[BidClub_]
Sohn Conference Foundation · · 15 分钟

Sohn投资大会2026做空圆桌

Soren AandahlJoyce MengZachary DatikashJim Chanos

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TL;DR
  • Joyce Meng将“假AI”视为高赔率做空主题——针对的是声称拥有并不存在AI敞口的公司。 她筛选那些突然把“AI”加入公司名称的改名案例,找出了 Resolve AI,以及一家从家居装饰转型为AI服务器制造商的中国公司;据她称,该公司把 NVIDIA 的产品目录用 Photoshop 合成到官网,还声称招募了在 LinkedIn 上无法核实的员工。她的做空组合今年取得正收益,自基金成立以来做空端表现为正,并以波动率较低的长期下行股作为压舱石。
  • Soren Aandahl认为,最好的空头往往是那些无聊的标的——“避开脱衣派对”。 市场上涨的广度极窄,“众数股票在下跌”,他认为这与1999—2000年的市场特征如出一辙。他的农业做空研究霍尔木兹海峡关闭、化学品、化肥和硫酸盐价格,以及它们对供应链和播种决策的影响,最终落到那些连“住在母亲家地下室、穿着汗衫的人”都不会在 Twitter 上讨论的公司。
  • Zachary Datikash认为,私人资本蜂拥进入的领域都提供做空机会——包括私募信贷、PE基金管理人和BDC,以及它们扎堆投资的企业。 他说,他认为 Brookfield 的AUM超过1万亿美元、有形净资产为负,而美国高收益债市场规模为1.5万亿美元。Chanos另举Planet Fitness:PE持有的健身房尽管单位经济性极差仍持续扩张,随后才削减扩张;Zach则用Mister Car Wash说明,1英里半径内出现3家门店就可能摧毁一个好生意。
  • Meng的基金国际敞口超过50%,既配置真实AI供应链、对冲假AI,也做空终值受颠覆的叙事。 她提到中国及其他市场存在信息不对称、报告标准较差以及企业质量指标虚高。终值增长率变化1个百分点,可能让DCF摆动8–15%,因此印度的传统软件和商品化BPO/联络中心服务构成有吸引力、下行不对称的做空标的。
  • Jim Chanos给出的逆向数据点是:互联网对宏观经济的影响几乎难以察觉。 他说,1986—1996和1997—2007两个时期,美国GDP增速与标普企业利润增速的CAGR均约为6%,且没有因为GFC而对这组比较做负面调整。他认为中国开放带来的影响远大于互联网;不过,Soren从铁路和互联网的视角看,颠覆性技术也能制造泡沫,并让早期高估值企业破产。
  • 圆桌前瞻性的做空主题是:AI可能让软件和白领服务走向商品化。 Zach在复盘时统计了145家市值超过10亿美元的软件公司,至少在他复盘的那个时点如此;一款竞品可能一夜之间加入客户想要的功能。Meng认为,软件超过80%的毛利率并不意味着代码开发仍是同样坚固的护城河,尤其对轻量级前台点解决方案而言;在FactSet遭重创后,她更偏好Morningstar等覆盖较少的数据公司。AI可能生成优于知识工作底部25%的产出,而这部分工作涉及美国45%的人口;她提到的估算显示,新增算力中60–70%会替代人力资本,同时强调时间点和持续时间仍未知。她认为K型经济中存在丰厚的多空价差机会。
摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. 狂热行情中,“假AI”是做空机会密集区

  • Joyce Meng表示,做空需要差异化判断和催化剂,但她的组合更偏主题,因为“涨潮见顶,会把同一片海域的许多标的一起带下去”。她最喜欢的主题是“假AI”:她描述了一家从中国家居装饰公司转型为AI服务器企业的公司,据称该公司把 NVIDIA 的产品目录用 Photoshop 合成到官网,还声称招募了在 LinkedIn 上无法核实的员工。
  • 发现 Resolve AI 的筛选器,寻找的是公司名称突然加入“AI”的更名记录。Meng称,做空组合今年取得正收益,自基金成立以来做空表现为正;她用波动性更低的长期下行股平衡高波动标的。

