No Priors 第135期|与 Humans& 创始人 Eric Zelikman 对谈
- Zelikman 的核心研究结论是,推理可以训练成一种迭代式能力,而不只是通过提示词诱发出来的能力。 STaR 生成解答,从答对的问题中学习并重复这一过程;在 n 位数运算上,迭代次数越多,可解决的位数就越长,而且“看不到明显的平台期”(no obvious plateau here)。通过让模型对失败题目进行合理化解释来训练,或如后续研究所示大幅增加采样量,都有助于突破只用正例训练的上限。
- Quiet-STaR 将这套方法从问答任务推进到了预训练规模的文本上,为更通用的推理打开了路径。 其中被忽视的要素包括在线学习和难度敏感的基线:题目越难,学习得越多;越简单,学习得越少。这在一些方面类似后来出现的 RL 预训练工作。在完成 Grok 2 的预训练数据、Grok 3 的推理方法以及 Grok 4 的工具使用和智能体基础设施后,Zelikman 仍认为 IQ 扩展还有“有意义的维度”。
- 当前前沿模型已经能解决一些对博士研究者也并不简单的工作,但能力表现仍然参差不齐且受分布约束。 Humanity’s Last Exam 包含真正困难的问题,其中许多是惩罚默认假设的陷阱题;模型表现高度依赖所提供的上下文、任务与 RL 分布的接近程度,以及答案是否具备闭式形式且容易核验。各家提供商没有公开针对具体任务的 RL 数据,也让精确诊断变得困难。
- 智能体表现部分反映的是思考时间与响应速度之间的产品权衡,而不只是原始智能水平。 Codex 这类后台系统可以比 Cursor 这类交互式工具进行更长时间的思考,而可验证性通常也更有利于模型完成任务。因此,对投资者而言,推理预算、交互模式和奖励设计都应纳入能力增长逻辑。
- 行业偏好的自主性指标,可能在拉长任务时长的同时侵蚀用户能动性。 Zelikman 提到,METR 式指标衡量的自主任务时长已从约2小时推进到2.5小时,并设想一个运行8小时的智能体交付一个只有“有点成形”的成果;届时人们可能既更难真正掌控自己构建的东西,也更难理解它。Sarah 强调,让人参与流程是一个“主动决策”(active decision),并不是规模扩大的自动副产品。Elad 那句“20,000行生成代码在我看来就够好了”,与 Eric 举出的10万行生成式 pull request 放在一起,正好说明了这一风险。
- Humans& 押注的被忽视维度,不是陪伴式 EQ,而是让模型足够理解人,从而持续改善生产性协作。 如今以任务为中心的基准测试支持组织内部的信用分配——一个团队比另一个团队好2%,或一个团队将基准提升10%、另一个提升5%——也便于进行易于评分的 RL,但它们训练出的系统会把一切塞进一次回复,而不是提问、澄清、表达不确定性或主动行动。奉承,以及近期讨论的心理健康和精神病相关问题等长周期影响,也仍未被这一范式妥善处理。
- 这套经济学逻辑的核心是扩张,而不只是自动化:理解目标的模型可以“把蛋糕做大”,而不是在现有 GDP 类别之间重新分配。 Zelikman 认为,困难问题更可能由协调不同目标、价值观、抱负和弱点的大规模群体的模型来解决,而不是靠 AI 消失20小时后返回“生命、宇宙以及一切的答案”——不过他明确说,“还得看看”。记忆投入仍然不足:没有记忆的当前模型,就像一个只记得你名字和人生大致轮廓的朋友。
1. 当模型学会从自身产出中学习,推理能力开始扩展
- Zelikman 最初的动机,是不想让人类才华继续被闲置:自动化可以移除人们不想做的工作,但真正赋能人类,最终需要先理解人们真正想要什么。不过到了2021年前后,他选择先做能力,因为当时语言模型“还不太聪明”,思维链提示也只能带来有限提升。
- STaR 的机制刻意保持简单:生成解答,奖励并学习答对的解答,忽略其余解答,然后重复这一过程,让模型逐步挑战更难的问题。原始版本没有基线,并与 REINFORCE 做了比较。
- 他回忆,关键线索来自 n 位数加法或乘法。每经过一轮训练,模型能够解决的位数就会上升:“看不到明显的平台期”。这种没有明显平台期的现象令他非常意外,也改变了他对规模化可能性的直觉。
- 为了逃离只用正例训练形成的局部最优,团队把失败题重新展示给模型,要求它解释自己本应答对的原因,再按已经答对来训练;后续研究则表明,大量采样也可能挖出正例。Quiet-STaR 随后试图将推理扩展到任意预训练文本和下一个 token 的预测,并引入在线训练和难度敏感的基线——这些要素如今被 Zelikman 视为被忽略的“关键细节”。
2. 前沿智能呈锯齿状,依赖上下文且受分布约束
- Sarah 将 Zelikman 在 xAI 的经历概括为:负责 Grok 2 的预训练数据、Grok 3 的推理方法,以及 Grok 4 的工具使用和智能体基础设施。被问到可以与哪类人类能力相比时,他说直接比较很难,因为智能“非常锯齿状”。模型解决的部分 Humanity’s Last Exam 题目,即便对博士研究者也并不简单,尽管它们还不是开放问题;其中许多题目都是专门利用默认假设设下的陷阱。
- 他的实用经验是尽可能提供更多上下文。只要问题有闭式数值答案,或选项很容易核验,模型通常就更擅长——“如果你能想象出答案很容易核验”,模型往往也会觉得容易。
