Anthropic 融资及其对潜在 IPO 意味着什么?Mag7:Google、Amazon 上涨,Meta、Microsoft 下跌
Alphabet 是“美国资本主义最激进季度”中最明确的赢家,但更大的判断是,分布顶端正在进一步甩开其他公司。 Mag 7 合计收入约为 $540B,而嘉宾将 AI 资本开支估算为 $700B;Alphabet 的云业务订单积压接近翻倍至 $462B,搜索业务依然稳固,云业务增速也在加快。这是“以前所未见的力度全面押注”。
超大规模云厂商的 AI 增长真实存在,但其中相当一部分仍来自向两家私有模型公司供应和分销产品。 Google、Amazon 和 Microsoft 向模型公司出售算力,再转售它们的 tokens,而核心 IP 仍掌握在模型公司手中;真正悬而未决的问题是:“音乐停止时,谁能坐上一把价值 1 万亿美元的椅子?”Gemini 的 token 产量从 Q4 每分钟 100亿增至 Q1 的 160亿,而 Anthropic 同期增长约 10x。
Microsoft 已将 AI 同时变成唯一有意义的增长引擎,以及估值的核心风险。 剔除 Copilot 和 Azure 的 AI 贡献后——嘉宾指出,有利收入还会被重新分配——Microsoft 其他业务被形容为持平至小幅下滑;AI ARR 为 $37B,而潜在资本开支为 $190B。Jason 认为管理层已经把风险测算到“小数点后最后一位”,但 Harry 的警告依然成立:每个资本开支周期顶峰的公司都会认为自己的投资是理性的。
Meta 的业绩超预期无法弥补其回报仍无法建模的 AI 计划,而 Amazon 提供了更清晰的应用层杠杆。 Meta 实现 $56B 收入和 $10.44 EPS,市场预期为 $6.67,随后将资本开支指引上调至 $125-$145B,却没有清晰可归因的收入来源。Amazon 收入 $181B,AWS 收入 $37B,与 Anthropic 的协同增强,AWS 增速创 15 个季度以来最快,使其成为嘉宾“弱持有买入”;Microsoft 则是卖出标的。
Palantir 正在将董事会层面对“必须在 AI 上做点什么”的需求,变现为传统点状方案无法承载的规模。 RPO 增长 134% 至 $4.45B,Rule of 40 得分达到 145%;其政府业务基因也让它有能力可信地出售 $10M-$100M 的企业级转型项目,而不是 $200,000 的试点。以 $349B 市值计算,它已经“定价到超越完美”,但如果未来 2 年连续翻倍,今天的估值看起来会没那么极端。
SaaS 末日并未结束,但 Atlassian 和 Twilio 展示了两条可信的突围路径。 Atlassian 成功将 Rovo 变现给存量客户后上涨 29%,Twilio 则因 AI 构建者带来新的 API 需求而上涨 20%,客户数量或接近增长 40%;Five9 在 9% 增长下上涨 23%,却没有打动 Jason。真正持久的赢家必须证明自身相关性、控制稀释并保持留存,最好还能吸引新客户,而不只是向老客户追加销售。
Anthropic 的机会巨大,但其披露的收入节奏,很难与许多高产能 agent 当前极低的 token 消费相互印证。 Jason 的两个自主营销和客户成功 agent 一个月总成本仅 $254,其中营销 agent 消耗 $94.27;而 Jason 的框架要求成熟工程组织将薪资支出的 20%-30%用于 tokens,而不是 5%。即便如此,拟以约 $900B 估值融资 $50B,也买来了关键的期权价值:“资产负债表上的现金永远不会太多。”
AI 开始奖励亲自下场的管理者,并淘汰那些无法交付成果的管理层级。 Coinbase 约 14%-15% 的裁员被概括为“要么交付,要么离开”:管理者也必须产出,CMO 应该能通过 agents 自己发起营销活动;一个稀缺的 AI 原生 SDR 可能值 $250,000,而过去 $60,000 的调研岗位将消失。Rory 不接受 Jason 的绝对化表述,但认可其中的机制——如果亲自下场的领导者表现更好,“经济规律就是达尔文式的”,今天的少数派最终会成为运营常态。
1. AI 将 Mag 7 财季变成资本配置军备竞赛
Harry 将这一周称为财报季的“超级碗”:合计收入约 $540B,同时投入 $700B 的 AI 资本开支。这些并非守着成熟业务防御的老牌公司;全球最大的企业正在同步加速增长,并在需求到来前提前投资。
借用 Evan Armstrong 的说法,Harry 称之为“美国资本主义最激进的季度”。规模最大的 5-6 家公司增速接近 20%,部分业务增长 30%-40%,资本开支则增长 50%-60%,直到吞噬大部分自由现金流。
结构性信号既令人振奋,也令人不安:“分布顶端正在甩开其他公司。”不同于新进入者攻击缓慢的老 incumbents 的传统颠覆周期,全球最大的 7 家上市公司中有 5 家——算上 Nvidia 则是 6 家——都拒绝让出下一个平台。
2. Alphabet 赢下财季,但 Gemini 被私有模型公司甩开
Alphabet 的云业务订单积压接近翻倍至 $462B,大约相当于其披露的 2025 年全年收入,而云业务在巨大规模上继续提速。Jason 的反应很简单:“这又一次让你怀疑,为什么还要投资其他任何东西。”
市场担心的搜索崩塌,无论从经济表现还是广告业务看都没有发生。Jason 自己的 SaaStr 搜索流量增长 60%,创历史新高;Google 面临的问题已不再是在现金牛与未来之间二选一,而是如何在自身、客户、合作伙伴以及 Replit 等平台之间分配稀缺的 TPU。
Harry 更不舒服的解读是:超大规模云厂商通过向私有 LLM 公司出售算力来增长,再通过既有分销渠道买入它们的 tokens 并转售。“全球市值最大的 5 家公司实际上都在为这两家私人公司工作”,而核心 IP 归后者所有。
Gemini 的产量从 Q4 每分钟 100亿 tokens 增至 Q1 的 160亿。David 随后将其与 Anthropic 约 10x 的增长作了对比。基准测试可能显示 Gemini、Grok 和开源模型差距不大,但在实际编程选择中,开发者仍持续集中使用 OpenAI 和 Anthropic,原因可能来自模型本身,也可能来自其 harness。
3. Microsoft 让 AI 同时成为增长引擎和估值风险
Harry 最关键的数据是:剔除 Copilot 和 AI 驱动的 Azure 增长后——他同时提醒,内部可能存在有利收入的重新分配——Microsoft 剩余业务持平至小幅下滑。“没有 AI 计划,Microsoft 这家公司收入就是持平。”
嘉宾将 Microsoft 的 AI ARR 设为 $37B,潜在资本开支设为 $190B:投资力度远超当前收入规模。如果最终证明投入过度,Microsoft 可以放缓支出,依靠现有业务度过消化期;它并没有承担弱势公司那种债务驱动的生存风险。
Jason 信任的是这笔押注的复杂程度,而非其不会犯错。管理层已经做过敏感性分析,清楚哪些风险可以转移给 CoreWeave 或 NVIDIA,也有能力收缩投入;但 Harry 的反驳是,每一家公司在每一轮资本开支繁荣的顶峰,都会认为自己的配置是理性的。
华尔街暂时允许公司投资,本身就是一种风险。Harry 提到,一家收入超过 $20B 的软件公司因为缺乏牺牲 5%-10% 毛利率来换取品类最佳 agent 的许可,反而庆祝 LLM 成本下降 100 个基点:“你被困在死亡螺旋里。”David 认同,当前应优先发展能带来正回报的 AI 功能,而不是优化成本。
4. Meta 的 $145B 计划仍缺乏可写进表格的回报
Meta 公布收入 $56B、EPS $10.44,远高于 $6.67 的预期,但资本开支指引上调至 $125-$145B 后股价仍遭惩罚。Google 可以将投入与快速增长的云收入挂钩;Meta 的回报仍然是间接的。
Meta 称模型驱动的广告优化可能带来 10%-15% 的提升,但 Rui 想看到缺失的 A/B 测试。即使 AI 增加了 $10B 或 $15B 的价值,也很难解释为什么要投入接近 $150B,尤其是部分底层技术完全可以从外部采购。
更可信的战略解释是购买期权:如果用户从与人交谈、消费新闻,转向与聊天机器人互动,Facebook 希望在场。这使其支出成为“一场 $150B 的未来押注,但未来还没有被清晰阐述”,而不是一个可以预测的新业务。
Jason 观察到,华尔街可以为超大规模云厂商建模 GPU 折旧和收入转化,但 Meta 不适合放进这类表格。Rui 更进一步说,Mark Zuckerberg “根本不在乎那些表格”;他会为了保持相关性而投入,结果可能诞生下一个 Instagram 或 WhatsApp,也可能迎来又一次失败。
5. Amazon 为应用层繁荣做好准备,Apple 则置身狂潮之外
如果必须在 Amazon、Alphabet、Meta 和 Microsoft 中买入一家、卖出一家,Rui 勉强选择买入 Amazon、卖出 Microsoft。Amazon 实现 $181B 收入,AWS 达到 $37B,增速创 15 个季度以来最快;与 Anthropic 更紧密的合作,又为其分销引擎增加了一台加速器。
Jason 更大的看多逻辑是衍生出的“应用层繁荣”。AI 不只是增强现有软件,而是在职业生涯前所未有的程度上推动更多软件被开发出来,从而利好 AWS、GCP 以及 Microsoft 的部分业务,即使 token 经济学最终成熟也不例外。Meta 不参与这部分基础设施需求。
嘉宾几乎跳过了 Apple,因为它全面超预期、持续回馈资本,也给 Tim Cook 交出了一份强劲财报,却没有成熟的 AI 故事。在这场支出狂潮中,Apple 传递的信息基本是:“谢谢大家,其他人都陷入了歇斯底里。”
内存价格上涨让所有资本开支比较变得复杂,因为部分预算增长只是以更高价格购买相同的物理容量。嘉宾提到的消费端案例是 Apple 将 Mac Mini 价格从 $599 提高到 $799,但他不确定其中有多少来自内存配置;类似成本最终可能传导至 iPhone 定价。
6. Palantir 将 AI 紧迫感转化为企业级大额订单
Palantir 的 RPO 增长 134% 至 $4.45B,Rule of 40 得分达到 145%;嘉宾称,达到这一水平的其他公司只有 Nvidia、Micron 和 SK Hynix 等 AI 基础设施公司。Alex Karp 也谈到翻倍,但 Rui 无法将他的时间表与正式前瞻指引对应起来。
Jason 的逻辑从企业预算开始:每一家财富 500 强公司的 CEO 都将“在 AI 上做点什么”列为董事会最重要的两项议题之一,但 $200,000 的 Harvey 部署或 $2M 的 Sierra 项目无法代表全企业转型。Palantir 则有能力可信地承接 $10M、$20M 乃至 $100M 级别的项目。
Palantir 的政府和国防业务记录,让 CEO 可以购买一个 3 年期项目,向董事会汇报可量化进展,并最终完成项目。Jason 对比了过去企业部署的规模:在 Salesforce 和 Workday 级别的公司中,他提到 Adobe 规模企业的相关项目约为 $26M 和 $24M;而 Palantir 能在 1 年内部署转型级项目。
Karp 提到一个引人注目的变化:采购周期正在压缩。过去通常由一名利益相关者引入 Palantir,再花几年说服其他人;如今“每一位利益相关者都会出现在会议上”,包括 CEO 和 CFO。Palantir 在欧洲的商业化采用才刚刚开始,这又提供了一条潜在增长腿。
7. AI 专业能力缺口正在重估顾问和运营者的价值
Jason 称,这是“我们这一代人经历过的内部与外部专业能力之间最严重的鸿沟”。这种稀缺性解释了为什么 Palantir 未来多年都能受益,也解释了为什么 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 的咨询业务并不像初看起来那么荒谬:客户有钱、有紧迫感,但几乎没有能执行的人。
Jason 对顾问业务的微观经济学辩护很务实:让专家花 6 个月学习某件事,然后购买这份专业能力中的 1 周,而不是在内部重复整个过程。这会成为对代理商的达尔文测试——具备 AI 能力的 HubSpot 和 Shopify 服务商可能面对无限需求,而没有差异化的同行会消失。
劳动力市场也会出现类似分化。Jason 认为,一个执行浅层调研、年薪 $60,000 的 SDR 用处不大;但一小批足以替代 20 名传统员工、生产力极高的 AI 原生 SDR,年薪可能达到 $250,000:“你必须具备的就是这些技能。”
8. Atlassian 和 Twilio 以不同且不对称的理由反弹
市场 headline 动作是 Atlassian 上涨 29%、Twilio 上涨 20%、Five9 上涨 23%,但 Jason 否认这 3 家共同证明了 SaaS 的普遍复苏。Five9 重新加速至 9% 增长仍不在他的关注范围内;真正有信号意义的是另外两家老平台。
Atlassian 成功将 Rovo 变现给存量客户,推动 AI 使用率和收入增长,但净新增客户增速仍在放缓。它通过了第一项测试——客户愿意为 AI 产品付费——但可能仍在回避更难的问题:平台能否吸引增量需求。
Twilio 展示了更有意思的第二条路径。公司披露得不够精确,但 Jason 估计其客户数量可能同比增长约 40%,因为 ElevenLabs 等公司及其他 agent 构建者开始采用其通信 API,尽管 ACV 增速没有那么快。
AI 构建者使用 Twilio 的 API,David 表示 Sierra 的 $15M 合同也运行在 Twilio 之上。成熟产品的可靠性和积累多年的运营商基础设施,使它“足够好,能够受益于正在发生的一切趋势”。
9. SaaS 赢家需要相关性、留存,以及最好还有新需求
David 的有限区间观点是,成熟 SaaS 公司不必归零。当一家稳健、能产生现金的公司以接近 3x 收入的估值交易时,可信地回到 6x 就能带来 2x 回报;Atlassian 32% 的 GAAP 收入增长支持的是有限度的修复,而不是一个新的 10x 品类。
Jason 更严格的双重标准要求公司既能向存量客户销售 AI,又能吸引新客户。最明确的受益者仍然靠近基础设施,例如 Cloudflare、Twilio、Datadog,甚至 DigitalOcean,因为新构建者会自动消耗它们的产品。
HubSpot 将成为下一场测试。公司计划让 agents 达到人类的同等水平,并完全向 agents 开放平台;Jason 认为,如果执行真正到位,增速应在 12 个月内重新加速。“有点晚,但还不算太晚。”如果失败,整个应用软件板块的前景都会转暗。
David George 反驳称,成熟品类可能只是耗尽了新客户需求,就像 Zoom 最终耗尽了需要账号的人。胜利也可以意味着重新回到 30% 增长、销售新产品、创造自由现金流、控制股票薪酬,并证明终值不为零——这些标准同样会暴露下一个 Medallia 式失败案例。
10. Anthropic 的收入上限取决于每位工程师的 token 支出
Harry 将 Anthropic 的收入节奏放在约 $44B,即每天约 $100M,这促使 Jason 提出核心尽调问题:在一家成熟的 AI-first 公司里,工程师薪资支出的多少比例会转化为稳定状态下的 token 支出?