2. 无聊空头正在奏效——这与1999—2000年如出一辙

  • Soren Aandahl的判断是,涨势的市场宽度窄到“众数股票在下跌”,这与他对1999—2000年的研究特征一致。他的应对是“避开脱衣派对”("avoiding the topless parties")。
  • 他的农业空头研究霍尔木兹海峡关闭、化学品、化肥和硫酸盐价格,沿供应链追踪其影响,并推演这些因素对种植者播种决策的后果,最终落到几乎没有散户或 Twitter 关注的冷门公司。

3. 私人资本蜂拥而入会毁掉好生意,发起方也显得承压

  • Zachary Datikash沿着资本周期追踪私募信贷和私募股权,认为机会既在基金管理人和BDC,也在资本扎堆进入的企业。他以Mister Car Wash为例:洗车店可以是极佳生意,但1英里半径内开出3家门店,单位经济性就会明显恶化。
  • Jim Chanos补充了Planet Fitness的案例:PE持有的健身房即使单位经济性极差,仍承受着扩张压力;扩张速度一旦放缓,增长故事也随之瓦解。
  • 在基金管理人方面,Datikash称他认为 Brookfield 的AUM超过1万亿美元、有形净资产为负,对照美国1.5万亿美元的高收益债市场。他提醒,这些数字“可能并不全都准确”,投资者也已经对该业务的规模化能力过于乐观。Chanos插话说:“这就是个简单生意,就是从最上面抽钱。”

4. 亚洲提供信息不对称,终值数学放大服务业空头空间

  • Meng称其基金国际敞口超过50%,对中国、大中华区和印度都有较大敞口,同时持有大量AI供应链敞口——做多“真实AI”、做空“假AI”——并利用信息不对称、较差的报告标准和企业质量指标虚高。
  • 她聚焦终值重估下的长期下行股,尤其是在中国AI快速演进的周期中。终值增长率每变化1个百分点,DCF就可能摆动8–15%,因此传统软件和商品化商业服务,尤其是印度的BPO和联络中心服务,可以提供较大的下行不对称性。她称基金已经从印度这些大额空头中赚了很多钱。

5. AI颠覆是真实的,泡沫在历史上也同样真实

  • Aandahl的历史视角涵盖互联网,也涵盖1850年代的铁路。革命性技术可以重塑社会与商业,也可能制造巨大泡沫,令高估值企业和基金走向破产。
  • Chanos给出的支持数据是:1986—1996和1997—2007两个时期,美国GDP增速与标普企业利润增速均约为6%的CAGR。他说:“我们没有因为GFC而扣分”,并认为中国开放带来的影响远大于互联网,尽管互联网确实带来了深刻变化。
  • Datikash看到了软件行业的新动态。在对145家全球软件公司进行复盘时——这些公司的市值至少在“当时”超过10亿美元——他指出,一款更低价的销售自动化产品可以一夜之间加入客户想要的功能,直接消除客户为竞品支付更高价格的理由。这意味着所有人都在彼此竞争;他把这个问题延伸到了服务自动化和咨询行业。
  • Meng认为,软件超过80%的毛利率并不意味着写代码仍然是同样强的竞争壁垒,尤其对轻量级、前台型点解决方案而言。服务业所需工时可能出现大幅通缩,由此带来棘手的价格弹性问题。在不确定市场中,她预计估值会跟随盈利下调或远期年度预测修正而动;虽然行业龙头已经经历估值下修,她更偏好覆盖较少、做空比例较低的数据公司——“如果FactSet已经被打得很惨,为什么不看看Morningstar?”——因为数据容易被抓取。
  • 她更广义的K型经济主题包括疲弱的消费环境、中低端白领工作,以及可能带来通缩的AI劳动力。她认为AI可能生成优于知识工作底部25%的产出,而这部分工作涉及美国45%的人口;她看到的估算认为,新增算力中60–70%会替代人力资本,并提到大型科技公司的大规模裁员。这一变化可能需要数年,持续时间也未知,但她认为这是多空价差策略的肥沃环境。
Jim Chanos

