Intel前CEO谈错在哪里、接下来怎么办 + Lovable CEO谈Vibe Coding的真正价值
- Pat Gelsinger对Intel的复盘是:公司不再按科技公司的方式经营,随后又通过资本配置把这一错误固化下来。 他2001年回归前的5至6年里,Intel向股东分配了1000亿美元,却整整10年没有建新厂,也没能买到EUV设备。他的原则是:十亿美元级别的技术决策不能“靠一张表格”做出来。
- Apple、Nvidia和TSMC击败Intel,靠的都是耐心建设能力,而不是押中某一个奇迹般的赌注。 Steve Jobs在4个版本的操作系统中悄悄保留对x86的支持,之后才把芯片和系统设计整合起来;Nvidia持续复利CUDA,直到GPU走出图形应用;TSMC把代工准入标准化,2001年晶圆产量已是Intel的5倍,如今约为7倍。Apple的逻辑不是“你作为供应商失败了”,而是“我自己供货会更好”。
- 半导体供应链韧性正在改善,但台湾对能源的依赖,仍让全球经济暴露于一场甚至不需要开枪的封锁。 Gelsinger称,CHIPS Act启动时美国先进制程产能约占12%,如今为18%;但台湾能源储备不足3周,一座停摆的晶圆厂需要90天才能重启。他认为,台湾限电对经济的冲击将“超过大萧条”。
- Gelsinger认为,AI是持续数十年的建设周期,其自然上限是电力,而不是市场对智能的需求。 能源供给限制了数据中心无限投建的可能;目标应是让AI能力提升10,000倍,把token成本和能耗降低5个数量级,再通过杰文斯悖论扩大使用量。他预计AI还会进步“20年左右”,但过程不会是一条平滑曲线。
- AI高估值可能反复回调,但这并不推翻底层逻辑,因为这些业务已经拥有真实营收和利润率。 Gelsinger欢迎周期性修正和更多“末日时刻”,认为这能抑制过度扩张,并将机会延伸为“计算三位一体”:经典计算、AI和量子计算。他预计2030年前会出现有实际意义的量子计算成果,加密问题可能在2032至2033年左右被解决。
- Lovable的数据表明,Vibe Coding已经从原型开发跨入生产和业务运营。 运营20个月后,公司称累计生成超过5000万款应用,每周新增100万个项目,这些应用每月访问量达7亿次,企业客户是增长最快的部分;Anton Osika还用“我们在5月达到500”纠正了Jason Calacanis对4亿美元营收的估计。Jason内部团队将一个过去需要50万美元开发的内网项目,压缩到约4至8小时完成,首年成本不到2000美元。
- Lovable的竞争壁垒正从单一基础模型之上移开,转向编排、运营数据、安全能力和持续积累的反馈。 它在商业前沿模型与开放权重模型之间分配任务,针对客户影响最大的失败案例进行后训练;只要便宜模型对客户的结果可测地更差,就不会为了省钱改用它。Osika认为,越来越大的限制来自人的判断:模型可以立即生成复杂软件,但判断“什么才是应该做的产品”进步得慢得多。
1. Intel的表格文化扼杀了技术飞轮
Gelsinger 18岁加入Intel——“我是在Intel经历青春期的”——当时公司由Andy Grove、Gordon Moore和Bob Noyce等技术型领导者执掌。他第一次参加高管会议时,20名与会者中大约15人拥有博士学位;这种技术密度决定了Intel招什么人、提拔什么人,以及把重大决策交给谁。
他对公司偏离轨道的判断是:业务管理者取代了技术人员,又提拔更多业务管理者,技术权威就这样逐步被掏空。Satya Nadella和Sundar Pichai不必是创始人,也可以符合他认可的管理模式;关键在于,他们必须具备足够深的技术背景,能在技术趋势尚未显现、投资账面经济性看起来并不划算时判断哪些投入值得做。
资本配置让这种文化失败变得具体。Gelsinger 2001年回任CEO前的5至6年里,Intel通过分红和回购向股东分配了1000亿美元,10年没有建新厂,也没有购买EUV设备。“如果当时再多给我1000亿美元,我能做的事太多了。”
Jason把批评扩大到Apple的回购和小型并购,但Gelsinger坚持把Intel的教训限定在更窄的范围内:每位领导者都会做出正确和错误的判断,但“这是一家科技公司”。科技人员必须掌舵,必须把更多科技人员招进管理层,也必须在表格证明能力价值之前持续投入能力建设。
2. Apple、Nvidia和TSMC将小优势复利成平台
Steve Jobs最初对Intel Centrino芯片提出了极高的尺寸和功耗要求。当他不再相信Intel能继续保持足够大的领先时,Apple收购了PA Semi,并逐步扩大内部芯片团队;这次战略转向并不是对供应商的愤怒拒绝,而是得出“我自己供货会更好”(“I can supply myself better”)的结论,同时协同优化芯片和操作系统。
Gelsinger讲过的Jobs代表性故事,发生在Apple早期从PowerPC转向Intel时。Intel提出帮助Apple移植操作系统,Jobs回答说,Apple此前4个版本已经移植到x86。Gelsinger对此非常震惊:在外部切换成为必要之前,Jobs早已悄悄保留了这一选项多年。
Intel当年同样把Nvidia的GPU视为小众图形设备,而Jensen Huang持续完善CUDA、SIMT及周边软件栈。随后,日本高性能计算研究者意识到,这些芯片其实是计算密度很高的通用设备。Gelsinger主导的竞争性x86项目Larrabee在他第一次离开Intel后仅1周就被取消:“整个世界都会不一样。”
TSMC的对应洞察发生在组织层面:投资200亿美元至300亿美元建设的晶圆厂,可以通过标准化的PDK、EDA工具和制造准入服务整个行业。Intel的专有IDM体系却把代工视为无足轻重的业务;到Gelsinger 2001年回归时,TSMC的晶圆产量已是Intel的5倍,他认为当前差距接近7倍。
