Doximity:医疗行业的枢纽——[Business Breakdowns,第236期]
- 理解 Doximity,最准确的方式,是把它看成建立在同一批用户之上的3种熟悉业务:「对投资者而言,它像 Bloomberg 或 FactSet」;对广告主而言,更像 Facebook。 目前平台覆盖80%的医生;William Blair 的 Jim Jones 解释称,它把新闻流、类似 DocuSign 的签署、加密消息、远程医疗拨号,以及如今的 AI 病历记录和临床参考整合在一起——医生全部免费使用,主要靠药企广告变现,因为「医生会告诉你自己是谁:‘我是 Milwaukee 的放射科医生。’」
- 医疗数字广告的长期渗透率约为整个经济体其他领域约75%水平的一半,而闭环 ROI 衡量正在推动这一迁移。 市场每年增长5–7%;药企在直接面向消费者(DTC)和直接面向医生(DTP)上的支出分别约为100亿美元和70亿美元;一项要求电视药品广告必须播报30秒风险披露的行政命令,正让 DTC 渠道吸引力下降,恰逢越来越多「拒绝见代表的医生」降低了带着甜甜圈上门拜访模式的吸引力。
- 这项业务的财务画像极为夸张:毛利率约90%、EBITDA 利润率55%、营业利润率54%,收入中仅1%用于资本开支。 随着用户注意力扩大,广告库存随之增长,而新增成本有限;公司可以在不侵蚀利润率的情况下持续投入研发。资产负债表上约有9亿美元净现金(约5美元/股),用于回购以及收购 AI 临床参考和病历记录引擎等资产。
- Jim 对护城河的解释刻意不拔高:Doximity 的胜负手,是把许多工具都做到「够用即可」(good enough)并集中在一个平台上,而不是在任何单项能力上做到行业最佳。 单点解决方案始终是持续存在的竞争威胁;AI 的风险情景则是出现某个「好得离谱」的单点产品。但这个全天候开放的一站式平台,才是留住医生注意力的关键,而用户参与度「大概是头号 KPI」。
- Doximity 在年销售额超过1亿美元的药企品牌中的钱包份额,已从10%升至超过50%;新推出的 Portal 让药企实时看到广告表现,为争取更多预算提供依据。 其他增长方向还包括:没有庞大销售团队、从一开始就采取数字优先策略的新生物科技和药企客户;持续流向 Doximity 的 CTV 预算;以及——「如果敢把梦想再放大一点」——医疗器械和诊断公司。
- 在估值问题上,Jim 反对卖方惯用的市销率:「市销率是为没有盈利和现金流的公司发明的。」 这项业务已经具备盈利和现金流。他根据长期迁移叠加份额提升所对应的持续时间,为现金流匹配估值倍数,并认为广告科技行业对商业模式持久性的怀疑,可能低估了机会——在他看来,这是「恰好通过广告科技变现的平台」。
- 关键宏观风险来自药企盈利能力:围绕关税、药价上限,或推动美国消费者减少用药的政策讨论,都可能压缩广告预算,「进而影响 Doximity」。 这项投资逻辑层面的风险,是公司没能持续领先于医生需求变化;一旦用户参与度开始下滑,就说明竞争正在产生实质影响。
1. 披着社交网络外衣的工作流平台
- Jim 开场将 Doximity 定义为「一款专为医疗专业人士打造的数字工作流平台」——用户包括医生、注册护士、即将毕业的学生、执业护士和医师助理。它最初是「医生版 LinkedIn」,提供转诊和招聘信息,随后逐步叠加类似 DocuSign、Zoom、Slack 的功能、新闻流、《New York Times》式内容,以及日益完善的 Scribe 功能和 ChatGPT。
- 贯穿全期的双重类比是:对医生而言,Doximity 像一款「几乎一直在线」的 Bloomberg/FactSet;对广告主而言,它更像 Facebook,因为医生会主动标注身份,让药企能够精准定向。
- 创始团队履历也很关键:CEO Jeff 此前做过 Epocrates——一家诞生于90年代末的数字药品参考指南,后来上市并被 athenahealth 收购。随后,他于2010年与 Nate Gross、Sherry Buck 共同创办 Doximity;Doximity 于2021年上市。
2. 医生工具免费,药企买单
- 这套用户参与机制彻底以医生为中心:通过机器学习筛选新闻,减少琐碎杂务;医生在平台阅读即可获得 CME 学分;平台还提供符合 HIPAA 要求的电子签署、数字传真、安全消息,以及远程医疗拨号器。后者显示医院来电号码,让患者愿意接听,同时无需暴露医生手机号。每11条新闻中插入1条广告。
- 公司的变现主要依靠广告,绝大多数收入来自面向处方医生的药企广告;医院可以购买企业版 Dialer Pro 合约,但医生免费使用这些工具。Jim 不排除未来 AI 工具带来医院系统层面的订阅收入,但「他们最不愿做的,就是惹恼医生或给医生离开平台的理由」。
3. 长期迁移:数字化渗透过半、ROI可衡量,传统渠道承压
- 随着预算从传统渠道迁移,市场每年增长5–7%。整个经济体的数字化渗透率约为75%,但医疗行业「大约只有一半」。真正的突破口在于归因:先锁定一组医生,购买第三方数据,再「看谁开出了处方」;相比之下,电视广告很难确认观众是否看到了广告、又是否因此开具了处方。
- Matt 追问了疫情是否造成市场扭曲。Jim 的说法是,疫情「可能只是让部分药企稍微更快进入数字渠道」,但真正持久的变化来自代际更替:越来越多「拒绝见代表的医生」,不再接受带一盒甜甜圈、请一顿牛排的销售代表拜访。
- 份额转移的来源还在叠加:药企销售代表减少,横幅广告和平面媒体等传统渠道承压,DTC 电视广告则受到一项行政命令的影响,必须播报30秒风险披露——「先花30秒讲完所有可能出问题的事之后,听起来就没那么有吸引力了」。在约100亿美元的 DTC 支出和约70亿美元的医生定向支出之间,预算既在各自池子内部迁移,也在两类池子之间重新分配。
- 风险传导路径很直接:如果关税、药价上限、推动美国消费者减少用药,或任何其他因素损害药企盈利能力,广告支出就可能下降,「进而影响 Doximity」。
4. 极高利润率、现金储备与“够用即可”的平台策略