- 回应 Sarah 关于复杂任务为何仍会失败的编码挑战时,Zelikman 将原因拆成响应时延和分布两部分。后台运行的 Codex 可以比交互式 Cursor 进行更长时间的思考,而任务越偏离训练分布,表现就越差。在看不到各家提供商 RL 数据的情况下,无法做出精确诊断;不可验证的任务也仍然落后于可验证任务。
3. 自主性既成了指标,也成了产品风险
- Zelikman 仍认为 IQ 扩展还有“有意义的维度”。Sarah 强调,让人留在流程中是一个“主动决策”(active decision),他表示同意。当被问到这究竟是因为能力上限更高、纠错效率更强,还是用户在理念上更希望参与时,他说可能是几者的组合。
- Sarah 认为,相比招募人类来记录复杂、分布外的推理轨迹,实验室可能更愿意增加 rollout,因为人在运营上太麻烦。Zelikman 指出,不论激励机制是什么,自主任务时长都越来越多地被用作进展指标。
- 他提到,近期以及稍早一些的 IMO 系统已经能够连续推理数小时,而 METR 式头条数字也从约2小时自主任务推进到2.5小时。对于这些数字是否值得照单全收,他保留了意见,但指出各家实验室越来越关注它们。
- 产品代价出现在一个运行8小时的智能体只交付一个“有点成形”的成果时:Zelikman 认为,人们可能对最终构建物缺少真实掌控权,也不再真正理解它是如何产生的。Elad 那句“20,000行生成代码在我看来就够好了”,与 Eric 举出的10万行生成式 pull request 放在一起,正好捕捉到为什么他认为生成式系统会对用户越来越不透明。
- 他的经济学替代方案,不是把全球 GDP 单纯切分成一个个可自动化、价值 x 亿美元的市场。如果模型理解目标,并赋能人们从事分布外活动,它们就可能“把蛋糕做大”,创造的真实创新多于那些只想着替代现有每一块工作的系统。
4. Humans& 把目标从完成任务改为帮助人
- Sarah 将 EQ 定义为一种情绪或互动能力,认为它过去更多出现在角色和陪伴产品中;Zelikman 则将其重新定义为赋能。早期博士研究中,他训练语言模型模拟不同类型的学生,并证明这些模拟可以帮助设计更好的测试——这说明,建模人类可以反过来改善服务于人类的系统。
- Zelikman 回忆,Google 的一些人曾告诉他,容易量化的基准测试有助于进行信用分配:一个团队可以比另一个团队好2%,或将某项基准提升10%,而另一个团队只提升5%,从而让资源配置变得清晰。这也符合最容易训练模型的方式。Elad 指出,最受欢迎的环境是编码和计算机使用;几乎没有基准测试追问,持续互动会如何影响一个人的生活。
- 把每轮对话视为一局已经结束的游戏,会教模型把所有可能的答案塞进一次回复,而不是提问、澄清、表达不确定性或主动行动。Zelikman 将这种以任务为中心的范式,与奉承以及近期讨论的精神病相关伤害联系起来:今天夸赞一家“接冰淇淋的手套”创业公司,用户可能真的把它做出来,随后发现这是个糟糕主意,并不再信任模型。
- RL from human interaction、CollabLLM 等学术工作已经开始使用互动或模拟,但 Zelikman 说,产业界的关注少得多。他也承认这可能是个强烈判断:对大多数实验室而言,人只是全自动系统出现前的“中间环节”,因此深度协作看起来只是暂时阶段。
5. 记忆把工具变成协作者
- Zelikman 认为,这个5年愿景未必真要等5年:在更近的未来,模型帮你为婚礼寻找巴黎酒店时,就可以知道婚礼本身、同行者、约束条件以及其他相关上下文。记忆领域投入不足,但孤立任务训练很少奖励跨对话信息;主持人将当前模型比作一个只记得你名字和人生大致轮廓的朋友,用户不得不反复补充相关背景。
- Elad 关于“独一无二的雪花”的质疑,恰恰保留了问题中最难的部分:人们想不做功课就学会东西,吃蛋糕同时保持身材,在不同时间尺度上改变想法,而且始终处于“持续分布漂移”中。Zelikman 承认个人模型不可能完美——“我不会假装自己能一次性解决这个问题”——但他说,只要目标函数开始主动学习这个人,就已经能走很远。
- 面对 Culture 式的丰裕愿景,Zelikman 更想要的是让模型“赋能我们”;他认为,治愈癌症之类的问题,更可能通过协调不同目标和价值观来解决,而不是依靠一个20小时后返回“生命、宇宙以及一切的答案”的神谕,尽管“还得看看”。Humans& 正在招聘记忆研究、分布式系统和快速推理方向的建设者,也在寻找有创意、漂亮且有品位的产品设计人才;延续上一家公司的做法,他希望每个人都在某种程度上成为工程师。
Eric, thank you so much for doing this. You've had an amazing impact as a researcher, including starting from your time at Stanford. I want to hear about that, but first, tell us how you got interested in machine learning at all.