3. 台湾将制造规模变成宏观经济风险
Gelsinger认为,CHIPS Act带来了切实但并不完整的进展:美国先进制程产能占比已从法案启动时的约12%升至如今约18%。Intel正在成为真正的代工厂,TSMC的美国工厂已实现规模化运营,Samsung也已进入市场,但18%距离供应链韧性仍相去甚远。
最令人担忧的约束是台湾不足3周的能源储备。一场切断石油和LNG供应的封锁,无需交火就可能让台湾陷入限电;一旦晶圆厂停摆,Gelsinger称需要90天才能恢复运行。他对全球经济损失的判断没有留下余地:“超过大萧条。”
Jason追问冲突可能在2027年、2030年还是2035年爆发;Gelsinger拒绝给出虚假的精确判断,因为自己没有作战指挥室级别的实时情报。他表示,过去4年里中国在他看来已经封锁台湾海峡7次,这意味着问题不只是理论推演,供应链多元化必须更快、更有实质意义。
4. AI的物理上限是能源,量子计算延长增长跑道
当被问及AI基础设施是否存在泡沫时,Gelsinger从电力供给中找到了安慰:没有电力,公司就不会购买GPU,也不会建设数据中心。他估计全球能源产能扩张约为5%,而美国过去10年接近1%;这一物理上限限制了支出能够超出可部署产能的幅度。
需求仍可能极其庞大,因为如果token可以衡量智能,那么它在供应链、金融、物流以及劳动力受限的经济体中的潜在价值“在某种程度上是无限的”。因此,Gelsinger预计这轮建设“不是几年,而是20年左右”,目标是让AI能力提升10,000倍,同时把token成本和能耗降低5个数量级。
Jason质疑AI公司的惊人估值,但Gelsinger认为,今天的公司与互联网泡沫时期的投机不同,因为它们拥有“真实营收”和“真实利润率”。他仍预计市场会反复修正,行业也会持续洗牌,包括更多类似“SaaS末日”的时刻,但他对此持欢迎态度:“每次出现这种修正,都应该说谢谢。”
Jason最尖锐的挑战是:量子计算已经连续25年被说成“还有5年”。Gelsinger回答称会在“本10年内”实现突破,2030年前将出现化学、生命科学和物流领域的实用成果,而破解加密等问题可能要到2032至2033年左右。他也披露了自己对PsiQuantum的投资偏向,但指出目前有4至6条正在改善的技术路线,纠错已经得到验证,剩下的竞争在于工程规模化。
5. Lovable已从生成应用走向运营业务
Osika将市场缺口分成两层:先让任何人都能构建产品,再帮助产品成长为一门生意。运营20个月后,Lovable每周新增100万个项目,累计应用超过5000万款,这些应用每月访问量达7亿次;企业业务是增长最快的客户群体。
用户中约20%具备技术背景,4/5为非技术用户。工程师看重Lovable带有明确技术取舍的架构、支付配置、持续安全扫描和监控;非工程师则借助同一套结构摸索到底应该构建什么产品。一些客户如今已在平台上运营年收入超过100万美元的业务。
Jason在Founder University的团队独立完成了一个内网项目,用时约4至8小时,随后又加入了涵盖就业、税收、住房和薪资的经济影响模型。他把结果与一个成本50万美元的传统开发项目对比,估算首年总成本不到2000美元;Lovable起价25美元,商业版则谈到50美元。
安全是Jason最初的担忧,Lovable团队随后审查了部署情况;Osika现在希望由渗透测试人员对比不同工具的安全性。他强调,即使免费用户也能获得后台安全扫描。与此同时,Lovable的托管产品增速已经快于应用创建业务,公司正在与AWS和Red Hat合作。
6. 软件护城河从代码生成转向上下文与判断力
Osika的下一款产品是“AI联合创始人”:当客户把应用和工具部署在Lovable平台上运行时,它就能接触公司的应用和运营数据。这个AI可以在一夜之间完成工作,然后提出战略方向、增长优化方案或更好的客户服务方案。Jason把这一主张概括得很简洁:客户“进来把软件做出来,但会留下来把业务做起来”。
定制软件有时会取代SaaS,但Osika预计二者将长期共存。在Nursa,一名员工打造了护士教育产品,以及排班、执照、认证和行政工具,随后替代了10多个内部工具,每年节省超过100万美元。在其他场景中,Lovable也可以保留Salesforce、HubSpot、Google、Microsoft或Slack作为底层系统,再套上一层定制界面。
每次新的前沿模型发布,人们都会反复宣称Lovable已死;面对这类判断,Osika只给出营收事实:“我们在5月达到500。”Lovable会在多个商业模型和开放权重模型之间分配任务,位于斯德哥尔摩的研究团队则专注于后训练,并针对对客户影响最大的失败案例进行强化学习。
Jason据此判断Lovable会全面押注开源,但Osika将其修正为基于速度、成本和可量化客户结果的组合策略。Lovable保留用量上限和追加购买机制,但只要更便宜的模型对客户结果可测地更差,他就不会用它替代更强模型。每周100万个项目持续提供反馈信号,帮助公司改进Agent运行框架和内部软件构建能力。
更便宜的工程能力也在改变组织设计。Osika支持让多个团队独立解决同一个问题,并回忆CERN的团队曾在论文发表前暂不共享结果,以避免陷入共同的局部最优。Lovable随后可以引入最好的功能并进行分流测试;当“工程不再是瓶颈”,真正稀缺的能力就变成选对产品和实验。
谈到Anthropic的“Fable”,Osika看到的是复杂、有吸引力的首次生成结果,甚至包括3D游戏。但迭代仍需要人类与Agent共同规划、提供正确数据并选择战略方向。视觉和技术内容的生成速度,正在快于判断什么真正能改善业务的速度。
Spent a long time at Intel.
