫你服从”这类潜在威胁。
Aaron Stupple 给出了极端案例:孩子可以无限量吃冰淇淋或 Snickers,无限时使用 iPad,不去上学,也自己选择穿什么。所有事情都变成说服和解释,“就像你对待室友,或家里与成年人共同生活时那样”。
Naval 没有走到这个极端。他的孩子每天需要完成约1小时数学或编程,以及2小时阅读,但实际可能只做15-30分钟数学和30分钟至2小时阅读;之后,他们就是“自由的生物”。Jason 说,他自己最大的孩子可能每天玩9小时 iPad。
主持人追问了营养、被动视频和长期后果。Naval 的回答是,优先给予自主权,而不是要求一致:最大的孩子现在有时会在被说服后主动拒绝冰淇淋,没有人看起来在“任何重要的事情上”落后,而 YouTube 字幕也让屏幕时间变成更快的阅读训练。“我宁愿他们拥有自主权,也不想让他们完全长成我希望的样子。”
3. Vance 将 AI 政策从安全重新定位到国家机会
Sacks 将 Vance 的开场——“不是 AI 安全,而是 AI 机会”——视为“向船头开的一枪”。Bletchley Park、欧洲监管、拜登行政命令以及媒体报道此前都聚焦潜在伤害;Vance 则告诉巴黎听众,机会同样应当被置于政策中心。
政府的4部分立场非常明确:美国 AI 应保持“黄金标准”;过度规则不能把行业扼杀在起步阶段;模型必须摆脱意识形态偏见;政策应当“让 AI 沿着有利于劳动者的增长路径发展”,支持美国创造就业。
真正的竞争要求的是底层技术栈,而不只是1个旗舰聊天机器人:芯片、AI 模型、应用和充足能源。Vance 还警告,大型现有企业推动的监管可能演变成监管俘获,因此保持克制,反而可能给小公司创造更公平的竞争环境。
他向欧洲提出的方案,是合作加条件。Sacks 称《数字服务法》是一条“减速陷阱”,对成功的美国科技公司打击尤其大;欧洲可以与美国及其所宣称的言论自由价值观站到一起——Sacks 补充说“希望如此”——也可以继续依赖那些为审查和人口控制而打造的敌对系统。
4. Naval 对 AI 的担忧是所有权集中,而非机器灭绝
Naval 反对那种反复出现的末日式“宗教”:气候、陨石、小行星、COVID-19,再到如今的 AI。前沿公司可能真心相信风险,但它们的激励结构也让它们特别容易接受一种能够让自己“在身后把梯子收起来”的叙事。
安全论本身包含矛盾:AI 据说危险到不能开放源代码开发,却没有危险到不能由1家私人公司拥有。如果这真是1个制造核武器的曼哈顿计划,Naval 认为,没有人会接受由1家公司控制结果。
他真正担心的是结构性问题:算力集群和模型训练的经济学天然会推动集中。因此,即使去中心化训练难以竞争,开源和“little tech AI”仍然重要。“我不怕 AI;我怕的是,控制 AI 的极少数人为了我们自己的利益,对我们其他人做些什么。”
5. 技术乐观派看到的是丰裕,现有利益方看到的是损失
Friedberg 将争论划分为加速与保守。AI、自动化、生物工程、半导体、量子计算和核能都能创造杠杆、降低价格并扩大丰裕;已经拥有很多东西的人,往往更关注自己可能失去什么,而不是上行空间。
他用人均 GDP 对比强化了激励差异:美国约8.2万美元,欧盟约6万美元,中国约1.26万美元,印度约2500美元。低收入社会更有动力追逐上行机会,而富裕社会则可能把自己监管到停滞,并走向更强的政府控制。
汽车是他用来反驳静态预测的案例:汽车不只是替代交通运输,还创造了修理工、经销商、道路和相关产业。AI 也可能释放今天被认为不可行的项目——新的半导体、能源系统、海洋居住,以及月球或火星城市。
6. 技术领先支撑繁荣与国防
Chamath 将 Vance 的论点压缩成一条国家实力链条:技术领先带来经济领先,经济领先带来军事实力;缺少这些,社会最终会崩塌。“谁能掌握并治理技术上更先进的东西,谁就会获胜。”
他举的具体案例是 Microsoft 据报道向美国陆军承诺的240亿美元项目:当 Microsoft 无法交付目标系统时,项目转给了 Anduril,Chamath 认为后者具备执行所需的技术能力。DeepSeek 则代表了来自中国一侧的同一场竞争。
Chamath 还把 Vance 和 Kamala Harris 描述成“2位副总统的对照故事”:Harris 早期负责墨西哥和危地马拉事务的安排,被批评为漫无边际且回避问题;相比之下,他认为 Vance 在巴黎的表现聚焦、精准且有野心。
Vance 自己关于 MAGA 与科技的表述,将劳动者保护和创新放在一起:“我不喜欢用廉价劳动力替代美国劳动力”,但“我喜欢增长和生产率提升”。消费者欺诈值得关注;更大的危险,是同业国家领先美国6个月。
7. 只有技能与融入社会同时流动,移民才有效
Sacks 区分了劳动力替代与生产率提升。开放边境以及以更低工资和更低标准生产的进口商品,会压低底层劳动者的处境;技术则可以提高每个劳动者的产出,并在理论上推高工资。他进一步提出,移民不受限制可能帮助资本拿走原本能够流向劳动者的生产率收益。
Naval 以移民身份表明自己的立场:他的父母在他9岁时带他前往美国,后来他归化入籍。“我的血是红、白、蓝的。”他支持合法、高技能移民,并认为必须给予足够的时间和空间完成融入——让最优秀的知识创造者流向“世界上最自由的国家”。
关键限定条件在于:移民必须具备技能,并成为美国人,因为“那份誓言不是没有意义的”。Naval 给出的刻意极端的反事实是:如果拜登政府只接纳 IQ 达到150的人,移民争论会完全不同。
Friedberg 否定了 Jason 关于“预期中的 AI 替代应决定边境政策”的前提。Jason 认为,AI 发展2年半后,仍未证明自己会造成大规模失业。但 Chamath 仍然看到了一种政治交集:轻资产劳动者、爱国企业主和创新领域领导者,都支持有针对性、有效用的移民政策,以及真正的社会融入。
8. AI 先提高吞吐量,尚未大规模削减工资单
Jason 不断回到自动驾驶汽车、收银员,以及数百万劳动者可能被明显替代的问题上。Sacks 和 Friedberg 拒绝给出确定判断:Jason 认为当前 AI 基本只是更好的搜索引擎,能帮助学生作弊;而即将到来的智能体尚未证明自己可以完全在无人监督下运行并替代整个岗位。
Friedberg 在公司里的运营证据恰好相反。过去占用分析师数小时的任务,现在只需几分钟,但员工并没有把剩余时间用于闲置;公司开发了更多产品,组织吞吐量也提高了。AI 正在发挥生产率杠杆的作用。
Jason 指出,Uber 和 DoorDash 创造了许多如今被视为永久存在的司机岗位,而 YouTube 创造了过去根本不存在的职业。Friedberg 的判断是,“新东西被创造的速度会快于旧东西消失的速度”。
Sacks 的3部分框架保留了不确定性:新技术带来生产率增长,扰动现有岗位的一部分,并造成一些彻底失业。历史上前两种效果占主导,但欧洲犯的错误,是假装监管者已经足够准确地预测未来,能够消除每一种风险。
9. 自然语言计算机扩大创业和人才入口
AI 正在让过去无法存在的企业变得可行。Airchat 需要转录和翻译,Naval 的新项目依赖 AI 却没有被包装成 AI 公司,而 AngelList 也在整个运营过程中采用这些工具。
Jason 认为,2至3人的团队可以做出产品,甚至实现100万美元收入;与此同时,专门化企业的长尾正在扩张,从滑雪追踪到冥想和断食都有。Naval 认为,越来越多的单人公司能够快速扩张,这是比“每个中级工程师都已经被替代”更可信的证据。
眼下最简单的就业策略是:下载工具、和它们交流,然后重新应用。Richard Baldwin 在2023年的判断成为本期的劳动市场主张:“AI 不会抢走你的工作;真正会抢走你工作的,是使用 AI 的人,因为他们比你更懂得如何使用它。”
Chamath 部分改变了自己此前推动所有人学习工程和硬科学的想法。智能体和深度研究可以提供这套工具的一部分,使创造力、判断力、历史、心理学、领导力和沟通能力的价值上升;高情商的人现在可以通过提出更好的问题和非线性思考,与纯粹依靠数学能力的人竞争。
10. 技术现实主义要求公开领导不可避免的转型
Sacks 提出了介于乐观与悲观之间的第三派:“技术现实主义者”。技术无论如何都会发生——试图阻止它,就像“命令潮汐停止”——因此公司和国家都应主动颠覆自己、引领转型,而不是等待竞争对手强行推动变化。
DeepSeek 打破了美国控制技术列车的想象。Chamath 认为,芯片和人才限制迫使中国团队转向效率,随后中国团队输出了开源模型,而美国公司却以安全为由维护封闭系统。
Chamath 的修正是,领导力不应意味着由1个美国守门人控制一切。开放、分布式竞争会把能力泄漏到海外,但网络效应仍可能奖励最初的发起者;开放互联网惠及全人类,而其主导公司仍然是美国公司,原因就在于美国较早拥抱了它。
Naval 也将当前模型与 AGI 区分开来:“我不认为我们知道如何构建 AGI。”目前存在的是1台异常强大的自然语言计算机,核心用途有2个——搜索,以及文书和作业;许多受到威胁的岗位,本来就是为了搬运文件而创造的行政工作,而不是持久的生产性活动。
11. 网络效应打破单边自由贸易的教科书逻辑
Jason 挑战了现代赢家通吃市场中的李嘉图比较优势。如果中国补贴 TikTok、半导体、无人机或 BYD,同时排除外国竞争者,那么早期规模就可能在名义上更高效的美国竞争者获得机会之前,锁定整个市场。
一旦规模经济和迟滞效应形成,赢家就可以把价格降到零、让挑战者破产、阻止新的投资,再重新提高价格。因此,静态消费者节省忽视了保留1个国内竞争者的期权价值,尤其是在战略性、高毛利行业中。
互联网提供了 Jason 所说的先发优势证据:在1990年代末,很少有人预期 Amazon 会主导电商,或 Uber 和 Airbnb 会整合各自的品类。“网络效应、网络效应、网络效应统治着我身边的世界”,贸易政策不能假装这一点不存在。
12. 关税与脆弱的再融资时间表纠缠在一起
Chamath 预计关税会落地,但规模取决于预算路径。参议院一份覆盖边境安全和军事支出的窄版方案,可能把财政斗争推迟;众议院提出的“又大又漂亮的法案”包含数万亿美元的削减和减税方案,可能更快制造对关税收入的需求。
他提醒,时点很关键:持续通胀、不断上升的逾期还款率,以及“在换挡处睡着的”美联储,同时出现;未来6至9个月约有1万亿美元需要融资。如果融资成本落在5%、5.25%或5.5%,在再积累3至5个月数据之前就强行推动综合法案,可能削弱 Trump 的政策灵活性。
Friedberg 强调了报复性措施:中国是美国农产品出口的最大买家,一旦减少采购,影响会穿透美国农业州。他回忆,Trump 第1个任期内,联邦向农民提供的转移支付超过200亿美元;下一场贸易冲突可能同样需要支持。
未经检验的实验是整套组合,而不只是关税本身:提高边境税、同时降低个人和企业所得税,可能重新引导资本流向。Friedberg 预计其他国家会“在某种程度上”屈服,但最终谈判平衡和短期损害仍未确定。
13. 无人机依赖使制造回流成为安全要求
Jason 的关税论点同样具有社会维度:民主制度需要拥有好工作的健康中产阶级,而不是所有收益都集中在资产所有者手中,其他人则沦为下层阶级。战略性就业不能被简化为当前最便宜的标价。
他称 DJI “可能是世界上最大的国防承包商”,因为乌克兰和俄罗斯使用的大量无人机,最终都源自中国。美国购买 F-35,而中国制造 Jason 所称的“自动子弹”蜂群,这暴露出危险的生产差距。
无人机制造回流意味着重建电机、半导体、光学、激光和其他全部产业链,而不是开设1家无人机工厂。Jason 认为,凭借国内石油、天然气、压裂和核裂变,美国还可以实现能源盈余;与驾驶或制造无意义文书相比,这类实体生产能够提供更好的工作。
14. Thomson Reuters 将替代效应变成版权测试
Thomson Reuters 拥有 Westlaw 的付费摘要和法律分析。ROSS 在无法获得直接训练许可后,与 LegalEase 签约;而 LegalEase 的材料曾从 Westlaw 复制。法官推翻了此前关于合理使用的结论,判定 ROSS 负有责任,成为讨论中的首个美国重大 AI 版权胜诉案例。
Jason 强调了合理使用的第4项因素:对原作品潜在市场和价值的影响。抓取俄罗斯镜像站或其他开放网络资料,并不会抹去底层权利人的权利,尤其是在输出内容替代了权利人本可以销售的衍生品时。
Naval 认为,OpenAI 惨败给 The New York Times 的概率并非为零,但只有5%-10%。禁令风险可能迫使行业从 Napster 走向 Spotify 式和解,让封闭模型提供商将约二分之一至三分之二的收入返还给内容所有者。
Jason 以 Wirecutter 为例,让替代效应变得具体:他过去订阅 The New York Times,主要是为了产品推荐;现在,付费聊天机器人利用源自 Wirecutter 的信息推荐商品,因此他取消了报纸订阅。除此之外,他说 Microsoft 正以3年2500美元的价格获得其 Harper Business 书籍的授权,用于将书籍纳入 LLM 索引;他计划签下这份协议,把它作为授权先例。
15. 有损压缩无法决定输出内容归谁所有
Naval 认为,法院缺乏稳定的技术框架,并提到 Oracle 与 Rimini Street 的版权诉讼及其后的上诉法院推翻判决。他推荐 Andrej Karpathy 关于语言模型的3小时讲解,因为理解技术机制后,很难再轻易作出绝对化的法律结论。
Jason 引用了 Ilya Sutskever 对 LLM 的描述:它们是极端压缩器;Sacks 认同这属于“有损压缩”,而 Naval 则将其与 Google 使用摘要和链接、把流量导回出版商的做法相比较。
Friedberg 的异议是哲学层面的:抓取公开信息并重新混合,可能类似于人类从前人那里学习。Girl Talk、White Panda、Ed Sheeran,以及古典作曲的传承,都暴露出尚未解决的测试标准——需要多大程度的转化,复制才会变成学习?