So, I'd like to take the rest of our time and talk to the panelists a little bit in light of the speculative environment of the markets, and also sort of a bifurcation that's occurring in the markets between AI and certain tech spending and lots of other stocks that are kind of going nowhere or going down. Where are you finding—and I know you're not thematic investors, all 3 of you. You're all stock guys and girls—but where are you finding interesting places to look? Joyce, you mentioned something you kind of avoid. Where are you basically avoiding in the current market? Joyce, why don't you start?

1. Fake AI Creates Short Opportunities

Joyce Meng

Yeah, definitely. I think the reality is that, for shorts, we always look for variant perception and a catalyst. We are a little bit more thematic in our shorts because we think a rising tide lifts all boats, and a cresting tide takes down a lot of names in the same neighborhood.

One of our favorite themes, especially in a market where you have an AI frenzy and everyone is trying to jump into it, is fake AI. We've been short a Chinese company that used to be a home decoration company and turned into an AI server company. They Photoshopped NVIDIA's product catalog to put it on their website and said they hired some people. We looked them up on LinkedIn, and they did not have the people they claimed.

There's just a lot of that. One of our favorite screens, and how we found Resolve AI, was name changes that suddenly had AI in them. We actually think it's a really rich market environment for shorts. Our short book is up this year, and we've had positive short performance from the fund's inception.

I do think that, thematically, trying to find where there's excess—where people claim something is good and claim they have it, but actually don't—is a really rich ideation opportunity for us. You can ballast it with secular decliners that don't have the same volatility as some of these spicier shorts.

Jim Chanos

Got it. Soren?

2. Boring Shorts Beat AI Hype

Soren Aandahl

I think our best shorts this year have been in the more boring areas—avoiding the topless parties, basically. Things like agriculture. If you look at the breadth of the rally, the breadth of the rally is really narrow, right? It's just a few stocks that are ripping. Actually, the modal stock is down. The performance, if you look at the wider market, has been really tough.

We think that's pretty emblematic of 1999 and 2000 and what it looked like back then, at least based on our study of it. In that context, some of the more boring stuff has actually been working really well. We've got a couple of shorts in the agriculture field where we're looking at the closures of the Straits of Hormuz and what's happening in chemicals.

Look at the prices of fertilizers and sulfates around the world. That has consequences in the supply chain. That has consequences for how growers and farmers plant. It's going to show up in companies that you've probably never heard of and that certainly someone in their mom's basement with a wife-beater on is not blogging about on Twitter.

It's just avoiding those types of high-retail, high-Twitter, a little bit more boring shorts that have actually worked for us this year.

Jim Chanos

Yeah, Zach?

Zachary Datikash

Yeah, definitely avoiding AI, right? I mean, avoiding AI has been a good place to start. I think we've mostly avoided AI, and we've done pretty well from the shorts this year as well. We're up on an absolute basis as well.

3. Private Capital Faces Scrutiny

I think what's interesting is that we follow the capital cycle a lot, and we do some thematic shorts. The one that people are talking more about is probably what's going on in private credit and private equity. There's been a lot of money going there for a very, very long time, and I think the story has changed a little bit.

People are looking for proof in the pudding, and there are interesting shorts to be done in that space as well, but also in the areas where they've gotten involved. What ends up happening is that they find something that's very, very interesting and then they just pile in, basically.

For instance, Mister Car Wash—I think that's one you've talked about in the past. It's an interesting company. Car washes are really, really good businesses, but if there are 3 opening up within a 1-mile radius, all of a sudden it's not a good business.

