[BidClub_]
Yet Another Value Podcast · · 44 分钟

市场总体看法与Humm变革的理由:Jeremy Raper

Andrew WalkerJeremy Raper

YouTube
TL;DR
  • Jeremy Raper停止公开发表,是因为面向付费读者写作开始扭曲他的投资方向。 他的优势仍在于被市场忽视、被误解的小盘和中盘深度价值股,通常还带有事件催化剂;但公开写作把他推向了与其认为最赚钱的风格和市值规模不同的想法。停止发表后,他感到“如释重负”(“the lifting of a weight”)。他仍在撰写私人备忘录,但也承认主动找上门的投资想法和人脉关系减少,让这一决定“并非纯粹的胜利”。

  • 日本大盘激进投资交易可能已进入第6或第7局,但Raper认为,市值约低于5亿-7亿美元、当然也包括低于10亿美元的区域性公司,仍处于第2或第3局。 东京证券交易所推动的公司治理、ROE和市净率压力,只是缓慢传导至东京以外的家族经营企业。按0.4-0.5倍账面价值买入、同时拥有净现金或接近负企业价值的公司,即便4年后只能拿回一半现金,仍可能实现60-70%的回报。Walker回应:“算我一个。”

  • Walker的核心质疑是,日本剩余的低估标的,可能恰恰是激进投资者最难施加影响的公司。 家族信托分散在几十名后代手中,仍可能合计控制25%;交叉持股和内部人持股也可能让名义上10%的激进投资者仓位失去效果。Raper承认会有顽固的阻力方——“可能我持有的全都是”——但他认为,如今改革方向的确定性已经超过实现周期拉长的风险。

  • 英国股市从统计指标看很便宜,但Raper自己的记录——可能10个项目赢1个,或12-15个项目在3年内赢2个——说明治理问题足以吞噬估值折价。 他的代表性案例是Cambria Automobiles(CAMB):一场报价不足的管理层收购以现金收购股份,同时提供名义上自愿、实际上无法使用的滚存安排,换成一只已退市证券。投资者实际上被要求继续“铐在”试图压价收购他们的管理团队身边,而独立专家甚至可以认定这一安排“并不公平,但合理”。

  • Raper与一名立场一致的股东合计持有humm group略高于9%的股份,已发起2月19日股东特别大会,要求改组董事会。 6项决议将罢免4名董事中的3名,包括持股近30%的董事长;任命Raper及另一名候选人;并防止现任董事会在投票前增补董事。Raper个人持股5.7%,并投入约2000万澳元自有资金:“我把全部身家都押在这场博弈里”(“I have the whole shebang in the game”)。

  • Raper对HUMM的投资逻辑是“好公司、坏治理”,核心资产是一项保持两位数增长、损失率低于ANR的2%的商业资产融资业务。 消费金融组合表现不一,但公司在全球金融危机和COVID期间都没有亏损。以每股0.76-0.77澳元的有形资产、同业约10倍盈利或至少按有形账面价值计价为参照,董事长提出的每股0.58澳元方案对应约5倍盈利和0.7倍有形资产。

  • 让Raper主张罢免董事会的,不只是董事长报价本身,更是董事会处理该报价的方式。 董事会允许近5个月尽调,却没有要求停牌期、进行市场检验或准备资本回报替代方案;直到股东提交罢免董事议案后,才披露一份可信的第三方每股0.77澳元报价,董事长随后又买入约3%的股份。Raper认为,新的董事会可以建立分红政策、分配超额现金、开展战略评估、调查前任董事会的行为,并防止少数股东最终以“严重低估”的价格被收购。

摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. 公开写作反过来成为投资流程的负担

  • Raper约在2013或2014年开始在Seeking Alpha发表文章,因为写作能“给一个投资想法施加外部纪律”。如果无法在纸面上把投资逻辑“连贯且严密地”展开,他就会怀疑这套逻辑是否真的可行;Walker也认同,许多尚未解决的问题,往往只有在思路落到纸面上后才会暴露。

  • 他的第二个目标,是在还没有可观资本或正式基金经理业绩记录时,先建立一份“智识履历”。他希望公开推荐最终能帮助自己募集大笔外部资金;但回头看,他的评价很直接:这“完全没有成为现实”,尽管写作本身仍然提升了他的投资能力。

  • 10-12年后,广泛的付费读者开始影响他的选股。Raper最擅长的领域,是市场覆盖不足、带有事件催化剂的小盘和中盘深度价值股;但流动性有限,使这些标的不适合管理9位数资金的读者。公开写作因此把他推向了与其认为最赚钱的风格和市值规模不同的方向,尽管Twitter等案例是重大例外。

  • Raper已经不再需要订阅收入,写作带来的压力开始超过乐趣,于是重新主要为自己写作。主动找上门的想法和关系减少,是他公开承认并感到遗憾的代价;但摆脱写作义务,也让他能够回到最初的策略。他还指出,美国事件驱动机会已经变得竞争更激烈、波动更大,也有更多写作者挤入。

2. 日本剩余机会已下沉至市场底部

  • Raper不认同私募股权界认为日本激进投资仍普遍处于第2或第3局的说法。对于大盘和中上盘公司,他认为显而易见的事件驱动和公司治理“低垂果实”已经摘取到第6或第7局;尽管过去12-24个月简单买入已披露的激进投资目标,本身仍能创造“惊人的alpha”。

  • 这一制度性催化剂始于Abenomics,随后在东京证券交易所重组上市板块、将Prime板上市资格与公司治理、独立董事、ROE和市净率要求挂钩后进一步加速。这些要求直到约4年前才真正形成压力,具体的市净率和ROE压力又在随后3年明显增强;改革几乎还没有传导到市场规模较小的一端。

