Dan Dreyfus:AI 的下一个瓶颈是铜
- Dan Dreyfus 认为,美国轻资产经济的“奇迹”正让位于一轮需要数万亿美元实体投资的再工业化周期。 他以电力消费衡量人类进步:AI、制造业回流、航空航天、国防和电气化需求,如今与数十年间被掏空的基础设施正面相撞,在关键矿产领域形成“供给冲击遇上需求冲击”。
- 中国的出口限制暴露出,矿产依赖能多快让美国工业停摆。 Dreyfus 表示,包括钐和镝在内的材料供应被切断后,Ford——他还补充说 McDonnell Douglas——距离停产“实际上只剩几天”;补齐缺口至少需要10年,“可能是20年”。
- 华盛顿正以一套异常激进的三件套方案,破解沉睡资源所有者面临的瓶颈。 战争部和能源部提供股权资金、许可证,以及带最低价的照付不议承购协议——收入确定性足以为矿山融资,同时保留上行空间。Dreyfus 称这是一个“似曾相识的时刻”。
- 铜是 Dreyfus 眼中下一个重大技术瓶颈的候选品种,他认为铜价“轻松”就能翻倍。 一座1 GW的 AI 工厂需要5万吨铜;如果每年新增15 GW产能,就要消耗75万吨,而去年铜供应增量只有50万吨,且这还没算电网、可再生能源、电动车和国防需求。
- 从更长期的铜供需算术看,局面更严峻:即便仅按类似 GDP 的速度增长,未来18年所需铜量也可能相当于人类此前1万年开采总量。 满足这部分需求意味着每年要建成5座一级矿山,但预计到本世纪20年代末都不足5座,而且每座矿山建设周期为7—12年。“这才刚刚开始。”
- 即使没有 AI,电力短缺也可能到来,因为发电只是约束之一;输电、配电,尤其是技术工人,才是主要瓶颈。 Dreyfus 预计停电、降压限电和电价上涨都会出现。主持人计算称,若完全用太阳能为一座1 GW的 AI 数据中心供电,在20%容量因子下需要5 GW太阳能板,占地35,000英亩——“比 San Francisco 还大”。
- 投资机会从矿产延伸至劳动力和硬资产,但关键是找准供应链的确切卡点。 Dreyfus 援引白银年消费量12亿盎司、供应量10亿盎司的数据,称缺口为每年2亿吨,并表示6亿盎司库存意味着“只剩3年”就会耗尽。财政货币贬值提供额外支撑;Dreyfus 认为技术可以替代紧张的供应链,而主持人警告,中国通过塑造供应或倾销压价,仍可能让一个看似显而易见的市场变成亏钱生意。
1. 资本轻量时代已让位于实体建设周期
Dreyfus 以电力消费衡量人类进步,并把半导体视为工业或基础设施公司——本质上就是工厂。他将搜索、社交媒体、流媒体、配送平台和 SaaS 所代表的软件时代价值创造,与美国同时“拆掉所有关键基础设施、把它们搬到中国”的现实进行对比。
COVID、俄乌冲突、关税和伊朗冲突多次让通胀“像火箭一样”飙升,暴露出缺乏韧性的供应链。新周期将制造业回流和 AI 对基础设施的高强度需求,与数十年的投资不足叠加在一起。
多个周期正在共振:Boeing 和 Airbus 未来10年的订单积压达1万亿美元;数据中心每年需要约1万亿美元的基础设施和大宗商品投入;Dreyfus 认为,市场目前所说的7500亿美元半导体投资,最终会以数万亿美元计。
2. 中国的矿产杠杆迫使美国转向新工业政策
Dreyfus 表示,去年4月,中国宣布将停止向美国出口部分关键材料,包括钐、钆、铽、镝、镥、钪、钇、铒和白银。
他称,钐钴磁体供应中断后,Ford 距离停产只剩几天,并表示 McDonnell Douglas 也面临同样风险。
他用3张纸概括战争部和能源部的应对:股权投资把资源变成矿山;许可证结束多年的等待;带最低底价的照付不议承购协议,则能以较高项目回报率获得融资,同时保留上行空间。
中国的控制仍然“绝对”,而追赶至少需要10年,可能是20年。但 Dreyfus 认可政府开始采取行动,而不是接受美国会“在黑暗中冻结”的反复威胁。
3. 铜的供需算术使其成为近在眼前的瓶颈
