[BidClub_]
Sohn Conference Foundation · · 16 分钟

从人身上寻找Alpha

YouTube
TL;DR
  • 本场对话中,主持人的框架是:「人才是唯一具有持久性的东西——想法来来去去。」 嘉宾寻找最优秀的人,通常是那些没有在找机会或已被边缘化的人,并称「我们没有简历」。她会做一场“考古挖掘”,审视P&L质量——其中有多少来自beta,所在板块或行业是否顺风,想法生成有多少来自创始人、CIO或投资想法晚宴,而非独立研究,以及流程是否可复制——因为真正擅长风险管理的人极少。
  • 尽调终究有边界:「只有当一个人真正坐上这个位置、承受压力并掌控局面时,你才真的知道。」 她刻意把面谈做得有挑战性,不把答案照单全收,同时观察候选人的反应。人在压力下情绪脆弱或缺乏安全感,「不是好兆头」。诸如「我的情商很高,所以我擅长组建团队」这类含糊回答,「不是好答案」。
  • 特殊的人身上有3个标志:早期成功复利为内生自信,能清晰说出自己的超能力,以及「以伤疤为荣」。 自信会复利,「和投资很像——当你处于盈利状态时,就能承担更多风险」。她重视那些会拆解一个略微亏损年份、失败的押注和事后才意识到的非预期押注,并围绕新发现的盲区重构风险流程的人;他们能以「清晰、精准、眼里带着火」的方式说出自己的优势。
  • 因为公开市场会考验定力,身上的逆袭者心气很重要。 相对于共识采取差异化观点,「既是一种反叛,也有点吓人」。她认为,历经困难后形成的坚韧自信,来自真实经历,而不是特权和一路顺风;学习障碍、语言障碍或曾遭受霸凌都可能成为来源。仅凭早期成功和机会,并不能保证职业生涯长久。
  • 职业生涯会因5种失败模式偏离轨道:错误的成长心态、缺乏自我认知、恐惧、没有可重复的流程,以及缺乏适应性。 「我现在所在的地方还有很多东西要学」是一种封闭视角;真正该问的是,你所在位置与其他地方相比,成长曲线和速度如何。在不牺牲其他学习机会的前提下,新岗位可以让一个人「不只是变成更好的自己,而是变成另一个版本的自己」。「我的嗅觉很好」不是流程。
  • 短期行业激励可能诱发次优风险决策。 业绩落后的人可能为了逃出亏损坑而全仓押注;一旦资金被削减,他们反而必须承担更多风险,因为「反正输了也拿不到钱,或者会被解雇」。业绩领先的人则往往在年末最后一个月按兵不动。她的解决方案是搭建一套功绩导向的激励「脚手架」:达到P&L门槛或晋升后,让奖金曲线的斜率、支付额或点数上升;比如创造某一水平回报满5年后,再加入10年累计P&L的一小部分,或管理费中的一部分。
  • 关于AI,她的判断是:「AI工具负责计算,人负责理解——优势在于掌握决策权。」 随着数据分析、财务分析和量化工作被商品化并外包给AI,人的优势仍在于说服力、判断力和人与人之间的连接。数据只能讲述部分故事:主题、因子、「I D O」以及底层经济同样重要;有时所有数据都指向负面修正,但股票却会上涨。
摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. 考古挖掘:看P&L质量,而不只是P&L

  • 主持人在一天的投资想法路演结束后给出的开场框架是:「人才是唯一具有持久性的东西,对吧?想法来来去去」(talent is the only thing with durability, right? Ideas come and go)。嘉宾寻找最优秀的人,通常是那些没有在主动找机会、或已经被边缘化的人——「我们没有简历」。
  • 需要拆开看的包括:P&L中有多少来自beta,所在板块或行业是否顺风,想法生成有多少来自创始人、CIO或投资想法晚宴,多少来自独立研究,流程是否可复制,以及候选人能否快速调整仓位、转向、降低总敞口,再把总敞口加回来。她说,真正擅长风险管理的人极少。
  • 她对主持人Jawad解释了尽调的上限:「只有当一个人真正坐上这个位置、承受压力并掌控局面时,你才真的知道……」面谈中会有大量来回追问和挑战;她不把答案照单全收,而是观察候选人的反应。情绪脆弱或缺乏安全感「不是好兆头」。谈到组建团队时,「我的情商很高」被她认为「不是好答案」;她要听到的是吸引、培养、指导和留住人才的具体方案。