  • Raper希望提前布局“冰球将要滑向的方向”:东京以外、通常位于Nagoya或Osaka等区域城市的家族经营企业,它们尚未接受新的监管和治理体系。在日本这个高度分散的市场里,“小盘”可以指低于10亿美元、尤其是低于约5亿-7亿美元的公司,这一范围内潜在目标有数百家。

  • Walker的反驳来自结构性障碍:区域性公司往往同时存在家族持股和复杂的交叉持股网络,几十名各持有50个基点股份的后代,可以合计形成25%的阻断性持股。Raper没有否认这一障碍,但在0.4-0.5倍账面价值、巨额净现金或接近负企业价值的情况下,他认为等待是可以接受的:即便4年后只能拿回一半现金,也仍可能获得60-70%的回报。

3. 英国低估背后藏着昂贵的治理漏洞

  • Raper很认同英国股票按传统统计指标衡量并不贵,但他的个人结果“相当糟糕”——大约10个项目赢1个,或者12-15个项目在3年内赢2个。他认为问题不在估值,而在公司治理框架允许足以摧毁折价的行为,尤其是在小盘股、收购交易以及大股东与少数股东博弈中。

  • Cambria Automobiles(CAMB)是他最典型的案例。管理层提出报价不足的现金收购,同时向反对股东提供滚存安排,让独立专家可以主张少数股东在技术上并未被迫出售;但实际上,大多数小股东无法继续持有退市证券,而滚存条款可能把他们锁在试图压价收购自己的管理团队身边。

  • Raper称,这种结构可以绕过胁迫性测试:即使滚存安排在经济上缺乏吸引力,专家仍可认定报价“并不公平,但合理”,因为股东获得了出售之外的另一种选择。他还提到Hunter Douglas:一份以65为基准签署认可的意见,在遭到异议后被提高到80多;当时股权价值最初约为120,之后升至接近160,并在6个月内以约165-170的价格出售给第三方。

  • Walker以生物科技并购中的公平意见为例强化了这一点:一份意见可能认可40的出售价,随后又认可60的更高报价。两人的案例都说明,名义上的替代方案或修改后的报价,足以让“公平”变得高度可塑。

4. HUMM兼具现金创造核心与利益冲突董事会

  • Raper持有humm group约5.7%的股份,他与一名立场一致的股东合计持有略高于9%。HUMM是一家规模约3.25亿澳元的澳大利亚非银行贷款机构,董事长持股略低于30%;Raper已投入约2000万澳元自有资金,并形容自己不只是把利益押在桌上,而是已经“梭哈”。

  • 商业部门是公司的“明珠”:它是澳大利亚规模最大、最成功的成长型资产担保融资业务之一,连续4年或5年保持两位数增长,并持续创造现金,损失率低于ANR的2%。消费金融业务更不均衡,覆盖澳大利亚、New Zealand、英国和Ireland的信用卡业务;但英国业务刚刚实现盈利,Ireland表现良好,New Zealand在增长有限的情况下仍保持盈利。

  • Raper强调,他批评的是董事会层面的管理,而不是公司当前的经营。管理层在长期人员流动后相对较新,CEO没有董事席位,所有董事都是非执行董事;他认为,这些名义上独立的董事实际上已经被董事长的偏好所左右。

  • HUMM在全球金融危机和COVID期间都没有亏损。公司披露约1.25亿澳元非受限现金,对应6000万澳元公司债务,但公司对“非受限现金”的会计定义存在异议;Raper估计其中至少有6000万-7000万澳元真正不受限制。董事长提出0.58澳元报价时,公司每股有形资产为0.76-0.77澳元。

5. 0.58澳元报价暴露了围绕董事长运转的流程

  • 董事长的6月报价是在一名持股5%的股东卖出股份、股价被压至A$0.40多的中高位后提出的;因此,表面上25-30%的溢价是相对于Raper认为没有代表性的最后成交价计算的。按约5倍盈利和0.7倍有形资产计价,该报价对应的估值低于约10倍盈利甚至更高的同业;Raper认为最便宜的同业也接近有形账面价值,而Shinsei Financial出售其澳大利亚消费直接贷款业务时,价格约为有形资产的1.2倍。

  • 在此前一年,HUMM偿还了约5700万-5800万澳元的夹层、类债务工具,而业务创造了约5500万澳元经调整现金收益。Raper认为,公司本可以把相近金额分配给股东:以当时约2.5亿澳元的市值计算,将这些收益作为股息派发,意味着接近25%的股息率,而行业股息率约为7-8%。

  • Raper第一时间告知董事会,该报价“侮辱性”“荒谬”,显然不可能赢得股东批准。尽管如此,董事会仍允许近5个月的尽调,既没有停牌期,也没有市场检验,更没有独立准备最佳谈判替代方案(BATNA);报价破裂后,董事长仍可自由增持股份。Walker称,缺乏停牌期已经进入“渐进式收购”的范畴。

  • Walker还单独质疑董事长在报价期间参与股价敏感事项,包括出席讨论年度账目的会议;他同时提到媒体报道,称董事长曾对一季度交易更新进行粉饰或修改。Raper认同董事长参与了偿还债务、而不是建立正式分红政策的决定,并称公司的一举一动都留下了他的手印。两人的更广泛指控是:在竞购方董事长从公司内部审阅公司的同时,董事们无视少数股东,也无视基本的治理防护措施。

6. 2月投票决定少数股东能否获得另一种选择

  • 这场治理争议在股东大会上进一步升级。正式会议通知称董事长将支持一项比例收购防御决议,但该决议在其报价结束次日被撤回,且没有给出解释;股东直到会议现场才得知他已转为反对。由于该决议需要75%的赞成票,董事长接近30%的持股本可以将其否决。

  • 协商换届方案遭拒后,Raper一方提交Section 203D通知,要求罢免董事。公司随后披露,它曾将一名可信的上市竞购方提出的0.77澳元报价搁置约1个月,期间甚至没有签署保密协议;该报价较董事长的0.58澳元报价高33%。这份报价与董事会挑战同步披露,Raper认为此举相当于让董事长在信息公开后恢复交易自由;董事长随后在2天内又买入约3%的股份。

  • 2月19日的6项决议将罢免3名现任董事,包括董事长;任命Raper及第2名候选人;并防止董事会在投票前临时增补董事。Raper承诺推动治理改革、建立可持续的分红派息政策、分配超额现金、开展全面战略评估,并调查过去12个月的董事会行为。他最后的指示异常直接:只有准备好投票,才应考虑这只股票。

完整逐字稿
Andrew Walker

Jeremy, how’s it going?