Friedberg 认为,稳定结果只有2种:向版权所有者付费,但外国开放权重模型可以绕开这一点;或者让使用开放数据训练的模型回归开源。对于 OpenAI,Jason 和 Chamath 倾向于在私人实体内部保留员工和投资人的激励,同时维持独立的非营利控制,而不是按照讨论中的400亿美元收购非营利组织、将全部业务转为营利性质。
16. 改善睡眠胜过所有奇特的长寿干预
Jason 与 Bryan Johnson 共进晚餐后,将整套方案压缩为“80%的80%”:睡眠。睡前3或4小时停止进食,把未解决的自我对话写进第二天的计划或日记,拿走手机,阅读,并建立稳定的睡前放松流程;据称 Johnson 入睡只需3至4分钟。
Naval 透露自己的 Eight Sleep 评分很糟,因为他每晚只睡几小时,而且频繁翻身。他认为,比设备本身更重要的是手机内容:邮件和 X 会刺激大脑,而书籍、冥想或宗教讲座可以降低兴奋度。
他可靠的技巧是在床上冥想:“大脑会想尽一切办法逃避冥想。”因此,当它必须在冥想和睡眠之间做选择时,会选择睡眠;如果没有睡着,冥想本身也仍然有收益。Chamath 还讲了 Khabib 的另一个故事:Khabib 训练后睡3小时,自青少年时期起每晚睡10小时。
17. 预测市场与创业者缩小了言辞和行动之间的距离
主持人提到,尽管媒体曾经质疑,RFK Jr. 和 Brooke Rollins 的提名最终都获得确认,而 Polymarket 基本提前预判了结果:RFK 的概率一度跌到约75%,Brooke Rollins 的市场概率曾达到约56%,随后反弹。市场信号早于传统叙事出现。
Jason 提出的政治机制是内部纪律。在众议院和参议院多数席位都很微弱的情况下,共和党参议员受到来自 Nicole Shanahan 或 Scott Presler 等人的初选威胁,比继续对左派保持愤怒更重要,也有助于推动 Kash Patel 和 Tulsi Gabbard 等提名人通过确认。
Naval 曾经接受政府必然变得更大、更慢;DOGE 和 Elon Musk 则重新唤起了“伟人史观”。看到创业者承担责任后,他开始反问自己是否正在做足够有用的事,这推动他转向1个尚未披露的硬件项目——它“真的很难”,而且仍然可能失败。
Jason Calacanis
Great job, Naval. You rocked it. Maybe I should have said this on air, but that was literally the most fun podcast I’ve ever recorded. I had my theory on why you were number one, but now I’ve had a realization.
What’s the actual reason? You’ve known us for a long time. What was your theory? What’s the reality?
Jason Calacanis
My theory was that my problem with going on podcasts is usually that the person I’m talking to isn’t that interesting. They’re just asking the same questions, dialing it in, and they’re not that interested. It’s not like we’re having a peer-level, actual conversation.
That’s why I wanted to do Airchat and Clubhouse and things like that, because you can actually have a conversation.
I see. What you guys have very uniquely is 4 people, of whom at least 3 are intelligent. I’m kidding.
Jason Calacanis
How could you say that? Isn’t he here? Sacks isn’t even here to hear you say that. That is so cold.
These 3 are intelligent, and all of you get along and can have an ongoing conversation. That’s a very high hit rate. Normally, in a podcast, you only get 1 interesting person. Now you’ve got 3, maybe 4.
The problem is, if you get people together to talk, 2 is a good conversation, 3 is possible, and 4 is the maximum. That’s why, at a dinner table in a restaurant, you have a 4-top. You don’t do 5 or 6, because then it splits into multiple conversations.
You had 4 people who were capable of talking, and I thought that was the secret. But there’s another secret: You guys are having fun. You’re talking over each other, making fun of each other, and actually having fun.
That’s why I’m saying this is the most fun podcast I’ve ever been on.
Jason Calacanis
That’s why you’ll be welcome back anytime.
I’ll come back. Absolutely. Three smart guys.
Jason Calacanis
For those of you who don’t know Naval, he was an entrepreneur. He kicked a bit of ass, got his ass kicked, and then started Venture Hacks. He started emailing folks and saying, “Here are some deals in Silicon Valley.” About 15 years ago, he went around writing $50,000 and $100,000 checks, hit a bunch of home runs, and turned Venture Hacks into AngelList.
He’s invested in a ton of great startups. Maybe give us some of the greatest hits there, Dave.
David Friedberg
Twitter, Uber, Notion, a bunch of others. Postmates, Udemy—a lot of unicorns, and a bunch of upcoming ones.
It’s actually a lot of deals at this point, but honestly, I’m not necessarily proud of being an investor. Investing, to me, is a side job. It’s a hobby.
I do startups.
Jason Calacanis
How do you define yourself?
I don’t. These days, I would say I’m more focused on building things. Every so-called career is an evolution, right? All of you are independent and do what you’re most interested in. That’s the point of making money: so you can do what you want.
These days, I’m really into building and crafting products. I built one recently called Airchat. It kind of didn’t work, but I’m still proud of what I built and got to work with an incredible team. Now I’m building a new product, and this time I’m going into hardware.
I’m building something that I really want. I’m not doing it all myself. Partially, I bring investors along. Last time, they got their money back. Previous times, they made money. Next time, hopefully they’ll make a lot of money. It’s good to bring your friends along.
Jason Calacanis
I love that you said, “I love the product, but it didn’t work.” Not enough people say that.
I built a product that I loved and was proud of, but it didn’t catch fire. It was a social product, so it had to catch fire for it to work. I found the team great homes, they all got paid, the investors I brought in got their money back, and I learned a ton, which I’m leveraging into the new thing.
But the new thing is much harder. The new thing is hardware and software.
Jason Calacanis
What did you learn building in 2024 and 2025 that you didn’t know before then?
The main thing was the craft—the craft of designing a software product pixel by pixel and launching it. The main thing I took away was that I really enjoyed building products, and I wanted to build something even harder and even more real.
I think, like a lot of us, I’m inspired by Elon and all the incredible work he’s done. I don’t want to build things that are easy. I want to build things that are hard and interesting. I want to take on more technical risk and less market risk.
Jason Calacanis
This is the classic VC learning, right? You want to build something where, if people get it and you can deliver it, you know people will want it. It’s just hard to build, as opposed to building something where you don’t know if people want it.
Airchat was a lot of fun. For those who don’t know, it was kind of like a social media network where you could ask a question and people could respond. It was like an audio-based Twitter. Would you say that’s the best way to describe it?
Audio Twitter, asynchronous AI transcripts, and all kinds of AI to make it easier for you, including translation. It was a really good way to try to make podcast-style conversations more accessible to everybody.
One of the reasons I don’t go on podcasts is that I don’t like being intermediated, so to speak. You sit there, someone interviews you, and then you go back and forth through the same old things. I just want to talk to people. I want peer relationships, kind of like you guys have running here.
Naval, what happened when you went through that phase? There was a period where it just seemed like something had gone on in your life and you just knew the answers. You were so grounded. It’s not to say that you’re not grounded now, but you’re less active posting and writing.
There was this period where I think all of us were like, “What does Naval think?” I would say it was in the late teens or early 20s. Jason, you can correct me if I’m getting the dates wrong. But there was a moment when the “Navalisms” and this sort of philosophy really started to take off. I think people had a tremendous respect for how you were thinking about things.
I’m curious—were you going through something at that moment?
Yes, that’s right. Very insightful. I’ve been on Twitter since 2007 because I was an early investor, but I never really tweeted. I didn’t get featured, and I had no audience. I was just doing the usual techie-guy thing, talking to other techies.
Then I started AngelList in 2010. The original idea of matching investors to startups didn’t scale. It was just an email list that exploded early on, but then it didn’t scale, so we didn’t have a business. I was trying to figure out the business, and at the same time I got a letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission saying, “You’re acting as an unlicensed broker-dealer.”
I was like, “What? I’m not making any money. I’m just making introductions. I’m not taking anything. It’s just a public service.” But even then, they were coming after me.
I had raised a bunch of money from investors, so I was in a very high-stress period of my life. Looking back, it’s almost comical that I was stressed over it, but at the time it all felt very real. The weight of everything was on my shoulders: expectations, people, money, and regulators.
Eventually, I went to Washington, D.C., and got the law changed to legalize what we do. Ironically, that enabled a whole bunch of other things, like ICOs, incubator deals, and demo days.
In that process, I was in a very high-stress period of my life, and I just started tweeting whatever I was going through—whatever realizations I was having. It’s only in stress that you’re forced to grow, so whatever internal growth I was going through, I just started tweeting about it without thinking much of it.
There are 3 things that are always running through my mind. One is that I love science—I’m an amateur, so let’s just leave it at that. I love reading a lot of philosophy and thinking deeply about it, and I like making money. Truth, love, and money—that’s my joke on my Twitter bio.
Those are the 3 things I keep coming back to, so I started tweeting about all of them. Before that, the expectation was that someone like me should just be talking about money and staying in his lane. People had been playing it very safe.
I think the combination of the 3 caught people’s attention, because every person thinks about everything. We don’t just stay in our lane in real life. We’re dealing with our relationships, our relationship with the universe, what we know to be true, science, how we make decisions, how we figure things out, and practical everyday material things—how to deal with our spouses, girlfriends, wives, husbands, children, and how to make money.
I was just tweeting about everything. I got interested in everything and tweeted about it. A lot of my best stuff was just notes to self: “Hey, don’t forget this.” “How to Get Rich—remember that one.”
Jason Calacanis
That tweetstorm was huge.
Yes. I think that’s still the most viral thread ever on Twitter. I like timeless things. I like philosophy and things that still apply in the future. I like compound interest, if you will, in ideas.
X has become so addictive recently that we’re all checking it every day. Elon built the perfect For You feed. He built TikTok for nerds, and we’re all on it. Normally, I try to ignore the news. Obviously, last year things got real, and we all had to pay attention to the news.
But I just like to tweet timeless things. People pay attention sometimes. They like what I write, and sometimes they go nonlinear on me. But, yes, the “How to Get Rich” tweetstorm was a big one.
Jason Calacanis
Is it problematic when people meet you because of the hype versus the reality? There’s a discordance now. If people absorb this content, they expect to see some Yoda floating in the air. You know what I mean?
Yes. I’m reminded of that line in The Matrix, where that agent is about to shoot one of the characters and says, “Only human,” right? That’s what I want to say to everybody: Only human.