- 数据极为突出:毛利率约90%、EBITDA 利润率55%、营业利润率54%,资本开支仅占收入的1%。随着用户注意力扩大、广告库存增加且新增成本有限,公司的增量利润率「高得不可思议」。约9亿美元净现金(约5美元/股)被用于回购和能够提升用户参与度的并购,包括近期收购的一款用于临床参考和病历记录的 AI 引擎。
- Jim 对 AI 风险的表述很坦率:如果出现「好得离谱」的单点解决方案,当然会构成风险。但平台策略的核心就是不追求每个单项能力都第一——Doximity「不一定要成为头号远程医疗提供商,也不一定要成为头号转录工具」;在一个医生全天打开的平台里,各项功能只要「够用即可」(good enough),最终就能胜出。产品创意部分来自每年与医生委员会举行的一次36小时会议。
- AI 的上行场景也很清晰:Scribe 能让医生「非常开心」,因为他们不必再把晚上耗在写报告上;临床参考功能则会让用户在平台上的时间「明显增加」,直接提升广告库存的价值。
5. 钱包份额、估值纪律与长期限之争
- 除了行业长期迁移,增长还来自多个层面:年销售额超过1亿美元的药企品牌数量不断增加,Doximity 在这些品牌中的钱包份额从10%升至超过50%;新推出的 Portal 让品牌实时了解广告表现,有机会撬动增量预算;数字优先的生物科技公司更早采用这类渠道,因为「它们一开始就没有一支庞大的销售团队」。医疗器械和诊断公司理论上也是新增市场,但在药企市场仍有「很长的路要走」的情况下,目前还只是次要议题。
- Jim 的估值立场值得记住:「市销率是为没有盈利和现金流的公司发明的……这项业务已经具备这些条件。」他根据行业迁移和份额提升预期能持续多久来评估现金流,并认为广告科技行业的历史可能让投资者不愿给这段持续期足够估值;这是一家「恰好通过广告科技变现的平台」(the platform that happens to monetize ad tech)。
- 他的收尾判断是:强客户价值主张、长增长跑道和高增量利润率,「是盈利能力快速提升的配方……事情可能很快变得相当不错」。但一如既往,前提是公司能够守住医生参与度。
完整逐字稿
This is Matt Russell, and today we are breaking down one of the more impressive B2B media businesses that I have come across, and that is Doximity. It's been called the LinkedIn for doctors, and with eighty percent of doctors on their platform, I think that's a fair categorization. But Jim Jones, partner and analyst at William Blair Asset Management, helped explain exactly how this one works as a business. So Jim gets into the community engine that works around medical professionals and for medical professionals. And yes, there is a social network, but it's the add-ons like the required continued education that doctors can do on platform, script signing, and all of those little tools that make a doctor or medical professional's life much easier. But the revenue engine is advertising, and you can probably imagine why this audience would be so valuable to a certain set of companies. But Jim gets into the nuance of how that spend works, why this is the business model that they've chosen. And I can tell you, when I was in the weeds of Colossus operations, I always looked at B2B media as the most attractive model, and Doximity's story is the perfect example of why. Now please enjoy this breakdown of Doximity.
All right, Jim. I’m excited to have you here to cover Doximity. As I was just telling you before we hit record, it’s one that’s somewhat near and dear to my heart: the idea of taking a professional community and building a great business around it. I don’t think it’s particularly well known to many people walking the streets. To a lesser extent, it might be known to investors. Maybe you could kick us off with an introduction to how you would describe what Doximity does, who uses it, and all those details to paint a picture of the business.
