SpaceX启动史上最大规模IPO|OpenAI提交上市申请|Uber裁撤23% HR
SpaceX以每股135美元启动750亿美元IPO,对应约1.8万亿美元估值——定价发现被Elon的信念取代。 在认购簿仅获2倍覆盖、远低于传统8–10倍目标的情况下,Jason Lemkin预计结果“名义上……会很差”,Rory O’Driscoll则认为首日下跌、平盘或由散户推动上涨的概率相当。展望未来12个月,Rory预计估值将重新主导定价,即使最终达到1万亿美元,也仍会是非凡结果。
SpaceX平淡上市对SpaceX自身的影响,可能小于它对随后借助公开市场融资的资本密集型公司的影响。 Jason认为,这可能压制OpenAI的估值或融资野心;而拿到历史性分配的LP可能开始要求基金取得常规的7–8倍回报,并认定“50亿至80亿美元的小IPO”已不足以改变结果。Rory的反驳是:万亿美元级结果不能成为运营假设,基金规模决定所需退出规模。
产品终点是持久化AI,而不是再开一个浏览器标签页;Dreaming V3的记忆升级,既改善体验,也优化token经济性。 Jason预计,今天这种非持久化AI在两年内会显得“几乎过时”;Rory认为,记忆功能既能带来更好的回答,也能避免反复传输完整上下文。因此,Apple采用Google驱动的AI更多是务实选择,而非投降:“对我们Apple来说,重要的是交付惊艳的体验”,利用手机、日历和个人上下文与OpenAI竞争。
AI最清晰的劳动力信号,不是Uber裁掉23%的HR,而是初创公司开始围绕远高于过去的单员工收入来设计组织。 讨论中,Lovable的ARR达到5亿美元,员工规模示例约为172人;Rory预计初创公司规模将缩减至过去约一半,并以每名员工至少创造100万美元收入为目标。但Rory的限定条件至关重要:如果企业将收入的50–70%用于模型“智能”,就不可能同时维持传统劳动力配比;而企业销售仍需要比PLG更多的人。
Jason认为,Elon的AI战略是在极短时间内把昂贵产能转化为纵向连接的算力与应用栈。 在收入尚未形成前投入估计200亿至300亿美元、建设Colossus和Colossus 2、模型最初失利后,Elon据称获得了Anthropic和Google每月约20亿美元的算力收入,并加入Cursor消化产能。“他是不是在3个月内把一笔亏损变成了胜利?”
创始人反VC情绪背后确有真实的个人创伤,但嘉宾不接受把普通融资拒绝变成永久怨恨。 Jason的直接说法是“想开点,因为这就是销售”,但他区分了被拒绝和被解雇;Rory则反驳称,创始人出售的是自己,而不只是产品,同时VC在结构上每100个机会会拒绝99个。Cloudflare与Vinod Khosla的争议,体现了直接评估团队与造成不必要伤害之间的张力。
只要资本仍然敢于承担风险,Ramp、Revolut、Suno和Bending Spoons都可以凭借持续执行获得高估值。 Ramp的440亿美元融资建立在增长延续的前提上;Revolut的1150亿美元价格依赖经增长调整后的金融服务经济学;Jason认为Suno很有用,但“很脆弱”;Bending Spoons则通过削减成本和提价,把被收购产品的客户惯性转化为现金。Rory对周期的总结是:“只要人们不害怕,市场总有钱。”
Databricks可以因为资本需求可控而继续保持私有,但基础模型市场无法无限推迟结构性清算。 Microsoft新模型无法联网,引发了即使是现有巨头也未必能追上Anthropic速度的疑问;Rory则追问,两年后市场会变成“寡头垄断”,还是仍保有4到5家可信供应商。非中国的美国开源模型之所以重要,是因为模型集中度决定整个AI栈的定价权。
1. SpaceX的固定价IPO放弃传统的首日上涨机制
周二录制时,Elon已经选定每股135美元的发行价,SpaceX估值接近1.8万亿美元,并计划募资750亿美元。Rory对此的描述是:“我们不做价格发现。我告诉你答案是什么”,投资者只需决定买多少。
Jason认为认购簿只有2倍覆盖,较传统的8–10倍目标明显偏弱;但Rory指出,在750亿美元的募资规模上实现10倍需求本就异常困难。固定定价也拿掉了投行通常用来制造10–15%开盘涨幅的末端需求信息。
因此,Rory认为首日低开的“非微小概率”存在,但并未声称自己举例的30%跌幅可以被准确预测。Jason的条件判断是,尤其在30%股份分配给散户的情况下,首周表现可能沉闷,随后每当发射、卫星或与收入挂钩的公告重新点燃热情,股价就会“不可阻挡地上涨”。
2. 中期估值比首日表象更重要
Rory拒绝让交易机制掩盖这项成就:SpaceX是“这一代人的标志性公司”,是一家非凡的技术企业,也是“只有美国才能发生的时刻”。他对估值的怀疑,与他对其所需资本、风险承受力、市场深度和执行能力的钦佩并不冲突。
Harry要求给出收盘价;Rory认为首日下跌、平盘和上涨各有三分之一概率,因为交易机制本身提供的信息很少。他对未来12个月的判断更明确,也更偏空:按约70倍远期销售额估值,他怀疑SpaceX还能维持1.7万亿美元,但同时强调,1万亿美元仍然会是“巨大的胜利”。
Jason指出,Facebook和Google上市时也是“无声无息”,并未损害它们最终的结果。SpaceX仍将创造一代人的财富和流动性;真正更容易受影响的追随者可能是OpenAI——在首发疲弱后,它激进的资本需求可能面对更低估值或更小规模的融资。
Jason提到,他接触到的LP已经提出7–8倍基金回报预期,并开始质疑50亿至80亿美元IPO在数学上是否还成立。Rory拒绝把SpaceX这一孤立结果外推为新常态,并对比了SpaceX在2008年的投资年份与Mercer可能在3年前开出的种子支票:万亿美元级退出确实稀有,但所需退出规模取决于基金大小,而不是某个新的普遍基准。
3. SpaceX的流动性会鼓舞LP,但不会改变VC算术
Harry问,SpaceX的分配是否会推动更多直接投资和更大规模基金承诺。Rory同意,拿到钱的人自然会追逐下一个机会,但称这只是从“绝对回报最高的风险投资交易”外推出来的结论。
重点机构赢家是Ontario Teachers,而不是Harry最初提到的“Ohio Teachers”。Rory还回忆起《华尔街日报》关于Washington University的报道:SpaceX分配额约占其捐赠基金的10–15%,显示出这笔回报的集中度和规模。
Rory引用老的“VC傲慢指数”作为核心约束:基金越大,就需要越大的公司才能实现基金回报。80亿美元的退出足以让规模较小的基金“高兴得不得了”;只有当基金本身接近100亿美元时,这个退出才会显得不够。
4. OpenAI提交文件保留选择权,AI正在走向持久化
Jason的问题是,OpenAI既然对时间表保持模糊,为什么还要提交上市文件。Rory将其理解为迟来的预期管理:释放准备上市的信号,但不承诺11月上市,避免任何普通延误演变成一连串“到底发生了什么?”的报道。
在公开表述的保留意见背后,Rory预计财务和法务团队听到的真实指令会是:“尽快把这件事办完,这样我们就拥有最大的选择权。”SpaceX异常迅速的SEC流程也强化了他的判断:在市场仍处于风险偏好状态时,多家资本密集型公司都在“冲向上市大门”。
Harry将Dreaming V3描述为OpenAI自上线以来最大的记忆架构升级。Jason认为,AI主要存在于浏览器中的状态已经显得过时,并预计两年内非持久化交互会变得“几乎古老”;与此同时,有限的IT预算仍会迫使企业严格控制token消耗。
Rory把记忆功能放进更大的模型“工具链”里理解:持久化上下文应该改善回答质量并降低成本,因为系统不必每次都把所有内容重新传给前沿模型。他还开玩笑说,研究了58期节目之后,OpenAI应该知道他大概率还会回来做更多20VC研究。
5. Apple的分发能力可能比拥有模型更重要
Jason认为Apple与Google的合作等同于部分放弃;Rory不同意。Apple可能向Google支付约10亿美元购买模型,但同时从默认搜索中获得200亿美元,这意味着AI支出只是一个小额抵消,而非战略投降。
Rory承认Apple没有自己的模型是“搞砸了”,但他认为,掌握手机控制权能提供比独立订阅更丰富的上下文——身份、日历、历史和意图。如果外部模型能修好Siri,只要最终体验继续推动用户购买设备,这就是进步。
Rory借用Ben Thompson的框架,区分了企业生产力和消费者休闲:“消费者不想工作。”Anthropic押注企业,适合自动化和效率提升;OpenAI的消费者定位则必须与Apple和Google竞争愉悦体验,因为用户很多时候想要的是放松,而不是复杂研究。
6. Uber的HR裁员是嘈杂的AI信号,Robotaxi才是更大的赌注
Harry强调Uber裁撤23%的HR、恢复每周3天到办公室的要求,同时否认这与AI有关,尽管95%的工程师都在使用AI。Jason区分了招聘职能与其他HR职能:招聘在增长失速时通常最先被削减,而他认为AI可以更全面地管理其他HR工作,有时也能减少偏见。
Jason提出的“AI HR副总裁”可以处理每一项工作成果、投诉和模式,而不是依赖片面的人工视角;它甚至可能得出结论:“也许你的老板确实是个蠢货。”但他明确表示,这不等于主张移除所有人,也不认为Uber全部裁员都由自动化造成。
Rory怀疑非工程岗位的AI采用率是否足以单独带来23%的节省。他把这次裁员视为争议区间中的一个数据点——5%、10%或Dario所说的50%——即自动化知识工作任务与消灭完整岗位之间的差距;普通的人员过剩也可能混杂其中。
对Uber而言,更重要的信号是它正在马德里与一家Rory认为可能是WeRide的合作伙伴测试Robotaxi。自动驾驶的发展远慢于此前预期的连锁反应,这给了Uber时间,把Robotaxi从生存威胁变成通过消费者已经在使用的App来调度的车队供给。
7. Revolut的1150亿美元估值反过来证明传统银行的失败
