媒体并购 - [Business Breakdowns,EP.230]
- 20年媒体投行经验可以浓缩成一条主线:互联网让分发变得免费,Google和Facebook拿走了大量广告主,价值“正越来越集中到少数人手里:Google、Facebook、Amazon”。 一家覆盖全美的美国有线电视网络,7、8年前约覆盖1.1亿户,如今只有5500万户,附属费收入实际上腰斩,尽管网络仍有广告及其他收入。Saunders在Methuselah Advisors工作约15年后独立出来,因为“媒体的交易会变少”,经典的30个买家竞价模板也已经改变。
- 按品类看,最值得交易的判断是:“买YouTube频道从来没有这么便宜过。” 深夜电视节目过去把YouTube当作播出后的“肩部”补充内容;如今品牌开始像买电视广告一样直接买YouTube,买的不只是触达,还有广告邻接,这也解释了Hot Ones为何能以“相当不错的倍数”卖出:它从YouTube购买自己的广告库存,再转售给P&G和Coca-Cola。Saunders认为,主持人和关键人物风险并非天然构成否决理由:“大多数电视节目都有主持人……Seinfeld本身就很有价值。”
- Saunders预计Substack并购会增加,行动迟缓的传统媒体正互相快速跟进:Bloomberg宣布将接入Substacks,CNN则加码Newsletter。 并非每个Substack都具备收购价值;真正能成交的标的必须“与买方的内容相协调”,而且“媒体公司收购Substack后,如果把它下架,那就是蠢”。
- 最自然的买家是“那些必须向Google和Facebook交过路费来获取消费者的人”——那么,Uber会买下最大的网约车司机注册网站吗? 答案是:“可能。”但非媒体公司通常运营不好媒体资产,比如Estée Lauder十年前推动美妆YouTube业务就“效果不太好”;真正的买家名单只有“3到5个”,而市场实际购买的是忠实粉丝:能“引发骚动”的主播,以及脱离CPM定价的线下活动——品牌可能花几千美元触达200–300名到场者,而同等规模的网页流量只需约10美元。
- “Google Zero”正成为越来越大的威胁;公开披露的数据落后于Saunders听到的情况——自然流量出现“两位数下滑”——而他对补救措施的回答毫不含糊:“不……没什么可做的。” 在一个品类中排名低于前10–20的出版商,小众品类中排名更靠后的出版商,都“已经遭受巨大打击”;唯一的防御方式是直接连接消费者,类似New York Times专注订阅的路径。
- AI叠加IP库是一个被低估的方向:大多数内容价值在前30–60天后就会衰减,但如果让“一个坐在键盘后的孩子”重新想象目录——比如一家音乐公司每周让20多名音乐人重做歌曲、重新推销给商业客户——就可能“改变整个歌曲资产组合的价值”。 Paramount则在走高价值IP的另一条路线:用South Park和UFC作为有针对性的拉新内容,引导用户订阅Paramount+。
- Saunders的宏观警告是:AI只需影响“几个百分点”的就业——沿用COVID封控的逻辑——就可能迫使社会推出UBI、提高所得税和资本利得税,甚至征收“Elon Musk税”,对尚未出售的资产征税。 一切都会变得便宜到通缩,但“多数人买不起”;Saunders认为,最有利的位置属于经济价值的创造者,“你不能做员工”,以及依靠真实性扩张的独立创作者——Kai Cenat这一代人可以成为“他们想成为的任何人”。
1. 互联网打破了媒体的家族垄断经济学——价值集中到3个平台
- Saunders先给媒体下定义:媒体是“通过订阅或广告变现的内容”,而每一代新媒介——书籍、报纸、广播、电视——都“更容易让人上瘾、更具参与感”。要么有人直接付钱给你,要么你帮助品牌促成一次购买。
- 他认为最大的主题变化,是互联网颠覆了媒体的所有权模式。报纸曾是延续数代的家族企业,几乎“拥有垄断地位”;联邦政府甚至禁止同一市场内的企业同时拥有电视、广播和报纸。随后Google和Facebook拿走了大量广告主,过去25多年,行业的思路转向“快速做大,然后卖掉”,而且往往没有通往盈利的路径。
- 电视行业的账本非常直观:一家覆盖全美的美国有线电视网络,“7、8年前……约有1.1亿户;今天是5500万户”,这相当于Comcast这类分销商支付给ESPN等频道的接入费收入腰斩,尽管这些业务仍有广告及其他收入。“大部分价值正集中到少数人手里:Google、Facebook、Amazon。”
2. 传统媒体快速跟进Substack和YouTube——Hot Ones展示了运作机制
- 大型媒体公司“被训练成行动迟缓者”——它们曾被Facebook Video伤过:组建了整套团队来做变现,但变现“从未发生”。“但一旦竞争对手开始行动,它们就会快速跟进。”眼下的证据包括Bloomberg接入Substacks、CNN加码Newsletter。Saunders认为,买家如今更把Substack视为“一个平台,而不是竞争对手”,并表示“媒体公司收购Substack后,如果把它下架,那就是蠢”。
- 更大的变化是,YouTube正从二轮“肩部”内容——比如Jimmy Kimmel的节目片段——转变为首播目的地,因为品牌终于愿意像买电视广告一样直接买YouTube,而电视销售的不只是触达,还有广告与内容的邻接关系。据报道,Hot Ones以相当不错的倍数卖出;它的运作方式是从YouTube购买广告库存,再转售给Procter & Gamble或Coca-Cola:“这是你能触达的人群,而你的广告接下来会挨着谁出现。”
- 这个判断针对的是整个品类,并非对每个资产都适用:“回头看时,我们会说,买YouTube频道从来没有这么便宜过。”Saunders认为,主持人和关键人物风险并非必然致命——“大多数电视节目都有主持人……Seinfeld本身就很有价值”——甚至Hot Ones主持人的绯闻也在“2秒内”被人忘掉。
3. 真正的买家名单只有3到5个——交易如今需要定制化流程
- 在Methuselah Advisors工作约15年后——“实际上15年来我一直在卖空气,准确地说是卖想法”——Saunders几周前通过一篇标题为“Conscious Uncoupling”的LinkedIn帖子宣布独立。传统卖方流程是把Teaser群发给30个买家,收集5到15份报价,再组织竞价;如今媒体交易需要“更多亲力亲为、更多定制化流程”,而且“媒体的交易会变少”。