太阳能每兆瓦用铜量是 CCGT 燃气轮机的5倍,风电是7倍,电动车则是内燃机汽车的5—6倍。在国防领域,Dreyfus 提到他的判断:俄乌冲突消耗的炸药超过整个二战,并指出其中使用了含铜的 Copperhead 炮弹;战场上的铜不会被回收再利用。
AI 工厂的需求更为尖锐:一座1 GW设施需要5万吨铜,而每年建设15 GW产能将需要75万吨铜,去年铜供应增量却只有50万吨。
铜的年需求约为3000万吨,其中400万吨来自回收,2600万吨来自开采。即便按类似 GDP 的速度增长,Dreyfus 计算未来18年也需要7亿吨铜——相当于此前1万年开采总量。
这意味着每年需要5座一级矿山,而本世纪这十年的项目储备“一只手都数不满”。在7—12年的开发周期和智利老矿品位下降的背景下,继 HBM 和 NAND 之后,铜将成为下一个近在眼前的瓶颈。
Dreyfus 认为铜价轻松就能翻倍;他指出,大宗商品周期通常持续15年,上行幅度可达数百个百分点,而本轮周期才刚开始几年。
4. 电网约束使劳动力与原材料同样具备投资价值
自战后以来,美国一直没有充分升级、现代化或加固电网。Dreyfus 提到 California 州 Paradise 的输电线火灾造成300人死亡,并称涉事线路已有超过106年历史。在 AI 加入需求之前,普通电气化就可能带来停电和降压限电。
Dreyfus 表示,企业不会等政府行动,可能会从零开始建设电力解决方案。主持人反驳称,工业用电仍然需要电网,并计算出:按太阳能20%的容量因子计算,完全用太阳能为一座1 GW的 AI 工厂供电,需要5 GW太阳能板,占地35,000英亩。
通胀的核心与其说是发电,不如说是输电和配电——电力价格按实际价值计算仍在下降。Dreyfus 表示,公用事业公司正在推高成本,以便向监管机构呈报更高的资本基数,并赚取获准的股本回报率;而技术工人“远远是”最大的瓶颈。
再工业化也在重排劳动力层级:Dreyfus 表示,Quanta University 的顶尖学生高中毕业后就能拿到150,000美元起薪,去建设可能取代部分低端白领工作的基础设施。
5. 每条能源路径最终都指向加工、矿产与财政稀缺
主持人表示自己坚定看多太阳能;Dreyfus 认为太阳能可以建设,但核电受制于美国甚至无法自行建造安全壳,而 Korea 可以。美国“天然气多到用不完”,但在各种能源路径中,真正的约束性投入是关键矿产,而不一定是原始燃料。
白银说明了时间压力:Dreyfus 表示,白银年消费量为12亿盎司,供应量为10亿盎司,将其描述为每年2亿吨的缺口,并援引6亿盎司的地上库存。“只剩3年了,”他说,按这一算法库存即将耗尽,这也引出了一个问题:光伏电池之后从哪里获得白银?
稀土分布广泛,更好的开采技术可能带来充足供应;更难的问题在于加工,Dreyfus 表示中国掌握相关技术。对铜而言,市场规模之大,使得一夜之间出现技术解决方案的可能性低得多。
Dreyfus 还指出货币层面的顺风:政府债务达40万亿美元,折现后的未来社会负债达100万亿美元,两者每年各增长2.5万亿美元,而税收收入只有5.5万亿美元。他认为,经济衰退可能迫使政府创造“giga-dollars”级别的货币,就像20世纪70年代一样;当时货币购买力损失了70%,大宗商品、硬资产和基础设施可以在这种环境下保护购买力。
在资产配置上,Dreyfus 建议先找到供应链卡点,再判断技术能否替代它。主持人警告,中国对供应的塑造或倾销压价,仍可能让一个显而易见的终端市场变成亏钱生意。
He's with Fornight Capital.
We're going to be measuring human progress by how much electricity we consume.
The semiconductor industry, I view that as an industrial or infrastructure company. I mean, it's effectively a factory.