Harry将Revolut的1150亿美元估值视为欧洲的反击。Rory认可这家公司,但认为它的机会来自“肥胖、愚钝、心满意足”的欧洲银行——尤其是传统外汇和跨境收费长期攫取过高利润,而Revolut可以将其价格打下来。
同样的框架也解释了New Bank对低效巴西传统银行的机会,以及Chime在效率更高的美国市场上约50亿美元的估值。在Rory看来,金融科技公司的结果取决于传统服务商过去的定价有多么“过分”。
Rory对长期结果的保留意见涉及系统层面:一家几乎不做长期放贷、却按市值成为最大银行的公司,商业上可能非常出色,但没有履行银行最核心的经济功能——把储蓄重新配置为信贷。鉴于Revolut目前的执行仍然出色,他暂时搁置了这一担忧。
8. 融资痛苦具有个人性质,但被拒绝才是VC常态
Jason承认,创始人时期的一些怠慢“真的让他很受伤”,包括投资人反复利用他去给竞争对手做尽调。他如今的建议是,仍然去参加那场会,并进行“反向情报收集”,因为创始人会记仇,而VC错过一笔交易后只是继续寻找下一辆车。
他更强硬的结论是:“想开点,因为这就是销售。”承诺购买的客户可以无视28封邮件和87条短信,投资人同样可以放弃买入一只股票;他认为需要区别对待的怨恨是被解雇,并以Uber前高管对Benchmark的愤怒为例,称那种愤怒可以理解。
Rory的反驳值得保留:创始人出售的是自我,而不是一辆Ford汽车,因此被拒绝会直击个人。但一家VC机构大约会拒绝审阅过的100家公司中的99家,就像谨慎的银行会拒绝6个借款人中的5个;当“拒绝”本身就是默认产品时,获得高满意度在结构上就很难。
Harry认为,最好的报复是忘记拒绝过你的人曾经存在过,尤其是当他们日后回头时。Rory承认,厚脸皮会逐渐形成,但他仍清楚记得自己第一次独立募资时,在2008年11月金融危机前后将时间点定错,并在1小时内收到3个LP拒绝。
9. Cloudflare争议说明直接建议如何变成持久伤害
在流传的Cloudflare故事中,Jason理解Vinod Khosla的建议是让Michelle和CTO离开并重新分配股份,而不是偷走股份。Jason不会提出这种建议,尤其不会在路演过程中提出,但他理解投资人有时看到的底层问题:创始团队能力不均衡。
Rory强调最终结果:无论Cloudflare当时拥有的是什么,“一点都不应该被动”。他还指出,Khosla否认这段对话发生过;一位极其成功、异常直接的投资人,可能选择一次直白的谈话,而不是用3次更有分寸的会面来减少伤害。
Khosla曾因Juniper登上Midas List,30年后又因OpenAI登榜;整体能力与一次冒犯性的个人会面可以同时存在。Rory的标准既不是否认,也不是永久谴责:承认每年数百次拒绝中不可避免会出现失误,错了就道歉,然后继续前进。
10. Lovable把单员工收入变成战略选择
讨论中,Lovable的ARR达到5亿美元,员工规模示例约为172人;Cursor达到40亿美元,并计划在年底前达到60亿美元。Jason认为,尚未解决的问题是:AI初创公司能否在1亿美元、5亿美元和10亿美元收入阶段保持精简,还是最终会“重新变胖”,建立层层叠叠的组织。
他拒绝把这些公司视为无足轻重的单一产品:编程平台同时提供数据库、托管、管理、SEO和持续不断的新功能,所处赛道竞争极其激烈。这种生产力让他“有点看不起那些需要变胖的初创公司”:如果高管还要求增加50–100人或追加1000万至4000万美元预算,很多时候应该直接离开。
Rory的限定是经济性的,而不是文化性的。一家公司如果将收入的50–70%用于购买Anthropic或OpenAI的智能,就不可能再把同样比例用于员工;token和模型智能改变了劳动力结构,让小团队获得异常高的杠杆、薪酬和人均收入。
PLG可以保持精简,因为“人要么在做东西,要么在卖东西”;Rory认为,企业分销通常需要更大的销售团队。他和Jason讨论了新公司是否会重新打造Oracle级别的销售组织:Replit正在招聘250名销售人员,Lovable则没有;Rory称,一些创始人可能愿意牺牲边际收入,换取2到5倍的效率。Jason同意平均效率会改善,但不接受企业销售可以由147人完成。
11. AI成本结构让新旧人均收入无法直接比较
Harry将每名员工超过300万美元的ARR与Salesforce接近35万美元的人均收入进行对比。Jason随后指出,Salesforce几乎不需要支付token成本——按他的示例约占收入的1%——而Replit这样的公司即使每人创造230万美元收入,也可能将收入约70%花在模型智能上。
Rory称,如今创始人的目标是每名员工至少创造100万美元收入,理想状态是200万美元,并建立由少量卓越同事组成的小团队。他的方向性预测是,初创公司,包括B2B企业,将以约一半于历史水平的员工数量实现相当的收入。
Jason完全接受这一逻辑:如果AI最终通过增强人类创造1万亿美元收入,那么对应的效率必然体现为每单位工作所需的人数减少。“如果销售AI的人都无法高效使用AI,那其他人还有什么机会?”
12. Jason称Elon将AI产能转化为算力与Cursor组合
Jason认为,收购Cursor在每个维度上都很聪明。在约24个月里,Elon从零起步建设Colossus和Colossus 2,经历模型失败,但仍因相信AI是值得押注的趋势,在收入形成前投入估计200亿至300亿美元。
这笔赌注据称让他在竞争对手恰好需要算力时拥有了数吉瓦产能。Jason提到,Anthropic和Google每月贡献约20亿美元、年化240亿美元;而Cursor目标达到60亿美元的业务,则可以为这些服务器提供额外的下游需求。
Jason的区分仍然明确:这并不能证明Elon拥有一个成功的基础模型,只是让他成为“一个更好的CoreWeave”,并拥有异常便宜的资本。但叙事已经从1月1日的闲置数据中心,转变为6月9日的大型外包算力业务和自有应用需求。
13. 风险偏好资本奖励增长,也惩罚小幅失误
Ramp融资7.5亿美元,估值达到440亿美元,此前收入增长至3倍、ARR突破10亿美元,并实现自由现金流为正。Jason估算,如果收入接近12.5亿美元,对应的收入倍数为30–40倍:只要增长延续就合理,但若降至“正常化增长”,这一估值便无法自洽。
Revolut同样报告约45亿美元收入和15亿美元经营利润,但普通银行的交易估值更接近12倍市盈率,而不是40–50倍。面对“科技公司还是金融服务公司倍数?”的问题,Jason的答案是:以金融服务经济学为基础,再针对非凡增长进行上调。
Suno融资4亿美元,估值54亿美元,是6个月前的2倍。Jason每月支付15–20美元,但可能只用它创作3首歌;这让产品显得令人印象深刻,却也“很脆弱”,他还看不到其走向隐含200亿美元结果的路径。
Rory认为,资金来源于心理状态:“只要人们不害怕,市场总有钱。”Jason提醒,1到100倍的增长叙事仍然会撞上GDP;Rory又补充了人性和Minsky式过度扩张。Broadcom给出的芯片指引为160亿美元,低于市场预期的172亿美元,并帮助触发了市场回调。
14. Bending Spoons变现的是惯性,而非纯粹的自然增长
Bending Spoons以约200亿美元估值提交上市文件,收入约13亿美元,此前收购了Evernote、Vimeo、WeTransfer、AOL和Eventbrite。Jason欣赏这一策略,并开玩笑说,如果AOL成为下一个热门产品,“这些人就是他妈的天才”。
Rory的进一步解读给出了不同的 turnaround 定义:砍掉低回报的收购支出、缩减团队、集中产品功能,并激进提价。以某个示例产品为例,提价80%可能流失10–20%的用户,但只要保留足够多深度嵌入的客户,收入和现金流仍可能扩大。
据称,Evernote平均价格从每年75美元涨到250美元;AOL是最纯粹的惯性资产,因为“还没从AOL流失的人,现在不会流失,直到死。”Rory认为,这套打法像面向消费者的Vista或Thoma Bravo:盈利能力很强,但如果增长主要来自收购,就未必值得15–20倍收入估值。
如果收购目标仍然买得起,且这套执行可以在“800家独角兽”中重复,Jason并不太在意自然增长这个标签。他也认可创始人信中做出的区分:发现产品市场契合包含运气,而在契合之后运营被收购产品,则可能变成可重复的机器。
15. Databricks可以等待,但模型市场结构不能等待
Databricks选择以1650亿美元估值再融资一轮,高于年初的1340亿美元。Rory将IPO决策归结为3个需求:资本、收购货币或股东流动性;他认为,一家不需要基础模型级别支出的软件公司,在融资条件更便宜、负担更轻时可以继续保持私有。
他通常会倾向于让公司在收入达到40亿至50亿美元时上市,但当前私募投资人给Databricks的增长倍数高于公开市场给Snowflake的估值。考虑到SpaceX和两家模型供应商正在挤占上市日历,等待更干净的年份可能是理性选择。
Jason认为,Microsoft刚发布的新模型无法联网,这一点非常说明问题。即便这一缺陷符合某些使用场景,它仍让人回想起早期ChatGPT的知识过时时代,也挑战了这样一种假设:Microsoft、DeepSeek或开源模型可以自动跟上Anthropic的速度。
Harry认为,许多开源模型已经相距不远;Rory回应称,这些模型主要来自中国,而且部分供应商可能转向闭源。未来两年的关键问题是,Reflection AI、Poolside或其他美国替代者能否阻止OpenAI与Anthropic形成寡头垄断,从而维持定价压力以及Nebius所说的整个生态系统。
Rory O’Driscoll
But the one thing we know about Elon for the last 30 years is that when he hears the words “more risks,” he says, “Yes, please. I’ll have two.”
