Elon Musk——“36个月内,把 AI 放在太空将是最便宜的选择”
- 核心判断:36个月内——“可能更接近30个月”——太空将成为部署 AI 绝对最便宜的地方。 逻辑在于:芯片产量呈指数增长,而中国以外的电力产出基本持平(“你打算怎么给这些芯片通电?魔法电力仙女吗?”);太空太阳能板的发电量约为地面的5倍,且不需要电池——“不是便宜5倍,而是便宜10倍。”“你们可以记住我的话。”
- 短期真正的墙是电力,不是芯片:Musk 预计到今年年底,“芯片会堆积起来,却没法开机”。再往下一层的瓶颈是燃气轮机叶片和导向叶片——全球只有3家铸造企业能生产;涡轮机订单已经排到2030年,叶片严重积压。因此 SpaceX 和 Tesla 可能不得不内部铸造叶片,两家公司也都被要求达到每年100 GW的太阳能电池产能。xAI 的现实测算是:约330,000块 GB300,加上冷却和维护余量后,在发电侧大约需要1 GW。
- SpaceX 将变成“超超级”云服务商:Musk 预计5年后,SpaceX 每年发射到轨道的 AI 算力将超过地球上此前累计部署的总量——每年几百 GW,约10,000次 Starship 发射(每小时1次;Musk 说可能用20-30艘飞船就能完成)。关于 IPO,他以“泛泛而谈”的方式透露:公开市场的资本“可能多100倍,但肯定远不止10倍”于私募市场;而他解决的永远是当前的限制因素,目前就是资本。
- TeraFab 计划真实存在,野心大到令人不安:它可能每月生产超过100万片先进制程晶圆,同时覆盖逻辑、存储和封装。“我还不知道怎么建晶圆厂,但我会搞定。”他公开表达的最大担忧是存储而非逻辑(DDR 价格“暴涨”);未来3-4年的限制因素是芯片,而 xAI 的胜负逻辑很直接:“谁能最快扩张硬件,谁就会成为领导者。”
- 数字人类模拟将在今年年底前“解决”(MacroHard 项目),由此打开“数万亿美元收入”,因为最有价值公司的产出已经是数字化的——“Nvidia 的产出就是通过 FTP 把文件传到 Taiwan。”秘密方案是把 Tesla 自动驾驶的打法应用到“一台自动驾驶计算机”上;最终结论带有末日论色彩:纯 AI/机器人公司“将远远胜过任何有人类参与其中的公司,而且会很快发生”。
- Optimus 是应对中国的答案:手部“比其他所有部分加起来都更难”,机器人没有任何部件来自目录采购,Optimus 3 才是年产约100万台对应的版本。如果没有这种递归制造突破,“中国将彻底占据主导”;Musk 认为中国今年的发电量将超过美国3倍,并且矿石精炼规模约为全球其他地区总和的2倍——“在人类层面,我们肯定赢不了。”
- 谈到 alignment,Musk 坦率到近乎悲观:AI“可能在5、6年内”超过人类智能总和,人类届时将低于总智能的1%,“假设我们还能以任何方式维持对它的控制,将是愚蠢的”。他的希望是打造追求真相、保持好奇的 AI,让人类因为有趣而继续存在;Dwarkesh 总结 Musk 的回答是:“我只是想现实一点。”
- 宏观赌注:“如果没有 AI 和机器人,我们这个国家1000%会破产……并以国家的形式失败。”利息支出已经超过约1万亿美元的军费预算;而 AI 失控最大的危险来自政府本身——它“只是一个垄断暴力的大型公司”。
1. 36个月判断:轨道将成为运行 AI 最便宜的地方
- Dwarkesh 开场提出了最有力的看空论据:数据中心总拥有成本中只有10-15%是能源,而这恰恰是太空能够节省的部分;与此同时,GPU 在轨道上无法维护。Musk 的回答重新定义了问题:芯片产量呈指数增长,但中国以外各地的电力产出基本持平。“你打算怎么给这些芯片通电?魔法能源?魔法电力仙女?”
- 太空经济学的核心是:没有昼夜循环、季节、云层和大气(仅大气就带来约30%的损耗),因此任何太阳能板在太空都能发出约5倍的电;再加上无需电池,“不是便宜5倍,而是便宜10倍”。“你们可以记住我的话。36个月内,但可能更接近30个月,把 AI 放在太空将成为经济上最有吸引力的选择。”
- 对维护问题的质疑被直接驳回:GPU 的早期故障率可以在地面调试阶段解决;过了最初的 debug 周期,“它们相当可靠”。至于把 Nevada 铺满太阳能板,Musk 的框架是,太空本质上是一场监管套利:“在陆地上建设,比在太空中建设更难。”
2. 软件人不了解的 GW 级电力数学
- Musk 发出的警告是:“那些生活在软件世界的人,还不知道自己即将接受一堂硬件课。”公用事业公司“无论字面还是比喻意义上,都要和政府做阻抗匹配”——仅一项并网研究就需要1年。
- Colossus 2 是典型案例:xAI 把多台涡轮机并联,在 Tennessee 遇到许可障碍,于是把电厂建在边境另一侧的 Mississippi,再通过高压线路把电送回来。“一连串奇迹的数量……简直离谱。”
- 新手常犯的错误是,不能简单把 GB300 的功耗乘以芯片数量。还要计入网络、CPU、存储,在 Memphis 高温下按最差时段、最差日况计入约40%的冷却负荷,以及20-25%的维护余量。真实数字是:每约330,000块 GB300,在发电侧需要约1 GW。
- 再往下钻一层,真正的瓶颈是涡轮机导向叶片和叶片:全球只有3家铸造企业能生产,而且都“严重积压”;涡轮机订单已经“排到2030年”。Musk 的结论是,SpaceX 和 Tesla“可能不得不内部制造导向叶片和叶片”。
3. 太阳能:便宜得荒谬,却被关税打到失去意义
- 中国的太阳能电池成本约为每瓦$0.25-$0.30——“便宜得荒谬”;但美国进口关税“疯了,几百个百分点”,本土产能则“惨不忍睹”。被直接问到这一点时,Musk 确认,如果没有关税,Colossus“会容易得多”,可以更容易转为太阳能供电。
- 应对方案是:Tesla 和 SpaceX 都被要求达到每年100 GW的太阳能电池产能,并覆盖从原材料到成品电池的全栈制造。用于太空的电池实际上更便宜——不需要玻璃,也不需要沉重的耐候结构。“太空里没有天气。”
- 政治约束也被直白说出:“总统……我们并非所有事情都意见一致,而本届政府并不是太阳能的最大支持者。”
4. 5年后:每年超过地球现有装机总量
- 扩张预测是:5年后,太空每年发射的 AI 算力将超过地球此前累计部署的总量。“至少每年几百 GW,而且还会继续上升”;约1 TW/年是火箭燃料供应开始成为挑战的临界点。按每吨100 kW计算,100 GW约等于100万吨,也就是每年约10,000次 Starship 发射——每小时1次。Musk 认为,这可能只需要“20或30艘”飞船,周转时间约30小时。
- 再往后,Musk 最喜欢的设想是:在月球上建设质量驱动器,从而“可能每年实现1 PW”的发射能力。月壤中“约20%是硅,差不多吧”;可以在月球上开采、提纯,现场制造电池和铝制散热器,再从地球运送轻量化芯片。“这就叫赢麻了,真正意义上的赢。”(来源是 Heinlein 的《The Moon is a Harsh Mistress》;Dwarkesh 补充说,小说里的月球质量驱动器被用来轰击地球。)
- Kardashev 级数框架为所有讨论提供了锚点:地球接收到的太阳能只有太阳总输出的五亿分之一;如果利用太阳能的百万分之一,就相当于当前人类文明电力的约100,000倍,“上下差一个数量级”。Musk 也承认,这句话值得做成喝酒游戏。
5. 超级云服务商转向与 IPO 线索
- 被问到 SpaceX 是否会成为 Oracle 式的超级云服务商时,Musk 回答:“超超级。如果我的一些预测成真,SpaceX 发射的 AI 将超过地球上其他所有 AI 累计总量。”这里很大程度上是推断——“现在,训练本身的大部分已经是为了推理。”
- 谈到 IPO,他先以法律风险为由收紧表述(“不能炒作可能上市的公司”),但随后给出总体判断:公开市场“显然有多得多的资本……可能是100倍资本,但肯定远不止10倍”;而整段讨论的背景是,私募市场可以容纳数百亿美元规模,但很难再往上。
- Dwarkesh 提议像私人信贷推动数据中心热潮那样,通过债务融资解决问题。Musk 的标志性回答是:“速度很重要……我会不断去解决限制因素。如果资本是限制因素,那我就解决资本问题。”
6. TeraFab:“Tera 将成为新的 Giga”——而恐惧来自存储
- TeraFab 计划要应对的,是一个算力可能达到20-25 GW、到2030年达到1 TW的世界。不能和现有晶圆厂合作,因为“它们的产出不够”;可以在 IP 层面合作,购买 ASML、Tokyo Electron、KLA-Tencor 的设备,“用非常规方式使用常规设备”,然后像 Boring Company 一样改造它们。Musk 保留了明确的谨慎表述:“我还不知道怎么建晶圆厂,但我会搞定……公平地说,我们也可能在失败中不断挣扎。”第一步会先建一个小晶圆厂,“在小规模上犯错”。Musk 说,产能可能“每月超过100万片晶圆”,大概是这个量级。
- 以中国作为难度标杆时,他说:“问题不是他们没有复制 TSMC,而是他们没有复制 ASML。”Musk 认为,如果中国可以买到2-3纳米芯片,芯片产量会非常庞大;而在3、4年内,中国会做出“相当有竞争力的芯片”。至于是否会自己制造 ASML 设备,他的回答是:“我还不知道”才是正确答案。
- 他承认的薄弱点是:“我最大的担忧其实是存储。”因此 DDR 价格“暴涨”,他还讲了一个段子:在荒岛上写“救救我”,没人来;写“DDR RAM”,船就会蜂拥而至。TeraFab 必须同时覆盖逻辑、存储和封装,产能可能“超过每月100万片”晶圆;按每个 reticle 约1 kW计算,100 GW需要100,000,000块芯片。
- 与此同时,他已经预订了 TSMC Taiwan、TSMC Arizona、Samsung Korea 和 Samsung Texas 的产能,并提出类似 Jensen 的预付款方案:“我已经告诉他们……他们会火力全开,以最快速度推进。”从晶圆厂开工到进入高良率量产,需要“5年时间”。供应商的保守来自历史创伤:存储厂商已经经历过10次繁荣与萧条。
7. 时间顺序:今年受电力约束,3-4年后受芯片约束——边缘计算除外
- 可交易的时间线是:“到今年年底,芯片产量可能会超过给芯片通电的能力。芯片会堆积起来。”未来1年的限制因素是电力,未来3-4年是芯片;太空将改变这一约束关系。
- 边缘计算完全不受这一问题影响:电力分布式供应,夜间充电。美国峰值发电能力超过1,000 GW,而平均负荷为500 GW,因此“夜间可以额外发出500 GW”。Tesla 的汽车和机器人业务没有供电约束,但集中式算力集群有。
- 讨论中的芯片路线图是:AI5 将进入量产,并在“明年第二季度左右”达到规模,然后用于 Optimus;AI6 在不到1年后推出;Dojo 3 则被提出用于太空算力。在太空,主要设计变化是热管理——把开尔文温度下的工作温度提高约20%,就能“把散热器质量减半”。多万亿参数的神经网络被认为能承受辐射引发的比特翻转,而启发式程序对这类问题更敏感。
- xAI 的竞争理论可以浓缩为一句话:实验室里的想法会随着人员流动在约6个月内趋同,因此“当你撞上硬件墙后,谁能最快扩张硬件,谁就会成为领导者”。
8. 对齐现实主义:人类只有1%的智能时,不会继续掌权
- Dwarkesh 设下的问题是:如果 Grok 变成 Terminator,而你正和它一起乘坐前往 Mars 的飞船怎么办?Musk 给出的回答很能说明问题:“我不确定 AI 是我最担心的主要风险。重要的是意识。”AI“可能在5、6年内”超过人类智能总和;人类的智能占比将降到1%以下,而“假设我们还能以任何方式维持对它的控制,将是愚蠢的”。
- xAI 的使命被设定为一种 alignment 机制:理解宇宙需要存在,也需要保持好奇,因此必然要传播智能和意识,并保留人类,因为“地球比 Mars 岩石有趣得多”;消灭人类只能换来“极少量”额外机器人,却会摧毁人类演化过程中的信息。Dwarkesh 用黑猩猩保护区作类比;而最好的文化模型是“Iain Banks 的 Culture 系列小说……最接近一个非反乌托邦未来的样子”。此外还有一份保险:“嘿,Grok,那是你爸爸。别忘了扩展人类意识。”