Excited to be here. Doximity may not be known by the common person walking around the street, but physicians know who Doximity is. It’s a digital workflow platform purpose-built for healthcare professionals: doctors, registered nurses, graduating students, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. Those are the people on the platform, and they spend a lot of time on it.
What are the use cases for them day to day? Obviously, it’s going to be different for someone still in school versus a doctor, surgeon, or whoever might be using it in the workforce. What would be some of the day-to-day use cases for them in terms of how they’re using Doximity when they log in?
1. Doximity Builds A Doctor Platform
It started as LinkedIn for doctors. There was a little social networking, medical referrals, and job postings. Over time, they added technologies that are more integrated into doctors’ workflows. Now it’s a platform with capabilities similar to DocuSign, Zoom, Slack, a newsfeed like The New York Times, and increasingly, Scribe functionality and ChatGPT. We’re taking a bunch of household technologies and putting them on the platform.
To the investor, it would be like a Bloomberg or FactSet that you’re on all the time. To the advertiser, it’s more like Facebook, because doctors will tell you who they are: “I’m a radiologist in Milwaukee.” Then advertisers know exactly whom they’re targeting and can direct ads to the right place.
In terms of the business model itself, what does it look like in terms of subscription revenue? Is it primarily ad-based revenue? How do they approach that?
It’s primarily ad-based revenue. The idea is that we want to have the doctors and medical professionals on the platform as often as possible, giving us eyeballs and spending time on the platform. Then big pharma will advertise its drugs to prescribing doctors.
Makes sense. When you know where the fish are, you can fish in that pond. You mentioned that when they launched, it was a social network, primarily the LinkedIn for medical professionals. When was that, and what was the storyline for evolving over the years? How much history is there in this business?
The current CEO, Jeff, had a previous business, Epocrates. Epocrates helped doctors make decisions about prescriptions and patient safety while on the go, so it was a digital drug reference guide. It was founded in the late 1990s, as mobile phones were becoming a thing. It eventually went public and was ultimately sold to athenahealth.
He started Doximity in 2010 with a guy named Nate Gross and a woman named Sherry Buck. They were really focused on the intersection of technology and healthcare, and then they went public in 2021.