Jason Lemkin
I think the IPO nominally will be a dud. I don’t think it will trade up dramatically.
Rory O’Driscoll
There’s always money when people aren’t afraid. When things get scary, it’s not that money runs out; it’s that money gets scared.
Jason Lemkin
I’m contemptuous of startups that need to be fat. I’m like, “What’s your excuse?”
Rory O’Driscoll
In any business, there are only 2 things that happen. People are either making stuff or selling stuff.
Jason Lemkin
If AOL becomes the next hot thing, I mean, these guys are fucking geniuses.
Rory O’Driscoll
Anyone who hasn’t churned from AOL by now isn’t churning until they die.
Okay, we are back, and what a week it is. We have the largest IPO roadshow in history. We have to start with SpaceX. We’re speaking on Tuesday, and obviously SpaceX is going out on Thursday. There’s going to be some time discrepancy there, so what we say will be scrutinized in intense detail by the time you’re probably listening.
Rory O’Driscoll
True. Though one of the things is, there are usually 2 questions you’re asking at this point: What’s it going to price at, and what’s it going to trade at? The funny thing is, unlike 99% of IPOs, the first question has already been answered.
Elon has decided that instead of doing price discovery, where the bankers build the book and then pick the price and announce it right at the end, the night before, the IPO pricing typically takes place the night before the trade opens. Then everybody who participates in the IPO gets to buy at that price, and it opens the next day at whatever price, up or down from that.
In this case, Elon has decided in advance of getting anyone’s input that the number should be, I think, $135 a share, which values the company at $1.8 trillion. In other words, he’s short-circuited the price-discovery process. Instead, he’s saying, “We’re not doing price discovery. I’m telling you the answer, and the only question is, how much of it do you want to buy at that price?” So one thing we can’t get wrong is that, Howie.
Is that a wise move? He’s leaving a lot of room for the markets to move in between that. That’s why you normally leave it as close as you can, because you don’t want an Iran-Israel conflict or a Broadcom moving markets and then putting you in a precarious position. It feels unwise, but Elon is a master, so I’m not going to—
Rory O’Driscoll
Calling someone unwise who’s about 2 days away from becoming a trillionaire is a big call, Howie. But I think what it is is, it’s no surprise given Elon. It’s ballsy. You’ve got way more room for error. You could be wrong to the high side, you could be wrong to the low side, or you could leave money on the table. Maybe all the orders flood in and you’ve left money on the table. Maybe, on the other hand, you’re struggling to get the orders in, it feels very high, and it opens down.
It’s more risk, but the one thing we know about Elon for the last 30 years is that when he hears the words “more risks,” he says, “Yes, please. I’ll have 2.” This must appeal to him. It’s like, “I’m telling you the answer in advance, and I’m taking the risk.” That’s how he became a trillionaire. Is it wise? We’ll see on the day.
Jason Lemkin
It’s a huge amount of capital, Rory, but if it’s really only 2x subscribed or oversubscribed—I’m not even sure oversubscribed is the right word if it’s only 2x—plus Elon picking the price, that suggests to me this one won’t pop. I do believe the day traders will drive it up ultimately, but it doesn’t feel like there’s excessive demand at 2x. In most IPOs, it would be almost insufficient to close the IPO.
Rory O’Driscoll
Agreed. There are 2 separate things in that, Jason. You’re right. One is that the decision to pick a fixed price logically reduces the probability of a pop, with no other information, because the whole point of the banker process is to pick the price the night before that allows the pop the next day. You simply aren’t doing that because you don’t have the information. You’re right.
But then the second thing you added is some information that has come out, which is that, to date, the book is 2x covered. Your comment is that that feels low compared to normal IPOs, correct?
Jason Lemkin
Traditionally, you want 8x to 10x to get the deal that you want, but you’re not raising the vast amounts of capital Elon is raising, either.
Rory O’Driscoll
It’s hard to get 10x oversubscribed on $75 billion. To be really direct, what you’re saying is that you’re pricing something at a fixed price that isn’t taking demand into account, where you’re looking for a very large amount of money such that you only have a small amount of coverage.
You’re right. You look at those circumstances and say, “There’s a nontrivial chance that it pops to the downside.” Is it 30%? I don’t know. But if you think about it, normally bankers bend over backward to try to have the damn thing pop, right? They’re trying to get a 10% to 15% pop, and nearly 90% or more of the time it pops. But 10% of the time, it breaks the IPO. They get it wrong. Even trying to fix the game, they get it wrong.
In this case, they’re not even trying to fix the game. Time will tell on Thursday night whether they’re too high or too low. But there is, by definition, probably a higher-than-10% chance that on the day, people go, “Everyone who put in for it put in for it,” and it’s not impossible for it to trade down.
It’s just that if you use mechanism A, which is designed to create a pop and works 90% of the time, and now you use a mechanism that doesn’t have the information to allow you to make a pop because you’ve used a fixed price, then, by definition, the probability of it going wrong goes up.
That’s all.
Jason Lemkin
I think what will happen, if that’s accurate and 30% goes to retail, is that the IPO nominally will be a dud. I don’t think it will trade up dramatically. But I do think every time there’s great news—more satellites in space for SpaceX, more things—it will begin an inexorable rise. People will be excited, especially if the upside is tied to potentially significant revenue, as the last announcements have been with Anthropic and Google.
I just don’t think it’s going to pop that first week. I think there aren’t enough buyers out there in this universe, or at least in this galaxy, at this price, at 2×.
Rory O’Driscoll
I’m going to step back. I kind of hate that we got—and I caused this, so I apologize—into the technicalities of the IPO, because zoom out a million miles here. This is amazing. This is an amazing technical company. It’s the iconic company of its generation. It’s going public this week.
It’s a huge moment. What do you say to Elon? Congratulations. What do you say to everyone involved? Congratulations. It’s a wildly impressive company. Look, I am skeptical of the valuation, but step back. I’ve watched some of the launches on little YouTube, and I’m like, they’re just so impressive. The whole thing is so impressive.
At the risk of sounding a little partisan American—sorry, Howie—this really is an only-in-America moment, right? Who else is going to find the capital to take that kind of risk and go for it? And frankly, who else is going to have a big enough capital market to fund it and a big enough addressable market to sell to? It’s a great outcome. It’s an amazing company. It’s a real asset to America.
End-of-day-1 prediction and end-of-day-90 prediction.
Rory O’Driscoll
So you really are determined not to let him have his great moment. See, you’re like those commentators in politics who won’t talk policies. All they want to talk about is the horse race. All you want to do is talk the horse race here, Howie, because you know that’s what sells. You’re such a little media slut.
I don’t think it’s knowable on day 1. I think all 3 scenarios are equally likely: one-third, it just goes down because there are weird pricing mechanisms, so they don’t have demand; one-third, it’s flat, because whatever; and then one-third, to your point, retail enthusiasm, it goes up. There’s no information here.
Now, I will make a call, though. I think over the next 12 months, I doubt it will retain this price. There, I will make that statement. I disagree with Jason. I think fundamental value here reasserts itself. I mean, there are 2 reasons I say that.
One is, again, I always go back to the base rate. The base rate on IPOs in general is that you do see quite a lot dip. The base rate on IPOs at more than 10× forward sales is even more of a dip. The base rate on IPOs at 70× forward sales—there hasn’t been one, but you’ve got to believe there’s a dip. So I think valuation reasserts itself over the medium term, and the probability of it being higher than the IPO price in 12 months, in my gut, is lower—significantly lower.
So I’d say I haven’t a clue about day 1. It’s a tactical thing based on the mechanisms, and I think over the medium term, this amazing company might, shock horror, only be worth $1 trillion instead of $1.7 trillion, and it’s still a huge win.
Jason Lemkin
Two thoughts. I don’t know what you guys think. One is, listen, there are many great IPOs, like Facebook and Google, that IPO’d with a whimper, right? It would not surprise me if this IPOs with a whimper at the end of the day. It doesn’t matter for SpaceX. We will have multiple layers of generational wealth created.
Elon will get his liquidity. It’ll all be great whether it’s a nothing-burger IPO or not. I guess it might hurt OpenAI the most because they’ve been so aggressive on their valuations and so aggressive on their capital raises. If that means they have to cut back their aspirations for the amount of capital raised, the valuation maybe doesn’t matter as much, but they are related. That could be the biggest negative effect. They need so much capital, too, that it could take some of the wind out of OpenAI’s sails.
The other thing I’ll just say briefly: before I got on a plane—I’m in Hong Kong as we record this—I spoke to one of my LPs, who’s getting lots of cash here, got cash in Cerberus, and is getting cash in all these other deals. It ties to a conversation we had before: the expectations are so high now for performance, and I think that will permeate through the ecosystem.
I do think it’s a minor negative, but I do think it’s something for founders and others to understand: it’s not a free lunch. The bar will continue to go up after these events when LPs are looking for 7–8× routinely from GPs, which is hard to do outside of anomalous periods of time. The expectations that GPs will have from founders continue to go up.