Many of you have stopped drinking, but I used to have the occasional glass of wine. There was a moment when I met with a reporter, back when I used to meet with reporters, and she asked where we were going to meet. I said, “Let’s meet at the wine merchant and have a glass.” She was like, “What? You drink?”
It was a big deal for her. She was so disappointed. I said, “I’m an entrepreneur. Most of them are alcoholics or on psychedelics.”
Jason Calacanis
Yes, for sure. Takes 2, man. Hot tub.
When they say, “I’m in therapy,” you know what that’s code for.
Jason Calacanis
You recently did a podcast with Tim Ferriss on parenting. It was out there. I loved it, and I bought the book from this guy. Give us a brief overview of this philosophy of parenting.
I didn’t listen to this. I have to write this down.
Jason Calacanis
Tell us this. You’re going to love it. It spoke to me, but it was a little crazy.
I’m a big fan of David Deutsch. I think he’s basically the smartest living human. He’s a scientist who works on quantum computation, and he’s written a couple of great books about the intersection of the greatest theories we have today—the theories with the most reach. Those are epistemology, the theory of knowledge, evolution, quantum physics, and computation.
Jason Calacanis
He’s the author of The Beginning of Infinity, correct?
Yes. The Fabric of Reality is another book. I’ve spent a fair bit of time with him, done some podcasts with him, and hired and worked with people around him. I’m just really impressed, because it’s the framework that’s made me smarter.
We’re all fighting aging. Our brains are getting slower, and we’re always trying to have better ideas. As you age, you should have wisdom as your substitute for your raw horsepower of intelligence going down. I take scientific wisdom from David—not take, but learn from David.
One of the things he pioneered is called Taking Children Seriously. It’s the idea that you should take your children seriously, like adults. You should always give them the same freedom you would give an adult. If you wouldn’t speak that way with your spouse, if you wouldn’t force your spouse to do something, don’t force a child to do something.
It’s only through the latent threat of physical violence—“I can control you, I can make you go to your room, I can take your dinner away”—that you intimidate children.
It resonated with me because I grew up very, very free. My father wasn’t around when I was young, and my mother didn’t have the bandwidth to watch us all the time. She had other things to do, so I was making my own decisions from an extremely young age.
From the age of 5, nobody was telling me what to do. From the age of 9, I was telling everybody what to do. I’m used to that. I’ve been homeschooling my own kids, so the philosophy resonated with me.
I found this guy Aaron Stupple on Airchat, and he was an incredible expositor of the philosophy. He lives his life with it 99% as extremely as one can go. His kids can eat all the ice cream and Snickers bars they want, play on the iPad as much as they want, and don’t have to go to school if they don’t feel like it.
They dress how they want, and they don’t have to do anything they don’t want to do. Everything is a discussion, negotiation, and explanation, just like you would have with a roommate or an adult living in your house.
It’s kind of insane and extreme, but I live my own home life in that arc, in that direction. I’m a very free person. I don’t have an office to go to. I try really not to maintain a calendar. If I can’t remember it, I don’t want to do it.
I don’t send my kids to school. I really try not to coerce them. Obviously, that’s an extreme model.
Jason Calacanis
So, if your kids were like, “I want Häagen-Dazs,” and it’s 9:00 p.m.—
You’re like, “Okay. Two nights ago I did this: I ordered the Häagen-Dazs.” It wasn’t Häagen-Dazs; it was a different brand. I ordered it. I’m just going to go through a couple of examples. We do ice cream at 9:00 p.m., and we all ate, so they’re like, “Dad, I want—” and they’re happy. They’re happy kids.
“I want to be on my iPad. I’m playing Fortnite. Leave me alone. I’ll go to sleep when I want.” You’re like, “Okay.” My oldest probably plays iPad 9 hours a day.
Then your other kid pees in their pants because they’re too lazy to walk to the bathroom. They don’t do that because they like peeing their pants.
No, I understand. I’m just saying there’s a spectrum of all of these things, right?
Jason Calacanis
Yeah, and your point of view is 100% of it is allowed and you have no judgments.
No, no, that’s not where I am. That’s where Aaron is. My rules are a little different. My rules are that they’ve got to do 1 hour of math or programming plus 2 hours of reading every single day. The moment they’ve done that, they’re free creatures, and everything else is a negotiation.
We have to persuade them. It’s a persuasion, I should say, not even a negotiation. Even the hour of math and 2 hours of reading—you get 15 to 30 minutes of math, maybe an hour if you’re lucky, and you get half an hour to 2 hours of reading, if you’re lucky.
Jason Calacanis
What do you think the long-term consequences of that are? Also, what are the long-term consequences on health if they’re making decisions that are just not good, like the ice cream thing at 9:00 p.m.? How do you manage that in your mind?
I think whatever age you’re at, whatever part you’re at in life, you’re still always struggling with your own habits. All of us, for example, still eat food and feel guilty, or want to eat something that we shouldn’t be eating, and we’re still always evolving our diets. Kids are the same.
My oldest already passed on the ice cream last time. He said, “I want to eat healthier,” because finally I managed to get through to him and persuade him that he should be healthier. My younger kids will eat it, but they’ll eat a limited amount. My middle kid will sometimes eat some.
If they say something, you’ll enable it, but then you’ll guide them. You’ll be like, “Hey, listen, this is not the choice I would make, I don’t think. But if you want it, I’ll try it.”
You also have to be careful. You don’t want to intimidate them, and you don’t want to be so overbearing that they just view Dad as controlling.
Jason Calacanis
I find this fascinating. What do you think happens to these kids when they’re fully formed adults? I’m sure you have a vision of what they’ll be like. What is that vision?
I try not to have one. They’re going to be who they’re going to be. This is how I grew up. I did what I wanted.
I would rather they have agency than turn out exactly the way I want, because agency is the hardest thing: having control over your own life and making your own decisions. I want them to be happy. I have a very happy household.
Jason Calacanis
What is Plato’s goal? Eudaimonia, right?
Eudaimonia.
Jason Calacanis
The fulfillment. Is that what you want for them?
I don’t really want anything for them. I just want them to be free and their best selves.
Jason Calacanis
God, I want Chamath to worry about details. He’s got 17 kids now, I don’t know if you know, but Chamath has a whole punch list of things.
I love this interview because you made a really interesting point, which was that they’re going to have to make these decisions at some point. They’re going to have to learn the pros and cons—the upside and the downside—to all these things, eating, iPad use, and so on. The quicker you get them to have agency and make these decisions for themselves, with knowledge and the ability to ask questions, the more secure they’ll be.
I found it a fascinating discussion. I like cause and effect, especially in teenagers. Now that I have a teenager, it’s really good for them to learn, “Hey, if you don’t do your homework, you have a problem, and then you have to solve that problem. How are we going to solve that problem?”
I like to present it as, “What’s your plan?” Anytime they have a problem—8-year-old kids, 15-year-old kids—I just say, “What’s your plan to solve this?” Then I like to hear their plan and let them know if they want to brainstorm it. I thought it was a very interesting, super-interesting discussion.
Overall, my kids are very happy. The household is very happy. Everybody gets along, everybody loves each other. Some of them are way ahead of their peers. Nobody’s behind in anything that matters. Nobody seems unhealthy in any obvious way. No one has aberrant eating habits. I haven’t found an aberrant behavior that’s out of line. It’s all good.
Jason Calacanis
I worry a lot about this iPad situation. I see my kids on an iPad, and it’s almost like unless they’re doing an interactive project, they end up watching—
Says the guy who has a video-game theme in the background, who probably grew up playing video games nonstop and probably spends 9 hours a day on his screen, just called a phone.
Jason Calacanis
Yeah, it’s the same thing.
Yeah, it’s the same thing, man.
Jason Calacanis
I feel like watching is different.
Do they watch shows?
Jason Calacanis
No, but there’s a hypocrisy to picking up your phone and then saying to your kid, “No, you can’t use your iPad.” I grew up playing video games nonstop. I was an avid gamer until just a few years ago.
I’m not criticizing the iPad. I was obviously on a computer since I was 4 years old, so I totally get it. The question for me is that I didn’t have the ability to play a 30-minute show, then play the next 30-minute show and the next 30-minute show, and sit there for 2 hours with a show playing the whole time. I was interacting on the computer and doing things and building things, which was a little different for me from a use-case perspective.
We used to control their YouTube access, although now we don’t do that. The only thing I ask them is that they put on captions when they’re watching YouTube, so it helps their reading. They learn to read fast.
Jason Calacanis
Good tip. I like that one.
One of my kids is really into YouTube. The other two are not. They just got over it. To the extent that they use YouTube, it’s mostly because they’re looking up videos on their favorite games. They want to know how to be better at a game.
Jason Calacanis
All right, let’s keep moving through this docket. We have David Sacks with us here. David, give us your philosophy of parenting.
Okay, next item on the docket. Let’s go talk about some real issues.
Jason Calacanis
This show is not a parenting show.
I asked David, “What’s your parenting philosophy?” He said, “I set up their trust 4 years ago,” so he’s done. The trust is set up. Everything’s good. GRAT check. You’re all set, guys. Let me know how it works out.
Speaking of working out, we’ve got a vice president who isn’t cuckoo for Cocoa Puffs and who actually understands what AI is. JD Vance gave a great speech. I watched it myself. He talked about AI in Paris. This was on Tuesday at the AI Action Summit, whatever that is, and he gave a 15-minute banger of a speech.
He talked about overregulating AI and America’s intention to dominate this. We happen to have with us Naval, the czar of AI. Before I go into all the details about the speech—and I don’t want to steal your thunder, Sacks—this speech had a lot of verbiage, a lot of ideas that I’ve heard before and that maybe we’ve all talked about. Tell us a little bit about how this all came together and how proud you are.
Having a vice president who understands AI is mind-blowing. He could speak on a topical subject credibly. This was an awesome moment for America.
Jason Calacanis
What are you implying there, Jason?
I’m implying you workshopped it with him.
Jason Calacanis
No.
Or that he’s smart.
Jason Calacanis
Both of those things.
The vice president wrote the speech, or at least directed all of it. The ideas came from him. I’m not going to take any credit whatsoever for this.
Jason Calacanis
It was on point. Maybe you could talk about it.
I agree. It was on point. I think it was a very well-crafted and well-delivered speech. He made 4 main points about the Trump administration’s approach to AI.
He’s going to ensure, first, that American AI continues to be the gold standard. Fantastic. Check.
Second, he says that the administration understands that excessive regulation could kill AI just as it’s taking off. He did this in front of all the EU elites who love regulation. He did it on their home court.
Third, AI must remain free from ideological bias, as we’ve talked about here on this program.
Fourth, the White House, he said, will “maintain a pro-worker growth path for AI,” so that it can be a potent tool for job creation in the United States.
Jason Calacanis
What are your thoughts on the 4 major bullet points and his speech here in Paris?
I think that you knew he was going to deliver an important speech as soon as he got up there and said, “I’m here to talk about not AI safety, but AI opportunity.” You have to understand what a bracing statement that was, almost like a shot across the bow.
You have to understand the history and context of these events. For the last couple of years, the last couple of these events have been exclusively focused on AI safety. The last in-person event was in the United Kingdom at Bletchley Park, and the whole conference was devoted to AI safety.
Similarly, European AI regulation is completely preoccupied with safety and trying to regulate away safety risks before they happen. You had the Biden executive order, which was based around safety, and then you have the whole media coverage around AI, which is preoccupied with all the risks from AI.
To have the vice president get up there and say, right off the bat, that there are other things to talk about in respect to AI besides safety risks—that there are actually huge opportunities—was a breath of fresh air and, like I said, kind of a shot across the bow. You could almost see some of the Eurocrats. They needed their fainting couches after that. Trudeau looked like his dog had just died.
I think that was a really important statement right off the bat to set the context for the speech, which is that AI is a huge opportunity for all of us. That point just has not been made enough, and it’s true. There are risks, but when you look at the media coverage and the dialogue that the regulators have had around this, they never talk about the opportunities. It’s always just around the risks.
I think that was a very important corrective. Then, like you said, he went on to say that the United States has to win this AI race. We want to be the gold standard. We want to dominate.
Jason Calacanis
That was my favorite part.
By the way, that language about dominating AI and winning the global race is in President Trump’s executive order from week 1. This is very much elaborating on the official policy of this administration.
The vice president went on to specify how we would do that. We have to win some of these key building-block technologies. We want to win in chips. We want to win in AI models. We want to win in applications. We need to build. We need to unlock energy for these companies. Most of all, we just need to be supportive toward them, as opposed to regulating them to death.
He had a lot to say about the risk of overregulation, how often it’s big companies that want regulation, and he warned about regulatory capture, which our friend Bill Gurley would like. He said that having less regulation can actually be more fair and can create a more level playing field for small companies as well as big companies.