Yeah.
Only 34 years.
34 years.
Yeah. Probably one of the greatest American companies ever, and then it absolutely went off the rails and got absolutely demolished by NVIDIA, TSMC, and, I guess, Apple to a certain extent. You had this incredible Intel Inside moment. We bought our computers based on, “Hey, the Pentium,” and that sound.
Intel Inside, baby.
Intel Inside. Dum dum dum.
The dum dum dum.
So let’s talk about how things went wrong, what went right, and then how it—and you were there for a long time, you took a break, and then you came back. But there seem to have been some critical mistakes that we can learn from, so let’s just embrace it and go right into it. Tremendous success in an American company coming back now, I think, reasonably. But when we look back on it and do our postmortem, what were the mistakes, and what would we change in terms of the direction of that company?
Having spent so much of my life there, I view it—I joined when I was 18. I went through puberty at Intel, right? That’s my joke. I was so early. Grove, Noyce, Barrett—they were the people I grew up with. They were my mentors, the people I adored, and they were deeply technical.
Andy Grove.
Andy Grove, Gordon Moore, Bob Noyce, the co-inventor—you know, these were deeply technical leaders. I remember when I joined the executive staff for the first time. There were probably 15 of the 20 people in the room who were PhDs. It was just that technical. One of the things that went off the rails was when it started to be run by business people instead of technical people.
Yeah, bean counters, the finance people.
Yeah. When I became CEO in 2001, I was the first technical leader in essentially 15 years. If you have a business leader, who does he promote? Business leaders. I think one of the fundamental things is that, as you look at the great technology companies today, they’re deeply technical.
And founder-led, typically.
Even if they’re not—Satya is not a founder.
No.
Sundar is not a founder as well, but they’re deeply technical individuals. When you’re making these hardcore technical decisions that affect billions of dollars, you don’t do that through a spreadsheet.
Right. That’s a lousy investment.
Right, unless the technology trends make it the right investment. I think that’s one of the fundamental things. In the 5 or 6 years before I came back, Intel gave $100 billion to shareholders.
Oh, the dividends and stock buybacks.
Yeah, $100 billion. What I wouldn’t have done for another $100 billion on the—
Well, I mean, what would you have done? You probably would have made chips for the iPhone, which Intel passed on, yeah?
Yeah. But it hadn’t built a new factory in a decade when I got there. How can you not be building? How could you not buy EUV machines? There are all of these things that you would only do as a technologist because the economics behind them by themselves were not good.
Getting back to the core of technology, to me, was the fundamental thing. You make good decisions and bad decisions as leaders. Every business does that as they go along. But fundamentally, this is a technology business, and you need technologists running technology, who then hire technologists onto the staff, who then hire the best technologists.
And take big swings at categories that could matter in the future, like skating to where the puck’s going. If you look at Apple, they’ve done the same thing for the past 15 years: buying back stock and paying tremendous amounts of dividends. They’re the largest holder of capital of any company, I believe, to this date.
What companies do they buy? They buy little, tiny acquisitions on the margins. I think the largest one was Beats, because they wanted to get inroads into certain demographic segments, like in the Android space, that they couldn’t get into. My God, what a colossal waste of time. Like you said, they could have done so many amazing things.
Tell me about Steve Jobs in 2008 or 2009 deciding, “I think we’re going to make our own silicon,” and the impact of that. Was that a covert product project? Did you guys know he was doing that? Did he inform you? That seemed to be another one of those forks in the road, yeah?
Steve was an incredible leader. He was also a ruthless leader, right? Very difficult. Read Walter Isaacson’s book, Steve Jobs, as well. I had many conversations with Steve over the years.
When they moved to Intel with the Centrino chip, it was a big deal. They were putting extraordinary demands on Intel: make the chip smaller, drive lower power. They were a demanding customer. When he was no longer convinced that we could continue to do that, he started the project.
If you remember, what was it? PA Semi. They acquired some small company and started to build some competency. They did a few little chips internally. It wasn’t a big deal, and then the little chips got a little bit bigger. Steve was a master of this—starting small efforts to build core competence inside the company.
I remember when we had the first conversation with Steve about porting the operating system to the Intel chip from the PowerPC chip that they were running on before they moved to Intel. We were quite proud of the silicon and software competencies that we had in compilers and operating systems. “Steve, we’ll help you port the operating system to x86.”
I remember that Steve said, “I’ve been working on that for the last 4 releases.”
He had been preparing the core technologies inside Apple for something that might happen in the future. I remember, I was just shocked: “I ported the last 4 releases to x86. I think we’ve got this.”
That’s how they got into semiconductors and started doing their own semiconductor design. Steve was thinking, “I’m not sure I can rely on Intel to be that much ahead of the industry. I can start optimizing the system design with the silicon design, as opposed to relying on one that’s been somewhat optimized for a Windows environment versus an iOS environment.”
It was just that kind of thing they used to say: “You failed as a supplier.” No, I can supply myself better.
Yeah, and Jensen decides he’s going to go all in on making these video cards. Talk about just incredible serendipity that these happened to be also very applicable for cryptocurrency and running these AI jobs. Was that luck or skill, or a combination of both?
