20VC:Cursor 融资23亿美元、估值293亿美元:谁赢得编程战争|Peter Thiel 与 SoftBank 卖出 NVIDIA:深度分析|为什么风险投资将达到1万亿美元,以及散户市场的开启|为什么 Stripe 和最优秀的公司永远不会上市
Cursor 以293亿美元估值融资23亿美元,前提是编程支出最终会变成一个巨大的劳动力替代市场。 Tom Tunguz 称,智能体编程是继搜索之后产品与市场匹配最强的领域;Jason 则把多头逻辑建立在一家公司收入从1增长到100、再增长到10亿美元之上,这意味着明年做到30亿—40亿美元并非不可想象。Jason 的核心判断是:「如果你看不到TAM大幅扩张,那VC根本没必要参与这场游戏。」
如果性能提升先于客户习惯趋于平稳,Cursor 仍可能保住40%—60%的编程智能体份额。 Tom Blomfield 认为 Cursor 的份额在40%—60%;Tom Tunguz 则表示,开发者会在模型出现巨大改进时切换,但一旦记忆、个性化工具和财富500强标准化形成惯性,就会留下来;他猜测5年后 Cursor 可能仍保有今天75%的用户。Jason 的反驳是,Replit V3 相比前代已经是「冥王星与水星」的差距,而软件进步速度比过去快了两个数量级,市场的「脂肪」远未凝固。
毛利率看起来还有改善空间,但可迁移性和价格战才是生死风险。 Tomasz 的 venture firm 让一个200亿参数模型学会工具调用,达到 Claude Code 97%的等效能力;Microsoft 则披露,过去12个月每GPU小时生成的 tokens 增加了90%。Rory 认为,即使1亿美元收入只有100名员工、毛利率达到60%,也足以产生可观现金流。最可怕的情形是,可迁移的 prompts 把10万美元的智能体变成大宗商品:「如果GPU变得更像DRAM,市场会非常难看。」
晚期风险投资目前像一个只有价格上涨时才有流动性的私人股票市场。 据报道,Ramp 在估值从130亿美元升至320亿美元期间完成了4轮融资;Q1 新晋独角兽中约15%到Q3时已经再次上调估值。Rory 的表述是绝对的:「晚期业务要么是世界上最好的生意,要么是世界上最糟的生意」,因为投资者可以交易估值上调,却不能指望市场反转时仍有退出机会。
Thiel 和 SoftBank 卖出 NVIDIA 只是较弱的顶部信号,信用市场提供了更清晰的证据。 据报道,Thiel 卖出1亿美元,占其估计100亿—200亿美元净资产不足1%;SoftBank 则是在转向风险更高的 OpenAI 敞口,但 Oracle 的信用违约掉期定价已升至同行约3倍,意味着市场正在重估其AI承诺。NVIDIA 的客户集中度也极高——2个客户贡献超过40%的收入,而按访谈中的说法,4%代表超过50%——因此只要推理需求出现波动,调整就可能「迅速且惨烈」。
美国风险投资到2030年可能达到5000亿美元,但结果正越来越像押注少数几家公司的高度相关交易。 Tomasz Tunguz 估计,年度投资规模接近2700亿—2750亿美元,2008年只有80亿美元;Rory 引用了 Excel 的 GlobalScape 数据,认为今年规模为1840亿美元,其中约一半流向4家公司。如果 OpenAI、Anthropic、xAI、SpaceX 及其他集中度较高的赢家继续上涨,它们的回报足以淹没几十家失败独角兽;如果没有,散户资金可能要经过5—7年的反馈滞后,才会发现损失。
Stripe 和最受追捧的私人公司可能选择不上市,因为私人资本如今附带「准入溢价」。 一轮私人融资的成本可能约为100万美元,而IPO约需2500万—3000万美元;同时还能避开季度市场压力,并为员工提供持续流动性。风险投资二级交易因此已从风险投资资金的2%—3%上升至约10%—12%。Tomasz 认为,投资者可以通过连续几轮融资逐步「用美元成本均摊」退出,但 Rory 警告,真正的下行市场将检验这套缺乏公开市场流动性的公开市场行为体系。
1. Cursor 的估值,考验增长能否压过两大现实风险
Harry 开场讨论 Cursor 以293亿美元估值完成23亿美元融资,投资方包括 Andreessen Horowitz、Thrive、Coatue、DST 和 Accel。Tom Tunguz 的多头逻辑包括智能体编程极强的产品与市场匹配、30%—70%的开发者生产率提升、快速收入增长,以及一个按每秒 tokens 计算、速度快4—5倍的新 Cursor 模型。
对一家AI公司而言,其财务画像异常干净。Tom 称员工总数约30人,ESOP 稀释有限,也没有 foundation-model 公司所承担的大量资本开支稀释。Rory 后来用100名员工假设一家收入10亿美元的企业,并非指 Cursor 当前的员工数。Tom「能看到3倍空间」,但 Cursor 能否提价仍是最终考验。
Jason 用一个示意案例搭建估值桥梁:如果某个业务一年前从1增长到100,今年再从100增长到10亿美元,那么牛顿式动量可能推动它明年达到30亿—40亿美元。这样一来,今天的 headline valuation 对应的是未来12个月收入约10倍,而不是一个明显荒谬的价格。
尚未解决的经营数据是留存率:Tom 表示,vibe-coding 公司可能只有约50%的 gross account retention。在快速问答中,Tomasz 和 Jason 仍选择以290亿美元估值的 Cursor,而不是120亿美元的 Cognition;Jason 称 Cursor 的数字简直「令人瞠目结舌」。
2. 编程支出从软件席位扩张为劳动力预算
Jason 认为,「生产率提升30%—70%」已经是越来越落后的框架,因为AI编程正在成为必需基础设施。他预计开发者渗透率最终接近100%,每名开发者每年支出最终达到5000—6000美元,不论最后由哪家供应商拿走这笔钱。
Tom 表示,5年前的市场规模模型假设全球有2500万—3000万名开发者,而近期 Microsoft 财报电话会文字稿讨论的仅 GitHub 开发者就有1亿—1.5亿。Jason 的激进计算是:最终有1亿—2亿人每月支出400—500美元,意味着这个品类的规模可能达到数千亿美元,并「接近1万亿美元」。
用户的支付意愿已经超过公开套餐。Tom 在一周刚开始2天就用完每月200美元的 Claude Code Max 额度,并考虑购买多个席位,把月度支出提高到1000美元:「我再也不会回到没有 Claude Code 的电脑使用方式。」Jason 称自己的 Replit 账单还要更高。
市场覆盖的不只是职业程序员。Jason 说自己会构建产品但不会写代码,自6月以来已经上线12个 Replit 应用,被使用了70万次。因此,Replit、Lovable 和 Base44 面向的是一批不同于估计职业开发者群体的用户。
3. 智能体定价推动TAM远超编程本身
Tom 将传统中端市场软件2万—5万美元的合同,与一家智能体软件销售负责人的中端市场合同作对比,后者全部处于几十万美元高段至数百万美元低段。逻辑很直接:这些产品替代了部分劳动力,因此软件定价摆脱了历史上的按席位预算。
Jason 表示,在越来越少人愿意做「亲自坐在键盘前」的工作的世界里,即使GDP的2%也可能只是低估。Rory 不接受1万亿美元这一极端预测,但同意几百万名认真工作的美国开发者每年支出5000美元,仍足以支撑一家巨型公司。
节目的投资判断分界线由此形成:「TAM不清晰时,买入价格很重要;TAM巨大时,唯一重要的是赢。」这解释了为什么小组接受 Cursor 的价格,同时在2亿美元估值的 Legora 与80亿美元估值的 Harvey 之间选择前者:Jason 还看不到 Harvey 所需的300亿美元品类退出空间。
4. 毛利率改善不必重现旧式SaaS经济学
Cursor 的尴尬在于,其直接竞争对手同时也是为其提供约50%—70%产品 tokens 的供应商。由于几乎没有人工成本,盈利能力与竞争持久性最终都归结为一个平台风险问题:Cursor 能否降低对那些同时挑战自己的模型供应商的依赖?
Jason 将 Cursor 与 Replit、Lovable 对比。后两者可以默认使用廉价或「N-1」模型,毛利率已经超过50%。他尚未解决的问题是:即便混入自有模型,一个高度依赖 frontier model 的产品如何达到60%毛利率。
Tomasz 提供了自己 venture firm 的效率样本:该公司使用 Claude Code 教会一个200亿参数模型调用工具,并实现了相当于大得多的系统97%的能力。「这些模型架构还有非常多效率可以挤出来」,即使行业不再回到过去软件70%—72%的毛利率水平。
Rory 认为,旧式SaaS的高毛利率还承担了庞大销售团队和复杂集成的成本。一个收入10亿美元、拥有100名员工、毛利率60%的自助式产品,仍能产生可观现金流;Microsoft 披露过去12个月每GPU小时生成的 tokens 增加90%,进一步强化了这条路径。
5. 编程市场可能早于技术进步完成定型
Tom 的切换模型对性能高度敏感:当 Gemini 3 或其他版本明显优于「Claude 405 Sonnet」时,开发者会迁移;但一旦性能提升趋于渐近,就会留下来。他安装的 Claude Code 中有100个自写工具、编码记忆和 linting 偏好,只有足够大的性能提升才值得迁移。
企业采购又增加了一层惯性。财富500强公司会选择一家供应商、完成标准化,并购买类似企业许可协议的产品;因此 Tom 估计,5年后 Cursor 可能保留当前用户群的约75%。
Tom Blomfield 的5年排名是:Cursor 以40%—60%份额居首;如果 Microsoft 改进产品并通过 VS Code 打包销售,位居第二;Anthropic 凭借编码能力排名第三,大致形成60/20/20的格局。Rory 看到了 Cursor 的先发优势、Microsoft 的企业分发能力和 Anthropic 的模型级实力。
Jason 反对市场过早整合。Replit V3 不只是「一夜之间」变好,而是达到了「冥王星与水星」的差距:智能体可以召集架构师、找 bug 的工程师和审查员,一个看似无限的上下文窗口还能记住数月工作。完全智能体化的功能测试可能再带来一个10倍的生产率跃升。
6. 分歧在于「煎锅里的培根」何时凝固
Rory 的基本情形是熟悉的:3—4年的圈地期,随后是10年甚至更久的稳定份额,即使市场本身继续扩大。Intel 的性能多次翻倍,却没有失去市场地位;同样,客户可能让自己选定的AI编程工具持续变好,而不是不断迁移。
Jason 反驳称,过去软件每5年才会出现一次重大版本或集成,而今天的产品进步速度约为过去软件时代的两个数量级。Cursor 已经展示了30个人能构建什么,因此另一支小团队仍有可能颠覆看似领先的公司。
Tom Loverro 将争论称为「煎锅里的培根」:所有东西都很热、流动、滋滋作响,直到火力下降、脂肪凝固。Jason 认为煎锅会在「10档」维持更久;Rory 则认为,即使底层技术继续进步,企业采用也会令份额固化。
7. 可迁移性可能成为智能体价格战的楔子
Jason 将一个在某个AI智能体中训练了数月的 prompt 转移到 Salesforce Agentforce,迭代约1天后获得了相当的表现。他的结论不是护城河不存在,而是可迁移的 prompts 和历史记录意味着护城河低于传统SaaS切换成本所暗示的水平。
Rory 区分了类似美国劳工统计局所说的良性通缩——同样支出获得2倍 tokens——与真正的价格侵蚀。危险情形始于排名第三至第五的玩家以更低价格争夺份额,领先者随后跟进,形成SaaS此前大体避开的价格战。
当前 GTM 智能体的经济模型仍留有充足降价空间。Jason 表示,部署通常从10万美元左右起步:其中软件约5万—7万美元,前置部署工程师支持约2.5万美元。在预算环境更平静时,把一个可迁移的工作负载从10万—20万美元的智能体转移到2万美元的替代方案,可能极具吸引力。
Tom Loverro 没有预测全面崩溃,但认为可能有1—2个品类率先经历这种冲击。Rory 提名了核心 API 定价、编程智能体和 Lovable 类产品;这些产品的数字化输入相对标准化,因此摩擦小于深度集成的企业系统。
8. 集成深度决定软件是高粘性资产还是大宗DRAM
Rory 将 Salesforce 和 DRAM 放在两个极端。Salesforce 能抵御更便宜的替代品,因为拆除其集成非常痛苦;大宗内存价格可以先上涨5倍,再下跌50%—80%,买家对 Samsung 的忠诚只会维持到 Hynix 或其他供应商更便宜为止。