Then he said to the Europeans that we want them to be partners with us. We want to lead the world. We want them to be our partners and benefit from this technology that we’re going to take the lead in creating. But they also have to be good partners to us.
He specifically called out the overregulation that Europeans have been engaged in. He mentioned the Digital Services Act, which has acted like a speed trap for American companies. It’s American companies that have been overregulated because the truth of the matter is that American technology companies are winning the race.
When Europe passes these onerous regulations, they fall most of all on American companies. He’s basically saying, “We need you to rebalance and correct this because it’s not fair, it’s not smart policy, and it’s not going to help us collectively win this AI race.”
That brings me to the last point. I don’t think he mentioned China by name, but clearly he talked about adversarial countries that are using AI to control their populations, to engage in censorship and thought control. He basically painted a picture where it’s like, “You could go work with them, or you could work with us. We have hundreds of years of shared history together. We believe in things like free speech, hopefully, and we want you to work with us. But if you’re going to work with us, then you have to cooperate and we have to create a reasonable regulatory regime.”
Jason Calacanis
Naval, did you see the speech? What are your thoughts on JD Vance generally, and on having somebody like this representing us and wanting to win American exceptionalism?
It was very surprising and very impressive. I thought he was polite, optimistic, and forward-looking. It’s what you would expect an entrepreneur or a smart investor to say, so I was very impressed.
I think the idea that America should win is great. I think that we should not regulate. I also agree that I’m not an AI doomer. I don’t think AI is going to end the world. That’s a separate conversation.
There’s a religion that comes along in many forms, which is that climate change is going to end the world, AI is going to end the world, asteroids are going to end the world, COVID-19 is going to end the world. It has a way of fixating your attention. It captures everybody’s attention at once, so it’s a very seductive thing.
In the case of AI, it’s really been overplayed by incentive bias and motivated reasoning by the companies that were ahead and want to pull up the ladder behind them. I think they genuinely believe it. I think they genuinely believe there are safety risks, but they’re motivated to believe in those safety risks, and then they pass that along.
It’s a weird position because they have to say, “It’s so dangerous that you shouldn’t just let open source go at it, and you should let just a few of us work with you on it.” But it’s not so dangerous that a private company can’t own the whole thing. If it was truly the Manhattan Project, if they were building nuclear weapons, you wouldn’t want one company to own that.
Sam Altman famously said that AI will capture the light cone of all future value—in other words, all value ever created at the speed of light from here will be captured by AI. If that’s true, then open-source AI really matters, and little-tech AI really matters.
The problem is that the nature of training these models is highly centralized. They benefit from supercomputer-clustered compute, so it’s not clear how any decentralized model can compete.
To me, the real issue boils down to this: How do you push AI forward while not having just a very small number of players control the entire thing? We thought we had that solution with the original OpenAI, which was a nonprofit that was supposed to do this for humanity. But because they want to incentivize the team and raise money, they have to privatize at least part of it.
It’s not clear to me why they need to privatize the whole thing, or why they need to buy out the nonprofit portion. You could leave a nonprofit portion and have the private portion for the incentives. The real challenge is how you keep AI from naturally centralizing, because all the economics and the underlying technology are centralizing in nature.
If you really think you’re going to create God, do you want to put God on a leash with one entity controlling God? To me, that’s the real fear. I’m not scared of AI. I’m scared of what a very small number of people who control AI do to the rest of us for our own good, because that’s how it always works.
Jason Calacanis
That’s well said. We should probably go with the Greek model, having many gods and heroes as well.
David Friedberg, you heard the JD Vance speech, I assume. What are your thoughts on overregulation and, to Naval’s point, one person owning this versus open source?
David Friedberg
I think there’s this big definition of social balance right now around what I would call techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. Generally speaking, people fall into one of those 2 camps.
Techno-optimists are folks who believe that accelerating outcomes with AI, automation, bioengineering, manufacturing, semiconductors, quantum computing, nuclear energy, and so on will usher in an era of abundance by creating leverage, which is what technology gives us.
Technology will make things cheaper and will be deflationary. It will give everyone more, so it creates abundance. The challenge is that people who already have a lot worry more about their exposure to the downside than they desire the upside.
Techno-pessimists, generally speaking, are the EU and large parts of the United States. They’re worried about the loss of X, the loss of jobs, the loss of this, the loss of that. Countries like China and India are more excited about the opportunity to create wealth, the opportunity to create leverage, and the opportunity to create abundance for their people.
GDP per capita in the EU is $60,000 a year. GDP per capita in the United States is about $82,000, but GDP per capita in India is $2,500 and in China is $12,600. There’s a greater incentive in those countries to manifest upside than there is for the United States and the EU, which are more worried about manifesting downside.
It’s a difficult social battle that’s underway. Over time, I do think those governments, countries, and social systems that embrace these technologies are going to become more capitalist, and they’re going to require less government control and intervention in job creation, the economy, payments to people, and so on.
The countries that are more techno-pessimistic are unfortunately going to find themselves asking for greater government control and intervention in markets, governments creating jobs, governments making payments to people, and governments effectively running the economy.
My personal view is that I’m a very strong advocate for technology acceleration because in nearly every case in human history, when a new technology has emerged, we’ve largely found ourselves assuming that the technology works within the framework of today or yesterday.
The automobile came along, and no one envisioned that everyone in the United States would own an automobile. Therefore, you would need to create all of these new industries: mechanics, car dealerships, roads, all the people servicing and building roads, and all the other industries that emerged.
It’s very hard for us to sit here today and say, “AI is going to destroy jobs. What’s it going to create?” and be right. We’re very likely going to be wrong, whatever estimations we give.
The area that I think is most underestimated is large technical projects that seem technically infeasible today that AI can unlock. For example, habitation in the oceans. It’s very difficult for us to envision creating cities underwater, creating cities in the oceans, creating cities on the Moon, creating cities on Mars, or finding new places to live.
People might argue, “That sounds stupid. I don’t want to go do that,” but at the end of the day, human civilization will drive us to want to do that. Those things are technically very hard to pull off today, but AI can unlock a new set of industries to enable those transitions.
I think we really get it wrong when we try to assume that technology is a transplant for last year or last century. Then we become techno-pessimists because we’re worried about losing what we have.
Jason Calacanis
Are you a techno-pessimist or an optimist? You bring up the downside an awful lot here on the program, but you are working every day in a very optimistic way to breed better strawberries and potatoes for folks.
David Friedberg
I have no techno-pessimism whatsoever. I try to point out why the other side is acting the way they are, to put it in full context.
What I’m trying to highlight is that I think that framework is wrong. I think that frame of technology—the way it operates, the way people think about it—creates this fear because of the focus on the downside. That creates regulation, like we see in the EU, and as a result, China’s GDP will scale while the EU and the United States stagnate, if that’s where they go. That’s my assessment, or my opinion, on what will happen.
I’ll give you 2 thoughts.
The first is that this is a really interesting moment where I would call this “the tale of 2 vice presidents.” Very early in the Biden administration, Kamala was dispatched on an equally important topic at that time, which was illegal immigration. She went to Mexico and Guatemala.
You have a really interesting A/B test here. You have both vice presidents dealing with what were, in that moment, incredibly important issues. JD was focused, precise, and ambitious. Even the part of the press that was very supportive of Kamala couldn’t find a lot of positive things to say about her. The feedback was that she was meandering, ducking questions, and not answering the questions that she was asked very well.
It’s interesting because it’s a bit of a microcosm of what happened over the next 4 years and with her campaign, quite honestly. You could have taken that window of feedback, and unfortunately for her it just continued to be very consistent.
That was one observation I had, because I heard him give the speech, I heard her, and I had this moment where I was like, “Wow, 2 totally different people.”
The second thought is on the substance of what JD said. I said this on Tucker, and I’ll simplify all of this into a very basic framework: If you want a country to thrive, it needs to have economic supremacy and military supremacy. In the absence of those 2 things, societies crumble.
The only thing that underpins those 2 things is technological supremacy. We see this today. On Thursday, what happened with Microsoft? They had a $24 billion contract with the United States Army to deliver some whiz-bang thing, and they realized they couldn’t deliver it. So what did they do? They went to Anduril.
Why did they go to Anduril? Because Anduril has the technological supremacy to execute. A few weeks ago, we saw an attempt at technological supremacy from the Chinese with respect to DeepSeek.
This is a very simple existential battle. Those who can harness and govern the things that are technologically superior will win, and it will drive economic vibrancy and military supremacy, which then creates safe, strong societies. That’s it.
From that perspective, JD nailed it. He saw the forest from the trees. He said exactly what I think needed to be said and put folks on notice that you’re either on the ship or you’re off the ship. I think that was really good.
Jason Calacanis
There was a secondary conversation that emerged, Sacks, that I would love to engage you on, if you’re willing. This civil war, quote-unquote, between MAGA 1.0 and MAGA 2.0—techies versus the core MAGA folks, perhaps, and the techies in the MAGA party like ourselves.
We can pull up the tweet here. In JD’s own words, he’s been engaging people in his own words. It’s very clear that he’s writing these tweets. There’s a distinct difference between other politicians and this administration: They just tell you what they think.
Here it is. I’ll try to write something to address this in detail. This is JD Vance’s tweet:
“But I think this civil war is overstated. Though, yes, there are some real divergences between the populists, which I would describe as MAGA, and the techies. But briefly, in general, I dislike substituting American labor for cheap labor. My views on immigration and offshoring flow from this.
“I like growth and productivity gains, and this informs my view on tech and regulation. When it comes to AI specifically, the risks are, number one, overstated, to your point, Naval, or, number two, difficult to avoid. One of my real concerns, for instance, is consumer fraud. That’s a valid reason to worry about safety.
“But the other problem is much worse. If a peer nation is 6 months ahead of the U.S. on AI”—again, he says he’ll try to say more.
This is JD going right at one of the more controversial topics the administration is dealing with: immigration and tech. These 2 things are dovetailing. If we lose millions of driver jobs, which we will in the next 10 years, just like we lost millions of cashier jobs, that’s going to impact how our nation and many of the voters look at the border and immigration.
We might not be able to let as many people immigrate here if we’re losing millions of jobs to AI and self-driving cars. What are your thoughts on him engaging this directly, Sacks?
The first point he’s making there is about wage pressure. When you throw open our borders or throw open American markets to products that can be made in foreign countries by much cheaper labor, not held to the same standards, minimum wage, union rules, or safety standards that American labor is, and that labor has a huge cost advantage, then you’re creating wage pressure for American workers. He’s opposed to that.
I think that’s an important point because the way that the media or neoliberals like to portray this argument is that somehow MAGA’s resistance to unlimited immigration is based on xenophobia. No, it’s based on bread-and-butter, kitchen-table issues. If you have this ridiculous open-border policy, it’s inevitably going to create a lot of wage pressure for people at the bottom of the pyramid.
I think JD is making that argument. But this is point 2: He’s saying he’s not against productivity growth. Technology is good because it enables all of our workers to improve their productivity, and that should result in better wages because workers can produce more. The value of their labor goes up if they have more tools to be productive.
There’s no contradiction there, and I think he’s explaining why there isn’t a contradiction. One point I would add—he doesn’t make this point in that tweet—is that one of the problems we’ve had over the last 30 years is that we’ve had tremendous productivity growth in the U.S., but labor has not been able to capture all of it. That benefit has basically gone to capital or to companies.
I think a big part of the reason why is because we’ve had this largely unrestricted immigration policy. If you were to tamp down on immigration, if you were to stop illegal immigration, then labor might be able to capture more of the benefits of productivity growth. That would be a good thing. It would be a more equitable distribution of the gains from productivity and technology, and that would help tamp down this growing conflict that you see between technologists and the rest of the country, or certainly the heartland of the country.
The final point he makes in that tweet is that we live in a world in which there are other countries that are competitive. Specifically, he doesn’t mention China, but he says we have a peer competitor, and it’s going to be a much worse world if they end up being 6 months ahead of us on AI rather than 6 months behind.
That’s a really important point to keep in mind. I think the whole Paris AI Summit took place against the backdrop of that recognition because just a few weeks ago we had DeepSeek. It’s really clear that China is not a year behind us. They’re hot on our heels, or only maybe months behind us.
If we hobble ourselves with unnecessary regulations and make it more difficult for our AI companies to compete, that doesn’t mean China’s going to follow suit and copy us. They’re going to take advantage of that fact, and they’re going to win.
Jason Calacanis
Naval, this seems to be one of the main issues of our time. 4 of the 5 people on this podcast right now are immigrants. America is a country built by immigrants and for immigrants.