When you think about that progression, Jensen was just building high-performance computers—throughput machines. When we were at the heights of our strength on CPUs at Intel, we sort of scoffed at his machines.
Yeah.
It was a graphics machine. Who cares? There were some gamers who wanted to use that kind of stuff. It was always the big CPU and those little GPUs. But when they started to build a real software stack with it, it was sort of, “Okay, this CUDA thing and SIMT as a technology, multithreading, and so on,” and it just kept getting a little bit better and a little bit better.
It was a little bit Jobs-like in that way. They were just making it better every release, and it was becoming more robust. All of a sudden, the crazy Japanese HPC guys said, “Hey, we could take those graphics cards and maybe start using them in HPC.”
That was a defining moment where it wasn’t just about doing graphics anymore. This was a more computationally dense platform to start attacking some of the world’s most interesting workloads. I think Jensen would agree that was a defining moment, saying, “These aren’t just graphics cards anymore. These are general-purpose computing devices that can start applying to these other workloads.”
AI had gone through what—its 5th nuclear winter by that point? It was, “Man, this is never going to matter. We’re never going to get the breakthroughs.” But the community around it was continuing to develop.
Yeah.
The CUDA software kept getting better, generation by generation. I had a project at Intel, Larrabee, where we were trying to take the x86 and essentially do the same thing. In my first departure from Intel, the project was killed a week after I left.
Huh.
And the world would have been so much different.
I think it's illustrative of continuous innovation, taking some risks, doing that fundamental research, and the compounding power of technology. I think it was William Gibson who said, “The street finds its own use for technology.”
Nvidia did not predict that this Bitcoin project would take over and that this would be the best way to do those computations. Nor did they anticipate that AI would take off. But because it was the best solution, the hacker community could—
Yeah.
—figure that out.
Well, as we wrap up the Intel portion of your career, Apple silicon is one. Then you have Nvidia. And then you have this Taiwanese company that starts becoming really great at fabricating these chips. Intel missed that as well, right?
Maybe you could talk a little bit about TSMC and its surge, and we can even get into some of the politics of it now. Then we'll get into some of these AI chips and venture investing.
The thing with TSMC was that they started with a vision of a foundry.
Mhm.
They were going to become the factory for the industry. Again, these factories are so expensive—$20 billion, $30 billion—and there is so much engineering and continuous investment required to do it. It was a stunning vision at that point in time.
Intel was an IDM, as we called it: an integrated device manufacturer. We never worked to make our process and our factories available for third parties.
Mhm.
It was always this thing: “Hey, we do enough CPUs ourselves. We reuse it for chipsets and some of the other things that we're doing.” But it was never standardized in a way that it could be made available for a broad ecosystem using PDKs and all the design tools.
We did a lot of our own EDA tools ourselves. One of the projects that I started early in my career was the foundation of EDA as well: the first place-and-route, the first standard cells, and the first hardware description language. It was so proprietary.
TSMC basically cut that in half and said, “I don't care whose chip it is. I don't care what you're designing. I'll be your manufacturing partner.”
Yeah.
At the time, that was such a trivial piece of the business that Intel didn't even care.
Mhm.
Over steady progress over a long period of time, with Apple as a customer driving them to become good, it became really meaningful. Obviously, the world changed.
Mhm.
When I came back to Intel in 2001, TSMC was producing 5× the wafers of Intel.
Wow.
Not 10% more—5×. All of a sudden, that foundry model became the model of the semiconductor industry, with 2 exceptions: Intel and memory.
Memory companies design and manufacture, which is uniquely different. Obviously, we're seeing $3 trillion memory companies—just extraordinary—and a trillion-dollar foundry company in TSMC.
The industry has said, “I want a lot of wafers. I want a lot of innovation across different designs. I want a layer of standardization and EDA tools.” The world changed. As I came back to Intel, that was one of the core theses of the new strategy: We must become a foundry as well.
Five to 1, and now it's more like 7 to 1 in terms of wafers, TSMC to Intel.
Are we going to be able to onshore that? Obviously, we had the CHIPS Act. Give us the broad strokes of what you think is going to happen here. Taiwan is obviously in play.
Some people in the administration believe it's going to happen the year after Trump is out, unless he takes his 3rd term. Other people believe it could happen as early as '27 or maybe going into '28.
Are we going to be able to replicate that here in America in a reasonable amount of time, or could this truly be a cataclysmic event if, God forbid, China decides, “Hey, we're going to blockade Taiwan,” and then the Taiwanese decide, “Yeah, we're going to burn the fabs and fly out all of the engineers and ship them to America?”
Mhm.
Well, there's a lot in that question. Do we have an hour to talk about this question?
Well, I mean, we have 6 minutes.
Oh, okay.
Yeah, do the best you can.
Okay.
I also want to talk about the AI bubble.
Three things about this, super quick. The first is that the CHIPS Act is having a benefit.
Yeah.
When we started the CHIPS Act, and when I came back, the U.S. was building about 12% of leading-edge chips. Today, that number is more like 18%.
Mhm.
We're making progress.
It's not 50%.
Mhm. We have a long way to go. Intel is starting to be a real foundry.
Okay, that's real progress.
TSMC's factories are up and operating at scale. We have Samsung as well, but I'd say the Intel and TSMC progress is meaningful.
Now, let's make it ugly for a second. The island of Taiwan has less than 3 weeks of energy reserves. There was a big article in The Wall Street Journal 2 weeks ago on this. That should just put a chill in everybody's spine.
Wow.