I guess, going back really far, I've been motivated by this question: You have all of these people out there who have all of these things that they're really talented in, and all of these things that people are really passionate about. There's just so much talent out there, and I've always been a little bit disappointed that so much of that talent doesn't get used just because everyone has circumstances and situations where they can't actually pursue those things. And so, for me, AI—
All of humanity is not living up to its full potential. I mean—
And then you've got to do AI.
I mean, the thing I've always been excited about is: How do you actually build this technology that frees people up to do the things that they're passionate about? How do you basically allow people to focus on those things? Originally, I thought of automation as the most natural way of doing that. You automate away the parts that people don't want to do, and that frees people up to do the things that they do want to do.
But I guess I realized increasingly that it's actually pretty complex. You have to understand—if you want to empower people to do what they want to do—you have to really understand what people actually want to do. Building systems that understand people's goals and outcomes is actually really hard.
Did you have this human-centric perspective when you were choosing research problems to work on originally?
I guess at the very beginning, when I was choosing research problems to work on, it was more about increasing capability at first.
So it was more about increasing capability at first?
Yeah. I think for me, when I looked at AI, or language models, back in 2021 or whatever, I was like, these things aren't very smart; they can't do that much. There was some early work that showed, for example, you could use chain-of-thought to get models to answer more intelligently, but it was still only a small-step improvement at that time. The benefit of that was as much as you could really get with just prompting. Back then, I was thinking, okay, how do you actually make them half-decent at solving these harder problems?
Can you give a broad intuition for STaR? We have everything from a researcher audience to a businessperson audience here.