Jason 粗略划分为 20%-30% 对比 5%。如果是前者,Anthropic 的收入可能增长到数千亿美元,甚至达到 $500B;如果只有 5%,今天的规模就很难解释。编程是“矛尖”,因为当前可实现的自动化程度远高于 Jason 对大多数其他知识工作职能低于 10% 的估计。
更高生产力不一定意味着开发者人数减少。如果 $40,000 的 tokens 能让一名年薪 $200,000 的工程师产出翻倍,工程团队的 ROI 就会上升;一家原本有 10 名工程师的成长型公司可能会招聘 15 名,同时在其他地方按比例少花钱。“只要你能吸引到他们,人数就会增加。”
David 随后给这一看多逻辑增加了复杂性:SaaStr 两个覆盖营销和客户成功的半自主 agent,整月成本仅 $254,其中营销 agent 成本 $94.27。营销 agent 提出的想法优于人类同事,但执行不如人类,这表明许多非编程工作流消耗的 tokens 可能远低于投资者的假设。
11. $50B 私募融资让 Anthropic 的 IPO 变成可选项
据报道,Anthropic 正寻求以约 $900B 估值融资 $50B。Chamath 承认自己此前建议跳过下一轮私募、直接 IPO,是“愚蠢的老世界思维”:一封邮件就能在 48 小时内获得承诺,无需公开市场披露,也没有上市责任。
资本需求具有异常强的非线性。Chamath 的经验法则是,Anthropic 每实现 $1 的收入,Anthropic 或其合作伙伴就需要投入 $3-$4 的算力;如果提前 1 年预测 10x 增长,就可能意味着“每有 $1B 收入,就要承诺 $30B 的资本开支”。
超大规模云厂商会吸收部分风险,但整个模型仍需要巨量的财务猜测。Chamath 修正后的结论是绝对性的:“资产负债表上的现金永远不会太多。”这轮融资降低了资金风险,也给 Anthropic 在 IPO 前提供了灵活性。
这轮融资可能降低 Anthropic 今年上市的概率,但未必改变其最终价格。如果市场环境、可预测性和准备工作都到位,Anthropic 仍然可以上市,但已经不必上市;Harry 提出,Anthropic 和 OpenAI 都可能推迟到 2027 年,Chamath 也同意两家公司今年都不再有必须上市的理由。
12. Sierra 证明软件仍有价值,也为巨大跃升预先定价
Sierra 正寻求以 $15.8B 估值融资 $950M,对应约 $150M ARR,即约 105x 收入。David George 的担忧是,所引用的 $400B 客户服务市场很大程度上代表人工成本,而现有客服软件市场可能只有 $20B-$30B。
因此,投资逻辑不能只是替代 Service Cloud。Sierra 必须抓住劳动力替代,并大幅扩展到销售和追加销售;但一旦多家 AI 厂商追逐同一个结果,它们的经济竞争对手就不再是人类劳动力,而是彼此。David 认为 AI 可能让 TAM 扩大 50%,但不相信扩大了 10x。
Rory 仍将这轮融资视为反驳“LLM 会吞噬所有软件”的证据。他估计 Sierra 的模型成本可能低于收入的 10%;大部分价值来自围绕 LLM 构建的应用、工作流、集成和行业专属层。即便如此,100x 收入估值仍然要求“一个极其激进的未来”。
被问到多投 1 美元哪里有更大上行空间时,Rory 毫不犹豫地回答“Anthropic”:对他而言,Anthropic 达到 $6T 比 Sierra 达到 $100B 更可信,尽管他认为两种结果都不太可能。围绕 Sierra 这一明星资产的感知下行保护,或许能帮助投资者获得心理安全感,但嘉宾警告,风险投资人经常夸大这种保护。
13. Musk 与 Altman 的诉讼,可能取决于时限和诉讼资格,而非场面
第一周提供了预期中的戏剧性:Elon Musk 承认 xAI 部分蒸馏了 OpenAI 模型,在宣誓作证时将 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 排在自己公司之前,并曝光 Greg Brockman 的私人日记和估计 $30B 的持股。Roelof 认为,比 Brockman 作为创始人变得极其富有更令人意外的是 Sam Altman 的零股权状态。
决定性问题可能是程序性的。Musk 早期的威胁或许能证明他在诉讼时效到期前已经掌握足够信息;而通过其捐赠者建议基金进行的捐赠,可能意味着法律上受损的是基金,而非 Musk 个人,因此拥有诉讼资格的也应是基金。
陪审团只提供咨询意见,最终决定权在法官手中。尴尬证词或许会主导这场“科技版 TMZ”,但 Roelof 认为 Musk 在法律实体问题上可能反而后退了,因为这些技术性抗辩足以在无需处理更大伦理叙事的情况下终结案件。
14. Coinbase 的“要么交付,要么离开”模式抬高了所有管理者的门槛
Coinbase 约 14%-15% 的裁员,被解释为削减那些无法同时贡献个人产出的管理层级。Jason 将 Brian Armstrong 的立场概括为:“如果你不能交付和管理,不能发起一场营销活动并担任营销负责人,我不希望你待在 Coinbase。”
Roelof 通常会将把裁员归咎于 AI 的 CEO 视为“在证明有罪前先视为有罪”,因为这种解释往往掩盖了过度招聘或增长放缓。但 Armstrong 过去即使面临巨大反弹,也坚持将职场政治排除在 Coinbase 之外,这让 Roelof 更愿意相信他;在 Roelof 看来,这体现的是对企业文化一贯的清晰判断,而非追逐时髦的借口。
Jason 要求高管做到的不只是拿出 10% 的时间尝试新工具。他的自主客户成功 agent 在午夜后联系了约 120 名 SaaStr 赞助商,收集他们的问题并给出下一步行动;传统高管可能先安排一场 2 周后才能进行的会议。同样,“今天的 CMO 应该能通过 agents 运营自己的营销活动”。
这一论点最终导向一个达尔文式预测:现在或许只有 10% 的高管能以这种方式工作,但更优的结果可能让比例升至 20%,再升至 40%。同样的逻辑也支撑 Harry 对周五居家办公的看法:它往往只是 3 天周末的工具——员工理性地选择这种生活,而投资者也理性地避开围绕这种模式组织起来的公司。
The most aggressive quarter in capitalism. This is leaning in like you’ve never seen leaning in before. This is the top of the distribution pulling away.
This week, it was the Super Bowl of earnings: Mag 7 earnings. So, what happened? Meta lost; Microsoft and Amazon, thumbs up; and Google, a home run. Next, is the SaaS apocalypse over? Atlassian, 29% up; Twilio, 20% up; SaaS, 23% up. And then, in private markets, Sierra raising $950 million at a $15 billion valuation. And then finally, Sam Altman versus Elon Musk: week 1 of the trial begins.
Jason Lemkin
When the music stops, who has a chair with $1 trillion on it? Without the AI initiative, Microsoft is flat revenue. Anyone on LinkedIn who talks about their team, fire them. “My team this.” They’re also precious about their team. Lead from the effing front with AI. A CMO today should be able to run their own campaigns.
Ready to go? Boys, there’s a lot for us to report on this week. We had a big week of earnings; Mag 7 Super Bowl was the title that I had down. $540 billion in combined revenue, $700 billion in AI CapEx. I thought we’d start with the clear winner, which seemingly was Alphabet. Cloud backlog nearly doubled to $462 billion. Now, that’s Alphabet’s entire 2025 revenue. Do you agree Alphabet was the runaway winner from this mega earnings season?
Jason Lemkin
It’s jaw-dropping at that scale, right? I think the meta-theme of this episode—and we can tie it into Twilio and Atlassian and Palantir—is just this jaw-dropping acceleration. Even since we’ve been doing this show, it’s obvious the CapEx boom has been happening. Rory’s been great on this, right?
But to see Google accelerate at this scale—60-some-odd percent, I think—it once again makes you wonder why you invest in anything else. Why you invest in the amount, the sheer force, of spend.
And as a side note, just as a personal note, everything’s clicking at Google. When we started the show, folks were wondering: would search die? Because everything would go to the LLMs. Clearly, it hasn’t happened economically. It hasn’t happened in advertising.
Honestly, I was checking even our own little SEO at SaaStr. It’s up 60% this year—the highest ever. The highest ever.
A lot of folks are struggling to protect their cash cow versus investment in the future, right? Should Uber invest in autonomous driving, which it needs to, or should it invest in Uber Eats, which is on fire? There are so many trade-offs here, but Google has no trade-offs.
Everything—the only trade-off it has is, where do I put my chips? Because I need all the TPUs for myself and for my customers and my partners, and I need them for Replit, who hosts every website on it. They just have to figure out who’s getting this massive backlog.
So, first of all, I agree on the framing. Actually, I’m going to quote a blogger—a Substacker I read, Evan Armstrong—who described this quarter, and I thought it was a great description. He writes something called, I think, Napkin Math or something.
He described this quarter as the most aggressive quarter in capitalism. I’d actually amend it to say the most aggressive quarter in American capitalism, because it is a uniquely American thing. This was an astonishingly aggressive quarter.
And I love the wording, because there are 2 things going on. One, the largest 5 or 6 companies on the planet are accelerating at scale and doing plus or minus 20% growth overall, 30% to 40% growth in some of the subsectors. So, that’s wildly aggressive growth, and then even more aggressive CapEx.
These same companies are doubling down on CapEx, letting it grow 50% to 60%, such that CapEx is now eating most of their free cash flow. This looks like leaning in like you’ve never seen leaning in before.
And you wrote a really nice piece that said, normally, it’s the new guys—the open commerce being aggressive—and the incumbents moving a bit slowly and defending their turf. These are 5 of the 7 largest market-cap companies on the planet saying, “Hell no, we’re not going to get pushed around.”
In fact, 6 if you include Nvidia, which didn’t report this week. We’re just going to make the bet too. That’s the first zoom-out comment. This is the top of the distribution pulling away, which is kind of a sobering thing if you start thinking about all sorts of inequality and all sorts of those kinds of issues. But just from a wild perspective, these are amazingly great companies doubling down. That’s kind of the first big-picture framing here. You just can’t take it for granted.
Second comment would probably be: yeah, you’re right. Of all the companies, Google did, quote-unquote, the best. Its existing business—Jason, you framed it right—the existing business where you could have made a disruption story around search hasn’t happened. And the cloud business has accelerated.
But I’m going to make a controversial take: for all of these companies, I won’t say it’s disappointing, but this is only the start of it. It’s not the main event.