As this LP said to me, “I don’t know that little $5–$8 billion IPOs really make the math work anymore.” We’ve talked about it, but to hear it from a large LP, it echoed in my ears how the bar goes up.
Rory O’Driscoll
I don’t think you can take a once-in-a-decade event and start extrapolating it as a norm. I think in life you should take this as the once-in-a-decade, maybe—
Jason Lemkin
But there are 4 or 5 of these once-in-a-decade events. There’s going to be Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX—
Rory O’Driscoll
Well, hang on. Go back. It’s interesting that you say that, but of course, the opportunity—the once-in-a-decade…
I mean, SpaceX was once in a decade. It was last decade. Reminder here: Founders wrote that check in 2008, right? It’s now 2006. It’s 18 years ago. So for that kind of huge return, I mean, yes, there’s been a 10× since 2008.
Jason Lemkin
When was the Mercer seed check written again? Remind me.
Rory O’Driscoll
The Mercer seed check? 3 years ago. Yes.
Jason Lemkin
So maybe they do happen more than once a decade. They seem to be—these decades seem to be shrinking.
Rory O’Driscoll
I think you’re going to have 1 $1 trillion outcome from the last decade, and 2, it looks like, from this decade if it all happens according to plan. But my point is, yes, you probably can’t assume 10. You don’t run your business on the expectation that every check you write is going to be a trillion-dollar outcome. If you’re really smart and you get 1, you should say, “Yay.”
So I think $8 billion outcomes will make everyone perfectly bloody happy. Obviously, unless you have a $10 billion fund, in which case it doesn’t. Fund size dictates the amount of market cap it takes. It’s a Josh Kopelman thing from ages ago—the venture arrogance index, whatever. The bigger the fund, the bigger the deal there has to be to make it work. There’s nothing surprising here.
Will this have knock-on effects in terms of LPs investing more directly and an increase in fund investments from LPs? You’ve got Ohio Teachers, who I think will make over $10 billion from their SpaceX.
Rory O’Driscoll
To be clear, I know you think the entire Midwest is the same, Harry, but I think it’s Ontario Teachers’, right? At this point, you’re conflating Canada and America, which is an easy mistake to make because we’re making it ourselves, starting with the president. It does begin with O and it’s kind of in the middle, so I understand your ignorance. But let’s go back—
Jason Lemkin
Maybe he’s just a big Fallout player, too. Who knows?
Rory O’Driscoll
Easy. But the bottom line is, yes, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan nailed it. I mean, they’re going to make a magnificent return. And there are a bunch of others. It’s great. University of Washington has an extremely savvy CIO who…
And by the way, Washington, Harry, just to confuse you further, is not in either Washington State or Washington, D.C., but we’ll keep that for now. But yes. Look, by definition, these are going to be the best co-investments ever because it’s the best deal ever. I mean, there’s nothing surprising in it.
But I think our LPs are going to come back and go, “Those that will get liquidity from this go, ‘Hey, we’re going to reinvest more,’” and will all that brethren be like, “Hey, we’re going to join this because we want the next generation, even if we didn’t have them?”
Rory O’Driscoll
Yes, because everyone’s just going to go, “Wow, that looks amazing.” As I say, again, it’s back to the extrapolation from the unique event. Of course they are, because it’s going to be amazing.
I saw, I think, in The Journal this morning—not University of Washington, Washington University. Again, I’m now getting confused. It’s 10 or 15% of their endowment. It’s awesome.
Yeah.
Rory O’Driscoll
It’s awesome. This is the best venture capital deal ever in terms of absolute return, and anyone involved is going to do really well.
Speaking of a once-in-a-lifetime or once-in-a-decade moment, as Rory very articulately put it, another once-in-a-decade moment is obviously OpenAI filing to go public, not so confidentially. Anything to say here that we haven’t covered?
Jason Lemkin
The thing I don’t understand is—maybe it’s a question for Rory—because I don’t get it. Other than the Captain Obvious element, what’s the point of hedging your bet on the timing but filing? I mostly get it, but I don’t totally get it. I only half get this: “We may want to stay private; we want flexibility, but we’re going public.”
Rory O’Driscoll
I think all they’re doing is being a little smart and managing expectations, finally. I read that as, “We’re filing to go public.”
In a perfect world, we'd love to go public as quickly as we can, but if it's delayed for whatever reason, we don't want to have a whole bunch of negative stories saying, “See, it's slipping.” So if you preemptively manage expectations and say, “We're filing, but we're not committing to a timeline,” we're not all going to be sitting here in late October going, “They said they'd be going public in early November. WTF is going on?”
The big aha here, and we said it 2 weeks ago, is everyone's suddenly gunning for the door. At some point, you need the capital markets—the public capital markets—because the scale involved is such that that's where you have to go, and everyone's just hit that point and they're going for it. I think, going back to your comment earlier on SpaceX, it feels like the market is very risk-on. We had that little dip last week, and then everyone got over it in 2 days, so it's as good a time as any. You keep cranking while you can and see if you can get it done.
I'm sure that they made that caveat—“We'll take our time”—but they made that statement in the press department. My guess is that in finance and legal, the mandate is, “Get this puppy done as quickly as possible so we have maximum optionality.” It's worth pointing out, by the way, that the SpaceX S-1 went through the SEC very quickly. Normally, that's a painful process with multiple iterations, and it seemed to happen here extraordinarily quickly, probably because we don't regulate anything anymore. So go team. This may all process through really quickly, in which case, brace yourself for a fun fall.
Rory's on fire this morning, eh? Gosh. I really want to touch on something beneath the product layer for OpenAI, which is that Sam Altman has been driving toward persistent and always-on AI. They shipped Dreaming V3, the biggest memory architecture upgrade since launch. I'm intrigued, Jason in particular, to hear your thoughts on this. Is the future of AI continuous, persistent, 24 hours a day, a fabric of life, always on, in your mind? How do you see this?
Jason Lemkin
I think we all believe it. We can make fun of Apple this week, basically repackaging Gemini and giving up on AI, if that's the way we want to view it, but that's a little piece of wanting, ultimately, AI to be persistent 24/7. We do want this. We already live little hints of it, and it's pretty silly that AI, for the most part, lives in our browser, right? If you think about it, that's very dated. It's so dated that we still use browsers. I mean, who would have thought we'd still live in the era of Netscape in so many ways?
I do think it's exciting. I do think, as this show continues, whatever we would want to call it—the tokenpocalypse, I think—it will morph into just standard business practice, right? At some point, the IT budgets can only be so large. There's only so much. Even if we lay off half of the employees, employment keeps growing, so we're going to have to manage spend. There is a conflict, but I do think we're going to look back in 2 years and think of this nonpersistent AI as almost archaic, almost sort of desktop-like.
Rory O’Driscoll
Yeah, because you threw in a lot there.
Rory, you pulled several faces there. For the audience listening, Rory's facial nuances—
Rory O’Driscoll
No, it's just that Jason, as he often does, covered a lot of different things, and I'm just processing through it more slowly. On the memory thing, and kind of what Jason has said, it just totally makes sense, right?
The question is, if you step back, you have the core models, and then you have what people are calling the harness, which is all the stuff around it to make those models effective. Part of that—it can either be in the model or, in theory, it could be in the harness—is just understanding memory. The impact of that, and I think why Jason went to the token economics part of it, is that part of the benefit should be that you get better answers with memory, and part of it should be that it's more cost-effective in terms of tokens, because you're not passing through all the context all the time. I think a lot of the trend with these harnesses will be adding stuff to minimize your cost on frontier models, and part of that will be having memory, right?
It also leads to a better experience, right? I actually just went in and tried to see: has it been switched on in mine yet? It makes a ton of sense. You should know who I am after I look up 58 20VC podcasts. I'm probably here to look at my 20VC podcast research, you guys, so it just makes a ton of sense.
Rory, most people know who you are now as well.
Rory O'Driscoll
No, I'm saying, but—
You're famous.
Rory O'Driscoll
My OpenAI sometimes doesn't. So, yeah, it's absolutely one of the necessary to-dos, and they're doing it, and it's great.
Rory, you pulled a face when Jason said about Apple giving up on AI with Gemini. You all right there?
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, moving on to that, that was an interesting one. Ben Thompson at Stacker did a really good piece on it this morning that I was reading. To some extent, they're giving up in the sense that they're paying Google $1 billion to use its model as the default model, but as a reminder, Google pays them $20 billion to be the default search engine, so it's a minor offset.
I give them credit. I actually think that they're making some progress. Yes, it would be better if they'd had their own model, but they're making progress on the use cases that make a ton of sense for the consumer. I think the amount of context you have when you're on someone's phone is such that they can deliver a unique and compelling consumer experience for the kinds of things they demoed around knowing context. It's like your memory comment, Jason: knowing which Rory it's talking about, knowing your calendar, knowing everything, and delivering a much better experience.
Now, should they have been able to do it with their own model? Yeah, but the bottom line is that they control the handset, and for the consumer it's a pretty powerful product. So I think they're in a good position to make progress. I don't think they're giving up. I actually think they're pragmatically saying, “We kind of screwed up by not having our own model, but that's actually not what matters for us at Apple. What matters for us at Apple is delivering an amazing experience to our consumers, because if we do that, they'll keep buying handsets, and if they keep buying handsets, we can probably afford to give someone $1 billion a year.”
I give them credit for getting their shit together. It is stunning that Siri has been so bad for so long, so I think actually trying to fix it is just awesome. I give them credit for taking a step in the right direction—that's my takeaway from it. So, it's the opposite. I don't think they're giving up. I think they're doing what it needs to win coming from behind, and they have a great position.
