Uber 创始人 Travis Kalanick 谈 AI、风险与打造未来 | EP #164
Kalanick 的统一命题,是通过“把原子当作比特”,让物理世界像计算机一样运行。 制造业操纵原子,房地产储存原子,物流运输原子;Uber 将网络层数字化,而云厨房和“atoms AI”则把这一命题延伸到生产、地产、机器人和人形机器人。不同于需要消耗时间的注意力生意,这些系统理应把时间还给人。
他的扩张原则很简单:“不要把失败规模化。” Uber 在进入纽约前,先在旧金山运营了1年;UberX 也经历了2012年年中的中间阶段,直到2013年初才完成铺开。一项当前计划在两个6个月周期中分别扩大至6倍规模,一年达到36倍,但 Kalanick 正推迟扩张,直到技术和核心流程足以避免组织“淹没在运营里”。
颠覆性优势真正来自找到“有价值的未知真相”,再赢得足够信任将其落地。 认知现实与实际现实之间的差距,是“创新者的游乐场”,但变化会触发天然的免疫反应。Kalanick 从 Uber 得到的新教训是,信任可以把“对手变成拥护者”,加速变化。Diamandis 补充说,这不意味着永远不“敲碎脑袋”;Kalanick 回答:“只要确保你知道自己在做什么。”
时机和地理复制,足以压垮一个原本成立的命题。 Kalanick 称,过早进入“等同于犯错”,随后又修正说:“更糟”,并回忆起4年没有薪水、靠“鲜血、汗水和拉面”坚持的日子。后来,他通过“跨洲并行部署”发现 Kuwait、Saudi Arabia 等他称为惊喜的市场,同时警告不要去 Indonesia、India 和 Colombia;他明确表示,厨房在 India 赚不到钱。
Kalanick 将创新定义为进步除以风险,而不是对冒险的热情。 他的公式是“创新等于大P除以小R”,其中风险包括时间、金钱和声誉;迭代应在保住进步的同时持续压低这些成本。客户至上同样需要双重要求:既要“很多真心”,也要“很多 ROI”,因为无差别降价把公司送进破产,并不能服务客户。
谈到 AI 对就业的影响,Kalanick 明确表示自己并不确定,但“乐观多于悲观”。 他的狭义经济学论点是:“机器人还没有银行账户”,生产率提升会让人类获得更便宜的商品,从而把钱花到其他地方。但那些按惯例执行传统工作的咨询顾问“将陷入大麻烦”;机会在于帮助搭建取代这些工作的系统。
投资者应把自己理解为资本配置者,而不是创始人幸福的守护者。 从创始人的角度看,Kalanick 认为有用的问题是:哪个投资者“造成的伤害最小”?一个热爱国际象棋、却没有参加比赛的人,不能对每周投入60小时下棋的创始人指挥落子。治理仍然重要,董事会成员应当用“你是不是嗑了什么?”质疑登月计划,但不能把自己任命为公司的创意引擎。
创始人的坚持应由信念、匹配度和可生存性决定,而不是“永不放弃”的神话。 Kalanick 会问3个问题:你是否仍然相信这件事?你是否是合适的人?继续下去是否会造成严重的精神或身体损害?运气在一场“游戏”中很重要,但他认为,当你经历100场游戏,或通过10,000个决策打造一家公司时,运气的作用会逐渐消退。
1. Uber 从轻资产洞察起步,随后把使命变成运营筛选器
这段起源故事简洁得近乎可疑:2008—09年,Garrett Camp 在 Paris 晚饭后步行3英里时,希望自己能“按一下按钮就叫到一辆车”。Camp 提议买20辆 S-Class、雇40名司机,再找一个车库;Kalanick 回答说,车本来就存在,Uber 可能既不需要拥有车辆,也不需要雇佣司机。
Diamandis 提到,Uber 用7年时间从0扩展到70个国家,完成50亿次出行,收入达到75亿美元,估值达到700亿美元。Kalanick 对 ChatGPT 提供的出行次数提出质疑:他回忆称,截至2017年年中,Uber 每周大约有1,300万次乘车,毛交易额/GMV 约500亿美元,同时提醒说,把 GMV 换算成收入“很棘手”。
Kalanick 的使命框架始于罕见的直白自知:了解自己的本性,这样当“职业灵魂伴侣出现时,你就会认出对方”。他适合做的事,是通过“高速、规模化创新”将物理世界数字化;相比之下,“我不该去运营 Pinterest”。
使命随后变成人员筛选器。Kalanick 把价值观不匹配的员工比作走进篮球场的网球运动员——“这里不用球拍”——这不是道德评判,而是说明对方在参加另一项运动。强文化价值观应当让这种错配在招聘过程中,或入职后很早就暴露出来。
2. 把原子当作比特,揭示下一层数字化空间
Kalanick 直接把计算机堆栈映射到实体经济:CPU 操纵比特,制造业操纵原子;存储装载比特,房地产装载原子;网络传输比特,物流传输原子。回头看,Uber 将“原子计算机”的3种核心资源之一——实体运输——数字化了。
商业模式的区别在于时间。社交媒体产品靠捕获注意力获胜,会“占用你的时间”;基于原子的计算机通常提升利用率,把时间还给用户。现有的盈利公司可以从客服、客户管理和数据流程等高度依赖人工的环节切入,但它们通常缺乏从内部重造核心产品的基因。
Uber 之前的出租车应用说明了表层数字化为何会失败:它们只覆盖了出租车市场的一小部分,把精力放在并不重要的20%收益上,同时依赖别人的平台。司机可以放弃通过应用安排的接单,转而接受没有佣金的电话叫车或路边扬招,可靠性因此被摧毁。Kalanick 说,当 DoorDash 或 Uber Eats 只是为原本服务于其他需求的厨房增加的一层功能时,餐饮配送也存在类似的结构性问题。
3. 时机、市场结构与运营准备度决定扩张速度
Diamandis 认为,Uber 受益于智能手机、GPS、Google Maps,以及2008年经济衰退让更多人愿意开车。Kalanick 说,他不认为经济衰退与此有多大关系;出租车应用的商业模式本身就存在结构性缺陷。他在 Uber 之前做网络软件的经历则带来了相反的教训:4年没有薪水,让他明白过早进入“会把你磨成灰”。