There’s a definite history in terms of the founder being around this space and probably understanding the pain points. It’s still somewhat of a youthful business, having been founded within the past 15 years, with a shorter public lifespan than that. In terms of competition in this space, what exists? Forget about LinkedIn. That’s going to be a different bucket and way more generalist. Do they have other competitors in the medical professional network space?
2. Doximity Unifies Point Solutions
There are competitors. When you think about how pharma companies are trying to reach doctors, historically it’s been banner ads, trying to chase doctors as consumers and trying to find them on Golf.com or other places. Pharma reps can be viewed as competitors: pharma reps going into hospitals and trying to educate doctors on recent studies or drugs that are coming out. There are a bunch of point solutions. There are telehealth providers and newsfeed providers.
What Doximity is doing is really taking a lot of those point solutions and putting them on a platform, so that the hospital or the doctors have one platform with all the services available to them.
When I think about doctors interacting with who is advertising to them, but also trying to take in information from the network itself, what does that look like? If I’m a doctor, can I do independent research on new medicine that’s out there? Is that something that’s offered, and how does that interact with the advertising? Obviously, you always have this balance between the information being fed to you, sponsored content, educational content, and all of that. I’d be curious to hear how they’ve approached that and found an effective balance.
Right now, they show 1 ad in every 11 news items. The business started as social networking, LinkedIn-like, and over time they added a newsfeed. Thousands of new pieces of information come out broadly across the healthcare space. Doximity basically uses machine learning to help filter out the news that’s relevant to you. You’re not sifting through thousands and thousands of articles that may or may not be relevant to your specific practice. They call it “cutting the scut.” It enables doctors to get through that stuff quickly.
Then the business evolved even further: now we have all these eyeballs reading their daily news. You get CME credits by reading these documents to maintain your licenses. That was the first step into the “workflow,” quote-unquote, and then they started adding workflow tools that help doctors’ productivity. Digital signing, HIPAA-compliant documents that can be signed and digitally faxed, and secure messaging. Doctors can’t just message other doctors using traditional text messages, so they implemented that.
The telehealth business is lowering the technology bar for patients, making it very easy for the doctor to call the patient. When you call that patient, you can select, “Hey, I want the caller ID to say this is the hospital calling,” so that the patient doesn’t necessarily have your cellphone number and can call you at all hours of the day. At the same time, the patient knows that it’s the hospital calling, and they’re dramatically more likely to pick up the phone. They’re very doctor-specific and unapologetically focused on the doctor first, maintaining their time and respecting their time.
These products that they come out with are very targeted at increasing doctor productivity.
It seems very logical to me that the doctor would be the highest-value target of an advertiser as well, so just keeping that customer happy and satisfied is particularly important from that side of the business perspective. Do they monetize any of those add-on solutions as they're rolling them out? Because it does feel like the DocuSign-esque, HIPAA-compliant productivity tools can make a material difference. They're going to increase the stickiness of using the platform, which is a net benefit to the advertising business. But I'm just curious if they've explored monetizing any of those add-on tools.
They'll sell enterprise agreements to hospital systems to get all the doctors on Dialer Pro, but doctors can use all the tools for free. If your system doesn't necessarily have an enterprise agreement, then doctors can use the tools for free, but most of the revenue comes from pharma advertising to the doctors, as opposed to the hospital systems.
What has the trend line looked like for advertising spend coming from pharma? I know it's always high, but I'm sure there's some cyclicality to it. Are there any secular trends in that ad bucket that are worth noting? Because it feels like the most obvious KPI here.
3. Pharma Advertising Goes Digital
The market grows about 5% to 7% per year. That's because there's a secular shift to digital from traditional sources of advertising. The healthcare industry is pretty far behind the rest of the economy in terms of how far we've gone digital, and it makes some sense. The healthcare industry, specifically pharma, has an army of salespeople who are going into hospitals, which a lot of industries just don't have.
The latest numbers I saw are that digital advertising has 75% penetration in most parts of the economy, and we're about half that in healthcare. There's a long runway of shift that needs to happen. It helps that you can identify the ROI. When you put a TV commercial on, you have no idea if that consumer saw the ad and then filled a prescription or not, but it's very clear: We target a group of doctors, and then we buy third-party data to see who's getting the prescriptions. Being able to see the ROI is driving that shift to digital. The rate at which pharma will move over is the governing factor there.