他从历史SaaS数据得出的结论是,集成数量最能预测留存率。一个置于供应商中立数据库中的可互换 prompt,实际上是在说:「你需要省下8万美元时,现在就把我换掉。」而5个运营集成会迫使企业承担足够多的IT工作,从而保留现有供应商。
Tom Loverro 以数据生态中的 Iceberg 为例:企业重新夺回了此前与 Snowflake 计算和存储捆绑在一起的数据控制权。类似的抽象层可能让企业拥有 prompts,再选择性地将其输入不同智能体,把价值从应用供应商手中转移出去。
Jason 已经看到迁移发生。他所在组织运行约12个AI智能体,另外还有5个 SDR/BDR 智能体分别通过不同实例和供应商运行;员工越来越多地与 Agentforce、Qualified 或 Artisan 对话,而不是直接使用 Salesforce。现有供应商可能保住自己的 logo,但「价值每周都在慢慢流失」。
9. 晚期风险投资只有在估值上涨时才是一门好生意
Rory 发现,Q1 大约有20—24家新晋独角兽;到Q3时,其中15%已经以更高估值再次融资,有些甚至完成了2次估值上调。据报道,Ramp 在一年内融资4次,估值从130亿美元升至320亿美元。
这种速度让 Harry 开始质疑种子期投资的精雕细琢:他的平台完全可以向已经高速增长的公司投入1000万—2500万美元。Bessemer 对 Anthropic 和 Ramp 的投资,以及 Kleiner、Lightspeed 等历史上偏早期的基金参与,说明这些机会被当作风险调整后的投资,而不是 crossover speculation。
Rory 的警告是结构性的:晚期风险投资「要么是世界上最好的生意,要么是世界上最糟的生意」。一笔1亿美元的仓位上涨时无需经营努力就能变成2亿美元;市场反转时,私人市场流动性却会在交易者最需要它的时候消失。
Harry 形容一位投资者像冷酷的 book manager,同一年以60买入、以180卖出。Rory 接受「新公开市场」这一比喻,但加上决定性限定:私人持有者可以交易估值上调,却不能假设下行时存在相称的流动性。
10. 信用市场比 NVIDIA 卖家传递出更尖锐的警告
据报道,Peter Thiel 卖出1亿美元的 NVIDIA 持仓,占其估计100亿—200亿美元净资产不足1%。这构成轻微负面信号——人们很少卖出自己预期会上涨的股票——但并非全面退出;SoftBank 的卖出则没那么看空,因为资金被转投到风险更高的 OpenAI 敞口。
Tomasz 关注的则是 Oracle 的信用违约掉期,其交易价格约为 Amazon、Microsoft 及其他同行的3倍。绝对违约概率仍然很低,但这一变动显示,债权人正在重新定价 Oracle 为 OpenAI 数据中心承诺提供的债务融资。
Rory 将债务和股权信号联系起来:Oracle 公布交易后产生的市值涨幅已经全部回吐,核心公司市值低于公告前水平。股权投资者在折价反映一份高风险合同,债权人则要求更高补偿,以对冲相关借款风险。
其他边际警告包括,在所引用的60天期间,次级借款人的汽车贷款逾期率创纪录;Blue Owl 冻结一只非交易 BDC 产品的赎回,同时将其转入另一只产品;以及 First Brands 违约。单独看都不是「巨大的尖锐红旗」,但合在一起说明风险感知正在扩散。
11. AI基础设施正以超过舒适区的速度运行
Tomasz 表示,数据中心资本开支正从每年约5000亿美元向8000亿美元甚至更高水平移动,同时市场质疑一笔涉及 Microsoft、NVIDIA 和 Anthropic、金额为150亿美元的投资是否存在循环融资。尽管如此,超大规模云厂商的 GPU 产能仍已售罄2年,其债务相对于自由现金流仍然很小。
NVIDIA 的客户集中度是更难处理的结构性问题:Tomasz 表示,2个客户贡献超过40%的收入,而4%代表超过50%。他计算称,这一集中度约为互联网泡沫时期 Lucent 的10倍,但 NVIDIA 最大的客户——Google、Meta 及同行——现金充裕,可以自主选择停止支出。
触发点将是推理需求不足:如果一家超大规模云厂商建成产能却只能填满80%,投资者就会开始质疑其背后每一个尚未完工的数据中心。「如果出现某种波动,调整幅度会迅速且惨烈」;整个经济正以「每小时1000英里的速度,行驶在一辆设计时速999英里的汽车上」。
Rory 的上行情形是物理约束。如果电力不足导致另外10座数据中心无法接入电网,支出可以放缓,而无需任何人承认需求已经消失;这比一座已完工的设施投入使用后发现「根本没人来」、并立即让正在建设的另外20座设施减值,要稳定得多。
12. AI长期繁荣仍可能包含多次30%—40%的回撤
当被问及未来3—4年是否能平稳上涨、毫无中断时,Rory 先回答「零」,随后给出「可能10%、20%」。Jason 回忆,SaaS 在2016年前后曾在约2周内下跌30%—40%,并预计市场在走向「数据中心就是新城市」的过程中还会经历多次类似调整。
长期走势图可能掩盖令人无法忍受的持有期。Harry 指出,Nasdaq 在2001—02年的跌幅约为70%—80%,花了16年才恢复;他说,如果任何4%—5%的波动都让人恶心,就应该重新评估资产配置,而他正在增加一部分现金。Rory 的建议是,感到害怕时不要看盘。
Rory 重复了这一行为建议:「害怕时,不要看。」早期创业者似乎也在这么做:Harry 描述 YC 公司融资500万美元后,立即打开后续可转债,并把5000万美元 post-money 当作标准,即使公开市场疲弱。
Rory 认为,创始人在资本充裕时充分利用资金,而VC在资金稀缺时变得冷酷,并不矛盾。真正的考验在人际关系上——「人生很长」——但市场无疑偏向创业者,因此怀念另一种权力平衡,在经济上没有意义。
13. 风险投资走向5000亿美元,取决于少数高度相关的赢家
Tomasz 估计,如今美国风险投资部署规模约为2700亿—2750亿美元,2008年只有80亿美元,2021年约为3000亿美元,并追问到2030年是否会达到5000亿美元。Rory 补充了被遗漏的周期:这个行业在1999年已经达到1000亿美元,随后崩跌至80亿美元。
Rory 引用 Excel 的 GlobalScape 估计,今年投资额为1840亿美元,略低于2021年峰值1830亿美元,但约一半流入4家公司。除这些公司外,市场状况更接近2020年:一边是大型AI公司和少数加速器,另一边是约900家找不到明显IPO或私募股权买家的独角兽,形成两极市场。
Rory 将行业预测简化为回报问题:只要过剩资金还没有消灭回报,资本就会继续进入。由于4—5家公司约占行业的40%,整个资金池的结果越来越取决于 OpenAI、Anthropic、xAI、SpaceX 及其同类公司能否压倒其他公司的失败。
Harry 强调了 LP 投资组合和 SPV 带来的下游乘数效应,最终触达「牙医」和数千名间接持有人。Rory 的总结很直接:「赌局已经开始,而这是一场单一且高度相关的赌局。」
14. GC AI 展示了如何高价投资,却不押注烧钱
Rory 表示,他在讨论另一家法律科技公司时发现了 GC AI。客户普遍知道并喜欢这款产品,采用率很高;由于它服务的是企业内部法务团队的日常工作,而不是律师事务所,因此壁垒不高。GC AI 以5.5亿美元 post-money 估值获得 Scale 投资。
让人放心的不只是增长,还有效率。GC AI 已经盈利,没有花掉上一轮融资,并采用了一种优雅、由需求驱动的分发策略;Rory 的规则是,避免把高买入价格与高烧钱同时组合。
他还拒绝把VC「造王」能力视为决定性因素。名气大的基金可以改善招聘和曝光,但企业买家不会因为 Sequoia 投资了某家公司,就购买糟糕的软件:「客户才是决定者。」持续的客户喜爱,可以抵消竞争对手的融资优势。
快速问答再次划清边界。Tomasz 和 Jason 选择2亿美元估值的 Legora,而不是80亿美元估值的 Harvey,因为这个品类能否达到300亿美元结果仍不确定——这正是 Rory 认为买入价格仍应主导投资判断的地方。
15. 准入溢价让 Stripe 没有多少上市理由
Stripe 以历史最高价41美元进行要约收购,体现了 Tomasz 所说的「新公开市场」。他比较称,晚期私人融资的法律费用约为100万美元,而上市约需2500万—3000万美元,其中包括对2亿—3亿美元发行规模收取传统6%—7%的费用。
过去的规则是,私人公司相对于公开市场倍数应享有20%—30%的流动性折价。Harry 和 Tomasz 认为,这一关系可能已经反转为20%—30%的「准入溢价」:受追捧的私人股票更贵,但发行人获得更便宜的资本、更低的交易成本,也无需承担季度业绩压力。
Rory 认为,这种特权只属于少数拥有持久 Silicon Valley 光环的公司——Stripe、领先的AI模型公司及类似企业。大多数还不错的云公司仍需要公开市场,因为私人买家不可能无限期地提供一轮又一轮2亿—3亿美元融资和员工要约。
Tomasz 猜测 OpenAI 可能在2026年Q3上市;Rory 认为时间会是2026年Q3或Q4,而 Jason 预计替代性融资会把时间推迟到2027年年中。Tomasz 表示,如果自己没有股份,就不会对稀释敏感;Jason 则认为,让一家公司的领导者受到「世界统治」驱动,而不是传统经济激励驱动,十分荒谬。
16. 散户和二级市场正在搭建私人公开市场
Tomasz 设计的散户路径是:从401(k)进入ETF,再进入 fund of funds,最终进入风险投资。Harry 提到 Coatue 的30亿美元散户基金和 GC 的扩张努力,认为这笔资金可能在24—36个月内到达,而低回报的认知则需要5—7年。
警示性案例是 Blackstone 约210亿美元的散户房地产产品及其赎回问题。风险投资的估值可能在12—18个月甚至更久的时间里保持不变,因此流动性散户负债可能对应一批价值已经走弱、但变化仍不可见的资产。
二级交易已经在扩张:Tomasz 估计其占私募股权资金约25%,历史上仅占风险投资的2%—3%,如今已升至10%—12%。相比把IPO低迷视为退出消失的证据,他更愿意将IPO、并购和二级交易合并起来衡量总流动性。
对于一支需要15年才能实现流动性的基金,Tomasz 描述了一种渐进式卖出策略:风险投资基金在几轮融资后先卖出四分之一,随后在新的估值节点继续出售——「用美元成本均摊的方式退出」。Rory 接受私人投资者正通过一个低效得多的市场,学习像公开市场股东一样行动。
17. IPO争论取决于费用、散户需求和下一次崩盘
Tomasz 认为 Goldman 收购 Industry Ventures、据报道支付了资产管理行业极高的估值倍数,说明新增散户资金需要二级市场敞口。排名约第2至第200的公司应该形成一个市场出清价格;而那900家被困住的独角兽,则在旧估值的零与全额之间,构成某种重组或收购业务。
Rory 仍然认为,最大的风险投资退出最终需要通过IPO完成,因为风险投资回报取决于少数真正非凡的公司,而不是通过私募股权式包装,把一批始终过得去的资产打包出售。他还指出,私人资本总体承担的 two-and-20 费用,远高于公开市场约60个基点的成本。
Tomasz 的回答是费用压缩:晚期散户产品的费用负担可以接近公开交易私募股权管理人的65—75个基点。他还提到,2022年私募股权曾将12%的公开交易软件公司私有化;如果市场上只有8家公司IPO,公开交易软件可能变成「一个正在消亡的品类」。
尚未解决的变量是真正的下行市场。在私人流动性被移除之前,所有趋势都支持持续要约收购和更少上市;之后,持有人可能重新发现公开市场存在的原因。Rory 对未来散户基金经理的警告是:最终,他们可能每年花10次投资者会议解释,为什么「你们赚了很多钱,而他们亏了」。
Rory O'Driscoll
Entry price counts when TAM is unclear. Winning is the only thing that counts when TAM is huge.
If you're not seeing massive TAM expansion, there's just no point in even playing as VCs.
Tom Tunguz
Coding is no longer on this extremely steep improvement path. As the models improve in performance dramatically, people switch.