Because after 3 weeks of blockade, the island browns out. When you turn off a fab, it doesn't come back on for 90 days. The economic impact of a brownout in Taiwan is greater than the Great Depression in the world.
You never need to do anything or fire a shot. You just need to say, “Great, no energy for 3 weeks.”
No oil. Yes.
Right, right. No LNG. That's how the island runs. That is scary to me. We need more resilient supply chains associated with it.
I don't think this is an alternative for the world because, if it really does become a risk—and I don't sit in the situation room and get all the data and so on—let's remind each other that I think China has blockaded the Taiwan Strait 7 times over the last 4 years.
Yep.
This isn't a theory.
No, no, they're running exercises. They're being pernicious and—
Right.
—pretty provocative in terms—
Is that 2027? Is that 2030? Is that 2035? Their intentions have been clear over a sustained period of time. We need more resilient supply chains.
That's something I put a lot of my time and energy into. We're making progress, but we need to go faster and make it more meaningful.
Yeah. Let's talk a little bit about the AI build-out. You watched the PC revolution, servers, and the internet. These were all extraordinary build-outs, and now this is the build-out to end all build-outs: the amount of data centers, the amount of chips, and the amount of inference needed.
Do you think it's a bubble? I think I've heard you say that it's obviously a bubble, but what's the risk factor here? That we build too much, or that the technology doesn't solve enough problems and we're swimming in tokens?
What worries you about what you're seeing now? The valuations of these companies have gotten quite extraordinary. If they build too much and spend too much money and don't make enough money, based on your experience with running a public company, that's a lot of tension on it. When you don't make as much money as you're spending, people tend to fall out of love with these stocks, right?
I do think there is a silver lining here that guarantees we don't get too far ahead of ourselves in terms of a bubble, and that is energy capacity.
Right.
Energy capacity in the world is expanding at 5%. In the U.S., we had a decade at 1%. It's just hideous what we did to our energy grid over about a decade and a half. But now that's getting built out.
Essentially, nobody's going to build and buy GPUs or build data centers if they don't have energy. So you have an upper bound on how aggressive, hyped, and bubbled we get. I take a lot of solace in that.
What, then, is the incremental value of a token? If it's a measure of intelligence, it's somewhat infinite. If I have more intelligence, I will have a better supply chain. I will do better finance. I will have more efficient logistics—all of those things.
To me, the potential value that we unleash in a token economic world is somewhat infinite, particularly with the labor shortages that we see in developed countries. I am an optimist that we're in a couple-decade build-out.
Wow.
Not a couple of years—a couple of decades. One of the big objectives I've said is that I have to make AI 10,000× better.
Mhm.
Right? It’s way too expensive today. We want to drop by 5 orders of magnitude the cost per token and the energy per token, so that we really do have Jevons’ paradox, where we just explode access to AI in much more economical ways.
It does seem like Jevons’ paradox has been at play over the last year. These tokens are so cheap and the tools are getting so good. I’m just going to start using these tools all day long until the bill comes in, and you’re like, “Okay, yeah, maybe I need to get some ROI out of this.” But you do have these incredible companies—Cerebras, Groq, et cetera—making inference.
And silicon and so on. If we accomplish these orders-of-magnitude improvements in token economics and availability, along with a reduction in the energy costs associated with it, we just have a fantastic couple of decades in front of us.
There has not been a time in human history when it’s been better to be a technologist than the one we’re in right now. We will solve chemistry. We will solve language. We will invent new materials and new forms of interaction, kill cancer, and lift people out of poverty. There is not a better time to be alive than the one we’re in right now. As technologists, we get to sit in the driver’s seat of it.
Pretty amazing. You’re investing now, and that’s your passion. What do you think of these valuations? It seems quite different if you lived through the dot-com bubble. We did see a disconnect there. These companies are slightly different. We just had ElevenLabs at $600 million in revenue. Lovable, I think they’re at $500 or $600 million. So that’s quite different from the dot-com speculation, yeah?
Yeah. Fundamentally, we have real revenues and real margins coming out of these businesses as well. That said, anytime the multiples get too high, we get some corrections. To me, periodic corrections that keep the earnings multiples and so on at reasonable levels are good, because this will not be a smooth curve.
I’m predicting 2 decades of goodness, and there are going to be lots of disruptions along the way. It’s not going to be a smooth curve. Every time we have one of those corrections, say thank you. We’re not letting the bubble get ahead of itself.
We had the SaaS apocalypse. There are going to be other apocalypses on that journey when industries get impacted by the capabilities that will be unleashed. That’s even before it gets exciting with what I call the trinity of computing: classical computing, AI computing, and quantum computing. When those 3 come together, that’s when things get really exciting.
Hey, quantum has been about 5 years away for 25 years. When is it actually going to do anything?
This decade.
This decade, so by 2030?
Yep.
It’ll be meaningful. What should we expect in terms of its impact in 2030?
You’re going to be able to start doing things that cannot be computed today. Chemistry and biology—there will be things that can’t be computed today. Some of the easy things will be logistics, where I will compute the best answer to get this thing to you.
Traveling salesman problem?
Right. All of a sudden, all of those problems. Obviously, it’s probably going to be 2032 or 2033 when we solve things like encryption. You’ll have the fundamental Q-day implications, but this decade we will see quantum-supremacy results across multiple industries.
We know how to build qubits. We know how to error-correct qubits. We now have algorithms for quantum. Now it’s just about engineering scale.
Who’s going to win?
Well, obviously, I’m a PsiQuantum guy, since that’s one of our portfolio companies. But what you’re seeing is that you now have 4, 5, 6 modalities of quantum demonstrating pretty good results across trapped ions, photonic approaches, and spin approaches.