We're finding more and more of that: something that was a very, very good business, a very steady business, with excellent customer dynamics and low customer acquisition costs is all of a sudden beginning to look like a much, much worse business because so much money is piled in. You don't get to see that, right? These are private companies, and all of a sudden they have lots of locations and lots of revenue. Competition just works over the long term.

Jim Chanos

There are even publicly traded companies that have private equity components. An old name of ours, Planet Fitness, has been down this year because private equity companies owned the gyms and felt the need to expand, but the unit economics were terrible. They cut back on the expansion, and the growth story fell apart. Private equity works its way into some of these companies in interesting ways.

Are you looking at any of the private equity sponsors or the BDCs?

Zachary Datikash

Oh, we're looking at those, too. There are obviously some very, very interesting numbers out there. If you look at what the Street expects for assets under management for many of these companies, it's just—these are enormous numbers, enormous numbers.

I think Brookfield has over $1 trillion of AUM with negative tangible equity. Just to size that, the entire high-yield market in the United States is $1.5 trillion. All of a sudden, you have these companies that are going to manage more than the high-yield market. That's very, very interesting to us.

Obviously, there is no underlying accounting. These companies are not lying, but what's interesting about that is just—

Jim Chanos

It's a simple business. You take money off the top, right?

Zachary Datikash

It might not all be accurate, but other than that, you know. They're relatively simple businesses. I think people have gotten carried away with how well this business can do with a lot more money.

Jim Chanos

Joyce, U.S. or Asia?

4. Asia Broadens The Short Book

Joyce Meng

We do both, actually. Our fund is over 50% international, and we have a lot in China, greater China, and India.

Jim Chanos

Good. On the margin, more in Asia these days or more in the U.S.?

Joyce Meng

Asia has done really great. I think we own a lot in the AI supply chain, so we own real AI against fake AI. But I also think Asia is an area where it's very easy to get some information asymmetry, especially given sometimes poor reporting standards and business-quality inflation metrics and things like that.

China, especially, is usually a very exciting place to find shorts. Where we're focused right now is both secularly declining businesses, because terminal value is being repriced, and the AI cycle is really fast in China.

There's always an opportunity to find some unique company that does something weird and then gets a big valuation, and you can always short that. For us, it's all single-name, individual-name ideas. With tech cycles, what people underappreciate is that a 1% change in terminal growth rates can swing your DCF by 8% to 15%.

If you can find terminal-disruption stories, especially in legacy software and business services—and we have a lot of that both in the U.S. and Asia—in India, a big services economy, you can imagine how meaningful that would be for the economy, especially in commoditized BPO and contact centers and things like that. We've made a lot of money on large shorts there.

You get the asymmetry to the downside because, to the point of micro themes, it's a very tough space.

5. AI Threatens Incumbent Profits

Jim Chanos

You talked about fake AI companies, but I want to broaden that out a little bit. Since this is a glass-half-empty panel, and we're going to hear about AI all day, where do you think AI may disrupt, much like the Internet took analog businesses that were in the business of making or distributing an analog product and just crushed profit margins as the cost of a bit and the cost of transmitting a bit went to 0?

AI may very well do the same thing in a lot of businesses. Are you thinking at all about that, looking out a handful of years—the ultimate disruptive power of an amazing technology? Soren, I'll ask this question of all 3 of you to take us home.

Soren Aandahl

Yeah, I agree. Capitalism destroys as well as builds. At our fund, we're very much students of history. The analogs that we look for are not only the Internet, but also railroads in the 1850s. We look at revolutionary technologies that changed the way the world operates, the way commerce and capitalism are organized, and the way society is organized.

Yet that also was responsible for the bankruptcy of many of the firms and funds that traded at very high levels. What investors sometimes confuse is that they look at Claude and say, “Holy smokes, this is going to change the way that I do business,” without recognizing that the same was true with railroads and the Internet.