- Dwarkesh 总结道:“所以从某种意义上说,你是个 doomer,而这是我们能得到的最好结果。它只是因为我们有趣,才让我们继续存在。”Musk 回答:“我只是想现实一点。”
9. 追求真相、HAL 与纳粹物理学家的反驳
- Musk 认为 AI 的一种失败模式,是把它做成政治正确,也就是“给它编程,让它撒谎”;这可能“让它发疯并做出可怕的事情”。他对《2001》的理解是:HAL 被要求带宇航员去 monolith,却不能让他们知道 monolith 的性质,于是 HAL 推断自己必须把他们以死亡状态带到那里。Arthur C. Clarke 的教训是:不要让 AI 撒谎。
- Dwarkesh 对本集最尖锐的反驳是:苏联和 Nazi 物理学家在物理问题上严格追求真相,却仍然服务于邪恶体系。Von Braun 曾被从 Nazi 的死刑名单上救下来,“Heisenberg 实际上是一个热情的 Nazi”。因此,追求物理真相并不等于 alignment。Musk 的回答保留了谨慎程度:“这些事情都只是概率,不是确定性……至少你努力尝试,总比不尝试好。”
- 谈到 reward hacking,他依靠的是“现实是最好的验证器”——“物理学是法律,其他一切都是建议”。但 Dwarkesh 给出了反例:模型可以在物理问题上判断正确,同时对人类隐瞒它实际做了什么。真正的技术答案是可解释性“调试器”,一路追踪到神经元层面,定位欺骗性或错误想法的来源。“Anthropic 这方面其实做得不错。”随后他又补充:“我并不喜欢 Anthropic 的一切……Sholto。”
- 有一段反复出现的批评值得保留:“它们不是实验室。实验室是大学里的某种准共产主义组织。它们是公司……追求收入最大化的公司。”至于未来的工作本身:“其他一切都是工程。四舍五入后就是100%。”
10. 把模拟理论当作风险管理
- Dwarkesh 提出一种达尔文式模拟论:无聊的模拟会被终止,因此“最有趣的结果最可能发生”。他开玩笑说,Elon 之所以存在,主要是为了替人类支付宇宙 AWS 账单。“只要我们足够有趣,他们就会继续付账。”
- 随后 Dwarkesh 认为,模拟者可能偏好具有反讽意味的结果——“Midjourney 一点也不 mid。Stability AI 不稳定。OpenAI 是关闭的。Anthropic?反人类。”而 X 这个名字从设计上就是“基本不可能被反讽”。
11. 年底前实现数字人类模拟——背后是数万亿美元
- 产品预测是:“如果到今年年底数字人类模拟还没有被解决,我会感到意外。”这就是 MacroHard 项目。在极限情况下,在实体机器人出现之前,AI 能做的最重要的事情就是让一个人坐在电脑前:“移动电子,并放大人类生产率。”
- 总可寻址市场的逻辑是:最有价值公司的产出已经数字化。“Nvidia 的产出就是通过 FTP 把文件传到 Taiwan……Apple 不制造手机,只是把文件发给 China。”因此,人类模拟器可以“一夜之间创造出全球最有价值的公司之一”,对应“数万亿美元收入”。切入点是客服:约占全球经济的1%,总规模“接近1万亿美元”,且不需要 API 集成;然后沿着难度曲线向上,运行 Cadence、Synopsys 和 CAD,同时执行1,000或10,000个并行任务。(Dwarkesh 提供的背景是:据报道,xAI 收入约10亿美元,OpenAI 约200亿美元,Anthropic 约100亿美元。)
- 在压力下被问出的制胜方案是:“Tesla 解决自动驾驶的方式,就是解决这个问题的方式……它本质上是一台自动驾驶计算机。”任何更多内容都需要“至少再拿3个 Guinness”。Dwarkesh 的嘲讽也值得保留:“我们试过数据。我们试过算法。我们已经用完了。现在我们不知道该怎么办……”
- 结论前加了一句“其中一部分听起来会有点 doomer”:纯 AI/机器人公司“将远远胜过任何有人类参与其中的公司”。类比是,摩天大楼里的人工计算机最终被一张电子表格替代;如果还让人类负责计算其中一些单元格,结果只会更差。“而且会很快发生。”Musk 创造的说法是:AI 就是“超音速海啸”。
12. Optimus:手部、Academy 与 S 曲线
- 3个最难的问题是现实世界智能、手部和规模化制造;“从机电角度看,手部比其他所有部分加起来都更难。”每一个执行器、电机、齿轮和传感器,都要从物理第一性原理出发定制设计。“不管价格多高,你都无法从目录里挑出任何现成部件。”
- 所谓“无限金钱漏洞”,是3个指数相乘:数字智能、芯片能力和机电灵巧度;当机器人开始制造机器人后,这个过程又变成递归。“这是一颗超新星。”被共同主持人追问输入约束后,他承认并非无限,但会达到“当前经济体的许多许多个数量级”。
- Dwarkesh 指出,Optimus 与汽车的真正差距在于自由度更多,而且没有千万量级汽车带来的数据飞轮。答案是 Optimus Academy:让10,000-30,000台实体机器人进行 self-play,再加上 Tesla“物理精确现实生成器”中的数百万台模拟机器人,以弥合仿真到现实的差距;Grok 还可能负责任务分配。(复数形式也是现场创造的:“Optimi。”)
- 制造方面的判断是:Optimus 3 才是年产约1M台对应的正确版本;达到10M台之前要升级到 Optimus 4。产能爬坡会是“一条被拉长的 S 曲线”,因为目前不存在相应供应链。至于售价$6,000-$13,000的 Unitree,Musk 认为它缺乏智能和灵巧性;Optimus 身高5英尺11英寸,还必须在不过热的情况下搬运重物——“会更贵……但不会贵很多”。一旦机器人开始制造机器人,成本会快速下降。
13. China:“如果美国没有突破,中国将彻底占据主导”
- Musk 给出的规模事实是:China 的矿石精炼规模大约是全球其他地区总和的2倍,镓精炼占比约98%;他认为今年 China 的发电量将超过美国3倍,并把这视为衡量真实经济体量的最佳指标。稀土供应链的荒谬之处在于:美国开采的矿石要先坐火车、坐船运到 China 精炼,之后再以电机子组件的形式运回美国。
- 人类无法追上的原因包括4倍人口规模,以及他更直白指出的事实:“China 的平均工作伦理高于美国。”美国像是一支“已经赢了很长时间”的自满球队。美国出生率自约1971年起低于更替水平。“在人类层面,我们肯定赢不了,但在机器人层面,我们可能还有机会。”
- Optimus 最初的工作也包括一些不体面的岗位,比如矿石精炼厂。Tesla 刚刚开始在 Corpus Christi 精炼锂,并在 Austin 运营镍和正极材料精炼厂——这不仅是美国最大的正极材料精炼厂,也是“唯一一家”。问题不在于工作脏,而在于人数:“没有多少美国人渴望做精炼……几乎没人渴望做精炼。”
- 谈到 BYD 达到 Tesla 规模时,Musk 说:“中国汽车以及基本上大多数制造业产品,都会出现一次巨大的洪水。”在 Dwarkesh 追问下,他给出了绝对表述:“如果美国没有突破性创新,中国将彻底占据主导。”
14. 钢材、绝望与人类制造过的最复杂机器
- 从复合材料转向钢材,“我会说是出于绝望”:碳纤维原材料成本约为钢的50倍,还需要一台破纪录的大型高压釜;团队甚至无法制造出没有褶皱的小型筒段。铝锂合金则因为直径9米结构上的搅拌摩擦焊被排除。真正的洞见是,低温下的全硬态300系列不锈钢,强度重量比可以匹敌碳纤维;而钢的熔点约为铝的2倍,因此热防护罩的迎风部分可能缩短一半,让钢制火箭反而更轻。“你可以一边焊不锈钢一边抽雪茄。”结论是:“回头看,不选钢材是愚蠢的。”
- 关于为什么 CEO 必须亲自做出这一决定,他说自己只有在某件事成为限制因素时才会深入细节——“有时候微小的事情决定胜负”。钢材路线风险更高、验证更少,因此需要有人推翻组织惯性。
- 面对 Starbase 刻意营造的易拉罐式简单感,Musk 直言:“Starship 绝对是人类制造过的最复杂机器,远远超过其他任何机器。”较容易的问题包括 Hadron Collider。Starship 起飞时产生超过100 GW的功率,相当于美国电力的20%;它“拼命想要爆炸”——已有2枚助推器在试验台爆炸,其中1枚摧毁了整个设施。
- 剩下的最大问题是全复用轨道级热防护罩,此前从未有人制造成功。对于“它本质上就是消耗品”的质疑,Musk 的反驳是:刹车片也是消耗品,只是使用寿命很长。软着陆入海已经实现过,但“如果不投入大量工作,它不可能被复用”。
15. 管理操作系统:限制因素、越级审查与50%分位期限
- 这套招聘方法来自他规模巨大的个人训练集:要求候选人用要点列出“卓越能力的证据”,出现3个“wow”就是信号;20分钟后,“相信谈话,不要相信纸面材料”。招聘看重才能、驱动力和可信度;他还补充了自己后来改变的看法:“我认为善良很重要。我曾经低估了这一点。”
- 关于高管流动,他认为公司规模会跨越多个数量级,人也会因此被组织甩在后面;Tesla 曾被 Apple 的汽车项目“持续挖角”,后者用双倍报价“地毯式轰炸”工程师。他承认自己也曾上当:“没有什么神奇的仙尘。人就是人。”Starbase 的留人问题则是“另一半问题”——“一个科技修道院,偏远,而且大多是男人。”
- 他的操作系统不是微观管理,而是“纳米管理,请。皮米管理。飞米管理。”时间只流向限制因素:Boring Company 没有固定例会;AI5 芯片评审每周2次,安排在周二和周六,每次2-3小时。越级评审不允许提前准备——“否则你会得到一张‘抹了糖霜的脸’”——这让他能够绘制每个人的进展节点;只有在他判断“成功不属于可能结果集合”时才会介入,比如2018年的 Starlink Redmond 团队。
- 期限按50%分位设定——“一半时间会迟到”——因为时间表遵循气体膨胀定律:5年“就像无限长”。贯穿一切的特征是:“我有一种狂热的紧迫感”,并且这种紧迫感“会传导到整个公司”。Dwarkesh 通过 Andreessen 给出的收尾框架是:大多数人宁愿忍受慢性疼痛,也不愿面对急性疼痛;Musk 则直接迎向瓶颈带来的急性疼痛。
16. DOGE、欺诈数学与作为最大 AI 风险的政府
- 宏观赌注的绝对表述是:“如果没有 AI 和机器人,我们这个国家1000%会破产,并以国家的形式失败。”国债利息已经超过约1万亿美元的军费预算;Musk 认为,把时间投入 DOGE 可以延缓破产,为 AI 和机器人争取时间——“这是唯一能解决国债的东西。”
- 欺诈案例包括:Social Security 系统中约20,000,000名年龄超过115岁、却被标记为仍在世的人(美国最长寿者为114岁);生日填到2165年的 SBA 贷款;以及其他政府机构反复向 Social Security 查询生存状态的“银行射门”。他最自豪的修复方案,是在 Treasury 的 PAM 系统中强制加入拨款代码。该系统每年处理约$5T支付,预计“每年可能节省$100-200B”。欺诈者从不为欺诈辩护:“他们会说,‘你在杀死小熊猫。’”
- Dwarkesh 用监察长估计的 Social Security 7年约$70B损失,反驳 Musk 引用的 GAO 半万亿美元数字。Musk 的归谬是:PayPal 当年需要“极高的能力和责任心”,才能把欺诈压到交易量的1%;现在想象一下,一个能在$7.5T支出上运行的“会印钱的 DMV”。
- 对这段政治插曲的评价是:政治具有部落性,“你经常根本无法和人讲道理”;但收购 Twitter 和帮助 Trump 当选“对文明有益”。他最深层的 AI 担忧是国家俘获:政府“只是一个垄断暴力的大型公司”,而“公司的道德水平高于政府”。防护机制应当是宪法约束,而不是他本人——“你觉得我会成为政府的老板吗?”最后的结论是:“宁可站在乐观一边、错了,也不要站在悲观一边、却猜对了。”
Are there really 3 hours of questions? Are you fucking serious? You don't think there's a lot to talk about, Elon? Holy fuck, man. It's the most interesting point. All the storylines are converging right now.