In the next 10 minutes, I am going to try to teach you about critical minerals, commodities, and our incredibly fragile infrastructure here in the US, which is going to require trillions and trillions of dollars of investment if we want to achieve our technological objectives, our reshoring and reindustrialization objectives, and our national security and military objectives.
But first, a little bit of history. We are at a very significant inflection point right now in US economic growth and what it is going to look like. From the early 2000s until just a few years ago, the US went through what I think was effectively an economic miracle, where we created so much growth, market cap, and value without really having to invest any capital at all.
Think of all the companies that were created with no capital. You had Google with the search engine. You had Meta with social media. They bought WhatsApp for $30 with 12 employees—no capital whatsoever. You had the streaming platforms and the food delivery platforms. You had Apple Computer, which was capital-light and created trillions of dollars in market cap. You had software as a service. Absolutely no capital was required to create all that value.
At the same time that we were creating these companies, we were literally tearing down all of our critical infrastructure and moving it overseas to China. We were really doubling down on that capital-light mentality.
But then it started to come back to bite us. We had COVID, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the tariffs, and now we have the Iranian conflict. Every time we had one of these geopolitical flare-ups, inflation spiked like a rocket. You needed a telescope to see how high inflation went, and it never came down.
The reason for that is that we let our supply chains get far too fragile and weak, and there is no resiliency in them. Now we are at this inflection point where we want to reshore everything that we tore down and moved to China. We want to reindustrialize. We have this technological compute revolution that is infinitely more infrastructure-intensive than compute was in previous generations, and this is creating a really wild demand shock for infrastructure, critical minerals, and commodities at the same time that there is a supply shock because we just have not invested in this stuff for so long.
There are so many capital cycles going on at the same time. I have never seen this many going on simultaneously in my career. We have the aerospace cycle. Boeing and Airbus have a trillion dollars of backlog over the next 10 years. Now throw in the space economy, which is going to compete for the exact same materials and backlog that Boeing and Airbus are trying to source.
We have the grid. Anytime it gets a little bit cold in Texas, ERCOT—the Texas grid—is not connected to the rest of the US grid. Every time it gets a little bit cold, that grid shuts down and people are freezing in the dark.
Then we have Paradise, California. There was a power line that caught fire and killed 300 people. Did you know that that power line was over 106 years old? There are parts of the grid in this country that are over 106 years old.
Here in California, if half the people buy electric cars, or there are robotaxis, and we all go and plug them in at 6:00 p.m. after work and turn up the air conditioning, we are just going to kill the grid. We are all going to be sitting in the dark. The grid barely works for what we need it for right now, and we have not even started talking about the tsunami of electricity demand that AI is going to bring.
There is power generation, too. We have let China go and build multiples more power generation than we have here. This is a trillion-dollar-plus capital cycle that is probably going to be a trillion dollars every 10 years for the next 30 years.
Data centers are now a trillion dollars per year in infrastructure and commodities. Then there are semiconductor fabs. The CPU is making a huge resurgence. CPU intensity is going up like a rocket, and I bet this number is way too low: $750 billion. I bet that is going to be measured in the trillions.
Then there is defense. Taiwan has turned into a porky pie. Japan is raising its defense budget. Europe is raising its defense budget. The US is raising its defense budget. The similarity among all of these end markets is that none of them will work without critical minerals. None of it can happen.
Here is the problem: Last April, China announced that it was going to cut off exports of some critical materials to the US—samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium, erbium, and silver. It just cut them off.
We are close to a lot of big industrial supply chains, and with the cutoff of samarium-cobalt magnets, we learned that Ford Motor Company was literally days away from having its entire production line shut down—the whole Ford Motor Company. And same with McDonnell Douglas, too, by the way.
This put people in the Department of War and the Department of Energy into a panic. To their credit, they are doing something really aggressive and important. They are now going around to small resource owners across the US and into Canada, knocking on the doors of companies that were left for dead over the last 20 years.
They are saying, “Here are 3 pieces of paper. The first piece of paper is an equity check that we are investing into your company so that you can start converting your resource into a mine.”
Then the company says, “That is great. That is a shock. But the problem is that I have been waiting on my permit for the last 20 years. Nobody wants to give me a permit.”
They say, “Look at the second piece of paper. There is your permit. Go and start building right now.”