但 Uber 仍然分阶段推进。它在 San Francisco 留了1年,第二站进入 New York;直到大约2013年初,才全面推出低价版 UberX,此前在2012年年中左右还有一个中间版本。“把事情做对很重要。”
Kalanick 在下一家公司过度吸取了 Uber 遭遇模仿者的教训,推出“PMD”——“跨洲并行部署”——试图在竞争对手出现前进入各国市场。这一实验意外发现了 Kuwait、Saudi Arabia 等极具吸引力的地点,但也暴露出错误:“不要去 Indonesia,不要去 India,不要去 Colombia。”他明确表示,在 India 做厨房不可能赚钱。
一项当前计划体现了他如今的平衡方式:它在一个6个月周期内扩大至6倍规模,接下来一个6个月周期又扩大至6倍,一年内从较低基数增长到36倍。然而,由于业务仍高度依赖运营,Kalanick 正暂停更大范围的扩张,先用技术收紧核心流程;否则“我们会淹没在运营里”。
4. 信任加速颠覆,迭代压缩下行风险
在 Kalanick 看来,创新者是在构建发现“有价值的未知真相”的机器。知道别人不知道的事情,就能采取别人无法采取的行动;但反复推动变化会触发阻力,因为自然会放慢可能带来伤害的变化。因此,信任是基础设施:与受影响的人建立足够信任,就“能把对手变成拥护者”。
他的管理模式是授权但有边界:“让建设者去建设”,前提是对齐目标并承担责任。当前公司的价值观是求真、信任和热情;Kalanick 还把创新与发现别人看不见的现实、快速且率先“把结果推过终点线”,以及带着利益相关方一起前进联系起来。
Kalanick 不认同把公司建设成一家“敢于冒险的公司”。他的公式是“创新等于大P除以小R”:进步除以风险,而风险来自时间、金钱和声誉。迭代可以在持续取得进步的同时压低这些风险;从概念上说,如果风险降到0而进步保持不变,创新就会趋于无穷大。
5. 当坚持的代价变高,创始人的判断最重要
客户至上既需要经济性,也需要同理心。Kalanick 将 Bezos 治下的 Amazon 视为标杆,但警告说,如果单纯降价导致公司明年无法继续存在,那就不是以客户为中心。“很多真心”必须与“很多 ROI”结合;有盈利支撑的杠杆,才能继续增加对客户的投入。
他为是否放弃设定了3部分、刻意不煽情的检验:你是否仍然相信?你是否是这个角色的合适人选?继续下去是否会造成严重的精神或身体损害?回忆此前的一家公司时,他提到资金耗尽、“末日般的噩梦”,以及那句格言:钱未必能买来幸福,但“能支付治疗费用”。
当被问及 Uber 之后领导方式如何变化时,Kalanick 描述的是一个持续迭代的过程。在 Uber 之前,他最大的公司只有12人;Uber 则达到约15,000—20,000名员工和数百万名司机。他仍然拒绝掌控一切的幻想:创业者必须适应“任何疯狂、搞砸一团的事情”突然出现,同时也不能变成一个没有脊梁、对任何事都照单全收的团块。
6. 云厨房、自动驾驶与“atoms AI”延伸服务经济
云厨房的目标,是提供一顿做好并送到家的餐食,让其质量、便利性和成本接近买菜回家。这将“对厨房做 Uber 对汽车做过的事”,把日常烹饪从自我供给转变为服务。马匹的类比体现了其中的微妙之处:他喜欢马,但不会骑马去上班;人们可以在想做饭时做饭,而不是因为不得不做饭。
Kalanick 认为,这类基础设施同时能改善健康并释放时间:“你不必富有才能保持健康”,而把食物准备外包出去,可以把时间还给其他活动。但他的建造实验也展示了瓶颈:漂亮的场外模块化设施,仍然依赖当地承包商;承包商可能拖延组装,或要求再加50万美元。机器人在现场施工可能是答案,但目前仍未解决。
他区分了“bits AI”——ChatGPT、DeepSeek 和 Grok——与“atoms AI”:后者让机器在物理世界中移动并采取行动。Waymo 这样的自动驾驶汽车是早期形态;人形机器人则需要“完全不同的一套模型”,有时会借鉴语言模型的进展,但运行在另一种游戏里。
Kalanick 说,Uber 的自动驾驶汽车项目在终止时并非由他负责,当时仅次于 Waymo,“可能正在追上”,并且很可能很快超过它。回头看,他说人们或许会希望现在已经存在自动驾驶网约车产品。谈到 eVTOL,Diamandis 说具体时间仍不清楚,但认为时速150英里的点对点出行可能改变通勤,并点名 Joby 和 Archer;Kalanick 简短表示赞同。
7. AI 将重写劳动力与分配,董事会则必须避免变成运营者
Diamandis 将咨询描述为一种稀缺心态生意:把专家隔离起来,再逐步“按量发放”他们的时间。他说 Deep Research 已经能让用户“按一下按钮”就得到一名顾问。Kalanick 认为,传统的执行型工作将陷入困境,但为客户搭建取代这些工作的 AI 系统的顾问仍有机会,尤其是面对拥有竞争壁垒的盈利公司。
Kalanick 的董事会准则是“不要造成伤害”。投资者是资本配置者,不是创始人幸福的提供者,也不应试图指挥一场自己没有参加的比赛。“如果投资者才是出主意的人,那你就找错公司了。”但良好的治理仍然需要追问:一个看似聪明的风险,究竟是否理智。
对于大规模替代就业,他仍保留原有的谨慎判断:技术史“基本上说明我们没问题”,但环境可能发生变化。在他的论证中,生产率节省和 AI 利润最终仍归于人,而不是存进机器人的银行账户,因此他的倾向更乐观;更根本的是,如果一个产品不能改善人们的生活,就“等着失败”。
Uber 让产品本身承担了教育功能:一名食客把按钮展示给另一名食客,大量应用安装发生在餐厅。它的“给与得”推荐机制——一个人可以送另一个人一次免费乘车,自己也获得一次——直到2015年或2016年左右,一度贡献了约三分之一的新用户,帮助这个陌生且有争议的服务转化为社会证明。
Will robots and AI replace all of our jobs?