- 他的买家框架是:“任何必须向Google和Facebook交过路费来获取消费者的人。”举个例子,有一个帮助Uber和Lyft司机注册的排名第一的私人网站——“Uber会买它吗?可能。”原因在于获客成本和司机流失率。但非媒体买家通常运营不好媒体资产;Estée Lauder十年前推动美妆YouTube业务,“效果不太好”。
- “这些生意没有20个买家,只有3到5个。”一些家族控制的收购方仍然高度自上而下——“去把这个买下来,我根本不在乎我们付多少钱”——而一些最好的交易则是在长期关系中酝酿出来的:Free Press的关系至少部分追溯到Allen & Company会议,“严格说,我不认为Barry当时是在出售。”
4. 真正被收购的是参与度——忠实粉丝,而不是频道数量
- 由个人驱动的品牌是“获取受众和实现规模化的最简单方式”,关键人物风险则要逐案评估。MrBeast是做对了的范本:除了频道之外还有Feastables等业务,带动各项指标,和其他真正强势的创始人没有区别。TCG投资Barstool时,“Dave很聪明地说:‘我要退出日常CEO工作。’”但他仍然是参与度的核心驱动力。
- 一个拥有50,000名高参与度读者的Newsletter,和它加上5个低参与度副频道,在买家眼里大致价值相当;买家会叠加自己的增长和广告销售能力。因此Saunders给独立创作者的建议是:“守住自己的赛道。”
- 活动是例外,因为它们“脱离了CPM定价”:品牌可能为一场200–300人的活动花费数千美元,而让同样的受众访问网页只需约10美元。但市场供给已经显得拥挤——Axios靠突发新闻吸引了约500人;那些“互相复制粘贴”的会议会陷入困境,不同于Kara Swisher以编辑内容为核心的Code,后者能制造Gates与Jobs式的文化时刻。
- 判断资产价值最直接的信号,是那些在纽约街头走动就能“引发骚动”的主播。“任何媒体公司都想买下拥有真正粉丝、能让粉丝陷入狂热的其他媒体业务。”
5. 高价值IP仍然重要——但平台让“糟糕内容高度上瘾”,AI可以重新激活内容库
- Saunders用美国人的饮食习惯打比方:“你去欧洲,会瘦下来……你去农贸市场,连续几周阅读食品包装,然后又回去吃McDonald’s。”平台偏爱UGC,是因为内容对它们免费——Instagram“很像一家媒体公司,但它们不用为任何内容付钱”。
- 他对Paramount的判断是,与其纠结South Park和UFC应该放在哪里,不如先确定目标用户,再买他们会看的内容,最终把订阅者导向Paramount+。这相当于试图重建MTV曾经赋予Paramount的时代文化影响力:UFC不再通过按次付费观看,而是成为“只能在Paramount上观看的高端产品”。
- 他承认,体育是“我犯下的一个重大误判”:Sinclair收购RSN、相关业务重组后,体育版权转移到了不同领域。他认为,体育可能正是未来出现“10亿美元以上并购或版权交易”的地方。
- IP库的价值长期被误判:价值集中在最初30–60天,此后“衰减得极快”。但AI改变了这笔账——故事可以由“一个坐在键盘后的孩子”重新构想,而不必依赖演员。一个正在发生的案例是:一家公司每周让20多名音乐人重做几首歌,周五试听会选出5首,再重新向广告客户推介;其中一首歌若成功,“就可能改变整个歌曲资产组合的价值”。
6. “Google Zero”正成为越来越大的威胁——而且没有解法
- Google News的分发机制已经改变,出版商正在失去过去流向自身网站的流量。公开披露的结果落后于现实——“一家公司公布数据时,往往已经是几个月前的情况”——而Saunders听到的数字是,自然流量出现“两位数下滑”。在一个品类中排名低于前10–20的出版商,小众品类中排名更靠后的出版商,都“已经遭受巨大打击”:它们要用固定成本支撑过去免费获得、如今却在消失的流量。一些中小型出版商已经彻底转向“迎合算法,这很糟糕”。
- Matt问,是否有任何新渠道能够缓冲这一下滑;答案毫不含糊:“不。这有点吓人,但没什么可做的。”幸存者需要直接连接消费者——New York Times依靠订阅增长,并把体育等垂直领域纳入重点——但“如果你只是一个泛化的内容新闻网站……未来会非常艰难”。
7. AI清算:几个百分点的失业就可能迫使税制再平衡——独立创作者胜出
- 他的宏观推演沿用COVID逻辑:疫情封控并非等到大规模感染,而是在影响仅达到“几个百分点”时就发生了;因此AI“不需要影响那么多工作”——仅仅让半挂卡车司机和Uber司机失去工作——就可能迫使社会彻底改变对无业人群的支持方式。他预计UBI和更高税负,包括提高针对“资本利得避风港”的税率,甚至可能扩展到“Elon Musk税”:“想办法对尚未出售的资产征税。”他参考的先例,是偿还二战债务期间实行的高税率。
- 对于科技乐观主义,他的判断是:“我们拥有比历史上任何时候都多的空闲时间,但大多数人都困在手机上……焦虑更多……朋友更少……性生活更少。”60%的美国人超重,“这就是事实”。“以一种正常的方式与AI共存,唯一的办法是断开连接,而不是连接得更多。”
- 通缩并不能解决问题——尽管他讲过商务舱去日本变便宜的例子,“一切都会变便宜,但大多数人买不起”。这也是他的个人结论,以及他创办自己公司的部分原因:“你必须成为经济价值的创造者……你不能做员工。”
- 他认为胜出者是独立创作者:不再需要Netflix特别节目的喜剧演员,以及靠品牌合作和产品线变现的21岁主播。Oprah必须适应行业塑造的模具;“Kai Cenat或这些更年轻的主播,他们就是他们想成为的任何人”——某位主播收视最高的直播,内容只是一只老鼠跑进了房间。真实性如今可以规模化。
完整逐字稿
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This is Matt Russell, and today we are exploring the world of media deals. My guest is Blake Saunders. Blake has been in media investment banking for about 2 decades.