Jeremy Raper

Hey, buddy. I’m good. Thanks for having me, and congratulations on your second arrival. It’s great news. I hope everything’s going well.

Andrew Walker

I know you have, too. Maybe I’ll have to get some pointers for how to survive and invest while doing two, because right now it’s tough.

Jeremy, it’s been a while since we caught up. Let’s just start. We’re recording this in early January 2026. What’s going on in the world of Jeremy Raper? How are things over there? What’s on your mind?

Jeremy Raper

Things are good. I don’t actually know when we last did a pod, so I feel like there might be a lot to catch up on. I guess the major changes that have happened in the last 12 to 18 months are that I obviously stopped writing the blog full-time in mid-2026—March, April, or May 2026—so it’s been a good 8- or 9-month period since I stopped writing the blog.

Andrew Walker

I miss it. Every couple of months, I miss it.

Jeremy Raper

That’s kind of you. I think I articulated at the time why I stopped, so some people might be interested in hearing about that.

I’ve been writing and being in the public domain on and off for the better part of 12 or 13 years. I think the first article I published was on Seeking Alpha back in, I want to say, 2013 or 2014, and I extended my output online since then.

The original reason I started writing, and the reason why I then evolved that into a formal blog where I would talk about specific stocks, and eventually into a paid blog, was that I obviously enjoyed writing and it was helpful to my investment process. But that was the main reason initially why I started. It wasn’t because I wanted to be known or become a personality—nothing like that. I simply found writing helpful in developing and fine-tuning the investment process because it imposes an external discipline on an idea.

Andrew Walker

There’s a quote—I completely agree, and I’m actually working on a post now. People are going to think you came up with it, but I can show them there’s a quote from Warren Buffett in one of his shareholder meetings. It might have been in 2000 or even in the ’90s. They asked him, “Why do you write?” He said, “Sometimes I don’t even know what I’m thinking until I start putting my thoughts on a page.”

To me, I say it all the time. I’ve told people my returns are better when I write something than when I don’t write something. When I write something, a lot of times there’ll be a question. I’ll write a paragraph, and there’ll be a question that’s obvious at the end. In my head, I thought it was answered, but when you put it on paper, you’re like, “Oh, no. This question has not been addressed.” You can keep pulling that thread.

I’m completely with you. Sorry to ramble. I’d love to continue to hear your story.

Jeremy Raper

No, no. I found something similar. If you cannot coherently and cogently develop and explain an investment thesis—now, that doesn’t mean it has to be short—but if you cannot coherently and cogently develop an investment thesis on paper, is it really a good investment thesis? Is it really a workable investment idea?

Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn’t. Obviously, there were times when I thought I had developed a cogent investment thesis on paper and the idea didn’t work. Similarly, there were times when I didn’t, and I had investments that did work. But for the most part, I found it overall highly additive to my investment process.

Back then, I was also trying to develop what I would call an intellectual track record. I didn’t have a lot of money back then, and I didn’t have a formal track record as a portfolio manager, but I aspired to one day run money professionally. I thought that if I didn’t have a formal PM track record but I had an intellectual track record, then I could somehow parlay that at some point into raising substantial outside funds.

That actually didn’t turn out to be true at all. But then, 10 or 12 years on from that, having developed a certain style, a certain amount of credibility, and having accumulated enough savings to be able to just invest as I saw fit, the calculus around specifically publishing for other people to read became quite different.

I still write memos for myself, and I still write things that are maybe not as extensive or long-form for myself. I still try to derive a lot of that original benefit, but the calculus around specifically seeking out investment ideas for the purposes of writing them up for an audience—and increasingly for a paying audience—I found recently started to distort my investment process.

This obviously wasn’t a quick discovery. It happened over a period of time, and you and I talked offline about this a good 6 to 9 months before I made the ultimate decision. You probably recall.

I found that over time, instead of focusing on where I had developed a clear edge and a clear winning strategy, which was in undercovered, misunderstood, deep-value, smaller- or medium-market-cap situations, often going through an event situation, I started moving away from that. A lot of those situations have limited liquidity, right? They would have been actionable by someone like me investing at the time with 7 figures or even 8 figures, but not 9 figures.

Because I was writing for a wider audience at that point, having developed a 10- or 12-year audience, I was gravitating toward ideas in styles and sizes that were largely divergent from where I was making the most money—or at least where I believed I was making the most money. There were some big exceptions.

This is why it took me quite a while to get to the end of that journey, because I had some of my biggest successes in some very large-capitalization stocks, like Twitter and a few other event situations in the U.S. over the years. Nevertheless, the trend was unavoidable. By early to mid-2025, the trend was moving in that direction.

I didn’t need the money. I’ll just be honest: I didn’t need the money from the subscriptions. I felt the pressure more than I enjoyed the output of writing for an audience, and it had begun to objectively distort my process.

I thought, “You know what? Move on from that.” That was a big change. Then I noticed almost the lifting of a weight—going back to my roots, in a way. I was free from that pressure, and things really picked up.

Andrew Walker

Yeah. Go on. Has the amount of inbounds changed since you stopped that? You still have your Twitter presence, and especially—we're going to talk about HomeCo—but has the amount of inbounds changed?