Do you think that should change now in the face of job destruction, which I know you’ve been tracking? Self-driving is something we both have an interest in. Over the years, what’s the solution here if we’re going to see a bunch of job displacement, which will happen for certain jobs? We all know that.
Should we shut the border and not let the next Naval, Chamath, Max, or Friedberg into the country?
Let me declare my biases up front. I’m a first-generation immigrant. I moved here when I was 9 years old—rather, my parents did—and then I naturalized as a citizen. Obviously, I’m in favor of some level of immigration.
That said, I’m assimilated. I consider myself an American first and foremost. I bleed red, white, and blue. I believe in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution—first, second, and fourth, and all the proper amendments.
I get up there every July 4 and deliberately defend the Second Amendment on Twitter, at which point half my followers go bananas because I’m not supposed to. I’m supposed to be a good immigrant and carry the usual set of coherent leftist and globalist policies.
I think that legal, high-skilled immigration, with room and time for assimilation, makes sense. You want to have a brain drain, with the best and brightest coming to the freest country in the world to build technology and help civilization move forward.
As Chamath was saying, economic power and military power are downstream of technology. In fact, even culture is downstream of technology. Look at what the birth-control pill did to culture, or what the automobile did to culture, or radio and television, and then the internet.
Technology drives everything. If you look at wealth, wealth is a set of physical transformations that you can affect, and that’s a combination of capital and knowledge. The bigger input to that is knowledge.
The United States has become the home of knowledge creation thanks to bringing in the best and brightest. You could even argue that DeepSeek is partly the reason why we lost that is that a bunch of those kids studied in the U.S., but then we sent them back home.
Is that actually accurate? They studied here?
Yeah, some of them, a few of them really did.
Oh, my God. That’s exhibit A. I didn’t know that.
You absolutely have to split skilled, assimilated immigration, which is a small set. It has to be both: They have to be skilled, and they have to become Americans. That oath is not meaningless. It has to mean something.
You have to separate skilled, assimilated immigration from open borders, where whoever can wander in just comes on in. That latter part makes no sense.
If the Biden administration had only been letting in people with 150 IQs, we wouldn’t have this debate right now. The reason we’re having this debate is because they just opened the border and let millions and millions of people in.
It was to their advantage to conflate legal and illegal immigration. Every time you’d say, “We can’t just open the border,” they’d say, “What about Elon? What about this?” They would parade them out. If they were just letting in Elon, Jensen, and Friedberg, we wouldn’t be having the same conversation today.
The correlation between open borders and wage suppression is irrefutable. We know that from the data. I think the Democrats, for whatever logic, committed an incredible error in basically undermining their core cohort.
I want to go back to what you said because I think it’s super important. There is a new political calculus on the field, and I agree with you. I think the 3 cohorts of the future are the asset-light working and middle class—that’s cohort number 1. There are probably 100 million to 150 million of those folks.
Then there are patriotic business owners, and then there are leaders in innovation. Those are the 3 cohorts. I think what MAGA gets right is that they found the middle ground that intersects those 3 cohorts of people.
Every time you see this left-versus-right dichotomy, it’s totally miscast, and it sounds discordant to so many of us because that’s not how any of us identify. That’s a very important observation because the policies that we adopt will need to reflect those 3 cohorts.
What is the common ground among those 3? Naval is right: There’s not a lot that those 3 would say is wrong with a very targeted form of extremely useful legal immigration of very, very smart people who agree to assimilate and be a part of America.
Jason Calacanis
I’m so glad you said it the way you said it. I remember growing up, my parents would try to pretend that they were in Sri Lanka, and sometimes I would get so frustrated. I’d say, “If you want to be in Sri Lanka, go back to Sri Lanka.”
I wanted to be Canadian because it was easier for me to make friends and easier for me to have a life. I was trying my best. I wanted to be Canadian. Then, when I moved to the United States 25 years ago, I wanted to be American. I feel that I’m American now, and I’m proud to be an American.
I think that’s what you want. You want people who embrace it. It doesn’t mean that we can’t dress up in a show of our culture every now and then, but the point is: What do you believe, and where is your loyalty?
Friedberg, we used to have this concept of a melting pot and assimilation, and that was a good thing. Then it became cultural appropriation. We made a right turn here. Where do you stand on recruiting the best and brightest and forcing them to assimilate, making sure that they care to be here?
David Friedberg
I reject the premise of this whole conversation.
Jason Calacanis
Wait, hold on. Look, I’m a first-generation American who moved here when I was 5 and became a citizen when I was 10. I’m fully American, and that’s the only country I have any loyalty to.
The premise that I reject here is that somehow an AI conversation leads to an immigration conversation because millions of jobs are going to be lost. We don’t know that. That’s also true. I agree that you’re making a huge assumption and buying into the doomerism around jobs. That is not a fact; there’s no evidence.
How many jobs have been lost by AI? Let’s be real. We’ve had AI for 2½ years, and I think it’s great, but so far it’s a better search engine and it helps high-school kids cheat on their essays.
You don’t believe self-driving is coming?
Hold on a second. You don’t believe millions of jobs will be displaced?
Jason Calacanis
Those driver jobs weren’t even there 10 years ago. Uber came along and created all these driver jobs. DoorDash created all these driver jobs.
What technology does is destroy jobs, but it replaces them with opportunities that are even better. Either you can capture that opportunity yourself, or an entrepreneur will come along and create something that allows you to capture those opportunities.
AI is a productivity tool. It increases the productivity of a worker. It allows them to do more creative work and less repetitive work. As such, it makes them more valuable. Yes, there is some retraining involved, but not a lot. These are natural-language computers. You can talk to them in plain English, and they talk back to you in plain English.
I think David is absolutely right. We will see job creation by AI that will be as fast or faster than job destruction. You saw this even with the internet. YouTube came along, and look at all these YouTube streamers and influencers. That didn’t used to be a job.
New jobs are really opportunities, because “job” is the wrong word. “Job” implies someone else has to give it to me, as if it’s handed out. It’s a zero-sum game. Forget all that. It’s opportunities.
After COVID, look at how many people are making money by working from home in mysterious little ways on the internet that you can’t even quite grasp.
Here’s the way I categorize it. Whenever you have a new technology, you get productivity gains. You get some job disruption, meaning that part of your job may go away, but then you get other parts that are new and hopefully more elevated and more interesting. Then there is some job loss.
I just think that the third category will follow the historical trend, which is that the first 2 categories are always bigger. You end up with more net productivity and more net wealth creation. We’ve seen no evidence to date that that’s not going to be the case.
It’s true that AI is about to get more powerful. You’re going to see a whole new wave of what are called agents this year. Agentic products will be able to do more for you. But there’s no evidence yet that those things are going to be completely unsupervised and replace people’s jobs.
We have to see how this technology evolves. One of the mistakes of the European approach is assuming that you can predict the future with perfect accuracy, with such good accuracy that you can create regulations today that are going to avoid all these risks in the future. We just don’t know enough yet to be able to do that.
The companies promulgating that view are the ones Naval mentioned: Those that have an economic vested interest in convincing the next incremental investor that this could be true, because they want to make the claim that all the money should go to them so they can hoover up all the economic gains.
If you stratify these reactions, there are small startup companies in AI that believe there’s a productivity leap to be had and that there’s going to be prosperity, everybody on the sidelines watching, and then a few companies with an extremely vested interest in being a gatekeeper because they need to raise the next $30 billion or $40 billion trying to convince people that that’s true.
If you view it through that lens, you’re right, Sacks. We have not accomplished anything yet that proves this is going to be cataclysmically bad. If anything, history would tell you it’s probably going to be like the past, which is generally productive and creates prosperity.
To bring it back to J.D.’s speech, where we started, I think it was a quintessentially American speech in the sense that he said we should be optimistic about the opportunities here, which is basically right.
We want to lead. We want to take advantage of this. We don’t want to hobble it. We don’t even fully know what it’s going to be yet. We are going to center workers. We want to be pro-worker.
If there are downsides for workers, we can mitigate those things in the future, but it’s too early to say that we know what the program should be. It’s more about a statement of values at this point.
Jason Calacanis
Do you think it’s too early, Friedberg, given all these optimists and all these robots being created? What we’re seeing in self-driving, you’ve talked about the ramp-up with Waymo—do you really think it’s too early to say that we will not see millions of jobs and millions of people displaced from those jobs?
What do you think, Friedberg? That’s the counterargument.
David Friedberg
My experience in the workplace is that AI tools doing things an analyst or knowledge worker was doing with many hours in the past are allowing them to do something in minutes. That doesn’t mean they spend the rest of the day doing nothing.
What’s great for our business and for other businesses like ours that can leverage AI tools is that those individuals can now do more. Our throughput and our productivity as an organization have gone up, and we can now create more things faster. Whatever the product is that my company makes, we can now make more things more quickly. We can do more development.
Jason Calacanis
You’re seeing it on the ground?
David Friedberg
At a high level, I’m seeing it on the ground. I don’t think this extrapolation of how bad AI will be for jobs is the right framing. It’s about an acceleration of productivity.
This is why I go back to the point about GDP per capita and GDP growth. Countries, societies, areas, and industries that are interested in accelerating output, accelerating productivity, and making and selling things are going to rapidly embrace these tools because they allow them to do more with less. That’s what I really see on the ground.
The second point is the one that I mentioned earlier. We’re underestimating the new industries that will emerge, drastically and dramatically. There is going to be so much new stuff that we’re not really thinking deeply about right now. We could do another 2-hour brainstorming session on what AI unlocks in terms of large-scale projects that are traditionally or typically held back because of constraints on their technical feasibility.
That ranges from accelerating new semiconductor technology to quantum computing, energy systems, transportation, habitation, and so on. There are all sorts of transformations in every industry that are possible as these tools come online. That will spawn insane new industries.
The most important point is the third one: We don’t know the overlap between job loss and job creation, if there is one, or the rate at which these new technologies impact and create new markets.
I think Naval is right. What happens in capitalism and free societies is that capital and people rush to fill the hole of new opportunities that emerge because of AI. Those grow more quickly than the old bubbles deflate.
If there’s a deflationary effect in terms of job need in other industries, I think the loss will happen more slowly than the rush to take advantage of creating new things will happen on the other side. My bet is that new things will be created faster than old things will be lost.
Jason Calacanis
As a quick side note, the fastest way to help somebody get a job right now—if you know somebody in the market who’s looking for a job—is to say, “Go download the AI tools and just start talking to them. Start using them in any way.”
Then you can walk into almost any employer in almost any field and say, “I understand AI,” and they’ll hire you on the spot.
Naval, you and I watched this happen. We had a front-row seat to it back in the day, when you were doing Venture Hacks and I was doing Open Angel Forum. We had to fight to find 5 or 10 companies a month.
Then the cost of running these companies went down massively: from $5 million to start a company, to $2 million, then to $250,000, then to $100,000. I think what we’re seeing is 3 things concurrently.
You’re going to see all these jobs go away through automation—self-driving cars, cashiers, and so on. We’re also going to see static team sizes at places like Google. They’re just not hiring because they’re having the existing bloated employee base learn the tools.
I don’t know if you’re seeing this, but the number of startups able to get a product to market with 2 or 3 people and get to $1 million in revenue is booming. What are you seeing in the startup landscape?
Definitely what you’re saying in terms of leverage. But at the same time, I think the more interesting part is that new startups are enabled that could not exist otherwise.
My last startup, Airchat, could not have existed without AI because we needed transcription and translation. Even the current thing I’m working on—it’s not an AI company, but it cannot exist without AI. It is relying on AI.
Even at AngelList, we’re significantly adopting AI. Everywhere you turn, it’s more opportunity, more opportunity, more opportunity.
People like to go on Twitter, formerly known as Twitter, and exaggerate. “Oh, my God, we’ve hit AGI. Oh, my God, I just replaced all my mid-level engineers. Oh, my God, I’ve stopped hiring.” To me, that’s moronic.
The 2 valid ones are the one-man entrepreneur shops, where there’s one guy or one gal scaling up crazy things through AI, or people embracing AI and saying, “I need to hire. I need to hire anyone who can even spell AI. Anyone who’s even used AI, just come on in.”
Again, the easiest way to see that AI is not taking jobs but creating opportunities is to brush up, learn a little bit, watch a few videos, use AI, tinker with it, and then reapply for the job that rejected you. Watch how they pull you in.
In 2023, an economist named Richard Baldwin said, “AI won’t take your job. It’s someone using AI who will take your job because they know how to use it better than you.” That’s become a meme, and you see it floating around X, but I think there’s a lot of truth in that.
As long as you remain adaptive, keep learning, and learn how to take advantage of these tools, you should do better. If you wall yourself off from the technology and don’t take advantage of it, that’s when you put yourself at risk.