If somebody wants to go and make a thing that doesn't make people's lives better, they should count on failing.
In your 7-year tenure: 0 to 70 countries, 5 billion rider trips, $7.5 billion in revenues, and a $70 billion valuation.
I didn't think of it exactly like this at the time, but basically, I was digitizing the network for the physical world. When you're trying to do something disruptive, there's a massive immune reaction that occurs. One of the best ways to deal with resistance to change is to build a massive amount of trust with those you're asking to change, or that you're asking to bring along with that change, because then you can turn your adversaries into advocates.
Nobody's in control of the world. So, you have to see where the world is going and build for that world.
Now, that's a moonshot, ladies and gentlemen. This is a group of entrepreneurs running $10 million- to $10 billion companies. Their focus is on getting clarity on their massive transformative purpose and then using that for a moonshot to do something extraordinary—to go from success to significance in the world.
When we've talked about understanding the process of reinventing an industry, transforming it, and making it efficient, I think there are only a handful of individuals who make that possible or have done that successfully. I want to read the numbers on Uber, just as an example, because I want to dive into the founding of Uber and then, obviously, what you learned in building CloudKitchens as well.
In your 7-year tenure, 0 to 70 countries—that's pretty impressive—5 billion rider trips. I want to dive into how you got started. Can you take me back, first of all, to that founding aha moment, and then we'll talk about purpose as a critical part of building a moonshot company?
Yeah. I don't know where that number came from. It came from ChatGPT or some site like that. When I left in mid-2017, we were probably doing—I don't know—13 million a week.
Okay. So, that would be like 7 weeks for every billion. So, maybe that's $7.5 billion in revenues. Not bad, thereabouts.
Yeah. Well, the gross at that time was probably about $50 billion. That would be GMV, and then how you calculate revenue from there could be tricky, but yeah, a $70 billion valuation—not bad.
The aha moment is kind of interesting. You hear a lot of founding fables. The public sort of generates this whole made-up thing. We don't have one of those, but it sounds like one.
We were in Paris. We were at—if you guys remember way back in the day, in 2008 and 2009—Loïc Le Meur's LeWeb. I was sort of in between gigs. I had sold my recent company to Akamai, and I didn't know what was next.
I was there with a guy named Garrett Camp, and we were walking back. Before Uber in Paris, you'd have to walk back. You would go out to dinner, and you'd walk home. That's just what it was. We were on a 3-mile walk back to our hotel after dinner, and he said, “Man, I wish we could just push a button and get a ride.”
That's a prophetic wish.
I'm like, “Pretty good.” He was like, “Yeah, let's just go back to San Francisco, make the app, buy 20 S-Classes, get 40 drivers in a parking garage, and we're off to the races.”
I'm like, “Look, there's enough cars out there already. We don't need to buy the cars. We don't need to get a parking garage, and we probably don't even need to hire the drivers.” That was kind of the balance at the beginning: He was the classy one, and I was the efficiency one, if that makes sense.
Purpose—we talked about this in advance. How critical is purpose in driving a company at this scale?
It's super important. You could probably have a whole conference on purpose. You could take it many different ways.
The first is, I think every individual—sometimes I'll talk to executives who are making the move to the next thing, ideally the one I'm trying to recruit them for. My advice, even when I'm not recruiting them, is that you've got to be really self-aware of who you are. If you get really, really self-aware of who you are, then when the next thing comes, you will know when your professional soulmate presents itself. You will know.
Fascinating.
If you're honest with yourself, you've got to be. It's like, I shouldn't be running Pinterest. It just wouldn't work out, but that's because I know myself.
If you understand your nature, you need to find a thing that matches that nature. So, when we talk about your massive transformative purpose—what wakes you up in the morning and what keeps you going—as the foundation for building a company, how does that translate to the team you build?
Before we even get to that, there are a couple more layers to it. I like to say that my sort of space is digitizing the physical world. Let's say that's the sport that I play, that I'm meant to play. If you play basketball and that's your thing, and you're really great at it, don't go play tennis.
So, you've got to know the sport through that self-awareness. You know your sport: digitizing the physical world. I'd also say innovation at speed and at scale is the stuff that gets me fired up.