Then they show them a third piece of paper. The company says, “What is this?”
They say, “This is an offtake agreement—a take-or-pay agreement with a minimum floor price—that is going to guarantee you a very high internal rate of return on your project. You can keep all the upside above the minimum price, but here is a minimum price that will allow you to go out and raise a bunch of capital to get this thing fast-tracked and up and running.”
China has an absolute grip on all of these critical minerals. It is going to take at least 10 years, probably 20, to catch up, but we have to start somewhere. We just cannot have China leading over us and squeezing our testicles every time we do something they do not like, saying, “We are going to cut off your exports. We are going to cut off exports of critical minerals, and you are going to freeze in the dark.”
I give a lot of credit to the administration for doing this. I have been doing commodities for 25 years, and I have never seen anything like this happen before. It's truly what I call a déjà vu day moment, which is the overwhelming feeling that none of this has ever happened before.
Here is copper. This is the king of metals. This is just one example. We need copper for everything.
If we want clean energy, solar power per megawatt takes 5 times the amount of copper as a typical baseload CCGT gas-fired turbine. It is the same with wind: 7 times the copper.
For data centers, a 1-gigawatt AI factory now needs 50,000 tons of copper per gigawatt. We are going to start building 15 gigawatts of these things per year. So, 50,000 tons per gigawatt multiplied by 15 gigawatts is 750,000 tons of copper that we are going to need for these data centers.
Do you know what the copper supply was last year? It grew by only 500,000 tons, and that is just the data centers.
Then there are electric cars. If we are going to have robotaxis everywhere, an electric car consumes 5 or 6 times more copper than a traditional internal-combustion engine vehicle.
Then there is the military. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, did you know that we used more explosives than in all of World War II? Do you know that? The artillery shells used for these explosives—guess what they are made of? One of them is called the Copperhead, very cleverly named after a poisonous snake. They are all made of copper.
Do you think we go onto the battlefield and recycle that copper? No. That copper is gone. We need these metals for everything that we do.
Now, where are we going to get it? Going back in human history to Mohenjo-daro, we have mined 700 million tons of copper over the past 10,000 years.
We could probably get 80% of that copper back if we wanted to. But what we would have to do is tear down this building, rip up the grid, and tear down the buildings in Europe, Japan, and China. We could get all that copper back, sure, but then we would be doing this conference in a tent.
So, how are we going to get it? Right now, copper demand is 30 million tons per year. About 4 million tons of that supply comes from recycled copper. The rest—26 million tons—is mined.
If we just grow in line with GDP, forgetting about data center upside and green-energy and solar upside, just growing at GDP like we used to—listen carefully—that means that over the next 18 years, we are going to need 700 million tons of copper.
Over the next 18 years, we're going to need as much copper as we mined in the last 10,000 years. That means we're going to need 5 world-class, mega, Tier 1 mines coming online every single year. You can go and Grok this or ChatGPT this. You can count on one hand and have some fingers left over the number of Tier 1 mines that are coming online between now and the end of the decade.
I don't know what they're going to do, because it takes 7 to 12 years to build a copper mine. The existing copper mines are dying. The big mines in Chile are over 100 years old, and the grades are depleting. This is going to be a major, major challenge and an upcoming bottleneck.
Today, all the rage is in memory, HBM, and NAND. Prices are going vertical because that's the bottleneck. If you want to look around the corner and see the next bottleneck coming, I strongly urge you to look at copper. Here we are: a supply shock meets a demand shock.
Commodity cycles typically last 15 years and have multiple hundreds of percent of upside. We're only a few years into this. This is just really getting started. I want to say one more thing. We spoke about demand—we're having this demand shock—and we spoke about supply. But what we haven't spoken about is how we're destroying the value of the US dollar.
Since COVID, we have absolutely destroyed the value of our fiat currencies. Today, we have $40 trillion of government debt that's growing by $2.5 trillion every year. On top of that, we have $100 trillion of discounted present value of future social liabilities: Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and pensions. That's also growing by $2.5 trillion a year.
So, you have $2.5 trillion of growth in the federal debt and $2.5 trillion of growth in the social liabilities. The US government only has $5.5 trillion of tax receipts every year. What's going to happen the next time we have a recession, when tax receipts go down and spending has to go up? We're going to print giga-dollars.
