欧洲防务扩张中的5000亿美元机遇
Molly O'SheaAistis ŠimaitisGeorge HadjiminasBruno Wejchert
- 乌克兰让规模与技术同样不可或缺。 George Hadjiminas表示,欧洲数十年防务投入不足,削弱了大规模制造和供应的能力。Aistis Šimaitis认为,“技术与规模”必须同时取胜(“technology and volume”);但如果被迫二选一,“宁可拥有100万件同一种东西,也不要每一种东西只有1件”(“you’d rather have a million of something than one of anything”)。如今,系统必须能够制造数万、数十万乃至数百万件。
- 制造环节,而非再造一家新型主承包商,是最清晰的空白市场。 Bruno Wejchert指出,欧洲供应商体系高度碎片化,关键部件交付周期以年计,这也解释了为什么主承包商完成某些合同交付需要4或5年。Onodrim的策略是收购实力制造企业和关键任务系统企业,为下一代主承包商提供供应能力。
- 随着部署规模上升,自主作战迫使军用部件成本下探。 Aistis举例称,一款军用电台4年前成本达到3万美元或许还能接受,但当系统需要支持从数百台到数万台机器人的舰队时,这一价格便无法维持。相机和其他过去属于“高精尖”的部件,也面临同样的成本与规模重置。
- 胜出的模式是把技术领先与工业能力结合起来。 George认为,技术采用是渐进演进而非革命式变化:“原型机打不了仗”(“Prototypes don’t fight wars”),先进系统仍需要具备持续交付能力的供应链。Aistis主张形成互补分工:一类企业专注软件、AI、系统集成和测试,另一类专业工业企业负责生产部件。
- 欧洲的弱点与其说是技术落后,不如说是制度碎片化。 George认为,欧洲整体能力大体可与美国相比,但欧洲拥有更多受保护的国家冠军企业,能够从初创成长为规模化公司的案例则少于Anduril或Palantir。Bruno补充称,采购仍在国家层面和欧洲层面之间分散,欧洲因此落后于美国式政府—OEM合作。Aistis表示,政府仍是买方;欧盟倡议以及他所说的到2030年投入防务的1万亿美元,正在吸引私人资本进入。
- 政府采购可以把获得融资的原型项目与可持续经营的防务企业区分开来。 Bruno表示,仅获500万美元或1000万美元融资的初创公司可能拥有更好的产品,却缺少政府视为可靠交付所需的数亿美元资金、人员规模和运营历史。既有企业可能已与政府合作10或20年,拥有数千名员工,账面规模达到数百万美元或数亿美元。与此同时,Helsing和ICEYE等公司已经成为“事实上的定局者”,可能继续从传统主承包商手中夺取份额。
- 上行情景是,未来10年内出现一家价值5000亿美元的欧洲防务公司。 Bruno认为,前提是欧洲既能在本土制造上取得优势,又能“构建防务智能层”;这家公司甚至可能是在过去5年内成立的。他仍明确保留判断空间:“不要引用我的话,但我认为未来10年内可以做到。”
1. 乌克兰让规模与技术同样不可或缺
- George的出发点是:欧洲数十年防务投入不足,削弱了其大规模为军队制造和供货的能力。乌克兰暴露了这些短板,随后涌入的防务支出则为企业实现工业化和扩大规模打开了空间。
- Aistis更尖锐的概括是“技术与规模”,如果只能二选一,规模优先。入侵前的防务市场偏爱高精尖技术,它们是“将军的梦想”,却无法量产;如今,装备只有能产出数万、数十万乃至数百万件,才具备现实意义。理想情况下,这些系统还不能被轻易复制粘贴。
- Bruno从战场给出了修正:一些在美国测试、并部署到乌克兰的系统,起初“没能奏效”。它们通过反复更新迭代得到改进,说明技术潜力必须经受真实环境中的持续验证,之后才有资格进入规模化阶段。
2. 欧洲制造业缺口是可投资的瓶颈
- Onodrim刻意不走“再造一家主承包商或新型主承包商”的路线。其模式是收购实力雄厚的欧洲制造企业和关键任务系统企业,将其做强,让防务主承包商能够在未来10年完成交付。
- Bruno认为,Helsing等新型主承包商崛起的底层同样存在这一机会:欧洲制造业基础高度碎片化,关键部件交付周期可能长达数年,过时的供应链也解释了为什么某些主承包商完成合同交付需要4或5年。