Another way to think about it is that these are natural-language computers. Everyone who was intimidated by computers before should no longer be intimidated. You don’t need to program anymore in some esoteric language or learn obscure mathematics to use these. You can just talk to them, and they talk back to you. That’s magic. The new programming language is English.
I’m pretty unconvinced anymore that you should bother even learning many of the hard sciences and mathematics that we used to think of as underpinnings.
I used to believe that the right thing to do was for everybody to go into engineering. I’m not necessarily as convinced as I used to be because I used to say, “That’s great—first-principles thinking, and you’re going to get trained in a toolkit that will scale.”
I’m not sure that’s true. You can use these agents and deep research, and all of a sudden they replace a lot of that skill. What’s left over? It’s creativity, judgment, history, psychology, and all of these other things—soft skills, leadership, communication—that allow you to manipulate these models in constructive ways.
When you think about the prompt engineering that gets you great answers, it’s actually just thinking in totally different, orthogonal ways and nonlinearly.
That’s my last thought. It does open up the aperture. For every smart mathematical genius, there are many, many, many other people who have high EQ. All of a sudden, this tool takes the skill away from the person with just a high IQ and says, “If you have these other skills, now you can compete with me equally.” I think that’s liberating for a lot of people.
Jason Calacanis
I’m in the camp of more opportunity. I got to watch the movie industry when digital cameras came out. More people started making documentaries, more people started making independent films and shorts, and then there was the YouTube revolution. People started making videos on YouTube and podcasts like this.
Look at what happened with the special-effects industry as well. We need far fewer people to make a Star Wars movie, a Star Wars series, or a Marvel series. We can get The Mandalorian, Ahsoka, and all these other series with smaller numbers of people, and they look better than the original Star Wars series or even the prequels.
There are going to be so many more opportunities. We’re now making more TV shows and more series—everything we wanted to see about every little character.
The same thing is happening in startups. I can’t believe there’s an app now called Slopes just for skiing, and there are 20 really good apps just for meditation. There are 10 really good ones just for fasting. We’re going down this long tail of opportunity, and there will be plenty of million- to $10 million businesses for people who learn to use these tools.
I love how the thing that tips you over is that you get an extra Marvel movie or an extra Star Wars show.
Jason Calacanis
For a lot of people, it feels great that AI may take over the world, but we’re going to get the next Star Wars movie, so I’m cool.
I mean, are you not entertained?
My final point is that given the choice between the 2 categories of techno-optimist and techno-pessimist, I’m definitely in the optimist camp, and I think we should be.
But I think there’s actually a third category that I would submit: the techno-realist. Technology is going to happen. Trying to stop it is like ordering the tides to stop. If we don’t do it, somebody else will. China’s going to do it, or somebody else will.
It’s better for us to be in control of the technology, to be the leader, rather than passively waiting for it to happen to us. I think that’s always true. It’s better for businesses to be proactive and take the lead and disrupt themselves instead of waiting for someone else to do it. I think it’s better for countries, too.
You saw this theme a little bit—I don’t want to ascribe my own views to the vice president, but I think you saw a hint of the techno-realist idea in his speech and in his tweet. AI is going to happen. We might as well be the leader.
If we don’t, we could lose in a key category that has implications for national security, our economy, and many other things. That’s just not a world we want to live in.
A lot of this debate is academic because whether you’re an optimist or pessimist is sort of a glass-half-empty or glass-half-full question. The question is just whether it’s going to happen or not. I think the answer is yes. So then we want to control it.
Let’s boil it down. There’s not a tremendous amount of choice in this.
I agree heavily with one point, and I would tweak another. The point I agree with is that it’s going to happen anyway. That’s what DeepSeek proved. You can turn off the flow of chips to them and turn off the flow of talent. What do they do? They just get more efficient, and then they exported it back to us. They sent us the best open-source model when our guys were staying closed source for safety reasons.
DeepSeek exploded the fallacy that the U.S. has a monopoly in this category, and that therefore we can slow down the train and have total control over the train. What DeepSeek showed is that if we slow down the train, they’re just going to win.
Exactly.
The part I would tweak slightly is the idea that we’re going to win when you say “America.” The problem is that the best way to win is to be as open, distributed, and innovative as possible.
If this all ends up under the control of one company, they’re actually going to be slower to innovate than if there’s a dynamic system. That dynamic system, by its nature, will be open. It will leak to China. It will leak to India.
But these things have powerful network effects. We know this about technology. Almost all technologies have network effects underneath. Even if you are open, you’re still going to win and you’re still going to control it.
Look at the internet. That was all true for the internet, right? The internet is an open technology based on tons of open source. Who are the dominant companies? All the dominant companies are U.S. companies because they were in the lead.
Exactly right.
We embraced the open internet.
That was different.
There will be benefits for all of humanity, and I think the vice president’s speech was really clear: We want you guys to be on board. We want to be good partners. However, there are definitely going to be winners economically and militarily.
In order to be one of those winners, you have to be a leader.
Jason Calacanis
Who’s going to get to AGI first?
Is it going to be open source or closed source? Who’s going to win the day? If we’re sitting here 5 or 10 years from now and looking at the top 3 language models, I don’t think we know how to build AGI.
Jason Calacanis
That’s a much longer discussion.
Who’s going to have the best model 5 years from now?
Jason Calacanis
Hold on. I 100% agree with you. I just think it’s a different thing.
What we’re building are these incredible natural-language computers. David, in a very pithy way, summarized the 2 big use cases: It’s search and homework.
It’s paperwork. A lot of these jobs that we’re talking about disappearing are actually paperwork jobs. They’re paperwork-shuffling jobs. These are made-up jobs.
The federal government, as we’re finding out through DOGE, is a third people digging holes with spoons, another third filling them back up, and the rest filling out paperwork and burying it in a mine shaft.
They’re burying it in a mine shaft?
They’re burying it in a mine shaft.
Jason Calacanis
They’re burying the paperwork in the mine shaft.
I’m going to get them some thumb drives. We can increase the throughput of the elevator with some thumb drives.
Jason Calacanis
It would be incredible.
What we found out is that the DMV has been running the government for the last 70 years.
Jason Calacanis
It’s been compounding. That’s really what’s going on. The DMV is in charge.
If the world ends in nuclear war, God forbid, the only things left will be the cockroaches and a bunch of government documents, status reports, and TPS reports down in the mine shaft.
Basically.
Jason Calacanis
Let’s take a moment to thank our czar. We miss him. We wish he could be here for the whole show.
Thank you, czar.
Jason Calacanis
Thank you to the czar. See you guys.
We miss you, little buddy.
Jason Calacanis
I wish we could talk about Ukraine, but we’re not allowed.
Get back to work. We’ll talk about it another time over coffee.
Jason Calacanis
I’ll see you in the commissary.
Thanks for the invite. Bye, man.
Jason Calacanis
I’m so excited. Sacks invited me to go to the military mess. I’m going to be in the commissary.
No, he didn’t. Jason, you invited yourself. Be honest.
Jason Calacanis
I did, yes. I put it on his calendar to keep the conversation moving.
Let me segue a point that came up that was really important into tariffs. Even though the internet was open, the United States won a lot of the internet. A lot of U.S. companies won the internet because we got there firstest with the mostest, as they say in the military.
That matters because a lot of technology businesses have scale economies and network effects underneath. Even basic brand-based network effects matter. If you go back to the late 1990s and early 2000s, very few people would have predicted that we would have ended up with Amazon basically owning all of e-commerce. You would have thought it would be perfectly competitive and very spread out.
That applies to how we ended up with Uber as basically one taxi service, or Airbnb and Meta. It’s network effects, network effects, network effects. Network effects rule the world around me.
But when it comes to tariffs and trade, we act like network effects don’t exist. The classic Ricardian comparative-advantage dogma says that you should produce what you’re best at. I produce what I’m best at, you produce what you’re best at, and we trade.
Even if you want to charge me more for it, if you want to impose tariffs for me to ship to you, I should still keep tariffs down because I’m better off. You’re just selling me stuff cheaply. Great. Or if you want to subsidize your guys, great—you’re selling me stuff cheaply.
The problem is that this is not how most modern businesses work. Most modern businesses have network effects. As a simple thought experiment, suppose we have 2 countries: China and the United States.
I start out by subsidizing all of my companies and industries that have network effects. I’ll subsidize TikTok. I’ll ban your social media but push mine. I’ll subsidize my semiconductors, which tend to have winner-take-all dynamics in certain categories. I’ll subsidize my drones, BYD, self-driving, and so on.
Then, when I win, I own the whole market and can raise prices. If you try to start a competitor, it’s too late. I’ve got network effects. Or if I have scale economies, I can lower my price to zero, crash you out of business, make sure no one in their right mind will invest, and raise prices right back up.
You have to understand that certain industries have hysteresis, network effects, or economies of scale. These are all the interesting ones. These are the high-margin businesses. If somebody is subsidizing or raising tariffs against you to protect their industries and let them develop, you do have to do something. You can’t just completely back down.
Chamath, what are your thoughts about tariffs and network effects? It does seem like we want to have redundancy in the supply chain, so there are some exceptions here.
Any thoughts on how this might play out? Trump brings up tariffs every 48 hours, and then it doesn’t seem like any of them land.
I’m still on my 72-hour Trump rule, which is: Whatever he says, wait 72 hours and then maybe see if it actually comes to pass.
Jason Calacanis
Where do you stand on all these tariffs and the tariff talk?
I think the tariffs will be a plug. Are they coming? Absolutely. The quantum of them, I don’t know.
The way you can figure out how extreme they will be is by looking at what the legislative plan is for the budget. There are 2 paths right now.
Path 1, which I think is a little bit more likely, is that they’re going to pass a slimmed-down plan in the Senate just on border security and military spending. Then they’ll kick the can down the road for probably another 3 or 4 months on the budget plan.
Plan 2 is the “one big, beautiful bill” that’s working its way through the House. They’re proposing trillions of dollars of cuts. In that mode, you’re going to need to raise revenue somehow, especially if you’re giving away tax breaks. The only way to do that is probably through tariffs, or one way to do it is through tariffs.
My honest opinion, Jason, is that we’re in a very complicated moment. I think the Senate plan is actually, on the margins, more likely and better.
The reason is that Trump is better off getting the next 60 to 90 days of data. We’re in a real pickle here. We have persistent inflation and a broken Fed. They are totally asleep at the switch.
The thing that Yellen and Biden did, which in hindsight was extremely dangerous, is that they issued so much short-term paper that in totality we have $1 trillion we need to finance in the next 6 to 9 months.
It could be the case that we have rates at 5%, 5¼%, or 5½%. I think that’s extremely bad at the same time that inflation and delinquencies are ticking up.
I think tariffs are probably going to happen, but I think Trump will have the most flexibility if he has time to see what the actual economic conditions will be, which will be clearer in 3, 4, or 5 months.
I almost think this big, beautiful bill is counterproductive because I’m not sure we’re going to have all the data we need to get it right.
Jason Calacanis
Friedberg, any thoughts on these tariffs? You’ve been involved in the global marketplace, especially when it comes to produce, wheat, corn, and everything. What do you think the dynamic here is going to be? Is it saber-rattling and a tool for Trump?
David Friedberg
The biggest buyer of U.S. exports is China. China’s exports are a major revenue source, a major income source, and a major part of the economy for a large number of states.
There will be, as there was in the first Trump presidency, very likely very large transfer payments made to farmers because China is very likely going to tariff imports or stop making import purchases altogether. That’s what happened during the first presidency.
When they did that, the federal government had transfer payments of north of $20 billion to farmers. This is not a negligible sum, and it’s a non-negligible economic effect because there’s a rippling effect throughout the economy.
In the early 20th century, we didn’t have an income tax, and federal revenue was almost entirely dependent on tariffs. When tariffs were cut, there was an expectation that there would be a decline in federal government revenue. What actually happened is that volume went up. Lower tariffs increased trade and increased the size of the economies.
This is where a lot of economists take their basis: “If we do these tariffs, it’s going to shrink the economy and cause a reduction in trade.”
The counterbalancing effect is one that has not been tested in economics, which is what’s going to happen if we simultaneously reduce the income tax and reduce the corporate income tax and basically increase capital flows through reduced taxation while implementing the tariffs at the same time.
It’s a grand economic experiment, and I think we’ll learn a lot about what’s going to happen here as this moves forward. I do think these countries are ultimately going to capitulate to some degree, and we’re going to end up with a negotiated settlement that will hopefully not be too short-term impactful on the economies, people, and jobs that are dependent on trade.