The final layer is: Who are the people that I'm serving? Whatever you're going to do, you're serving somebody. You should be fundamentally passionate about them and what the thing you're going to do is going to do for them.
No, and I think that's when, in the nomenclature here, we talk about your MTP: Who are you serving? Who do you want to be a hero to?
So, you get clarity on that. Then you start building an organization. I guess the challenge is, if you're bringing in people who don't share that, you're going to very quickly start going in the wrong direction.
This is when you get an internal culture clash: There are people who don't see things the same way you do, at least in terms of values. Most of us here have personal relationships of one kind or another—friends, loved ones, partners in life, the whole thing. Opposites can attract, but the core values need to be shared.
How do you use that as a filter for who you're bringing in? Are you dogmatic about it, or are you allowing those who naturally gravitate that way to come in?
Those 2 are, I think, very similar. Sometimes somebody who shouldn't be there is like a tennis player who goes to a basketball court, and you're like, “Whoa, whoa, we don't do rackets here. We have this much larger ball that we put in this hoop. It's different.”
It doesn't have to be a judgment. It's just an assessment, a factual sort of thing. You have to understand what the values are and whether the values are the same. Again, it's those things that I just went through.
This gets codified into what you might call cultural values or things like that. If your cultural values are really, really good, then it becomes really clear who's not supposed to be there.
You don't want to get to that place where somebody's not supposed to be there. When somebody comes in, you want to make it work. It doesn't always work, but you want to try to make it work. Ideally, it becomes really clear in the recruiting process, and if a mistake happens on the way in, it becomes clear super early: “Well, I play tennis, not basketball.”
You said a few minutes ago that you are focused on optimization and getting rid of inefficiencies. Is that your superpower for finding opportunities?
It goes to that digitizing the physical world. We know what the digital world is: It's called a computer. The CPU manipulates the bits, storage stores the bits, and the network moves bits from point A to point B. These are the 3 core computing resources in a computer.
But if digitizing the physical world becomes your sport, then you've decided that treating atoms like bits is what you do. So, you go, “Okay, well, the CPU manipulates the bits. What manipulates atoms?” That's manufacturing. “Storage stores bits. What stores atoms?” That's real estate. “The network moves bits from point A to point B. What moves atoms?” You're like, “That's logistics or transport.”
My last company, Uber, I didn't think of it exactly like this at the time, but basically, I was digitizing the network for the physical world. Digitized transport. One of the 3 core computing resources in an atoms-based computer.
You're like, “Well, that's well on its way.” It's not all the way done. We need autonomous cars and all of this to really be out there, but there's light at the end of the tunnel. What about digitized manufacturing and digitized real estate? That's how I see what I do.
So what I do is I make atoms-based computers. If you are treating atoms like bits, it will naturally be about efficiency. It's very different than, say, “I make a social media app.” A social media app is going to win when it takes your attention and your time, and that's how they make money. Atoms-based computers typically are giving you your time back.
Yeah. Now, we talked this morning about the idea of looking into your business and finding everything that's not been digitized yet and dematerialized yet. Somebody is going to eventually do it if it's doable.
Yeah.
What advice do you have for folks about doing that? The other part of it is companies that are born as digital-native companies, like you built Uber, and those that are trying to retrofit themselves.
Well, I mean, these are very different things. So, if you are digitizing a business that exists, let's assume that business is profitable and has some sort of competitive moat, et cetera, in some ways, the starting point is very straightforward. It's like you just take all the line items where there are humans, and you try to find ways to get more leverage on those humans.
So, you start with customer support, account management, any workflow where people are doing things, filling in data—workflow-type stuff. That's the easy starting point. It's not as innovative, per se; it doesn't get to the core product, but it's sort of how you start surrounding the core if you have something that's not digitized.
But the radical thinking is to really digitize it from the inside out. That's not always the domain of an existing profitable business with a competitive moat. It usually doesn't have the DNA to do it. Sometimes it does, but most of the time it does not.
I mean, we didn't see very many other preexisting transportation companies copy what you did, even though you gave a very clear model. Timing on this: I know Bill Gross was here with us today, but he spoke yesterday morning about one of the talks he's given, looking at the most successful companies and the companies that failed—whether it was their CEO, their capital, and so forth. His conclusion was that it's timing.
Being too early is identical to being wrong.
It's worse.
Yeah, because you waste a lot of money and time. I mean, it's the worst.
The company I did before Uber was networking software. I sold it to Akamai, but I was probably wrong and too early, which is really the worst. For the first 4 years, no salary. I didn't have anything, right? I like to say, I actually at some point had socks that said, “Blood, Sweat, and Ramen.” It will grind you to dust if you're early. And if you're early and wrong, that's intense.
You hit a key point when the theme of this session is technological convergence, but your convergence on the smartphone, Google Maps, GPS, and the 2008 recession. How important was that recession for getting the gig-economy people willing to drive?
I don't think it had much to do with it.
Was it a concept Uber tried before you? Did some people try?
I mean, the main thing that existed before us was a couple of taxi apps.
Mm-hmm.
But the problem was it was just a broken model. A lot of times, when people see an opportunity, they go after it the wrong way. Taking a slice of the taxi market: A, it's sort of very small. And B, you're on somebody else's platform, and they can squeeze you. You're basically getting yield optimization from the 20% that doesn't matter.
So, if a taxi guy agrees to go pick somebody up but then gets a call that he doesn't have to pay any commission on, or somebody waving their hand and hailing him, you're done. The reliability and the quality of the product you're going to be able to offer sucks, which you could say is similar to where online delivery of food is right now. Uber Eats or DoorDash on a restaurant is like a taxi app. You're getting yield optimization on a thing that's built for something else.