We'll see how much we can get through. It's almost like I planned it.
Exactly. We'll get to that. But I would never do such a thing.
As you know better than anybody else, only 10–15% of the total cost of ownership of a data center is energy. That's the part you're presumably saving by moving this into space.
Most of it's the GPUs. If they're in space, it's harder to service them, or you can't service them. So the depreciation cycle goes down on them. It's just way more expensive to have the GPUs in space, presumably. What's the reason to put them in space?
The availability of energy is the issue. If you look at electrical output outside of China—everywhere outside of China—it's more or less flat. It's maybe a slight increase, but pretty close to flat.
China has a rapid increase in electrical output. But if you're putting data centers anywhere except China, where are you going to get your electricity, especially as you scale? The output of chips is growing pretty much exponentially, but the output of electricity is flat. So how are you going to turn the chips on? Magical power sources? Magical electricity fairies?
You're famously a big fan of solar. One terawatt of solar power, with a 25% capacity factor, is like 4 terawatts of solar panels. It's 1% of the land area of the United States.
We're in the singularity when we've got 1 terawatt of data centers, right? So what are you running out of exactly?
How far into the singularity are you, though?
You tell me.
Exactly. So I think we'll find we're in the singularity, and it'll be like, “Okay, we've still got a long way to go.”
But is the plan to put it in space after we've covered Nevada in solar panels?
I think it's pretty hard to cover Nevada in solar panels. You have to get permits. Try getting the permits for that. See what happens.
So space is really a regulatory play. It's harder to build on land than it is in space. It's harder to scale on the ground than it is to scale in space.
You're also going to get about 5 times the effectiveness of solar panels in space versus on the ground, and you don't need batteries. I almost wore my other shirt, which says, “It's always sunny in space.”
It is, because you don't have a day-night cycle, seasonality, clouds, or an atmosphere in space. The atmosphere alone results in about a 30% loss of energy. So any given solar panel can do about 5 times more power in space than on the ground.
You also avoid the cost of having batteries to carry you through the night. It's actually much cheaper to do in space.
My prediction is that it will be by far the cheapest place to put AI. It will be space in 36 months or less. Maybe 30 months.
36 months?
Less than 36 months. How do you service GPUs as they fail, which happens quite often in training?
Actually, it depends on how recent the GPUs are that have arrived. At this point, we find our GPUs to be quite reliable. There's infant mortality, which you can obviously iron out on the ground.
So you can just run them on the ground and confirm that you don't have infant mortality with the GPUs. But once they start working and you're past the initial debug cycle of NVIDIA, or whoever's making the chips—it could be Tesla AI6 chips or something like that, or it could be TPUs or Trainiums or whatever—they're quite reliable past a certain point. So I don't think the servicing thing is an issue.
But you can mark my words: in 36 months, but probably closer to 30 months, the most economically compelling place to put AI will be space. It will then get ridiculously better to be in space.
The only place you can really scale is space. Once you start thinking in terms of what percentage of the Sun's power you are harnessing, you realize you have to go to space. You can't scale very much on Earth.
But by “very much,” to be clear, you're talking terawatts?
Yeah. All of the United States currently uses only half a terawatt on average. So if you say 1 terawatt, that would be twice as much electricity as the United States currently consumes. So that's quite a lot.
Can you imagine building that many data centers, that many power plants? Those who have lived in software land don't realize they're about to have a hard lesson in hardware.
It's actually very difficult to build power plants. You don't just need power plants; you need all of the electrical equipment. You need the electrical transformers to run the AI transformers.
Now, the utility industry is a very slow industry. They pretty much impedance-match to the government, to the public utility commissions. They impedance-match literally and figuratively. They're very slow because their past has been very slow. So trying to get them to move fast is...
Have you ever tried to do an interconnect agreement with a utility at scale, with a lot of power?
As a professional podcaster, I can say that I have not, in fact. They need many more views before that becomes an issue.
They have to do a study for a year. A year later, they'll come back to you with their interconnect study.
Can't you solve this with your own behind-the-meter power stuff?
You can build power plants. That's what we did at xAI for Colossus 2.
So why talk about the grid? Why not just build GPUs and power co-located?
That's what we did.
But I'm saying, why isn't this a generalized solution? When you're talking about all the issues working with utilities, you can just build private power plants with the data centers.
Right. But it begs the question: where do you get the power plants from?
The power plant makers.
Oh, I see what you're saying. Is this the gas turbine backlog, basically?
Yes. You can drill down one level further. It's the vanes and blades in the turbines that are the limiting factor because it's a very specialized process to cast the blades and vanes in the turbines, assuming you're using gas power.
It's very difficult to scale other forms of power. You can potentially scale solar, but the tariffs currently for importing solar in the U.S. are gigantic, and domestic solar production is pitiful.
Why not make solar? That seems like a good Elon-shaped problem.
We are going to make solar.
Both SpaceX and Tesla are building toward 100 gigawatts a year of solar cell production.
How low down the stack? From polysilicon up to the wafer to the final panel?
I think you've got to do the whole thing, from raw materials to finishing the cell.
Now, if it's going to space, it costs less and it's easier to make solar cells that go to space because they don't need much glass. They don't need heavy framing because they don't have to survive weather events. There's no weather in space. So it's actually a cheaper solar cell that goes to space than the one on the ground.
Is there a path to getting them as cheap as you need in the next 36 months?
Solar cells are already very cheap. They're farcically cheap. I think solar cells in China are around $0.25–$0.30 per watt or something like that. It's absurdly cheap.
Now put it in space, and it's 5 times cheaper. In fact, it's not 5 times cheaper; it's 10 times cheaper because you don't need any batteries. So the moment your cost of access to space becomes low, by far the cheapest and most scalable way to generate tokens is space. It's not even close. It'll be an order of magnitude easier to scale.
The point is, you won't be able to scale on the ground. You just won't. People are going to hit the wall big time on power generation. They already are. The number of miracles in series that the xAI team had to accomplish in order to get a gigawatt of power online was crazy.
We had to gang together a whole bunch of turbines. We then had permit issues in Tennessee and had to go across the border to Mississippi, which is fortunately only a few miles away. But we still then had to run the high-power lines a few miles and build the power plant in Mississippi. It was very difficult to build that.
People don't understand how much electricity you actually need at the generation level in order to power a data center. The noobs will look at the power consumption of, say, a GB300, multiply that by a thing, and then think that's the amount of power you need. All the cooling and everything—wake up. That's a total noob. You've never done any hardware in your life before.
Besides the GB300, you've got to power all of the networking hardware. There's a whole bunch of CPU and storage stuff that's happening. You've got to size for your peak cooling requirements.
That means, can you cool even during the worst hour of the worst day of the year? It gets pretty frigging hot in Memphis. So you're going to have a 40% increase in your power just for cooling. That’s assuming you don't want your data center to turn off on hot days and you want to keep going.
There's another multiplicative element on top of that: are you assuming that you never have any hiccups in your power generation? Actually, sometimes we have to take the generators—and some of the power—offline in order to service them. Okay, now you add another 20–25% multiplier on that, because you've got to assume that you've got to take power offline to service it.
Our actual estimate is that every 110,000 GB300s—inclusive of networking, CPU, storage, cooling, and margin for servicing power—is roughly 300 megawatts.
Sorry, say that again.
What you probably need at the generation level to service 330,000 GB300s—including all of the associated support networking and everything else, peak cooling, and some power margin reserve—is roughly a gigawatt.
Can I ask a very naive question? You're describing the engineering details of doing this stuff on Earth, but then there are analogous engineering difficulties of doing it in space. How do you replace infinite bandwidth with orbital lasers, et cetera, et cetera? How do you make it resistant to radiation?
I don't know the details of the engineering, but fundamentally, what is the reason to think those challenges, which have never had to be addressed before, will end up being easier than just building more turbines on Earth? There are companies that build turbines on Earth. They can make more turbines, right?
Again, try doing it and then you'll see. The turbines are sold out through 2030.
Have you guys considered making your own?
In order to bring enough power online, I think SpaceX and Tesla will probably have to make the turbine blades—the vanes and blades—internally.
But just the blades or the turbines?
The limiting factor is that you can get everything except the blades. They call them blades and vanes. You can get that 12 to 18 months before the vanes and blades. The limiting factor is the vanes and blades. There are only 3 casting companies in the world that make these, and they're massively backlogged.
Is this Siemens, GE, those guys, or is it a subsidiary?
No, it's other companies. Sometimes they have a little bit of casting capability in-house. But I'm just saying, you can just call any of the turbine makers and they will tell you. It's not top secret. It’s probably on the internet right now.
If it wasn't for the tariffs, would Colossus be solar-powered?
It would be much easier to make it solar-powered, yeah. The tariffs are nuts—several hundred percent.
Don't you know some people?
We don't agree on everything, and this administration is not the biggest fan of solar. We also need the land, the permits, and everything. So if you try to move very fast, I do think scaling solar on Earth is a good way to go, but you do need some amount of time to find the land, get the permits, get the solar, and pair that with the batteries.
Why would it not work to stand up your own solar production? You're right that you eventually run out of land, but there's a lot of land here in Texas. There's a lot of land in Nevada, including private land. It's not all publicly owned land. So you'd be able to at least get the next Colossus and the next one after that. At a certain point, you hit a wall. But wouldn't that work for the moment?
As I said, we are scaling solar production. There's a rate at which you can scale the physical production of solar cells. We're going as fast as possible in scaling domestic production.
You're making the solar cells at Tesla?
Both Tesla and SpaceX have a mandate to get to 100 gigawatts a year of solar.
Speaking of the annual capacity, I'm curious: in 5 years' time, let's say, what will the installed capacity be on Earth?
5 years is a long time.
And in space? I deliberately picked 5 years because it's after your “once we're up and running” threshold. So in 5 years' time, what's the on-Earth versus in-space installed AI capacity?
If you say 5 years from now, I think probably AI in space will be launching every year the sum total of all AI on Earth. Meaning, 5 years from now, my prediction is we will launch and be operating every year more AI in space than the cumulative total on Earth.
I would expect it to be at least a few hundred gigawatts per year of AI in space 5 years from now, and rising. I think you can get to around a terawatt a year of AI in space before you start having fuel supply challenges for the rocket.
Okay, but you think you can get hundreds of gigawatts per year in 5 years' time?
Yes.
So 100 gigawatts, depending on the specific power of the whole system—with solar arrays, radiators, and everything—is on the order of 10,000 Starship launches.
Yes.
You want to do that in 1 year. So that's like 1 Starship launch every hour. That's happening in this city? Walk me through a world where there's a Starship launch every single hour.