The economy feels like it’s in a very precarious place.
It does to asset holders, obviously. They left it in a bad place in the last administration. We shut down the entire country for a year over COVID. The bill for that has come due, and that’s reflected in inflation.
Jason Calacanis
I think there are a couple of other points about tariffs.
First, it’s not just about money. It’s also about making sure we have a functional middle class with good jobs. If you have a non-tariff world, maybe all the gains go to the upper class and an underclass. You can’t have a functioning democracy when the average person is on one of those 2 extremes.
Another issue is strategic industries. If you look at it today, probably the largest defense contractor in the world is DJI. They have all the drones. Even in Ukraine, both sides are getting all their drone parts from DJI.
They’re getting them through different supply chains and so on, but Ukrainian drones and Russian drones, the vast majority of them, are coming through China and DJI. We don’t have that industry. If we have a kinetic conflict right now, and we don’t have a good drone supply chain internally in the United States, we’re probably going to lose because those things are autonomous bullets. That’s the future of all warfare.
We’re buying F-35s, and the Chinese are building swarms at scale. We do have to reshore some of these critical supply chains. What is a drone supply chain? It’s not just one thing called “drone.” It’s motors, semiconductors, optics, lasers, and everything across the board.
I think there are good arguments for at least reshoring some of these industries. We need them.
The United States is very lucky in that it’s very agrarian. We have all the resources and all the supplies. We can be upstream of everybody with all the energy.
To the extent that we’re importing any energy, that is a choice we made. It’s not because fundamentally we lack the energy. Between all the oil resources, natural gas, fracking, and all the work we’ve done in nuclear fission and small reactors, we should absolutely be energy-independent.
We should be running the table on energy. We should have a massive surplus.
If you’re worried about a couple million DoorDash and Uber drivers losing their jobs to automation, there are going to be factories to build the parts for these drones that we’re going to need. There’s a lot of opportunity for people.
There is a difference between different kinds of jobs. Those are better jobs—building difficult things at scale, physically, that we need for both national security and innovation. Those are better jobs than paperwork, writing essays for other people to read, or even driving cars.
All right, listen. I want to get to 2 more stories here.
We have a really interesting copyright story that I wanted to touch on. Thomson Reuters just won the first major U.S. AI copyright case, and fair use played a major role in the decision. This has huge implications for AI companies here in the United States.
Obviously, OpenAI and The New York Times, Getty Images versus Stability AI—we’ve talked about these. It’s been a little while because the legal system takes a little bit of time, and these are very complicated cases.
Thomson Reuters owns Westlaw. If you don’t know that, it’s kind of like LexisNexis. It’s one of the legal databases that lawyers use to find cases. They have a paid product with summaries and analysis of legal decisions.
Back in 2020, 2 years before ChatGPT, Reuters sued a legal-research competitor called Ross for copyright infringement. Ross had created an AI-powered legal search engine. It sounds great, but Ross had asked Westlaw if they would pay a license for its content for training. Westlaw said no.
This all went back and forth, and then Ross signed a similar deal with a company called LegalEase. The problem is that LegalEase’s database was just copied and pasted from a bunch of Westlaw answers.
Reuters and Westlaw sued Ross in 2020, accusing the company of being vicariously liable for LegalEase’s direct infringement. Super-important point.
The judge originally favored Ross on fair use, but this week the judge reversed that ruling and found Ross liable, noting that after further review, fair use does not apply in this case.
This is the first major win. We debated this, so you heard it here first on the All-In podcast. Here’s a clip:
“What I would say is, when you look at the fair-use doctrine, I’ve got a lot of experience with it. The fourth-factor test, I’m sure you’re well aware of, is the effect of the use on the potential market and the value of the work.
“If you look at the lawsuits that are starting to emerge, it is Getty’s right to make derivative products based on their images. We would all agree that Stable Diffusion, when it used the open web, has no excuse to use an open-web crawler to avoid getting a license from the original owner of that content.
“Just because you can technically do it doesn’t mean you’re allowed to do it. The open-web projects that provide this say explicitly, ‘We do not give you the right to use this.’ You have to read the copyright laws on each of those websites.
“On top of that, if somebody were to steal the copyrighted works of other people and put them on the open web, which is happening all day long, you still need to get a license if you’re building a derivative work. It’s no excuse that I took some site in Russia that did a bunch of copyright violation and indexed it for my training model.”
I think this is going to result in—
Friedberg, can you shoot me in the face and let me know when this is over?
David Friedberg
I feel the same way. Same way.
Jason Calacanis
Exactly. I know. Me too.
Since these guys don’t give a damn about copyright holders, what do you think?
I’m so glad you’re here, Naval, to actually talk about the topics. I’m going to go out on an even thinner limb and say I largely agree with you.
I think it’s a bit rich to crawl the open web, hoover up all the data, and offer direct substitution for a lot of use cases. Now you start and end with the AI model. It’s not even like you link out, as Google did, and then close off the models for safety reasons.
I think if you trained on the open web, your model should be open source.
Absolutely. That would be a fine thing.
I have a prediction here. I think this is all going to wind up like the Napster or Spotify case. For people who don’t know, Spotify pays, I think, 65 cents on the dollar to the original rights holders of that content—the music industry. They figured out a way to make a business, and Napster is roadkill.
I think there’s a nonzero chance—maybe 5% or 10%—that OpenAI is going to lose the New York Times lawsuit, and they’re going to lose it hard. There are going to be injunctions, and I think the settlement might be that these language models, especially the closed ones, are going to have to pay some percentage in a negotiated settlement of their revenue—half, two-thirds—to the content holders.
This could make the content industry have a massive uplift and a massive resurgence. I think the problem is that there’s an example on the other side. There’s a company that provides technical support for Oracle. It’s a third-party company, and Oracle has tried to sue them into oblivion, using copyright infringement as part of the justification.
It’s been a pall over the stock for a long time. The company’s name is Rimini Street. Don’t ask me why. It’s on my radar. I’ve been looking at it.
They lost this huge lawsuit. Oracle won, then it went to an appellate court, and then it was all vacated. Why am I bringing this up? I think the legal community has absolutely no idea how these models work.
You can find one case that goes one way and another case that goes the other. What I would say should become standard reading for anybody bringing these lawsuits is an incredible video that Andrej Karpathy just dropped. He does a deep dive into LLMs and explains ChatGPT from the ground up.
It’s on YouTube. It’s 3 hours, and it’s excellent. It’s very difficult to watch that and not reach the same conclusion that you guys did.
Jason Calacanis
There’s also a good old video by Ilya Sutskever, who I believe was the founding chief scientist or CTO of OpenAI. He talks about how these large language models are basically extreme compressors. He models them entirely as their ability to compress.
Lossy compression.
Jason Calacanis
Exactly. Lossy compression.
Google got sued for fair use back in the day, but the way they managed to get past the argument was that they were always linking back to you. They showed tiny snippets and sent you the traffic.
This is lossy compression.
Jason Calacanis
I hate to say this, Naval, but you were right.
You were right. You were right.
Jason Calacanis
That’s all I wanted to hear after all these years.
I was shaking my head when I saw those videos because I thought, “Jason was right. Jason was right.”
Jason Calacanis
I’ve been through this so many times. Rupert Murdoch said we should hold the line with Google and not allow them to index our content without a license. Google navigated it successfully, and they were able to avoid being forced to stop.
I think what’s happened now is that The New York Times remembers losing their content in the snippets and the one-box to Google, and they couldn’t get that genie back in the bottle.
The New York Times realizes this is their payday. I think The New York Times will make more money from licenses from LLMs than it will eventually make from advertising or subscriptions.
The New York Times content is worthless to an LLM, but that’s a different story. I think the actual value is political, or whatever the reason is.
Jason Calacanis
As a user, I loved Wirecutter. I think you knew Brian and everybody over at Wirecutter. That was a great product. I used to pay for The New York Times, but I no longer pay for it.
My main reason was that I would go to Wirecutter and just buy whatever they told me to buy. Now I go to ChatGPT, which I pay for, and it tells me what to buy based on Wirecutter. I’m already paying for it, so I stopped paying for The New York Times.
David Friedberg
I philosophically disagree with all of your nonsense on this topic. All 3 of you are wrong, and I’ll tell you why.
Number 1: If information is out on the open internet, I believe it’s accessible and viewable. I view an LLM or a web crawler as basically a human who’s reading and can store information in its brain.
If it’s out there in the open, it’s accessible. If it’s behind a paywall or some protected password, 100%.
Jason Calacanis
Wait, wait, wait. David, in that case, can a Google crawler just crawl an entire site and serve it on Google? Why can’t they do that?
David Friedberg
The fair use is that you cannot copy or repeat the content. You cannot take the content and repeat it. That is how the law is currently written.
But now I have a tool that can remix it with 50 other pieces of similar content, change the words slightly, and maybe even translate it into a different language. Where does it stop?
Do you know the musical artist Girl Talk? We should have done a Girl Talk track here today.
Jason Calacanis
He’s got musical taste, this guy.
David Friedberg
He basically takes small samples of popular tracks and made music, and he got sued for the same problem. There was another guy named The White Panda, I believe, who had the same problem. Ed Sheeran got sued for this.
Jason Calacanis
Their entire sites—Stack Overflow and Wikipedia—have basically disappeared now because you can just swallow them all up and spit them all back out in ChatGPT with slight changes.
David Friedberg
I think the fair-use question is exactly the right question: How much are you changing?
Jason Calacanis
That’s the question. It actually boils down to the AGI question. Are these things intelligent? Are they learning, or are they compressing and regurgitating? That’s the question.
I wonder this about humans, and that’s why I bring up The White Panda and Girl Talk in audio, but also visual art. There have always been artists, and even in classical music, there were composers who learned from the next composer.
You can track music as standing on the shoulders of what came before. The same is true in almost all art forms, human knowledge, media, and communication. It’s very hard to figure out.
David Friedberg
That’s exactly right. It’s very hard to figure out, which is why I come back to there being only 2 stable solutions, and one of them is going to happen anyway.
If we don’t crawl it, the Chinese will crawl it. DeepSeek proved that. There are only 2 stable solutions.
Either you pay the copyright holders—which I actually think doesn’t work, because someone in China will crawl it and dump the weights—or, if you crawl it, make it open. At least contribute something back to open source.
You crawled open data and contributed it back to open source. The people who don’t want to be crawled are going to have to go to a huge length to protect their data. Now everybody knows how to protect the data.
Jason Calacanis
Something is happening here. I have a book out from Harper Business on the shelf behind me, and I’m getting $2,500 for the next 3 years for Microsoft indexing it.
They’re licensing this stuff. They’re paying $2,500 for my book, through Harper, to go into an LLM—specifically Microsoft’s. I’m going to sign it because I want to set a precedent. Maybe next time it’s $10,000, maybe next time it’s $250,000. I don’t care. I just want to see people have their content respected.
I’m hoping that Sam Altman loses this lawsuit and they get an injunction against OpenAI.
He’s such a weasel in terms of turning OpenAI into a closed thing. I like Sam personally, but I think what he did was the ultimate weasel move for his own personal benefit.
He does it for the love.
Jason Calacanis
What was the statement? He does it for the “job benefit”? He does it for the benefits? He got health care, I think.
I think in OpenAI’s defense, they do need to raise a lot of money, and they have to incentivize their employees. But that doesn’t mean they need to take over the whole thing.
The nonprofit portion can still stay the nonprofit portion and get the lion’s share of the benefits and be the board. Then Sam can have an incentive package and employees can have an incentive package.
Jason Calacanis
Why don’t they get a percentage of the revenue? I don’t understand why the nonprofit has to be bought out right now for $40 billion and then the whole thing disappears into a closed system.
That part makes no sense to me.
That’s called a shell game and a scam.
Jason Calacanis
I think Sam and his team would do better to leave the nonprofit part alone, leave an actual independent nonprofit board in charge, and then have a strong incentive plan and a strong fundraising plan for the investors and employees.
I think this is workable. Trying to grab it all just seems way off, especially when it was built on open-source algorithms from Google, open data from the web, and nonprofit funding from Elon and others.
What a great proposal. We just workshopped this here. What if they made, say, $6 billion a year and took 10% of it—$600 million every year—and put it into a bonus pool?
They’re losing money, Jason, so they have to—
Jason Calacanis
Eventually they won’t. Even if it’s equity, they could give equity to the people building it, but they could still leave it under the control of the nonprofit.
I just don’t understand this conversion. There was a board coup, right? The board tried to fire Sam, and now it’s self-dealing.
They’ll get an independent valuation.
Jason Calacanis
We all know that game. You hire a valuation expert who’s going to say what you want them to say, and they check the box.