2. 什么样的人称得上特殊:复利式自信与战痕

  • 早期成功会让自信产生「复利效应」——和投资很像,处于盈利状态时,你能承担更多风险。真正出众的人还能以「清晰、精准、眼里带着火」的方式说出自己的超能力;大多数回答都很含糊。
  • 「以伤疤为荣」:相比所有优秀结果,她更看重候选人是否愿意花更多时间复盘一个略微亏损的年份,深挖失败的押注,以及事后才意识到的非预期押注,并解释自己如何围绕新发现的盲区「重做整套风险流程」。
  • 个人层面,他们往往有一股由某段刻骨铭心、必须跨越的重大经历淬炼出的不服输劲头——可能是学习障碍、语言障碍或曾遭受霸凌。相对于共识采取差异化观点「既是一种反叛,也有点吓人」;她认为,坚韧的自我信念来自亲历困难,而非特权和一路顺风。仅凭早期成功和机会,并不能保证职业生涯长久。

3. 5种失败模式,恐惧往往最能拖住人

  • 错误的成长心态是其中之一:「我现在所在的地方还有很多东西要学」是一种封闭视角;应该比较的是,你所在位置与其他地方的成长曲线和速度。她用一个3年期的假设说明:留下来可能会加深基本功、增加与创始人共事的历练、扩大覆盖范围;换到另一种范式,则可能获得做空能力、更快的想法产出、更多元的组合、真正的团队建设能力和更复杂的工具。如果候选人无需牺牲其他学习机会,「你不只是变成更好的自己,而是变成另一个版本的自己」。
  • 其余问题包括缺乏自我认知——看不见所在基金的竞争劣势,也看不见自己的发展方式——恐惧伪装成择时判断、没有可重复的流程,以及缺乏适应性。候选人会说「我的嗅觉很好」「我的模式识别能力很强」或「我能有效使用AI」;知道自己的流程,环境变化时就更容易适应。恐惧还会表现为等待更好的P&L或更好的offer,或者因为基金今年表现不错而留下,而不是为更长期的职业轨迹做最优选择。

4. 激励设计:为当年业绩付费,为10年搭脚手架

  • 短期激励会推动次优风险决策:业绩落后的人可能「把一切都押上,试图逃出那个坑」。如果资金被削减,他们反而必须承担更多风险,因为「反正输了也拿不到钱,或者会被解雇」。业绩领先的人则往往在年末最后一个月按兵不动。
  • 她偏好的激励脚手架是功绩导向的——绝不能仅仅为了在LP面前维持人员稳定的观感,「从Peter那里拿钱去给Paul」——但可以在达到P&L门槛或晋升后,让奖金曲线的斜率、支付额或点数上升;比如创造某一水平回报满5年后再提高。其他选择包括给出10年累计P&L的一小部分,或管理费中的一部分。这些结构能建立持久性和黏性,「对我来说反倒不太好」。

5. 人的优势,以及人们最容易错判的风险收益权衡:自己的职业生涯

  • 随着数据分析、财务分析和量化工作被商品化并外包给AI,优势在于「人的部分」——说服力、判断力和人与人之间的连接。数据能告诉我们的终究有限;主题、因子、「I D O」以及底层经济同样重要。「有时所有数据都指向负面修正,但股票却会上涨……AI工具负责计算,人负责理解,优势在于掌握决策权。」
  • 让她仍感到意外的是,那些以评估风险为职业的人,在给留在原地与离开分别做风险加权、评估自己职业生涯的风险收益时,可能会「出乎意料地失衡」。
  • 闪电问答:优秀投资者「对自己的研究主题充满热情,但不被自己的观点绑架」;最难培养的品质是「饥饿感,驱动力」;早期红旗是「傲慢和固执」;这个行业奖励「坚持到底和适应性」;她也看重幽默感,因为「我认识的最强竞争者也知道如何笑」。
Speaker 1

Welcome, Milana. Few people have had the vantage point that you’ve had over the last 2 decades evaluating investment talent. When you meet someone for the first time, what are you really trying to understand about them?

You guys have been listening to idea pitches all day long. But if I can pitch this, talent is the only thing with durability, right? Ideas come and go. So, just a little plug for our session: They saved the best for last.

1. Looking Beyond the Paper

Speaker 2

What do we look for beyond paper? We don’t get a lot of paper. We’re after the best people in the industry. What we’re looking for is—and they’re typically not looking; they’re not disenfranchised, and we don’t have résumés—so our archaeological dig is really about whether these special people are that special.