In the 1970s, we had this problem as well. The way we did it was we just debased the currency through some inflation and some growth, and the currency lost 70% of its purchasing power. Commodities, hard assets, and infrastructure will protect your purchasing power in that kind of environment. Go and look it up. In the 1970s, what was the best-performing asset class by a mile? That's your homework.
With that, thank you, and I look forward to chatting with you guys.
I think on the prediction show, you did—it was your call. I forget which category it was, but you definitely had copper as the top—
The best-performing asset was going to be copper, yeah.
Yeah. And that's before I talked to Dan Dreyfus.
That's right.
Which is saying something.
Well, I think the copper price is easily going to double from here. I've seen molybdenum go from $1 a pound to $33 a pound, so a double is no big deal.
Yeah.
Take a step back. You said something really interesting backstage, which is, if you look at everything that we're doing right now, we're barely going to keep up with just the natural energy demands of humanity. Just explain that thesis the way that you framed it in the back.
Here's the issue: we have not invested in upgrading, modernizing, and hardening the electric grid since post–World War II. We just let it go. The last 2, 3, 4 administrations were sleepwalking and haven't done anything to harden this infrastructure.
If we simply want to achieve our objectives to reindustrialize, reshore, and electrify—when I say electrify, that just means replacing your old gas boilers in these buildings with heat pumps, which every commercial building is doing—it means electric-car penetration going up. It means using your electronic devices more. Not even talking about AI. Not even talking about AI. We're going to have shortfalls just from that.
Just from living our lives. So, what happens? Blackouts, brownouts?
Blackouts, brownouts, and we're going to have to—
Prices.
Rising electricity prices. But you brought up a really great point on one of your shows, where you were talking about how the utilities are really goosing up the cost to do everything so that they can report to their regulator and earn that ROE on the higher capital base.
What's really interesting and underappreciated is that's where all the inflation is coming from. It's from the transmission and distribution from the utility. Power prices over the last 20 years, even after the rise we've just had, are still down—they're definitely down in real terms—but they haven't really gone up much in absolute terms. So, when you're talking about power going up—
Making it is still cheap.
But getting it is more expensive.
No, it's getting it to people.
Getting it to people, because the labor, by far and away, is the biggest bottleneck: craft labor, right? What do we tell all our kids to do? In the last 10 or 15 years, they go out and stand for you become a coder.
Northeast.
Yeah.
Right. Big mistake. So, I'm curious from the audience: in your homes, how many people have put up solar and/or Powerwalls? How many people have actually done that?
How many people, second question, are planning to do that in the next year or 2?
Okay, so that's another 20%. It's pretty obvious. This is obviously an affluent crowd. They are routing around the grid.
Is the solution to this energy independence in the home, in the business?
Great question.
Businesses are not waiting for the government. So, maybe the grid is going to be this weird, archaic infrastructure, and it's just going to be a ground-up solution.
Well, you're going to need the grid no matter what for industrial use. I mean, that's the foundation of industrial use. The scale of what we have to do just for industrial use—here's a good stat for you.
A 1-gigawatt AI factory, if you wanted to do it all with solar—and I'm a big solar bull, okay—solar's capacity factor is 20% because the sun doesn't shine all the time. With a capacity factor of 20%, a 1-gigawatt data center needs 5 GW of solar. Each GW of solar takes up 7,000 acres. So, at 5 GW, that's 35,000 acres. That's bigger than San Francisco.
Where are you going to find the people? That's the biggest bottleneck we have, by the way: craft labor.
Yeah. What about scarcity generally breeds innovation? I've seen some startups that are talking about new technology in mining to access what I think traditionally are rare earths. That's kind of the pitch. Everything we need is in the earth below us; it's just that we only mine the stuff that's on the surface. That's the general thesis.
Is there a set of innovations that you think are coming to market that are going to ultimately unleash more productivity than we see? We're still using the same technology we did 100 years ago to get this stuff out of the ground.
For some commodities, yes. You brought up rare earths. Coming out of the 14th century, there were these guys called alchemists. They said they could turn lead into gold.
Back then, the periodic table was just 4 elements: water, fire, air, and earth. Fire you could figure out what it was. The air was pretty pure. The water was pure. But every time they saw something in the earth they didn't know what it was, they called it a rare earth.