I think it's interesting. The person you have to think about this a lot with, obviously, is if you're OpenAI versus if you're Anthropic, because Anthropic has made the enterprise bet and OpenAI, in part, has made the consumer bet. I like my OpenAI subscription, because I sit at my desk and I do research. But for a lot of consumers, it was a great line, and credit to Ben Thompson: he said it very clearly. I've thought it, but he said it clearly. He said, “Consumers don't want to work. There's not a big market for consumers in their non-working life to do a whole bunch of complex research or use AI for productivity. They just want delightful experiences because they want to relax and be entertained.”
I think, actually, the consumer space is going to be a tougher space for OpenAI. The enterprise space has really been validated, because an enterprise is all about automation and efficiency. In a consumer space, it's about experiences. Apple's well-placed to do that. OpenAI has to compete with that and compete with Google, and it's a tough space, especially if Apple is getting its shit together.
Well, speaking of consumers not wanting to work, soon they won't have to. Uber cuts 23% of HR.
Rory O'Driscoll
It's just to make Jason happy.
Sorry, I'm so sorry. It's obviously people losing jobs, and it's terribly sad, but I'm the one who fucking said, “No great CEO likes HR,” and everyone got angry at me. Then everyone starts cutting HR. Anything of note here from Uber cutting 23% of HR, remote work rescinded, 3-day in-office mandate? The company denies AI played a role, despite 95% of engineers using it daily. Anything of note there?
Jason Lemkin
Well, look, HR and recruiting—which, let's consider them different—are the easiest things to cut. You always see any big tech leader stumble a little bit, and they lay off 30% of their recruiting department. Well, you often want them back. I mean, it makes sense on paper, right? The HR one will be interesting.
We've put out a call for someone to report to our AI VP of marketing, and I've gotten my head bitten off a lot on social media for that by people not really listening to what I'm saying about that.
But I do think HR is one of these areas where many parts of it will be better managed by AI. I think an AI can be a better VP of HR for certain parts of the job than a biased human. I think there are advantages to having an AI VP of HR—not that I want to get rid of all the humans or even lay people off, but an AI VP of HR can evaluate every single thing you’ve ever done, every little bit of your work, and all of your issues.
An AI VP of HR can figure out, hey, maybe it really is your idiot boss, Jason. Maybe that really is the problem. It’s not you. An AI VP of HR can find out a lot of things, process them, and ask questions. I think it’s an under-discussed area compared with other areas, but it should be massively disrupted.
Rory O'Driscoll
The big-picture question in all these areas is: how much efficiency do you get? My gut? It felt like 23%. I doubt everyone is automating and saving 23% using AI in the non-engineering departments, because adoption there isn’t as strong as in engineering. Do I think there’s some? Of course I do.
So my bottom line is, I think my guess is that some portion of this is, quote-unquote, AI automation. I doubt it’s 20%, because I’m always calibrating off what percentage—it’s the Dario number—of quote-unquote knowledge work is going to be automated. And it’s knowledge-work tasks and then knowledge jobs. Is it 5? Is it 10? Is it 50, as Dario has said? Twenty-three percent felt like a lot, but whatever. Again, what you don’t know is how much of it is just that there are too many folks there and they’re partly rationalizing. So it’s a data point.
I think the other data point from Uber is far more interesting, which is not the AI for HR but the AI for autonomous driving. They continue to make progress on autonomous driving. They’re actually rolling out more autonomous-driving experiences in Europe, in Madrid, I think, right? They’re partnering, I think, with WeRide or some of the technology providers.
If you want to talk automation, driving is one of the biggest targets in terms of the number of humans who do that job. When you see Uber making experimental progress on robotaxis in Europe, that’s obviously something to keep an eye on. It’s worth pointing out that this stuff is still moving way slower than I think people anticipated. It hasn’t been Waymo in San Francisco resulting in Waymo being everywhere within 6 months. It’s been a long, steady progression for Waymo.
Uber’s doing what it should do. The Travis Kalanick devotees would say the cutting of their autonomous project in 2016 or 2017 was a fatal error for Uber. I’m not sure. I think 10 years later they can pick up the thread, which is what they’re doing, and catch up on that, because it’s not like the technology tipped like a domino.
I think they’re smart to now start pushing robotaxis and partnering with technology providers. The question on the Uber stock is always, “Oh my God, is robotaxi existential?” That’s the bad scenario. The good scenario is that lots of people build robotaxi technology, and Uber is in a wonderful position to be the coordinating thing because it’s the app we use. If they just add 10,000 robotaxis to the fleet, then things continue just fine.
Frankly, it’s good to see the Europeans do something. I say this respectfully, Harry, but typically Europe is the slow technical laggard, especially on stuff like that. So, go Madrid.
Should we discuss Revolut at $115 billion? $115 billion, you know?
Rory O'Driscoll
Amazing.
Yeah. Thank you.
Rory O'Driscoll
I think you’re doing that defensively. You felt I was dissing you and Europe, and you’re basically implicitly saying, “Oh, look at Revolut. It’s amazing,” correct?
Correct.
Rory O'Driscoll
And it is amazing. And you know why it exists? Because the European banks, unlike the American banks in general, are so crappy. There’s a reason that Revolut is worth $115 billion, because the incumbent European banks were fat, dumb, and happy, making margin off their customers. There’s also a reason why Chime is worth $5 billion. That’s still a great outcome, by the way. That’s because the U.S. banks, on average, are a little more efficient.
That’s also why New Bank is such a valuable business—
Rory O'Driscoll
Agreed.
—because it’s multinational.
Rory O'Driscoll
Because the Brazilian banks were inefficient. I think all these fintechs really are proven markets. It’s a function of how egregiously priced the incumbents are. Europe, especially when it had no single currency, had all this foreign exchange. Of course, you guys aren’t into Europe. You had the FX charges and all this transactional bullshit, and Revolut just blew a hole through that.
I think it’s amazing, and I know you’re a big fan of the CEO. I wish him all the best, and I hope he pounds those old-school European banks into the dirt. At some point, we’re going to have to deal with the fact that the largest bank by market cap doesn’t do much lending, and that’s actually going to be a real problem in the aggregate, because the whole point of banking is to recycle savings into lending.
Right now, Revolut’s not a long-term lender, but that’s by the by. They’re killing it.
I’m fascinated to hear Jason’s thoughts on this one. What’s dominated my Twitter over the last week is Greg Isenberg’s original tweet about a horror story of a venture fundraise. It led to hundreds and hundreds of founders sharing horror stories, including the Cloudflare CEO, who talked about his experience with Khosla and Vinod Khosla. Jason, I’m really intrigued to hear your thoughts on this one. I’m sure you have some. How did you feel about this slew of founders bluntly saying how terrible a VC experience they had in certain cases?
Jason Lemkin
Well, I’d say a couple of things. First of all, when I was in the most intense phases of being a founder, I had those stories, too. We forget how deep some of these things cut—these slights. Folks who are friends of ours now, whom we co-invest with, I thought terrible things of them at the time. Literally. One that we both know really well would constantly use me just for due diligence on another investment. Constantly.
Now I’m pretty zen about that crap. To founders, I’m like, “Just take the meeting and do reverse intel.” If you’re just being used for a competitor, then sit down with them and find out about your competitor. Get the exact information. But, man, that stuff really burned me.
First of all, with the whole thing involving the CEO of Cloudflare, just remember: founders hold grudges. I still do. I’m just getting over my founder grudges now. Founders hold grudges in a way that VCs actually, I think, don’t, because if VCs miss the deal, they’ve got to find another bus, right?
Having said all that, get over it because it’s sales. The only thing to really hold a true grudge over is if you got fired. I think the folks from Uber who hate Benchmark deserve to hate Benchmark. I think there are others. But if you were treated poorly during the fundraising, get over it. It’s sales. Have you never sold? This is what I say to people.
Have you never sold anything? Have you ever thought a customer deal was going to close and it didn’t? Have you ever had a prospect tell you, “Rory, of course we’re going to buy by the end of the quarter,” and then you send them 28 emails and 87 texts and the deal never closes? How is selling stock any different from selling anything else? So there are a bunch of issues to separate: the grudge, the firing, which is a niche issue, and learning to sell, man. Grow some.
Rory O'Driscoll
In one sense, you’re right. But I think the difference for the founder—and I think a ton of what you said was super insightful—is that the founder in this case isn’t selling their product. They’re selling themselves. So I think you’re right about one thing: the rejections cut deeper. There’s no doubt.
Even on my side, I remember a VC 30 years ago saying to me, “You never forget the LP turndowns.” Thirty years later, he’s so right. You remember those people who turned you down. It’s just a personal thing, because you’re not just selling your product. You’re not selling Ford cars on the dealer lot; you’re selling yourself.
So I totally agree with you, Jason, that you do have to grow a pair. You do have to get a thick skin. But I totally get the way founders feel. Even if something doesn’t go wrong in the process, I totally get it. Rejection sucks. And so, that’s the founder side. I thought you were super sympathetic there.
Just to put the other side of the table, every venture person is in a business where we turn down 99 out of 100 deals that we look at. Rejection is our default M.O. That’s why I always wrestle with these ratings businesses—the kind that rate VCs. It’s doable, and I think there actually are appropriate ways to do it. But you do have to remember that the default is a no, and it’s really hard to have high customer satisfaction when 99 times out of 100 you’re going to tell the customer no.
It’s why no one ever loves the bank they apply to for lending money, because a well-run bank turns down 5 out of 6 customers. No one likes that experience. Rejection sucks, so it’s set up for failure out of the gate. Sometimes, in the course of turning down 200 or 300 people a year, you get some stuff wrong.