Across all of the companies that have been successful out of here—and it’s obviously Google, it’s not Meta, which we’ll talk about in a second—it is Microsoft; it is Amazon. If you analyze what they’re boasting about, and if you go 1 level deeper, it’s 2 things.
One, we sold a lot of compute to the LLM companies to make their tokens. And then the second thing they’re boasting about is, “Oh, and by the way, we bought some of those tokens and sold them to our customers because we have distribution, too.”
Both of those statements are true. Both of those statements made the revenue line go up, but if you zoom out a million miles, what you say is, “Oh, let me get this straight. You, the 5 largest market-cap companies on the planet, are effectively working for these 2 privately held companies and doing their distribution and doing their CapEx investment, while ultimately they own the IP.” Hmm. Just an interesting phenomenon.
And that’s kind of the second big-picture comment here, which is: this is a bunch of the largest companies growing quickly by servicing these other companies. It’s super interesting.
And then the last comment, going back to Google: I thought everything was really good, but it was interesting that—yeah, let’s talk about Gemini. You see all these evals of Gemini, and you know, it’s nearly as good—nearly as good for coding, right?
And then they cited a number, and I wrote it down. I apologize; I couldn’t find it in front of me. The month-on-month token growth in Q1 was pretty good. It was like 60 or 70 billion tokens per second, or some vanity metric like that.
But the truth is, Anthropic probably did 15× the tokens in Q1. The interesting thing is, I go back to thinking every other business is ancillary to the business of making tokens as an LLM.
The only guys who are even in the game there are Google, because they actually have their own model, and their token growth—their Gemini growth for coding and related things—significantly underperformed the other 2 guys.
So, where I’m going with this, the last thing I would say is: the most aggressive quarter in American capitalism is an underperforming quarter relative to the privates. Jason disagrees.
Jason Lemkin
No, no, no. I actually just want to make the point without connecting it to another section quickly. The point is super interesting, of course. They’re at the mercy of these 2 privately held companies, right? They’re the hyperscalers.
On the other hand, Palantir blew out the quarter, growing—I should have it at hand—80-something percent in revenue. And I watched—I never do this, because I just read it—but I watched Alex Karp’s analyst discussion. It’s great. He’s so entertaining.
He has a T-shirt just like Harry’s today. And he’s with his team. Really interesting. He made the point—and obviously he’s talking his book, to use Rory’s point—but he was really insistent that there is no value at the LLM level to Palantir because, at Palantir’s scale, this is not a simple B2B app. This is high-end AI.
He’s like, “There’s no difference between the LLMs.” So, it is interesting that where the value is across the 3 layers—from the application to the LLM to the infrastructure or hyperscaler—it is, if nothing else, a challenge that it’s fluid.
It’s just going to be fluid. It’s hard to predict. I’m not—I know you’re not challenging me. I just, when Alex said that, I don’t buy it today, but I don’t not buy it, right? It’s so fluid.
Totally. By the way, before I say what I agree with, I think he is living on a different plane. Look, I think—and let’s play it back to the hyperscalers. Let’s compare it to Microsoft, which went down after the results.
Palantir had an exciting enough enterprise product line that, despite the whole “LLMs are going to eat everything” story, they can make that statement and make it credible. And I believe it’s credible for them, and we can talk about why later, right?
I don’t think Microsoft can make that statement: “Hey, our Copilot is so cool that we don’t care which LLM we use, and enterprises are just ripping it off the shelves,” right?
So, I agree. I think that you’re correct for Palantir. There’s that same level of insatiable enterprise demand for Palantir. The only insatiable enterprise demand that Amazon, Google, or Microsoft are experiencing is the insatiable enterprise demand for sell-through of the LLM products that they now host and can sell using their large distribution channel.
And it's a great business, don't get me wrong. They get revenue—I mean, right now they probably get more revenue from the LLMs than the LLMs are getting, because they get the revenue going in on the hosting. In Google's case, they get the revenue going in on the chips, they get the revenue going in on the hosting, and they get the revenue on the distribution side from selling.
Only a small sliver accrues to the LLM, but my instinct is that, over time, that's the attractive sliver vis-à-vis those guys, not vis-à-vis Palantir, to your point, Jason. I think Palantir—because this is all about it—there's clearly a wall of money out here, and everyone's trying to figure out who gets to keep it when the music stops, who has a chair with a trillion dollars on it, right? And that's what we're all trying to figure out here.
Jason Lemkin
The only one thing I might add is that, in that Substack you quoted and others, there remains a lot of skepticism that this investment is consuming all of their free cash flow. Are they really capturing value? Microsoft owns some of OpenAI's IP, but are they really capturing any value? We went from free-cash-flow engines to no free cash flow, right?
The only thing I would say—I know this is Captain Obvious, but it's certainly clear to me. When I worked at a Fortune 500 tech company, it was clear then and it's clear today: if there's one thing these companies are good at, it's financial engineering, day in and day out. They have worked through 27 sensitivity analyses, and maybe they're making the wrong bet. Maybe they will regret having squandered their free cash flow on a bunch of chips sitting in depreciating servers, but they know exactly what they're doing.
They know exactly where they can offload risk to CoreWeave, they know what NVIDIA should take, and they know what to do. They may be making the wrong bets, but it probably doesn't matter because they'll scale them back, right? But I do believe that it is very thoughtful financial engineering. When OpenAI blew up and they fired Sam, Satya kept saying that this was not such a huge bet for us back then. Remember, he kept saying things like, “This is important, but this is not going to ruin Microsoft.” So my only rambling point is, I think they may be wrong, but I think they know exactly what they're doing to the last decimal point.
I don't know. Maybe a better statement is this. I saw a dialogue on Twitter about 6 months back where someone said, effectively, “Who are you to second-guess these folks? These are the smartest people on the planet making bets.” The response that really struck me was, “Look, no one at the height of the capex boom thinks, ‘I'm just doing something dumb here,’ because they wouldn't do it, right?” Everybody, when they're spending a trillion dollars, thinks this is a great idea, it's going to come back, and then sometimes you're wrong, right?
I think they are making informed bets, and right now, one of the things they're wrestling with is—for example, Microsoft was a little conservative a year ago, and now they're wrestling with that. It turns out that being aggressive is the winning strategy, and one of the definitions of a bull—of a crazy bull market—is when the most aggressive person makes the most money, right? So we're in that stage now, right? But you are right about one thing: if they overinvest, the great thing is—and this is where it is different from '99—if they are overinvesting and they throttle back, they still have their existing businesses. That's your point.
Jason Lemkin
I think it's low risk—lower risk than the Substacks actually claim it is, right?
It is, I agree. That's why I've come up with this distinction between overinvestment—which may be happening; so far, it's not even overinvestment, we can't prove overinvestment—and a bubble. I don't use the word “bubble” because the word “bubble” is, to your point, Jason, making a financial and valuation statement, right? I don't think you have to make that statement here. You're simply saying, right now, the computers are all finding a good home. Will they over the next 5 years? Who knows.
It's interesting. I want to go back to your comment on Satya that it doesn't matter that much to us. One of the most interesting statistics about Microsoft is that, in this quarter, excluding—taking out their “AI businesses”—and to some extent they do this reallocation; all the good stuff is reallocated, right? But if you take out Copilot growth and Azure growth, the rest of the business is flat to slightly down.
In other words, Satya, if you didn't have an AI business, you'd be another SaaS company trading at 3 times revenues. Welcome to our world, right? So it does matter. I mean, 3 years ago that might have been true, but right now, if the AI bet is wrong, all these valuations are wrong, despite the fact that they're not outrageously valued on a P/E basis. All the growth is coming from these initiatives. It was stunning to me. Let me repeat: without the AI initiative, Microsoft the corporation is flat on revenue.
The allocations have been great, and the more you allocate, the smarter you look. Six to 9 months ago, there was this, “Oh, I don't want to buy from OpenAI because they might not have the money.” Now, Cohere is killing it, OpenAI looks like a good credit, and the more compute you have, the smarter you look. I don't want to sound like Debbie Downer here talking about capital misallocation when right now it's working. But, yeah.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah, so a good bet?
The AI ARR is $37 billion. That capex spending will be $190 billion. Does that concern you to hear?
Jason Lemkin
The most aggressive quarter in American capitalism, baby. That's right. I mean, yeah, I know. Look, if they're wrong, they just throttle back the future, live off the cash flows, and have a great big digestion period where the stock looks overvalued and goes down. So it's not as terrifying as—let's just say you had the same bet and you financed it with $150 billion of debt. That would be beyond terrifying. But no, it is an aggressive investment well in advance of revenues, so by definition, it's an aggressive bet.
I have a slightly different take, for what it's worth. We know this, but you especially see it when you work on the other side, at an extremely profitable public company with massive margins. Your cash is so trapped. You cannot spend it; your EPS goes down, your dividends might be impacted. But there are moments in time when the public market lets you spend it and doesn't take a hit for it, right? Some of this is financial engineering, where it sits on the balance sheet, et cetera. That's important, right?
One of the reasons Salesforce Ventures and Google—Google owns so much of SpaceX—and everybody is doing this is that you could do something with the cash. You're allowed to make investments. It hurt Shopify this quarter. But when you have these windows and you don't have to be like Jeff Bezos, day in and day out convincing Wall Street to let you spend, when Wall Street lets you spend and doesn't punish your stock, you should spend every dollar on the balance sheet that it lets you spend, because you'll build it back up.
But it's trapped when growth slows. When growth slows, you're literally at the mercy of getting another half cent into your EPS. It's a terrible place to live. Being at the mercy of not being able to spend is awful. “Oh, we have $6 billion on the balance sheet, but if you can't spend it, who cares?” Literally, who cares? You can't grow if you can't spend it.
Jason Lemkin
I understand what you're saying, and you're not incorrect about the wider constraints and how Wall Street and perception impact your ability to invest aggressively. But the result you articulated is that it raises the risk of bad capital allocation, because if you're grabbing the moment not because the ROI is there but because the permission is there, what you're basically saying is that your decision to invest is in some part predicated on the street's willingness to give you that permission.
Now they're giving you permission, and I think you're correct: everyone's allowed to lean in right now a little. But it does heighten the risk of groupthink and the fact that you end up allocating badly. Having said that, I've just got to say it again: right now, the allocations have been great, and the more you allocate, the smarter you look. Six to 9 months ago, there was this, “Oh, I don't want to buy from OpenAI because they might not have the money.” Now, Cohere is killing it, OpenAI looks like a good credit, and the more compute you have, the smarter you look. I don't want to sound like Debbie Downer here talking about capital misallocation when right now it's working. But, yeah.
Yeah, but let me just give you one example. Sorry, I was talking with the CEO of a $20 billion-plus public software company where growth is modest today, but revenues are very impressive. We were talking about AI and agents, which is what people want to talk to me about, and he was talking about how they were saving roughly 100 basis points on their LLM costs. I'm like, “You're dead.” You're dead because you don't have permission from Wall Street to do the opposite. You don't have permission to spend 10% to decrease your gross margins 5% or 10% so you have the best agent in your category.
You're trapped in a death spiral. The margins of this company are very impressive, right? But he's so focused on driving them up to keep Wall Street happy and to keep the Carl Icahns happy. The room for maneuver is so narrow at a $20 billion market cap. When Satya and Google can spend, if I were running one of these companies, I would force you to force-rank it, of course, but spend it all before we're allowed to—
Jason Lemkin
Spend it all, boys, because the day will come when we can't spend anything.
David Friedberg
Again, I always recoil from the vehemence of the direction, but I think you're right in the sense that if your number one priority right now is to optimize your LLM spend dollars, you're missing the point. Over the medium term, you'd probably want to optimize, but if there's positive ROI in LLM spend in terms of agent functionality, yes, you should be doing it.
As usual with you, Jason, I agree with the broad thrust. You're exactly right. If you think you're going to make money by saving money right now, that's not the case. You do want to be a little more circumspect than some of the investment you're seeing, but err on the side of aggression.
So maybe it's a good time to talk. By the way, I did find that number for Gemini token production. They boasted about the fact that their Gemini token production went from 10 billion per minute in Q4 to 16 billion per minute in Q1. All I'll say is, Anthropic 10x'd in that period of time, and tokens probably went up by more than that.
What's your takeaway from that, then?
Rui Ma
My takeaway from that is, every time you look at the evaluations, it says, "You've got the big 2, obviously Anthropic and OpenAI, and then, close behind, you've got Gemini and Grok. Then you've got the open-source guys 6–12 months behind." When you look at what's actually going on, the big 2 guys are getting all the money.
Gemini, for some reason, doesn't appear to be able to do a great job of developing code or Lovable and getting that kind of traction, because coding is where it's all happening. Grok is obviously nowhere until it gets Cursor done. Even with the open-source models, you do see people using them, and you do see the Palantir perspective, which is that you can get something done with open source.