Rory O'Driscoll
To say that would be ugly would be an understatement. It would be terrifying—beyond terrifying.
Tom Tunguz
I think we're at a point where, if there's some wobble, the magnitude of the correction will be fast and brutal.
Guys, I am so excited for this. It's always my favorite show to do. We have the wonderful Tom Tunguz joining us today. Tom, welcome to this wonderful trio. It's so great to have you.
Tom Tunguz
Thrilled to be here. Thanks for having me on.
Not at all.
Rory O'Driscoll
Tom, I've got to say, have you become so Americanized, Tomasz, that you're just going with Tom now? Or are you just recognizing that Harry, like all English people, has no command of foreign languages?
Sorry, I didn't understand that.
Rory O'Driscoll
Would you like him to use your given name, Tom? Are we going to stick with what Harry said?
Tom Tunguz
Oh, Tom's great.
Yeah.
Tom Tunguz
That's great. Let's roll with it. Let's be brief.
Rory O'Driscoll
We've become an American.
Tom Tunguz
Let's get to the point.
Rory O'Driscoll
Tom it is.
Tom Tunguz
Yeah.
Don't worry, Tom. Rory will remain this obnoxious way for the following 90 minutes. It's all good. I've gotten used to it. He'll correct your punctuation next.
1. Cursor Raises $2.3 Billion
But I want to start on some very exciting news for Cursor: $2.3 billion at a $29.3 billion valuation. Andreessen Horowitz, Thrive, Coatue, DST, and Accel—all the big players involved. Chaps, how did we analyze this? I look at this and honestly feel more irrelevant than I've ever felt. How should we look at this? This is a free-for-all.
Tom Tunguz
I mean, look, I think product-market fit for agentic coding is probably the best of any use case aside from search. And then you have this massive growth. So I think the bull case is that the productivity gains for software engineers here are pretty enormous—30% to 70%, depending on which company you're looking at.
You have pretty significant multiple expansion. I'm not sure if you guys have played with the new Cursor model, but it's phenomenal. It's unbelievably fast—4 or 5 times faster on a tokens-per-second basis—and that allows them to capture a whole bunch of margin. And then, on a multiples basis, it's actually not that wild. You put all those things together, plus the buoyancy in the market, and so you see a valuation here. I mean, can you see a 3x? You don't have a lot of ESOP dilution because total employee count is 30.
Jason Lemkin
Is it still 30?
Tom Tunguz
They just hired a PM 4 months ago, so—
Okay.
Tom Tunguz
—they increased headcount by 5%. But you don't have a lot of the CapEx dilution that you always see within the foundation models. And so, does it go public? You have massive revenue growth, increasing margin, but a pretty attractive financial profile.
We can debate the entry price, but I think it's a classic bull-market bet. The big question is this: We were looking at a bunch of the vibe-coding companies, and typical gross account retention is 50%. So what does that really mean in this business? Can they push any higher price? I think that's probably the ultimate determining question. But, given the usage that we see, I can see the case. I can see the case.
2. The Developer TAM Expands
Jason Lemkin
There are 2 thoughts to add onto it. One, I think this idea that you get a 30% to 70% productivity boost is almost a backwards way of looking at it, because the way I think about it now is that it's just default and necessary. This is the way we code.
So if we were talking earlier in the year—even if we were at SaaStr in May—we were talking about productivity boosts, right? What are you getting out of Cursor and Windsurf and all? I don't know anybody who's not using Cursor or something. It's moved to the point where we're going to approach 100% penetration per developer at some sort of price per year—$5,000, $6,000.
You guys, Rory and Tomasz, are better at math than me. Before we even get to Replit and Lovable, the prosumer products for engineers, how many engineers are there on planet Earth today, and what's $5,000 times that? Seriously, we're going to have 100% penetration, right?
Tom Tunguz
Yeah, no, I agree with you. So when I used to do market-sizing models, 5 years ago, we used to assume that there were 25 million to 30 million developers. In the most recent Microsoft transcript from the earnings, they're talking about 100 million to 150 million developers just on GitHub.
Jason Lemkin
Okay, so 200 million times $5,000. How much is that, Rory?
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, 200 million. I mean, look, 200 million times $1,000 is $200 billion.
Jason Lemkin
No, $5,000. $5,000 a year.
Rory O'Driscoll
I don't buy that for a second.
Jason Lemkin
I think Cursor can do $1 trillion. Okay, it could do $500 billion, right? Seriously, this is what we're missing. This is all—the whole AI play to me. If you're not seeing massive TAM expansion, there's just no point in even playing as VCs.
Tom Tunguz
Okay, so I was chatting with a sales leader last night. He's a mid-market seller in an agentic company, and I asked him, "How many figures are in your mid-market deals?" I think of a mid-market deal—for me, a mid-market deal is $20,000 to $50,000. $50,000 on the high end, maybe $75,000.
Yeah.
Tom Tunguz
He said they're all 7 figures.
Jason Lemkin
7?
Tom Tunguz
Yeah. So he's at an agentic software company, and the mid-market is high 6 to low 7 figures.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah. That's TAM expansion.
Rory O'Driscoll
That's TAM expansion.
Tom Tunguz
It's labor replacement in some form or another, right? And so, to that point, if the total number of developers increases... And look, willingness to pay—I pay for Claude Code Max; I pay $200 a month.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, and you run out.
Tom Tunguz
I run out 2 days into the week, right? So now I'm at a place where, okay, do I buy 2 additional seats, 3 additional seats? Instead of spending $200 a month, I'm spending $1,000 a month, and switching between these keys is a total pain. It makes me wonder: What is my willingness to pay for Claude? I will never go back to using a computer without Claude Code. I couldn't imagine it.
Rory O'Driscoll
And that sound you hear is them creating the Tomasz $300- or $400-a-month plan because they need it.
Jason Lemkin
You don't want to know what I spend on Replit.
Rory O'Driscoll
It's more expensive.
And you would never go back, right? There's no way.
Rory O'Driscoll
Well, they're different. Cursor is never going back. I actually think, now that we do the math, we said 100 million active developers. Sorry, maybe I got the math wrong, right?
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah, I think that's right.
Jason Lemkin
I think everyone's gonna pay $400 to $500 a month ultimately, no matter where they are, so that's $1 trillion. We're coming up on $1 trillion. I think that's real, and maybe Cursor gets 30% of it, we could argue, right? Then we could back into whether it's a good deal. Then Replit, Lovable, Base44, and friends—that's the other couple hundred million people. Tomasz, I've shipped 12 apps since June on Replit: 12 apps used 700,000 times. I built product, but I don't code, right? That's a whole other TAM.
Tomasz Tunguz
But that's 3% to 5% of US GDP. I mean, if we're talking about $1 trillion—
Jason Lemkin
Well, that's global. You said global developers, right?
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay, fair, but most of the money will accrue to US companies.
Rory O'Driscoll
Wait. Any software business is 50% US, even though—what is it?
Okay, so that's 2% of GDP, right?
Yeah.
Jason Lemkin
Most of us aren't even gonna be working in 5 years. So 2% of GDP is necessary because no one wants to work; no one wants to be a hands-on-keyboard executive. No one graduating from college that I know wants to work, right? So 2% sounds low to me.
Look, I'm gonna call it. It won't be 2% or anything like it, but it can still be huge. You multiply 100 million by $5,000 a pop, and you get a huge number. You can narrow this thing down to quote-unquote serious developers. You get, I think, 3 or 4 in the US, right? A really serious one: "I'm paid to code 8 hours a day, 5 days a week." You can still multiply that by $5,000 a year and get a huge company.
So I think the aha here is—I mean, I'm just going back to the question. Call me boring. The Harry question is at roughly $30 billion for $1 billion in revenue is just crazy, right? And the proof of it is that I struggle more to get the con side than the pro side. Look, the pro side is revenue, revenue growth rate, and probably TAM. If something's gone from 1 to 100 a year ago, and it's gone from 100 to $1 billion this year, it's hard to imagine, with that—Newton's laws of motion require it to go to $3 billion or $4 billion next year. So suddenly you're in this thing at 10 times NTM revenues.
On revenue and revenue growth, and we just did it on TAM, all of these are great. So, yeah, if you're trying to come up with an argument against, the 2 ones I hear are profitability and moat, and I'd love to talk about those. And, Tom, maybe you have some insight into that. Let's talk profitability. You had a whole bunch of, "Oh my God, the gross margin on these things isn't great." Sometimes you hear it isn't great; sometimes you hear it's awful. Obviously, all that money's flowing to Anthropic, and we'll come back to that. But it is also noteworthy that they talked about building their own model, which, of course, will allow them to capture that revenue. So I don't have compelling data on that, but I'd love to hear people's thoughts on profitability and gross margins for these businesses.
Tom Tunguz
My pushback on the con side would just be the emphasis and the focus that OpenAI and Anthropic are placing on Codex and on Claude Code, and then your alternative players like Cognition—
3. Profitability And Durability
Rory O'Driscoll
I said there are 2 negatives, and I'm gonna list them: profitability and durability. Profitability is, do you make money? Durability is, is someone else gonna take your money? I think those are the only 2 issues, which is amazing. Just think about it. It's a $30 billion market-cap deal where, on a revenue, revenue-growth, and TAM perspective, it's big, resounding yeses: revenue scale, hypergrowth, huge market. Yes, yes, yes.
So you're right, the 2 are profitability and then competition and durability. So let's do them in turn, because I think they are linked, Harry. You're right. The odd thing about the current business is their direct competitor is also currently their supplier of the raw ingredient that makes 50%, 60%, 70% of their product. It's a very weird platform-risk kind of deal, and maybe you can just lump them in together. Look, with 100-odd employees, it ain't labor that's killing them. It's the cost of the tokens, which is money they give to the company that also has a competing product. So, Tom, I'd love to hear your thought. How do you think about Claude Code versus Cursor?
Tomasz Tunguz
The way I'd put it is, as the models improve in performance dramatically, people switch. Gemini 3 just came out. It's a little bit better than Claude 405 Sonnet on coding. That's what matters to this audience. When there's a lot of improvement, people switch. I want to see: is the Cursor model a whole lot better than the Claude model? 405 comes out of OpenAI, great. I want to go—uh, 401. I want to go check out that model on Codex.
But as the improvements in coding start to asymptote, I'm going to stay where I am. I'm going to stay where I am because there's memory, and it remembers how I program, and it remembers my linting, which is how many tabs I put into each particular function. I think we're at a place where agentic coding is no longer on this extremely steep improvement path, and so people will stay where they are.
I have 100 tools in Claude Code. Claude Code wrote all of them, and now I have this whole setup where it does all kinds of stuff for me. Sure, I told Gemini this morning, when Gemini 3 launched, "Look at everything that I've done in Claude Code and migrate it so that you can use it," and it'll migrate. But I will only do that if I think that the benefit of the migration is significant.
If you look at the initial distribution of Cursor, what fraction of people are really going to switch? Especially once the enterprise business starts to come in, because Fortune 500 companies will pick one, standardize, buy effectively an ELA, and then switching diminishes. And so I think they'll be able to improve margins. As long as they're able to continue to grow, I bet they hold on—I don't know—75% of their audience 5 years from now, something like that. And so, to your point, Rory, on just inertia in the business, it will be there.
Jason Lemkin
What I don't get—here's where I'm ignorant, and here's where the difference between Replit and Lovable is so different, right? Replit and Lovable, frankly, are using cheap models most people don't know or care about, and they're well marked up. The gross margins are north of 50%, okay? We're not bouncing back and forth between the latest Gemini and 4.5, right? In fact, Replit defaults you to an N-minus-one model unless you want to pay more, okay? And it works fine for that use case.
What I still remain ignorant of, even as we're talking about it, is this: I think Cursor has a moat and has switching costs, and enterprise ELAs and others will lock in. But ultimately, even with mixing in their own model, which may not even have that much higher margins, right? It'll have higher margins, but how do they get to 60% gross margins? How do they get there, right? But I totally get how Replit and Lovable are already at 50%.
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah, I mean, I don't know either. But we've met a bunch of different companies, and they're taking big models and then distilling them into small models. We've done this internally. We've taken Claude Code, which is, I don't know, a trillion-parameter model, and then we've taken a 20-billion-parameter model and said, "Claude Code, teach this little model how to call tools." I mean, this is a venture capital firm. Yes, we have a great head of AI, but we're not a research lab, and we can get to 97% equivalency on that tool-calling distillation with a model that's 1/150th the size.