One of the reasons I've kept doing it—actually, a main reason I've kept doing it—is the relationship I've developed with a lot of these people, especially on the premium side. Those are your biggest fans; they're the people who choose to pay. I hate to have my friends pay, I guess, but it's honestly people I never would have connected with except for the site. Has that changed at all?

Jeremy Raper

Definitely. It's gone down a fair bit, so that's a drawback. This is not an unadulterated win; there are drawbacks. There are pros and cons, so the decision is different for everyone. It depends on the situation.

I should also mention one other thing I forgot, which is highly relevant to the decision. I had gravitated away from doing more U.S. stuff. So, when I first started writing—

Andrew Walker

I know what you're going to say. Let's not even talk about that piece. We don't need to put that in the book. Yeah.

Jeremy Raper

No, no, no, no. That's what I was going to say. I was just saying the U.S. event environment had become either more competitive, more volatile, or more difficult, or some combination of all 3. There's obviously also a proliferation of other Substacks and writers, so the writing environment had become more competitive.

The ideas you're getting in the U.S. in particular—someone, I think it was Yellow Brick Investing, which is a site I don't follow closely, but they've emerged in the last 12 months—collected a bunch of pitches from online writers and did this snapshot of all the ideas on his site. Something like 80% of them were U.S. stocks, and there was not 1 single idea on there from Australia or Japan.

I'm not here to evangelize for Australian markets or Japanese markets. I happen to be in Asia, whether I'm in Australia, Thailand, Japan, or whatever. If you're in the Asian time zone, you can do all the Asian markets.

Just by way of example, when you have a situation where all these online Substacks are attacking Western Europe and the United States, and there wasn't 1 single pitch from Japan, for example, that's kind of an argument in and of itself. I did find that focusing less on U.S. stocks also lent itself to not losing quite as much, let's say, from giving up that interactivity with the network, the client base, and the broader network. But I do miss it.

Andrew Walker

I'm glad you made that point. I thought you were going to say something else. I know you know what I thought you were going to say, but I'm glad it's okay.

Jeremy Raper

Australia—I would agree with you, though I do think I'm seeing a lot of Substacks that are increasingly writing up Australian stocks, maybe following in your footsteps. Japan, I feel like I disagree, because I feel like there are 15 different Substacks now. Maybe they are more along the deep-value side: “Hey, here's yet another Japanese stock trading for negative EV,” versus the event side. So maybe that's where the difference is, but I do think Japan is really picked over.

Let me ask you about Japan. We talked about it on our last podcast, and you and I have talked about it a lot offline.

Andrew Walker

The market for events in Japan: if we were recording this 4 years ago, the Japanese market would have been cheaper, but I think there would have been fewer angles. The Japanese market is obviously not the U.S. market, where if you trade negative EV, somebody's going to come in with an axe and force you to return capital, but there's been some progression. How are you viewing the Japanese event market today? Just in general, nothing specific, obviously.

Jeremy Raper

Yeah. The opportunity set, such as it is in Japan, is still very good. A lot of KKR long-term money or private-equity-backed capital—long-term money—says we're still in the second or third inning. I think that's not right. For the larger-cap securities, or even the larger mid-cap securities, they're probably in the 6th or 7th inning, realistically, on the pure event-driven, low-hanging-fruit-extraction and activism side.

Those who are raising multibillion-dollar funds will take umbrage with that comment, but I think that's a reasonably fair judgment. On the other hand, at the smaller end of the pond—anything, and by the way, Japan is obviously a hugely diffuse market—the smaller end of the pond is not sub-$100 million necessarily. It's probably sub-$1 billion, or definitely sub-$500–700 million. There is still a huge amount of opportunity in the multiple-hundred-company subset within that bucket.

Basically, what happened is that when Abenomics first began in the early 2010s, you had this steady progression. Really, things only kicked into high gear once the TSE, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, reorganized its subsegments to promote listings—Prime and Standard listings—where Prime listings were dependent upon things like massive corporate governance reform.

Part of that is having a certain number of women on the board and a certain number of independents on the board, but a lot of it is tied directly to return-on-equity minimums and achieving certain levels of price-to-book ratio, et cetera. It's trying to embed a management that is at least semi-conscious of the cost of its equity capital. That only became hardcore, I want to say, 4 years ago.

In the last 4 years, there have been a number of developments: obviously, the Governance Code, the Stewardship Code, and then these discrete P/B- and ROE-related targets that have been promulgated in the last 3 years. That was, let's call it, 4 years ago, with increasing vigor from then on, but that's really just trickled down from the top and has hardly made its way to the lower end of the pond.

I've been public about my views that you don't really want to go to Tokyo-based companies that are $5 billion companies where Oasis is already on the register. Actually, I'm going to contradict exactly what I just said. If you had invested in every single disclosed activist target above a certain market cap—$1 billion—24 months ago and 12 months ago, you would have generated an astounding amount of alpha. That would have been an excellent strategy.

But it's my fervent view that going forward, there's a lot more money to be made where the puck is going to be than where the puck currently is. That means looking at companies where they're still not playing ball with the new regime. They're probably based outside of Tokyo, meaning a long way from the center of political and economic power, where they are typically run by family operators, if not family owner-operators.

They're based in some backwater in regional Japan, if not third- or fourth-tier cities—Nagoya or Osaka or something like that. I think that's where the lowest-hanging fruit remains. On that basis, I think the opportunity set is probably in the second or third inning.

Andrew Walker

Using the U.S. framework, I'll just apply it here: a lot of the backwater companies, as you mentioned, are smaller, and the family has more control. While I hear you that the valuations there have not floated up with the rest of the boats, I do worry you're stepping in there.

The nice thing about billion-dollar-plus Japanese conglomerates is that there wasn't a lot of insider ownership. So yes, they were misaligned, but you could go in, buy 10%, and really affect change.