- 自主化进一步放大了这一约束,因为它要求更低的单件成本。Aistis认为,一款3万美元的军用电台过去或许可以接受,但当系统需要部署数百台乃至数万台机器人时,这一成本就无法维持;相机等部件同样必须“显著降价”,并以大得多的规模供货。
3. 技术与产业必须协同演进
- George反对把技术与产业对立起来。Theon在4或5年前主要是一家工业企业,核心产品是夜视设备;此后已延伸至新技术领域。其电光业务覆盖单兵便携式和平台应用,包括夜视、增强现实和抬头显示等。公司还在2024年完成IPO,并保持强劲增长势头。
- George认为,技术采用是渐进式而非革命式的过程:新技术会被纳入既有平台和系统。他的判断是绝对的:“原型机打不了仗”(“Prototypes don’t fight wars”)。要保持竞争力,既需要领先技术,也需要足够强的工业执行能力,反复完成交付。
- Aistis倾向于两类互补的公司:一类技术企业专注软件、AI、联网战场、武器总装和测试;另一类工业专业企业负责生产相关部件。胜出的合作关系应当是协作性的“非零和”关系,而不是每家技术公司都试图成为制造业巨头。
4. 将欧洲与美国区分开的不是能力,而是碎片化
- George认为,欧洲与美国的技术能力差距小于普遍想象。更大的差距在组织方式:美国已经诞生Anduril和Palantir这样的初创—规模化成功案例,而欧洲的国家利益仍在维护更多受保护的国家冠军企业,其数量超过充分竞争市场本应支撑的水平。
- Bruno对采购体系提出反驳:美国与欧洲的流程并不可比。欧洲采购在国家层面和欧洲层面之间分散,既有军工体系的部分环节已经过时,有些国家还持有大量未必能正常运行的系统。欧洲也落后于美国政府与Anduril或Hadrian等公司的合作模式。
- Aistis表示,政府仍然是买方;关于私人军事公司取代这一模式的设想迄今尚未成为现实。他提到欧盟倡议以及正投入防务的1万亿美元,并称到2030年这将带动风险投资和私人资金进入防务领域。
- Aistis仍然看好欧洲的人才供给。他说,其联合创始人兼CTO Alex在美国生活17年后,2周前带着家人回到德国,以加强欧洲防务;这也体现了他所看到的更广泛的人才需求。
5. 最终胜出的是规模化企业,而不只是初创公司的新意
- Bruno预计,风险投资支持的企业将经历残酷筛选。一家仅获500万美元或1000万美元融资的公司可能做出了更好的产品,但相比一家已与政府合作10或20年、拥有数千名员工、账面规模达到数百万美元或数亿美元的公司,政府可能并不相信它具备大规模交付和制造能力。
- 一些赢家已经成为“事实上的定局者”:德国的Helsing,以及在欧洲层面负责SAR应用的ICEYE,可能继续从传统主承包商手中夺取份额。George对应的鲜明判断是“规模化企业优先于初创企业”(“scale-ups over startups”)——寻找真正匹配、且具备扩张能力的公司,而不是再押注一场所谓的革命。
- Aistis从Palantir身上得到的启示是,应当专注于变得重要且有价值,而不是围绕下一年的收入做优化。他提到Palantir曾“超过15年”不盈利,如今已经“fit”了,最后总结:“钱会来的。”
- 在收尾的“秘密”问答中,Aistis表示,选择是一种幻觉,并援引研究称,人是在产生感受之后才开始思考。Bruno则认为,未来5到10年由AI驱动的科学知识积累,可能相当于人类用100年完成的研究,从根本上改变世界,速度会快于许多人意识到的程度。
- Bruno的看多情景是,未来10年内出现一家价值5000亿美元的欧洲防务公司,前提是欧洲同时掌握本土制造能力和防务智能层。
完整逐字稿
All right, so for this one, we're going to do something special and hand the baton to Bruno to introduce our lovely guests today. Bruno is a host for us with Strike and at Villa Charlotte. So, Bruno?