Jason Lemkin
What was interesting is that Matthew was really upset that Vinod asked him to consider getting rid of Michelle, whom we know and who is great, and his CTO, and giving him the shares.
It was not stealing her shares, which I think was misinterpreted. He made it a suggestion and a pitch. Listen, I’m a super fan of Michelle. I would not make that suggestion.
But let’s step back for a minute. We’ve all had those meetings with founders where the team is very unbalanced. Am I Vinod? Would I say it that way? No, but you might know me well enough: I almost would, in a different situation. I almost would say that to a founder. I just wouldn’t do it during a pitch. I would just say it’s not a fit for me.
But I find myself constantly, post-investing, being the only one who would say things like, “What are you going to do with your co-founder? Rory’s just not committed enough. He’s not getting it done.” I think his directness is interesting. It bothered the CEO of Cloudflare so much, but in a way, it was just his read of the team. I think it was wrong, at least for one of them, but it was his read of the team.
Rory O'Driscoll
And by “wrong,” you mean incorrect relative to the subsequent outcome?
Jason Lemkin
Well, I know Michelle. I don’t know Michelle that well. I think she’s a great founder, so I would keep her. But the fact that VCs go in and see that the founders are not equal in terms of their commitment and skill set, right?
Rory O'Driscoll
Look, it’s clear, given the superb outcome, that whatever Cloudflare had, it shouldn’t have been touched one little bit. It should’ve just been left to do exactly what it did. It’s a great outcome.
But you’re right. Again, Jason, you raise a good point. You go in, you see things, and especially at the earlier stages, if you think the team is wrong but you want to do the deal, then that’s a really tricky conversation. As well as when you’re as successful as Vinod, you’re like, “I could take 3 meetings and slowly and delicately get to this point, or maybe I’ll just say it.”
It’s also worth pointing out that he said very clearly he doesn’t believe that happened. So I think, stepping back, I don’t know if it’s a useful way to rehash. The more successful you are, the more meetings you’ll have. The more meetings you have, the more likely some of them go wrong, especially if you’re direct, and Vinod is nothing if not direct. So stuff happens.
As someone pointed out, he was on the Midas List the first time for Juniper, and he’s on the Midas List this year for OpenAI. There are 30 years between those 2 events, so he must be doing something right overall. That’s still not to say that on an individual day, you can piss people off.
I’m sure I look back across 300 or 400 turndowns a year for 30 years, and I know there have been some where I wish I’d handled it differently. There have been 1 or 2 where, literally at the term-sheet level, I wish I’d handled it differently. It happens. It’s not ideal.
If you’re aware of it, you apologize later and say, “Look, I got that wrong,” and you just have to move on. Some element of breakage is inevitable.
I have to admit, Rory, I disagree with you. I’ve been turned down by lots of LPs. The best way to have revenge is to forget they even existed. I’m being a dick here, but a lot of them ping me now. I’m like, “Wow.” When they turned me down when I was 21, I’m like, “Whoa.” And you’re like, “Who are you?”
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, maybe early on you remember, but you’re right. Over time, to Jason’s point, you develop a thick skin. And you’re right, I remember much less the turndowns in Fund 7 than in Fund—
First independent.
Rory O'Driscoll
The second fund was Fund 3. I do remember in Fund 3, our first independent fund, which we foolishly timed literally for the week of the Great Financial Crisis in November 2008, getting turned down 3 times in the space of an hour. So I do remember that pretty vividly, but life goes on.
Okay, so again, big milestones for Lovable and Cursor this week. Lovable, literally just before we came on, hit $500 million in ARR. Cursor has hit $4 billion, and it’s targeting $6 billion at the end of the year. Jason, you’re the man of the hour for this one.
Jason Lemkin
You’re the coder.
Any thoughts on this?
Jason Lemkin
I think there are 2 different things you said. One was about the scale of these companies, which we’ve talked about. I do think the headcount thing is something that we’re still learning about.
When we started this show, we were in an area where folks were very lean and growing very quickly. But the question was, does this normalize over time? As you approach scale—as you approach $100 million, $200 million, $500 million, or $1 billion in revenue—will startups get fat again? Do you just need these layers?
I can think of a number of hot AI startups that are getting pretty fat, especially on go-to-market teams and others. But we’re seeing more and more examples to the contrary, and it is disruptive on many levels if you can stay as efficient as these guys are.
It is disruptive to investing. It is disruptive to employees because it will shrink the number of these great roles, and it will increase compensation, right? To the ClickUp point, to Zeb’s point, I’m doing layoffs to give a million dollars to a handful of folks. Lovable can pay its team whatever it wants. With less than 200 employees, it can pay whatever it wants.
But, man, if this becomes the steady state for startups—and maybe it was in the old days, maybe in the old days of Microsoft it was true—it’s just so different if they’re not going to reflate. That’s what I think about, because it’s not a lot of people. It’s not a lot.
What people don’t understand—I know Replit a little better than Lovable, but they’re the same—is that they’re pushing out a lot of code. One thing you could say is, “Oh, it’s easy because they only have 1 product,” right? That would be a comeback that I think works a little bit. You don’t have to have 22 products like Datadog or 7,000 like Salesforce.
Well, maybe, but these are pretty complicated products. You’ve got a database, hosting, management, SEO you’re running, and more. These guys are pushing out more features than any of us did in our entire lifetimes a generation ago because it’s the most brutally competitive space there is.
I don’t think we’re dealing with people who aren’t working. These folks are working incredibly hard, and they’re incredibly productive. And if you want to have some contempt for VCs, tying this together, I’m kind of contemptuous of startups that need to be fat. I’m like, “What’s your excuse? What do you need another 200 people for?”
When I’m at a board meeting and a VP says—or, they’re all C-levels now, right? A C of something. There are no VPs anymore in startups. They’re all Cs—and they say, “Well, I could do that, but I need another 50 or 100 heads. I need another 10 or 20 or 40 million,” I just think that person should go.
Rory O'Driscoll
First of all, I broadly agree, but the only pushback I’ll make is this. We’re saying, “They’re amazing that they can do this with only 146 employees.” But remember, if you’re spending 50% to 70% of your revenue on intelligence from Anthropic or OpenAI, you don’t have the option to also have 50% to 70% of your revenue go to employees because there’s just not enough room in the percentages. They’re different businesses with different business models.
Jason Lemkin
They are, but you have the choice of who you invest in or who you work for, right? We vote with our legs and pocketbooks, right?
Rory O'Driscoll
No, of course. And this is actually one of the core challenges many of these other companies are going to have. If you can be 1 of the 146 employees, that is, I agree with you, Jason, 100%, getting leverage from this AI such that your economics are compelling because you’re 1 of a small group of people making a lot of money in a business that’s leveraging technology to have a very high revenue per headcount.
It means we can pay you a lot. That’s a far better place to be as an employee, you’re right, than one of 90,000 employees at Salesforce. You’re exactly right, because you’re not getting leverage from the models and intelligence.
And this is the question: how much will be labor, and how much will be intelligence? This is kind of the question of what the split will be. What you’re seeing, to your point—and I’m sorry I’m rambling on this, but it’s clear in my head and I want to get it across—is that in businesses that are using a lot of intelligence, and I’m using tokens as a proxy for that, small numbers of people can achieve a lot and make a lot.
Those are better places to be as an employee, and often as an investor, than slogging it out with 10 times the employees, not a ton of new leverage from AI, and being stuck in the 2010s ground game.
Jason Lemkin
Which sucks.
Rory O'Driscoll
That’s what you’d want to do if you could, as a founder, as an employee, as an investor. You’d want that. If you could, that’s the model you’d want.
That’s where I’d want to go work. I want to go work somewhere where I’m empowered, where I’m—oh, I’m 1 of 172 people at $500 million in revenue? I’m happy.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah, but to your point, I do think—and I want to call it out—I do think as you start to develop an enterprise motion, and you implicitly said it, you’re probably talking about the foundation models that are building big go-to-market machines, because they have to.
Rory O'Driscoll
We are going to see way more buyers. I don't buy that there's not going to be an infinite number of—
Jason Lemkin
No, Rory, I, it's not just, I mean, it's the Gore, it's Hobby—
Rory O'Driscoll
Agreed.
Jason Lemkin
It's your Sierras.
Rory O'Driscoll
Once you're selling to enterprise, this idea that 157 people can do it on their own is not going to be true. I think for products, because remember, at the end of the day, someone wires the check.
Jason Lemkin
It's not true.
Rory O'Driscoll
Hang on. Agreed. In any business, there are only 2 things that happen—
Jason Lemkin
People are either making stuff or selling stuff. If they're not doing either of those 2 things, they're just overhead.
To your point, if you're selling stuff via PLG, then you only need people to make stuff, so you can be pretty lean. Once you start selling to law firms, once you start selling to corporates, then you do end up with a big-ass sales force.
One of my theories is that this doesn't change from cycle to cycle. The Anthropic sales force in 5 years will look like the Oracle sales force, the Microsoft sales force, and the IBM sales force 50 years ago because—
But here's the thing: I don't know that that's going to be true, Jason. First of all, there's—I don't mean to go back to, well, if we compare Replit and Lovable, I know Replit's hiring 250 sales reps this year, so that's going to look very much like a traditional organization. Lovable isn't, and it's different DNAs and different goals.
But the majority of Anthropic's enterprise sales are not allowed to talk to a human. My point is that we can't all be Anthropic, but founders are choosing to have leaner go-to-market teams, leaner sales teams. They just don't want this crap. They don't want 250 people running around, and they're willing to trade off some marginal revenue.
Anthropic has fewer than 5,000 employees, right? They're just saying culturally—so I don't think they're all going to—I thought they would all look like SAP, Oracle, and Salesforce. We're not seeing that.