When I first met him, he was a banker, so I wasn't expecting to lean into this relationship. But I often introduce Blake to others as the banker that is really great, that I really love. He's been one of the best resources for me over the past 3 years because he's simultaneously involved with those making 8- or 9-figure deals, those who pay his paychecks, as he is with the new media upstarts and everything that's happening in the podcasting universe, the Substack universe, and the YouTube universe.
So I took what would otherwise be a private conversation and did it for the podcast. We get into the deal landscape that exists today and some of the realities of the media market, how companies are dealing with this new era, and who's best positioned for the next chapter.
I benefited from Blake, who had previously been known to some as the Anonymous Banker, who wrote some amazing things over the past year because he came out of hiding and was willing to come onto the podcast with us. So please enjoy my conversation with Blake Saunders.
All right, Blake, I am excited to finally have you on the show, and I can have you on without having to refer to you as the Anonymous Banker, as you've come out of hiding here. You have a deep history in media. You've been an incredible resource to me as a media banker over the past few years.
I wanted to start this out very high-level. We're going to get into a lot of the weeds, but as I was trying to come up with topics, it's incredibly difficult for me to define media. I thought the best place to start was to have you share your view on what media means to you.
Media at a high level is effectively content that's monetized via subscriptions or advertising. It takes on so many different forms and continues to evolve. It started at the beginning with books and manuscripts, and that evolved to newspapers, then radio, and then television.
I think each successive iteration of media, to where we're at today, gets more addicting and more engaging. At the end of the day, either the media company is making money because someone's paying them directly, or they're helping an advertiser, brand, or agency get someone to make a purchase decision and make that purchase.
You hit on a good point at the end there in terms of who the actual customer is, whether it's the advertiser or the audience itself. But going into your history as a banker, you've been in this media market, in the M&A markets, for decades now. Not to get into age dynamics—I'm right there with you—but what would you sketch out as the major thematic changes in terms of what has changed from the early days in your career to where we are today?
I would use an M&A lens if you can, but whatever you would say to capture the thematic changes.
1. The Internet Changed Media Deals
I think the biggest change that happened in media, just in general, is the internet. Even though it made distribution free, people's perception of what they were building and how to create value in the last 25-plus years has been to build it quickly and then sell it.
I think before that, newspapers and things like that were owned by families for multiple generations, and they were really stable and great businesses. TV—there are a lot of media companies today that still have family ownership, like Condé Nast and Hearst. So that's a big change.
The reason why it's changed, and it's not the best, is the lens has shifted from businesses that maybe don't take that much money to start and are very cash-flow-generative and stable. Newspapers had basically a monopoly, and the federal government actually regulated what you could own. This was a rule that went away, but you couldn't own TV, radio, and newspapers in the same market because they were worried about a monopoly.
The problem is Google and Facebook now came into these markets and effectively took a lot of the advertisers because they were just able to get customers more easily. Starting 20-plus years ago, you saw people raising money to build media businesses that may not ever be profitable, with the pure goal of getting them big enough to then sell them to another media company.
Where we find ourselves today is we're in a spot where it's really tough. Every company is struggling. I think people that have subscriptions and direct contact with their consumers are doing okay. But anyone that's relying on organic search traffic to drive advertising revenue is having a really tough time because the degradation you're seeing in consumer engagement is really high.
This is also on the TV side, too. In the US, a fully distributed cable network used to have around 110 million households. This was 7 or 8 years ago, so it's not that long ago. Today, it's 55 million.
The reason why that matters for TV and cable is that each of those households that are subscribing is paying a fee to Comcast or one of the other distributors, and part of that fee is then making its way to ESPN or whatever cable network. If you have that, you've effectively halved your revenue. They have other places to get revenue from, like advertising, but these businesses are changing rapidly, and most of the value is accruing in the hands of a few people: Google, Facebook, and Amazon.
It's incredible, the breadth out there, where there's literally no barriers to entry now for anyone in the media space. I did want to put the lens back on you in terms of going through your career and working for institutions. You've made this change recently, which I want to get into. Can you talk about why you left your firm recently and whether any of these developments had anything to do with you taking a different strategy personally?
2. Banking Goes Custom
I was at a small firm called Methuselah Advisors for 15 and a half years—I think 14 and a half years—and then I spun out a couple of weeks ago and started my own platform.
Being at a small firm, you're always your go-to-market when you talk to clients. Yes, it's about your partners, but it's also that they're hiring you. When you're at a larger bulge bracket, you have a multitude of services to sell into a client across the board: debt capital markets, equity capital markets. So you're able to provide more services.
I started at Citigroup for a year and then joined the smaller platform. Effectively, for 15 years, I was just selling air—literally, ideas. I just see the world changing a lot in terms of how firms will be structured, what clients want, and the services we can deliver.
I wrote this unique LinkedIn post, and I titled it “Conscious Uncoupling.” When you're in a partnership for 15 years, it's a conversation. It's not like I'm sending an email or a PDF with a signature on it. It was a conversation, and I think it just made a lot of sense.
I want to build something that can sustain these changes that are happening across the landscape. There are going to be fewer deals in media. The way to take businesses to market is changing dramatically.