Anyway, the point is, I think there's so much efficiency to squeeze out of these model architectures because there's just a lot of fat in these systems. Candidly, I don't know if any of these companies achieve 60% to 70%. I mean, we all know publicly traded software companies from the previous era were at 70% or 72% gross margin. I don't know if we ever get to that place, but the other point is, do they need to?
Rory O'Driscoll
You don't need to. Absolutely. You're exactly right, because those companies were selling workflow software with a big sales force and lots of integrations. Here, you're selling a tool that people can turn on and use themselves. You've got low sales and marketing costs. In the end, things are valued on a multiple of free cash flow, in the end, in the limit. And I'm kind of with you. I think that, as I listen to this whole discussion, if we buy the durability thing—in other words, most people won't switch once you asymptote out—then the only, quote-unquote, "negative" is this gross-margin issue.
And I think you're right, Tom, that if the only thing between you and, you know, $50 billion or $60 billion is your ability to chip away at a digital product where there's a ton of optimization to be done, my guess is you'll find a way to get it done.
Tomasz Tunguz
You'll get there.
Rory O'Driscoll
It mightn't be 80%, but if you can get to 60% gross margin and sell $1 billion in revenue with 100 headcount, you're gonna be kicking off cash.
Tomasz Tunguz
Totally. Microsoft also said that, compared with 12 months ago, they were producing 90% more tokens per GPU hour than 12 months ago. So, yeah, that's the rate of efficiency gain.
4. The Coding War Leaders
So, 1, 2, and 3 in this space in 5 years' time—who are gonna be the top 1, 2, and 3 players? Assign market ownership to each of them before we move on. I think Codex is gonna have 60%, Anthropic's gonna have 20%, and Cursor's gonna have 20%, for example.
Rory O'Driscoll
My gut would be Cursor because they're there and they're ahead. GitHub because they'll bundle, and it's Microsoft, so a whole bunch of corporate America will just go with that. It's like the Zoom versus Teams discussion. There'll be bundled people, so those are the two.
The third you have to put Anthropic in because they're relevant, and/or Cognition just because it's slightly different. Which leads me to assume Codex isn't a huge player here. I just did that on the fly, but I think that you throw out Codex, which is OpenAI, obviously, and look at people who have a natural lock on the space.
You have the people who are first, which is Cursor. You have the people who can bundle, which is Microsoft at the enterprise level, at the distribution level. You have the people who can bundle at the model level, which is Anthropic. And then you've got the clever guys out in the corner. It's a crowded space. I don't know if you put OpenAI in the top 3 in this space.
Tom Blomfield
I agree with Rory. I think it's a very astute assessment. I think Cursor has 40% to 60% share. Microsoft really needs to step up its product. They really had it. They had the market locked up, and then I don't even know what the agentic Microsoft coding product is. It's definitely not the tab autocomplete, which is the last time I used it.
But maybe it's bundled within VS Code. They can come out the way they did with Teams and come out of nowhere. So if it's in 5 years, yes, in years 4 and 5, are they probably the number 2 player? It's right on the money. And then Anthropic is just so good at coding, and it seems like that's where they're focused. So that's 1, 2, 3: 60/20/20, something like that?
Jason Calacanis
I could provide a slightly different perspective. The latest version of Replit v3 blows everything out of the water. It's not just night and day; it's what's more than night and day. It's Pluto and Mercury, okay?
In v3 now, agents talk to agents. It calls in an architect and reviews my code. It calls in a different agent and finds bugs. It calls in a different agent to review what it has. It has an unlimited context window that appears to go on for months now and remembers everything we've done.
My point is, the rate of change is so high on this side of things that I'm not betting there won't be someone else in 18 months who blows everyone out of the water. Do I think someone can invest what Anthropic and OpenAI can invest? Hard to imagine. How much have they raised? A lot, okay? So I don't know that you can build that, but in terms of building a layer on top of other models, there's a level of disruption to come that I don't think we've even touched on yet. It's just so much different and so much better.
For me, now that the Replit agents are so good and so autonomous, and this is true for all of software, the biggest issue is QA. What if there was a version that could truly do all functional QA agentically? That would be another step function. Then I'd be 10 times more productive.
I think all these leaders are too big to go away, but if 30 kids at Cursor can build this into a billion-dollar company, are you sure it's just 30 kids? Because AI isn't static. This rate of change is so crazy. I know Gemini feels like 8% better than 4 or 5 Sonnet, but in a year, what we can do with it—we may underpredict what we can do in a year.
Rory O'Driscoll
I wonder, is that correct? There's one world that says the window opens with a new technical discontinuity, and there's 3 or 4 years where it's up for grabs. Then things start to coalesce and settle, less because the technology is not continuing to train, but more because enterprise moats come in. You make a decision, you get locked in, a corporation buys for its people, and then market share becomes harder to move.
Yes, another revolutionary step-function change in the AI underpinnings and the models could cause that to happen. But my base case is that it will start to coalesce more and that market shares will become less subject to flux. In other words, people will settle into their rough market share, and that's been typical for most markets.
There's this new wild period, but after about 3 or 4 years, you grab what share you can. Then, in most other markets, there's a long 10-year or 20-year period where, even though the market doubles, trebles, or 10Xs, the rough market share at the start is the rough market share at the end.
Jason Lemkin
But I don't think we've ever seen software get remotely this good this quickly in our lifetimes. It's like 2 orders of magnitude faster. Software used to get better maybe every 5 years. You'd have a major release, and it would have an API. It would integrate with Looker. That would be the big deal that year: We got our Looker integration working.
Rory O'Driscoll
The argument back is that Intel doubled every 18 months, whatever, and market share didn't move for 15 or 20 years throughout the entire life cycle of the CPU. Massive performance increases on their own often aren't enough to cause market-share shifts once they get embedded in.
Intuitively, 4 years ago, no one did coding using AI. Now everyone's doing coding using AI. There was a 4-year period where everyone would have to pick their AI coder. Once you've done that, are you just going to lie back and say, "The AI coding company will just make my shit better?" As Tom said, is he going to be in the market to shift 2 years from now, provided they all stay roughly comparable? I think it's at least plausible that the balance of probability is no. Sorry, Tom.
Tom Loverro
No, no, no. I'm trying to figure out the right blog post for this debate. I think it's the bacon-in-the-skillet debate: When does the fat congeal?
Jason Lemkin
Yes.
Tom Loverro
Right? Right now, everything is hot, everything's moving around, there's a lot of sizzle, and then all of a sudden the heat comes off and everything's fixed, right? It's just much harder to move through.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes. I love it.
Tom Loverro
And when does that happen? I think that's the debate. When does that happen? Jason's perspective is that probably doesn't happen for a while because the skillet's going to be cooking on 10 for a long time.
Jason Lemkin
Let me give you another version of that. We rolled out Agentforce for Salesforce. We're probably one of the few organizations of our size to have rolled out Agentforce, okay?
The interesting part is, we took the prompt from another AI agent that we trained for months and gave it to Agentforce. We iterated on it with Agentforce for about a day, and it worked just as well. The point of the story is these moats are real, okay? But if I could move that prompt and all that learning from one agent into Agentforce, don't overestimate your moats today. It's just the meta-learning. They're there, but I think they're lower.
5. The Price War Risk
Tom Loverro
So, just on that point, let's talk about commoditization, right? We talked about moats at the beginning. The markets are growing incredibly quickly, and so you have technologies where you could see rapid commoditization and deflation in pricing power.
Jason Lemkin
I'm hoping.
Tom Loverro
You're hoping we see that?
Jason Lemkin
I think at 100 grand per agent, there's only so many that I can buy. I need these fees. I need a little bit of that fee stream to increase, to go beyond 12 agents in production.
Rory O'Driscoll
Let's just ask that quickly. I want to drill down on the word "deflation," because there could be 2 meanings to that word. One of them is the BLS meaning—the Bureau of Labor Statistics—and then the other one is the terrifying one.
The BLS meaning is, "Oh my God, this year I get 1 million tokens. Next year, for the same price, I get 2 million tokens." At some macro level, I've had more increase in value. I'm still paying roughly the same amount. It's not catastrophic. It's not an implosion, right? That, to me, is what's happening right now. Agreed? It's roughly that trajectory.
But you hinted at something that, if true, would be something more than that. It's where you suddenly see—
Price erosion.
Tom Loverro
Price wars.
Rory O'Driscoll
Price war.
Tom Loverro
What if there's a price war?
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes, and it's worth pausing on this because it's the only bad scenario, and we never saw that in SaaS. We never saw it, with few exceptions. I remember Box had to compete against Microsoft, which was free, but most of the time there wasn't this.
What you're positing, Tom, is that a year from now, the product manager at Anthropic says, "Screw it, I want to win in Claude Code. I'm going to go from $100 to $50 a pop." The other guys have to respond. Or maybe it's because people are embedded, and some product leader says the only way to change that is to go down in price.
Tom Loverro
Yes, and it's not numbers 1 and 2 in the market; it's numbers 3, 4, and 5. They say, "We have to win significant share. How will we win share? We win share by underpricing." And then what happens?
Jason Lemkin
But that's not new. There's always been a low-end version of every product we can think of in the market. I'm not saying it's not new; I'm just understanding the point. There's always been a low-end CRM. There's always been a low-end everything in the market. There's always been a $5-a-month version of CRM. It didn't stop Salesforce from getting to almost $50 billion in revenue, right?
Tom Loverro
Right. But to your point, Jason, if I can take a prompt out of one agent and put it into another...
Jason Lemkin
Yeah, it's riskier. Your point is that it adds to the risk because of that portability from the product—or even using the low-end clone in CRM, but adding that enterprise-grade product and having the prompt work just as well. That's very disruptive, because then maybe I pay—actually pay—the same for the AI, but for the core CRM I pay $5 a seat instead of $300.
Tom Loverro
Well, and then the time to ship the feature to compete is much less. Go ahead, Rory. Sorry, it was up to you.
Yeah.
Rory O'Driscoll
I've got to take two extremes to encapsulate this price-war comment. Subscription-revenue enterprise software that's embedded with a whole bunch of integrations, like Salesforce, is almost immune to price wars. Even if the other shit's cheaper, you're like, “I'm not going to rip it out,” right? So there's some mild price pressure, but they're indifferent.
The other extreme is classic product DRAM. We don't talk about the DRAM wars now, but commodity memory semiconductor chips glut, and then they go short every 6, 12, or 18 months, and your pricing spikes 5x. You're loyal to Samsung for 30 seconds. Then, because it's an embedded product, the end user doesn't care, and 6 months later the prices have gone down—not a 10% decline, to Tom's point, but a 50% or 80% decline—and they're a commodity. Someone's now buying them from Hynix or Microchip for one-tenth the price.
Those are the 2 extremes, and we mentally always assume that most software products are a bit below Salesforce: less sticky than Salesforce if it's lovable, but still in the sticky category. If anything like that semiconductor DRAM product-type commoditization took place, to say that would be ugly would be an understatement. It would be terrifying—beyond terrifying. If GPUs became more like DRAM, it would not be pretty out there.
Tom Loverro
No, and it hinges on how easy it is for a mid-market or an enterprise to switch. What abstraction layers can they impose as a business? You could imagine—look at Iceberg within the data ecosystem, right? Snowflake captured compute and storage, and then an open-source technology came and made large enterprises realize, “I want to control my own data, and I want to store it.”
And so Snowflake says, “I'm going to take this out of your business, and I'm going to hold on to it, and I'll selectively give you access to it.” So, Jason, what if you had a database of all those prompts and you fed them selectively into different agents?
Jason Lemkin
You can. Two thoughts. One, this is tough. We essentially have 12 AI agents running now at Aster—more than humans, okay? And we have 5 SDRs and BDRs running from different instances and different vendors.
I've been a Salesforce customer since the beginning, but now they've turned it almost into a database for us because we interact with the agents. We don't log into Salesforce, we don't talk to Salesforce; we talk to Agentforce, Qualified, or Artisan. Some of what you're saying has already happened to us.
That's why Salesforce has to win with Agentforce, because these agents are the most important part of the stack. It can lead to a lot of portability—portability of data or even just portability of value. To me, that's what I'm learning. It's portability of value. Old-school guys have to win the agent wars, or the value just leaks out of their platforms. Even if the logos are retained, the value's just leaking, slowly leaking out every week.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes, they would be in the category of the thing you sell. The existing product you sell, as Salesforce, is still wildly sticky, but nobody cares and all the extra money went elsewhere. So you just flatten out, and obviously your market cap reflects 10% growth, not 50% growth.