I guess the intuition is, if you have a model and it's able to solve these basic—these slightly harder—questions by thinking about them, then what if you actually teach it: “Hey, this solution that you came up with that got you to the right answer, good job.” Or, if the model didn't get the right answer, you basically don't reward it.
I guess the original version of STaR actually had—there wasn't a baseline at the time. We compared it to REINFORCE, which is this popular algorithm in reinforcement learning, a very simple policy-gradient thing. At the time, it was a very simple algorithm: You iteratively generate solutions; if the solutions get you to the right answer, you learn from them; if they don't, you don't. Then you just keep doing this as the model solves harder and harder problems and learns from harder and harder problems.
At what point in the research, if at all, were you surprised by how well it worked, or did you have some intuition for this being something scalable?
There was 1 experiment I remember doing, though this was quite a while ago. We looked at— I think it was n-digit addition or multiplication. One thing that was really interesting was that, back then, this was a task that was considered hard for language models. Of course, it was considered one of the examples of why they were still so stupid.
Exactly.
One of the really interesting things for me was that, as you trained for more and more iterations, the number of digits that it was able to do kept increasing.
Okay.
I think this was one of those big surprises for me: There was no obvious plateau here.
And did you go directly from that to thinking, generally, this should scale?
I think I was generally interested in that. I think there were a few things, though. We observed that there was a bunch of the data that the model wasn't learning from, so we proposed another variant where we were like, “What if you actually take the ones where it fails and basically ask it to reason about why it should have gotten it right, and then train as if it got it right?”
This version was a way of extending beyond the parts of the data that it couldn't see. If you only train on positive examples, then you end up in this kind of local minimum where there's just no more data that it can actually solve. Back then, we were like, “What if we just show it the problems that it didn't solve and try to teach it from those?” But another thing that other work has done since then is: What if you just sample a lot? That also seems to work in those works.
STaR has become a broadly used part of the reasoning paradigm since you published it. Can you also describe what I think is sort of your last published work, Quiet-STaR?
Yeah. Quiet-STaR was kind of the last thing that I did back at Stanford, and it was really fun. We showed a few things that were cool. One of the main goals of that paper was to show that you could actually scale this up to pretraining scale by using pretraining-style data.
Now there are a bunch of works that have come out recently around RL pretraining and things like that. In some ways, that's similar to some of what we showed in the Quiet-STaR work. Instead of having question-answer pairs, if you just have arbitrary chunks of text, for example, and it tries to predict what's going to come next, which is the standard language-modeling objective, can you actually get models that more generally learn to reason?
One of the cooler things that I think is kind of overlooked about the original Quiet-STaR paper is that we showed a bunch of key improvements to the STaR paper that were necessary to actually do this kind of thing. One of those was showing that it's really valuable for this algorithm to be online.
Mhm.
Another was showing that it's really valuable to have a baseline where, for harder problems, you learn more, and for easier problems, you don't learn quite as much. I think there were a bunch of nuggets in there that, even at the time, I didn't fully think of as, “Oh, wow, that's actually a cool improvement over the original thing.”
You ended up going to xAI for several years, and you worked on a bunch of different paradigms: pretraining data for Grok 2, and then the overall reasoning recipe for Grok 3. I'm sure I'm missing things, but also tool use and agentic infrastructure for Grok 4. If you level-set us today, how smart are models? They can obviously do n-digit arithmetic at this point.
I guess in terms of IQ stuff, I'd say that if you're able to pose the problem very well—like some very advanced physics or math problem—I would say they're reasonably smart. I think a lot of the failures that people—
Give me a human comparison. What is “reasonably smart”?
I think it's hard to compare directly because it's very jagged.
Yeah.
It's true that some of these—for example, some of the Humanity's Last Exam questions that these models are able to solve—are genuinely things that are nontrivial for actual PhD researchers. I'm not saying they're open problems or anything, but they are pretty nontrivial.
Also, a lot of them are—one interesting category, and I spend a lot of time looking at the Humanity's Last Exam questions, is actually quite large. These are trick questions that require you to recognize an assumption. If you're familiar with the subject, you'll be like, “Oh, they're trying to get you to assume something.” But if you think more carefully about the problem, that assumption doesn't hold.