Rare earths are everywhere. The technology to extract rare earths is going to allow us to have a huge abundance of them. But the problem is processing them. That's the problem. The Chinese have all the technological know-how to convert what you take out of the ground into something that we can use.
There's always going to be some element of conversion that you're going to need. With something like copper, the market is so big that it's really difficult to find a technology that could solve that problem overnight.
If we're having this rivalry with China, and they are the provider, and that's the brittle part of the supply chain, we can solve the problem of job displacement—not apocalypse, displacement. People in America who want jobs: these are going to be incredibly high-paying jobs.
We can start bringing the fabs from Taiwan here, which we're doing. And we're going to bring both to North America and, I understand, South America, from a friend of mine who's got an automated mining system. We're going to be able to just create a large number of jobs here.
So, maybe you could talk a little bit about what impact this has. We keep talking about how behind America is, but what happens to China if we stop buying and start building?
What you said is very important for this whole jobs debate. The craft labor that we're going to need is going to be almost limitless for what we have to build, and there's really no other way around it.
In many ways, look what happened in the 2000s: we tore down all our factories and moved them to China. Who got killed by that? It was the blue-collar craft labor. It created all kinds of unintended consequences: fentanyl and wealth gaps.
Pennsylvania, Detroit.
The coasts were making all the money, and the heart of the country, the salt of the earth, was getting killed.
What’s ironic today is that that same part of the middle country—those people who got displaced—are now getting entry-level salaries. If you go to Quanta University and you’re at the top of your class, you’re starting out at $150,000 right out of high school. And the jobs they’re doing, ironically, are the jobs that may or may not be displacing some of the early, lower-level white-collar labor. So the tables have totally turned.
It’s an efficient market. The jobs are going to flow where the money is, and the money right now is really coming into this area.
Can we talk about a couple of other areas? What’s your take on other forms of energy—not gas, coal, nuclear, hydrocarbons? I mean, the demand pull seems like, based on this, maybe the most reductive takeaway is everything. But then how do you differentiate why you said, for example, you’re super bullish on solar? What are your thoughts on nuclear? How do you trade all these different sources of energy off?
We’re swimming in natural gas in this country. We can build solar; that’s not a bottleneck. And nuclear—we can’t really build it. We can’t even build the containment vessels in this country. The Koreans can do it, but we can’t do that here. So there are always going to be these big bottlenecks in the system.
Whether you’re talking about solar, natural gas, or uranium, we’re going to have the raw inputs, like the natural gas that we drill from the ground. But what we’re going to be short of is the critical minerals to build the nuclear power plants. We’re going to be short of silver, for example, to build these solar panels, especially if we start launching data centers in space. These are going to consume incredible amounts of silver.
Right now, the silver supply-demand dynamic is that we consume 1.2 billion ounces a year and supply 1 billion ounces a year. So there’s a 200 million ton deficit per year. And we only have 600 million ounces of above-ground inventory left. The clock’s ticking. We’ve got 3 years left, guys, before we stock out. Then the solar story is: where do you get the silver for the photovoltaic cells?
So for our kids and for the country, generation tool belt for us allocating, get some exposure to copper, silver, minerals, and then there’s a bunch of service providers in and around that area that we should be investigating over the next year.
Don’t forget the labor—the service providers. That’s a big one.
Okay. And how do you allocate capital? You’re at the front end of owning what? Mines and production, but then also the end-use cases? How do you decide where not to play? Because a lot of these things look like incredible end markets, but you can get run over. If you’re in the wrong part of the market, there are supply shocks, supply shaping by China, and price dumping. It can all look obvious, and you could lose a lot of money, too.
Yeah, look, you really have to understand supply chains. And I think, to a lot of people out there, supply chains are this sort of weird, mystical concept. I still think a lot of urban Americans think a ham sandwich comes from the refrigerator, and they don’t think about the 30 million pigs every month getting slaughtered outside of Chicago.
But you have to understand where the pinch points are in the supply chain, number 1. And number 2, you have to make sure that you’re not going to get technologically disrupted, where you can find something that’s going to replace that tightness in the supply chain.
Give it up for Dan. Well done. Very informative.
Thanks, bro.