We’re looking at things that might show up on paper, like the P&L. We’re going into the quality of the P&L. How much is beta? Is their sector or industry in favor? How much of the idea generation came from the founder or CIO, or from idea dinners like you have? How much of this is independent research? How repeatable is the process?

If they’re in a risk-taking seat, can they move their feet quickly and pivot, degross, and regross? I find that very few people are good at the risk-management piece of this job. How intellectually flexible are they? Can they go long something they’ve gone short?

What is their approach to human capital? We get answers like, “I think I’d be good at building a team because I have high EQ.” Not a good answer. We’re looking for a really substantive approach to how they’re going to attract, develop, mentor, and retain talent. You guys see all the headlines out there about talent wars and gazumping. It’s the hardest thing in the world to do. I’m not just saying that because we do it for a living.

I also look at whether, if we’re looking for someone to build a business and they run something substantial where they’re at, they’ve had to hustle and create something from nothing, or whether there was a lot of ease, given where they’re sitting, in terms of being able to build it. Those are the sorts of things we look at under the hood.

What I will tell you is that it’s a good insight into how special they are if they can answer these questions in a substantive way. But you don’t really know, Jawad, until somebody is in the seat, under pressure, and in control. We have a lot of back-and-forth in these meetings. We don’t accept what they tell us at face value. We challenge them to get to the heart of the truth of who they are and what they’re capable of, but also to see how they react in a situation like that. To the extent that there’s some emotional fragility or insecurity, that’s not a good sign.

Speaker 1

Are there some common threads that you see that lead to successful outcomes?

Speaker 2

Okay, so are we going really under the hood? Let’s do it. I need water for this. Okay, so—deep, deep.

2. The Traits of Special Investors

There are certain things that I do think are strong indicators of whether somebody is special. The first is innate self-confidence. I find that special people have had success at an early age, and there’s a compounding effect to confidence, right? It builds with each win, much like with investing. You can take more risk when you’re up.

Special people have a unique ability to articulate their superpower. What are they really best at? Very few people can answer that with clarity, precision, and fire in their eyes. We get really mushy answers to that all the time.

Finally, there are a lot of things, but we’re limited on time. I’d say the other thing that’s really important is, for lack of a better word, their pride in their battle scars. Whether it’s performance, we’ll meet people who will spend more time on the one bad—might not even be the right word—slightly down year they had than on all the good stuff, because they were so pissed off about that one not-so-good year.

They’ll dig into the bets they made that didn’t go their way and what they learned from them. They’ll dig into the unintended bets they now see they made, and then they’ll talk about how they retooled their entire risk process to address the blind spots they’re now attuned to.

There’s also the personal side. I think special people tend to have a chip on their shoulder. There’s some searing, historic thing that they had to overcome that left an imprint, whether it was a learning disability or a speech impediment. I was bullied at a young age, and that definitely drove me. I think this general underdog syndrome is important because public markets test your resolve.

It is inherently contrarian to take a differentiated point of view, long or short, versus an established consensus. It’s defiant and a little scary, and I think that rugged self-belief and confidence only comes from having lived through some stuff, not from privilege and things having been easy. There are still people who may have had early success and lots of opportunity, yet they’re unable to build enduring careers.

Speaker 1

So, where does it usually start to go wrong?

3. The Five Failure Modes

Speaker 2

There are 5 failure modes. We don’t have time to dig into all of them, but they are lacking the right growth mindset. We all understand that if we’re not growing, we’re shrinking, right? We get that. That’s not a news flash.

But people meet with us and say it’s the wrong time to make a move because there’s still so much left to learn where they’re at. Or they’ll say, “I’ll leave when I feel like I’ve exhausted my growth where I’m at.” That’s the wrong approach. It’s a very insular way of looking at things because there’s a whole world out there, right? What you should be thinking about is what the growth curve and pace are where you’re at relative to someplace else.

I tell people, like, in 3 years from now, let’s say, Jawad, you were at a directional long/short equity fund and you said that to me. If I think you have it in you to progress to the next level and you want to be a PM—let’s say you’re an analyst, or you’re still pitching ideas to the founder—then, by definition, you may be a partner, but you’re not a PM, technically, whatever your title is.

I may tell you that in 3 years from now, you’ll develop a deeper fundamental skill set, have more reps with the founder, and maybe have a broader coverage universe. But are you developing a more robust shorting capability, more idea velocity, a more diversified portfolio, the ability to build a real team—not just 1 or 2 analysts—and the ability to use more sophisticated tools?

If I could take you and put you in this other paradigm and you don’t sacrifice any of the other learning, you’re not just a better version of yourself; you’re a different version. Now we can talk about moving you into a different seat.