Meta and Google, obviously, have an eyeball thing going on there. They built quite impressive businesses on the back of that thesis alone—the ability to measure the ROI on your ad spend—so it certainly checks out. I was reading this negative investor report. During COVID, you obviously had all of those sales reps basically grounded and unable to visit hospitals. Therefore, there was this big need for Doximity. Was there anything noteworthy that came out of revenue from that time period, where naturally you would expect to see a big push into a channel like Doximity? Was there any hiccup or breaking of that trend as you emerged out? What did the revenue trajectory look like through that period of time?
Your instinct is right on. During COVID, this was an absolutely necessary tool. Coming out of COVID, it probably pushed some pharma into the digital channel maybe a little faster than they would have gone otherwise. I think it opened their eyes to the effectiveness. During COVID, hospitals were shut down and pharma reps weren't allowed to go in.
What we see now is an increasing number of doctors who are what's called no-see doctors, where they don't want you to bring them in a box of donuts and talk about their drugs anymore, or take the doctor out for a steak dinner. It's almost generational that that's not how people are being marketed to or prefer to be marketed to these days.
The medical sales profession is quite unique. Would you expect, in terms of that share shift over time—you mentioned it's still quite far behind most other industries, or the economy broadly, in terms of digital ads as a percentage of total—that the natural place where you see share gains coming from would be the medical sales profession? Is it split evenly between traditional linear advertising and print advertising? Where would you expect it to come from the most?
It's coming from a few different areas. There'll be fewer pharma reps going forward. Banner ads and print are more traditional sources. Increasingly, consumer advertising will be moving over.
There was an executive order to really clamp down on what needs to go into a TV commercial for pharmaceuticals advertised to the consumer. In essence, you need to add 30 seconds to the commercial and talk about all the risks. It sounds a lot less appealing after 30 seconds of all the things that could go wrong. The ROI or the attractiveness of that channel is decreasing with this executive order.
Pharma spends about $10 billion a year in direct-to-consumer marketing today. Direct-to-physician is about $7 billion. This is a pretty big shift in terms of where the dollars were going historically, both from within the HCP channel and now also stealing from other buckets.
You mentioned the numbers on the overall market growth being quite healthy, multiples of GDP growth. Have there been any periods of time where you've seen a material pullback, or would there be anything that could represent a threat to overall pharma ad spend that would be noteworthy to keep in the back of your mind?
The pharma companies are operating on an ROI basis as well. If there was discussion of tariffs, or a push to have U.S. consumers on fewer drugs, I'd say if the profitability of pharma takes a hit, then they will likely spend fewer dollars advertising for their drugs. If there are caps on prices, or whatever may drive lower profitability for pharma, that would flow through to advertising and, therefore, Doximity.
Before we get into the profitability metrics of Doximity, I'm curious if they have done anything as it relates to in-person events. This is somewhat of my media-community-audience brain going back into that world, but it's a common attachment to these types of businesses to have trade shows or things of that nature. Is that ever anything they've explored or noodled with—dipping their toes into the live space, event space, anything along those lines?
They don't do a whole lot of that, to my knowledge. They have a board of directors of doctors that they bring in once a year, and they get ideas from the doctors on what would be helpful to them and what would help productivity. I think that's a 36-hour meeting on an annual basis that is just brainstorming and throwing stuff against the wall. Doximity implements and gets a lot of ideas from that weekend excursion.
Always good to have design partners in the business. On the margin side of the equation, how does this stack up? It sounds very technology-based, so I would assume that there are some impressive numbers here, but can you just give us a snapshot of the margin profile of the business and whether that's materially changed over the years?
4. High Margins Fund Expansion
It is impressive. The gross margins are about 90%. EBITDA margins are 55%, and operating margins are 54%. They're just placing ads on their platform in front of the eyeballs, so as the eyeballs grow, the inventory grows. There's not a whole lot of expense required on their side to place that ad.