If you’re going to capture the light cone of all future value or build superintelligence, that’s worth a lot more.
That’s why Elon just bid $100 billion.
Jason Calacanis
You’re saying the things that the regulators and legal community have no insight into. They’ll see a fairness opinion and think, “It says ‘fairness’ and ‘opinion’ side by side, so it must be fair.” They don’t know how all this stuff is gamed.
David Friedberg
I have stories about 409A valuations that would make that exact point.
Jason Calacanis
The 409A valuations are gamed. These fairness opinions are gamed. The reality is that I don’t think the legal and judicial community has any idea.
Imagine, in a totally imaginary situation, that Naval had a great term sheet at some incredible dollar amount, didn’t take it, ran the valuation down to under $1 million, gave himself a bunch of shares, and then took it 3 months later. What would that be called?
Securities fraud.
Jason Calacanis
Let’s wrap on your story. I had an interesting dinner on Monday with Bryan Johnson, the “don’t die” guy. He came over to my house.
How’s his erection doing overnight?
Jason Calacanis
We talked about how he gets 3 hours a night of nighttime erections.
Wow.
Jason Calacanis
Look at this, by the way. First of all, I think that—
Which one of those is giving him the erection?
Jason Calacanis
No, he measures his nighttime erections. I think his regimen is giving him the erections.
He said that when he started, he was 43. He was basically clinically obese, and over the next 4 years he became a specimen. He now has 3 hours a night of nighttime erections.
His skin, in person, is like a porcelain doll’s. Both my wife and I were like, “We’ve never seen skin like this.” It’s incredibly soft.
How do you know his skin is soft? Did you brush your hand against his forearm or something?
Jason Calacanis
You give the guy a hug at the end of the night. I’m telling you, the guy’s skin is supple. It’s the softest skin I’ve ever touched in my life.
Anyway, that’s not the point. It was a really fascinating dinner. He walked me through his whole protocol.
At the end of it, I think it was Nash, the CEO of [?] Networks, who was just like, “Give me the top 3 things.” Of the top 3 things, I’ll boil it down to the top 1 thing, which is 80% of the 80%: It’s all about sleep.
I was about to guess sleep.
Jason Calacanis
He walked me through his nighttime routine, and it’s incredible and straightforward. It’s really simple.
Let’s say our normal time is 10:00 or 10:30. I try to go to bed by 10:30. He says you need to be in bed by 9:30 or 10:00. First of all, stop eating 3 or 4 hours before bed. I do that. I eat at 6:30, so I have about 3 hours.
You’re in bed by 9:30 or 10:00. You deal with the self-talk: “Here’s the active mind telling you all the things you have to fix in the morning.” Talk it out. Put it in its place. Say, “I’m going to deal with this in the morning.” Write it down in a journal—whatever you do—so that you put it away.
You cannot be on your phone. It has to be in a different room, or you have to be able to shut it down. Then read a book so that you’re engaged in something.
He said he typically falls asleep within 3 or 4 minutes of getting into bed and starting this. I tried it. I’ve been doing it since I had dinner with him on Monday. Last night, I fell asleep within 50 minutes.
David Friedberg
The hardest part for me is putting the phone away.
Of course.
Jason Calacanis
What about you, Naval? Tell us your wind-down routine.
I know Bryan pretty well, actually, and I joke that I’m married to the female Bryan Johnson. My wife has some of his routines, but she’s the natural version—no supplements—and she’s intense.
I think when Bryan saw my sleep score from my Eight Sleep, he was shocked. He was like, “You’re going to die. You’re literally going to die.”
Jason Calacanis
You got a 70 or 80?
No, it’s terrible. It’s awful. But it’s also because I don’t sleep much. I only sleep a few hours a night, and I move around a lot in the bed. It’s fine. I never have trouble falling asleep.
I would say Bryan’s skincare routine is amazing and his diet is incredible. He’s a genuine character. I do think a lot of what he’s saying, minus the supplements—I’m not a big believer in supplements—does work.
I don’t know if it’s necessarily going to slow down your aging, but you’ll look good and feel good. Sleep is the number-one thing.
In terms of falling asleep, I don’t think it’s really about whether you look at your phone or not. Believe it or not, I think it’s about what you’re doing on your phone.
If you’re doing anything cognitively stressful or getting your mind to spin, then yes, it will keep you up. But if you’re scrolling TikTok, that’s fine. Anything entertaining can be fine. You could read a book on your Kindle or iPad, and I think that would be fine. You can listen to a meditation video or some spiritual teacher, and that will actually help you fall asleep.
But if you’re on X or checking your email, that’s going to keep you up.
My hack for sleep is a little different. I normally fall asleep within minutes.
Jason Calacanis
Do you have a set time?
No. I sleep whenever I feel like it, usually around 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning.
Jason Calacanis
God damn. I’m in bed by 10:00.
I’m an owl. But if you want to fall asleep, the hack I found is that everybody has tried some kind of meditation routine.
Just sit in bed and meditate. Your mind will hate meditation so much that if you force it to choose between the fork of meditation and sleeping, you’ll fall asleep every time.
If you don’t fall asleep, you’ll end up meditating, which is great too. Just do a body scan.
The coda to this story was that a friend of mine came to see me from the UAE. He was here on Tuesday, and I was telling him about the dinner with Bryan.
He told me a story because he’s friends with Khabib, the UFC fighter. He said that when Khabib goes to his house, he eats anything and everything—fried food, pizza, whatever—but he trains consistently.
My friend asked him, “How are you able to do that? How does it not affect your physiology?” Khabib said, “I’ve learned this since I was a kid. I sleep 3 hours after I train in the morning, and I sleep 10 hours at night. I’ve done it since I was 12 or 13 years old.”
Jason Calacanis
That’s a lot of sleep.
It’s a lot of sleep. The direct correlation for me is that if I do something cognitively heavy, like big, heavy-duty conversations, I don’t sleep well. No heavy conversations at the end of the night. No existential conversations at night.
If I go rucking, I have a 35-pound weight vest on the ranch. I walk 1 to 2 miles with the 35-pound weight vest, and it just tires my whole body out. When I lay down, I’m ready to sleep.
Jason Calacanis
Is that why you don’t prepare for the podcast? This podcast is one of the top 10 podcasts in the world. Chamath, do you think that’s an accident?
David Friedberg, what’s your sleep routine? Can you just go to bed?
David Friedberg
I take a nice warm bath.
Jason Calacanis
You do that every night?
David Friedberg
I do. I take a warm bath every night with candles, too.
Jason Calacanis
Do you do it right before you go to bed?
David Friedberg
Usually after I put the kids down, I’ll start to wind down for bed. I do watch TV sometimes, but I have the problem and the mistake of looking at my phone for probably too long before I turn the lights off.
Do you have a consistent time when you go to bed?
David Friedberg
Usually 11:00 p.m. to midnight, and then I’m up at 6:30.
Jason Calacanis
I need 8 hours, otherwise I’m a mess.
I go to bed somewhere between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. I'm trying to get 8 hours. I consistently get between 6 and 7.
I try to go to bed in the 11:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. window and get up in the 7:00 to 8:00 window. My problem is, if I have work to do, I’ll get on the computer or my laptop, and once I start that in my evening routine, I can’t stop. All of a sudden, it’s 3:00 in the morning, and I’m like, “Oh no, what did I just do?”
Then I still have to get up at 6:30, so that does happen to me. Last night was unusual for me, but it was kind of funny. I thought, “I should go to bed early because I’m on All-In,” but I ended up eating ice cream with the kids late.
Jason Calacanis
Wait, what was the brand? You said you went for another brand. I want to know the brand.
I think it’s Van Leeuwen or something like that—the New York one, the Holiday Cookies & Cream. Oh my God, so good.
Jason Calacanis
Yeah, it’s so good.
After I polished that off, I was like, “I probably ate too much to go to bed, so I better work out.” So I did a kettlebell workout.
Jason Calacanis
You sound like me. I have 8 kettlebells right here next to me. This is called working out, Friedberg.
While I was doing my kettlebell suitcase carry, I was texting with an entrepreneur friend. He’s in Singapore, so it was the middle of the night for me and early for him. When it was time to go to bed, I was like, “Okay, now I’ve got to get to bed. How do I get to bed?”
My body was all amped up, I had food in my stomach, the kettlebells, and my brain was all amped up. The All-In podcast was tomorrow. What time is it? 1:30 in the morning. I better get to bed.
I put on one of those spiritual videos to calm me down, and then I got in bed and was like, “There’s no way I’m falling asleep.” I started meditating, and 5 minutes later I was asleep.
Jason Calacanis
You know, actually, the Dalai Lama has these great discussions on his YouTube channel. They’re about 2 hours long. You get about 20 or 30 minutes into one, and you will fall asleep.
Well, my lesson is to watch any Dharma lecture from the Dalai Lama.
Jason Calacanis
Exactly. My lesson is that the mind will do anything to avoid meditation.
By the way, did you guys see, just before we went on, all the confirmations? RFK Jr. was confirmed, Brooke Rollins was confirmed. If you look at Polymarket, Polymarket had it all right a couple of weeks ago. There was a moment when Brooke Rollins fell to 56%, and there was a moment when RFK fell to 75%, but then they bounced back and it was done. You could have sniped that, man. You could have made money.
The media was like, “No way he’s getting confirmed. This is not going to happen,” but Polymarket knew. It’s so interesting.
I saw a very insightful tweet, and I forget who wrote it, so I’m sorry I can’t give credit. The guy basically said, “Look, Trump has a narrow majority in the House and the Senate, and he can get everything he wants as long as Republicans stay in line.”
So all the pressure and all the anger that the MAGA movement is directing against the left is pointless. It’s all about keeping the right wing in line. All the people saying to the senators, “Hey, I’m going to primary you”; Nicole Shanahan saying, “I’m going to primary you”; Scott Presler saying, “I’m moving to your district”—that’s the stuff that’s moving the needle and causing the confirmations to go through.
That’s how you get Kash Patel. That’s how you get Tulsi Gabbard as the DNI. That’s how you get RFK.
Do you worry about any of these? Do you think any of them are too spicy for your taste, or do you just like the whole “burn it down, put in the crazy outsiders” thing?
That’s such a bad characterization. That’s not a fair characterization. Honestly, I never thought I’d see it, but I think between Elon and Sacks and people like that, we actually have builders and doers, financially intelligent people and economically intelligent people, in charge.
Despite all the craziness, Elon’s not doing this for the money. He’s doing it because he thinks it’s the right thing to do. He moved into the Roosevelt Room. I think, like many of us, I had bought into the great-forces-of-history mindset, where it’s just like, “Okay, it’s inevitable. This is what’s happening. Government always gets bigger and slower, and we just have to try and get stuff built before they shut everything down and we turn into Europe.”
But then what happened was, Caesar crossed the Rubicon. The great-man theory of history played out, and we’re living in that time. It’s an inspiration to all of us.
Despite Sam Altman and Elon’s current fighting, I know Sam was inspired by Elon at one point, and I think all of us are inspired by Elon. The guy can be a Diablo player, do DOGE, and run SpaceX, Tesla, The Boring Company, and Neuralink. It’s incredibly impressive.
It makes me want to do something useful with my life. That’s why I’m doing a hardware company now. Elon always makes me question, “Am I doing something useful enough with my life?”
That’s why I don’t want to be an investor. Peter Thiel, ironically, is an investor, but he’s inspirational that way too, because he’s like, “Yeah, the future just doesn’t happen. You have to go make it.” So we get to go make the future, and I’m just glad that Elon and DOGE and others are making the future.
Jason Calacanis
What do we got going on here?
Maybe I’ll come on the All-In podcast in a couple of months, but it’s really difficult. I’m not sure I can pull it off, so let me try. Let me just make sure it’s viable.
Jason Calacanis
Is it drone-related? Is it a self-driving drone?
Drones are cool, but no, it’s not.
Jason Calacanis
Maybe the All-In podcast should be an angel investor.
Oh, yes, absolutely.
David Friedberg
No, no syndicate, Jason. Just our money. What are you talking about?
Jason Calacanis
You know how I learned about syndicates? It was Naval. The first syndicate I ever did on AngelList—I think it’s still the biggest. I don’t know, 5%—and Naval is my partner on this, for sure.
I think you’ll love what I’m working on if I pull it off. I think you guys will love it. I’d love to show you the demo.
Jason Calacanis
Let us know where to send the check. Get that black cherry chip Van Leeuwen. I love you guys.
Jason Calacanis
What have we learned? I gotta go. Big shout-out to Bobby and Tulsa. That’s a huge, huge, huge room for America. I’m stoked about both of them. Congratulations.