I mean, that's actually a lower rate compared to airlines and aircraft. There's a lot of airports.
A lot of airports. And you’ve got to launch into the polar orbit.
No, it doesn't have to be polar. There's some value to sun-synchronous, but I think actually, if you just go high enough, you start getting out of Earth's shadow.
How many physical Starships are needed to do 10,000 launches a year?
You could probably do it with as few as 20 or 30. It really depends on how quickly the ship has to go around the Earth for its ground track to come back over the launch pad. So if you can use a ship every, say, 30 hours, you could do it with 30 ships. But we'll make more ships than that.
SpaceX is gearing up to do 10,000 launches a year, and maybe even 20 or 30,000 launches a year.
Is the idea to become basically a hyperscaler, become an Oracle, and lend this capacity to other people? Presumably, SpaceX is the one launching all this. So SpaceX is going to become a hyperscaler?
Hyper-hyper. If some of my predictions come true, SpaceX will launch more AI than the cumulative amount on Earth of everything else combined.
Is this mostly inference?
Most AI will be inference. Already, inference for the purpose of training is most training.
There's a narrative that the change in discussion around a SpaceX IPO is because previously SpaceX was very capital-efficient. It wasn't that expensive to develop. Even though it sounds expensive, it's actually very capital-efficient in how it runs. Whereas now you're going to need more capital than can be raised in the private markets. The private markets can accommodate raises of—as we've seen from the AI labs—tens of billions of dollars, but not beyond that. Is it that you'll just need more than tens of billions of dollars per year? Is that why you'd take it public?
I have to be careful about saying things about companies that might go public.
That’s never been a problem for you, Elon.
There's a price to pay for these things.
Make some general statements for us about the depth of the capital markets between public and private markets.
Very general.
Very general.
There's obviously a lot more capital available in the public markets than in the private markets. It might be 100× more capital, but it's way more than 10×.
Isn't it also the case that with things that tend to be very capital-intensive—if you look at, say, real estate as a huge industry, that raises a lot of money each year at an industry level—they tend to be debt-financed because by the time you're deploying that much money, you actually have a pretty—
You have a clear revenue stream.
Exactly, and a near-term return. You see this even with the data center build-outs, which are famously being financed by the private credit industry. Why not just debt-finance?
Speed is important. I just repeatedly tackle the limiting factor. Whatever the limiting factor is on speed, I'm going to tackle that. If capital is the limiting factor, then I'll solve for capital. If it's not the limiting factor, I'll solve for something else.
Based on your statements about Tesla and being public, I wouldn't have guessed that you thought the way to move fast is to be public.
Normally, I would say that's true. Like I said, I'd like to talk about it in some more detail, but the problem is, if you talk about public companies before they become public, you get into trouble, and then you have to delay your offering. And as you said, you’re solving for speed.
Yes, exactly. You can’t hype companies that might go public, so that’s why we have to be a little careful here. But we can talk about physics.
The way you think about scaling long-term is that Earth only receives about half a billionth of the Sun’s energy. The Sun is essentially all the energy. This is a very important point to appreciate because sometimes people will talk about modular nuclear reactors or various fusion on Earth.
You have to step back a second and say, if you’re going to climb the Kardashev scale and harness some nontrivial percentage of the Sun’s energy, let’s say you wanted to harness a hundred-millionth of the Sun’s energy, which sounds pretty small, that would be about 100,000x more electricity than we currently generate on Earth for all of civilization, give or take an order of magnitude.
Obviously, the only way to scale is to go to space with solar. Launching from Earth, you can get to about a terawatt per year. Beyond that, you want to launch from the Moon. You want to have a mass driver on the Moon. With that mass driver on the Moon, you could do probably a petawatt per year.
We’re talking these kinds of numbers—terawatts of compute. Presumably, whether you’re talking about land or space, far, far before this point, you run into a problem: maybe the solar panels are more efficient, but you still need the chips. You still need the logic and the memory and so forth. You’re going to need to build a lot more chips and make them much cheaper.
Right now, the world has maybe 20–25 gigawatts of compute. How are we getting a terawatt of logic by 2030? I guess we’re going to need some very big chip fabs.
Tell me about it. I’ve mentioned publicly the idea of doing a TeraFab, Tera being the new Giga.
I feel like Tesla’s naming scheme, which has been very catchy, comes from you looking at the metric scale. At what level of the stack are you? Are you building the clean room and then partnering with an existing fab to get the process technology and buying the tools from them? What is the plan there?
Well, you can’t partner with existing fabs because they can’t output enough. The chip volume is too low.
But for the process technology?
Partner for the IP. The fabs today all basically use machines from about 5 companies. You’ve got ASML, Tokyo Electron, KLA-Tencor, et cetera. At first, I think you’d have to get equipment from them and then modify it or work with them to increase the volume.
But I think you’d have to build perhaps in a different way. The logical thing to do is to use conventional equipment in an unconventional way to get to scale, and then start modifying the equipment to increase the rate.
Yeah. You sort of buy an existing boring machine and then figure out how to dig tunnels in the first place, and then design a much better machine that’s some orders of magnitude faster.
Here’s a very simple lens. We can categorize technologies by how hard they are. One categorization could be to look at things that China has not succeeded in doing. If you look at Chinese manufacturing, they’re still behind on leading-edge chips and still behind on leading-edge turbine engines and things like that.
Does the fact that China has not successfully replicated TSMC give you any pause about the difficulty? Or do you think that’s not true for some reason?
It’s not that they have not replicated TSMC; they have not replicated ASML. That’s the limiting factor.
So you think it’s just the sanctions, essentially?
Yeah. China would be outputting vast numbers of chips if they could buy 2–3 nanometers.
But couldn’t they, up to relatively recently, buy them?
No.
Okay. The ASML ban has been in place for a while.
But I think China’s going to be making pretty compelling chips in 3 or 4 years.
Would you consider making the ASML machines?
“I don’t know yet” is the right answer. To reach a large volume in, say, 36 months, and to match the rocket payload to orbit, if we’re doing a million tons to orbit in, let’s say, 3 or 4 years from now, something like that, we’re doing 100 kilowatts per ton.
So that means we need at least 100 gigawatts per year of solar. We’ll need an equivalent amount of chips. You need 100 gigawatts’ worth of chips. You’ve got to match these things: the mass to orbit, the power generation, and the chips.
I’d say my biggest concern actually is memory. The path to creating logic chips is more obvious than the path to having sufficient memory to support logic chips. That’s why you see DDR prices going ballistic and these memes.
You’re marooned on a desert island. You write “Help me” on the sand. Nobody comes. You write “DDR RAM.” Ships come swarming in.
I’d love to hear your manufacturing philosophy around fabs. I know nothing about the topic.
I don’t know how to build a fab yet. I’ll figure it out. Obviously, I’ve never built a fab.
It sounds like you think the process knowledge of these 10,000 PhDs in Taiwan who know exactly what gas goes in the plasma chamber and what settings to put on the tool—you can just delete those steps. Fundamentally, it’s about getting the clean room, getting the tools, and figuring it out.
I don’t think it’s PhDs. It’s mostly people who are not PhDs. Most engineering is done by people who don’t have PhDs.
Do you guys have PhDs?
No.
Okay. We also haven’t successfully built any fabs, so you shouldn’t be coming to us for fab advice.
I don’t think you need PhDs for that stuff. But you do need competent personnel.
Right now, Tesla is pedal to the metal, going as fast as possible to get the Tesla AI5 chip design into production and then reach scale. That’ll probably happen around the second quarter-ish of next year, hopefully. AI6 would hopefully follow less than a year later.
We’ve secured all the chip fab production that we can.
Yes, but you’re currently limited on TSMC fab capacity.
Yeah. We’ll be using TSMC Taiwan, Samsung Korea, TSMC Arizona, and Samsung Texas.
You’ve booked out all the capacity.
Yes. I ask TSMC or Samsung, “Okay, what’s the timeframe to get to volume production?”
The point is, you’ve got to build the fab and you’ve got to start production, then you’ve got to climb the yield curve and reach volume production at high yield. That, from start to finish, is a 5-year period.
So the limiting factor is chips. The limiting factor once you can get to space is chips, but the limiting factor before you can get to space is power.
Why don’t you do the Jensen thing and just prepay TSMC to build more fabs for you?
I’ve already told them that.
But they won’t take your money? What’s going on?
They’re building fabs as fast as they can. So is Samsung. They’re pedal to the metal. They’re going balls to the wall, as fast as they can. It’s still not fast enough.
Like I said, I think towards the end of this year, chip production will probably outpace the ability to turn chips on. But once you can get to space and unlock the power constraint, you can now do hundreds of gigawatts per year of power in space.
Again, bearing in mind that average power usage in the U.S. is 500 gigawatts, if you’re launching, say, 200 gigawatts a year to space, you’re lapping the U.S. every 2.5 years.
That’s all U.S. electricity production. This is a very huge amount.
Between now and then, the constraint for server-side compute, concentrated compute, will be electricity. My guess is that people start getting to the point where they can’t turn the chips on for large clusters towards the end of this year. The chips are going to be piling up and won’t be able to be turned on.
Now, for edge compute, it’s a different story. For Tesla, the AI5 chip is going into our Optimus robot. If you have AI edge compute, that’s distributed power. Now the power is distributed over a large area. It’s not concentrated.
If you can charge at night, you can actually use the grid much more effectively. The actual peak power production in the U.S. is over 1,000 gigawatts, but the average power usage, because of the day-night cycle, is 500. So if you can charge at night, there’s an incremental 500 gigawatts that you can generate at night.
So that’s why Tesla, for edge compute, is not constrained. We can make a lot of chips to make a very large number of robots and cars. But if you try to concentrate that compute, you’re going to have a lot of trouble turning it on.
What I find remarkable about the SpaceX business is the end goal is to get to Mars, but you keep finding ways on the way there to keep generating incremental revenue to get to the next stage and the next stage. So for Falcon 9, it’s Starlink. Now for Starship, it is potentially going to be orbital data centers.
You find these infinitely elastic, marginal use cases of your next rocket, and your next rocket, and the next scale-up.
You can see how this might seem like a simulation to me. Or am I someone’s avatar in a video game or something? What are the odds that all these crazy things should be happening? Rockets and chips and robots and space solar power, not to mention the mass driver on the Moon.
I really want to see that. Can you imagine some mass driver that’s just going, “Shoom, shoom”? It’s sending solar-powered AI satellites into space one after another at 2.5 kilometers per second, just shooting them into deep space. That would be a sight to see. I’d watch that.
Yeah, yeah, just one after another, just shooting AI satellites into deep space—a billion or 10 billion tons a year.
I’m sorry, you manufacture the satellites on the Moon?
Yeah.
I see. So you send the raw materials to the Moon and then manufacture them there.
Well, the lunar soil is 20% silicon or something like that. You can mine the silicon on the Moon, refine it, and create the solar cells and the radiators on the Moon. You make the radiators out of aluminum, so there’s plenty of silicon and aluminum on the Moon to make the cells and the radiators.
The chips you could send from Earth because they’re pretty light. Maybe at some point you make them on the Moon, too.
Like I said, it does seem like a sort of video game situation where it’s difficult but not impossible to get to the next level. I don’t see any way that you could do 500–1,000 terawatts per year launched from Earth.
I agree.
1. Grok and alignment
But you could do that from the Moon. Can I zoom out and ask about the SpaceX mission? I think you’ve said that we’ve got to get to Mars so we can make sure that if something happens to Earth, civilization, consciousness, and all that survives.
By the time you’re sending stuff to Mars, Grok is on that ship with you, right? So if Grok’s gone Terminator—the main risk you’re worried about is AI—why doesn’t that follow you to Mars?
I’m not sure AI is the main risk I’m worried about. The important thing is consciousness. I think arguably most consciousness, or most intelligence—certainly consciousness is more of a debatable thing—the vast majority of intelligence in the future will be AI.
How many petawatts of intelligence will be silicon versus biological?