Typically, the best sell-side process, when a banker sells a business, is getting an asset that you can market. You can basically have someone young on your team send it out to 30 people and get 5, 10, or 15 bids back. Then you decide, take whoever you want to a second stage, and pick the ultimate winner of an auction process.
But that's changed. In order to sell media companies or media-adjacent businesses, it's much more hands-on and much more custom. So that's what we're building. It's different.
I think there's a lot of strategic insight from the media that you know very well, and not to blow smoke, but you're incredibly well plugged in in terms of the new developments. But I also think there's a parallel to what's happened in media and seeing individuals go out on their own versus working under institutions, for a variety of different reasons.
So it's interesting when these things come together. One of the things I wanted to get your insights on is that I get a lot of exposure to the theoretical sellers—those who are building media businesses from the ground up—and these tend to be smaller in size, but even some of the medium-size businesses. I don't have nearly as much insight into the buyers.
How do you frame buyers in the media market? We could take this in so many different ways, but do you have a framework for thinking about who the natural buyers are in this market? You can elaborate on that however you like.
3. Buyers Chase New Audiences
It's super dynamic. With some of my clients or people I'm trying to pitch, I make this basic statement, which is, “If you're thinking about hiring a banker,” because a lot of times, most of what you do in banking is just copy and paste what you did 6 months ago, because you're doing a bunch of busywork.
Don't give away the secrets.
Yeah. If you're thinking about hiring someone who's copying and pasting a presentation from even 2 or 3 months ago, it's probably changed. The demands and desires of larger media companies, and where they want to invest, are changing rapidly.
A perfect example is Substack. I think you'll start to see more and more M&A around Substack. You saw Bloomberg a couple of days ago announce that they're going to turn on Substacks. CNN said they're going to lean more into newsletters a couple of months ago. There's a reason why this happens.
A lot of large media companies have been trained to be slow movers. When the platforms started to get bigger, they would offer unique things. Facebook turned on Facebook Video, and they did all these partnerships with larger media companies. They were like, “Build video teams, create video for Facebook, and we'll help you with the monetization.”
The monetization never happened, and Facebook shut that down after a year. Then they let everyone else suffer and clean up the mess: “Okay, what do we do with this team of 5 or 10 that we just hired?” A lot of media companies have been slow movers in adapting to change, but as soon as their competitors start to make moves, there's a fast follow. That's what I expect to see. It seems like more of them are getting wise to some of these new mediums.
The biggest one that I'm sensing now is YouTube. Think about the late-night shows, not in the context of them all getting canceled. Prior to that, they used YouTube as a place for shoulder or adjacent content. Say Jimmy Kimmel did a fun lip-sync or something like that; he would clip it up and put it on YouTube. They always thought of YouTube as a second-run place to continue to cultivate their audience and get them back to TV.
What you're starting to see with the larger traditional media companies, and it's just happening now, is that they're realizing, “Oh, wow, we should think of YouTube as a first-run spot, so let's actually make content for that.” The reason is that brands and agencies are finally willing to buy direct on YouTube and buy it like they do TV. I think Hot Ones, the show, sold at a pretty good multiple because they sell it like TV.
TV sells adjacency. Yes, they sell reach, but they also sell adjacency. When large brands want to buy advertising, they want to make sure that the content aligns with the person they're going after. Everybody has done a lot of studies around this.
Even premium content that has the wrong negative connotations—even if it's a premium show that everyone loves—could actually harm a brand by having the interstitial of a commercial in it. Brands care about adjacency, and a show like Hot Ones can effectively go buy its inventory from YouTube and resell it to brands.
They go to Procter & Gamble or Coca-Cola, and they say, “Hey, we're going to have these 2 actors on this week. Will you come in and buy this week? This is your reach, and this is who you're going to be next to.” That's been really profitable for that business. Larger media companies are starting to spin up digital ad sellers and think about the YouTube ecosystem in a much different way.
This is the backdrop to say digital media done right will continue to be more valuable. Yes, it's going to be hard to sell a creator-led YouTube channel. I totally get that. But I think Hot Ones is a good example of a business that, yes, has a host on it, but I think what people forget is that there have been hosts on most TV shows.
There are actors who are specific to those shows. Seinfeld has a lot of value, and we sometimes forget this key-man risk that exists in most content. Even with Hot Ones, there was a little bit of salacious gossip around the host, and people forgot about that in 2 seconds.
People reference Hot Ones. They don't reference Sean or Sean's show. It's a good framework. That particular anecdote about them buying back the inventory from YouTube and then selling it was interesting and a kind of missing piece to me in terms of the sale, so that's interesting in the weeds.
Applying the same thought process to something like Substack, which feels a little less obvious to me: YouTube has this natural analog to television. When you see more movement into Substack, to me, that's a net positive for Substack as a platform. You've seen plenty of brands now lean into that.
What is that telling you in terms of whether this is a signal that Substack is now considered a place where you can get eyeballs for newsletters? What are the dynamics that are driving that in your mind?
For media companies, their whole goal is to reach an audience. Substack is purely a platform. It's easy to reference Substack; I think you could just say the category of newsletters. I think a media company would buy any newsletter. Some of the fastest-growing newsletters happen to be on Substack.
I think if a media company buys a Substack, they're stupid to take it off. I think they're starting to see it more as a platform instead of a competitor. There are some people on beehiiv, but where the best talent has gone seems to be Substack.
I make this comment that I think we'll look back and say that there's never been a cheaper time to buy YouTube channels. That gets a retort: “Well, what about this one? What about this one?” That's not a specific comment around a specific person, and the same thing applies to Substack. I'm not making a claim that every single Substack can be bought.
YouTube—every channel is different. Same thing with Substack. People group all of these together. The Substacks that will get transacted on are ones that are basically harmonized with the content of whoever's buying them.
This is a random example, but if someone has a really good cosmetic tutorial or something like that, you could see a cosmetics brand buying that. Or, like, a news one where it's just links—you could see a news company wanting to buy that because it fits within maybe a premium product. There's such a diverse group of YouTube channels and Substacks that you can't say, “Every single Substack is going to be valued at X, and they should all sell for Y.” It's not going to happen. It's more about very specific types of content.