Jason Lemkin
Yeah, but if you can somehow monetize these agents, that's interesting. Going to the deflation question, the other interesting thing—what I've learned from the GTM agents, right? I think there will be a price war coming, but right now there isn't. Right now they basically all cost $100,000 to start, but the cheapest entry price is like $50,000 to $70,000, plus $25,000 of an FTE to get going—a forward-deployed engineer. So you're talking about $100,000 to get going.
They're not rampantly discounting it for a lot of reasons. If that price war were to come, all of this massive ARR growth we're seeing in these vendors would deflate rapidly, right? If instead of being a $100,000 product, they were a $2,000 product, it'd be tough in venture.
Tom Loverro
Look, I don't think it's going to happen. I just think it's important to raise the question because I suspect maybe in 1 or 2 categories this does happen, where you start to have—
Rory O'Driscoll
I think that's the right statement. It could happen in other areas more quickly. If it's going to show up, it's going to show up in core API pricing, coding agents, and the Lovables. That's where it's more likely.
Jason Lemkin
But if you're out there charging $100,000 a year for your agent with super-happy customers—this is Tom's point—they're great. It's working great. It's wonderful. But I can take that prompt and just a little bit of history, just a little bit of abstracted data, and move it to a $10,000-a-year tool. When things are a little less frothy and AI budgets are a little more stable, moving that $100,000 or $200,000 to a $20,000-a-year agent might be appealing.
Rory O'Driscoll
I remember looking at churn in SaaS companies, and the number-one predictor of retention was the number of integrations. Going back to your point, if it's easy to rip it out, you will rip it out if it's cheaper, and if it's hard to rip it out, you won't bother.
So I agree: if you are just literally—your concept of a database of prompts, and you are interchangeable—then it's like, you're right, it's a big sign saying, “Cut me now when you have to save $80,000.” But if you're integrated to 5 things and you're like, “Oh my God, we'll have to talk to IT,” then screw it.
6. Venture Becomes A Trading Market
Rory O'Driscoll
But can I, Harry, talk about a totally different topic, but on the same topic, as it were? I want to come back to your theory, Harry. Do you feel irrelevant, right? I think there was a fun point in that, because Cursor has had at least 3 rounds this year, and the first round was above $1 billion.
One of the most noticeable things about this year—and I have a stat for it—is the number of companies doing multiple rounds, obviously at significant step-ups in the same year.
Yes.
Can I just touch on that? Ramp was $13 billion at the start of this year. Now it's $32 billion, with the latest round announced yesterday.
Rory O'Driscoll
They've seen 4 rounds this year. I looked it up. Ramp's had 4 separate financings this year. To give a statistic on that, we look every year at the newly minted unicorns for that quarter, because that's mentally the outer edge of where we play. So I'm like, “Okay, what did we miss?”
There were something like 20 to 24 minted unicorns in Q1. By Q3, 15% of them already had a step-up, and now, with Cursor, some of them had 2. If you think about the velocity of step-ups, that's almost—normally you think your financing is 12 to 18 months. Fifteen percent of the companies you entered at $1 billion or above had already had a step-up within 6 months.
To your point, it seems like a high-velocity, big-numbers game, and it looks like a remarkably easy game from this. I'm sure it's not, but you're right. You look there and go, “Let me get this straight. You put in $100 million at $1 billion, and you have a 15% chance of being worth $2 billion within 6 months. Why not do that for a living?” I think that's what you're saying, Harry, effectively. Buy Ramp in January at $13 billion, sell Ramp at $26 billion in May.
I'm saying, is my insertion point fundamentally challenged because it is just so much easier? And you say, “Oh, it's not easier, Harry.” It is. It absolutely is. With the brand and the platform that we have, access, to a certain extent, is the core challenge for most.
Respectfully, I could be doing $10 million to $25 million checks into these high-flyers, like your Harveys of the world that we've discussed before at length, and we would be able to get them, and I could get the step-up. But no, I go back to the craftsmanship of Seed and building companies in the trenches with entrepreneurs, and I'm thinking, “Why the fuck do I do that?”
Jason Lemkin
Well, I'll tell you what's interesting. Watching Bessemer, who's wildly successful in cloud and B2B, for generations just co-lead the last Ramp round. And they did Anthropic, what, about a year ago, right? And that's probably up 10x, right? So they did $100 million or something into Anthropic.
Canva's so late. Byron, I love Byron, but—
Jason Lemkin
This is my observation from afar. They did Canva in 2021, and then I think maybe they had a little bit of shock. They're like, “Wow, maybe that's a great one. Maybe we overpaid.” Now they're in the money on it.
But then they did Anthropic, which seemed expensive. We should look it up. And then, going from that—being conservative but wildly successful, then going to Anthropic, then going to Ramp at $30 billion, saying the classic post, “We're so excited to partner together now”—Bessemer must think that is a low-risk investment.
That's what I'm saying. This is a venture capital firm that's been around since the 1800s, right? Or something like Bethlehem Steel or Bessemer Steel or something.
They think Ramp at $30 billion is the best play in the market. I don't know what Thiel thinks, but it's to your point, right? This is not Tiger or SoftBank rolling the dice. This is Bessemer saying Ramp at $32 billion is a safe bet. Kleiner and Mamoon doing Anthropic at $180 billion—another example of that.
Rory O'Driscoll
I mean, one of the interesting things here is that a large number of the folks doing these kinds of rounds are not the late-stage crossover people who, to some extent, got snookered in 2021, licked their wounds, and crawled away. It's actually the great large early-stage, now multi-stage firms who are going—they're looking at the same map we just looked at in Cursor, and they're saying to themselves, "Risk-adjusted, is this just a great place to put my money?"
If you have the scale of capital to be relevant at that stage, because you can maybe show up, Harry, because you're a media celeb, but you're 25. Normally, they want to talk to people with 100-plus. If you have a fund that size, so far it's been a very excellent place to put one's money, and many of the big, what we would have called early-stage firms 10 or 15 years ago, are doing it.
You're right. It's the Bessemers, Kleiner—Lightspeed led, I think, the Ramp round. This stuff is working. I always used to say to my LPs, "The late-stage business is either the best business in the world or the worst business in the world, and there's nothing you can do to determine which it is."
When prices go up, putting in $100 million and having it go to $200 million with no effort on your side, that feels as good as life is going to get. Obviously, when prices go down, it ain't so much fun. See 2021 and 2022 for details.
I think the secret to success in that business is just being a trader. I was walking in the park with a multibillionaire today who is in this market, and he is a trader, a ruthless trader. He buys at $60, sells at $180 in the same year, and it is absolutely a marked-to-market book that he manages. Not with the "ride your winners, hail this unicorn founder" approach. It's fucking trading.
Tom Loverro
It's the new public market.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yes, guys, with one huge fucking difference—excuse my language. There's no liquidity to the downside. It is the new public market because these are companies that, by any rational stretch, could be public today.
And Harry, you're right: in public markets, some people have a trading strategy and some people have a holding strategy. But the key sentence you're missing is you can't execute a trading strategy if they're private, because when things go wrong, the liquidity won't be there. When things go right, you can.
You can trade on your way up, but it will be a lot harder to get out of one of these investments on the downside because the liquidity will not be commensurate with the public markets.
100%, but Rory, putting $25 million into any chosen company—I'm just making it up—Ramp at $13 billion, and then selling it at $32 billion now would not be difficult?
Rory O'Driscoll
No, you're exactly right. On the way up—let me repeat—on the way up, the late-stage business is the world's best business.
But most are on the way up. We have our YOLO segment, which you've taken the piss out of me before, Rory. They're all just riding freaking high.
Rory O'Driscoll
But apparently, you might want to turn on your ticker for the last 24, 48, or 36 hours, but yes, in general, stocks go up.
I did. There's so much red, Rory. There's so much red. Duolingo—it's like the Titanic. It's all under the surface, you know?
Rory O'Driscoll
Totally.
7. The AI Market Top
Two elements concerned me this week. Well, there were several, to be honest. One was Thinking Machines Lab at $50 billion, and the other was Thiel and SoftBank exiting NVIDIA, and what it means for whether we're at the top of the market. Both were potential signs of a market top. When you look at those 2, can you unpack either of them—both of them? They both concerned me when I saw them.
Tom Loverro
The only thing I would note from the media is that Peter Thiel sold $100 million of NVIDIA. What's the dude worth? This is like me selling a tenth of a Bitcoin. I mean, it just isn't—
Rory O'Driscoll
The estimate's been $10 billion to $20 billion, so you're right, it's sub-1% of his net worth. Though I will say, it's been my life experience that people rarely sell stocks because they think they're going to go up.
So at some minor level, in the 10 seconds it took to run that decision by the big guy, he said, "Yeah, you should sell that stock." But you're right, it's not like he's unloading the way he was when he was unloading his Facebook position.
And again, on the NVIDIA one, I don't think there's any data in SoftBank selling. They just need that money—I mean, they're selling the profitable public company, NVIDIA, to put that money in OpenAI. This is a guy ramping up his risk. This is not a de-risking.
Tomasz Tunguz
The data points I'm paying attention to are in the credit market. I'm looking at Oracle credit default swaps, triple what Amazon and Microsoft and others are. I'm looking at, even in consumers—here's a data point—subprime borrowers in the past 60 days hit the highest delinquency rate on auto loans in recorded history.
And then you have Blue Owl, which has frozen redemptions for one non-traded BDC vehicle, and it's moving it into another one, right? And then you have the First Brands default on private credit.
Can we just unpack those? You said something about the Oracle credit default swaps. Can you help me understand what's going on there and why that's important?
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay. Oracle has a big deal with OpenAI. Oracle needs to build lots of data centers. To build those data centers, they borrow money, like a mortgage. They've borrowed money, and there's a thing called a credit default swap, which you may remember from the Great Financial Crisis. It measures the odds that Oracle defaults on its debt: they cannot pay their mortgage.
Google and Microsoft and other major technology companies are at a certain level, which is basically the same rate as the federal government. Oracle is 3 times that in the last 3 or 4 days. So the risk is still quite small. The overall probability of an Oracle default is small. The magnitude of the move suggests a meaningful repricing of risk.
Rory O'Driscoll
I totally agree, and it's worth pointing out that at the same time, the entire value of the core Oracle deal—remember we talked about it when the stock price rose 33% and said that it was crazy?—that entire deal has been unwound.
The market cap of the core company is actually below where it was when the deal was announced, and I think both those data points are saying the same thing, which is, "Oracle, you've just underwritten a risky piece of business, so your equity's worth less, and I'm going to have to insure your debt."
All people at the margin are going, "Maybe I want to be one of the first people off this pain train, and maybe I can insure my risk, hedge my bets." That's the tell here.
Tomasz Tunguz
And so is it this big, screaming flag? No, it's not. It's just a data point. The market is starting to perceive an increasing amount of risk in some of these big contracts.
And then you have the Anthropic deals today from Microsoft and NVIDIA with a $15 billion investment, and the circularity questions and all those kinds of things. So people are perceiving more and more risk as the CapEx for data centers goes from $500 billion a year to $800 billion a year or more.
Do you think there are any screaming flags from the last week?
Tomasz Tunguz
I don't think so. Most of the hyperscalers' GPU capacity is sold out for the next 2 years. They generate cash. The debt as a percentage of free cash flow is really small.
The major red flag for me is that customer concentration risk is higher than it's ever been. NVIDIA—2 customers for NVIDIA represent more than 40% of revenues. 4% represent more than 50% of revenues.
I went back and looked at the dot-com era, the networking companies. NVIDIA is 10 times more concentrated in terms of revenue than Lucent was. I think that's an issue. But most of NVIDIA's customers are super cash-flow-positive, right?
Google and Meta and others are spitting out cash, and they can decide to stop at basically whatever point. So I think it's all okay. How does this merry-go-round stop? If the game of musical chairs were to collapse and everyone falls on their ass, what happens is inference demand slows.
And if there's a hiccup—if Google says, "We built this amount of capacity and we can only fill 80%"—if that happens, then you see—
Rory O'Driscoll
You're about to learn something by doing this podcast on Tuesdays that you might not have internalized, but I'll tell you what it is. This thing comes out on Thursday, and NVIDIA reports on Wednesday night.