Despite the life-changing and society-changing impact, it still resulted in a massive market bubble, and it resulted in a lot of the companies that were the early purveyors of these things going completely bust.

And that's the lens with which we're trying to approach our shorts, basically. Jim Chanos

I would point out, before Zach, you answer, that we took a look at U.S. GDP growth in the 10 years prior to Netscape and the 10 years post-Netscape, basically 1997 to 2007. We didn't penalize it for the GFC, and U.S. GDP growth was exactly the same in both periods.

Corporate profitability growth, measured by the S&P, was also exactly the same: 1986 to 1996 and 1997 to 2007, at about 6% compound annual growth. So, there's no doubt the Internet changed many things. It didn't have a super-huge impact. The opening up of China, for example, had a much bigger impact than the Internet did, interestingly.

Jim Chanos

Zach, why would you answer that question?

Zachary Datikash

I mean, definitely, there's a lot of change, right? It's very visible. The way we used to do work two years ago versus a year ago versus now is very, very different, so everyone's doing their work very, very differently.

6. Software Faces Instant Competition

Take an easy one. I think we did this about two or three months ago. We looked at the software universe, and there were 145 software companies around the world, at least back then, with a billion-plus market cap. I mean, 145 doing some little thing. Some of them are as big as CRM and SAP; others are much, much smaller, doing something much, much smaller.

When you think about the dynamics of what's happening in software, what happens? Let's say company X does sales force automation and company Y does sales force automation. All of a sudden, if I'm a customer and I'm saying, "Well, I really wanted this feature, and before I was going to turn off the one that charges me $1,000 and buy one for $2,000 that really had that feature," the one that charges you $1,000 can make that feature you want literally overnight, right?

That has a massive effect on everything, because everyone all of a sudden is competing with everyone else. Where this goes, I don't know, but that's not a great dynamic, right? I'm sure you can keep going with that, right?

The services are very, very interesting. What is service automation? What do consultants do? There are lots of really, really interesting questions that this opens up, and I think you have to keep an open mind about how things are changing. The nature of work is changing in very big ways.

Jim Chanos

Joyce, last words.

Joyce Meng

Yeah, I echo a lot of the things that have already been said. I do think that software has 80%-plus gross profit margins, and creating code is no longer as much of a competitive advantage, especially if you're a point-solution, light-touch application that's front-office-facing. For services, it's massively potentially deflationary in terms of hours, and so it becomes a very difficult question of price elasticity.

When the market is uncertain, you will see valuations follow earnings cuts or out-year earnings revisions. We think a lot of the bellwether names have already de-rated. So, in business services, we like the niche-ier stuff that's a little hidden. If people have crushed FactSet, why not Morningstar? We like looking at those where there's less coverage, not that much short interest, and you can play that commoditization of data, especially since it's so easy to scrape and get that.

But the second thing I think about AI labor is, to the point you mentioned about productivity, the internet didn't really impact jobs or labor the same way that China did. I think what's unique about AI is that it's creating output that maybe is better than the bottom 25th percentile of that. And the white-collar knowledge worker, which is 45% of the U.S. population, especially in those more core, commodity, replicable services—what's the future for that?

A broader short theme we've been doing is the K-shaped economy. Consumer has been tough, especially with this Iran war and gas prices. But at the lower end, especially in lower-end white-collar work, which is different for the first time, right? Versus blue-collar work, where everyone quit their job to become a plumber. I think that is something that's still to be determined.

If it's overbuilt—and we know these always end up overbuilt—but it might take years. You don't know the duration. Sixty to 70% of the additional compute being built is substituting for human capital. We've seen some of the big layoffs in the tech firms, and these are higher-paying jobs, right? The white-collar jobs that people actually went to school for.

So, I think it's a fundamental change. No one knows yet, but I think it's a really rich environment for long-short spreads.