The buyers—do you see them as legacy media companies like Bloomberg or The New York Times, or is this filtering into the territory of cosmetics brands and corporations, where every entity is now a media entity? When you think about strategic buyers, or who's dominating the buyer side of the equation, where does that tend to lie?
I think it's anyone that has to pay a toll to Google and Facebook to acquire a consumer. There's a really cool B2B newsletter and website all around this gig economy. It's the number-one site to help Uber drivers and Lyft drivers sign up, and then they communicate all the new rules and things like that.
It's a completely private site. Would Uber buy that? Maybe, because they pay so much to get every single driver to sign up and complete the application on their platform to then be a driver, and they have a high churn. So when you go through cycles and valuations are starting to go up, you see people enter the fray who want to pretend they can operate a media company. It usually never works.
Cosmetic companies got into YouTube channels 10 years ago. I think Estée Lauder had a whole push into a beauty YouTube channel. I don't think it worked out that well because most people that are not media companies- Can operate a media asset.
I think it will be a mix, and that's again why I think, on some assignments, we can basically be better positioned than other large platforms: There aren't 20 buyers for these businesses. There's like 3 to 5, and you really have to communicate in a direct way what the value is.
And just to hammer on that point, this list of potential buyers—are they actively seeking to find solutions to whatever problems they're having, like what you mentioned? Or is it coming in the opposite direction, where sellers are looking to strategically place themselves with buyers and you need to pitch the buyer on the reasoning?
I think it's both. Every company is really different. The way that you navigate it is different. Some of them, when they have family ownership, are still led from the top. Someone will say, “Go buy this, and I really don't care what we pay for it.” So they have a corporate development team that's good at negotiating pricing, but they're not price-sensitive.
But it's a mix because there are a lot of people coming to market. In podcasts, yes, assets are for sale, but typically, I think some of the best deals are born out of longer-term relationships. Think about the Free Press. That relationship is not something that... I guess it kinda started at The Allen Company conference, but I don't think Barry was for sale technically.
On the point around media, you always seem to hammer on the importance of content.
Is that still the holy grail in your view?
4. Premium IP Still Matters
There’s a nuance to that. Facebook, Snapchat, and TikTok are oriented to ensure that UGC content is the most addictive because they don’t have to pay for it. Instagram is a lot like a media company, but they don’t pay for any of the content.
One of the reasons why I have very strong views on how to fix Substack is because I want places where premium content can fully monetize to continue to exist. It’s kind of like the American diet, and I think this happens to everybody. You go to Europe, you lose weight, and you’re like, “I’m going to come home, and I’m going to eat healthy,” or, “I’m going to try to eat that way.” You go to the farmers market and read the packaging for a couple of weeks, and then you go back to eating at McDonald’s.
The unfortunate thing is premium IP matters, and we can talk about that in a second with Paramount, but the platforms have made shitty content highly addictive. That goes back to why certain YouTube channels will be less valuable or more valuable in the hands of a media company. But I think it’s because they’re creating premium-like content, maybe not using the budget of premium content, but creating premium content that users, using the analogy of food, are getting real value from.
An interesting thing with Paramount is that they spent a lot of money on South Park and a lot of money on the UFC. I think their strategy, because they have the budget to buy stuff, is that instead of worrying about where the stuff is going to live, ultimately, they want it to live in Paramount+ and get people to subscribe.
But I think their positioning is that they used to have the zeitgeist with MTV and all these cable channels. That’s gone, and so it’s, “How do we turn that back on?” Instead of worrying about where it lives today, I think they’re most focused on, “Let’s go figure out our target customer and what they’re watching that we can actually go easily get.”
The 2 things I just referenced are major draws. South Park, even in its 22nd or 21st season, is still funny, still relevant, and still making news. The UFC, I think, is one of the most watched sports. They did a good job during COVID, basically turning themselves back on really quickly. They’re bringing it in a form where you’re not going to do the pay-per-view, but I think it’ll still feel like a premium product that you can only watch on Paramount+.
Yeah, it’s interesting for both of those properties. You seem to hit a specific demographic as well, and you have this die-hard audience, for lack of a better term, where you can feel more comfortable that they’re going to port over with you versus the many other large audiences where, if something went behind a paywall, it might not.
I always reference The Economist, which had an 85% drop in its podcast listenership after it brought its podcast behind a paywall. I’m sure there are other things going on in the numbers, but it’s interesting to me that there’s a test of when something is free versus when something moves, and you see that same audience go with it.
It’s interesting just to hear the dynamics of what they targeted. How many assets do you think are out there that are that particularly powerful in terms of having scale, but also having this engagement, which feels stronger than what you would easily find in the top decile?
The interesting thing in media is that it’s ever-changing. New shows come along. One thing I heard from a producer is that the unfortunate dynamic of all these numbers and statistics is that a lot of shows are not getting a chance to breathe.
Most of the good content that we look back on and say, “That was a really good fucking show,” took 2 or 3 seasons to develop, and now shows get cut after 1 season if they don’t show the right metrics. A lot of the best shows, when Netflix first came out, were basically greenlighting their own content. So much of it was built in a way to have you binge.
A lot of new content that’s being created is more addictive but is not as good, so I don’t know if it will have the underlying IP and asset value. I think the way to think about it is: What do you watch? I don’t watch TV, so I have a hard time saying what’s valuable.
I think there are probably some really good podcasts. The next iteration is that some of these podcasts can have the same amount of advertising weight as a good TV show, and you’ve seen SiriusXM do a really good job of partnering because they have an insane audio sales team.
That’s why they do these deals: They know that they’re going to get the deepest penetration with the right advertisers and get good CPMs. Again, I don’t watch TV, so I don’t know any other valuable IP that has the same weight as South Park, because that’s a lot of money.