I remember my first Uber ride in San Francisco, when you were just running the black-car service. And someone said, “Oh, I was going from a party—let me show you this new app.”
Yeah.
And what's interesting was you didn't try to boil the ocean in the beginning. You began really with the black-car service in San Francisco. Can you talk about staging a moonshot start—staging something that would scale? Just that mindset of, “Let's get it working here,” right, before we grow it.
Well, look, we were in San Francisco for a year before we went to our second city. Our second city was New York. We didn't even do the low-cost product, what we call UberX. We didn't do that until—that must have been early 2013. Maybe mid-2012 was sort of halfway, and then early 2013 was all the way. So, yeah, getting it right matters.
In my current company, there are a couple of situations where we went too big too quickly because you can learn the wrong lessons from the last thing. I'm like, “Oh, this scale is easy. It works.”
So, I did this thing—the acronym was PMD. Basically, I didn't want to have happen at my current company what happened at Uber, which was that we invented this thing and then had copycats everywhere, in different countries and continents, that we had to then go fight because they copied our thing before we got there.
Yeah.
Even though we went to so many countries so quickly, we got there after the clones got there.
Right.
So, we didn't want that to happen again. I came up with this acronym. It was called PMD: parallel multicontinental deployment. It sounds like a nuclear war.
And we did it, but we went to some places we shouldn't have gone. It just so happens you can't make money on kitchens in India. It's just not possible. We also found places that were amazing. We went to Kuwait, a lot of places you wouldn't go, that ended up being—we went to Saudi, we went to lots of places that we wouldn't have otherwise gone without that mentality.
But, yeah, don't go to Indonesia, don't go to India, and don't go to Colombia. Those are the main ones. I remember when France made Uber illegal. My motto was, “Don't start a tech company in a country that made Uber illegal.”
How important is getting the system and the operation working really buttoned down before you start moving to additional new territories?
Yeah, I mean, there's a balance. There are a couple of initiatives that I have right now that are—you know, they talk about the moonshot inside the moonshot. There are things like that that make the overall thing win. We've got a couple right now that are very much in that category.
That balance between when to cook it and when to scale it is a tricky one. There's judgment and instinct, but this is kind of tautological and kind of obvious, so I'm not sure it's going to be helpful: You don't want the overall effort of winning to be dragged down because you went too big.
Okay, obviously.
Right now, I have this one project where it's still operationally intensive because we haven't gotten the tech right yet, but it's growing. We've had 2 6-month periods in a row where we grew 6× in that 6-month period.
Wow. Now, you're on a low base.
Okay. But it means it's 36 times bigger than it was a year ago.
Yeah, it's not going to be small for long. When do we push and start expanding?
But I know we'll drown if I don't get those core workflows tight. We're going to drown in ops.
Yep.
So, we're almost there. We're right about to click in and sort of expand.
Scaling something that's broken is not fun.
Yeah. I like to say, “Let's not scale failure.” That's what I say at the office.
When you're trying to do something disruptive, there's a massive immune reaction that occurs. Sometimes the immune reaction is within your own organization, if people have been doing something else all along, and sometimes, obviously, it's competitors. How do you deal with the resistance that you had—just general resistance?
Yeah. I mean, I like to say that one of the most important things that innovators do is they are really good at finding valuable unknown truths—things that are true and very valuable that nobody else knows.
So, if you create a machine that's finding valuable unknown truths, then you start to know a lot of things other people don't know. And if you know a lot of things other people don't know, you can start doing things that other people can't do.
That's called changemaking. You start to be able to do stuff other people aren't doing, which means you're doing some stuff nobody's seen. So, you start doing a lot of it because you're really good at that core thing, which is finding valuable unknown truths. You start doing a lot of it. You're basically in the changemaking business.
And there is this thing in nature that is everywhere around us. It's called resistance to change. It's in nature. It's natural because nature is a monopoly, and nature abhors change that can cause harm. It's a natural mechanism to slow down progress, to make sure it's the right kind of progress.
And so one of the best ways to deal with resistance to change is to build a massive amount of trust with those you're asking to change, or that you're asking to bring along with that change. You really have to have a philosophy around how to build trust while changemaking, because then you can turn your adversaries into advocates and actually end up moving much faster.
A lot of times, people learn the wrong lessons. They're like, “Oh, man, the Uber thing: just go crack some skulls and kick some ass.” But actually, the lesson to learn is different: if you build trust as you make change, you can actually go even further.
When I knew you at Uber, we were talking about that. That doesn't mean don't crack skulls—you've still got to do that, too.
Okay. Just make sure you know.
We were in the midst of working on an Uber XPRIZE for flying cars. That was part of your initiative, as well as the autonomous car program at Uber. Do you think it was the right thing for those not to continue, or do you think they would have gotten the technology going faster? What are your thoughts? I know it's retroactive.
No, it's okay. It's okay. Look, they killed the autonomous car project we had going on. At the time, we were really only behind Waymo, but probably catching up, and we were going to pass them in short order. So my guess is you can look back at 2020 and say, maybe—I wasn't running the company when that happened—but you could say, “I wish we had an autonomous ride-sharing product right now. That would be great.”
Yeah, I think the same thing here. I think there's still some lack of clarity around flying cars—or, let's say, eVTOLs, electric vertical takeoff and landing vehicles—and how and when exactly it plays out. But it's pretty clear: if you can get from here to there at 150 mph, and it's kind of like a very fast commute, I think it changes the game in a lot of ways.
