[BidClub_]
Sohn Conference Foundation · · 12 分钟

Tariq Barma 在 Sohn 2026 推介 Perimeter Solutions

Tariq Barma

YouTube
TL;DR
  • Balance Capital 的 Tariq Barma 将 Perimeter Solutions 定义为一只“被误解的赢家”,基准情景下未来2–3年实现翻倍,主要由盈利增长驱动。 他预计备考 EBITDA 未来几年增速将“超过30%,并轻松跑赢预期”,同时盈利预测持续上修;牛市情景还包括估值倍数扩张,而市场若将 Perimeter 视为“衰退中的大宗化学品供应商”,则隐含约20%的下行空间。
  • Balance 对2028年 EBITDA 的预测比华尔街一致预期高15%;若计入并购,Barma预计自身预测值会高出很多。 通过 FOIA 获取的2024年及更早历史合同,按基地逐一分析后显示,价格更高的 Tier 1 加仑量“接近翻了3倍”。合同收入结构已向服务收入而非按量收入倾斜,2026年合同生效后还将进一步变化;上周公布的新 U.S. Forest Service 合同及 CAL FIRE 续约带来提价空间。
  • 护城河的核心在于:Perimeter 提供的是端到端、可靠的野火阻燃剂服务,而不只是制造产品,竞争实际上已不构成问题——“Perimeter 已经达到逃逸速度”(“Perimeter has already hit escape velocity”)。 所有试图进入该领域的竞争者都已失败或被收购;即使出现一家可行的竞争对手,最早也要到2028–29年才能展开竞争,更可能是2030或2031年。随着并购推动公司多元化,Barma预计到2030年阻燃剂业务将占 EBITDA 的30%。
  • 并购将开启 Perimeter 的下一篇章。 Barma预计公司将以有吸引力的回报率投入大笔资本;IMS 和 MMT 已提供早期证据,其中 IMS 采用了类似 TransDigm 的 Extant 路径,MMT 的表现已经超出预期。
  • 管理层逻辑建立在 TransDigm 基因之上:团队中既有前投资人,也有优秀的做空者;由资深 TransDigm 校友组成的董事会打造了 Perimeter 员工采用的 3P 方法论——精益成本控制、深度贴近客户、在问责下保持自主,以及“按价值而非成本”定价。 公司每条业务线的利润率均扩大逾1,000个基点,管理层在5年内回购了相当于公司16%的股份。
  • Barma认为,市场深恶痛绝的激励薪酬并不是问题。 “华尔街人人都讨厌它。我们认为这很荒谬。”管理费将于2027年到期,激励费将于2031年到期;投资者可以直接评估扣除相关费用后的净回报。真正的风险包括帝国式扩张、潜在竞争者就 U.S. Forest Service 合同授标提起诉讼所带来的按市价重估风险——Barma认为最终不会成为问题——以及技术发展可能令野火和阻燃剂使用进入长期下行趋势。
摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. 背景:从 SPAC 废墟走向“被误解的赢家”

  • Barma 在 Balance 采用的筛选框架——Balance 由他与 Ali Karim 于2022年共同创立——聚焦未来两年的盈利预期差:“价值增长15%、盈利预测上修,再加上估值倍数重估,回报率进入20多区间。”
  • Perimeter 于2021年通过 SPAC 上市,股价从14跌至3,原因包括新竞争者出现、火灾季疲弱,以及资本配置故事未能兑现。Barma称,过去两年公司已逐项解决这些问题。
  • 在野火阻燃剂业务中,Perimeter 负责生产、供应链和航空基地人员配置。Barma的核心观点是,价值不在制造阻燃剂本身,而在于全国范围内为客户提供可靠服务,在短暂且高风险的作业窗口中做到100%成功。其他细分业务包括泡沫灭火剂、P₂S₅ 油品添加剂、IMS 和 MMT。

2. 预期差:独家研究让 Balance 比华尔街高15%

  • 通过 FOIA 获取的2024年及更早历史合同,按基地逐一分析后显示,Tier 1 加仑量“接近翻了3倍”,从而降低业务对疲弱火灾季的敏感度。合同收入结构已更多转向服务收入而非按量收入,2026年合同生效后还会进一步改善。上周公布的新 U.S. Forest Service 合同和 CAL FIRE 续约带来提价空间。
  • 在正常火灾季,Barma认为这项业务本就低于应有盈利水平。与 MMT 前员工的交流显示,利润率存在显著提升空间,而华尔街模型只计入小幅扩张;一次性油品添加剂问题若得到解决、包括近期赢得一份合同在内的抑火业务持续增长,以及 IMS 执行到位,都可能带来进一步上行。