There are very few appointment-viewing things. I think that’s why you’ve seen this flock toward live sports. It is truly appointment viewing. I would put UFC into that category. South Park is one of the last things that I’m sure its audience would still view as appointment viewing, maybe not as strongly as it once was.
Sports is probably a big miss on my part. Sports is probably the easiest, most heavily weighted thing where you’re going to see a different adjudication of who owns the rights and how they’re able to be used, because there’s been sort of a shake-up.
Sports rights are controlled at a couple of different levels—in-market versus national broadcasts—and it was a way to basically put more value back to the teams. When Sinclair acquired a bunch of the RSNs and then ended up having to restructure those businesses, a lot of those rights got put back into different areas. They just changed.
Those were really valuable for the sports teams. It was driving a lot of the value. So probably sports is the place where you’re going to see billion-dollar-plus M&A-type deals or rights deals. I was having a hard time thinking about specific content.
It’s incredibly rare to have that type of “you want to be there in the moment” viewing, because now things you might want to watch just pile up. You’re getting fed so much content. I have books, TV shows, and things that have just been on my list for a while, which is a lot different than it used to be.
One of the things that’s always been misjudged is the value of IP libraries, meaning people misperceive them as being more valuable because there’s just a ton of degradation. In most content formats, the first 30 to 60 days are where all the value is, and then it degrades exceptionally quickly.
With technology now, I think there are going to be unique opportunities with these libraries of IP—music, TV shows, scripts, books, all this stuff—because you can reimagine it in a much quicker way. I’m sure there are some crazy esoteric union rules about what you can and can’t do and how you can use the actors, but it is something interesting to think about.
Good stories and narratives can be reimagined in a lot of different ways. I think there are going to be opportunities to use these libraries to reimagine content in the future. Imagine if, instead of having to hire actors and stuff, it was just a kid behind a keyboard. When Disney recolored some of the movies, it was that quick—with, obviously, new content, better content, and things like that.
It taps into what a lot of the studios did with Marvel originally: the idea of superhero movies where the superheroes sold the movie, not the actors, and there was a way to not have to pay nearly as much. Now things have come full circle, but if it’s not the humans who are attracting the audience, you can hire lower-cost labor, juice that up, and recreate the same things, and you’re still going to get a similar audience, which I think is interesting.
On the technology side, I think you saw it in the music industry, where a lot of those old catalogs—I mean, this wasn’t even reimagining them—but by having streaming come into play, you saw Spotify reinvigorate a lot of these royalty streams.
Not only did you have a pickup in terms of the income that was coming in, you also, in theory, had better visibility, or at least that’s what the funds were selling: Because you had this hard data, you had better visibility into what it would look like in the future. That industry took off, and that was from technology unlocking historic IP and bringing new income streams to it.
Taking the music example, a lot of musicians never make a lot, so you have hobbyists and stuff like that. There’s a company right now where they focus on a couple of songs each week and have 20-plus musicians do different versions of them.
There have been a few songs that have been used as the intros or outros to TV shows that have become hits. What they’re using is technology to help them produce faster. They send the songs out to everybody. Everybody works on them for a week. They come on Friday and have a listening session where they listen to everyone’s songs.
They pick 5, fully produce those, and then go re-pitch those songs for commercials and all these different things, taking it a step further. They’re using this base of IP, reimagining it with a slightly different tone, and turning it back on, basically.
First, they don’t have to pay these musicians that much at all. Second, if they hit and can grow the value of 1 song, it could change the entire value of a portfolio of songs.
Going back to some of the new dynamics of the media upstarts that we’re seeing today, one of the interesting themes up until the Churnin deal with Barstool was: How do you apply a multiple to a business where there’s such high key-man risk?
Where does that stand today, just in terms of the comfort level of acquiring businesses that are built around individuals, where it’s hard to separate the individual from the brand, versus those that are able to accomplish the brand while being a key individual, versus those that try to go the full-brand route and limit the individual connectivity?
5. Creators Build Valuable Brands
I think the reason why you see more person-driven brands is that it’s the easiest way to get an audience and get scale.
Obviously, most podcasts are led by the person because you can't have a brand. Certain forms of media, like cooking, are really personal. If you're selling a recipe website, you'll get dinged because people are worried about it, but what you're trying to show is, look, this person has been producing content for 10 or 15 years.
Even though they may get a large check at the end of a transaction, there are ways to tie them into whatever company is going forward. Each time, it's a unique situation, but MrBeast, I think, has done it pretty well. He's been able to raise a lot of money around Feastables and other things like that.
When you look at his go-to-market, it's not just the YouTube channels. It's everything else he's going to build that will create ongoing value. I think people see Jimmy as someone who is much more than just his YouTube channel. If you talk to people who work with him, he's very focused on the business, not just the content. The way he drives to metrics and things like that sounds like any other really strong founder.
It's a case-by-case basis. Most large media companies do a pretty good job of trying to get a sense of who that person is, and that's what they'll base what they're buying on. But when TCG invested in Barstool, Dave smartly said, "I'm going to step back from the day-to-day CEO role," but he still drove so much of the engagement. I think most media companies at a smaller scale need someone like that, or they have a team of people. There's a reason why you're showing up, and it's not just because of the brand.
On the idea of those individuals or those brands having a lane, we often think about certain creators or businesses and their Substack, YouTube, or podcast. But then you see them building out newsletters and all these other properties. Through the lens of a buyer, how important is it that they have maximum platform exposure, versus are they buying these businesses just for that single lane, whether it's the Substack or the YouTube?
Obviously, that's going to have most of the value, but how important is it to be spread onto all those other platforms as well?
Media companies are buying other things. They're adding a capability, so that's more of a tech-type acquisition. If they're buying another media company, they're buying audience. If someone has a really strong newsletter that has 50,000 engaged people versus someone who has a newsletter with the same audience plus 5 other random things that have no engagement, I think they'll probably judge them pretty similarly.