It's not going to be 147 people doing $500 million when it's enterprise sales.
Rory O'Driscoll
Nope, but what you might see is 2 to 5 times the level of efficiency, and it just changes the culture, the headcounts, and where people are. That's the difference, right? It doesn't really matter whether it's 0 or 4×, right?
Jason Lemkin
Agreed.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah.
Jason Lemkin
It will be better. No matter what happens, when you start with a clean slate and leverage intelligence, you just become way more efficient. I agree: on average, these companies will be way more efficient.
When you do a comparison, it's over $3 million in ARR per head versus a Salesforce, which is $350,000 per head. It's 9 times more efficient.
Jason Lemkin
Yes, you're right, but I'm just going to say it here: Salesforce is enterprise-heavy, R&D-heavy, with no AI costs, right? Remember, they have $300 million of— they just said it—of tokens. Let's do it here. We did the math. That's roughly $10,000 or $15,000 per engineer, and engineers are only about 1/5 of what they have.
Remember, that $300,000 in ARR is probably only 1% tokens. Do you understand me, Harry? In other words, Salesforce has $300,000 of revenue per head, which means if they're going to make money, they can't pay anyone more than $200,000, and they're probably spending 1% of revenue per head on tokens.
Contrast that with your example of Replit. They're getting $2.3 million per head, but they're probably spending 70% of their dollars on tokens. It's just vastly different businesses, and one of them is more aggressively leveraging the new enabling technology.
So, to Jason's point, it's probably a sweeter spot to be 1 of the 147 people in that gig than 1 of the—I used to know the headcount, now I don't. I probably could do it if I'm at that 20,000 or 30,000 people in a much larger organization where you don't have the leverage. They're just different businesses.
Rory O'Driscoll
But this, to me, is much more interesting than layoffs in these stories. I think every founder today—forget about older companies—wants to run a startup that's at least $1 million in revenue per employee or more. They're targeting $2 million. They want to be at $1 million, and they want it because they want great teams, lean teams, and the best people.
They want to work this way. They want to go to work with people they look up to and respect. They don't want bloat. My sense is that, roughly, over the coming years, startups will be half the size they used to be for a given level of revenue, including enterprise.
This is very much B2B-focused. That's a much bigger change than whether this company does a 10% or 15% layoff. If everyone's half the size they used to be, it's a much bigger change.
Jason Lemkin
Can I make a comment here? By definition, if you invent something that's meant to augment humans and make them more efficient, and that thing is called AI, and it does $1 trillion in revenue, by definition you need to see $1 trillion of efficiencies. The way efficiencies show up is fewer humans per unit of task.
You're exactly right. That's the bet. If it wasn't happening, the entire thesis of the case would be bullshit. So you're right, Rory, it's got to be happening. If the people who sell AI can't be efficient with AI, then what chance is there for the rest of them? I agree with you.
Did Elon have the acquisition of the year buying Cursor for what will be 10 times end-of-year revenue? It looks like a pretty prescient buy if they're going to hit target.
Jason Lemkin
It was a clever deal on every dimension. When I was thinking about this, because I'm always skeptical of the valuation, Elon did such an amazing job of meeting the AI moment.
You look back and go, he obviously founded OpenAI, and then all the drama happened. But in the last 24 months, he moved from ground zero to building Colossus, building Colossus 2, and failing with his model.
Just because he had the guts to show up and spend that kind of money—for fairness, he does have the cheapest cost of capital on the planet—he found himself with gigawatts of capacity just when everyone needed it, was able to sell it to them, and then did the Cursor deal to backfill the space.
Everything stems from the fact that he had the big-picture conviction that AI mattered, and he was willing to put $20 billion to $30 billion of capital in the ground in advance of revenue because he felt this was the trend to back. At least right now, it looks like a great trend.
You're right: prescient is exactly the right word. He found 2 of his biggest competitors who want to buy from him. He's getting $2 billion a month—$1.25 billion from Anthropic and $950 million from—no, the other way around: $950 million from Anthropic and $1.25 billion from Google, or the other way around.
It's $2 billion a month, $24 billion a year in compute revenue. On top of that, he has Cursor coming in at the back end to fill those servers. So he is the most efficient CoreWeave, with the lowest cost of capital.
Separately, it doesn't mean you have a foundation model; it means you're just a better CoreWeave. But, oh my God, did he turn a loss into a win in the space of 3 months.
On January 1, you could have said, "Look at all those data centers, and you don't have a foundation model. You're screwed." Here we are, June 9, and he can say, "I have a $24 billion outsourced business, and I have this other business that's coming in that's going to be doing $6 billion that'll run on my servers." I thought, "Great move."
Incredible transition. There were 2 large private rounds. Ramp raised $750 million at a $44 billion valuation. We've discussed Ramp a lot: it tripled in a year, crossed $1 billion in ARR, and is free-cash-flow positive.
Then there's Suno, the AI music creator company, which raised $400 million at a $5.4 billion valuation, teasing its first licensing model. BOND led that one. It was double the previous valuation just 6 months ago. Anything on either of those?
Jason Lemkin
With Ramp, we've said it before: it kind of gets to the Revolut point. They'll trade like financial services companies, but they'll be adjusted for growth.
We always have this example: when Brex slowed down to—I can't remember what it was—30% or 40% growth, they sold for 6×. Here we have Ramp; I've heard they're actually as much as $1.25 billion, so they're trading at 30 to 40 times, right? Whatever the number is, of that order.
It's a growth bet. If the growth keeps up, this will be a smart round, and if the growth goes down to anything like "normalized growth," it won't be. It's the same bet with Revolut. They're raising at 100 and something; they're doing $4.5 billion in revenue and $1.5 billion in operating income, which is freaking amazing.
These companies are great. Banks don't trade at 40 or 50 times earnings. They trade at 12 times. So on both of them, it's really just—people always say, "Will this trade like a tech company or like a financial services company?"
It'll trade like a financial services company, but it will be adjusted for growth. Ramp is getting the growth, and they just seem to do a very good job of riding the zeitgeist, their AI story, and their adoption story. They just seem to do a good job on all that.
For now, they've got the growth, and as long as they've got the growth, the math works. It's a big TAM, so we'll see.
Jason, are you trying Suno, the music AI company? Do you have Suno playing AI music in your personless office?
Jason Lemkin
I do like Suno. I pay for Suno. It's one of those services that, if I were more cost-sensitive, I would cancel my subscription because I think I pay $15 or $20 a month for 3 songs. There are certain apps that I think are fragile for certain users because I'll continue to pay them, but barely. The utility's there, but barely.
It is amazing. Even though I've been a customer and user for a while, I'm not smart enough to see it yet. The rate at which that valuation doubled, and the $20 billion outcome for it, I'm not smart enough to see it yet. So it feels a little bit like risk-on, right? The revenue justifies it, the growth justifies it, the stickiness justifies it, and the brand justifies it. You can't lose in AI, but I don't know. We'll see. We'll see at the IPO.
I just don't know where all this money's coming from. No, I'm saying, with all the IPOs—and then you mentioned Revolut again, Rory—is that targeting $750 million with the secondary sale they're doing at the $115 billion valuation? And then, with all the IPOs, we say, “We should know where all this money's coming from.”
Rory O'Driscoll
There's always money when people aren't afraid. I always say the converse is important: when things get scary, it's not that money runs out; it's that money gets scared. In the same thing in a bull market, it's not that more money's being made; it's that people are brave. There'll always be money when people are brave, and there'll be nothing but treasuries when they're not.
How long will they be brave for, Rory?
Rory O'Driscoll
If I knew that, Harry, I wouldn't be sitting here talking to you. I'd be trading QQQ. I don't know. At some point they won't be brave, but right now it feels like everyone's risk-on, so I think people are brave.
Jason Lemkin
But we've all convinced ourselves the rules have changed now, right? You can go from 1 to 100 in a year, and so many other things have changed. We throw these growth numbers out as if it doesn't require a massive change in externalities to justify them. Everyone thinks all the best startups go from 1 to 100 in a year. Going from 1 to 20 in a year is pretty good today. You want to be doing 5 to 8 by the time you get out of YC. The rules have changed, and they have changed, but there's a limit to how much the rules can change, right? There is a limit. It's called GDP.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes, and it's also called human nature. I think that the rules have changed what's doable, but what we do is, in the face of these increased opportunities, we all get more aggressive. We keep on getting aggressive until the only thing that stops us being aggressive is someone gets burned.
It's the whole Minsky analysis: you're going to do what you're going to do, and it's going to continue, and the only thing that will stop it is overreaching. The skill is to figure out when you're at that point.
It was funny: last Friday there was a little dip, and you never know why stocks go down when things are overpriced. The narrative was that the employment numbers were good, so rates won't go down, and therefore stocks went down. Intellectually, I generally find things don't go to hell in a handbasket because employment is good, right? That's not going to be how this thing ends.
Well, it was because of chip guidance, to be clear. Chip guidance was $16 billion and missed the $17.2 billion number.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, you're talking about Broadcom.
Yeah, which triggered it.
Rory O'Driscoll
Right, got it.
One that's amazing, which we may not have commented on, but it is amazing, is Bending Spoons. This is a roll-up play on traditionally consumer companies. Some of their properties are very well known: Evernote, Vimeo, WeTransfer, AOL, and Eventbrite. It's a massively executed roll-up strategy—$1.3 billion in revenue, and they're filing to go public at $20 billion in the US. From Italy, I hasten to add. It's one of the few large Italian success stories, to be very blunt. I thought it was an amazing success story. I don't know if you guys have a comment on it, but I thought it was fantastic.