You can now say modality is not an issue. Error correction has been proven across them. I think the race will be on, and my prediction is meaningful results before 2030.
Wow. You realize that’s about 40 months from now. Yeah, okay. Meaningful results. Thanks so much, Pat, for sharing all this incredible information and knowledge. Great to see you.
Very good.
Anton Osika is one of my favorite founders. He’s the founder of Lovable. Why do I love this founder? Well, he built a product that people are addicted to—primarily, Anton, the people who work for me.
I love talking to you because, as the founder, you have a North Star. You’re incredibly laser-focused on enabling anyone to build great software. That’s the mission of the company. I’m paraphrasing here, but essentially that’s the mission of Lovable.
The mission I talk about is empowering humans.
Empowering humans.
The first gap is to build a product. The second gap is to build a business around that product.
Right.
Now, at Lovable, everyone at Lovable is working on both of these 2 gaps. The first one, we’ve gotten very far. We’re seeing 1 million new projects built every single week on the platform.
On the second one, we’re investing a lot in making it easier to run your business, to get people to care, and to help people discover what you build. For the entire business of whatever you’re doing, as a small business or as a large business, we’re also getting a lot of traction.
As proof of that, we’re seeing more than 700 million visits to the applications every month. Every month, there is extreme growth in the surface area of the entire platform, with more than 50 million apps built on the platform to date.
How many years has Lovable been in the market, or how many months now?
20 months since we launched, yeah. Again, we’re seeing people who are first-time founders. We’re seeing enterprise leaders move much faster together with their teams on this platform, which has a lot of opinionated pieces in how you should create software, how to operate that software, and how the different applications in your company connect to each other over time.
That’s why we’re seeing so much growth on the enterprise side, where we’re actually growing fastest right now.
This is really interesting, because 10 years ago people were doing WYSIWYG software. What was the name for it before vibe coding? No-code, low-code. Yes.
When I saw that 10 years ago in my incubator, every 20th company, somebody would come in who was an MBA or not a developer, and they had no-coded something. They were using these different software platforms, and the software didn’t look good. It didn’t work perfectly well. It was slow, but the promise was there.
I guess it took LLMs and this new intelligence to make actually good software. Maybe you could talk a little bit about who the customer is. Do developers use Lovable, or is it the other 95% of society that are your customers? How do you think about who your ideal customer profile is?
Yeah. We’re seeing people use Lovable with both technical and nontechnical backgrounds. About 20% are technical or some type of engineer, and they love that we’re quite opinionated. We put all the best practices into how the software is architected, and we make it seamless to set up payments from the get-go in a very secure way.
We do things like run security scans after every change and monitor the projects in the background. It’s actually quite appreciated by the engineers in the technical community, also because it’s a great bridge to the nontechnical people, who are 4 out of 5 users.
They’re often building first to figure out what is the right thing to build, which is where Lovable has always been exceptional. Now what we’re seeing is that people are running businesses making more than $1 million in revenue on the platform.
So it’s building for everyone. It’s this entire spectrum. What’s exciting to see is that often, if someone discovers Lovable from their colleagues at a large company, they go out and run a side hustle. Some of those side hustles really work. They make hundreds of thousands of dollars, and then they become a founder after that. So this is cross-pollination from both—
Yeah, and this is the really interesting thing about vibe coding. If we were sitting here last year, people would look at it and say, “It’s a great way to make a mock-up.” Like you said, “A great way to think about product and maybe create wireframes or a workable prototype.”
All of that’s out the window now. The whole concept of building wireframes and building a mock-up—well, you can just go right to building the product in a day or 2 days.
What people, I think, don’t appreciate about what you’re doing at Lovable is that after you’ve made a product that you’re proud of and that has some product-market fit, there are many more steps that are required.
You mentioned payments and security, making sure that the data isn't lost or leaked. That's changed dramatically over the last 12 months, yeah?
Very much so. Many engineers don't look at the code. They don't write code anymore. That means that you don't need to be an engineer to create software, right? But what Lovable does for anyone, including nontechnical people, is create a structure for the architecture of the software that you build and make sure that you don't go off a cliff.
Things like setting up payments and emails, getting discovered by other AI chat engines, and getting discovered by Google Search are taken care of. You don't have to know how all these things work in detail. You can trust the platform to take care of data security and connect to other tools that you might be using in a secure way.
That's really where being opinionated from day one and being focused on making this for the 99%—it's a vast market, right?
Right.
Being focused on the 99% from day one is what made us very successful.
Yeah, and I can tell you that internally, I gave my team all the different tools they could possibly want to use. Somebody had started with Lovable. I think I told you the story when you were on This Week in Startups a year ago. They made some interesting websites and were trying to make an intranet, but they couldn't quite get it done.
Then I had some people who started using Cursor or Claude Code. They started vibe-coding stuff, but they couldn't finish the product. Then people tried to solve some problems with Cowork. I really like Perplexity Computer.
Then my team came to me and, for one of our projects—I was talking to you about Founder University, our pre-accelerator—they wanted to make an intranet. This is something I would have never okayed because it would have cost $500,000 10 years ago to make, and we don't have that kind of budget. We'd rather put that toward the founders in the program and getting more people into the program.
In 4 to 8 hours, they made the whole intranet, and they made a bunch of things I hadn't asked for. It was the person running Founder University who made it. She did it on her own, without permission, in Lovable. I said, “Whoa, how did you build this?” She said, “Lovable.” I was like, “Oh, we still have Lovable?” She said, “I just put it on my corporate card.”