A lot of these companies might have a weird web of organizations and a little bit higher insider ownership. So you go in and say, “I bought 10%,” and they say, “Well, we've got a family trust that's been here 100 years, 50 different grandkids, and all of them own 50 basis points. That adds up to 25%. Go pound sand. We own enough that you can't do anything.” Have you run into that, or am I simplifying too much?

Jeremy Raper

No, it's definitely still a problem, and it's hard to speak in absolute terms because, of course, you still have recalcitrant companies that have webs of cross-shareholdings and will not play ball. But in the main, I've seen enough in the last 12 to 24 months to suggest that the direction of travel is clear.

Of course, there will still be holdouts. There will still be tougher situations. Probably all the ones I own will be the tougher situations, but in the main, the direction of travel is your friend. In the main, that's where the opportunity set is largest, I believe.

Again, if you're buying stuff at 0.4 of book, 0.5 of book, and it's massively net cash and borderline negative EV, then even if it takes 4 years instead of 2 years, and even if you get half the cash instead of all the cash, you'll still do very nicely.

Sure, you might not double your money in 3 years. You might only get a 60%–70% return over 4 years. Or you might not do that well either. But again, we're talking risk versus reward.

Andrew Walker

So if the downside is simply that you have an okay return rather than an exceptional return, while risking essentially no capital by buying something below net cash or whatever it is, sign me up, baby. Sign me up.

Andrew Walker

I do hear you, though. You know, this was the pitch for Japan in 2012, 2014, and 2016. I do think the interesting thing is, as you said, the larger boats have started to be lifted, and maybe some of the smaller boats haven't been lifted. But once the larger boats start getting lifted, the tide has started to rise, and eventually, as you've seen in the past, it kind of trickles down. It's really hard, once the larger boats start to get lifted, for the smaller boats.

Let me ask you about one more market, and then I want to turn to Humm Group, and then we'll turn to the second thing we're going to talk about.

One more: you mentioned that a lot of the subsets focused on Western Europe, and I do hear you, though. I mean, I've sent you emails. The UK market in particular—I've joked about it a few times on the podcast—it's an emerging market. It's an inefficient market, in my opinion. Do you think, when you were talking about how the Western markets are picked over, you would apply that to the UK market? Or do you think I'm wrong when I say I find it pretty inefficient? I think there's a lot of cheap stuff there. Or do you think, hey, it's actually been pretty picked over, Andrew? Let's go spend some time in Vietnam or Thailand. I mean, I'll spend time there anywhere, but I'm talking about the stock market, not in person.

Jeremy Raper

Okay. It's definitely undervalued. UK stocks are definitely cheap on typical valuation metrics or statistical valuation norms.

The problem I have in the UK is twofold. One is a little bit of my own personal experience there. I don't think I've made money on a UK stock. I think I might be 1 for 10 in the last 3 years, or 2 for 15, something like that. 2 for 12. It's pretty bad. So I have a personal sense that, at some point, either I don't quite understand what's going on, or my sense for that market is somehow off.

I think it relates to this idea that, while it is incredibly statistically cheap, the governance framework is not robust enough. Or I should rather say, in situations that I've been involved in, often at the small-cap end of the pond—event situations, takeout situations, majority-minority takeout situations—the governance framework has been so poor as to allow pretty bad behavior, frankly, that has ultimately been destructive of shareholder value, such that even in the ones where I've won, I haven't won.

Just to give you an example that should be familiar to a lot of value investors on your channel, Cambria Automobiles, CAMB, was taken out in a management buyout about 4 years ago. Maybe it was 3 years ago, and it was a very, very close vote. But they used a trick in convincing the shareholders to sell—a trick that you often see in some markets, but you don't often see in the US because the governance structure is just better there. It's a trick you see in some other markets, too, but I've particularly noticed it in the UK, and it's really put a dampener on my view of the UK.

They offer a cash consideration for a takeout, and it's wildly insufficient. If the cash consideration were the only option, either the FCA would step in or the fairness opinion would not be able to be granted. So, in the vast majority of majority-minority takeouts, the independent expert will give a fairness opinion. They have to say something like, “This is fair and reasonable to minorities,” or, “This is not fair, but it's reasonable to minorities.” You can really finesse that. Obviously, these independent expert opinions are bought and paid for, but up to a certain limit.

This was the case when we did Hunter Douglas back in the day, right? You have a fairness opinion that says it's worth 65, while fair value is 150. That's just not going to fly. But if the truth—

Andrew Walker

RA Capital published this great piece, and they've been on a lot of boards for biotech mergers. They were saying, “Sometimes you'll get a fairness opinion that says it's fair to sell at 40, and then you'll get a topping bid at 60. Then they'll come in with a fairness opinion that says it's fair to sell at 60.” You'll be like, “Wait, you just signed off on 40, and now it's 60?”

Jeremy Raper

I mean, look, Hunter Douglas signed off on 65. We complained—I complained—and they raised it to 80-something. The value of the equity had started at 120, and it went from 120 to 160. Within 6 months, they sold to a third party at 165. The same board that signed off on a 60 bid, 6 months later, signed off on a third-party transaction at 170 or whatever it was.

It happens a lot, but specifically, the workaround they found in the UK—or that seems to be used by highly opportunistic management teams—is they offer a cash consideration, then they offer a rollover option to those who don't want to take the cash consideration. Then they pitch it to their shareholders, saying, “Listen, no one's forcing you to take the cash. If you want to stay, stay with us and roll forward.”

I got involved in a couple of fights in Australia around ASX delistings. The reality is that the vast majority of small equity owners cannot hold a delisted security.

Andrew Walker

And the rollover terms I've seen are so onerous. You just don't know what you're getting. It's designed so that no one can do it.