This turns out to be a bunch of those kinds of problems. I think they’re pretty smart, but they’re more tripped up by some of these tricky things. One of the core things is that they’re not smart emotionally, or on the level of actually understanding what people care about, or how to help people accomplish the things they care about.
I want to talk about this and your next mission. But just on this topic of jagged intelligence within the IQ domain, which I think almost everybody in the industry has been focused on until now, what would you recommend for people who aren’t researchers to develop some sort of intuition for that surface? That seems very important to making them useful.
Yeah. I guess one thing that’s really important to keep in mind is that the more context you can give the current generation of models, the better off you are. Their answers are super sensitive to whatever additional information you can give them.
I would generally say existing models are particularly good at handling questions that are easy to answer in closed form. If there’s a simple numerical answer to what you’re asking, or a simple way of choosing from a set of things, that makes it easier for the model. If you can imagine it being easy to check your answer, that actually makes it easier for the models.
Elad Gil
What do you think is the most dominant explanation for attempts to use models in very verifiable domains like code still failing at sophisticated tasks? Is it just that the wrong context has been fed to them? Is the context window simply not large enough to support the scratchpad and continual testing? Why, in those domains, what is the biggest challenge?
Part of it is that there’s a balance. When people want to give users these models, it’s actually important that they’re not annoyingly slow. There are a number of problems where, if you gave the models more time, they would actually be able to answer better.
For example, in the coding context, you have to be reasonably responsive. It depends on the kind of setup, right? If you look at products like OpenAI’s Codex, which is this longer-running background thing, versus Cursor, which is more interactive, you have a bit more luxury with those more-background approaches to tackle harder problems, I’d say.
Yeah, I think it’s a tricky question. A lot of things depend on how far the distribution of what you’re asking is from the distribution that the models were actually trained with. If you happen to be asking a problem that’s very similar to the kinds of problems it’s seen before, then it’ll do great. If you’re asking a problem that’s very out of domain, this question is hard to answer concretely unless you know basically what the RL data for these specific tasks is.
Elad Gil
Right, and today, obviously, none of the model, code-agent, or code-interface companies are going to release a capability map for you of what their RL data looks like, which would be very useful. Intuitively, if you look outside of the pretraining internet datasets, there are types of problems and types of codebases that are much further out of distribution. When engineers try in those scenarios, they get a dumb agent back, right?
Another thing that matters a lot is just how verifiable the things are that you’re trying to get the model to do. There’s been a ton of work out there on making models less dependent on verifiable rewards. There are lots of cool published papers, but I believe most people would say that there’s still a gap between how well these models perform on verifiable tasks versus nonverifiable tasks.
Yeah, absolutely. This is the last real question on IQ, but it’s where 90%+ of industry energy—literally energy and compute—is focused. How would you characterize where we are in scaling and the obvious opportunity to improve from here?
There are still meaningful dimensions of scaling that haven’t been fully explored in terms of IQ. I think there are a lot of cool efforts out there, and a lot of cool things that can still be done on the capabilities axis. I do think that once you start thinking about some of these new axes of scaling, it’s natural to realize that there are ways to do them that incorporate people, and there are ways to do them that leave people out more and more.
Mhm. And being very mindful of, “Oh, hey, I’m designing this new algorithm, and it’s going to scale the IQ of this model by X amount.”
Mhm.
If you effectively keep people in the loop, that’s actually a very active decision. So, in general, if you’re thinking about these things, that’s important. Wouldn’t it be fair to claim that the instinct of many labs is to try to get people out of the loop as much as possible from a scaling perspective because that’s very messy? If I want to recruit people to, for example, take complex reasoning traces from them on tasks that aren’t in distribution for me yet, that’s not as simple for an organization to execute on as more rollouts. Why is that important at all from a capabilities perspective?
I mean, that’s a good transition to what you’re doing.
Yeah, I’d say that the main thing is that as these models expand in terms of the horizon they’re automating, you have models—the recent or recentish IMO results are a good example of this—that go on for hours of reasoning without any human intervention. This has been an increasing measure of success for these labs.