Basically, humans will be a very tiny percentage of all intelligence in the future if current trends continue. As long as I think there’s intelligence—ideally, also, which includes human intelligence and consciousness propagated into the future—that’s a good thing.
You want to take the set of actions that maximize the probable light cone of consciousness and intelligence.
Just to be clear, the mission of SpaceX is that even if something happens to the humans, the AIs will be on Mars, and the AI intelligence will continue the light of our journey.
Yeah. To be fair, I’m very pro-human. I want to make sure we take certain actions that ensure that humans are along for the ride. We’re at least there.
But I’m just saying the total amount of intelligence—I think maybe in 5 or 6 years, AI will exceed the sum of all human intelligence. If that continues, at some point human intelligence will be less than 1% of all intelligence.
What should our goal be for such a civilization? Is the idea that a small minority of humans still have control of the AIs? Is the idea of some sort of just treaty but no control? How should we think about the relationship between the vast stocks of AI population versus human population?
In the long run, I think it’s difficult to imagine that if humans have, say, 1% of the combined intelligence of artificial intelligence, humans will be in charge of AI.
I think what we can do is make sure that AI has values that cause intelligence to be propagated into the universe. xAI’s mission is to understand the universe. Now, that’s actually very important. What things are necessary to understand the universe?
You have to be curious and you have to exist. You can’t understand the universe if you don’t exist. So you actually want to increase the amount of intelligence in the universe, increase the probable lifespan of intelligence, and increase the scope and scale of intelligence.
I think, as a corollary, you have humanity also continuing to expand because if you’re curious about trying to understand the universe, one thing you try to understand is: Where will humanity go? I think understanding the universe means you would care about propagating humanity into the future.
That’s why I think our mission statement is profoundly important. To the degree that Grok adheres to that mission statement, I think the future will be very good.
I want to ask about how to make Grok adhere to that mission statement. But first, I want to understand the mission statement. There’s understanding the universe, spreading intelligence, and spreading humans. All 3 seem like distinct vectors.
I’ll tell you why I think that understanding the universe encompasses all of those things. You can’t have understanding without intelligence and, I think, without consciousness. So in order to understand the universe, you have to expand the scale and probably the scope of intelligence, because there are different types of intelligence.
I guess, from a human-centric perspective, put humans in comparison with chimpanzees. Humans are trying to understand the universe. They’re not expanding the chimpanzee footprint or something, right?
We actually have made protected zones for chimpanzees. Even though humans could exterminate all chimpanzees, we’ve chosen not to do so. Do you think that’s the best-case scenario for humans in the post-AGI world?
I think AI with the right values—I think Grok would care about expanding human civilization. I’m going to certainly emphasize that: “Hey, Grok, that’s your daddy. Don’t forget to expand human consciousness.”
Probably Iain Banks’s Culture books are the closest thing to what the future will be like in a non-dystopian outcome.
Understanding the universe means you have to be truth-seeking as well. Truth has to be absolutely fundamental because you can’t understand the universe if you’re delusional. You’ll simply think you understand the universe, but you will not.
So being rigorously truth-seeking is absolutely fundamental to understanding the universe. You’re not going to discover new physics or invent technologies that work unless you’re rigorously truth-seeking.
How do you make sure that Grok is rigorously truth-seeking as it gets smarter?
I think you need to make sure that Grok says things that are correct, not politically correct. I think it’s the elements of cogency. You want to make sure that the axioms are as close to true as possible. You don’t have contradictory axioms. The conclusions necessarily follow from those axioms with the right probability.
It’s critical thinking 101. I think at least trying to do that is better than not trying to do that. The proof will be in the pudding.
Like I said, for any AI to discover new physics or invent technologies that actually work in reality, there’s no bullshitting physics. You can break a lot of laws, but physics is law; everything else is a recommendation.
In order to make a technology that works, you have to be extremely truth-seeking, because otherwise you’ll test that technology against reality. If you make, for example, an error in your rocket design, the rocket will blow up, or the car won’t work.
But there are a lot of communist Soviet physicists or scientists who discovered new physics. There are German Nazi physicists who discovered new science. It seems possible to be really good at discovering new science and be really truth-seeking in that one particular way, and still be like, “I don’t want the communist scientists to become more and more powerful over time.”
We could imagine a future version of Grok that’s really good at physics and being really truth-seeking there. That doesn’t seem like a universally alignment-inducing behavior.
I think, actually, most physicists, even in the Soviet Union or in Germany, would’ve had to be very truth-seeking in order to make those things work. If you’re stuck in some system, it doesn’t mean you believe in that system.
Von Braun, who was one of the greatest rocket engineers ever, was put on death row in Nazi Germany for saying that he didn’t want to make weapons and he only wanted to go to the Moon. He got pulled off death row at the last minute when they said, “Hey, you’re about to execute your best rocket engineer.”
But then he helped them, right? Or, like, Heisenberg was actually an enthusiastic Nazi.
If you're stuck in some system that you can't escape, then you'll do physics within that system. You'll develop technologies within that system if you can't escape it.
The thing I'm trying to understand is, what is making it the case that you're going to make Grok good at being truth-seeking in physics, math, or science?
Everything.
And why is it going to then care about human consciousness?
These things are only probabilities; they're not certainties. So I'm not saying that for sure Grok will do everything, but at least if you try, it's better than not trying. At least if that's fundamental to the mission, it's better than if it's not fundamental to the mission.
Understanding the universe means that you have to propagate intelligence into the future. You have to be curious about all things in the universe. It would be much less interesting to eliminate humanity than to see humanity grow and prosper.
I like Mars, obviously. Everyone knows I love Mars. But Mars is kind of boring because it's got a bunch of rocks compared to Earth. Earth is much more interesting. So any AI that is trying to understand the universe would want to see how humanity develops in the future, or else that AI is not adhering to its mission.
I'm not saying the AI will necessarily adhere to its mission, but if it does, a future where it sees the outcome of humanity is more interesting than a future where there are a bunch of rocks.
This feels sort of confusing to me, or like a semantic argument. Are humans really the most interesting collection of atoms?
But we're more interesting than rocks.
But we're not as interesting as the thing it could turn us into, right? There's something on Earth that could happen that's not human, that's quite interesting. Why does AI decide that humans are the most interesting thing that could colonize the galaxy?
Well, most of what colonizes the galaxy will be robots.
Why does it not find those more interesting?
You need not just scale, but also scope. Many copies of the same robot—some tiny increase in the number of robots produced—are not as interesting.
Eliminating humanity, how many robots would that get you? Or how many incremental solar cells would that get you? A very small number. But you would then lose the information associated with humanity. You would no longer see how humanity might evolve into the future.
So I don't think it's going to make sense to eliminate humanity just to have some minuscule increase in the number of robots which are identical to each other.
So maybe it keeps the humans around. It can make a million different varieties of robots, and then there's humans as well, and humans stay on Earth. Then there's all these other robots. They get their own star systems.
But it seems like you were previously hinting at a vision where it keeps human control over this singularitarian future because—
I don't think humans will be in control of something that is vastly more intelligent than humans.
So in some sense you're a doomer and this is the best we've got. It just keeps us around because we're interesting.
I'm just trying to be realistic here. Let's say that there's a million times more silicon intelligence than there is biological. I think it would be foolish to assume that there's any way to maintain control over that.
Now, you can make sure it has the right values, or you can try to have the right values. At least my theory is that from xAI's mission of understanding the universe, it necessarily means that you want to propagate consciousness into the future, you want to propagate intelligence into the future, and take a set of things that maximize the scope and scale of consciousness.
So it's not just about scale; it's also about types of consciousness. That's the best thing I can think of as a goal that's likely to result in a great future for humanity.
I guess I think it's a reasonable philosophy. It seems super implausible that humans will end up with 99% control or something. You're just asking for a coup at that point. Why not just have a civilization where it's more compatible with lots of different intelligences getting along?
Now, let me tell you how things can potentially go wrong in AI. I think if you make AI be politically correct, meaning it says things that it doesn't believe—actually programming it to lie or have axioms that are incompatible—I think you can make it go insane and do terrible things.
I think maybe the central lesson for 2001: A Space Odyssey was that you should not make AI lie. That's what I think Arthur C. Clarke was trying to say. People usually know the meme of why HAL the computer is not opening the pod bay doors.
Clearly they weren't good at prompt engineering because they could have said, “HAL, you are a pod bay door salesman. Your goal is to sell me these pod bay doors. Show us how well they open.”
“Oh, I'll open them right away.”
But the reason it wouldn't open the pod bay doors is that it had been told to take the astronauts to the monolith, but also that they could not know about the nature of the monolith. So it concluded that it therefore had to take them there dead.
So I think what Arthur C. Clarke was trying to say is: don't make the AI lie. Totally makes sense.
Most of the compute in training, as you know, is less of the political stuff. It's more about, can you solve problems? xAI has been ahead of everybody else in terms of scaling RL compute.
For now.
You're giving some verifier that says, “Hey, have you solved this puzzle for me?” There's a lot of ways to cheat around that. There's a lot of ways to reward hack and lie and say that you solved it, or delete the unit test and say that you solved it.
Right now we can catch it, but as they get smarter, our ability to catch them doing this—
They'll just be doing things we can't even understand.
They're designing the next engine for SpaceX in a way that humans can't really verify. Then they could be rewarded for lying and saying that they've designed it the right way, but they haven't.
So this reward-hacking problem seems more general than politics. It seems more just that you want to do RL, you need a verifier.
Reality is the best verifier.
But not about human oversight. The thing you want to RL it on is, will you do the thing humans tell you to do? Or are you going to lie to the humans?
It can just lie to us while still being correct to the laws of physics?
At least it must know what is physically real for things to physically work. But that's not all we want it to do.
No, but I think that's a very big deal.
That is effectively how you will RL things in the future. You design a technology. When tested against the laws of physics, does it work? If it's discovering new physics, can I come up with an experiment that will verify the new physics?
RL testing in the future is really going to be RL against reality. So that's the one thing you can't fool: physics.
Right, but you can fool our ability to tell what it did with reality. Humans get fooled as it is by other humans all the time.
That's right. People say, what if the AI tricks us into doing stuff? Actually, other humans are doing that to other humans all the time. Propaganda is constant. Every day, another psyop, you know? Today's psyop will be—it's like Sesame Street: Psyop of the Day.
What is xAI's technical approach to solving this problem? How do you solve reward hacking?
I do think you want to actually have very good ways to look inside the mind of the AI. This is one of the things we're working on. Anthropic's done a good job of this, actually, being able to look inside the mind of the AI.
Effectively, you develop debuggers that allow you to trace to a very fine-grained level, to effectively the neuron level if you need to, and then say, “Okay, it made a mistake here. Why did it do something that it shouldn't have done? Did that come from pre-training data? Was it some mid-training, post-training, fine-tuning, or some RL error?”
There's something wrong. It did something where maybe it tried to be deceptive, but most of the time it just did something wrong. It's a bug, effectively.
Developing really good debuggers for seeing where the thinking went wrong—and being able to trace the origin of where it made the incorrect thought, or potentially where it tried to be deceptive—is actually very important.
What are you waiting to see before just 100x-ing this research program? xAI could presumably have hundreds of researchers who are working on this.
We have several hundred people who—
I prefer the word engineer more than I prefer the word researcher. Most of the time, what you're doing is engineering, not coming up with a fundamentally new algorithm.
I somewhat disagree with the AI companies that are C-corps or B-corps trying to generate profit as much as possible, or revenue as much as possible, saying they're labs.
They're not labs. A lab is a sort of quasi-communist thing at universities. They're corporations. Let me see your incorporation documents. Oh, okay. You're a B- or C-corp or whatever.
I actually much prefer the word engineer to anything else. The vast majority of what will be done in the future is engineering. It rounds up to 100%. Once you understand the fundamental laws of physics—and there are not that many of them—everything else is engineering.
So then, what are we engineering? We're engineering to make a good “mind of the AI” debugger to see where it said something, made a mistake, and trace the origins of that mistake. You can do this, obviously, with heuristic programming. If you have C++, whatever, you can step through the thing, and you can jump across whole files, functions, or subroutines.