So we've now been pontificating, and one of 2 things is going to happen on Thursday when you, we, and the listeners are listening to this, right? If NVIDIA is steady as she goes and it's doing fine with a few little warnings, we will look like balanced and rational people.
If they pull the pin to the downside, we will look like the last men on the Titanic here, right? And it's terrifying because that's just the nature of the recording clock.
But now, to lash myself to that mast with you, Tom, I think you're right, and what you're not seeing is... And now I'm going to do something I hate doing: you're almost, to some extent, I suppose, predicting something that, by the time this is played, our listeners will know.
Rory O'Driscoll
What you’re not seeing is a mass collapse of demand or anything like that. You’re seeing really strong demand. All the hyperscalers are saying, “We want to buy more, we want to build more, we want to invest more.” The stuff is at the margins. The negatives are at the margins, which are the overleveraged people trying to do this.
People are correctly worried about their debt. The people who have both the balance sheet and the need for these products, on the other hand—the Microsofts and Googles—aren’t worried at all. In the middle, you have Meta, where it’s like, “You can afford it, but why are you doing this, dude?” So you internalize that. I doubt NVIDIA are going to get on a call tomorrow and say, “The margin’s gone down.” So all should be fine for a while.
It’s to your point: over the medium term, people are going, “Hmm, the debt that some of these folks are taking on, like Blue Owl, like Oracle, that’s just a risky bet if things turn down.”
Tomasz Tunguz
I think we’re at a point where, if there’s some wobble, the magnitude of the correction will be fast and brutal. Everyone knows the tachometer is at the red line. We are going as fast as we possibly can. In fact, we’re going so fast that we are, as an economy, really uncomfortable with it.
I was reading a macro hedge fund’s tweet last night, and he was talking about how, because the big companies are borrowing lots of money, they’re paying less in tax revenues to the US government. Those tax revenues are so significant that it actually will increase the national debt, right? This is where we are.
We are going 1,000 miles an hour in a car that’s designed to go 999, and so the whole thing is shaking.
Rory O'Driscoll
I totally agree. The fact that people argue about the depreciation schedules on GPUs, and the answer to that question can move the entire US stock market, is beyond bizarre. But you’re right. We are where we are. We’re making this bet, and even a mild slowdown would be painful.
My random theory is that, because no one can get the power to build these, we actually might be saved from ourselves. If no one has to say there’s no inference demand, and everyone just says, “Well, I would love to build those extra 10 data centers, but we just can’t get the power, so we’ll just gradually slow down the ramp,” maybe it’ll just slow a little bit less ostentatiously than if someone gets on a conference call and says, “We built another brand-new, spanking data center. We turned it on and nobody came.”
Because that’s the moment, as Tom said, where you go, “Hmm, maybe the other 20 we have in the works aren’t going to be worth much either.” Maybe our inability to connect power will save us from overcapacity, and that’s my upside case, people.
What do you think the chance is that we actually just continue smooth sailing into the sunset and don’t hit an air pocket or a challenge for the next 3 to 4 years? What if we’re overestimating?
Rory O'Driscoll
Zero. Maybe 10%, 20%. I’d be more—
Yeah, Jason.
Jason Lemkin
I think the past moves so much more slowly than the present in B2B. But if we go back through our history of SaaS, which we all can do, we had a lot of minor bumps on the way to the peaks. We had a meltdown in 2016 that we’ve all forgotten, I think, where SaaS fell 30% or 40% in 2 weeks. It was right during SaaStr Annual, right?
If you go back and squint at those charts, you’ll see massive corrections that then we fully rebounded from right until 2022. So why wouldn’t we have micro-massive corrections on the way to us all living in a data center, which I think we all are? I think data centers are the new cities. We’re building more data centers than offices, I think.
Why shouldn’t we have 30% or 40% corrections along the way? We should. How could there be no bumps, right? Maybe Oracle can’t get its debt refinanced. Maybe those CoreWeave contracts aren’t quite what we hoped, right? Maybe it’s something small. Maybe Nebius just has a bump and it creates a contagion in the market, or Microsoft has some issue.
Why should we not expect 3 to 4 little 30% to 40% drops? We’ve seen it before in our investing lifetimes.
Tomasz Tunguz
I’m trying to imagine what a house would look like with a white GPU fence.
Rory O'Driscoll
A white GPU fence.
David Friedberg
Oh my God. That’s the theme—
It’s coming.
Rory O'Driscoll
—of the day. The new American dream. I love it: a white GPU fence, with a “Made in Taiwan” sign on it. How much more American can you get?
Jason Lemkin
It is coming. There’ll be more agents in this country than humans soon enough.
Tomasz Tunguz
Oh, yeah.
Jason Lemkin
No, for real. But it’s going to fundamentally change our lives. So that’s the part we’re missing: when there are more agents than humans.
Rory O'Driscoll
Linking it back to Tomasz’s comment, though, unfortunately, what they don’t do is pay their car loans. This is back to the comment on where the wider economy is. But just one comment on that crash comment, Jason: I remember 2016, and I even saw a tweet that showed the Nasdaq since 1981. They were saying, “Hey, it’s all fine,” and they had a little pointer to the 2001–2002 crash saying, “Look, in the scheme of things, it’s nothing,” because the line goes up and to the right.
They’re entirely correct, but someone tweeted back and said, “Yes, but it took 16 years to get back to par.” The longer your time horizon, the more indifferent you can be. But if you find yourself on the wrong side of what was, in 2001, a 70% to 80% correction, I think clustered in the Nasdaq, it can hurt for a long time.
So my public-service announcement is: if you find yourself feeling pretty nauseous about the de minimis crash you’ve lived through in the last weeks—4% to 5% down, maybe 20% in a second—it sucks. You should just look long and hard at your asset allocation and maybe put a little more in cash. Because I’m doing that. I got a little scared and I was like, “Hmm, Rory, what are you doing here?”
Rory O’Driscoll
No, when you’re scared, you seriously don’t look. If you’ve been around for a little while, you have to learn: if you’re scared, don’t look. That’s the only thing you should do. Don’t look. It’s the best advice.
If you’re scared, don’t look. That is the theme of this YC batch, I can tell you this week. I’m being serious. I’ve never seen such exuberance around a batch. I’m getting emails like, “Hey—
Rory O’Driscoll
They’re always the best batch ever, Harry. That’s the obligatory tweet you have to start doing.
We’ve raised the $5 million round, and now we’ve opened up the next note for the next note on the note of the note.” I cannot tell you the exuberance there is. They’re good companies, but holy shit, the fear of public markets and impending doom has not reached early stage, baby. It’s like $50 million post, standard.
Are you seeing the same? Are you nervous like me? Also, a question for you: advice. I feel like it’s like you’re so lucky to have a meeting with me, and I’ll determine if I should ever take your money, Harry. And I’m like, “I haven’t even met you.” Am I being too romantic?
Rory O’Driscoll
The thing is this: when money is scarce, conditions toughen up, and frankly, VCs get pretty hard-nosed about allocating the capital. You’ve got to expect that when money is plentiful, entrepreneurs behave the same way. So some part of what you’re describing is legitimate.
The test of character is how you behave and how you act interpersonally in those times. When money is scarce, I think as a VC you have to allocate capital carefully, but you don’t have to be a dick. In the same way, you’re right: you see some behaviors now where it’s almost like an interview to an interview. You’re like, “Okay, I get what you’re doing and you have the hot company, but life is long.”
I think the best way to approach this is to try and be a human being most of the time, either as an entrepreneur or a VC, and recognize it’s a massive, multi-period game. But at the same time, you can’t deny that the market is the market, and right now that market is wildly pro-entrepreneur. Railing against that, Harry, or being romantic about that, is a waste of time.
8. Venture Capital Reaches Half Trillion
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay, so I have a question. What are the odds, do you think, that the US venture capital market hits half a trillion by 2030 in size?
Rory O’Driscoll
What’s it now?
Tomasz Tunguz
When I started in 2008, it was about $8 billion. In 2021, it hit about $300 billion, and today it’s about $270 billion to $275 billion.
Rory O’Driscoll
100% chance. Maybe more than 100. What’s north of 100 again?
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay. So if that’s the case—
Rory O’Driscoll
I’ll tell you why, but keep going.
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay. So let’s assume that’s the case. Then venture capital, or the cost of venture capital, continues to decrease, which means valuations continue to increase, which means capital increasingly commoditizes.
Rory O’Driscoll
Put it this way: you would be correct, Tom, on the data that you put forth. I’m going to add 1 more data point that you missed. What was your first year, 2008? How much was in the business? What did you say? What was your first number? Twenty—
Tomasz Tunguz
Eight.
Rory O’Driscoll
Eight. What you missed was that in 1999, 4 years beforehand, there was $100 billion in the same system. So it went from $100 billion to $8 billion. Basically, since then, it’s been an upward line.
I remember I was in the business from ’94 on. I remember in 2000, you literally could delete 75% to 80% of your address book because you were never going to see them again.
They’re just VCs who were gone. So if you extrapolate the line, you get to $500 billion. You’re exactly right. If you allow for a cull, maybe you don’t.
Well, but here’s the thing. It depends what you mean. I’m just looking at Excel’s GlobalScape, which they published this week. They had a nice chart. Tomasz always has the better data, but they said this year they’re estimating $184 billion in venture capital invested, by their definition. The peak was 2021 at $183 billion, so one more billion this year.
But half of the $184 billion is into 4 companies. So is that venture capital? If that’s venture capital and AI grows at anything like the rate we’ve discussed, of course it will double. Maybe 110%, 95%. But only 74% went into the rest, which is half of 2021 and consistent with 2020. So it could be that YC is overloaded and these 4 or 5 names are overloaded, but for the rest, the money says it’s not overloaded. It’s not easier.
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah. It’s money from the public market that is fighting its way to those shares, irrespective of the venue. That’s what you’re saying.
Rory O’Driscoll
So we have this bimodal market where YC and maybe Neo and a few others have huge benefits, and they’ve earned it, right? Then the massive names have earned it. And then we’ve got 900 unicorns that are never going to IPO. Poor guys. We all have 1 or 2 in our portfolio that are at 9 figures in revenue, that are still growing and will never IPO, and there is no PE buyer for them.
I think we really have to define what venture capital is to fully answer your question. But if you include Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI, it’s got to double, right? SpaceX, it’s got to double. Ramp doesn’t even make the list. Poor guys at $32 billion. Maybe they’ll get there. They’re only consuming a few billion. It’s not enough.
Tomasz Tunguz
And so what we’re basically talking about is a huge concentration of those dollars at the very, very late stage. I mean, these seed rounds of $1 billion—
Rory O’Driscoll
Absolutely. None of it matters. To be clear, Tomasz, that was actually a helpful intervention because it made me realize something. The answer to the question, “Will the industry double in the next 2 years?”—you hinted at it earlier when you said it’s a function of whether the return is there, then it will double, because money chases returns. That’s the first statement, right? If the returns continue to be really good, more money will come in until eventually the money kills the returns. That’s the way the movie works.
So the question of whether the industry will double can be reduced to a simpler question: Will the returns be good? The aha that you guys just gave me is that, to a rounding error, that question really resolves itself to whether the 4 or 5 companies that constitute 40% of that industry, non-diversified, will be good.
If OpenAI, Anthropic, and xAI yield the return that everyone obviously hopes they do, then already you’ve taken half the risk off the table. Everything else does roughly okay. Even if some of the old stuff doesn’t work out—a lot of the old stuff doesn’t work out—the $40 billion in OpenAI, from a pooled-return perspective, can swamp 40 separate unicorns entirely. Poof, gone.
So basically, you could be right. If the concentration works, it’s all going to be fine and the industry will keep on chugging. If the concentration doesn’t work—
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah. So what you’re saying is, if OpenAI trades up at IPO, it’s roses for everybody.
Rory O’Driscoll
More Anthropic than OpenAI, but those kinds of things. Remember SpaceX too, which is worth $300–400 billion. It definitely helps a lot.
The way I always see that, actually, is in meeting LPs, because of the number of LPs that are sitting there with positions in Stripe and SpaceX and the names that we mentioned. And I think you forget the downstream multiplier recipients of all of these big names—literally dentists in SPVs now, in a lot of them. Poor dentists; we always use them. But it’s just the thousands and thousands and thousands.
Rory O’Driscoll
It’s back to what Tomasz said earlier. This is where we find ourselves. Who knew? But this is it. The bet is on, and the bet is singular and utterly correlated.