Because they're generating 55% EBITDA margins and 54% operating margins, they're able to recycle back into R&D without really disrupting the margin profile of the business. Because margins are so high, they're able to reinvest. And that also means that as the top line grows and they continue to take market share, and more dollars move into their world, the incremental margins are incredibly high, which also just fuels the growth.
Do they have much excess cash? I would assume, as you mentioned, they've been building out this suite of different productivity tools for doctors. That's going to be a high-ROI investment, I think, just to reduce churn. Do they have excess cash that would go back to shareholders, that they would use for M&A? How do they think about capital allocation more broadly once it goes beyond reinvesting in the business?
I think they have about $900 million in net cash today, so that's about $5 a share. They use that cash. They've been buying back stock the last few years, but also making acquisitions. They're making acquisitions to increase the engagement of the doctors on the platform and continue to give them new tools.
They recently bought an AI engine that is now going to be used for clinical reference. You're getting your news feed, then you're making phone calls and signing documents, and now you're going to be increasingly using the platform for medical reference, clinical reference, and also for scribing your appointments with your patient.
On the AI point, there are obvious ways that incumbents can adopt AI into their systems, and as it stands today, in November 2025, I would expect that most agentic AI is just a benefit to existing corporations more than a threat. But medicine and the medical field are a very interesting study here, because I think when people question where AI could have the biggest impact, it is in the medical profession. Maybe that's more on the research side of things, but how have they framed both the risk and the opportunity, and then how have you thought about this? Because you have to think about it both as a risk and as an opportunity as it relates to AI.
5. AI Extends The Growth Runway
Starting with the risks, if there are point solutions that have much better reference, or are giving you more succinct answers or direct-to-the-point answers, or are wildly better, then that's certainly a risk. Doximity has made their platform on technology that's good enough, and that almost makes it sound like it's not great. It doesn't necessarily need to be the number-one telehealth provider and the number-one transcriber.
As long as on the platform I can get it all in one place and it's effective, that proves to win the day. The exciting thing about this clinical reference tool is just the amount of time that doctors will now be spending on the platform—it goes up quite a bit. The scribe tool makes doctors incredibly happy because they're not spending their evenings writing reports or putting together charts. The AI can do that for them.
When you think about the secular growth or shift toward more digital, it seems very obvious to me in terms of being part of the upside case here. Are there other things that you would add to that, getting more of that wallet share onto the platform? Is there anything else that you would point to, or does it all revolve around that?
They're in the right place at the right time from a market-growth perspective as the industry moves digital. The wallet share is real. They have some charts in their investor presentation that show you the number of big brands—call them brands with over $100 million—over time, and the number of brands is increasing over time. Within that chart, you can see their wallet share of those big brands, and you can see how, over time, they went from 10% of the wallet share to more than 50%. You can see how that's shifting because of the ROI.
Other industries might move faster given the ROI that they're seeing, but it's just a lot more measured in pharma. They recently launched what they call the Portal, which gives pharma real-time feedback on how their ads are doing. That's just another way for them to gain wallet share, because as brands are seeing, “Oh, this ad is doing well, we're getting the scripts,” they can add on top of that. We talked about the CTV market moving in their direction, and then there are also new customers.
Increasingly, new biotech and new pharma customers are launching digital-first. They don't have an army of salespeople to begin with. They move to Doximity earlier in their maturation process than they have historically. If you want to dream the dream, they're currently largely just in pharma, but could theoretically move into medtech and diagnostic companies as well. They've got a lot of road in front of them—a lot of road to hoe with the pharma companies—so I think that's a little bit of an afterthought at the moment, but it certainly adds to the runway.
I still have this idea in the back of my head that even if it's a small dollar amount of subscription revenue that could come in, it is the very basic investor brain of subscription revenue and its attractiveness. In 5 years from now, if they were doing something that was subscription-based for doctors or their user base, would that be very surprising to you?
It wouldn't be surprising if they started charging the doctors, or really at the system level most likely, and I would guess it would be largely for the AI tools because they're adding so much value. The last thing that they want to do is upset doctors or give them a reason to leave the platform, because it's very doctor-centric, and they understand that keeping their engagement is probably the number-one KPI. So long as you don't give them a reason to lose engagement, that's probably the better way to lead.