3. TransDigm 校友操盘 3P 方法论

  • 管理层包括几名前投资人,其中一些人被 Barma 称为出色的做空者;董事会则由资深 TransDigm 校友组成,Perimeter 员工采用他们的运营打法。这套 3P 方法论包括精益成本控制、深度贴近客户、按价值而非成本定价,以及在问责框架下保持业务单元自主权。Barma称,公司每条业务线的利润率均扩大逾1,000个基点。
  • 市场参与者曾质疑这套方法论能否适用于航空航天以外的行业。Barma称,“我们无需再猜”:一位 TransDigm 资深前员工表示,这套方法已被成功应用于随其他公司一并收购的非核心业务。TransDigm 的近100笔收购、在5年内将被收购公司利润翻倍的目标,以及极高的成功率,构成了这一模式的样板。

4. 逃逸速度、并购与值得跟踪的风险

  • 每一个试图进入野火业务的参与者都已失败或被收购。即使出现一家可行的竞争对手,最早也要到2028–29年才能展开竞争,更可能要等到2030–31年;届时仍将面对 Perimeter 长期保持的100%成功率与可靠性。
  • 并购是公司多元化的引擎:Barma预计并购将提速,并认为 Perimeter 应以有吸引力的回报率投入大笔资本。IMS 正在沿用 TransDigm 成功的 Extant 路径,由前 Extant 员工带队;MMT 已经超出预期。Barma预计,到2030年阻燃剂业务将占 EBITDA 的30%。
  • 对于备受诟病的创始人薪酬,管理费和激励费分别将于2027年和2031年到期:“你完全可以自己算一算,判断是否认可净回报。”最大的实际风险是帝国式扩张;其他风险包括潜在竞争者就 U.S. Forest Service 合同授标提起诉讼,这会带来按市价重估的风险,但 Barma认为最终不会成为问题;此外,技术发展也可能令野火和阻燃剂使用进入长期下行趋势——“这是需要重点跟踪的事情”。
Speaker 1

Please welcome Tariq Barma, co-founder and managing partner, Balance Capital Partners.

Tariq Barma

Some people have asked, so I just wanted to correct the record: My photo was not my prom picture.

Thank you to the Sohn Conference Foundation and host committee for inviting us to present. I’m Tariq Barma, and I’m excited to share one of our favorite ideas with you today. Here’s our disclaimer: Please don’t sue us.

1. Balance Finds Misunderstood Winners

I co-founded Balance in 2022 with Ali Karim. At Balance, when we look for long investments, we focus on misunderstood winners. The misunderstood part means we have a meaningful variant view on earnings 2 years out. We look for several characteristics listed here that end up filtering out most of the ideas we come across.

The simple formula is 15% value growth, upside estimate revisions, and a multiple re-rate, which brings the return into the 20s. We think Perimeter Solutions is a misunderstood winner.

2. Perimeter Wins On Service

If you’ve ever seen a plane go by and drop red powder to stop the spread of a wildfire, you are familiar with Perimeter. They handle everything from manufacturing to managing the supply chain and staffing air bases. The value is not in manufacturing retardant, but in reliably servicing customers nationwide with 100% success during short windows of time when every second matters and errors have severe consequences.

The other segments include foam suppressants, P₂S₅ oil additives, IMS, which produces printed circuit board assemblies and optical components, and MMT, which makes machines and aftermarket parts for medical devices in the catheter technology space. These are businesses where quality and service matter most.

Every single one of Perimeter’s business lines has a favorable industry structure within the specific niches that they focus on. They are trying to solve difficult and unique problems for their customers in areas with limited competition.

Perimeter has had a bumpy road since coming public in 2021. In its first few years, the stock declined from 14 to 3. Investors tossed out any company that came public via SPAC. A new competitor entered the scene. Weak wildfire seasons caused investors to question long-term secular growth, and the capital allocation story investors were excited about failed to materialize.

In the last 2 years, the company has overcome each of these, and the stock has risen to new highs. So, where do we go from here?

3. The Earnings Power Upside

Our thesis is that normalized earnings power is still materially underappreciated. We expect the company will grow pro forma EBITDA north of 30% in the coming years while handily beating estimates and seeing positive revisions.

The underlying business has structurally improved, and competitive dynamics have progressed to the point where Perimeter has already hit escape velocity. The next chapter will come from the company executing on value-creating M&A. We expect them to deploy significant amounts of capital at attractive returns.

This will result in a base-case double over the next 2 to 3 years. Most of the return comes from earnings growth. In a bull case, multiple expansion will drive further upside. In a scenario where market perception dramatically shifts and the company is viewed as a declining commodity chemical supplier, we think there’s about 20% downside.

We have a variant view on every single business line. Our 2028 EBITDA estimate is 15% ahead of the Street. Including the M&A, we expect our numbers to be much higher.

Why is that? In the newly acquired MMT business, our calls with former employees suggest there’s a material margin opportunity, while the Street models minor expansion. The retardant business should see upside under the new U.S. Forest Service contract. They also announced a renewed contract with CAL FIRE last week, and the pricing impact drives upside as well.

In a normalized fire season, we think the business was already under-earning. Lastly, there’s upside from resolving one-time issues in oil additives, continued suppression growth, including a recent contract win, and from executing in the IMS business.