I think there are companies that are doing some interesting stuff. Joby and Archer are probably two of the more interesting ones, among a number of them. I mean, it's packet-switched humans, where you're moving people through.
Sure.
Well, this is what you just did, right? That's a network for the physical world. You just went into an atoms-based computer, right?
Yeah.
One last question before we go to your questions here, so get them ready. Iterating under pressure. I mean, one of the things that you fabulously did was iterate the company, the models, the products, the services, and so forth. You talk about how important iteration is.
I mean, that's—I guess that's like, how important is breathing?
It's really about how you breathe well. What's your mantra? How hard did you push your teams to iterate, or were you the one driving the iteration?
No, my companies generally run in an empowered way, with checkpoints. We like to say, “Let builders build,” but you need alignment and accountability in order to empower.
Iteration—look, there's a lot to be said there. I'm trying to think of some pithy things to say that make it sound like I figured it out. But you've got to find those valuable unknown truths. You have to have a passion to get it over the line fast and first, and you have to build trust with those you're bringing it to.
Our 3 cultural values at my current company are truth, trust, and passion. One of the things about iteration is really lowering risk. A lot of people say, “I want to have a risk-taking company,” or, “I want to go work for a risk-taking initiative,” or whatever. I'm like, “No, I want to be a not-risk-taking company, or a risk-mitigating company.”
I like to say that innovation equals big P divided by little R. Big P is progress, and little R is risk. Risk comes in the form of time, money, and reputation. So I need to squeeze down risk. If I get it to 0, then innovation goes to infinity. Hold on to that progress while getting risk down.
As you go to the mics, I'm going to ask one more question. You've really been passionate about a customer-centric focus. Speak to that for a moment.
Who's the best of the best of the best at this? It's probably Amazon under Bezos. That was just next level, done so beautifully. It's so clarifying to make a person's happiness or a company's happiness your target. It's visceral. If you start there and work your way through it, you just get clarity.
A lot of people go, “Oh, I'm going to be customer-obsessed. I'm going to lower the price.” Well, if you don't exist in business next year because you went out of business, you weren't customer-obsessed. Customer-obsessed means you have to have a lot of heart for the customer. You have to have a lot of love for them, but you also have to have a lot of ROI.
If you get a lot of ROI with that heart, then you can put in even more heart. I think that's one of the things where the feelings and the numbers come together, if that makes sense. Sometimes people forget that it's about both.
Simon, this is not about technology. It was about your mindset when you had so much trouble pushing the taxi syndicates, and every day it seemed like you had another issue. How did you keep resilience in your mind and your team? What's the mindset you can recommend to us? We are always seeing challenges and changes every day, like you did.
Well, it's interesting because every once in a while I'll get an entrepreneur who comes to me and says, “When do I give up? When do I move on?” I've sort of formulated a 3-step program.
I'd love to know the answer.
I've held on too long a few times. I've never given up early, but I've held on too long.
I have, too.
I don't know if this applies to all areas of life, but it might. I haven't thought about it.
Okay, step 1: Do you still believe? If you don't believe, move on.
Yeah. Obvious.
Step 2: Are you the right person to do it? This goes back to self-awareness and just knowing: What sport are we playing? Am I a support player? Am I the main player? Where do I land? Where am I in this? You need super-hyper-transparent honesty with yourself about it.
Okay, so let's say we check that box, too. Step 3: Am I about to do significant mental or physical damage to myself by continuing? I remember one of my companies. And that's the hardcore entrepreneur way. That's when you're really right on the edge.
I was running a launch company in the late ’80s, way before SpaceX. In the last days of the company, I was making journal entries saying, “The patient’s on life support. Four days left to live.” Yeah, Richard, if you start having apocalyptic dreams or nightmares, you’re probably getting pretty close, in my experience.
Richard, please.
Hi, everybody. Richard Medaf [?]. The question on my mind is the inner journey. You’ve led this industry disruption at scale, and as it got bigger, were there moments when there was some kind of inner story or fear, or when you stopped playing the big enough game? I’m just wondering what those pivotal inner moments as a leader were.
I’m not sure I understand the question.
You were leading change where there was no playbook, right? You were out there at the forefront, writing the rules as you went, with a lot of pressure from various states. I was just wondering what that did for your own personal leadership. Were there moments where you lost your nerve or doubted yourself?
Never happened. Just kidding.
Okay. So, the inner game—what’s the unheard story of what goes on for you?
Look, there’s something to be said for when I finished that company before Uber—the one where I did 4 years with no salary, ran out of money a couple of times, had apocalyptic nightmares, and all this kind of thing. I did a couple of talks, entrepreneur talks and things like this, and one of my aphorisms was, “Money will not buy you happiness, but it will pay for therapy.”
The clearer you are and the more centered you are, the more you can do.
We’ll go to one of our teens. Omar.
Thanks, Peter. Hi, Travis. How do you see CloudKitchens evolving in the near future? What role will AI and automation play in its future growth, and do you foresee CloudKitchens merging with any other AI company to become even more cutting-edge?
Look, the high-level idea of that question is this: Can you get a meal that is prepared and delivered to you so high-quality, so cost-efficient, and so convenient that it approaches the cost of you going to the grocery store? If you do that, you do to the kitchen what Uber did to the car. You turn this thing that we all do for ourselves into a thing that a service does for you.
That doesn’t mean we don’t cook. I like horses, but I don’t ride a horse to work. This kind of infrastructure will be so much healthier. I like to say, “You don’t have to be wealthy to be healthy,” and that’s one of those things we talk about.