Why do dentists have so much time, by the way? It seems like they finish work at 5:00 and just go home and figure out how to invest their cash. I’ve never seen a group outside of tech more obsessed with tech investing than dentists.
It’s because they have a non-insurance-governed market. It’s a cash-pay market. Dentistry is a good business because you get your crown done and you pay cold, hard cash. They don’t have to deal much with insurers. They just make good money.
If you go to your dentist, they’re all good businessmen. They have 10 chairs running. They have 10 hygienists. You get 5 minutes with your dentist. He charges you a ton. It’s a great business.
I try to avoid dinner parties, but my biggest fear is going to one and sitting next to a dentist—not because I don’t want to talk about his or her business. I don’t want to talk about tech.
“Can you get me into Tomasz’ latest deal? Can Harry get me into Perplexity? Can you ask Harry if I can get into Perplexity?” with the dentist. Oh my God.
9. Rory Backs GC AI
Rory, after all these weeks of Harvey and Legora and me chatting about Solve, you go and do a deal in legal tech, baby. GC AI raised from Scale at a $550 million post-money. Well, weren’t that price-sensitive, were we, Rory? What are the top lessons, then, Rory, from leading this round? I’m really interested, given that we’ve talked a lot about it.
Rory O’Driscoll
Sure. And look, I’ll say something: I didn’t expect to lead this deal. We were doing references on another company in broadly the same space, and we just got customer love for this product. It’s just that simple. We just got customers saying, “I really like this.”
Again, I don’t like making this show about our own deals because I think people respect the fact of, “I’m not trying to talk our own book,” so we’ll keep it tight. The name says it all. It’s GC AI. It’s AI for the in-house legal team, which is different from AI for corporate law.
We talked to customers in a related space. They all knew GC AI. They all liked it. The adoption was huge. The barriers to adoption were low. It really dealt with what the GC does in their daily business. So that’s how we got to the company, and it was just great references. We like the team and the traction. I mean, not much more complex than that.
The company’s growing really fast, barely able to spend the money they raised. So you’re in it, it’s profitable, and it’s growing very quickly.
How did you get comfortable with future financing partners, given everyone is out of market, being an investor in Harvey or Legora? Because they won’t touch this.
Rory O’Driscoll
Yeah, so we do see a slightly different market, but the more important point is this: The company is wildly cash-efficient. They haven’t spent their last round. I mean, we have a very elegant distribution strategy, so I don’t think we’re looking at a whole bunch of huge raises.
One of the things we’re thinking about, stepping back and making it less about the deal, as you’re leaning in a little on price in some of these companies, is that I want to at least pay attention to burn. What you don’t want to be is a high-price, big-burn deal.
What I find very attractive is that some of our recent deals—actually, 2 of the most recent pre-seed deals—have all been hovering around cash-flow positive despite trying to invest more, because the organic demand has been such that you’ve been able to sell enough to, frankly, fail to invest ahead of revenue.
If you do have a downturn, I think that’s a nice place to be, right? A little more demand-led, a little more PLG-led, and a little less massively expensive.
And you weren’t concerned about the kingmaking?
Rory O’Driscoll
I do buy the idea of leaders, first of all, that they can become the leader in the industry, and that’s a big advantage, going back to what we said earlier about durability of lead. I even buy the fact that money can be important, especially in the big-burn deals. I do buy some kind of employee-level kingmaking if you’re seen to be a hot venture firm in the Valley.
But step back. In the wider US, I don’t buy this idea that because X company got money from Y VC, the average corporate buyer cares all that much. They want to solve their problem. So I’m not a believer in kingmaking being dispositive when you have great execution and great customer love. I think the customers decide.
We’re in a capitalist economy, and the definition of a capitalist economy is that the customers decide whom they choose to do business with. On average, customers are rational. They’re going to look, and they’re not going to say, “Oh, this software is crap, but Sequoia invested. I’ll buy that.” They’re going to say, “Which software do I like?” That’s how capitalism is meant to work, Harry, in case you’re unclear.
10. Stripe Stays Private
Okay, so Stripe does a tender at an all-time high of 41 bucks. I’d love your thoughts.
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah. We have a new public market. This is wild for me. I went back and looked at Microsoft. You needed $50 million in trailing revenue and 6 quarters of profitability to go public, right? And the cost to take a company public was a couple million bucks.
To do a late-stage financing, what is the legal cost? Rory, you’d know. What is the legal cost on a Series D? It’s a million bucks?
Rory O’Driscoll
Probably less on a D, but actually, I think once you get into the employee selling, it gets a lot higher because you have a lot more transaction costs.
Tomasz Tunguz
So let’s call it $1 million.
Okay, what is the average cost to take a company public in the US, according to, I think, KPMG? The transaction costs.
Rory O’Driscoll
Well, it's 7%. It's 6% to 7% of the raise, and the raises are now $200 million to $300 million, so, yeah.
Tomasz Tunguz
It's $25 million to $30 million.
Rory O’Driscoll
Yeah.
Tomasz Tunguz
Transaction costs. And so there's just no—I mean, why in the world would you pay that amount of money to raise a round of capital? Why? It's like getting a $1 million mortgage and having to pay $150,000 in legal fees.
Rory O’Driscoll
The only reason you would, Thomas, is the point you made earlier: if the capital you get is cheaper than the capital you get privately. And as you pointed out, in fact, it's not.
Tomasz Tunguz
No, because now there's an illiquidity premium, right? There used to be—I remember when I joined the venture business, I was taught about the illiquidity discount. Private companies should trade at a discount relative to public companies.
Rory O’Driscoll
You were always taught it was 20% to 30% to the public multiples. That's the discount it should be for late stage.
Tomasz Tunguz
Right. And now there is an access premium. Harry mentioned this. So have we completely inverted? Is the access premium now 20% to 30% above public?
Rory O’Driscoll
It probably is. So from a company's perspective, it's a cheaper cost of capital with a lower transaction cost. Why wouldn't I do that?
Tomasz Tunguz
And then the ongoing service of that financing round is significantly less burdensome to the business because of quarterly earnings and all that kind of stuff. So you really only have to go public if you need to raise a quantum of capital that is so massive that the private markets cannot support it in some form or another.
Rory O’Driscoll
Do you think that even is a blocker? Why would you not be able to raise billions privately? OpenAI are proving that you can.
Tomasz Tunguz
I guess you're right. I guess they could raise in the private markets.
Rory O’Driscoll
And we have a liquidity mechanism now where you can trade in and out—not quite as efficiently, but still pretty efficiently.
Tomasz Tunguz
Right. And it's a form of regulatory arbitrage, right? If you think about it that way, it's a whole lot easier.
So the reason that you would actually go public, maybe, is bluntly because you need dumb retail investors to supply you with cash. That's the only reason—
Tomasz Tunguz
It's a capital market of last resort.
Rory O’Driscoll
Well, no. I love the access premium thing. I think there's a small number of companies who, even at super scale, have this desirability and cachet such that they can continue to raise in the private markets, right? I think Stripe's a good example of that. Obviously, the AI models.
I don't think it's true for most companies. Let's take Navan. They just went public. Or Commvault, or ServiceNow went public this year—or maybe late last year, right? Great cloud companies, but they're not going to raise 10 more private rounds because they're not wildly sexy. They're just perfectly good businesses.
So they didn't have access to this—I love the expression—access privilege, access premium private capital. They couldn't get it done. You wouldn't be able to do a $200 million to $300 million employee liquidity for a company like that. It's just not desired enough.
To bring it back to Jason's comment, your dentist doesn't get excited about being in ServiceNow while it's private. So ultimately, they had to go public because that was the lowest cost of capital available to them, and that is going to be true for most companies.
There will be this small number of high-taste, high-premium, Silicon Valley-beloved companies that can push it off a lot longer. The only time Stripe will go public, and we've said this on a call before, is when the capital available in the private markets is too expensive.
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay, but let me make the case for why I disagree with that. I don't know if I believe this, but let me straw-man it for a second: retail has had no access to venture for the last 15 years. It's been in technology, basically, where you want to be.
Now, with upcoming changes in regulation, I can take my 401(k), put it into an ETF, the ETF goes into a fund of funds, and the fund of funds invests into venture capital. As a result of that flood of retail capital, those dollars need to go someplace.
They'll probably end up going into the businesses that, you're right, are not the top, Pareto-optimal 80% of secondary dollars where the market is effectively liquid. But those retail dollars are effectively going there, and they're still probably cheaper than the public-market dollars.
Rory O’Driscoll
That's a fair counter, and it's true. Provided the capital keeps coming in because it perceives the returns to be high, more and more people will be able to stay private.
Again, the reason that capitalism has bankruptcy and downturns and pain and suffering and wipeouts is to stop the extrapolation to infinity. And until that happens, it's not going to stop. You're exactly right. If returns go monotonically up for another 5 years in venture, more and more money will come in. And all it will ensure is that when they do, in fact, go down, they'll just go down further.
Do you think the supply of cash is dependent on the returns? I was with Hemant from GC. I was with one of the great investors from Coatue, and they were saying the opening of retail is the next frontier of the supply of our business.
Do you think the opening of retail is predicated on great returns, or are we just going to see it open over the next few years regardless?
Rory O’Driscoll
I think in the end, when people lose money, they figure it out. They may take longer. They may be last to the party. In the end, the only thing that matters is returns. The only question is, how long does “in the end” take?
We're in an industry which has very long reaction cycles. You put in the money. You don't get a signal for 5 years. You don't figure it out for 7. The runway at which things can continue is very long.
But we could see the opening of retail much quicker than the runway happening. We've got Coatue with $3 billion now in retail funds, and we're seeing GC be very aggressive in opening up retail funds.
That could come in the next 24 to 36 months, whereas that evolution of poor returns could be a 5- to 7-year lag.
Tom Loverro
You mean there's a mismatch between assets and liabilities? How many times have we learned this lesson? I think you're totally right. You look at Blackstone's real estate investment trust: they ran a huge retail fund, I think $21 billion, and then had all kinds of redemption issues associated with that.
I agree with you, Harry. I think there's a tsunami of retail capital that's coming into venture, which is another reason to believe why the asset class, broadly defined, will hit half a trillion before the end of the decade. Because they're illiquid assets, they're not marked to market very often. The hottest ones, sure, it sounds like they're marked to market every 4 months, but the 2021 marks on the unicorns won't be marked to market for 12 to 18 months, maybe longer.
Tom, should we do a $10 billion retail growth fund?
Tom Loverro
Let's do it.
Fucking A.
Jason Lemkin
Only fees. Only fees required on this fund. You guys keep the carry. We want you to make money. We'll just take 5% a year in fees.
Tom Loverro
Yeah, we just want finder's fees.
Jason Lemkin
That's enough. We want you to capture all the upside.
Rory O'Driscoll
I will say one hard-nosed thing. This is all great until you've had to go into a room and look people in the eye and say you've lost them money, right?
I did my own business when I was 21, and it didn't work out. At 26, I had to shut it down, and I had to go into a room and say to people, “All your money's gone.”
We're talking all this great game, but there'll be a miserable part of this when you've taken these big funds, it was fun, and you put all the money out, and then you realize you've locked in a whole bunch of retail investors to a subpar return for a decade. That will not be fun. Just remember that. Hold that thought for 5 years from now.
I'm not going to let you read the kids a bedtime story. Thanks for ruining that party, Grandpa. Fucking hell. We were talking about 5% fees on $10 billion, and you come in with, “You've got to come in and throw water on the fire.” All right.
Rory O'Driscoll
You're going to have to have an annual meeting for 10 years and explain to them why you've made a ton of money and they've lost.
Ah, that's why Jason doesn't have an AGM. You don't do that meeting. Right, team, before we do a quickfire, are there any final topics that we need to discuss that I've missed?
11. Secondaries Replace IPOs
Jason Lemkin
You know, just one, since we have Tom here. I just wrote it up today on SaaStr. We're not ending the year with a great IPO market. We're not.
When we started this show—30-something shows ago—IPOs were just coming back, and it looked like 2025 would be a pretty good year. Now, in some senses, it's a good year, right? But we're well off our peaks, and the number of deals is not what we thought.
StubHub is a mess. We have some deals that are a mess. Navan's a mess, even though it's a great company. We're ending the year with an IPO whimper. It's kind of a bummer, despite Cursor hitting $30 billion in 22 months. It's kind of a bummer.
Tom Loverro
Yeah. I think the lens may be outdated. What I mean by that is, I think secondaries have exploded—absolutely exploded.