Perfect. We're here today with Aistis, who was leading Palantir's commercial business for Europe and is now a co-founder and CEO at Onodrim Industries. We're also here with George Hadjiminas, who is the chief strategy officer at Theon. Thank you guys for coming.
Thank you, Bruno. Thank you.
For the audience, without much context, we're going to be talking about European defense right now. I would love to start with both of you. Just give us a little bit of background.
Onodrim's mission is strengthening the foundations of European defense. Our company isn't building another prime or neo-prime. We actually look to find very good manufacturing and critical mission systems businesses in Europe, acquire them, and make them, uh, not about the next European defense to make sure that the defense primes can deliver the others in the next decade. So that's our mission.
Theon is an established player in the European defense industry. The focus is electro-optics, both for man-portable and platform applications. An example for everyone would be night-vision systems, augmented reality, head-up displays, and things like this.
We are one of those companies that was well positioned to take advantage of this boom in European defense over the past few years, both through an IPO in 2024 and by having a pretty strong growth trajectory since then.
So what is the current state of European defense, and how has warfare changed since the start of the Ukraine war?
1. Europe Rebuilds Its Defense Base
To answer this question, we have to look at where Europe was a few years ago versus where it is today. Europe really was underspending on defense for the past few decades. Ukraine proved that this can no longer be the case. We need to prepare, we need to be ready, and we need to industrialize.
It showed a lot of the weaknesses that we had in terms of our own ability to manufacture at scale and supply our militaries at scale. Now, obviously, there is a very large influx of money being poured into defense as Europe and European nations aim to strengthen their arsenals and build up their armies.
This provides a very interesting opportunity for a lot of companies to scale up, develop technologies, create new technologies, and really achieve a scale that a few years ago would not have been achievable in this industry in Europe.
I'll add to that, elaborating on the scale paradigm. I think the biggest lesson for defense companies from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the war that's happening is that the advantage is technology and volume. Just having technology is not enough. If you had to pick between the two, you would go for volume. Volume wins. Large scale wins.
You'd rather have a million of something than one of anything. Ideally, we have to do both, but really, I think a lot of the defense industry before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was focused on exquisite, advanced technologies that were the dreams of generals but could not be mass-produced.
Now we're seeing a shift in the realities of defense. Anything you do has to be produced in tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions. So volume matters a lot. This is, I think, the biggest conceptual change. Ideally, it also has to be technology and, ideally, it also shouldn't be easily copy-pastable.
Mm.
To double down on what Aistis said, a lot of the systems that were new and tested in the United States and deployed in Ukraine, frankly, didn't work at the beginning of the war. They needed to go through iterative cycles where they kept being updated and made better.
So even before they reached scale, they had done extremely well in testing environments, but they just had not managed to perform as well as expected toward the beginning of the war.
Bruno, I'm actually curious, because you have mapped out the whole market: How do you categorize what people are building most in defense right now, and where do you think there are still gaps?
2. The Manufacturing Gap
There has been a very big focus on neo-primes like Helsing, and each core geography has some emerging players that are likely to seize a very large part of the defense spend in that country.
But one of the biggest gaps that we've noticed is, as Aistis has pointed out, a lot of those systems are going to need to be produced at massive scale, and a lot of those systems will, more importantly, need to be produced in Europe. In order to do that, you're going to have to acquire a very fragmented manufacturing base.
The lead times for some of those components could also be years, which is why certain primes take 4 or 5 years to deliver on certain contracts. So I really think that the white space is very much in the manufacturing gap: supplying some of those next-generation primes that are building systems on outdated supply chains.
Have you had any issues with hiring and talent?