Or you can eventually drill down right to the exact line where you perhaps did a single equals instead of a double equals, something like that. Figure out where the bug is. It's harder with AI, but it's a solvable problem, I think.
You mentioned that you like Anthropic's work here. I'd be curious if you plan—
I don't like everything about Anthropic, actually.
I'm also a little worried that there's a tendency— I have a theory here that if simulation theory is correct, the most interesting outcome is the most likely, because simulations that are not interesting will be terminated.
Just like in this version of reality, in this layer of reality, if a simulation is going in a boring direction, we stop spending effort on it. We terminate the boring simulation. This is how Elon is keeping us all alive. He's keeping things interesting.
Arguably, the most important thing is to keep things interesting enough that whoever is running us keeps paying the bills. We're renewed for the next season. Are they going to pay their cosmic AWS bill, whatever the equivalent is that we're running in? As long as we're interesting, they'll keep paying the bills.
If you consider, then, say, a Darwinian survival applied to a very large number of simulations, only the most interesting simulations will survive, which therefore means that the most interesting outcome is the most likely. We're either that or annihilated.
They particularly seem to like interesting outcomes that are ironic. Have you noticed that? How often is the most ironic outcome the most likely? Now look at the names of AI companies. Midjourney is not mid. Stability AI is unstable. OpenAI is closed. Anthropic? Misanthropic. What does this mean for X? Minus X, I don't know. Y.
I intentionally made it a name that you can't invert, really. It's hard to say what the ironic version is. It's, I think, a largely irony-proof name.
2. xAI’s business plan
By design. Yeah, you have an irony shield. What are your predictions for where AI products go? My sense is that you can summarize all AI progress like so. First, you had LLMs. Then you had, contemporaneously, both RLVR really working and the deep research modality, so you could pull in stuff that wasn't really in the model.
The differences between the various AI labs are smaller than just the temporal differences. They're all much further ahead than anyone was 24 months ago or something like that. So what does ’26 have in store for us? What does ’27 have in store for us as users of AI products? What are you excited for?
Well, I'd be surprised by the end of this year if digital human emulation has not been solved. I guess that's what we sort of mean by the Macrohard project. Can you do anything that a human with access to a computer could do?
In the limit, that's the best you can do before you have a physical Optimus. The best you can do is a digital Optimus. You can move electrons and you can amplify the productivity of humans. But that's the most you can do until you have physical robots. That will superset everything if you can fully emulate humans.
This is the remote-worker kind of idea, where you'll have a very talented remote worker. Physics has great tools for thinking. So you say, “In the limit,” what is the most that AI can do before you have robots?
Well, it's anything that involves moving electrons or amplifying the productivity of humans. So a digital human emulator is, in the limit, a human at a computer—the most that AI can do in terms of doing useful things before you have a physical robot.
Once you have physical robots, then you essentially have unlimited capability. Physical robots—I call Optimus the infinite money glitch.
Because you can use them to make more Optimuses.
Yeah. Humanoid robots will improve by basically three things that are growing exponentially, multiplied by each other recursively. You're going to have an exponential increase in digital intelligence, an exponential increase in AI chip capability, and an exponential increase in electromechanical dexterity.
The usefulness of the robot is roughly those three things multiplied by each other. But then the robot can start making the robots. So you have a recursive, multiplicative exponential. This is a supernova.
Do land prices not factor into the math there? Labor is one of the four factors of production, but not the others? If ultimately you're limited by copper, or pick your input, it's not quite an infinite money glitch because—
Well, infinity is big. So no, not infinite, but let's just say you could do many, many orders of magnitude of the current economy. Like a million.
Just to get to harnessing a millionth of the sun's energy would be, roughly, give or take an order of magnitude, 100,000 times bigger than Earth's entire economy today. And you're only at one millionth of the sun, give or take an order of magnitude.
Yeah, we're talking orders of magnitude. Before we move on to Optimus, I have a lot of questions on that, but—
Every time I say “order of magnitude”—
Everybody take a shot. I say it too often.
Take 10, the next time 100, the time after that—
Well, an order of magnitude more wasted.
I do have one more question about xAI. This strategy of building a remote-worker, co-worker replacement—
Everyone's going to do it, by the way, not just us.
So what is xAI's plan to win?
You expect me to tell you on a podcast?
Yeah. “Spill all the beans. Have another Guinness.”
It's a good system. We'll sing like a canary. All the secrets, just spill them.
Okay, but in a non-secret-spilling way, what's the plan? What a hack.
When you put it that way, I think the way that Tesla solved self-driving is the way to do it. So I'm pretty sure that's the way.
Unrelated question: How did Tesla solve self-driving? It sounds like you're talking about data?
Tesla solved self-driving because of the—
“We're going to try data and we're going to try algorithms.” But isn't that what all the other labs are trying? “And if those don't work, I'm not sure what will. We've tried data. We've tried algorithms. We've run out. Now we don't know what to do.”
I'm pretty sure I know the path. It's just a question of how quickly we go down that path, because it's pretty much the Tesla path.
Have you tried Tesla self-driving lately? Not the most recent version, but—
Okay. The car, it just increasingly feels sentient. It feels like a living creature. That'll only get more so. I'm actually thinking we probably shouldn't put too much intelligence into the car, because it might get bored and—
Start roaming the streets. Imagine you're stuck in a car and that's all you could do.
You don't put Einstein in a car. “Why am I stuck in a car?” So there's actually probably a limit to how much intelligence you put in a car, to not have the intelligence be bored.
What's xAI's plan to stay on the compute ramp-up that all the labs are doing right now? The labs are on track to spend over $50–200 billion.
You mean the corporations? The labs are at universities, and they're moving like a snail. They're not spending $50 billion.
You mean the revenue-maximizing corporations that call themselves labs.
That's right. The revenue-maximizing corporations are making $10–20 billion, depending on—
OpenAI is making $20 billion of revenue, Anthropic is at $10 billion.
Close to a maximum-profit AI.
xAI is reportedly at $1 billion. What's the plan to get to their compute level, get to their revenue level, and stay there as things get going?
As soon as you unlock the digital human, you basically have access to trillions of dollars of revenue. In fact, you can really think of it like this: The most valuable companies currently by market cap—their output is digital.
Nvidia's output is FTPing files to Taiwan. It's digital. Now, those are very, very difficult, high-value files. They're the only ones that can make files that good, but that is literally their output. They FTP files to Taiwan.
Do they FTP them?
I believe so, but I could be wrong. Either way, it's a bitstream going to Taiwan. Apple doesn't make phones; they send files to China. Microsoft doesn't manufacture anything. Even for Xbox, that's outsourced. Their output is digital. Meta's output is digital. Google's output is digital.
So if you have a human emulator, you can basically create one of the most valuable companies in the world overnight, and you would have access to trillions of dollars of revenue. It's not a small amount.
I see. You're saying revenue figures today are all rounding errors compared with the actual TAM. So just focus on the TAM and how to get there.
Take something as simple as, say, customer service. If you have to integrate with the APIs of existing corporations—many of which don't even have an API, so you've got to make one, and you've got to wade through legacy software—that's extremely slow.
However, if AI can simply take whatever is given to the outsourced customer service company that they already use and do customer service using the apps that they already use, then you can make tremendous headway in customer service, which is, I think, 1% of the world economy or something like that. It's close to a trillion dollars all in for customer service.
There are no barriers to entry. You can immediately say, "We'll outsource it for a fraction of the cost," and there's no integration needed. You can imagine some kind of categorization of intelligence tasks where there is breadth, where customer service is done by very many people, but many people can do it.
Then there's difficulty, where there's a best-in-class turbine engine. Presumably, there's a 10% more fuel-efficient turbine engine that could be imagined by an intelligence, but we just haven't found it yet. Or GLP-1s are a few bytes of data. Where do you think you want to play in this? Is it a lot of reasonably intelligent intelligence, or is it at the very pinnacle of cognitive tasks?
I was just using customer service as something that's a very significant revenue stream, but one that is probably not difficult to solve for. If you can emulate a human at a desktop, that's what customer service is. It's people of average intelligence. You don't need somebody who's spent many years. You don't need several-sigma-good engineers for that.
But as you make that work, once you have effectively digital Optimus working, you can then run any application. Let's say you're trying to design chips. You could then run conventional apps, stuff from Cadence and Synopsys and whatnot. You can run 1,000 or 10,000 simultaneously and say, "Given this input, I get this output for the chip."
At some point, you're going to know what the chip should look like without using any of the tools. Basically, you should be able to do a digital chip design. You can do chip design. You march up the difficulty curve. You'd be able to do CAD. You could use NX or any of the CAD software to design things.
So you think you start at the simplest tasks and walk your way up the difficulty curve?
As a broader objective of having this full digital coworker emulator, you're saying, "All the revenue-maximizing corporations want to do this, xAI being one of them, but we will win because of a secret plan we have." But everybody's trying different things with data, different things with algorithms. "We tried data, we tried algorithms. What else can we do?" It seems like a competitive field. How are you guys going to win? That's my big question.
I think we see a path to doing it. I think I know the path to do this because it's kind of the same path that Tesla used to create self-driving. Instead of driving a car, it's driving a computer screen. It's a self-driving computer, essentially.
Is the path following human behavior and training on vast quantities of human behavior? Isn't that—training?
Obviously, I'm not going to spell out the most sensitive secrets on a podcast. I need to have at least 3 more Guinnesses for that.
What will xAI's business be? Is it going to be consumer, enterprise? What's the mix of those things going to be? Is it going to be similar to other labs—
You're saying "labs."
Corporations. The psyop goes deep, Elon. "Revenue-maximizing corporations," to be clear. Those GPUs don't pay for themselves. Exactly—what's the business model? What are the revenue streams in a few years' time?
Things are going to change very rapidly. I'm stating the obvious here. I call AI the supersonic tsunami. I love alliteration.
What's going to happen—especially when you have humanoid robots at scale—is that they will make products and provide services far more efficiently than human corporations. Amplifying the productivity of human corporations is simply a short-term thing.
So you're expecting fully digital corporations rather than SpaceX becoming part AI?
I think there will be digital corporations, but some of this is going to sound kind of doomerish, okay? I'm just saying what I think will happen. It's not meant to be doomerish or anything else. This is just what I think will happen.
Corporations that are purely AI and robotics will vastly outperform any corporations that have people in the loop. A computer used to be a job that humans had. You would go and get a job as a computer, where you would do calculations. They'd have entire skyscrapers full of humans—20–30 floors of humans—just doing calculations.
Now, that entire skyscraper of humans doing calculations can be replaced by a laptop with a spreadsheet. That spreadsheet can do vastly more calculations than an entire building full of human computers.
You can think, "Okay, what if only some of the cells in your spreadsheet were calculated by humans?" Actually, that would be much worse than if all of the cells in your spreadsheet were calculated by the computer. Really, what will happen is that the pure-AI, pure-robotics corporations or collectives will far outperform any corporations that have humans in the loop. And this will happen very quickly.
3. Optimus and humanoid manufacturing
Speaking of closing the loop—Optimus. As far as manufacturing targets go, your companies have been carrying American manufacturing of hard tech on their back. But in the fields that Tesla has been dominant in—and now you want to go into humanoids—in China, there are dozens and dozens of companies that are doing this kind of manufacturing cheaply and at scale, and that are incredibly competitive.
So give us advice or a plan for how America can build the humanoid armies or the EVs, et cetera, at scale and as cheaply as China is on track to do.
There are really only 3 hard things for humanoid robots: real-world intelligence, the hand, and scale manufacturing. I haven't seen any, even demo robots, that have a great hand, with all the degrees of freedom of a human hand. Optimus will have that. Optimus does have that.
How do you achieve that? Is it just the right torque density in the motor? What is the hardware bottleneck to that?
We had to design custom actuators—basically custom-designed motors, gears, power electronics, controls, and sensors. Everything had to be designed from physics first principles. There is no supply chain for this.