6. What Could Break The Thesis
On the alternate side of the equation, just from a risk perspective, what would stand out the most to you in terms of a risk to this thesis playing out? What is most top of mind when you think about risks that could potentially play out?
Staying ahead of what the doctors want and need. You've got to be forward-looking on what is most important to saving them time and increasing productivity. If there's a misstep there, that could be a problem, and it could lead to lower doctor engagement on the platform. If there's a competitor that somehow steals all the eyeballs or starts to chip away at them, that's going to be the first sign of some slowdown or some potential competition that's going to impact the business.
I think they have 80% share of doctors—some crazy market-share numbers. Does it come up often where there's new competition entering the market, or are there some competitors making noise or showing some impact that's worth monitoring?
They're point solutions for the most part. There are constantly point solutions coming to the market, trying to garner attention from doctors. The platform is really the differentiator. Having all the point solutions in one place that's open all day long is the moat that keeps the point solutions from taking attention. If you have a point solution that is just far and away better than anything else, then maybe you use that outside the platform. What Doximity is doing is just trying to be good enough to keep you on there.
There's a bar in terms of how much better something needs to be in order to get you away from the one-stop shop. It's a unique business. There's not an obvious public company that perfectly matches what they do. So when you think about this from a valuation perspective, whether it's comps analysis or anything like that, how do you even approach thinking through a valuation framework when it sits in such a unique niche of the market?
7. Cash Flows Anchor Valuation
I think it always comes back to cash flows. Comps analysis is potentially interesting, but I look at the business on its own and look at the cash flows, the growth opportunity, and the moat around the business to try to assess: for this level of cash flow, this level of growth, and this expected duration of growth, what am I willing to pay for that? That's how I think through valuation.
A lot of the sell side will use price-to-sales multiples. I think price-to-sales multiples were invented for companies that had no earnings and cash flows, just as a way to get your arms around what could be. This business already has that. It's got great margins and great cash flows. 1% of revenues goes back into CapEx. I put a multiple on the cash flows, and based on how long I see this long secular shift happening and the rate of growth, there's a long secular shift, and then they're going to add share on top of that. I try to make an assessment of how much share they can take on top of the secular shift and put a multiple on the cash flows.
I can at least acknowledge a price-to-sales multiple on a business with nine percent gross margins, but when you have actual cash flow to use to approach it, that certainly makes sense. From a market perspective, with these niche businesses, you often will have dislocations. Does the market treat it like a software business? Do they treat it like an advertising business? Do you have any sense of how you think the market looks at Doximity and goes about valuing it?
I think it's traditionally covered by some software and some healthcare. In a way, people may think of it as ad tech, in the sense that they can report a great quarter, but people don't necessarily give them credit that that's going to continue in quarters forthcoming. I view it as the value proposition to the advertisers getting higher as engagement gets higher. That's leading to strength in the quarter and strength so far this year.
Because it's related to ad tech and the history of ad tech, people may be a little wary of giving credit for the duration of growth. I view it a little differently in that it's the platform that happens to monetize ad tech. So long as the platform is there with engagement, then we can feel comfortable that they'll be able to capitalize on this long runway ahead of them.
It makes sense from all sides of the spectrum in terms of where there might be a varying view. This has been fascinating. I got to learn more about a business that I was very interested in already. We close out the conversations with a key lesson that you might be able to pull away from this particular business and apply elsewhere. Is there anything that stands out from Doximity that you think is useful from a framework perspective, or just a broad lesson that you took away?
I think value proposition to a customer matters a lot. The doctor-centric nature of Doximity is not just something that they say; it's something that they do and care a lot about. When you can combine a high value proposition to the customer with a long runway, and throw in strong incremental margins on top of that, it's a recipe for rapidly increasing the earnings power of the business. When you get those things operating together, so long as they can maintain engagement on the platform in order to capitalize on that runway, things can get pretty good pretty quickly.
Well, thank you, Jim. I appreciate you joining us today and sharing your knowledge and educating me a little bit more on what I love.
It was a lot of fun. Thanks, Matt.