I think hiring into defense has been great. People like Europe's ambition to rearm and reindustrialize. Honestly, from our monitoring perspective, we see top talent.
My co-founder, Alex, our CTO, spent 17 years in the United States, and now he came back to Germany 2 weeks ago with his family to strengthen European defense. We see a lot of that demand, especially with companies with big ambitions, which I think Europe has not seen enough of.
Helsing has seen the same thing. They have no problem attracting the best talent. So I really think this is a very favorable environment.
In the US, defense is funded by the government, and ventures also come into the scene. What has the process been like for funding, and how is it different?
3. Defense Funding Follows Government Demand
The government is the buyer. There are theories that private military corporations will be the next way to do defense, but that's not yet the case.
Funding is from the government, with a lot of initiatives from the European Union. That obviously attracts venture funding when there is a trillion dollars being poured into defense. By 2030, this triggers venture and private funding for companies to make use of those funds. So this has been the dynamic in Europe.
As warfare becomes more and more autonomous, there's more robotics involved, there's AI, and there's software. How does that change the supply chain?
4. Autonomy Makes Scale Essential
The key thing—and I'll let George say it—is that everything has to become cheaper. If a radio could cost $30,000 4 years ago for the military and that was acceptable, this is no longer acceptable when you're talking about autonomous mass technologies and a lot of robots, hundreds and tens of thousands of them.
A lot of components that were exquisite—and I mentioned radios specifically as an example, but there are more—have to become significantly cheaper in price and significantly higher in scale. Cameras are actually the same. So I think that's the big impact. Again, coming back to volume, it becomes a significant issue.
I could not have said it better. Scale is the most important parameter here, but also having the underlying supply-chain networks that allow for that scale to be reached.
In 20 years, do you think defense companies will look more like technology companies or industrial companies?
5. Technology Meets Industrial Scale
I personally don't see this as being mutually exclusive. I think, with our example with Theon, we were mostly an industrial company about 4 to 5 years ago. The main product we were making was night vision, and still is, to be honest.
But since then, we’ve branched significantly into new technologies. Mind you, the militaries of the world were not very quick to adopt new technologies a few years ago. This is changing. It is not so much a revolution, I would say; it is more of an evolution as new technologies get gradually adopted into existing platforms and systems.
To answer your question, I think the right recipe is a combination of both. Prototypes don’t fight wars. No matter how good they are, they cannot win wars. So if you want to be competitive in today’s world, you need to have good technology. You need to be at the forefront of technological development and also be industrially astute enough to be able to deliver this at scale.
My view here is slightly, maybe, controversial, but I think you need the 2 types of companies. I think technology companies that do AI and software for defense and the connected battlefield should not also be the manufacturing giants of the world.
Essentially, I think the success recipe for Europe, and for the world, is having technology companies that focus on the tech, the software, AI, weapon final assembly, and testing to make sure that they work. And then there are industrial companies that are extremely good at producing components that those companies making technology need. The synergy between the 2 should not be competitive in nature, but non-zero-sum, where they collaborate to produce at scale. I think this is my winning recipe for this part.
So I asked this question yesterday when we were interviewing FEMA on photonics about the state of AI in Europe versus the US and the dynamics there. But the question for you both—and Bruno, too—is: What is the biggest misconception about European defense?
6. Europe Has a Procurement Problem
European defense has, to a very large extent, similar technological capabilities to the US. I don’t place them as far apart as a lot of people might think. We have some fantastic companies in Europe.
I’d say one main differentiator is the prevalence of startups in the US that have become scale-ups, so to speak. Anduril being one of them, Palantir being another—and “scale-ups” is an understatement of what these companies are. In Europe, the traditional primes are very similar to the traditional US primes, with the only difference being that we have some countries that protect their own interests.
We have conflicting interests between countries, so you have a lot of national champions in Europe because there are simply many countries. It’s not like the states in the US. I would say that the difference is that we have more companies than are needed in a lot of ways, because so many are national champions that would not survive in otherwise competitive landscapes. Whereas in the US, all of the US primes seem to have found their niche. This is where I would compare one with the other.