To your point, she made it. That software is now driving the program, and the reason people do the program in their country—we have it in Saudi Arabia and Japan—is because it has economic impact.
Yeah.
So I said, “Hey, I have an idea. Can you make for me an economic impact of the 50 companies that are in the program?” She asked Lovable to do it. I gave her some prompting, human prompting, boss-to-employee prompting.
Now it has the economic impact in there, and with our prompting, it considered, “Well, how many people work at each company? What are they paying in taxes? How much do they rent their home for? What is their average salary?” It built something that I would have never been able to afford to build.
Lovable is $50 a month, I think. I don't know how much you charge, but it's far too little.
That's if you're on a business plan. I start at $25.
Yeah. The economic impact of what you're building—I would equate what you built for us to something that would have cost me $500,000 2 years ago. It was built in 4 hours by an employee, which, if you just put employees at $50, $60, whatever, $70 an hour, plus the cost of your software, it got made for less than $2,000 in a year. It's extraordinary.
I'd love to hear more about the progress of the intranet. Anything that you asked for that you want to forward directly to me?
Well, right now, my concern was security and making sure that data didn't leak. They talked to your team, they went through it, and it's secure, so we feel good about it.
Well, look, I'm now asking people who do penetration testing to say, “I want you to compare all the tools and make sure that all the work we're doing that's not visible on security and trust is accounted for.” There's a lot of other things where we invest and spend money, too. Also, free users get a lot of security scanning running in the background that actually translates to something that security experts can see.
A year ago, we were at mockups. Now we're at functionality that's secure and super-viable for deployment. Where will you be in a year?
What we're seeing is that there's a gap in being able to build the product, right? You built an entire intranet on the platform. That's great. What we've done since then is introduce a new product line, basically the hosting part, which includes both the AI and all the normal hosting. That product line has been growing faster than the building thing I mentioned.
AWS competitor.
Let's say it's not. You run all your software, and we're working with companies like AWS and Red Hat as well.
What you also want to have is to use Lovable—we're seeing this with our customers—as an AI co-founder, a partner that you talk to about everything in your business. If you're running your apps and tools on the platform, then just talking to Lovable means it has access to all the data that you might want to know about your company and how it's doing.
We're working with some of our customers in pre-release to give them access to a co-founder that works for you even when you're sleeping and comes back to you in the morning and says, “Here are some strategic directions you could go. Here are some optimizations you could make in terms of growing your business faster and serving your customers better, faster.”
That's the evolution toward operation and intelligence, toward driving outcomes for your business.
So you come and build the software, but you stay to build the business.
Yes, to operate your business. What we're already doing—and I've been doing this for a very long time—is compound everything we're learning. Every time Lovable makes a mistake, it goes through our agentic system, with our engineers improving it. That compounding intelligence is, of course, applicable to our customers and users running their businesses on our platform as well.
Is software going to become 100% bespoke, even the internal tools? I was looking at Slack, and our bill for Slack, even on the highest version, is maybe $10,000 a year. It's not a lot of money. It's well worth it. But I was starting to think, well, maybe I should vibe-code my own Slack so it's integrated into everything we do at a deeper level.
What do you think the future will look like in terms of some of these foundational pieces of software that every startup and every enterprise uses—Salesforce, HubSpot, Slack, the Google Suite, Microsoft Office? Will bespoke software start to replace those? Do you believe?
I like this question. Let me answer you, but I'll just give you a story about someone I recently heard who's going on this journey. They're quite the brand.
Nenad works at a pretty large company in the US, Nursa. He came to our platform because he wanted to build out the new product lines—Nursa Academy, for educating more nurses. He built out all the admin tools for the program, the scheduling for the nurses, getting their licenses, and their certification management.
He was able to build that into a product and take it to market because they had all that access to nurses wanting their certification. What he also did was take it into the back office internally, and they've now replaced more than 10 tools they had with bespoke applications.
I think, in terms of your question, you can do that for multiple reasons. In their case, they're saving more than $1 million per year.
Right.
That's huge, right? But it's also the case that in some cases, you have specific requirements where the tools that you've been using to date aren't suited for those requirements exactly. In those cases, I think, yes, you will have more bespoke solutions.
Yeah.
But I also expect us to see that Lovable continues to interoperate with all of those tools. I'm not sure if you tried this, but if you ask for a connection to anything in the Google Suite, anything in the Microsoft Suite, or Slack, Lovable guides you through all the steps to do that in a way where you can get a very good overview of exactly how the data flows. That's of course very important—you don't want to give the wrong person access to the wrong data.
You can continue to use Salesforce, HubSpot, and all the tools that you like to use under the hood, but with a bespoke interface on top of them.
How have these new frontier models—They're in some ways competitive, but in some ways you can use them to power Lovable. How do you think about the competition with them, open source, and the future of Lovable?
People have announced that Lovable's dead every 6 months since you started, and then every 6 months you go from $100 million to $200 million to $300 million. I think you're at $400 million in revenue, something crazy.
We reached $500 million in May.
Okay.
Yeah, growth is phenomenal.
So you're dying again by another $100 million in annual revenue. But underneath the hood, you're using some of these—
Yeah, let me explain.
Yeah. So, we've always had the strategy that we do whatever is best for our customers. In terms of intelligence, that means we're using multiple models. If you ask Lovable now, it's routed to the model that's most suitable to whatever you want to do, including commercial frontier models from multiple vendors and, increasingly, open-weight models. When our team gets routed to our own model, that model becomes more intelligent for our agent harness.
Yeah.
From multiple vendors.
Yeah.
Especially on the mistakes that it might be making in some cases: which tool to call, which integration to create, and how to guide you through success for your business.