This really matters because there's one view of the world—the Palantir view of the world—that 5 years from now these are all API calls; they're all commodities. If you look at the benchmarks, you could convince yourself of that story. But if you look at what's actually happening, there are millions of developers who have that same choice every day, and they are choosing over and over again, because of the model or because of the harness, to go with the big 2.
I think Google has outperformed everyone in terms of being AI-relevant. They are by far the best of the 5 companies that reported this week. But in terms of mindshare in coding—taking that as the mother lode and the epicenter of the revolution—they're nowhere compared with the other 2 guys.
Help me out. We have Meta crushing earnings: revenue of $56 billion and EPS of $10.44 versus $6.67. It's an insane beat. They got crushed because CapEx was raised again, from $125 billion to $145 billion. Why did Meta get crushed on CapEx increases when Google got applauded?
Rui Ma
Two companies are spending $100 billion to $200 billion, and one of them has revenue coming in that's clear and attributable, and that's Google, while one of them doesn't. That's Meta, right? That's the big picture.
Let's dive down one level. Why is Meta doing this? You can imagine 3 scenarios, and I think there's only 2 of them. One scenario is that they're going to be yet another third-party hyperscaler provider. It doesn't look like that's happening. They're not competing with Google to provide compute to Anthropic—not that they shouldn't, right?
The 2 reasons they use it: one is the reason they started using a little bit over the last couple of calls. "Oh my gosh, we're optimizing our ad performance a whole ton using these models, and it's making the numbers better." Let's dive into that a little. There's no doubt the numbers are amazing. If you do the math, they're saying they're getting a 10–15% lift in the last couple of quarters; the performance is better.
But it's super hard, unless you see an A/B test, to know whether you're really getting that lift. That's always the case with lift analysis. You need to see half of the ads optimized using, let's call it, Meta Llama 5, whatever the new model is called—I can't remember—and half not optimized. Are you really getting lift? You probably are getting some lift. Is that worth $10 billion a year? Maybe $15 billion? But they're spending $150 billion.
They've been using this justification for the LLM spend: it'll optimize our existing business. I've always felt that's because if it takes $150 billion in CapEx to give a 10% lift on a $200 billion business, it's probably a mistake, especially when some of that technology might be available from third parties.
What was noticeable in this call was a little more of the "we're just going to build next-generation experiences" qualitative commentary. Simply put, if people go from talking to other humans and looking at news to talking to chatbots, Facebook wants to be there when that happens. I think that's the justification.
The market is looking at it and going, "I get it. This isn't a business. This is, 'I want to show up if something happens.'" It's a $150 billion bet on the future that's not quite articulated. You just put a slightly higher discount on that. That's all that's happening here.
I don't know why they're spending, and he doesn't have to ask anyone for permission. Maybe he'll be right, like he was on Instagram or WhatsApp. Or maybe he'll be wrong, like he was on the metaverse. But it's not like Google, where you can say, "Oh, I get it. They're spending $150 billion, but they're getting $60 billion back, it's growing 80% year on year, and in 2 years it'll be cash-flow positive." It's just a different thing.
Jason Lemkin
I do think that Wall Street is also, to Rui's point, building all these spreadsheets: GPU depreciation, CapEx, where it's going. The Meta model doesn't support that.
Rui Ma
Agreed.
Jason Lemkin
It's indirect, right? It just doesn't support it.
Rui Ma
Well put.
Jason Lemkin
Nor does the math tie, but it's too confusing. They're all running spreadsheets and arguing over the inputs and outputs of these capital investments, and they just debate it.
Rui Ma
I like that, Jason, because effectively what you didn't say, but it's true, is that Mark isn't running those spreadsheets and doesn't give a shit about those spreadsheets. "Thank you very much, guys. Knock yourselves out. I'm going to spend to be relevant."
Their little heads are hurting when they run the spreadsheets because they can't touch it. They can do it for the other guys, and they can't do it here. I think you're exactly right. He didn't make $200 billion by running a spreadsheet at Harvard. He just built a product and got the traction, so he isn't going to change now.
Of the 4—Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and Google—you can buy 1 and sell 1. What do you buy? What do you sell?
Rui Ma
You buy Amazon and you sell Microsoft, but these are weakly held.
Why do you buy Amazon? It's the one we didn't touch on. For everyone listening, Amazon has $181 billion in revenue, AWS at $37 billion, and its fastest growth in 15 quarters.
Rui Ma
It's weakly held in the sense that there are 2 net sellers and 2 net buyers. Amazon and Google are doing well; Meta and Microsoft are less clear. You obviously pick 1 on each side.
I picked Microsoft because that sentence—that they're flat excluding AI—made me really pause. With Meta, even though what they're doing is crazy, they can always stop, and they'll still be the best ad network business on the planet. That's the sell.
On the buy, honestly, it's too boring to buy Google at this point. It was great a year ago when we were saying it was great. Now it's up; it's slightly the highest valuation on a P/E basis of those 4.
To some extent, it was an on-the-fly contrarian bet that Amazon now has access to Anthropic's models and is going to get that lift. They have the AWS distribution, and they now have access to Anthropic's models, so they're more aligned there.
One thing that we talk constantly about is how AI impacts the top line and, to a lesser extent, the bottom line. There's a secondary, derivative effect that benefits everyone and doesn't benefit Meta at all, which is that we're not just using AI to make applications better; we are building many, many more applications.
There is an application boom. This is the greatest boom in application building in the history of our lives. The amount has exploded. Right now, you make even more money selling tokens than you do selling basic AWS or GCP services, but there's a double boom going on here.
I have to put Meta last because they're not benefiting from the application boom either. They're not benefiting from it, and there may even be a crossover where AI gets a little mature, which I do not remotely see happening, okay? But even if it did, the application boom has just begun.
The thousand flowers of applications are blooming. Maybe this was the quarter SaaS bounced back from the SaaS apocalypse, but I think in a couple of years we'll look back and laugh at the SaaS apocalypse and say, "My God, the explosion of B2B applications was like nothing we've seen before." They were just old guys that learned a new dance and didn't die. But who cares? We'll look back in a couple of years and we won't care because of this app explosion. Everyone's building everything.
Jason Lemkin
It’s so wonderful. That could lead to a renaissance for Amazon beyond what we’ve seen, right? Because of its traditional strength. It benefits Microsoft in the enterprise, but not below that, right? And GCP is in Gemini, or there’s this weird thing where it’s very cost-effective and developer-friendly. I can’t predict, but I know Meta loses in the app explosion.
Before we move to the SaaS apocalypse, I just want to mention that Palantir—we added it at the last minute—was a home run in terms of performance. RPO is up 134% at $4.45 billion. Rule of 40, they’re at 145%. Borrowing from your tweet here, Karp’s letter was blunt: this number has only been matched by AI infrastructure companies Nvidia, Micron, and SK Hynix. I don’t know what to say other than, holy cow, these numbers are really good.
Rui Ma
He also said—and it didn’t quite tie to the forward guidance—but he also said that they were doubling. So they’re accelerating from there. He was clear. Now, I couldn’t quite get that to tie to the Wall Street guidance. That happens when you shoot from the hip, but he was very clear that they’re doubling. So they are accelerating.
I just think he was shooting from the hip in terms of the timing of when the RPO would land. He was clear, and, Harry, he was very clear that Europe has just started. It’s so far behind—not at the startup level, but at the buying level—that that’s just started on the commercial side.
Jason Lemkin
The way I was thinking about it is, they’re just in a very enviable position, right? Because if you’re a large corporation, I always think that whenever you’re selling application software, you want to be one of the top 2 initiatives for the most senior person you’re selling to. That’s how you make money.
Right now, they’re selling to the CEO, and the most senior initiative—the top 2 initiatives—for every CEO in corporate America is to do something in AI. That’s what your board is telling you. So what are you going to do? If you think about it, you don’t have a large number of choices.
You can sign up for something with Anthropic and OpenAI. You can buy Copilot, or you can buy Cursor, or you can buy Claude for every one of your employees. That gets individuals using AI, but it doesn’t move the needle, right? What you really want to do is some corporate-wide initiative that’s big, right?
All the AI app companies that we all fund tend to be fairly point solutions, because they’ve been founded in the last 2 or 3 years, right? They’re really good at saying, “Let’s take Sierra. We’ll talk about it in a second. We’ll deal with your customer support.” That’s probably the most call-high company in AI land, in new AI land. In other words, Bret Taylor can call higher than anyone else; most of these 25-year-old founders can’t. So that’s as high as they can call, right?
You can spend $2 million with Sierra. You can spend $200,000 with Harvey, or whatever. And that’s an issue. If you’re running corporate America, if your number 1 task is to do AI, you don’t spend $200,000, because that doesn’t solve the problem, right?
What you really want to do is some corporate-wide initiative that’s big, right? And then there’s this 1 company that’s been selling to the US government for 20 years that can move in $20 million and $100 million chunks. They can literally say, “You want to redo your entire go-to-market infrastructure? You want to redo your entire business intelligence with AI? We can do that. We did it for the US government. We did it for the DHS. We’ve done it for JPMorgan.”
They credibly move in $10 million chunks. So now this corporate CEO can say, “I have 2 initiatives this year: launch that new product and make this company AI-first. I just signed Palantir for $10 million. They’re going to bring in people. They’re going to make it happen. Initiative done. Tick it off. Report to the board. It’s June 30th. I’m on track for the year,” right?
It sounds stupid, but big companies have to spend big money to do big things. There are very few software companies that are situated to do this. It’s why IBM has existed for 30 years longer than it should, right? Because they can do these kinds of big deals and big initiatives. It’s why EDS made a lot of money as an outsourcer.
Palantir right now is the only business that can credibly say, “Hey, Mr. Corporate America Fortune 500, you want to move the needle with an AI initiative that has measurable, demonstrable results and is about enterprise-wide transformation? We can deliver you that,” right? The alternative to them is Accenture with a bunch of cloud licenses. What do you do, right? I’d go with the—
Guys who have won in the war.
Rory O’Driscoll
Palantir is like General Catalyst for AI transformation, for the AI people. You need to move $100 million; you probably won’t get fired. Cool.
Absolutely. And it has this more clearly demonstrated value. I know that sounds really simplistic, but just think of it from the perspective of the CEO, right? You can’t have your top 3 initiative be a $200,000 spend. With any of these AI companies, it’s just like, “Whoa, that’s a bit of a weenie bash,” right?
You come back in and say, “We hired the guys that have been doing this for all of corporate America and for the government. We spent $5 million. Here’s a 3-year plan.” You’re done.
Jason Lemkin
To add on to this, maybe 2 things. One, the numbers have obviously gone up, because I’m dating myself. When I was a VP at Adobe, there were only 2 or 3 big initiatives at a time, to Ro’s point. That’s it. But they were all $20 million a year and up. Maybe they’re $30 million today. That’s just what it cost at Adobe’s scale in the Fortune 500 to have something that was critically important for five figures of employees. That’s what was budgeted.
I believe back in the day Salesforce was $26 million a year, and Workday was $24 million. Those were the big projects. They took 5 years to deploy. Now Palantir can deploy it in less than a year, which is magical.
The other thing I would add—and it was funny, having been doing B2B for a while—is that Alex Karp, on the earnings call, first talked about the defense business. He talked about how important it is to support our country, and that the only thing more important than our customers is supporting our country. Clearly, they’re deeply embedded in defense in the Western world.
But then he went to the commercial side of the business. What he said to me was super interesting, even though it was obviously different from my entire year—the last year. He said, “My entire year, on the commercial side, I get brought in by a stakeholder—marketing, revenue, someone. Then I’ve got to sell to another stakeholder and another stakeholder, and it takes a couple of years.”
He said, “In the last year, every stakeholder shows up to the meeting. Everyone is there.” So not only are they a top 2 or 3 driver—to Ro’s point—to drive corporate change, but the CEO and the CFO, importantly, are saying, “Now, everyone come to the table now.” And if Palantir is the answer, or at least the bet, they’re not going to evaluate for 2 years. They have to do this now.
Alex was so aggressive, in his somewhat charismatic, weird, goofy way, on the call. But he was taken aback by the compression of the buying cycle. It felt to me almost like the COVID buying cycle today, because we just never saw folks on the commercial side do deals this big like Adobe, but instead, everyone’s there. Everyone shows up to the damn meeting.
Rory O’Driscoll
Look, AI sparks the imagination in a way that digital transformation, databases, client-server, or SaaS just doesn’t. It’s got that spark of, “Oh my God, is it live? Is it sentient?” Corporate America now believes it is the way to transform their company. And you’re right, Jason: every board is telling every company to get on top of this.
Who’s going to be the C-level executive who says, “No, I don’t want to join the meeting on the most important corporate initiative. I don’t think it’s going to work,” right? By the way, what it means now is that those lily-livered naysayer voices have gone to zero.