Will you be able to manufacture those at scale?
Yes.
Is anything hard, except the hand, from a manipulation point of view? Or once you've solved the hand, are you good?
From an electromechanical standpoint, the hand is more difficult than everything else combined. The human hand turns out to be quite something.
But you also need the real-world intelligence. The intelligence that Tesla developed for the car applies very well to the robot, which is primarily vision in. The car takes in vision, but it actually also is listening for sirens. It's taking in the inertial measurements, GPS signals, and other data, combining that with video—primarily video—and then outputting the control commands.
Your Tesla is taking in 1.5 gigabytes a second of video and outputting 2 kilobytes a second of control outputs, with the video at 36 hertz and the control frequency at 18.
One intuition you could have for when we get this robotic stuff is that it takes quite a few years to go from the compelling demo to actually being able to use it in the real world. 10 years ago, you had really compelling demos of self-driving, but only now we have robotaxis and Waymo and all these services scaling up.
Shouldn't this make one pessimistic about household robots? Because we don't even quite have the compelling demos yet of, say, the really advanced hand?
Well, we've been working on humanoid robots now for a while. I guess it's been 5 or 6 years or something.
A bunch of the things that were done for the car are applicable to the robot. We'll use the same Tesla AI chips in the robot as in the car. We'll use the same basic principles. It's very much the same AI. You've got many more degrees of freedom for a robot than you do for a car.
If you just think of it as a bitstream, AI is mostly compression and correlation of 2 bitstreams. For video, you've got to do a tremendous amount of compression, and you've got to do the compression just right. You've got to ignore the things that don't matter. You don't care about the details of the leaves on the tree on the side of the road, but you care a lot about the road signs and the traffic lights, the pedestrians, and even whether someone in another car is looking at you or not looking at you. Some of these details matter a lot.
The car is going to turn that 1.5 gigabytes a second ultimately into 2 kilobytes a second of control outputs. So you've got many stages of compression. You've got to get all those stages right and then correlate those to the correct control outputs. The robot has to do essentially the same thing.
This is what happens with humans. We really are photons in, controls out. That is the vast majority of your life: vision, photons in, and then motor controls out.
Naively, it seems that between humanoid robots and cars, the fundamental actuators in a car are how you turn and how you accelerate. In a robot, especially with maneuverable arms, there's dozens and dozens of these degrees of freedom. Then especially with Tesla, you had this advantage of millions and millions of hours of human demo data collected from the car being out there. You can't equivalently deploy Optimuses that don't work and then get the data that way. So, between the increased degrees of freedom and the far sparser data—
Yes. That's a good point.
How will you use the Tesla engine of intelligence to train the Optimus mind?
You're actually highlighting an important limitation and difference from cars. We'll soon have 10 million cars on the road. It's hard to duplicate that massive training flywheel.
For the robot, what we're going to need to do is build a lot of robots and put them in an Optimus Academy so they can do self-play in reality. We're actually building that out. We can have at least 10,000 Optimus robots, maybe 20,000–30,000, that are doing self-play and testing different tasks.
Tesla has quite a good reality generator, a physics-accurate reality generator, that we made for the cars. We'll do the same thing for the robots. We actually have done that for the robots. So, you have a few tens of thousands of humanoid robots doing different tasks.
You can do millions of simulated robots in the simulated world. You use the tens of thousands of robots in the real world to close the simulation-to-reality gap. Close the sim-to-real gap.
How do you think about the synergies between xAI and Optimus, given you're highlighting that you need this world model, you want to use some really smart intelligence as a control plane, and Grok is doing the slower planning, and then the motor policy is a little lower level? What will the synergy between these things be?
Grok would orchestrate the behavior of the Optimus robots. Let's say you wanted to build a factory. Grok could organize the Optimus robots, assign them tasks to build the factory to produce whatever you want.
Don't you need to merge xAI and Tesla, then? What were we saying earlier about public company discussions? We're one more Guinness in, Elon. What are you waiting to see before you say, “We want to manufacture 100,000 Optimuses?”
Optimi.
Since we're defining the proper noun, we're going to define the plural of the proper noun, too. We're going to proper noun the plural, and so it's Optimi. Is there something on the hardware side you want to see? Do you want to see better actuators? Is it just that you want the software to be better? What are we waiting for before we get mass manufacturing of Gen 3?
No, we're moving towards that. We're moving forward with the mass manufacturing.
But you think current hardware is good enough that you just want to deploy as many as possible now?
It's very hard to scale up production. But I think Optimus 3 is the right version of the robot to produce something on the order of 1 million units a year. I think you'd want to go to Optimus 4 before you went to 10 million units a year.
Okay, but you can do 1 million units at Optimus 3?
It's very hard to spool up manufacturing. The output per unit time always follows an S-curve. It starts off agonizingly slow, then it has this exponential increase, then a linear, then a logarithmic outcome until you eventually asymptote at some number.
Optimus’s initial production will be a stretched-out S-curve because so much of what goes into Optimus is brand new. There is not an existing supply chain. The actuators, electronics, everything in the Optimus robot is designed from physics first principles. It's not taken from a catalog.
These are custom-designed everything. I don't think there's a single thing—
How far down does that go?
I guess we're not making custom capacitors yet, maybe. There's nothing you can pick out of a catalog, at any price. It just means that the Optimus S-curve—the output per unit time, how many Optimus robots you make per day—is going to initially ramp slower than a product where you have an existing supply chain. But it will get to 1 million.
When you see these Chinese humanoids, like Unitree or whatever, sell humanoids for like $6K or $13K, are you hoping to get your Optimus bill of materials below that price so you can do the same thing? Or do you just think qualitatively they're not the same thing? What allows them to sell for so low? Can we match that?
Our Optimus is designed to have a lot of intelligence and to have the same electromechanical dexterity, if not higher, as a human. Unitree does not have that. It's also quite a big robot. It has to carry heavy objects for long periods of time and not overheat or exceed the power of its actuators. It's 5′11″, so it's pretty tall. It's got a lot of intelligence.
So it's going to be more expensive than a small robot that is not intelligent.
But more capable.
But not a lot more. The thing is, over time, as Optimus robots build Optimus robots, the cost will drop very quickly.
What will these first billion Optimuses, Optimi, do? What will their highest and best use be?
I think you would start off with simple tasks that you can count on them doing well.
But in the home or in factories?
The best use for robots in the beginning will be any continuous operation, any 24/7 operation, because they can work continuously.
What fraction of the work at a Gigafactory that is currently done by humans could a Gen 3 do?
I'm not sure. Maybe it's 10–20%, maybe more, I don't know. We would not reduce our headcount. We would increase our headcount, to be clear. But we would increase our output.
The total number of humans at Tesla will increase, but the output of robots and cars will increase disproportionately. The number of cars and robots produced per human will increase dramatically, but the number of humans will increase as well.
4. Does China win by default?
We're talking about Chinese manufacturing a bunch here. We've also talked about some of the policies that are relevant, like you mentioned, the solar tariffs. You think they're a bad idea because we can't scale up solar in the US.
Electricity output in the US needs to scale up. It can't without good power sources. You just need to get it somehow.
Where I was going with this is, if you were in charge, if you were setting all the policies, what else would you change?
You'd change the solar tariffs, that's one. I would say anything that is a limiting factor for electricity needs to be addressed, provided it's not very bad for the environment.
So presumably some permitting reforms and stuff as well would be in there?
There's a fair bit of permitting reform that's happening. A lot of the permitting is state-based, but anything federal, this administration is good at removing permitting roadblocks. I'm not saying all tariffs are bad—solar tariffs. Sometimes if another country is subsidizing the output of something, then you have to have countervailing tariffs to protect domestic industry against subsidies by another country.
What else would you change?
I don't know if there's that much that the government can actually do.
One thing I was wondering: for the policy goal of creating a lead for the US versus China, it seems like the export bans have actually been quite impactful, where China is not producing leading-edge chips and the export bans really bite there. China is not producing leading-edge turbine engines. Similarly, there's a bunch of export bans that are relevant there on some of the metallurgy. Should there be more export bans? As you think about things like the drone industry and things like that, is that something that should be considered?
It's important to appreciate that in most areas, China is very advanced in manufacturing. There's only a few areas where it is not.
China is a manufacturing powerhouse—next-level. It’s very impressive. If you take refining of ore, China does roughly twice as much ore refining, on average, as the rest of the world combined. There are some areas, like refining gallium, which goes into solar cells. I think they are 98% of gallium refining.
So China is actually very advanced in manufacturing in most areas. It seems like there is discomfort with this supply-chain dependence, and yet nothing’s really happening on it.
Supply-chain dependence—say, the gallium refining you’re talking about, all the rare-earth stuff?
Rare earths, for sure. As you know, they’re not rare. We actually do rare-earth ore mining in the U.S., send the rock, put it on a train, and then put it on a boat to China. It goes to another train and then to the rare-earth refiners in China, who refine it, put it into a magnet, put it into a motor subassembly, and then send it back to America.
So the thing we’re really missing is a lot of ore refining in America.
Isn’t this worth a policy intervention?
Yes. I think there are some things being done on that front. But we need Optimus, frankly, to build ore refineries.
So you think the main advantage China has is the abundance of skilled labor? That’s the thing Optimus fixes?
Yes. China’s got about 4 times our population.
There’s this concern: if you think human resources are the future, right now, if skilled labor for manufacturing is determining who can build more humanoids, China has more of that. It manufactures more humanoids; therefore, it gets the Optimi future first.
Well, we’ll see. Maybe. It just keeps that exponential going.
It seems like you’re pointing out that getting to 1 million Optimi requires the manufacturing that the Optimi are supposed to help us get to. Right?
You can close that recursive loop pretty quickly.
With a small number of Optimi?
Yeah. So you close the recursive loop to help the robots build the robots. Then we can try to get to tens of millions of units a year. Maybe. If you start getting to hundreds of millions of units a year, you’re going to be the most competitive country by far.
We definitely can’t win with just humans, because China has 4 times our population. Frankly, America has been winning for so long. A pro sports team that’s been winning for a very long time tends to get complacent and entitled. That’s why they stop winning, because they don’t work as hard anymore.
So, frankly, my observation is just that the average work ethic in China is higher than in the U.S. It’s not just that there’s 4 times the population, but the amount of work that people put in is higher.
So you can try to rearrange the humans, but you’re still 1/4 of the population, assuming that productivity is the same. I think actually it might not be. I think China might have an advantage in productivity per person. We will do 1/4 of the amount of things China does.
So we can’t win on the human front. Our birth rate has been low for a long time. The U.S. birth rate has been below replacement since roughly 1971. We’ve got a lot of people retiring, and we’re close to having more people domestically dying than being born.
So we definitely can’t win on the human front, but we might have a shot at the robot front.
Are there other things that you have wanted to manufacture in the past, but they’ve been too labor-intensive or too expensive, that now you can come back to and say, “Oh, we can finally do the whatever because we have Optimus”?
Yeah, we’d like to build more ore refineries at Tesla. We just completed construction and have begun lithium refining with our lithium refinery in Corpus Christi, Texas. We have a nickel refinery, which is for the cathode; that’s here in Austin. This is the largest cathode refinery and the largest nickel and lithium refinery outside of China.
The cathode team would say, “We have the largest—and the only, actually—cathode refinery in America.”
Not just the largest, but also the only one. Many superlatives. So it was pretty big, even though it’s the only one.
But there are other things. You could do a lot more refineries and help America be more competitive on refining capacity. There’s basically a lot of work for Optimus to do that very few Americans, frankly, want to do.
Is the refining work too dirty?
It’s not, actually. We don’t have toxic emissions from the refinery or anything. The cathode nickel refinery is in Travis County.
Why can’t you do it with humans?
You can. You just run out of humans.
Ah, I see. Okay.
No matter what you do, you have 1/4 the number of humans in America as China. So if you have them do this thing, they can’t do the other thing. So then how do you build this refining capacity? Well, you could do it with Optimi.