If you look at private equity, the total fraction of dollars in secondaries as a fraction of the asset class is about 25%.
Tomasz Tunguz
Historically, venture's been about 2 to 3. Now we're 10 to 12. Liquidity dollars, maybe another way of defining it, is the total value of liquidity dollars irrespective of liquidation channel: M&A, IPO, secondary. That's the stat that I'd want to see, and I bet that we're up meaningfully on it.
Just through the conversation that we've had, nobody wants to go out. Why would you go public? So, yes, IPOs will remain a very slow way and probably a decreasing share of total count and dollars. Except when OpenAI goes public, they will likely remain the less attractive liquidation option.
Jason Lemkin
You really believe that, or are we just deferring these IPOs? You believe they'll never come for the top 50 names? They'll literally never go public?
Rory O'Driscoll
I mean, why?
Tomasz Tunguz
What are you getting?
Jason Lemkin
If you fall a little bit out of the top 30, just a degree out of the top 30, right?
Tomasz Tunguz
Right. Okay, so Goldman bought Industry Ventures, a leading secondary fund. It paid the highest multiple, I think, ever for an asset manager. Why? Because a lot of retail dollars are coming, and they need to go into the private asset class.
What's the best way of doing it? Secondaries. So I think there will be a mid-market secondaries market for not names 1 through 20, but names 2 through 200. And you made the point, Jason, before: 900 unicorns, they're never going public. No. But people will need liquidity in some form or another.
Jason Lemkin
But there's no liquidity for them, my friend.
Tom Loverro
But there's some market-clearing price for that secondary.
Rory O'Driscoll
I agree. I think you're right on that part, Tom. I disagree on the IPOs, but I think you're right. The 900 unicorns have to go to someone that is worth north of zero and south of $2 trillion. Somewhere between those 2 numbers, there's a buck to be made. And you're right, someone's going to have to deal with the problem of cleaning up 900 companies, and maybe turning them into 30 great companies, merged up or acquired or whatnot.
It's some kind of restructuring business. I'm not sure I agree, though. I think in the end, the big exits will IPO, and we're in the business of the big exits. I don't believe long-term—I mean, the top 30 names prove me a liar today—but I think over the medium term, the IPO window has to be open for the math to work overall, and it just has to become more relatively attractive.
You are right: the direct cost to the company of an IPO is higher than the direct cost to the company of a private round. But if you look at it from a systems perspective, private capital has 2 and 20 fee drag, and public markets have almost 60 bps of fee drag. From a societal perspective, there's no doubt in my mind that assets being managed privately have a far higher aggregate cost between the cost to the issuer and the cost to the investor than public assets.
Tomasz Tunguz
Yeah. But I think that changes. I think the fee structure changes on these extremely late—
Rory O'Driscoll
That's interesting.
Tom Loverro
Retail products.
Rory O'Driscoll
Then you could be right.
Tom Loverro
Look at SPV fees. They're not 2 and 20.
Rory O'Driscoll
That's fair.
Tom Loverro
The fees are significantly less. They're significantly less.
Rory O'Driscoll
So, those late-stage guys, the good news is your business is going to double, and the bad news is you're working for 1 and 15.
Tomasz Tunguz
Right. So I was looking at PE funds. You can look at PE funds, the publicly traded ones, and you can see the average fee load is something like 65 to 75 bps. At some point, you'll see late-stage funds and venture capital have to approach that because they need to be competitive. Then I think the math can work. But I don't know. Look, we're all just pontificating.
Jason Lemkin
Tom, let's delete that. We don't want to talk about reduction in fees. We've just said about a $10 billion fund. You want to do 65 bps? Dude, come on. You think Jason's getting out of bed for 65 bps?
Tomasz Tunguz
No. We're craftspeople here.
Jason Lemkin
Come on.
Tom Loverro
We're craftspeople. We're making artesian water.
Rory O'Driscoll
Exactly. We're making artesian water. They're writing $200 million checks, so even 65 bps is plenty of money to monitor 1 deal. They'll be fine.
Jason Lemkin
Dude, Jason needs to buy a place in Yellowstone. 65 bps ain't it. Come on. We've heard about it. Country club.
Tom Loverro
I've got enough.
Jason Lemkin
Enough material goods. Starting to shed them. But, Tom, you think there'll be a perpetual secondary market, like an infinite secondary market for top names? Because that would be very disruptive. We can't prove that yet, right? But that would be utterly disruptive to venture as we know it if secondaries go forever. It feels like it's true of SpaceX at least, right? No one's expecting an IPO there ever, are they?
Rory O'Driscoll
No. PE works: you buy and hold for 3 to 5 years, you package it up for the next person in the value chain, right?
Tom Loverro
Yes.
Rory O'Driscoll
That's how it works. For a $10 million EBITDA company, I get it to 25 as a result of acquisition and operations. I hold it for 3 to 5 years, and I sell it to the next guy. I think venture moves in this direction, except for a handful of very, very large funds.
If that's true, then venture's failed. If you look at the top 10 companies by market cap in the US, 9 of them are venture-backed. Those companies don't get PE packaged around them. PE makes a lot of money moving mid-market shit up and down the value chain, and nothing is amazing, but everything is good. We're in the business of lots of things being utterly crap, some things being okay, but a few things being amazing, and the amazing set moves everything else.
Tomasz Tunguz
Okay. So, Rory, you find your nth fund returner. You find your nth decacorn. I don't know how many you have, but I'm sure you have many. You know that it will take 15 years to get to liquidity.
What you do is decide, "You know what? I'll sell a quarter of the position 3 rounds later, and then I'll sell a little bit more in the next round, and then I'll sell a little bit more in the next round, and I'll dollar-cost my way out of this business." It may not look exactly like PE because it's not a full-ownership sale.
Rory O'Driscoll
That's fair. Yes, I do buy that. It's not a PE sale. Basically, what you're saying is, in this pretend public market that's still private, I act exactly as I would have in the public markets; I just do it at a different transaction cost to a different set of buyers. Yes, I buy that.
Tomasz Tunguz
That's right. I think that's what's happening. Unless the cost to go public and the premium that the public market is willing to pay change, the trend is inexorable, and the number of publicly traded companies will dwindle as PE picks them off.
I think in 2022, I calculated PE had taken private 12% of all publicly traded software companies in a year.
Jason Lemkin
That was 2022. Yes. They hoovered it up.
Tomasz Tunguz
If that continues to be the case, and we only have 8 IPOs, the number of publicly traded software companies—they're a dying breed.
Jason Lemkin
So IPOs will be for the A-minus. They'll be for names 50 through 150. Very, very good companies, 500 million, growing 50%, but that can't do quarterly tender offers of billions a year. It'll be for the B tier.
Tomasz Tunguz
Well, it kind of depends on how big the retail flow is into the secondary market. It may be for companies like 200 to 500.
Jason Lemkin
That'd be a gift.
Tomasz Tunguz
Oh, yeah.
Jason Lemkin
That would be a thumbs-up.
Tomasz Tunguz
But there are a lot of pieces coming into place where the probability is increasing.
Rory O'Driscoll
I do agree with that. I think every part of the trend is in your favor to prove you right in this assertion. The unknown is how people's response will be to a significant down market, which we haven't seen meaningfully since 2008–2009, and in tech, really not since 2000 to 2002.
The 2 things were a meaningful down market where you're not able to trade the stocks because there's no private liquidity. We'll see how that impacts the trend, but until then, I think you're right. I think the trend is clearly going this way.
Okay, team, we're going to do a quick fire.
Rory O'Driscoll
He loves his Kalshi, Tom. It's a pain in the butt, but you've got to deal with it.
Tomasz Tunguz
No, I love Kalshi. It's awesome. It's another new stock market.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Thank you. Optimism. Optimism, Rory. See that? We love Kalshi. Thank you. Would you rather invest in Cognition at $12 billion or Cursor at $29 billion?
Tomasz Tunguz
Cursor.
Jason?
Jason Lemkin
Yeah. To me, I usually go with the cheap one, but the numbers are just jaw-dropping with Cursor. You've got to go with it.
All right. Harvey at $8 billion or Legora at $2 billion?
Tomasz Tunguz
I'll go Legora, knowing very little about the business. It's just the entry price.
Jason Lemkin
I'm seconding it. Listen, I'm only so smart. I don't see the $30 billion exit in the category yet, but it may be ignorance. I believe in the AI GC. I believe in that model. I met her at the seed round. I think it's a great investment that Rory made, but I don't see the $30 billion exit to justify Harvey yet. It may be my ignorance.
Jason Lemkin
If I had the numbers in front of me, I might say, “I’ll do it at 12,” but I have to go with Legora just for the math. I’m backing Tom on this one.
Rory O'Driscoll
Oh, my God. We’re in sync again. Entry price counts on this one. Funny, because—
Rory O'Driscoll
Sometimes.
Tomasz Tunguz
I think it’s an interesting point. Yeah, you’re right, because we didn’t do entry price counts on Cursor. Entry price counts when TAM is unclear. Winning is the only thing that counts when TAM is huge.
Rory O'Driscoll
Well said.
Tomasz Tunguz
I think our 2 choices have been rational.
Love that. Give me a quarter for when OpenAI will go public.
Tomasz Tunguz
That’s not on the list.
Well, think on your feet.
Tomasz Tunguz
Q3 ’26.
Rory O'Driscoll
Yeah, Q3 or Q4 ’26. It’s slated for next year; the year hasn’t started yet. It’s already the end of the year. You’d want to be going into, leaning into ’27. That was a very good call. Sorry. We’re well in sync again.
Jason Lemkin
I think that’s a good idea. I think Sam will come up with so much alternative financing, it’ll slip into mid-’27. But I think that’s the straw man today, would be my guess. That’s the plan, but there’ll be so many other sources. Maybe the government will guarantee it. Who knows who will guarantee the money, but I think it’s going to—again, that’s going to be the straw man, but it’ll get pushed to ’27.
Rory O'Driscoll
To be fair, we do now know from Intel that the price of a guarantee is 10% of the fully diluted common stock. So for $50 billion, I’ll gladly guarantee OpenAI myself. That’s a priced call here, but—
Tomasz Tunguz
If you could guarantee infinite compute, it might be a good deal.
Rory O'Driscoll
It might be a good deal. Okay.
Tomasz Tunguz
It’s not like Sam’s seen a lot of dilution. If I were running OpenAI, I would not be dilution-sensitive if I had no shares. I would be growth-sensitive. I would raise as much money as possible if either I had full anti-dilution or no shares. I would raise everything.
Jason Lemkin
Funny thing you should say that, because we’ve talked a bit about this in the past, and I meant to say it at the time, but there’s always something terrifying about someone who’s in charge of a company who’s just not money-motivated or incentivized. Anyway, it is kind of bizarre. I always have this reassuring feeling when I realize my CEOs are motivated by dilution and money, because then you know where the buttons are.
It must be weird to be on a board with someone where you’re like, “What are your buttons?” Because you’re right, they’re not dilution. It’s that they’re for world domination, and that’s just kind of weird.
Tomasz Tunguz
I had one CEO I worked with at the beginning of my career. He had negotiated full anti-dilution as CEO through the IPO. He was re-upped in every single grant, every single everything. He was guaranteed his 7% through the IPO.
Jason Lemkin
Oh, wow.
Tomasz Tunguz
He was a good guy, but it did actually change a lot of motivations. He was an outside CEO who came into a clusterfuck, okay? That was his condition. He was like, “I don’t know how much capital this is going to take to fix. This is not Cursor. It’s a real business, but I’m not going to take that risk if you want me, because I can’t predict what it’s going to take to right the ship.”
He did right the ship. He did take the company public. It’ll be nameless, but it did create a different set of incentives.
Listen, team, I’m excited for us to be partners in the growth fund. It’s going to be a very profitable journey that we have together. This is a transition from our normal early stage. Tom, you’re going to have to let the Theory LPs know about that slight strategy shift.
Tomasz Tunguz
I know we said we were artisanal, but we decided that volume was the way to go.
Yeah, it’s just so hard, you know? Jason told me seed was for suckers, and I was like, “Okay.” We’re making T-shirts, by the way. We’ve got T-shirts being made with Jason’s face and “Seed is for suckers.”
Jason Lemkin
Yeah.
It’s brilliant. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Jason Lemkin
It’s great. You don’t have to go to board meetings. You don’t have to add any value. You just write the check and send some tweets.
Rory O'Driscoll
And get the step-up.