Jeremy Raper

Of course. Of course it is. Even if they set up a velvet feather bed for you to jump into and just hang out there for 3 years in some cushy vehicle, it's so wholly unattractive to be locked up with a management team that just screwed you, and that oftentimes has related-party transactions going on in the background within your investment.

Andrew Walker

I mean, that's almost always the case. When they're willing to rip you off to an extent that you complain about something like this, there are further related-party transactions, right? Jeremy Raper

So you're essentially being handcuffed into an agreement with someone that's already tried to screw you, or is screwing you, essentially.

Then you're being told by the independent expert, “Okay, it might not be fair, but it's reasonable because they've offered you the option not to sell your shares.” The regulatory rule, the rule of law, often in these situations, is that these kinds of majority-minority coercion tactics are only not allowed if the regulator deems that you're being forced or coerced to sell your shares at an undervalue.

Technically, under the letter of the law, if they offer a rollover option—even a fundamentally shitty rollover offer—then that technically is not coercive, right?

Andrew Walker

Even if they offer a shitty, fundamentally shitty rollover offer—

It's a great point. I know of a few where the company went private, and then 2 months later they sold a division that nobody even knew they had—a startup division that no one even realized they had—and they sold it for 50% of the enterprise value or something. It was literally valued by all shareholders at zero. They go private, take it out, and then, 4 years later—

Jeremy Raper

Yeah.

Andrew Walker

You've been very active and very public. The question we got the most was Humm in Australia. You've been very active, and there's an upcoming vote. I'd love for you to— you've been on this for 9 months, I'd say. I can't remember the exact time, but maybe you could quickly summarize, for people who haven't been following the whole thing, what's happened there, how you got involved, and what the game plan is.

Jeremy Raper

Well, I don't know how I'm going to summarize this quickly. Maybe keep it to very broad strokes.

Okay, so look, it's all public information. I personally own about a 5.7% position in Humm Group. Humm Group is a non-bank financial lender listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. The market cap is about 325 million Australian dollars. It's a smallish company.

As many followers will know, it's a quasi-controlled company. The chairman owns just under 30% of the company. I, along with another shareholder acting in concert, own, call it, 9%—maybe just over 9%—of the company, and we've called an extraordinary general meeting to propose full board renewal at the company.

This meeting will be held on February 19, so about a month from now. We're recording this on January 15, so about a month and change. At that EGM, we'll be proposing 6 resolutions. 3 of them are for the removal of current directors, including the chairman. The current board has 4 people.

We're proposing to remove 3 and add 2, including myself and another gentleman, to the board. The sixth resolution is essentially a protection resolution to protect us from the incumbent board adding additional directors between now and the date of the meeting. Essentially, I'm asking all shareholders to support my call for board renewal, because this is a company that's been woefully mismanaged under the stewardship of the chair. I should say: mismanaged at the board level, not the operational level.

This is one of those good-company, bad-governance situations where the underlying business is actually doing fine. The operational executives, while new due to chronic turnover as a result of the chair's mismanagement, have been doing fine, and the business is doing okay to well. The CEO of the company is not on the board. None of the board members are executives; all of them are either nominally independent but not really, or non-independent but non-executive, meaning the chair.

Essentially, what I'm proposing is simply to fix the governance culture and the alignment of the board, which has demonstrated itself to be captive to the whims of the chairman. If we do that, then I'm hopeful it will lead to a rerating in the stock, which I think is obviously very cheap. I put A$20 million of my own money, which I earn in the market, into this stock, so you could say I have skin in the game. More realistically, I have the whole shebang in the game.

I have a significant personal investment. I bought it slightly below market prices, but not meaningfully different from market prices, so I'm pot-committed on this. So, what's been going on at Humm?

Big picture, this is a non-bank financial lender. They have 2 segments: 1 is called commercial, and 1 is called consumer. There's a bit of a good-co, bad-co split there. It's a very simplistic overview, but essentially, commercial is a jewel. It's 1 of the largest and most successful growing asset-backed finance businesses in Australia.

The consumer business is a bit more of a hodgepodge of different things. They have a cards business in New Zealand, a cards business in Australia, and a cards business in the UK and Ireland. Some of these are in various stages of maturity. The UK business just turned profitable. The Irish business is doing quite well. The New Zealand business hasn't really grown but is still highly profitable. The Aussie business is a bit more of a hodgepodge.

If you've been following the non-bank lending space, or the direct-to-consumer lending space, over the last 4 or 5 years, you'll understand that buy now, pay later has kind of upended that business. There's a lot of competition in the direct-to-consumer, unbanked, or unsecured direct-lending space. On the other hand, the commercial business is an excellent business. It's been growing double digits for the last 4 or 5 years. Loss rates, again, are a function of where we are in the cycle, but they're close enough to historical lows—under 2% of ANR—and the business just prints cash, essentially.

I don't want to go too far back into ancient history. The reason I got involved in the situation was that the chairman, as is typical, made a lowball bid for the company in June of last year. He offered 58 cents per share at a time when the stock was trading in the mid- to high-40-cent range. That was about a 25%, maybe even a 30%, premium over the last trade. But that last trade was only a function of the fact that a 5% shareholder dumped his stake the day before.

So, really, it was a low premium to the undisturbed price.

Andrew Walker

Have you followed PRTH? This is in the US domestic markets, but did you see what happened there?

Jeremy Raper

Someone brought it up to me. I did look at it quickly, but I didn't—

Andrew Walker

I have a small tracking position, so I'll disclose that. But it's very similar to what you said. The stock was at, let's call it, 8, and they reported earnings and missed analyst estimates, so the stock went from 8 to 5. The chairman owned 60%. It went from 8 to 5, and the next day he lobbed an offer: “I'll take you out for 6. This is a 20% premium. Let's go.” People were like, “Whoa, man. You can't take an illiquid stock out on a 1-day dump premium.”