Rory O'Driscoll
I did read it in detail because I was super interested. “Turned around” is an interesting expression. What they do—their MO—is they buy these things, cut all extraneous expenditure, including a lot of the acquisition expenditure. It's a little ironic; it's like the Vista playbook in enterprise. Then they raise prices massively.
I actually tried to figure out the organic growth rate of each enterprise because they're growing nicely overall, but a large part of the reason they're growing is that they're adding new companies. By definition, revenue goes up. You're trying to figure out what they did in terms of growth by entity. That's the next level down.
Even then, they get a pretty good growth rate out of the gate, to your point. But then you go one level below that: how do they do that? It's mainly price increases. It's very hard to get any sense of unit growth by individual product.
Take Evernote as an example. It's doing $200 million in revenue. They just cut all the marketing initiatives other than the high-ROI stuff. They take out 80% of the marketing spend, focus the team on features, and raise the prices 80% over the course of 2 years. Ten percent of the existing users go, maybe 20%. Their net retention is reasonably decent. It's below 100%, but it's reasonably decent.
So they raise prices, and the people who really want it stay. It's really hard to grow new businesses, but what it means is that it kicks off cash. Let's get real here: anyone who hasn't churned from AOL now ain't churning until they die. You can raise money on that. You've had 2 whole decades, people. It is 26 years since the AOL Time Warner acquisition. You've had 26 years to churn off this thing. You're going nowhere.
So they have very sticky, inertia-driven customers, and they stick it to them. It's an excellent business. The big 3 properties are AOL, Eventbrite, and, I want to say, Vimeo. It was interesting: the top 10 are about 80%, I think. Evernote, which I use, is in the top 10, but not the top 3.
You still use Evernote?
Rory O'Driscoll
I don't use it, but I have a bunch of stuff in it, so I paid for another year. I need to get it out and figure out where I'm going. It's a long story, but I'm not using it. I'm using ChatGPT, but I have to get all my stuff into one place. It's a long story.
I mean, Rory, what was the Last Supper like?
Rory O'Driscoll
Let's focus on the business. I looked at it and thought, the odd thing is that this is a consumer internet version of early Vista and Thoma Bravo. Buy those companies, cut the costs, raise the prices, and probably tap them out.
The question is, is it a great business? Absolutely. Should it go public at 20 times revenue or 15 times revenue? Maybe not, because you're relying on acquisition for growth. I mean, you're not getting organic growth. You're getting a profitable business, and you probably have to look at the sustainable profit.
It's hard to value it on a growth multiple, and you might be leaning in a little at $20 billion. But I think it's a great story. Everyone was playing in the enterprise space, and what these guys realized is that there's a similar opportunity on the consumer side.
The whole idea was that, in these verticals, no one's going to change their car-dealer accounting system because they put prices up 20%. In the same way, the default consumer is going to stay. So it's a totally sensible and orthogonal play to what everyone else was doing. They deserve the prize. Should the prize be $10 billion or $20 billion? That's a different question, but it's a great story.
Does it diminish what we've previously said about the bar to go public today? Don't get me wrong, they're at fantastic scale. It's $1.3 billion in revenue, which is awesome. But we have said that we're seeing this kind of bifurcation and that you need to be huge.
Rory O'Driscoll
No, you've said it. I haven't said it.
Jason Lemkin
But they're growing what, 70% or 80%? What are Bending Spoons growing?
Rory O'Driscoll
By acquisition, yes.
Jason Lemkin
I mean, Rory would know better than me. I'm not even convinced the markets care as much as we think about whether it's organic or inorganic.
Rory O'Driscoll
Salesforce itself—the balance of it is inorganic at some point, and then it becomes organic. We don't even think about a lot of these products as inorganic or organic. Does anybody really care? As long as it works, if they can keep finding these targets for the right price, if they can do what they did with Evernote, which is raise the pricing from $75 to $250 a year on average, and if they can find enough of these without just running out of affordable targets, going to the founder's letter, it sounds better to me than starting something from scratch.
Just go—there've got to be 800 unicorns to buy. Just go buy those ones.
Jason Lemkin
I really liked his letter. He said finding product-market fit is just a continuous mission of luck in some ways, and then the execution machine built after that requires no luck at all.
Rory O'Driscoll
Totally. Absolutely.
Jason Lemkin
It's just traditionally you bought—the Constellation version was 1 to 2x revenues, right? I don't know what Bending Spoons' blended price is, and maybe it's not revenue-based. I just don't know.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah. This is Constellation for consumer with a much higher valuation, because right now software is under pressure and this stuff isn't.
Speaking of big enough to go public, guys, Databricks came out today. No, no, we're going to do another round: $165 billion, up from $134 billion earlier this year. But obviously not going public with that announcement anytime soon. How do we think about that?
Rory O'Driscoll
The argument we've said for why the big model providers are going public is that they have a huge capital need. I think it might have been Diamond, or maybe the Goldman guy, who said recently there are 3 reasons to go public: you want capital, you want currency to buy other things, and you want to get liquidity for your shareholders. If you don't have 1 of those 3 things, then do you want the hassle?
I think Databricks, unlike these guys, for now at least, may well be in the position where their capital needs are still manageable. For context, the last private round at Anthropic was $30 billion, and the last private round at OpenAI was $122 billion. So this is less than—oh my God, it's 0.1% of the last OpenAI private round. What that says is, if there's money to fund OpenAI, there was money to fund Databricks privately. So they can do it for longer because it's just not the same need.
It's a software company. So they don't, quote-unquote, “have to.” I personally think you should at $4 billion or $5 billion in revenue, at the margin. I think in the end, logically, the cost of capital should be cheaper in the public markets, but right now it's not. Databricks can get capital at a higher revenue multiple because their growth rate is higher than Snowflake's, and on hassle-free terms.
I also think the other argument he made, which does resonate a little with me, is the idea that this is just going to be a noisy year. You've got SpaceX by Friday, you've got the 2 big model companies by the end of the year—there's just a lot going on. It may well be that next year is a clean deal.
The bigger point was that they don't need it. The amount of money that you need to build a foundation model is 2 or 3 orders of magnitude more than anything else, so the imperative for those guys to go public is just different.
All right, boys, is there anything that I've missed that you think we should discuss? Other things that made it to the top: SaaS now trades at a discount to the S&P 500 for the first time in history. Wow, that's sad. Meta is weighing tens of billions more for CapEx spend, following suit with Google. Zuck, attaboy.
Jason Lemkin
I'll tell you about the 1 small one I'll pick just for fun, if we're breaking. I think it's actually a more important story, but maybe it takes time to track it. Microsoft's new models that it launched, right? I think it said they were in beta. I found it very interesting that the models can't even search the web.
There are certainly use cases where that's not important, but it's interesting to me that you would launch a model that can't extend its knowledge by searching the web. It's a flashback to when this show started, when basically every time you chatted to ChatGPT, everything was 9 months ago. I don't remember. My memory's only through September 2024.
We think everyone can catch up. We think Microsoft can catch up. We think DeepSeek and open source can catch up. But if Microsoft launches these models and they don't even search the web, can we really keep up with the pace at Anthropic? I mean, the pace of change is so rapid. It's so impressive. There's so much progress. I just can't predict. I can't predict where it will play out over the rest of the year and next year.
Rory O'Driscoll
But you are right, Jason. It did matter because it was the final recognition that, frankly, they got caught out in mobile. They never caught up in search. They did catch up in cloud compute with Azure and, who knows, here. But you're right, it is the 1 that matters.
One of the big questions, between Microsoft and the open-source vendors, especially, is whether it's going to be a non-Chinese, U.S. open-source vendor that's even within spitting distance of the frontier models. That matters a lot from a pricing perspective.
There's a lot of open-source models today that are within spitting distance, no?
Rory O'Driscoll
There are, but mainly Chinese, and the question then is whether that's sustainable. A lot of our companies are using them; is that sustainable? Even though it's open source, is that sustainable over the medium term?
If your only plan is that you can download Kimi or DeepSeek and fine-tune it, that's great, but, A, some of those Chinese companies are themselves going closed source. I think what happens in terms of an open-source competitor in the U.S. matters, and obviously you've got, I think, Reflection AI and Poolside doing that.
But, to Jason's point, sometimes you get caught up in the stories, and you're the worst for that, Harry, because you just love the gossip. But Jason's right. What really matters is whether this is going to be an oligopoly or whether it's going to be 4 or 5 players in foundation-model land 2 years from now, which is why what Microsoft did matters.
I just did a show with the founder of Nebius, and he said the single biggest threat to Nebius is consolidation of models. If we have concentration of model winners, we are in a tough space, and we want an ecosystem, not a monopoly.
Rory O'Driscoll
There's a reason, yes, that everyone other than Anthropic and OpenAI is shoving money furiously at anyone else who can help erode that competitive advantage.
I just did a show with Aaron at Perplexity, and he said that export controls have actually hurt the U.S. in many ways because it meant that they've innovated on architecture that they wouldn't have needed to, and really built muscle that they wouldn't have had to. Combined with the open-source model capability that they have, it's now a competitive threat that's even stronger. It was an interesting discussion.
Rory, I have to say, we'll wrap. My mother texted me after our last episode and said that your quote, “Making money is like sex,” was the favorite moment of any Trio show that she's heard, and I got about 50 texts from people saying, “That is the quote of the century.”
Rory O'Driscoll
I've got to tell you, I think it's not in direct format, but there's a version of that either in Fred Schwed's Where Are the Customers' Yachts? from the 1960s or in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator from the 1920s. One of those 2 investing books hinted at that, but I always remembered it.
I'm not the original author, but the books are 3 to 5 times older than you are, Harry, so it's kind of like the Bible as far as you're concerned.