So you do think there’s going to be some pretty interesting misallocation. As I say, if you’re selling $5 solutions right now for the biggest corporate imperative, you’re in a golden place. Good for them.
At a $349 billion market cap, though, is it priced to perfection, or is there upside?
Jason Lemkin
Of course it’s priced to perfection. It’s priced to more than perfection. I will admit, I tailed when I saw this quarter, because when you pushed me again a few weeks ago to name stocks, I’m proud that I named Atlassian, and we’ll talk about that in a second.
But on the expensive side, I said Palantir is the best situated. And yes, it’s wildly expensive. You really have to grow for 2 or 3 years to get into this valuation. But if the boom has legs, they’re the most likely to grow into it.
It’s still terrifying. I woke up the night after I did that podcast, and I’m like, “Ooh, that’s a risky one,” right? Atlassian is a value play. It’s a no-brainer. But this one—wow. You’re leaning in, but this quarter kind of justified that. You do the math, and 2 years of doubling makes it look cheap.
But Alex predicted basically a year of doubling. So there’s an argument—if you think that’s cheap, I haven’t fully thought it through—if you think it’s cheap, it’s not the craziest place to get to, right? Because 100—100, we’ve already—the CEO’s already said he probably fudged a quarter or 2, but he said it’s coming.
Jason Lemkin
Agreed. Yeah.
Rory O’Driscoll
The thing, just to—I know it may be Captain Obvious, but going to Rory’s narrative about how corporations work in Palantir, it’s just a reminder. Every conversation I have is a reminder that no one has this expertise in-house. No one.
It’s the worst gap between in-house and external expertise in our lifetimes. And so, for years, this is going to benefit Palantir. It’s going to mean that even if we’re head-scratching about why Anthropic and OpenAI are setting up these consulting entities, which seem goofy, right, they’re not, because the dollars are going to go up and the initiative is going to go up.
But the inability to have anyone in-house who can execute—there’ll be folks down the line. Some HubSpot agencies will figure this out. Some Shopify dev shops will figure this out. Everyone in these ecosystems thinks the majority of HubSpot and Shopify agencies who actually deploy—most of them are not direct to these SMBs. You need an agency to deploy HubSpot. Most of them are gone.
They have no AI play. But the ones that do are going to have infinite demand, because whether it’s enterprise or SMB, no one has this expertise. No one. It’s almost embarrassing how few people have this expertise, right? Even Coinbase today: “I’m laying off 15%.” I don’t need managers managing managers. I need folks who will actually do the work in AI, right? If Brian doesn’t have the people, what hope is there for the rest of the world?
Agreed.
Jason Lemkin
And I think, when you say it, in one sense it sounds almost derogatory: no one has the expertise. But the real truth is this. I’m donning my microeconomics hat here, right? Logically, what you want is for someone to take the time—6 months—to develop the expertise and then sell it to me, and I only have to pay them for a week of their time. It totally makes sense.
I even think about how I learn AI. A good slug of it is doing it myself. But when I get stuck, I just ring our chief data scientist and say, “Look, I could spend a whole day or two slogging through this point, but just tell me the freaking answer so I can keep moving here, right?” That, in a microcosm, is what you need in every organization.
David Friedberg
You’re a line manager in marketing. You’ve been told you need to roll this out. You just have to hire the expert who knows. Which is why, to your point, Jason, this is a Darwin test for every consultant and, frankly, anyone looking for a job, too. That kind of gets to the undergraduate unemployment discussion.
If you don’t develop the skills you need, you deserve your fate. I truly believe if you develop the skills that people want and focus like a laser on the things they actually want, there’s real demand for that skill in all these companies.
Jason Lemkin
I call it the $250,000 SDR. There is now a market, instead of SDRs being worth $60,000 in the US or $80,000, for a small number of $250,000-a-year SDRs. But there’s almost no need for a $60,000 SDR with 6 months of junior-college research who can’t spell ElevenLabs. You just don’t need that person anymore. You needed them 3 years ago; you don’t need them today.
But you can spend $250,000 per year for someone who is as productive as 20 human SDRs. Those are the skills you have to have.
Before we move on to the SaaS apocalypse next, it’s so funny. We are about to do something incredibly funny. We’re about to skip the one line item in the agenda just to point out that Apple pulled—Apple beat across the board. Tim punches out on a high. Stunning results. Great quarter. No real AI story yet.
Thank you, everyone else, for getting caught in hysteria. Meanwhile, we’re just building one of the 2 largest companies on the planet and doing really well here. Not wasting our money on CapEx. Continuing to do buybacks. Just working for the stockholders. I just felt the need to call that out in passing.
Jason Lemkin
I thought the memory-chip supply constraints were interesting.
That is interesting, and it’s not just for Apple. One interesting statistic I saw is that everyone’s talking about how the CapEx budgets have all been raised this quarter by 10%, 20%, 30%. A significant slug of that CapEx increase is for the same physical amount of CapEx, just at a higher price, because the memory portion of anything you’re doing has exploded in cost.
I agree, and I think you’re going to see some impact from that right down to the price of your iPhone next year. It doesn’t appear to have impacted demand, but you probably will see that filter through. That would be the iPhone you can’t afford, transported to the US on a plane that can’t have jet fuel from the Far East. But, yeah, there you go. Much, much pain to come.
Memory prices and, obviously, memory stocks are a factor not just for Apple, but across the whole CapEx story.
David Friedberg
Well, I mean, Apple basically increased the price of the Mac mini this week from $599 to $799 because of memory.
Oh, wow.
David Friedberg
The $599 model sold out because of these damn OpenClaws. I believe it’s maybe the 16 GB versus 8 GB. I forget what the difference is, but it’s not $200 even at current prices.
All this stealth inflation—it’s off topic, but it will lead to a lot of socioeconomic stress when folks can’t afford either a $799 or $599 Mac mini and the average individual is hurt. It’s like the rental market in San Francisco. It’s almost unimaginably competitive versus even when we started the show. It was cheap to live in San Francisco. Now you can’t rent anything. They don’t even exist. No one’s going to leave.
Jason Lemkin
I see bid prices like $3 million higher than the $5 million listing.
David Friedberg
Yeah, I just made $30 million on my Anthropic vesting. My partner wants a house. What am I going to do, argue that it’s not worth $5 million? I mean, it’s been 6 months. I’m just going to buy it. I don’t really care, right?
Last week, we were in a bit of doldrums and we wanted more positive news. The SaaS apocalypse could be over. Atlassian up 29%, Twilio up 20%, Five9 up 23%. Boys, is the sunshine coming out? Is the SaaS apocalypse over, or is this a case of 3 good-performing companies pulling away?
Jason Lemkin
Well, look, Rory categorized these companies the last few times we did this. Let me just break it up. First of all, Five9, I’m not interested in. Reaccelerating at 9%, I don’t care. I’m not saying that they’re not benefiting, but I don’t think that deserves to be with the friends.
It is heartening to see Atlassian and Twilio reaccelerate. These are older companies, right? Atlassian is still founder-led. Mike was on the show, right? He’s great. But everyone was worried about Atlassian, right? Twilio pushed Jeff out, who was on the show, who we love. Somehow, moldy oldy products were able to reaccelerate. So, 2 great stories.
If nothing else, they support the idea that for folks who are benefiting from AI, we’re past the bottom. We’re going to see some more quarters come out that maybe aren’t as good before the next show. But this is my bias and my perspective: Wall Street missed a subtlety that I think you guys will agree with.
Atlassian got really good at monetizing its AI product. It’s Rovo AI. It sold the F out of it last quarter, and people were happy to pay for it, okay? Its net new customer count is still slowing. Twilio did the opposite. This company was dead when we started this podcast. Now it’s reaccelerated to 20%, but accelerated. Their disclosure is less clear, but their net new customer count may have grown 40% in the last year because of AI and other startups and other companies.
The ACV per customer hasn’t gone up quite as much, right? But there is an explosion. ElevenLabs uses Twilio. All these AI folks use Twilio. So Twilio won on 2 points: folks use it for AI, and they had net new customer growth. Atlassian monetized its base with AI. Thumbs up. Passed the test.
But it’s not clear that it’s attracting new customers. So you might be deferring bad news ultimately if your AI story gets more revenue from your base but does not expand it. To be proven.
David Friedberg
You’re right on the facts. Going back to—you said, “Is the SaaS apocalypse over?” No, I would say it’s not over in the sense that I didn’t think—look, 3 months ago we said, and I think Teams is a buy, Atlassian’s a buy, right?
If you just avoid going from guardrail to guardrail, the big picture is that when people price these stocks like it’s all going to zero, you’ve got this potential for a 20% or 30% bounce, and you saw that right now. Taking Atlassian, for example, I don’t think it’s going to 10x from here. It’s never going to be an AI-first, 5x–10x growth company.
What it is going to be is a really well-run company that, as you say, is—if you can’t add new customers, maybe your steady-state growth is 20% or 30%. If you can add new customers on top, maybe you can go higher. But these are going to be cash-flow-positive companies growing 30%. They’re going to deal with the SBC issue, and then instead of being worth 3 times, they’re going to be worth 6 times.
You're going to move in that bounded range. My point is this: you're going to move in that bounded range, and when people's heads start exploding, saying it's all going to zero, and they trade at 3 times, but the company's fundamentals are decent, you can buy and get a 2x. And when people start believing it all and they're still pretty lofty, like ServiceNow was before the last announcement, when you're trading at 6 or 7 times revenues, you're very vulnerable to a correction, right?
I think you've got a bounded range, and you're right: the low end is Five9—you know, it grew at 9%. The high end—I mean, Atlassian's growth rate was pretty impressive: 32% in GAAP revenue, right? And I'm not surprised at the lack of new customers, because I always felt these stocks would slow down independent of AI. These markets are fairly well served.
Atlassian has done a great job over 15 years of meeting the need for this product. Now, additional customer growth either is new company formation or taking away from someone else. So it's not surprising. It's a bounded, well-executed company.
I'm delighted for them. I'm delighted—I said buy it at $62 two months ago when we were asked. As I often say here, things are proving out to be exactly what they should be, which is these are solid, high-growth, cash-flow-generating companies probably worth closer to 6 times if they're going north of 30%, maybe even a little higher, right? That's what they traded at for a decade and a half before COVID. And there you go.
Jason Lemkin
It goes back to your early framing: Are you getting value from new products? Do your existing customers adopt them, and are you getting new customers? When you do the latter, yeah, it's good. Why would anyone in AI—why would Level Up or Replit bother rebuilding this stack? Especially if you can buy it on an API basis, just call it a day.
David Friedberg
Well, the risk would be if, at the infrastructure layer, someone had built a better Twilio—something that was better—you might switch, right? But Sierra's $15 million deal runs on Twilio, right?
There's a lot of—I'm not a total expert, but obviously there's reliability, right? There's infrastructure under the infrastructure. And so my learning is, for a lot of folks, nobody built Twilio. Nobody beat Twilio. It's not just software. They could—it's possible, right?
But now they're a beneficiary because this infrastructure was good enough, like Apple. I mean, it's a little attenuated, but there's something. It's good enough to benefit from all the trend happening. It's good enough.
Who are the other traditional SaaS companies in SaaS jail that should be released in the same way that, hopefully, Atlassian and Twilio are being released?
David Friedberg
Well, here's where Aaron and I diverge. That's why I'm worried Atlassian isn't a 2-pronged AI beneficiary. To be a 2-pronged AI beneficiary, you have to be able to monetize your AI and attract new customers. There are 2 prongs, and the ones that have done it so far are close to infra: Cloudflare, Twilio, Datadog, and even DigitalOcean, which proves anybody can do it, right.
Jason Lemkin
If you're the 11th cloud provider and you can grow 352% in stock price, anyone can do it. And the one I'll tell you—the one I'm waiting to see is HubSpot.
This week, HubSpot announced that it will put agents on parity with humans in its coming release. Its platform will be completely open to agents, and it'll make sure that the agentic version of HubSpot is at least at parity with the human version. That's the right vision.
Now, are they going to overcharge for it? I mean, I'm not even sure anymore it matters outside of SMBs, but I want to see if that works. It's a little late, but it's not too late. In a way, it's Marc Benioff's headless vision that he talked about, right?
But let's see if HubSpot can become the hub for agents in all of its categories—for SMBs, for GTM. It should reaccelerate dramatically. Let's see if it works. If it doesn't work there, I think we can write all the rest off—all of its peers, I mean.
It should work, but HubSpot has such a broad customer base. It's relatively more tech-centric than Monday, right? So I think this headless thing—I'm not saying it should lead HubSpot to double, right? It's not mathematically possible—I believe over the next 12 months, this strategy, if it's real, should lead to genuine reacceleration at HubSpot. Otherwise, there's no hope for this class of categories, because they're going to make it completely open to all agents.