4. Management Proves The Playbook

I want to make a few points about the jockeys we’re betting on. As an aside, I’ve heard the CEO is in the audience today.

First, the management team includes several former investors, some of whom the audience may already be familiar with. When we look at the body of evidence, they have objectively done an excellent job, as I’ll shortly demonstrate.

Second, many of these folks are talented short sellers. When short sellers are betting their careers on a company, it is worth paying attention to.

The board is made up of senior TransDigm alumni who created and successfully implemented the operating playbook that Perimeter employees use.

The fire retardant business has structurally improved under management’s leadership. We FOIAed the historical 2024 contract and the prior historical contracts and did a base-by-base analysis. We found that the percentage of higher-priced Tier 1 gallons has nearly tripled, which reduces revenue sensitivity during weak wildfire years.

The company has restructured its contracts to include more service- versus volume-oriented revenues, and this will further increase when 2026 contracts go into effect. They’ve also struck longer-duration contracts.

Lastly, we observed the U.S. change its approach to fighting wildfires with more aggressive initial attack. The proof is in the numbers. 2022 and 2025 had similarly weak acres burned, and we can see profitability has significantly improved.

It is not just the retardant business. Every single business line has seen material margin expansion of over 1,000 basis points. The reason is that management has successfully implemented the 3P operating playbook.

These are not just platitudes. It’s easy to say, “Just cut costs, just raise prices,” but these are simple ideas taken seriously, and the proof is clear in the numbers and new business wins.

They do run lean on costs. They get close to customers to solve their unique problems and drive new business, and they price to value, not cost. Each business unit is empowered to operate autonomously, and those closest to the customer are able to make decisions and then be held accountable for those decisions.

5. Competition Cannot Catch Up

The fire business is difficult. Every new attempted entrant has failed or been acquired. The industry structure is highly favorable. If you pass Go, collect $200.

We think residual competitive concerns in the market are misplaced. Perimeter has already hit escape velocity. In a best-case scenario, even if a competitor had a viable product, they would not be able to compete until 2028 or 2029 at the earliest, and more likely 2030 or 2031.

Even then, they would need to overcome Perimeter’s long track record of 100% success and reliability. By the time any of this even matters, the potential impact to Perimeter’s earnings will be limited.

6. M&A Builds A Better Company

That is because Perimeter is evolving. They have begun to deploy capital into high-return M&A. They are buying great businesses with limited competition. We’ve seen this with IMS and MMT, and expect M&A to accelerate from here.

By 2030, we think retardant will be 30% of EBITDA. The market sees a cyclical fire company with no clear comp set, so it gets lumped in with chemicals or oil services. We see a growing collection of niche-advantaged businesses with a repeatable playbook to structurally improve.

We have confidence because we’ve already seen evidence of smart capital allocation. Management opportunistically repurchased 16% of the company over the last 5 years at attractive prices. They’ve improved every business line they’ve operated, which supports the idea that they can do the same on acquired businesses to create value.

Early M&A has been promising. At IMS, the company is running a similar strategy to one TransDigm has already run successfully at Extant, and it is being led by former Extant employees. The recent MMT deal is already exceeding expectations.

This is a strategy we have seen work outside in. TransDigm has been a programmatic acquirer with nearly 100 acquisitions to date. Their goal is to double profits at acquired companies over 5 years, and their hit rate is extraordinarily high.

Former employees have talked about never seeing them fail and how the company excels at disciplined decision-making, pricing, contracting, and operating lean. It generates meaningful alpha.

While each company shown here has a different strategy, they demonstrate that individually, a strong operating skill set, niche businesses with limited competition, and programmatic acquisition at good prices each result in outperformance.

Some market participants have questioned whether the operating playbook can be applied outside of aerospace, but we do not need to wonder. A senior former TransDigm employee suggested that it has already been successfully applied at noncore businesses that have come along with acquisitions. They have proven it works.

7. The Edge And The Risks

We think there’s an edge for 3 key reasons. We are meaningfully ahead of the Street on earnings power, and this is because we’ve gone out and done unique research.

Second, there is still skepticism about the management team and the retardant competitive environment. As the company continues to execute, we think these concerns will subside.

Lastly, there is dislike of the incentive compensation structure. Perimeter founders effectively receive a management fee, which will expire in 2027, and an incentive fee, which will expire in 2031.

Everyone on the Street hates it. We think this is silly because that’s not something that needs to be debated or hated. You can easily do the math and evaluate if you like the net return.

We think the biggest real risk is empire building and evidence of poor capital allocation. There’s also a potential competitor that’s litigating the award of Perimeter’s Forest Service contract. While that brings mark-to-market risk, we think this will prove moot.

Lastly, technological developments could turn wildfires and retardant usage into a secular decline. There are several mitigants that make this hard in practice, but it is something important to monitor.

In conclusion, we think Perimeter is a misunderstood winner. We like the stock. Thank you.