To add further to George’s point, I think one of the biggest misconceptions is that the processes in the US and in Europe for procurement of defense systems are similar. They actually aren’t. They’re quite fragmented, and it’s sort of country by country or on the European level.
Because of that, a lot of the current existing military-industrial complex is very outdated. Countries like Germany and others have large volumes of systems that are not necessarily working. In the US, companies like Anduril or Hadrian have partnered with the government in joint-venture initiatives to really change how this relationship between government spending and defense OEMs exists.
We think that Europe is certainly going in that direction, but it’s very much behind in terms of those partnerships. I would say that’s the biggest misconception.
Do you think we’re at risk of a defense bubble, or is it still too early? Is it too late?
From a venture landscape point of view, I would say that a lot of companies have been funded with minimal amounts of capital, like $5 million or $10 million, and the products that those companies have built can potentially be even better than the existing systems.
The problem is, if you don’t have hundreds of millions of dollars on your balance sheet and the end customer is the government, they have very little belief in your ability to actually deliver and manufacture the product at scale, versus a company that has been working with the government for 10 or 20 years and has thousands of employees and millions or hundreds of millions on its balance sheet.
I think a lot of those companies in Europe are not going to do well, even though their product might be deemed superior compared to traditional OEMs. At the same time, certain companies have already become de facto kingmakers, like Helsing in Germany or ICEYE on the European level for SAR applications. Those companies are just going to keep eating away at market share from traditional primes.
Mm-hmm. I asked this before we started rolling and taping, but I have to ask you again: What do you think is a secret you know about the world that no one else does?
7. The Future Is Already Changing
I think that choice is an illusion. I think there is more and more research actually showing that we think after we feel. So that’s my answer to this question. George?
George?
How could I top that? That was—
How can you follow that?
Yeah, that was deep. I think Bruno should take that.
Well, thank you very much for the reins. I think Aistis is hard to beat. One secret about the world that nobody else knows—is that the question?
Yeah.
Should we talk about the Ukraine-Russia conflict? No. I would say one secret about the world that very few people know is—and this might be a bit of a cliché—but I think that the next 5 to 10 years of scientific knowledge because of AI would be the equivalent of 100 years of manual human research.
It may not be seen as a secret, but I think the world is very much going to fundamentally change over the next 5 or 10 years in more ways than we imagine, and all of our lives are going to change because of this. So I don’t know if that’s a secret or not, but—
It’s a good answer.
I’m not sure many people are aware of that.
Aistis, I have to ask you: What is the biggest lesson you learned from Palantir, and maybe Alex Karp?
Focus on being important and valuable, and the money will come. So that’s Palantir not being profitable for, I don’t know, over 15 years, and now being fit, is good. I think that’s the lesson I always remember when people ask, “What do you sell tomorrow? What’s your next year’s revenue?”
How am I creating value? Why are we becoming more important as a company for the world—
Mm—
—and then the money will come.
Amazing. Okay, so as we close out, you guys get the question everybody else gets. We have to know: What is your hottest take right now?
I briefly mentioned this before. I think a somewhat controversial take is that defense does need more of this ability to scale rather than crazy innovation or revolution, so to speak, on the technology side.
This is a very interesting thing to tell to people who are in the VC world: It’s not about finding something that’s going to revolutionize everything, but finding the right fit that has the capacity to scale to be successful. So I would say scale-ups over startups in defense is a somewhat controversial take.
Mm-hmm. Bruno?
Well, very tough to beat both of those, but I believe that because of how large the defense market is, especially in Europe, and how close we are to the front lines, if Europe can truly do exceptionally well both at manufacturing locally and at building the intelligence layer for defense, there could be a half-a-trillion-dollar company coming out of Europe in the defense space that was founded probably in the last 5 years or so.
How long will it take? Well, don’t quote me on that, but I think it could be done in the next decade.
Amazing. Well, that’s a wrap. Thank you, guys.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Great job.