David George
I think, to your point, Jason, far more of them are going to fall into the not-reaccelerating category. Reacceleration will be the exception, not the rule, right? And then, for the others, it's a question of whether it's a slowly evaporating ice cube or a quickly evaporating ice cube.
The underlying issues in this apocalypse haven't changed, right? For the drama to reduce around it, we need a few more folks to be in that category, I think. And I'm not sure Atlassian gets both prongs, but I'm here for it because it lifts all the boats, right?
If we get 3 or 4 of these, then we can kind of—the underlying issues are there, but we can move on and talk about other things.
David George
Just to push a little on Atlassian again, because I actually think you're changing the goal. I thought your other goal was not new customers—which is obviously the best of all—but I don't think it's realistic any more than I think Zoom will ever get a new customer again. Everyone who needs a Zoom account has one.
But the other test you applied, which I thought was a good one, was: Can they sell new products to their customers? Atlassian's daily active users and their AI revenues did take a jump, so I do think there's some lift there that you can get.
It would be great if 10 or 15 of the companies started doing that; then you'd have a sense of what good looks like for SaaS companies. I think that's what people are struggling with, because there's no universe in which any of these companies become an LLM, or a Sierra, or a Harvey, or anything like that. That's just not going to happen. You can't get there from here.
The question is, can you return to 30% growth with free-cash-flow positive, stock-based comp under control, and gross and net retention such that no one's terrified that you have a zero terminal value? If you can do those things and demonstrate relevance, then the advantages you bring to the table in terms of scale, in terms of a couple of billion dollars in revenue, can all come to the fore, right?
And you're right, a couple of these guys have done it. If more of them do it, then we'll know what winning looks like. And to your point, Jason, then it'll become painfully clear what not winning looks like.
And let's be frank: what we saw in Medallia was an investor walking away saying, "This thing isn't winning. I just can't get there from here," right? Even though it had positive EBITDA, that was 5 or 6 times coverage on the downside. There's just nothing here, right?
So, in many respects, seeing what Twilio and Atlassian have done will be a positive for the people who are on that journey and will be the nail in the coffin for the people who aren't, because it'll be like, "Oh, that's what it takes to win, and you're not doing it, Mr. Fill-in-the-Blank."
Okay. On to the next. Onwards to private-company land: Anthropic at $44 billion. Jason's question here, which he put in, was exactly the right one: Are there enough developers for this level of revenue growth to continue?
And you can immediately say yes when you look at the service value of developers. But when you look at this, it's $100 million per day. How did you guys react to this?
Jason Lemkin
I think that's the right question. If I was to pick 1 number that I'd like to know, which would give me an informed opinion on this, we're trying to figure it out. We're doing some work in the portfolio. What is the steady-state token spend as a percentage of salary dollars per engineer in a fully mature, AI-first organization?
Because I was just looking at this, doing the bottoms-up knowledge-work analysis. And I think in anything other than pure AGI, which is too arm-wavy for me, most of the other jobs have task-automation potential. In my view, that's sub-10%. You can do some of marketing, some of sales, some of accounting, but not all of it.
Whereas for coding, you can do a ton today. And we don't need to argue the former yet, Harry. The point is coding: it's pretty clear that it can be done, that there's a huge amount of automation that can be done.
So now, in a way, it's not as clear yet for the other areas. Let's just go with that for now, right? Therefore, coding is the tip of the spear. Coding is—pick your cliché—the canary in the coal mine. Therefore, if you know what the long-term, steady-state automation of tokens as a percentage of salary is, you know how big this can be.
At 20% or 30%, Anthropic can grow into that multihundred-billion-dollar revenue category. Maybe even half a trillion dollars. At 5%, it gets a lot harder. So, to me, that's the question.
When you look at Andrej Karpathy's thing, right? He used to use it for 20%, and now he helps with the final 20%.
David George
But how much would you have to pay Andrej Karpathy to code for you? I can tell you it ain't $250,000 a year.
Jason Lemkin
Probably about a billion a month.
David George
That's my price. I'm $20,000 an hour just for me. That's what I quoted this morning.
I love it.
David George
I got one of those requests to help them look at this vibe code at the $20,000-an-hour rate. I got a yes. I don't know if it'll really happen, though. I just do it for fun, right? That's my price.
It's interesting that David Sacks, Marc Andreessen, and others were pointing out that the number of reqs out there—job specs for developers and engineers—is up, right? Are there just enough developer dollars and everything? It's interesting that 20% doesn't sound high to the scale analysis, but it's not going to come from a net headcount cut in developers and engineers who are AI-pilled. It's not coming from a loss of humans, right?
Jason Lemkin
I totally agree. To be very clear, this is what I don't know why people struggle with. I think—words I never thought I'd say—David Sacks and people are entirely right on this thing, right? Aaron says it really well. If 20% spend on tokens triples the effectiveness of your developer, then the ROI on developers goes up, so the number of developers will go up.
Yeah, that's the point people are missing. If the ROI is higher, then if you can attract them, the number will go up. You'll hire more.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah. Now you have all sorts of second-order effects. It's what you're pointing out, Jason: there'll be lots more competition and lots more bundling. I think software companies will have to cover a wider surface area because there's just going to be more competition.
David George
Products are easy to make, but there's no doubt that if 20% token spend—hypothetically, if you have a $200,000 engineer, and $40,000 on tokens doubles that person's productivity—and you had 10 engineers, my guess is you'll have 15. You're like, "These engineers are really good." Now, you might spend less in sales and marketing because your product will be better, so you might have more gross margin. You might have more in cost of goods because your token spend will go up, but your efficiency should go up.
Can I share one slight bull case on it that I didn't even realize until this week? People are definitely missing the point. If you can find engineers who are AI-pilled and AI-capable, you'll hire more and more of them because they're infinitely more productive. Of course you will if you're growing. If you're shrinking, the calculation is different. If you're hyper-growing, you will hire unlimited engineers if you can find people above the line with AI.
A funny thing is, we built this AI VP of marketing and AI VP of customer success at SaaStr. They're pretty good now. It took a while to get them pretty good, and I have to tell you, I'm too busy. I never looked to see what they cost each month in tokens and everything. I never looked until literally this week for the first time. I think it was Sunday.
What did you hear?
What do you think it costs per month to run a full-time, semiautonomous AI VP of marketing and customer success in tokens and everything? These are autonomous now. They're doing everything. They replaced many people.
Jason Lemkin
$2,800 a month.
Jason did not want a single efficiency maximizer there. So I'm going to give you four or five. I'm going to give you $2,000.
Jason Lemkin
So, $6,000 total for 2 full-time agents.
David George
You're right. There's no attempt to—
You're following me. $2,800. Oh, I'll give you $3,000.
It's like The Price Is Right, isn't it?
David George
Absolutely. I did think that. I mean, is Jason going to have you? Yes, there's a bit of gamesmanship in that answer.
Two of them full-time—2 full-time human equivalents—cost $254 a month.
Oh, wow. Interesting.
David Friedberg
$250. I sent this to Amelia on our team, and she's like, "Per day?" in Slack. I said, "No, that's the whole month."
It may tie to Notion saying that open-source LLMs are fine. It may be that not only is engineering the first and best use of LLMs, for all the reasons we've discussed, but the next wave are great too. They're just as good. We don't need as many tokens as we thought to replace Jason on the marketing team. We only need $254 a month for both of them running full-time, right?
It's going to be a little higher this month because it's a SaaS renewal, but not much. That's deflationary and weird at the same time. Amelia literally thought that was per day: $254 a month to run 2 highly valuable autonomous AI agents for marketing and customer success. Pretty crazy.
Chamath Palihapitiya
I would have guessed you'd be sloppier than that.
David Friedberg
I am sloppy. You get it. I don't have time. I don't care.
Chamath Palihapitiya
I don't know what to make of that information. It's odd because it would have been my prior, right? When we did some of the survey results on engineering spend, it's 2%—we found one at 15%. So it's not anywhere close to 20%, right? That implies that someone's spending hundreds of dollars a month, even in engineering, not thousands, right? So I'm trying to disaggregate that from the engineering—
David Friedberg
The caveat, obviously, is you don't have to refactor a massive code base 8 times a day to run a lot of agentic workflows, even very, very high-quality ones, right?
To be clear, it's kind of crazy. This AI VP of marketing we built now comes up with 3 great ideas every morning, which are better than any human is going to come up with. It's exhausting. It's so many ideas, right? It can do all of that for $94.27 in tokens last month.
It beats any human in ideas, not in execution. This beats any ideas that humans have for $94 a month. That's just an argument that, at some point, as we get into these other categories, they're just not as attractive as engineering for token consumption, right?
Chamath Palihapitiya
And that's why I had said I think it's 20% and 5%, but what you're saying is even that might be high, which is interesting. I'm frustrated at myself now because that would have been my gut. I will admit, because I've done the data and looked—for example, some of our companies are selling a software product that's LLM-enabled, and I said, "What's the token intensity there?" It's sub-10%, and that's on the COGS line, not the employee line, right?
I talked to our internal guy about what we're doing, and I'm like, "That feels relatively small." So my prior would have been around there. But if that's the case, I really struggle to figure out how they're doing $44 billion, right?
David Friedberg
That was my question. It's clearly true. It's just that I need someone smarter than me to take it and tie all the math together, right?
Chamath Palihapitiya
What it means is that there must be small numbers of engineers literally doing half the salary to get to that kind of number, right? The second-order question is, are they at the tip of the spear and this is the way the world is going, and therefore the 20% overall number will happen? Or are they token-maxing for performative reasons, and is some of this overdone? Could you get the same result with a more efficient use of tokens?
In which case, obviously, that $44 billion is not as much of a one-way street as I thought, right? That's why I go back to, "I don't know." The answer is evidenced by the fact that my guess was wrong and influenced by Twitter, but I do know enough to know it's the right question.
If you know the relationship between human spend and token spend for coding as the model load grows, you probably have a handle on what's going on, right? That's why we're surveying our companies as we speak.
David Friedberg
25% seems like a good framework for today. We'll see where the rest of the year takes us. There's so much. You could literally—some token-maxing may be performative, but imagine you could run a code review every single day, in real time. You're constantly finding bugs.
The agents already find bugs themselves in real time, but what if you could do meta-reviews constantly every day across massive code bases and iterate on them? It's easy to see this going up an order of magnitude.
Chamath Palihapitiya
Agreed, because that's the positive spin. The one thing you always have to remind yourself is that tokens get cheaper by the year. Every turn of the crank on GPUs gives you a 3×. Every turn of the crank on LLM optimization gives you another 3×.
You're looking at 10× prices falling every 18 months. So, in a weird kind of way, it might pay you to be inefficient now to get good at doing this, and you'll just become more efficient over time. So that's why I go back to this question: how much intelligence can you stuff into this economy, and at what price?
At what price? Roughly a $900 billion valuation, according to the latest. I've had 7 LPs ping me, saying, "Harry, you know everyone. How do we get in? How do we get in?"
Chamath Palihapitiya
Do we get shares? How do we get in?
How do we get in? Anthropic eyes a $50 billion round at a $900 billion valuation.
Chamath Palihapitiya
I'm going to admit, here's one where I was wrong 2 weeks ago. I thought they wouldn't have to do it; they should go straight to the IPO. But that was stupid old-world thinking, because the truth is, you shouldn't do it if, A, you have to spend a whole bunch of time doing a raise, and B, those raises give you rights around an IPO block or anything like that.
But we live in a world where they can just send out a freaking email, people respond in 48 hours, there's no drama, and they take the terms they get. So yes, they should grab the $50 billion. I didn't, and good on them, because—
Yeah, you had 48 hours to decide. Nothing is better than any IPO on planet Earth.
Chamath Palihapitiya
You're right, Harry. You know, we talk about public versus private. As long as you can raise capital like that in the private markets without any statutory liabilities or disclosure liabilities, why would you go public?
That was going to be my question. Does it do anything to the timing or the price of this supposed Q4 IPO?
Chamath Palihapitiya
It might do nothing to either of them, but what it does do, if you're the Anthropic CFO, is allow you to exhale. You always hate to have to do something that you have to do, right? There's no doubt that, had they not done this, they would really want to get public in the back half of this year. You could see a scenario where that's not possible due to circumstances beyond your control.
I think what it does is—there's a mild anchoring effect on pricing. I'm sure there are no blocks on IPOs, so, to a rounding error, we should assume these shares are powerless and illiquid and have no votes and no knowledge. There might be a mild anchoring effect to the high end, but the real point is it just gives you that degree of freedom. You don't have to do it.
One bit of math I did, and tweeted because you guys helped me think through it, is really obvious: if you have a company, every dollar of revenue that Anthropic generates means someone—either Anthropic or its partners—has to invest 3 or 4× in capex, because it's just expensive in terms of compute to service AI.