What you get in return for this is that you basically get your time back to do all the other things in life you love, and cook when you want. That’s great, but you don’t have to. Similar to what happened with Uber, of course everybody used to drive themselves, and more and more every year, somebody else is doing it for us, or there’s a service that does it for us, and ultimately an automated one.
As it relates to AI, I think everybody is very familiar with ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Grok, this kind of thing. I call that Bits AI. That’s AI for bits.
There’s a whole other thing that we’re probably going to start seeing more of, which is what I call Atoms AI: AI around the physical world. You could say the first iteration of that is what you see with the Waymos rolling around, right, and autonomous cars generally. But what about humanoids? How does a machine move through the physical world and act in the physical world?
There’s a whole other set of models that are going to need to be invented to make that real, sometimes borrowing from the other side, but it’s a different ball game.
Thank you. Gustavo on Zoom. What’s your question, Gustavo?
Hi, Travis. I’m from Brazil. I am a serial entrepreneur. I have a $1 billion company in my track record that I co-founded. In my experience, luck plays a bigger role than my vision and ability. In your view, does luck significantly contribute to the success of a business? Could you venture a percentage? If so, how important is luck, Travis?
Okay, so I like to play back. Does anybody here like to play blackjack? Anybody? All right, there we go. In any given game, luck plays a real role, sure. But if you play 100 games, it doesn’t. That’s a really good analogy.
The way to think about it is: Is the success that you have due to 10,000 decisions, or is it due to 2? If it’s due to just a couple, then you’re lucky. If it’s due to 10,000, you’re not.
Love that. Cartique [?].
Thanks, Peter. Travis, thrilled to have you here. My question is actually—and I’m going to reference George’s question up there, if you don’t mind—about what framework you have and are deploying to assess timing, but also valuable unknown truths.
Yeah. I mean, timing—you get burned. A lot of the other questions I get are, “What did you learn at the last thing?” or, “What did you learn?” And I’m like, “Well, I learned all the things I shouldn’t do.”
All of that is really about seeing the future, right? A valuable unknown truth means you see something nobody else does. It means you believe something that is against what everybody else believes. It means you have to see the future.
You have to see the difference between perception and reality. Everybody thinks reality is here—that’s their perception. They think reality is here, but it’s actually over here. The distance between the 2 is the innovator’s playground.
You have to get good at seeing what the future really is, being very skeptical of everything coming in, analyzing in a very truthful way, and getting good at it. What is actual reality, not what people think reality is? Look for those moments when what people think is very, very different from what is real. That’s where all the good stuff is.
Beautiful. Give it up for that. John.
Yes, me. Hi, Travis. Thanks for being here. I have a really important question. How has your leadership changed since everything that happened at Uber?
Yeah, great question. Before Uber, the largest company that I had run was a 12-person company. Everything I’m saying right now comes from a journey where you learn every day and deeply commit to getting better every day—from 12 people, running scrappy, not knowing what the hell you’re doing, and not paying yourself for 4 years, to thousands.
How big was Uber at that point?
It was like 15,000–20,000 people.
Yeah.
And then several million drivers. It was all—so what I learned is that everything I’m saying, you iterate on all those things as you go.
We’ll go to Elin. Elin.
Thank you, Peter. What’s your advice on an industry that’s super-segmented, such as construction materials? I’ve been trying to digitize that industry, and I’ve been wrong for the last 5 years.
Look, we buy property and do construction. That’s part of what we do. I’ve sort of dabbled in modular construction. The promise of it is so beautiful. Of course, the issue is local contractors and subcontractors.
We did this thing where we would manufacture these beautiful kitchen facilities off-site, just really epically, just wonderful. But then it turns out, okay, you have to put them together like Legos on-site. Now I have to train a set of contractors to build it.
In the first go, we had 1 that could do it. He wakes up one morning and he’s like, “You know, I don’t feel like doing it today.” And you’re like, “Please, pretty please. We signed a contract. You’re supposed to do it.” Then he’s like, “You know, I think if you paid me half a million dollars more, I would do it.”
So you get into this world where it’s against the contract you signed, but they’ve got you. Then you’re like, “Okay, now I have to train all these contractors to do this thing so that I can manufacture somewhere else and then put the pieces together.”
My point is that there’s a lot of change that needs to happen. It may be that we only get there when we get into true robotic construction on-site, or I don’t know. I haven’t solved this.
Vertically integrate everything again.
Yeah, I don’t know. I don’t have the answer for this one, but I have so much hope.
Thank you. Yeah, Jacob, one of our teens again.
Hello, Travis. Do you believe that the mass disruption of currently existing industries happens based on factors within or outside of your control when you’re creating a business, based on your experiences at Uber?
Look, nobody’s in control of the world. You have to see where the world is going and build for that world. Sometimes the world changes in ways that you didn’t expect, and you have to adapt to that.
We’re only in control of what we do each day, but most definitely, most of what’s going on we’re not in control of. I think that’s a super-important thing for people to realize, because a lot of people get really attached to this idea of controlling stuff, and they get into weird spots when they do that.
Now, there’s the other side of it. You get so used to not being in control. As an entrepreneur, you wake up and you’re like, “What crazy, effed-up thing is happening today?” And you just go, “Yeah, I guess that’s what’s happening today. Let’s go.” But then you almost lose your spine. You almost become an invertebrate because you’re like this blob that’s just cool with whatever’s happening. So you have to sort of keep the fight to try to make the world the way you want it, but you can’t get attached to trying to control it. It’s like this balance. It’s amazing.
Varun on Zoom, please.