Right. So, you're all in on open source. You believe that's the future of Lovable.
Well, I'm leaning into it. We have multiple partnerships, and we're investing heavily to be close with those partners. They're the big labs, and it's also about making sure that we get the fastest performance at the lowest cost for our customers when we know we can do that with our own models.
Right.
We have a really strong research team up in Stockholm working on what's called post-training. We're applying all the best practices to do that and scaling up that team quite significantly. We also believe it's an important part of the European ecosystem to have that capability in Europe specifically.
Are you doing or using any of the data-labeling or data-training companies to help you understand the most common businesses and build that proprietary data?
What we're doing is looking at the mistakes that any of the models make right now.
Ah.
Then we prioritize them by what drives the most impact for our customers. We create datasets where we do something called reinforcement learning, specifically for the problems where the frontier models are making mistakes for us right now. We have this enormous token distribution from a million new projects being built every single week.
You're burning a lot of tokens.
We are, yes. That's a lot of signal for making the system better: both the agent harness and what we've been refining over the last 2 years, which are the skills that we have—the internal-type skills that tell the agent when to remember facts, based on feedback from our software engineers who know how to build really good software. We're modifying both of those every single week.
It makes total sense. Somebody told me some companies are doing token dumping. They're selling $100 worth of tokens for $50. Basically, they become token resellers in some ways, and they're money-losing businesses. You're money—you’re profitable, I believe, now or close to it.
We always monitor our margins, but again, we're doing what's best for our customers. That often means more intelligence, so we're not looking at, “Oh, let's use a cheaper model here,” if it's measurably worse for our customers. We can measure what's best for our customers.
Is it unlimited for the $50, or do you have caps now?
We have caps.
Yeah, you have to have caps. Are people starting to hit the existing caps?
Yeah, our customers definitely hit caps, and then you can top up. We have multiple subscriptions here.
What percentage of people need to top up? They're so addicted to it that they're blowing past the limits.
I'm hearing that more and more often: people are willing to pay the overages because they're getting so much value. I think that's the future of the business. People are looking at it and saying, “Well, if I'm paying $600 and if you token-max it to $6,000 a year, but this is a $500,000 piece of software, I don't care. I'm still paying somewhere between 0.1% and 1% of what I would have paid 3 years ago. Who cares? Go for it.”
Yeah, what we're seeing is that everything is about moving fast these days. More AI usually lets you move much faster, so this spend is usually worth it.
Hey, do you see your customers—final question for you—because I'm starting to see this now, where multiple people in the organization try to solve the same software problem and compete with each other? For example, this intranet I'm talking about: we built one for Japan.
Yeah.
But somebody built the U.S. one. So now I have 2 pieces of software. I said to the 2 different people, “Did you guys fork each other's code?” They're like, “No, we just built 2 different Lovable projects.” And I'm like, “Is that the right thing to do?” Because you went faster and I had 2 swings at bat—2 different intelligent, brilliant people making their version of the software.
But you would never have done that in the previous way of building software. You would have had one trunk of software, and you would have been building Frankenstein software, trying to get all the needs into it from the 2 different groups.
Yeah, I'm actually a huge fan of very rapid experimentation. For a while, I worked at a place called CERN, where they do particle physics. It's pretty unique, right? That's where I was introduced to this concept of competition, where they have 2 actually quite isolated teams working on the same particle accelerator, but at different places on it. They don't share the results until they publish, and that way they can, over time, learn what's working best in the different organizations. You don't get stuck in a local minimum.
Free markets work extremely well because of competition, and they do that in academia as well. Now, since engineering is less of the bottleneck, it's more a question of what is the right thing to build. I think it's a great thing to have, if you have sufficiently many humans, to attempt to solve the same problem in different ways.
If you do that on Lovable, what I like to do is bring up a new project—or one of the projects—and say, “Hey, can you check out this other one and take these 3 things that I really like and bring them over here? Maybe even run a split test, run an experiment, to see if it's improving the metrics for the customers we're trying to serve?”
Did you see somebody use Fable to build Fortnite?
I think there are some 3D games, yeah.
Yeah. What is your take on this latest version from Anthropic, Fable? I know they're a partner—or I assume they're a partner. I don't know that.
Yeah, we use Fable as one of the models in Lovable.
So, what do you think of it compared to the last generation? Faster, better, both? Is it a massive step function?
What I've seen is that, on the first attempt, it can create very sophisticated things that look really good. As you're evolving, it's still the same thing: as a human, you have to think, and you often have to plan together with your agent about what is the right thing to do. That's more of the bottleneck.
More intelligence is great on some tasks. It creates really beautiful things—3D games, for example—but figuring out what to build, figuring out the right strategic directions or experiments you should run to improve the outcomes for your business, that's not changing as fast. It's humans knowing how to use the tool and plug in all the right data to be able to make the right decisions to take your product and your business forward.
Listen, I love the product, but even more than I love the product and you as a founder, I love the outcome. The outcome for business is extraordinary. Anybody who's listening, Lovable is absolutely worth your time. Don't wait. Just put it on your corporate card and start building. That's my message. Just start building with Lovable. It's an incredible product, and congratulations on being reborn 6 times, because every 6 months you had $100 million in revenue, it seems. Then everybody says Lovable is dead because the new foundation model is so good, but you keep studying your customer and somehow surviving and thriving. So, congratulations as an entrepreneur.
Thank you so much, Jason. I enjoyed that talk. I hope you enjoy the rest of your stay here in Paris.
It's pretty great, and the Palace of Versailles is so impressive, huh? Someday we'll be building this with Lovable and Optimus robots.
I look forward to it.