And then, on top of that, if you're going 10× and you have to forecast 1 year out, you're now guessing not your capex or your revenue today, but your capex a year from now. So, when you're doing $10 billion in revenue at a run rate, you're actually making capex predictions that might be 10 times that amount, times 3 times $3 per dollar of revenue. You're committing $30 billion in capex for every $1 billion in revenue you have. It's amazing.
A lot of that risk is laid off to the hyperscalers, but when you zoom out, my big aha—and that's why I was wrong 2 weeks ago—is that there is no such thing as too much cash on your balance sheet. There is no such thing. Dario is entirely right. This is the riskiest game of financial guesswork I've ever seen.
You're betting 10 times your—I mean, you're somewhere between 5 and 10 times your revenue at any point in time to meet the capex demand 1 year out. It's huge. There's never been a bet like this before, and the only thing you can do is de-risk the bet: raise capital.
But I do think it somewhat decreases the odds of an IPO this year.
Chamath Palihapitiya
Yes.
I think there are 2 factors. Just mathematically, if you can raise $50 billion literally in 48 hours with no rights or anything—and again, I've become Team Sam and OpenAI recently. With my agents, as my agents have taken control of my life, I've changed my allegiances to some extent.
But if OpenAI said today they were thinking about spinning out the hardware business they just bought for $6 billion, and with the slight drama between Sam and Sarah Friar, if OpenAI pushes out its IPO timeline and Anthropic is well-funded, they may be less of a rush to deal with the headaches of being public. So, if they really feel like OpenAI is a second-half 2027 IPO, this may be just for the sport of it. I think the combination of the two decreases the odds of the IPO this year. We'd have to check Polymarket.
Do we think that, after we've all said all along that both will go out this year, this is actually the first sign of true slippage and that both will actually go out in 2027?
Chamath Palihapitiya
I think the truth is now they don't have to. I mean, OpenAI, remember how quickly we forget, was $120 billion 6 weeks ago. Anthropic was $30 billion and now has another $50 billion. Neither of them have to go public this year.
I'm with you, Harry. I think you described it well. You still will, with a favorable wind, if things are organized and you feel you're predictable. You won't if you're not. And now you don't have to. So, in the right circumstances, they'd be crazy not to go, but you can't control the circumstances.
David George
First of all, you have another IPO pricing in advance of you that has way more risk and story risk in it in terms of SpaceX. So, you can imagine the world getting a little disrupted because of that. There was a war on, as a reminder. Lots can go wrong.
If you're the CFO of Anthropic, you go home after you raised $50 billion after 2 days' work and say to your spouse, "Good week at the office, hon. We got it done." Probably in Excel.
I logistically don't know how they do it with the amount of 10s, 20s, and 30s, and just the logistical challenge of collecting $50 billion from every family office and institution under the sun.
David George
The key is having a Brex and a Ramp account. You have to split it up between the 2, right? That's the insider trick.
You get the credit card points. I like—genuinely, that's why I think you end up with these minimum check sizes that are huge. That's why you end up with people doing bundling and SPVs so it looks like a single check size. You just end up with those structures to make it happen, right?
I remember speaking to one of the leading GPs at one of the leading firms. I said, "How much does it cost to take a meeting with you to get one as an LP?"
David George
Yeah.
$250 million.
David George
Yeah.
That was the entry price. I was like, "Wow, I'm really thrilled that you're on the show. I'm thrilled that you're on the show. That's awesome."
Speaking of OpenAI, OpenAI's chairman, Bret Taylor, is out in the market raising $950 million at a $15.8 billion valuation for Sierra. They're at $150 million in ARR, which is a 105× revenue multiple. On the negative side, it's a $400 billion customer service market; on the positive side, how do we read this raise?
David George
I'm starting to get worried. What I mean is, on the legal side, we have clearly, if nothing else, proven that the TAM is a little larger than we thought in agent tech. I'm not 100% convinced the CX market is as big as $400 billion, whatever you want to call it. I'm not convinced it's grown 10× because of AI. I believe it's grown a bit. I believe it might have grown 50%.
Everyone from Bret Taylor to Eoghan at Intercom sees these agents emerging, and they're going to do sales and CX and enterprise. I'm not saying it's not true, or that you're not replacing all these humans that we saw earlier. I'm not saying I'm even right, but I'm worried that the overall TAM is being flattered by the desire to reduce headcount. It seems to flatter the TAM expansion.
I just think it's TBD at this valuation whether there's a $100 billion company here or not. I don't know.
Bret, do you agree?
David George
My guess is the customer support software market that exists today is probably $20 billion or $30 billion, and the customer support labor spend is $400 billion. So, you're exactly right.
If you're selling a story that says we're going to replace the old customer support software with new—you're going to replace Service Cloud, which is the Salesforce product, which Bret Taylor obviously knows really well, with Sierra—that's not a great business, because you're going to be grinding out replacement for the next couple of decades, right? You have to buy into some level of this TAM expansion from labor replacement.
No, no, no, no, no—that's not right.
David George
Not any TAM expansion from labor replacement, but actually expansion into sales and upsell massively to—
Rory O'Driscoll
I agree. There’s a lot of—I agree because, in the abstract, you have TAM expansion from labor replacement, but once you have 3 or 4 companies competing for the same thing, then your competition is not labor. Your competition is 3 other companies, all of whom are using LLMs for the same thing.
So, I think, to state the obvious, there’s a fair amount of leaning in here at 100 times revenue in a world where you can buy Anthropic for, you know, 30 times revenue or 44, yeah, 20 times revenue, right? Just to state the obvious.
Now, I think the fun thing about it is that, when you have this whole dialogue—software is dead, right?—there are 2 sub-dialogues of “software is dead.” There is the SaaS apocalypse: all software is dead because there’s a SaaS apocalypse. And then there’s the more terrifying version: all software is dead because the LLMs are going to eat everything, right?
What I like about this is that this is the guy who’s chairman of the still-biggest LLM company, OpenAI, and they clearly believe that there’s value to be added on top. It’s the same story Alex Karp is telling: there is value to be added on top of LLM software to build a large, independent company. When people are giving me the “is software dead, are the LLMs going to eat everything?” story, people are voting with their dollars to say it’s not, right? With companies like Sierra. And I believe them to be correct.
One rule of thumb, going back to my failed math earlier but now trying to get it right, is that one of the things I look at in these companies is token intensity, which is how much they spend on tokens on a cost-of-goods-sold basis. In other words, how much does it cost to deliver a next-generation Sierra customer agent? My guess is their LLM spend is sub-10% of revenues. In other words, LLMs are not the dominant portion of the value they deliver. It’s the LLM plus the software plus the whole thing plus all the domain-specific knowledge.
So, I think the fact that they can raise this kind of money is healthy, and it speaks to the belief in the next-generation software companies. The multiple—you can definitely look, anytime you’re paying 100 times ARR for any software company, no matter how fast it’s growing, you really are leaning into a very aggressive future. I hope they’re right.
Rory makes such an important point here. The SaaS apocalypse assumed that no one was going to buy software. So, there is a counter-narrative to that, if nothing else. We want to buy SaaS, as is Palantir from this week, right? So, there’s meta-level good news, but maybe not for a lot of our portfolio. At a meta level, it’s great news.
Jason Lemkin
Are we really running out of ideas that much, GV and Tiger? My friend Tom Hulme runs GV, so I love him and I’m taking a dig at him here lovingly, but, seriously, if it’s a $100 billion company with no more dilution, you’re doing a 5.5x.
David George
Yeah, but we want Tiger to be back. That’s good for everybody, Harry. So, let’s distinguish between GV and Tiger, okay? We want Tiger to be deploying lots of capital into our portfolio companies. So, let’s cheer them on, okay? We need Tiger to be strong again.
Rory O'Driscoll
No, it doesn’t. I think, Harry, we’re all Pavlovian. Investors are the most Pavlovian things out there. The things that we do, the things that feel good, we do more and more of until it feels bad, right? And the truth is this: buying marquee assets at absurd prices has been by far and away the best strategy for the last 3 years.
True.
Rory O'Driscoll
So, you’re just going to do more, and you’re just going to keep doing it until you overshoot. Is this the moment they’ve overshot? I don’t know. I would have guessed $380 billion for Anthropic. Ooh, that feels a bit lofty, right? The point is this—
Jason Lemkin
The point is also, on the flip side, OpenAI would buy them today for $40–$50 billion to get Bret Taylor as CEO.
Rory O'Driscoll
Actually, I don’t think they need to. The truth is this: we’ve got to say it—something has happened at OpenAI. We suggested this a while back, and when I suggested it, I was also saying it shouldn’t be necessary, because really all we need is for someone to tell the team at OpenAI, “Come on, just stick to your knitting. Do 2 or 3 things, do them well, and get rid of the external noise.”
To be fair to them, you’ve seen some progress in that direction, right? So, you don’t need to have Bret Taylor run this company. I think whatever’s working, Mr. Altman has decided to focus a little bit and reduce the extraneous noise, and they seem to be getting better performance. I’m kind of, to Jason’s point, being a little bit back on Team OpenAI—not from a bandwagon perspective, but from an all-you-have-to-do-is-just-do-the-ordinary-things-well perspective, and you’ll do great.
Which has more upside if you were to put a dollar to work: Sierra or Anthropic?
Rory O'Driscoll
Anthropic. Not even a question for a second. Not even a question for a second.
Wow.
Rory O'Driscoll
I mean, yeah.
You’re saying it’s more likely that Anthropic is worth $6 trillion than Sierra’s worth $100 billion?
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes. I think the likelihood of both of those happening is low, but yes.
That’s interesting.
Rory O'Driscoll
You can play it. My sense is—I’m not good at the VC gossip, Harry. You’re much better at this than me—but my sense is they’re just different bets, because Anthropic is a bet that there’s boundless upside. Byron Deeter was on CNBC or whatever this week saying, “By far, this is the best round to invest in,” right? A little bit, he’s talking his book, but I definitely—we all know Byron. I believe he believes that this is the best round, okay?
I believe Sierra—I don’t know. I met Tom once through you when he was at SaaStr London. I really—but I believe that they all believe there’s also downside protection in this deal. And it’s just a different type of deal. People were kind of snippy when they did the round at $10 billion. Again, I don’t know gossip, but I was at a big event, and people were like, “Well, they did that round because they wanted access to Bret.” I don’t believe that, right?
But the sense that there’s massive downside protection, when folks are still struggling to deploy capital in venture, is important. It’s not easy. These bets are risky, and they’re very expensive. The fact—I don’t know how big the round was—$950 million? I can put half a mil—half a billion—into Sierra, and at least my downside’s protected.
You don’t want every deal to be like that in your portfolio, but there’s some comfort in having downside protection, even if it’s pretend. But it’s part of venture investing. Downside protection is real; we just overstate it, right? And the number of potential acquirers is real. We actually overstate that, too.
Jason Calacanis
Well, worst case, Vlad told me this the other day. I was talking about my portfolio, and he’s like, “Well, worst case, this one will exit for $1.5–$2 billion to one of these 3 folks.” I’m like, “Thanks, Vlad. I feel better.”
Let me explain. Yes, that’s because the training data doesn’t include the decades that I remember. Well, let me tell you, there are worse—there are—
Worst case, Jason.
Jason Calacanis
Worst case, yeah. Worst case.
Okay. In other news, Musk versus Altman, trial week 1. Roelof, going back to this that you mentioned earlier, Musk admits xAI distilled OpenAI models—partly. Importantly, he said partly. Greg Brockman also claims that his stake is now worth $30 billion. Another revelation that came out. Boys, what’s the analysis on week 1 of Musk versus Altman?
Roelof Botha
First of all, thank God for this gift: the tech version of TMZ. It’s going to be the gift that keeps on giving. It’s a little bit like rubbernecking at a car accident because it’s going to be impossible to tear your eyes away from it, right? And yeah, Evan’s going to come out, and it’s just going to—yeah, people aren’t going to look great.
Which is different from—actually, we should talk in a second about the actual legal issues here, which are much more distinct. But yes, in no particular order, the distillation comment wasn’t a good look for Elon. Being asked under oath to rank the models, and having to rank OpenAI and Anthropic above him, probably hurt deep in his soul, right?
It just shows that whenever you get to this kind of lawsuit, it’s always embarrassing for both sides. I feel for Greg Brockman, and you have this private diary where you write your inner thoughts. Suddenly, you get a document-retention request, and now your private personal diary, because it doesn’t have attorney-client privilege, is out there forever, and they just narrate you. It’s kind of—right?
On the $30 billion thing, people have been like, “Well, of course. The Twitterati are all, ‘Elon’s $30 billion. He didn’t put any money in.’” Well, yeah. That’s how equity works when you’re a founder, and he’s a founder. He is one of the top 2 or 3 executives in a company worth $800 billion. It would be surprising if he was worth less than $10 or $20 billion.