Jeremy Raper

Look, he did that. I mean, just on the underlying valuation, he was offering 5 times P/E and a big discount to tangible assets. Tangible assets at the time he made the bid were about 76 or 77 cents a share, and he was offering 58. This is a highly profitable business. It had not lost money in the GFC and had not lost money in COVID. Tangible assets were, as I said, close to 80 cents a share.

Every other comparable company in the market trades at, call it, 10 times earnings. There's nothing purely apples-to-apples, but essentially, the comp set trades at 10 times earnings or above. A lot of them aren't even profitable, but they're growing very fast. They trade at 10 times earnings or above, and some of them trade north of 2, even 3, times price-to-net-tangible-assets.

The cheapest one in the group traded, I think, around net tangible assets. The cheapest transaction in this space, even during the height of COVID, was when Shinsei Financial sold its Aussie business—its Australian consumer direct-lending business—for, I think, 1.2 times price-to-net-tangible-assets. You cannot buy this stuff below price.

So, he comes in and offers 0.7 times net tangible assets and a paltry multiple of last-12-month earnings. By the way, the company has oodles of excess cash. At the time he made the offer, they reported an unrestricted cash balance of $125 million. The company will quibble with the accounting definition of unrestricted cash. They do have $60 million of corporate debt, but even just removing the corporate debt and looking at the pro forma leverage of the underlying entity, at least $60 million to $70 million of that cash is truly unrestricted.

You know that because, in the prior year, they made the decision to repay some mezzanine-financing, debt-like instrument that's accounted for as equity on the balance sheet, for I think $57 million or $58 million gross. The business generated adjusted cash income of about $55 million. They essentially took all the earnings of the business and chose to repay equity. Well, they repaid its book balance-sheet equity, but it's not buying back shares. It's a fixed obligation in terms of the requirement to pay on that liability—a nominally high interest rate, but nevertheless, it was a decision to repay a debt-like instrument instead of just returning $58 million in cash to shareholders, which they easily could have done, and just kept that debt piece outstanding.

At the time he made the bid, the market cap was $250 million. If it had just paid out those earnings as a dividend, it would have been trading on a 25% yield.

Andrew Walker

Yep. Which obviously it wouldn't, because the average yield in the sector is 7% or 8%, or whatever.

Jeremy Raper

So, a highly opportunistic offer. I come off the top rope immediately. I write to the board. My position is much smaller at the time, and I say, “Listen, no one's saying you have to sell the company. No one's saying you have to do anything. You shouldn't engage with this offer. This is an insulting offer.”

The standard for a board to engage with an offer always has to be this: first, what is the best alternative to a negotiated transaction? What is our BATNA? And second, is this transaction capable of being consummated into a binding agreement? It was a non-binding indication.

As soon as they launch the bid, socials are covered. All the shareholders are furious. Yes, he owns 30%, but there are a few other shareholders in there. I'm off the top rope. There's no chance 58 would get up. It's insulting. It's derisory. It's desultory. That was made clear from the get-go.

Despite that, the board allowed 5 months of due diligence. During that period, they did not extract a standstill agreement. They did not conduct a market test. They made no attempt to develop a BATNA. They made no attempt to return excess capital on their own for the benefit of all shareholders.

They simply opened the kimono and allowed the chairman to do as much and as deep a dive as he wanted, with no consequences for the rest of the shareholders. Because guess what happened when the deal obviously fell apart, as it was always going to do? The chair jumped into the market and started buying shares to entrench himself even further.

These matters have come to a head over a period of time, but that demonstrated that the chairman was acting in bad faith, fundamentally. There's a whole other host of problems with his behavior over the last 9 months. There are rules on undisclosed takeover offers.

Andrew Walker

Well, yes, obviously we'll get to that, but there are strict rules in Australia, as there are in any jurisdiction, where, if a person has a material personal interest in the stock price at large, they need to be stood down and/or recused from all matters that affect that stock price, right? This is in the Corporations Act, which is the governing document that sets the tone for all corporate and capital-markets legislation in this country.

He was present at board meetings discussing the annual accounts. There have been press reports alleging that he massaged and edited the 1Q trading update. He did not recuse himself from discussion of the accounts.

Jeremy Raper

He was part of that decision to pay back the debt instead of adopting a proper dividend policy. His fingerprints are all over the behavior of the company. All these matters clearly affect the stock price during the pendency of his bid, while he was supposedly conducting due diligence on the company.

So, the fact that that environment was allowed to continue; the fact that the supposedly independent members of the board willfully ignored the views of the other shareholders and would not even conduct themselves within the norms of standard good governance—or decent governance, I should say—was problem A1.

Andrew Walker

And it's the lack of a standstill that gets me. I do a lot of these. Obviously, these are U.S.-focused, and I don't want to opine on another country's laws because they can get very technical, but it's the lack of a standstill where you have him make the offer and then you don't even put a standstill in place and you let him buy.

It's a creeping takeover, right? You could get into creeping takeover territory, and I can't believe that.

Jeremy Raper

These issues are what really prompted us to go to an EGM as opposed to a consensual workout. Obviously, these issues came to the fore at the EGM, which was in November—mid-November. All these issues were given a full airing before the shareholders. We asked directly, “Why was there no standstill?” They said, “Look, we asked for a standstill. He wouldn't give it to us.” We just said, “That's not good enough.”

A standstill is M&A defense 101. As you just said, it doesn't matter what the jurisdiction is. We could be doing this in Poland. We could be doing this on the moon. There'd be a bloody standstill agreement.

Andrew Walker

And if he wants due diligence, as you're saying, there has to be a quid pro quo. If he wants due diligence, he's going to say, “You've got to do it,” or else you say, “Hey, you're not working in the interest of all shareholders. You've got to get out.”