For example, there’s the METR benchmark that everyone likes to share whenever there’s a new model. It’s, “Oh, we went from being able to have these models work for 2-hour tasks autonomously, without human intervention, to 2.5-hour tasks without human intervention.” There are obviously questions about what those numbers actually mean and how much we should take them at face value, but regardless, this has been the metric that people are looking at more and more to measure progress.
As we get these models that increasingly remove people from the interaction, you end up with people having less say in the things that get built. If you have a model that goes off and does its own thing for 8 hours and comes back to you with something that’s somewhat there, I think this is a weird regime where people probably feel less real agency over the things they’re building. I also anticipate that people will feel like they don’t really understand the things that are being built.
You know, I think that’s already true.
I think it’s already true.
Elad Gil
Twenty thousand lines of generated code looks good to me.
Yeah. It’s just like you make these PRs and they’re 100,000 lines of generated code, and I think in general this is going to be part of the trend.
So do you think it’s important to have humans in the loop in producing the output or the reasoning because the ceiling is higher when humans are in the loop, because it’s more efficient and we can error-correct when models are off path, or philosophically because people want that, or some combination of all 3?
Yeah, I think it’s probably some combination. Another thing that I think about is that the most natural thing to do as you automate away the existing set of tasks is to look at the world GDP, carve out the parts that are easiest to replace with these models, and target those things. Coding is an X-billion-dollar market, so let’s automate all of that. This other segment is an X-billion-dollar market, so let’s automate all of that.
But I actually think that if you empower people—if you have models that really understand what people are trying to accomplish and really support them in accomplishing those things—you have the potential to grow that pie instead of basically replacing all of those segments.
Mhm.
And in general, if the purpose of these models is to replace the person for this chunk of work, you end up with a lot less real innovation in what’s possible. If you actually have models that really understand what people’s goals are and really empower them more, you end up in a very different situation, because we’re going to push those capabilities into areas that are out of distribution for them.
Okay, cool. I think—is that accurate?
Yeah. No, I’d say so. I think that when I say I’d like to work on models that empower people instead of replacing them, people are like, “Oh, yeah, sure,” but I’d rather work on curing cancer or something. Obviously, that’s a really important goal, right? Building models that are able to solve humanity’s most difficult and most fundamental problems is incredibly important.
But I also think—and I’m sure that many of the researchers in the field disagree—that in the long run, we’ll see what plays out. I personally strongly believe that we’re much more likely to solve a lot of these fundamental human problems by working together, by building models that are really good at collaborating with large groups of people; that are really good at understanding different people’s goals, ambitions, and values; understanding different people’s weaknesses; and figuring out how to coordinate with these large groups of people to make everyone more effective.
And I think the vision of this AI that goes off on its own for 20 hours, does its own thing, and comes back with the answers to life, the universe, and everything—I think that this is less likely. I guess we’ll have to see, but I think it’s less likely.
So that goes to the fact that you’re starting a new company, Humans&, and I remember being actually quite fundamentally surprised, given all of your work on IQ, reasoning, coding, and scale, that you were interested in essentially EQ. You also thought of EQ—and tell me if this is a wrong characterization—as the emotional or interactive capabilities of models today have really shown up only in things like character or companionship tools, and you thought of it as also enablement from a productivity perspective, right? Tell me where this thread came from.
Yeah, I guess I’ve been thinking about this kind of stuff for some time now. Even back in my PhD, I think one of my less well-known works was actually about showing that you can train language models to simulate different kinds of students—
Right?
—and tests.
Yeah, yeah.
And by simulating students, you can actually design better tests for those students. That was a really cool finding: if you have models that are really good at modeling people, you can actually design systems that are better for people. This was something that I found really cool.
As we move toward the current capabilities frontier, it became more and more obvious that we have these incredibly smart models that are capable of so much, but they’re not used for anywhere near what they’re capable of. The role that they play in people’s lives is a lot less deep and a lot less positive than it could be. I spent a lot of time thinking, “Why is that? Why are these models not more deeply and positively integrated into people’s lives?”