Thank you, Peter. Hi, Travis. I’m dialing in from Dubai. My question is: The global consulting industry is highly fragmented, and as we live longer, there are going to be a lot more people who work in the industry who will become consultants. It’s really fragmented, and it’s a large industry. Is it a good idea to consolidate this industry using the Uber model?
Push a button, get a consultant. I was just kidding. People are like, “Okay, yeah.” No, I think the consulting world is so much about what can be done with AI.
Yeah, I think consulting is about to get radically transformed with AI right now. If you’re sort of a traditional consultant and you’re doing the thing, executing the thing, you’re probably in some big trouble. If you are the consultant that puts the things together that replaces the consultant, maybe you’ve got some stuff. You’re basically going to those, as I previously mentioned, profitable companies with competitive moats, making their moat bigger and their profit bigger. That’s probably pretty interesting from a financial point of view.
I think consulting is a scarcity-mindset business. You build a wall around these consultants and meter them out a little bit at a time, and that will get completely disintermediated by AI.
Tad, let’s go. You can push a button now and get a consultant. It’s called Deep Research. We’ve been talking about it for the last 2 days. It’s pretty cool. Let’s go.
Travis, what advice do you have for investors and board members who want to make entrepreneurs like you successful, or who are working with people like you? What are the tailwinds and headwinds that they create?
I’m going to say some provocative things.
I was hoping you would.
All right, let’s go. I think there are a lot of investors who make the pitch of being founder-friendly. They make the pitch as if their job is to serve the founder, but that’s not their job. Their job is called capital allocation. Once you make that leap—that you understand that your job is capital allocation and not the happiness of a founder—then I think a lot of things actually get into a much better spot.
Generally, from a founder’s perspective, the way a founder should look at an investor is not, “Which investor is going to be founder-friendly or help me?” I’ve just never seen that work. It’s which investor does the least amount of harm.
The way I look at it is: Okay, you’re playing a chess match. You’re like a grandmaster chess player, right? You’re playing another grandmaster chess player, and you’re playing this game, this match, 60 hours a week. Sixty hours a week is what you’re doing, and you’re pretty exhausted from doing that, but you’re passionate about it. Then there’s this chess enthusiast who doesn’t actually play chess trying to tell you what moves to make on the chessboard. You’re like, “Homie, let me tell you the 18 reasons why that’s not a thing.” It’s not their fault. They’re not playing chess. It’s okay. But the do-no-harm is a real thing.
Look, governance matters. But a lot of times I think investors get in the mode of thinking they’re the idea guy. If the investor is the idea guy, you have the wrong company. Getting a board that supports you as a moonshot entrepreneur, that gives you the freedom to do riskier things—it’s got to be smart risks.
Yeah, right. Of course.
But still, you, as a board member, should be like, “Are you smoking something?” The response should be very good, but you should be asking, “Are you smoking something?” because things can get weird.
Thank you. This is such a wonderful conversation. We were having dinner last night. It was a group of founders, and we started to brainstorm around what’s happening over the next 5 years and 10 years. Will robots and AI replace all of our jobs? How do we prepare for that future? I’d love to get your thoughts because it’s coming up fast.
This is a hard one to answer because the history of technology basically says we’re fine. But a lot of times history says you’re fine, and then things change. So it’s like, I don’t know. The one thing we’ve got going for us—this is a weird one—is that robots don’t have bank accounts yet. We had a 2-hour session on crypto last night.
Easy, easy. Okay, hold on. Let me just roll with this for a second.
Okay, let’s just assume robots don’t have bank accounts. Why does that matter? Because if you’re making something cheaper, it’s cheaper for a human. It means that they have more money to spend on other things. When they spend it on something that’s powered by AI, it doesn’t go to a robot’s bank account. When some founder makes a ton of money doing whatever and they’re going to spend that money, it doesn’t go into a robot’s bank account. So, in a weird way—I know this is a little bit niche with the way I’m answering this—I’m more optimistic than pessimistic.
I’d say the other thing that I’d put out there, which I think might be more generally applicable or make more sense, to be honest, is that I’ve done companies that have failed. The main thing when the company failed that I experienced, or that I saw, was that nobody wanted the thing that I made. If somebody wants to go and make a thing that doesn’t make people’s lives better, they should count on failing. If you want it to succeed, you better be making somebody’s life better, and probably a lot of people’s lives better, if you want it to succeed.
That’s where things ultimately go: The machines, by their nature, their DNA, are serving us. Just throwing it out there.
Time for one last question. Rachel, thank you.
And Travis, Uber changed my grandparents’ lives, so thank you. My name is Rachel Odin, and I am an Ascend fellow and also a new founder. I am building an AI-driven company to revolutionize how we form, sustain, and grow our most intimate relationships.
The question I have for you is that Uber wasn’t just a company. It introduced an entirely new market. It was disruptive innovation. So how did you balance needing to educate people on the market with building your product, refining your business model, and scaling?
Well, you hear about somebody’s first experience with Uber, and the fortunate part is the product itself is the education. They’re sitting at a dinner table, and you’re like, “Check this out.” It was naturally social. A large percentage of the app installs were at restaurants, right? A large percentage of the app installs were due to one person introducing the thing with a link: “I get a free ride when I give you a free ride.” We called it Give/Get. It was like a third of all of our new users up until 2015 or 2016. So the product itself was the education.
I think it’s pretty weird that one citizen taking another citizen across town became somehow really controversial. It’s kind of weird that that was controversial, but it was. So we had to sort of deal with the controversy as we went. Maybe it gets back into that changemaking thing and trust, or lack thereof.