Jeremy Raper

Look, I wish the violations just stopped with the no-standstill agreement. The reality is that the chair puts out a document called a notice of meeting before the AGM. This is signed off by the board, but it's a document put to the stock exchange. It's a quasi-legal document. It's a binding document.

That notice of meeting explains how the chair intends to vote on all the resolutions put to the meeting. In that notice of meeting, the chair stated he intended to vote for all the resolutions. One of those resolutions was a proportional takeover defense resolution. As part of explaining that resolution, the company put out a 6- or 7-page document explaining why a defense against proportional takeovers was good for all shareholders.

I don't want to get too technical, but essentially, it was a resolution that would stop someone coming in and bidding for, say, 10% or 20% of the company, thereby encroaching and creeping without offering a full control premium. He said in the notice of meeting that he would vote for that resolution at the AGM.

That resolution was withdrawn. It was withdrawn a couple of days before the meeting, the day after he dropped his bid for the company. But no explanation was given for why it was withdrawn. Only at the AGM did he disclose that he had changed his voting intention and decided to vote against that resolution as a shareholder. Therefore, he would have killed that resolution, because a 30% vote against would have killed it. It's a special resolution; you need 75% support.

He didn't make an announcement to the stock exchange. The board didn't find it problematic that the chairman of the company would not announce to the market that he had changed his voting intention before the AGM. I find it literally incredulous that the board can continue on after something like that, after making a false statement to the market.

Under continuous disclosure in the U.S., that would qualify under Regulation FD, the Fair Disclosure rules. It's a similar thing in Australia. It's called continuous disclosure. That is just insane to me.

So that happened. Then we find out that, after that, I approached the company and said, “Listen, the culture is not good enough. It needs to improve. Are you interested in pursuing consensual board renewal?” “No, we are not. Go away,” was essentially the message.

So we put in a Section 203D. Section 203D is a technical notice in Australia that says you intend to remove directors of the company at a forthcoming meeting. As soon as we popped that in, they announced to the market that they'd been sitting on a third-party bid at a 33% premium to the chairman's bid.

In other words, a third-party bidder came in and wanted to buy the company at 77 cents. The last chairman's bid, which never got anywhere—that was undercooked, I should say—was enabled by a compliant board. That was 58 cents. That got 4.5 to 5 months of due diligence. That was okay to get due diligence. At 77 cents, nothing happens for a month.

They don't even sign an NDA. They don't disclose it to the market. To be clear, they're not legally obliged to disclose it to the market; it's an immature proposal. But then they make the choice to disclose it to the market, paired with the announcement that we had challenged the board in this way.

So the only time the shareholders actually learn that there was a bona fide bid—this is another listed company, a billion-dollar company in Australia, a credible company—a bona fide bid to acquire the company at a huge premium to the chairman's own derisory offer is when that information has to come out to cleanse the chairman and allow him to trade the shares, because that's obviously inside information.

Guess what happens? He announces that, and he starts buying shares in the market. On the same date, with no standstill agreement, he buys 50 million shares in the market over the next 2 days—3% of the company—in order to try to entrench himself.

So this is where we are. The company has come out with its statement saying vote against all our resolutions for various reasons, most of which are ridiculous. But at its core, if you cannot trust management to look after your interests as shareholders, and if the chairman has demonstrated—not said he would, not hinted he would, but demonstrated—that he intends to buy you out at a massive undervalue, then that's the situation.

Indeed, he was asked directly at the AGM, “Will you guarantee you will not make another offer for the company?” He said no. He said no. So the only possible outcome to this situation, if you're a minority shareholder, is that one day he will wake up and try to steal your shares.

Well, I should not say he will try to steal your shares. He will try to extract your shares from you at a massive undervalue to fair value. That's the only possible outcome unless you change the board.

If you change the board, all manner of things become possible. We can reform the governance culture of the company. We can institute a proper dividend payout ratio and a proper dividend payout policy based on sustainable earnings. We can pay back some of the excess cash within the company.

We can conduct a full strategic review of the best alternatives for the company. Last and not least, we can do a full examination of all the conduct that occurred on the board over the last 12 months to understand exactly the extent of the misconduct and to clean the slate, moving forward with what ultimately is a good, profitable company that should be a growing company going forward for the benefit of all shareholders, not just for the narrow interests of the chairman.

Andrew Walker

Jeremy, you had to have taken debate in high school. That ending with the 5 points and the finger—that was fantastic.

Jeremy Raper

Yeah, I love debate. I was a debater in high school, but unfortunately I didn't continue on at college. Girls and whiskey got in the way. [laughter]

Andrew Walker

I think about that all the time, man. Some of the stuff in college. I was very focused, but I wish I'd been a little more. All right. Well, look, Jeremy, I hate to cut it off here, but there's one other thing we want to do. The only thing before we cut off—sorry, last thing, just—yeah. Yeah. The last thing I want to say is if you are interested—

Jeremy Raper

I would only encourage you to look at it if you intend to vote. There's no point either getting involved or buying shares unless you intend to vote. If you have any questions, you can reach out to me on DMs, or you can go to www.humboardcleout. Humm is humboardout.com. Easy to find. It has all the information you need for the meeting. All the coverage. All of your points collateral on that site.

Andrew Walker

That is exactly what I wanted to wrap it up with. Jeremy, we said we're going to do 20 to 25 minutes bouncing around the market. We went for 50. I'm going to end this video right here, and then we'll do the next thing. But thanks so much for coming on.

Jeremy Raper

My pleasure, man.

Andrew Walker

Yet Another Value Podcast Hall of Famer, Jeremy Raper. We'll talk soon.

Jeremy Raper

Thanks.

A quick disclaimer, nothing on this podcast should be considered investment advice. Guests or the hosts may have positions in any of the stocks mentioned during this podcast. Please do your own work and consult a financial adviser. Thanks.