Effectively, when they look at it, they want to know, okay, if we overlay our ability to grow this, our ability to sell these ads, and our ability to bring this value back to our broader platform of consumers who are consuming our media today, it doesn't necessarily matter whether you're on 5 or 10 platforms. Whatever channels you're in, you just need to have the right engagement.
You see this right now with some people where they have their 1 main thing, and then they're adding stuff, and the other things have light engagement. It gives them an opportunity to test and learn to see what resonates, because each thing is different. That's the tough thing, especially if you're not raising any money or just a little bit of money as a media company. You can't copy and paste what you're doing on 1 thing and hope it works on the next, because it won't.
They all have different types of audiences. They all have different feed dynamics, how often you have to post, and things like that. So in order to be good on multiple channels, you probably have to have a person thinking about it. You have to change the content slightly. It's not an easy thing.
For independent, fast-growing media companies, I think it's best to stick to your lane. If you want to do other stuff, it's an opportunity to engage with people slightly differently and test things out. But that's more on the digital side.
If you do a newsletter and then have in-real-life events, that's just like a typical media company. The nice thing with events is they basically become detached from CPMs, and you can sell them on a different thing: influence. There are a lot of reasons why brands will buy events and give someone a lot more money than they would otherwise.
An event that has 200 or 300 people at it, a brand might spend thousands of dollars, whereas if a couple hundred people showed up to a webpage, they would get $10. If you have the right engagement on whatever channel you're on, you see some of these livestreamers who, when they walk around New York City, cause pandemonium. That, to me, is a pure signal that they have real fans. I think any media company wants to buy other media businesses that have true fans who are going crazy.
Where do you think we are in terms of the event cycle? After COVID, there was this pent-up demand for more in-person interactions. That has been met with increasing supply and an increasing pivot toward a focus on events for media businesses. I know this is not new, but do you have a sense of whether this is a cycle or whether there's a real secular trend here?
I'm not that popular, but I have event invites probably every day. So I can only imagine how many are truly out there.
Axios had its event last Thursday. I think they had 500 people at it. So there's always going to be room for really good events.
There are a lot more events. I don't know what happens there. It feels pretty full. There could be double the amount of events, but I don't think there's enough stuff to cover. In the way that it's being covered, I think Axios does a good job: They speed it along, and they try to break news.
I always make this anecdote. Why would I go to a conference when I can listen to the same content on a podcast and just have it sped up 1.5 times? Folks like Axios are doing a better job of trying to break news and making it important to be in the room.
But a lot of conferences that are purely selling content and not the connections are going to struggle because everyone has the same speakers. Especially if it's not a reporter interviewing the person, it's a very lightweight conversation that, in some instances, makes you think, "Wait, what did they even say?"
That's why Kara Swisher's Code Conference was really good, because it was editorial-led. She effectively brought people she knew really well, and she was willing to ask really tough questions. There are moments along the growth of technology where you can point to them and say, "Oh, yeah, that was that weird time when Mark Zuckerberg acted really weird," or, "Oh, you remember the time Kara brought Bill Gates and Steve Jobs together?"
She had these cultural moments, and I think that's usually the case when it's a journalist-led conference, not just a random person leading it. So there is room for a lot more. The problem is, everyone's go-to-market from a content perspective is literally copying and pasting each other, which I don't think works.
It's a fair point. Things moved away from what's happening on stage to who else is in the room. Now there feels like there's an abundant amount of, "Just trust who else is going to be in the room," without a real direction. So I think you'll just see a shaking of the weaker branches, and people who can dial in either what is excellent that's happening on stage or create better connectivity to the people in the audience, because that's what a lot of people go for: the relationships.
We've touched on the SEO dynamic a few times. I'll bring up a brand like the New York Post, where my consumption of the New York Post has dropped as a result of Google searches and social media posts. It just gets served to me a lot less, whereas it used to show up at the top, and I consumed it naturally as a result of that.
I'm not going to newyorkpost.com quite frequently—not to use them as the poster child for what's happening—but for brands in a similar context, what happens there?
6. Google Zero Threatens Publishers
Some of that's bounded by how Google News serves up content. Everyone's probably seen this. You see breaking news, and you go to The New York Times. They have 1 paragraph, and you're like, "Wait, why did they post this?" It was all to effectively make sure that you were at the top of Google News, because Google News used to give priority to people who posted first, and a lot of this is changing.
They used to have an embargo where they would push people off of Google News if it was within a certain content window. So if it was the first 6 or 12 hours, they would say, "Okay, we're going to let them come to your website now." They're keeping those people on the site.
Even big news brands are struggling to maintain the organic traffic that they once had, and it's happening really fast. When some of these changes in traffic drops happen, people will tell me, "Oh, well, this public company is doing fine." And I have to remind them, yeah, the numbers you're looking at are all historic. When a company is reporting, the numbers are a couple of months old because it's looking backward.
The numbers I'm hearing are double-digit declines in organic traffic. There's a lot of fixed cost at publishers. Most of them are already very thin today, because organic traffic is free. They didn't have to pay anything to get it.
So you start to get into this world where the whole economic model of a publisher—and I think the New York Post is probably a bit more insulated from this—but anybody that's below the top 10 or 20 in a category, or a smaller number if it's a more niche category, is already suffering mightily.
It has a dramatic impact because there's a lot of fixed costs in these businesses that they can't cut as quickly, and they've already done a lot. Some of the fastest-growing publishers at a smaller or midsize scale have basically completely changed their publishing model to cater to the algorithms, which sucks, because most of their content is not as well researched.
But they're focused on publishing more, faster, and in a lot of cases, there's not really direct reporting. It's just copying what everyone else is writing about. Yes, the decline of the New York Post is happening across the publisher landscape. The New York Times is focused on its subscription numbers. That's how they're growing their business. But I think more and more publishers talk about Google Zero, which is the day where they get no organic traffic.