The most surprising thing is Sam Altman’s worth zero on this, right? Which I still think is weird and a mistake. It would be easy to troll both sides, but it actually doesn’t matter to the legal issues. The legal issues, I think, are going to be—you know, the one that no one talks about that’s super interesting is statute of limitations. Did Elon—
The earlier you see threats from Elon about, “Hey, this might be something I want,” the earlier it says you should have known then and you should have sued then. He may lose on the statute of limitations. The judge may just decide, “Dude, you have to bring a case within 3 years. 5 years have passed, so I’m not going to rule on the merits. It’s been fun listening to you guys for 2 weeks, but I’m ruling it out on that,” right?
Then another one that’s super obscure, but the minute you hear it, you go, “Oh, I get it.” A lot of the money came through his donor-advised fund, and anyone uses a DAF. It’s super efficient. You distribute stock into it, and then you advise the fund how to spend the money. But it turns out that the DAF is a separate legal entity, and once you give the money to the DAF, it’s not your money anymore. So the DAF is the person who’s been harmed when Elon’s DAF gave that money to OpenAI. Elon may not have standing in the case.
These are the legal issues that are going on underneath the surface. What’s going to happen here is that sometimes, especially in a pure jury trial, if someone looks like a jerk on the stand, it can impact them. Both sides are going to look like jerks on the stand, possibly, because at times they are jerks. But it doesn’t matter, because the jury is advisory in this case. In other words, they have the right to give advice on some of the issues, but ultimately, it’s kind of a weird thing: the judge decides.
So, in the end, this is going to boil down to 1 judge, probably a series of legal issues, and then, at the margin, the merits of the case. When you look at it, on the first day Elon looks maybe slightly better. Regardless of that, no one looks great—maybe that’s the truth. But in terms of the merits of the case, Elon probably went backward just because of these technical issues.
It’s hilarious. But I will admit, I say all that and I give this virtue speech about how we shouldn’t be looking at the car crash, and then I’m looking over at the car crash just like everyone else. It’s like, “Oh my God, you did that.” It’s just going to continue.
Jason, we can choose 1 final topic of the week. You get to choose, because Roelof likes to hand this over to us.
Jason Calacanis
Okay. Do I have choices?
Yeah. You have choices, dude. You can choose any of the remainders. There’s a lot in the VanEck Private Markets, Founders Fund’s new $6 billion fund, Coinbase cutting 14%, Vanta’s 63% growth to $300 million ARR, and Rogo raising at $2 billion.
Jason Calacanis
I’m going to give a quick shout-out to Vanta. We don’t have to spend the time on it. Another story of reacceleration of growth. It’s not just Palantir. We had Rippling last week, 70% of a billion. Vanta, 63%—I think every week we’ve got to have a shout-out. So, shout-out to Vanta, our good-news story of the week.
But I don’t think we need to talk about SOC 2 compliance this week. So why don’t we just leave it as a cheerlead?
Even though I hit it at the beginning, I do think, at least as we record this, that the Coinbase thing, if people really think about it, is pretty important and transformational. Brian is saying, “I just don’t need anybody at Coinbase who isn’t also an individual contributor anymore. I just don’t want anybody here,” is what he said this morning when we recorded this.
So, with a day’s delay, we do not need managers and managers, and we do not need managers. If you can’t ship and manage, if you can’t deliver a campaign and be the head of marketing, right? If you can’t manage sales agents and be a sales manager, I don’t want you at Coinbase.
That’s how I think all founders have felt. Then we give up at a certain point. We give up—it’s always true of the first 50, right? And then we start to give up. Around 500, I’ve learned, in the old days, you would just capitulate. Then you have managers and managers, and you start not meeting people as CEO before they leave, right?
I remember I was at Aaron Levie’s office when they crossed 500, and he said, “This was a learning moment for me. Now people leave Box before I’ve ever met them.” He didn’t mean managers and managers, but we capitulated to this.
Brian is saying, “No more with AI. We will even have teams of 1 that are self-managers,” right? I’m living that today. Every founder wants this world to exist where there is no one anymore working at my effing company who isn’t shipping, who isn’t committing, who isn’t building.
I think if this really hits, he’s putting into words what many of us have struggled to say: We don’t want managers anymore. You’ve got to build or you’ve got to go. Interesting. Build or go. Everyone wants this. Every founder wants this. It’s not the layoffs. Build or go. Build or leave.
What percentage of managers can also build?
Jason Calacanis
5%. They’ve all got to go. They build Kanban cards and talk about their team. Anyone on LinkedIn who talks about their team, fire them. “My team did this.” They’re all so precious about their team. “My team. My team did this.” That means they did nothing.
Lead from the effing front with AI. No, but it also says AI lets you lead from the front, and this is who we want to work with. This is who we want to invest in. This is who we want on our teams. We want folks who lead from the front.
Managers of managers lead from the rear. They lead from HQ, from their comfy office and their mug, and we’re done with it. I’m done with it. Anyone who talks about how great their team is, get your 4 months of severance and 2 weeks for each year you’ve been at the company. Good luck to you.
Roelof Botha
As usual, there’s a part of me that wants to recoil against this, but I’m coming around to your perspective. I’m going to start with Coinbase and Brian Armstrong, because a while back we talked about this, and I did a tweet on it that got a lot of pickup on all the performative, lying reasons why people are blaming AI for terminations: either because they’ve overhired, because growth has slowed, because they just spent all the money on capex, or, as you pointed out, because they need different people—all of which are different from the pure “I just can do more with less,” right?
So my assumption is, when people use AI as a justification for layoffs, I’m now mentally guilty until proven innocent: you’re lying. But—and this is the big but—I have to give Brian Armstrong credit. He’s demonstrated clarity of thought in how he thinks about hiring, firing, and company culture.
Go back to when we were locked in what turned out to be a fairly destructive period of conflating politics with how you run your company and bringing your political self to work, which proved divisive. He was one of the ones who early on said, “We’re not going to do that.” He didn’t say, “I believe in this and you believe in that.” He just said, “We’re not bringing that to work anymore.”
You remember that manifesto he did, and basically said, “I’ll pay you. I’ll give you severance if you want to go.”
To a lot of backlash at the time.
Roelof Botha
A lot of backlash, and in retrospect, an excellent call. It was an excellent call not only because it wasn’t a political call—it wasn’t taking the other side; it was taking no side—which has turned out to be entirely the correct position.
So my mental model is, when he says something like this, I’m going to assume there’s going to be less cant and hypocrisy in it than in the average CEO blaming AI for the thing, right? That’s the first comment.
And then, to your second point, you want to believe that managers should manage and, at some point, Alfred Sloan—the guy who built GM—was managing the modern corporation. But there’s a part of me that agrees with you, Jason, that if you’re not hands-on, you just don’t have a feel for it.
The best CEO at every level—yeah, you can’t be an individual contributor all day, because Jamie Dimon’s not out there making loans, right? But you have to do enough to know what’s happening on the front line with the new stuff. You can’t be so dissociated from it that you don’t understand, because then you’re in the grip of the experts, right? Today, that thing is AI.
If you take a different example, if you look back to 2008 and 2009, the financial crisis, and really examine what happened, those companies—the financial companies that went bust—it was like, “CDO, CLO, my 25-year-old kids are doing this, my quants are doing this, and I don’t understand, so I’m just going to accept—I’m going to be, as Jason says, a manager of managers, and I’m going to accept that they did the work correctly, and it’ll be fine.” They all went bankrupt.
I think Jason’s right today. If you’re not using the technology yourself at least 10% of your time, then you’re in the business of listening to other people tell you things that you don’t know are true or not. I always run my own models for our companies. I just want to see the numbers. Where does the cash go? It makes me a little old-school, but I think there’s an element of hands-on authenticity that Brian Armstrong is speaking to, and I think you’re speaking to it, Jason. I actually think it’s a thing, because without it, you just end up disconnected.
Jason Lemkin
I think it’s more. I think that was true last year. I think Brian wants more.
Jason Calacanis
Yeah.
Jason Lemkin
So let me give you an example. Last night, we had our AI VP of customer success reach out to 120 sponsors for SaaStr Annual, asking them exactly what their issues were, telling me everything they had to do, and getting it done.
You don't want a chief customer officer who has to tell 3 people to do that. Today, you want a chief customer officer who actually understands: Why is that possible? How did that happen? Why is that better than anything a human has done on my team? They can then talk to Claude Code or Replit or whatever and make it better tomorrow.
That's who you want on your team. It's not just that they dabble. It's not that they want to, because pre-AI, a chief customer officer could not reach out to 150 customers at 12:32 last night, as we did. Now with AI, our chief AI officer reached out to 200 and something customers at 12-something in the morning.
You want that person, or move them out. Promote the director who knows how to do that. It's a waste of time having that overfed person talk to the VP, who tells the director, who tells someone else, and it takes 3 weeks to do this, when we did it at 12:32 last night with 100-some-odd sponsors.
Point taken. The $10 million in revenue?
Jason Lemkin
They wouldn't ask for feedback; they'd ask for a meeting to get the feedback, which would take 2 weeks to get the meeting to get the feedback. Then they'd do it all over again.
And for sure, that's what's always been frustrating. But now we know that the best executives—let me make an even simpler version. A CMO today, and I know this will be really triggering to 90% of CMOs, but you know it's true, should be able to run their own campaigns.
And this is why. I'm not saying you have to spin up Marketo or HubSpot. I'm saying you should be able to tell your agent. Our agent, our AI VP of marketing, started running its own campaigns over the last 2 weeks, and it's better.
You don't even need to know exactly how that works. But the CMO should be able to interact with the agent and say, “Let's talk about the 3 best campaigns we should run to support scale, whatever,” and run them themselves now, because you don't need a team to do it.
You and the agent should do it, and you should want to do that. You should be passionate about it, and you should get rid of the executives in your organization who are resisting that. Get rid of them.
Yeah, I love it, but what percentage of CMOs can do that? 2%? 1%?
Jason Lemkin
Maybe you just need a director or VP who cares, and you don't need a CMO.
But the interesting question on that—let's say it's 10% or less—is: Do they become the most successful CMOs?
Jason Lemkin
Yeah, they're going to crush it.
If Jason is right and there's a correlation with success, then the one thing I do know is that economics is Darwinian. Over time, that 10% will become 20%, will become 40%, because the people who can't do it will be forced out. Right?
I think what you're saying, Jason, is that what it takes to compete is changing. If the people who have it succeed, capitalism works. It excludes the people who can't do it.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah.
And we might be better off without them.
Jason Calacanis
And that's why all the CX executives show up to the Palantir meeting: They know Jason's on the board, and he's going to put them against the wall if they don't know how to do this.
It's a genuine comment. It all ties back: If there's that level of imperative to do it, then anyone with an ounce of the survival gene in them will make sure that they're in the room when those decisions are happening and will want to be part of it.
I want to ask 1 question in a new round called “Rage bait but real.” I often tweet things and people think they're rage bait, and it's not. It's just genuinely how I think, and you can tell me if I'm an idiot or not.
Working from home on Fridays is BS, and it's an excuse for a 3-day weekend. Real or rage bait?
Jason Calacanis
Well, but you always rage-bait. They're going to be work-from-office days on Monday and Friday. They always have been. My logic was that we had our 2 partner meetings every Monday and every Friday in the old world, pre-COVID, and why should we change just because that happened?
Once in a while, we allow people—if you're on the road or if you want to make a longer trip—you can use 5 shifts a year and work from home on a Friday. But 90% of the people are in the office every Monday and every Friday, because those are the best 2 days to get people together.
My question.
Jason Calacanis
Real.
Yeah.
Jason Calacanis
Real.
The question is, is there a problem with it? Is that the question?
My point is, everyone said to me, “You're full of it. That's not true.” When you have 4 days a week in the office and Fridays working from home, yeah, it's an excuse for a 3-day weekend.
Jason Calacanis
Right. And the 90% of folks who don't want to work hard, and the 5% of the remaining 10% who do want to work hard but find it so hard that they think you're toxic—and Brian, well, at Coinbase, you've gotten an email to your personal email this morning: “Sorry, your Coinbase account no longer works. We had to do that to protect our customers,” it said in the email.
Your email no longer works. That's what's going to happen to those people criticizing you. They're not wrong in terms of quality of life and the way they want to live. They are right. You're both right.
They're all right that what you're describing is not the way they want to live, and you are right that they should not invest in those companies. Not only should we not invest as investors, you should not invest your time.
If you want your equity to be worth something, if you want to contribute to this world rather than just collect a paycheck, we are going to more and more bifurcate into folks who just want to collect a paycheck so the agent doesn't displace them and folks who want to change the world.
And that's fine. Let's not conflate the 2 like we did in 2021.
I love it. I like that. “Rage bait but real” is a new round.
Jason Calacanis
“Rage bait but real.” Exactly.
“Rage bait but real.” I've got more for you next week. Boys, thank you so much for doing this. Exciting week, as always.