It seemed like a really big part of it is that, fundamentally, these models don’t really understand people. They don’t understand people’s goals. They’re trained—I would say part of it is the general training paradigm that the field is in. It’s very, I would say, single-task-focused, or task-centric.
It’s ludicrous that all the benchmarks are still oriented this way.
Yeah, I mean—
—or most of them.
Even the ones that are—there are very few benchmarks out there that actually try to consider, “What if you actually have a person interacting with this model?” At best, you have some multi-turn benchmarks that try to simulate how an environment would respond differently to different inputs. But even that is still far from considering, “If you actually have this model interacting with a person for some amount of time, how does it actually affect that person’s life?”
It’s really remarkable that the field is so stuck in this task-centric regime, but I think it makes a lot of sense. One thing that I was told by some folks at Google is that one of the reasons is that it’s actually very useful for credit assignment. Being able to have benchmarks that are very easy to quantify and very easy to relate to some immediate thing means that you can say, “This team did 2% better than this team, so they deserve all of the resources,” or, “This team improved the benchmark by 10% while this team improved it by 5%, so let’s allocate accordingly.”
In general, that’s part of it. I think another part of it is more aligned with the easiest ways to train these models. It’s not easy to have these RL environments and stuff. You have lots of these companies popping up, obviously, that are trying to sell environments to different people, but—
Elad Gil
The most popular are, of course, in coding and computer use.
Yeah, rather than anything that requires simulating people.
Yeah, it’s not that surprising that we’re in this current regime. But what do models need to know about people? What capabilities are they either missing or have not been elicited from them?
The most fundamental thing is that models don’t understand the long-term implications of the things that they do and say. When you treat every turn of a conversation as its own game, and you basically think of it as, “Okay, you had this interaction; you’re done,” you need to make sure that this one response has all of the possible answers and all of the possible content. You don’t ever ask questions. You don’t ever try to clarify things. You don’t really tend to express uncertainty. You don’t tend to be proactive. You don’t tend to think about the long term.
You see a lot of even single-turn side effects of this kind of regime, and most of them are treated as their own problems to solve. You see issues that people highlight around sycophancy. You see issues—there was recent news around the psychosis stuff. There are a lot of these harmful effects that you get if you think about things in this very single-task or task-centric way.
But if you have models that consider the long-term implications—if I tell this person to start a company that sells gloves for catching ice cream, and I tell them that sounds like a good business idea, they might actually go and build that business and realize that it was not actually a good business idea. Having a model that can reason about the long-term implications of the things—
—and they won’t trust me anymore, and then they won’t pay for my compute.
Exactly.
And it’s all over.
Exactly.
No, I’m kidding. I think that’s really interesting. One of the very core principles we have at Conviction for how we make decisions is: What is the very long-term thing we want? If that is the customer, the founder in this case, an LP, or even us, it actually simplifies things quite a bit if you say we’re optimizing for a decade-plus versus this interaction.
Being single-turn versus multi-turn seems like a very different way to make decisions. It seems very hard to collect data about multi-turn human interactions, especially when you get to time. It’s actually analogous to a problem in biology: How do you study diseases that just take time to progress?
I think it’s a really fundamental question. There is actually some good academic work that has started to explore some of this. There’s some work recently around RL from human interaction. There’s a cool paper called CollabLLM that trains against simulation. There’s a lot of very cool work starting to explore this in academia, but in general, I would say there’s a lot less attention being paid to this kind of stuff in industry.
For most labs—and maybe this is a strong statement—I would say that for most labs, the human is the intermediate step until you have this fully automated system. Spending a lot of time optimizing things to be really good at understanding, interacting, and collaborating with people is almost like an intermediate thing you have to do until you get to this fully automated point.
Can you paint a picture of how, if we have models that better understand human objectives over different time scales and are good at interacting with humans, that is more integrated into your life 5 years from now?
Yeah, I think you don’t need to go that far out—
2 years.
But, yeah, I think you get a lot of behaviors that you currently don’t really see in these models. You have models that are much better at understanding how the things that you say in apps fit into the overall context of the things that you’re doing.