Is there a solution? I do believe that sometimes secular declines are too hard to overcome. But do any of the new outlets offer a cushion to slow that decline down? Or if you were in their seats, is there anything you could do to offset that?
No. It's kind of scary, but there's nothing to do. That's the problem. When you enter this world where the platforms control who can view your content, it gets really tough. There's just going to be less media.
From a strategic perspective, what you see the media companies doing is being more thoughtful about where they're talking to their consumers. They're collecting more data. They're trying to make their websites more like a destination. For The New York Times, they should try to target you if you like sports—what sports teams you like to watch—and lean into the content verticals where there's probably resonance. But if you're just a generic content news website, or pick any vertical, the future is really tough unless you have direct connectivity to the users.
I stopped getting my news from some sources. Social media has overtaken the news sphere so quickly that it's incredibly hard to dig out of, especially if it's not well researched. Everything that we've talked about has a tie to what's happening in AI, but what would you wax poetic about in terms of the impact AI is having on the market, from any angle you want to hit? What would you say stands out?
7. AI Reshapes Media Economics
The biggest thing is that people still question whether it's going to have an impact and then use weird analogies to say that everything's going to be fine. Society is very fragile. The reason why we had to shut down during COVID was not because half of the population had COVID. It was because a couple of percentage points were infected, and we had to stop the spread.
So when you think about how our economy is built, the number of people actually working in the US is not 300 million-plus people. It's a lot less. And the number of people who actually pay taxes is less than that. AI doesn't really need to impact that many jobs, but if it impacts a couple of them, it will need to radically change how we deliver value to people who aren't working.
This idea that the more free time we get, the more creative we get—it's not true. We have more free time than we've ever had, and most people are stuck on their phones and have more anxiety. They have fewer friends. They have less sex. We're more overweight than we have ever been—ever. If there's 1 fact that someone can point to and say all this extra time and all this extra technology has made our life better, I don't see it.
I made this point last week. The only way to coexist with AI in a normal way is to disconnect, not connect more. The COVID point is that we underappreciate how significantly tax rates will need to increase—not just on ordinary income, but, I think, on the safe haven of capital gains. And you start to see regressive tax societies in Europe and other places where they start to come after retirement, and it's the Elon Musk tax of, “Let's just figure out a way to tax assets that you haven't sold yet.”
It has to come because you're going to have to rebalance out to help people make a living, which is going to be UBI. It's like a weird debate that I get into with people, and most of the time, the other side of the debate is just, “It's going to be so great,” and stuff like that. What's great in their minds, which they don't see yet, is everybody on GLP-1s and everybody on social media 24 hours a day. To me, that's not good.
If AI is naturally deflationary, where it could do all the roadwork and it could teach in the schools—pick your various government expenses—then maybe there's some offsetting impact.
I recently bought business-class tickets to Japan, and I was like, “This is so cheap, and I can just buy it.” For a personal expense, I would normally not buy business-class tickets on a 15-hour flight. Yes, the world will be completely deflationary, and I think most things will be cheap. The problem is most people will be given effectively government money, and the people who are creating assets and creating value will make a lot of money and basically be able to do whatever they want. Yes, everything will be cheap, but most people won't be able to buy it.
It's very dystopian, but I hear you in terms of the reality of it.
I'm not trying to be the 3:00 a.m. radio show—the aliens are coming. Play out these basic trends. So if everyone gets an extra hour because of technology, are they going to put down their phones? I see this every time I take my son to the playground. Everyone else is on their phone, which is crazy to me. Put your phone down.
If people are given an extra hour, AI is going to be more addicting, not less. The world's not going to end. For people who are operating businesses, it should be okay, but you just need a recognition that it's probably why I started my own firm. You have to be a creator of economic value. That's the only way to sort of exist. You can't be an employee.
And then there has to be, like, a significant recognition, one or two percentage changes in the economic base and how people are employed. If we just take out drivers in the US—semi-truck and Uber drivers—that's a big hit to the income base. It has happened before when we had to pay back the debt from World War II, when the tax rates were much higher for an extended period of time. It's less about worrying about it and more about looking at where the trends are going.
If you have the realization, you could see the COVID lockdowns coming a couple weeks before, and I think you can see this coming now, where the income base is going to go down. The taxes are going to go up. There's still a society that you and I want to exist in, which is less technology and more creative. I think there'll be a lot of creativity happening, but for the majority of Americans—and this is today—60% of Americans are overweight. It's just a fact.
It's fascinating. I think there's a lot of points that tie into everything else. To wrap things up, if you measure attention as value, which we can debate, social media and the platforms are gaining more and more of that share, getting that addiction humming stronger, faster, harder. So those feel like obvious winners. You can make the case that the individual creators or the upstarts who are creating this real connectivity to an audience are also net winners in this new environment. Is there anyone else you would point to who you think could be a winner that emerges from all of this, who maybe isn't as obvious?
The winners are independent content creators. Someone said this is like there's never been more independent bookstores. Comedians now don't need a Netflix special, even though they all still like to get that checkmark to say that they did that. Some of the highest-paid streamers are 21 years old. You see a future where a lot of them have big brand partners and sponsorships, and then some of them have made their own products and things like that.
So as much as there's a negative downside with social media and its addictiveness, there's also a platform where, when your content resonates, you can really scale. There's never been a time like that. Oprah says this. When she first got her break, that's why she changed her name. She had to fit within this mold of what they wanted. And then you look at Kai Cenat or these younger streamers—they're whoever they want.
I think the 1 positive thing is they give their generation the ability—you don't have to be polished. One of them said their highest-rated stream was when a mouse ran into their room and they freaked out. There is an opportunity to show a bit more of their real life and show people of any age it's okay to not live this perfect world. So I think that's a positive.
I think so too. There's a trust level and an authenticity, especially in the age of AI, which is even more powerful. This has been a pleasure. I know it was very wide-ranging, so thank you for diving deep on so many topics. Thank you again for sharing the knowledge here.
Yeah.