Speaker 1

They don’t usually step up when the opportunity presents itself. What is it that’s holding them back?

Speaker 2

The other things are self-awareness. In terms of what’s holding them back from that, well, that’s one of the other things—it’s fear. I think oftentimes people see that they’ll be able to grow more, not just vertically but also in other ways, horizontally, elsewhere.

Sometimes they aren’t really aware of the challenges that their fund is facing. Their fund might be at a competitive disadvantage. They might not be really aware of how they are, in fact, developing. But let’s say they are. Let’s say they’re completely aware of what their evolution looks like. They often get held back by fear.

They’ll come up with all manner of excuses for why it’s not the right time to leave. “If I stick around a little bit more, maybe I’ll have a better P&L and I’ll be able to optimize for a higher offer.” Or, “The fund is up. Let me stay a little bit longer because I think this is going to be a good year,” as opposed to focusing not on the short term but on the longer-term trajectory.

The other 2 things that I tend to see as common derailers are a lack of a repeatable process and adaptability. People will say things to us when we ask about their process, like, “I have a good sniffer,” “I have good pattern recognition,” or “I use AI effectively.” When the environment changes, if you know what your process is, it’s much easier to adapt it.

Speaker 1

What role do incentives play here? How are they perhaps shaping behavior in ways we don’t fully appreciate?

4. The Incentive Trap

Speaker 2

I think the industry, by and large, is too short-term-oriented with respect to incentives. If we don’t give people a broader incentive structure, it’s just year in, year out. There’s no nod to duration or to what they’ve done in the past; they’re always optimizing for that year.

You see this with suboptimal risk-taking behavior. If they’re down, they’re going to pile all in to get out of that hole, and if you cut their capital, then they have to take even more risk. That’s not always the right decision, because the idea is, “Well, if I lose, I’m not getting paid anyway, or I’m going to get fired.”

If they’re up, they tend to sit on their hands for the last month of the year to preserve their returns. The best incentive systems that I’ve seen are ones that combine—you always want to have a meritocratic approach to paying talent. You never want to take from Peter, who’s done a great job, to pay Paul, who maybe hasn’t done such a great job, but you want to make sure he doesn’t leave because how will that look to LPs? I don’t want to have turnover.

Speaker 2

Founders are incentivized in different ways to hang on to people. I think the best thing is to build scaffolding where you pay everybody what they're worth for the performance in that year, but the slope, the payout, or the points you give somebody changes or goes up when they have maybe hit a certain P&L, or they get promoted to PM or partner and their compensation changes as a result. Maybe when they've put in 5 years of having been able to produce a certain return.

Or maybe you pay them, in addition to their normal compensation, a small percentage on their 10-year cumulative P&L. Maybe you give them a piece of the management fee. These are all things which I think build durability and stickiness and make it harder to take people out, which is not so good for me.

Speaker 1

With AI getting better at analysis and pattern recognition, where do you think human edge remains valuable?

5. The Human Investment Edge

Speaker 2

It might sound trite, but in our humanness. I think that as data analysis and financial analysis and all things quant get commoditized and outsourced to AI, it's our ability to persuade, to use judgment, and our human connections.

The data only tells us so much, and AI is driven by data, right? Sometimes all the data points to a negative revision, and yet the stock goes up. There are so many things that go into performance—themes, factors, yes, I D O, the underlying economy, et cetera.

But it is maybe the art part of it that is the most important thing, right? AI tools compute, but we comprehend, and I think the edge is in owning the decision.

Speaker 1

What still surprises you about people after all these years?

Speaker 2

About people? Well, I think we're supposed to be so good at assessing risk for a living. When it comes to assessing the risk of our own careers—the staying put versus making a move and risk-weighting that decision—I think people can be surprisingly lopsided when it comes to doing the risk-reward analysis of what their future should look like.

6. The Great Investor Test

Speaker 1

So let's end with a few quick one-liners. First thing that comes to mind.

Speaker 2

A great investor is someone who has passion for his or her subject matter, but is not wedded to his or her ideas.

Speaker 1

What is the hardest quality to teach?

Speaker 2

Hunger. Drive.

Speaker 1

The biggest red flag you see early is—

Speaker 2

Arrogance and stubbornness. In the end, the business rewards stick-with-it-ness and adaptability. Over time, I've come to value a sense of humor. I think the fiercest competitors I know also know how to laugh at the end of the day, and I love that.

Speaker 1

This is such a gift, Elana. Thank you very much.