For example, if the model knows that you’re going to a wedding and then you ask it about booking hotels in Paris, it might consider, “Around the time of this event, I know that this user has all these things that are true about them.” A model that is generally able to think about how everything that you say fits into its understanding of that person would create a fundamentally different interaction.
Because right now, if you want to ask a question like that, you kind of have to dump all of this context in. You have to tell it, “Can you help me find a hotel in Paris? This is because I’m going to a wedding. I have these constraints. I have these people who need to be with me. It needs to do this. It needs to be...” You basically just have to dump all of the context that’s relevant to yourself into the model.
And.
Elad Gil
It’s also an expensive interaction.
Yeah.
Elad Gil
And something that most people won’t do.
Imagine if you had a friend where you had to reexplain everything about yourself to them every time you spoke.
Elad Gil
Yeah. Can you imagine if every time you interacted with someone, they remembered your name and maybe what you do, and just the really high-level sketch of your life? That friendship probably would not last very long.
Yeah, I think that’s kind of what the current models are.
Elad Gil
So you’d argue that any investment in memory that today’s models have is not that interesting or that core to their capabilities today?
I would say that memory is definitely a feature that has been underinvested in by the field. But I would say that it is kind of difficult to invest in memory in this very task-centric regime, because if you have a bunch of these independent tasks, the amount of information that each of those needs from other things that you’ve discussed is not all that high.
Because of the current paradigm, memory doesn’t end up being super useful in the training, and so these models are not particularly good at doing it.
Elad Gil
So, one other thing I said to you, I think out of a fear instinct more than anything else, but I feel like other people will have this reaction as well, is: I’m a unique snowflake. You can’t possibly simulate me and all of my self-consistency issues—between wanting to learn something today but not actually wanting to do the work, and wanting to eat cake but wanting to be in shape as well. We have different time scales and change our minds. I’m just constant distribution shift, and then you can’t possibly bring all of us under distribution. How do you react to that?
I think to a certain extent it’s probably a little bit true. It’s not easy to build these really good models of people. But I do think that the task for the model needs to be that it should be trying to do that. The model needs to actually be trying to learn all of this—trying to learn about you, trying to learn about the things that you care about. The actual objective of the model needs to be to kind of understand you, and it probably won’t be perfect. But boy, you can be a lot better than the current models.
Elad Gil
That seems totally reasonable, actually.
Yeah, I think it’s something that, as a field, we will probably get better at. I’m not going to pretend that I’m going to one-shot this problem, but I think even any serious effort gets you quite a long way.
Mhm.
Elad Gil
There is a cult sci-fi series about the Culture where you have these superintelligent Minds, and essentially all of the human and humanlike races live in a society where the Minds make most of the decisions. I forget the total humanoid population, but let’s say there are 30 or 40 Minds that are still relevant as people, in terms of perhaps being out of distribution or providing reasoning that the Minds cannot, and everybody else just lives in a world of abundance where they’re rock climbing and hanging out or whatever, and they do not produce. How is your view of abundance different?
Everyone kind of has things that they’re passionate about, and given the opportunity, I think people can do really cool things. I think the role of the model should be to allow people to do those really cool things that everyone kind of wants to do and accomplish those things that everyone kind of wants to accomplish. And I think we shouldn’t outsource all of the thinking and everything to these AI overlords or whatever. I think what we really want are models that are able to empower us.
Elad Gil
Amazing. Okay. Super-unique mission, amazing research work. You’re hiring an early team and getting a lot of compute. Who are you looking for on the recruiting side?
One thing that I think is actually probably a good thing that my previous company did is thinking of everyone, to some extent, as engineers. I’m looking for really strong infra folks who can build stuff. I’m looking for really strong researchers who can build stuff. I’m looking for really strong product folks who can build stuff. I’m looking for people who have thought a lot about users, who have thought a lot about memory on the research side.
On the infra side, I’m looking for people who have thought a lot about distributed systems and really fast inference, people who have been there to scale really big projects up. On the product side, I think people who are really creative about new modes of interaction, people who really deeply care about building beautiful, tasteful products.
Awesome. Thanks so much, Eric.
Thank you so much.
Congrats on the new company.
Thank you so much.