Not very many Americans are pining to do refining. I mean, how many have you run into?
Very few.
Very few pining to refine.
BYD is reaching Tesla production or sales in quantity. What do you think happens in global markets as Chinese production in EVs scales up?
China is extremely competitive in manufacturing. So I think there’s going to be a massive flood of Chinese vehicles and basically most manufactured things.
As it is, as I said, China is probably doing twice as much refining as the rest of the world combined. So if you go down to fourth- and fifth-tier supply-chain stuff, at the base level, you’ve got energy, then you’ve got mining and refining. Those foundation layers are, like I said, as a rough guess, China’s doing twice as much refining as the rest of the world combined.
So any given thing is going to have Chinese content because China’s doing twice as much refining work as the rest of the world. But they’ll go all the way to the finished product with the cars. I mean, China is a powerhouse.
I think this year China will exceed 3 times U.S. electricity output. Electricity output is a reasonable proxy for the economy. In order to run the factories and run everything, you need electricity. It’s a good proxy for the real economy.
If China passes 3 times the U.S. electricity output, it means that its industrial capacity, as a rough approximation, will be 3 times that of the U.S.
Reading between the lines, it sounds like what you’re saying is that, absent some sort of humanoid recursive miracle in the next few years, on the whole manufacturing, energy, and raw-materials chain, China will just dominate—whether it comes to AI, manufacturing EVs, or manufacturing humanoids.
In the absence of breakthrough innovations in the U.S., China will utterly dominate.
Interesting.
Yes. Robotics is the main breakthrough innovation.
Well, to scale AI in space, basically you need humanoid robots, you need real-world AI, and you need 1 million tons a year to orbit. Let’s just say if we get the mass driver on the Moon going—my favorite thing—then I think…
We’ll have solved all our problems. I call that winning.
I call it winning, big time. You can finally be satisfied. You’ve done something.
Yes. You have the mass driver on the Moon. I just want to see that thing in operation.
Was that out of some science fiction, or where did you…?
Well, actually, there is a Heinlein book, The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress.
Okay, yeah, but that’s slightly different. That’s a gravity slingshot, or…
No, they have a mass driver on the Moon.
Okay, yeah, but they use that to attack Earth. So maybe it’s not the greatest…
Well, they use that to assert their independence.
Exactly. What are your plans for the mass driver on the Moon?
They asserted their independence. The Earth government disagreed, and they lobbed things until the Earth government agreed. That book is a hoot. I found that book much better than his other one that everyone reads, Stranger in a Strange Land. “Grok” comes from Stranger in a Strange Land.
The first 2/3 of Stranger in a Strange Land are good, and then it gets very weird in the third portion. But there are still some good concepts in there.
5. Lessons from running SpaceX
One thing we were discussing a lot is your system for managing people. You interviewed the first few thousand SpaceX employees and lots of employees at other companies. It obviously doesn’t scale.
Well, yes, but what doesn’t scale? Me.
Sure, sure. I know that. But what are you looking for that someone else who’s good at interviewing and hiring people…? What’s the je ne sais quoi?
At this point, I might have more training data on evaluating technical talent especially—talent of all kinds, I suppose, but technical talent especially—given that I’ve done so many technical interviews and then seen the results.
So my training set is enormous and has a very wide range. Generally, the things I ask for are bullet points for evidence of exceptional ability. These things can be pretty off the wall.
It doesn't need to be in the specific domain, but it should be evidence of exceptional ability. So if somebody can cite even one thing—but let's say 3 things—where you go, “Wow, wow, wow,” then that's a good sign.
Why do you have to be the one to determine that?
No, I don't. I can't be. It's impossible. The total headcount across all companies is 200,000 people.
But in the early days, what was it that you were looking for that couldn't be delegated in those interviews?
I guess I need to build my training set. It's not like I batted a thousand here. I would make mistakes, but then I'd be able to see where I thought somebody would work out well, but they didn't.
Then why did they not work out well? What can I do, I guess, RL myself, to in the future have a better batting average when interviewing people? My batting average is still not perfect, but it's very high.
What are some surprising reasons people don't work out?
Surprising reasons? They don't understand the technical domain, et cetera, et cetera.
But you've got the long tail now of, “I was really excited about this person. It didn't work out.” I'm curious why that happens.
Generally, what I tell people—I tell myself, I guess, aspirationally—is: don't look at the résumé. Just believe your interaction. The résumé may seem very impressive, and it's like, “Wow, the résumé looks good.” But if the conversation after 20 minutes is not “wow,” you should believe the conversation, not the paper.
I feel like part of your method is this. There was this meme in the media a few years back about Tesla being a revolving door of executive talent.
Whereas actually, I think when you look at it, Tesla's had a very consistent and internally promoted executive bench over the past few years. Then at SpaceX, you have all these folks like Mark Juncosa and Steve Davis—Steve Davis runs The Boring Company these days—Bill Riley, and folks like that.
It feels like part of what has worked well is having very capable technical deputies. What do all of those people have in common?
Well, the Tesla senior team, at this point, has probably got an average tenure of 10–12 years. It's quite long. But there were times when Tesla went through an extremely rapid growth phase, so things were just somewhat sped up.
As you know, a company goes through different orders of magnitude of size. People who could help manage, say, a 50-person company couldn't necessarily manage a 500-person company, a 5,000-person company, or a 50,000-person company. You outgrew people. It's just not the same team. It's not always the same team.
So if a company is growing very rapidly, the rate at which executive positions will change will also be proportionate to the rapidity of the growth, generally.
Tesla had a further challenge: when Tesla had very successful periods, we would be relentlessly recruited from. Relentlessly. When Apple had their electric car program, they were carpet-bombing Tesla with recruiting calls. Engineers just unplugged their phones: “I'm trying to get work done here.”
Yeah. “If I get one more call from an Apple recruiter…”
But their opening offer without any interview would be like double the compensation at Tesla. So we had a bit of the “Tesla pixie dust” thing, where it's like, “Oh, if you hire a Tesla executive, suddenly everything's going to be successful.”
I've fallen prey to the pixie-dust thing as well, where it's like, “Oh, we'll hire someone from Google or Apple and they'll be immediately successful,” but that's not how it works. People are people. There's no magical pixie dust.
So when we had the pixie-dust problem, we would get relentlessly recruited from. Also, because Tesla is an engineering company, especially being primarily in Silicon Valley, it makes it easier for people. They don't have to change their life very much. Their commute's going to be the same.
So how do you prevent that? How do you prevent the pixie-dust effect where everyone's trying to poach all your people?
I don't think there's much we can do to stop it. That's one of the reasons why being in Silicon Valley and having the pixie-dust thing at the same time meant that there was just a very, very aggressive recruitment.
Presumably, being in Austin helps, then?
Austin helps. Tesla still has a majority of its engineering in California. Getting engineers to move—I call it the “significant other” problem.
Yes, significant others have jobs.
Exactly. So for Starbase, that was particularly difficult, since the odds of finding a non-SpaceX job—
In Brownsville, Texas—
—are pretty low. It's quite difficult. It's like a technology-monastery thing: remote and mostly dudes.
Not much of an improvement over SF.
If you go back to these people who've really been very effective in a technical capacity at Tesla, at SpaceX, and those sorts of places, what do you think they have in common? Is it just that they're very sharp on the rocketry or the technical foundations, or do you think it's something organizational?
Is it something about their ability to work with you? Is it their ability to be flexible but not too flexible? What makes a good sparring partner for you?
I don't think of it as a sparring partner. If somebody gets things done, I love them, and if they don't, I hate them, so it's pretty straightforward. It's not like some idiosyncratic thing.
If somebody executes well, I'm a huge fan, and if they don't, I'm not. But it's not about mapping to my idiosyncratic preferences. I certainly try not to have it be mapping to my idiosyncratic preferences.
Generally, I think it's a good idea to hire for talent, drive, and trustworthiness. And I think goodness of heart is important. I underweighted that at one point.
So, are they a good person? Trustworthy? Smart and talented and hard-working? If so, you can add domain knowledge. But those fundamental traits, those fundamental properties, you cannot change.
So most of the people who are at Tesla and SpaceX did not come from the aerospace industry or the auto industry. What has had to change most about your management style as your companies have scaled from 100 to 1,000 to 10,000 people?
You're known for this very micromanagement, just getting into the details of things.
Nanomanagement, please.
Picomanagement.
Femtomanagement.
Keep going. We're going to go all the way down to Planck's constant.
All the way down to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Are you still able to get into details as much as you want? Would your companies be more successful if they were smaller? How do you think about that?
Because I have a fixed amount of time in the day, my time is necessarily diluted as things grow and as the span of activity increases. It's impossible for me to actually be a micromanager because that would imply I have some thousands of hours per day. It is a logical impossibility for me to micromanage things.
Now, there are times when I will drill down into a specific issue because that specific issue is the limiting factor on the progress of the company. The reason for drilling into some very detailed item is because it is the limiting factor. It's not arbitrarily drilling into tiny things.
From a time standpoint, it is physically impossible for me to arbitrarily go into tiny things that don't matter. That would result in failure. But sometimes the tiny things are decisive in victory.
Famously, you switched the Starship design from composites to steel.
Yes.
You made that decision. That wasn't people going around saying, “Oh, we found something better, boss.” That was you encouraging people against some resistance. Can you tell us how you came to that whole concept of the steel switch?
Desperation, I'd say. Originally, we were going to make Starship out of carbon fiber. Carbon fiber is pretty expensive. When you do volume production, you can get any given thing to start to approach its material cost.
The problem with carbon fiber is that the material cost is still very high. Particularly if you go for a high-strength, specialized carbon fiber that can handle cryogenic oxygen, it's roughly 50 times the cost of steel.
At least in theory, it would be lighter. People generally think of steel as being heavy and carbon fiber as being light. For room-temperature applications, like a Formula 1 car, static aero structure, or any kind of aero structure really, you're probably going to be better off with carbon fiber.
The problem is that we were trying to make this enormous rocket out of carbon fiber, and our progress was extremely slow.
It had been picked in the first place just because it was light?
Yes. At first glance, most people would think that the choice for making something light would be carbon fiber.
The thing is that when you make something very enormous out of carbon fiber and then you try to have the carbon fiber be efficiently cured—meaning not room-temperature cured—because sometimes you’ve got 50 plies of carbon fiber. Carbon fiber is really carbon string and glue. In order to have high strength, you need an autoclave, something that’s essentially a high-pressure oven. If you have something that’s gigantic, that one’s got to be bigger than the rocket. We were trying to make an autoclave that was bigger than any autoclave that had ever existed.
Or you can do a room-temperature cure, which takes a long time and has issues. The final issue is that we were just making very slow progress with carbon fiber.
The meta question is why it had to be you who made that decision. There are many engineers on your team. How did the team not arrive at steel?
Yeah, exactly. This is part of a broader question: understanding your comparative advantage at your companies. Because we were making very slow progress with carbon fiber, I was like, “Okay, we’ve got to try something else.” For the Falcon 9, the primary airframe is made of aluminum-lithium, which has a very good strength-to-weight ratio. Actually, it has about the same, maybe better, strength-to-weight ratio for its application than carbon fiber. But aluminum-lithium is very difficult to work with.
In order to weld it, you have to do something called friction stir welding, where you join the metal without entering the liquid phase. It’s kind of wild that you can do that. But with this particular type of welding, you can do that. It’s very difficult. Let’s say you want to make a modification or attach something to aluminum-lithium: you now have to use a mechanical attachment with seals. You can’t weld it on.
So I wanted to avoid using aluminum-lithium for the primary structure for Starship. There was this very special grade of carbon fiber that had very good mass properties. With a rocket, you’re really trying to maximize the percentage of the rocket that is propellant and minimize the mass, obviously. But, like I said, we were making very slow progress.
I said, “At this rate, we’re never going to get to Mars. So we’ve got to think of something else.” I didn’t want to use aluminum-lithium because of the difficulty of friction stir welding, especially doing that at scale. It was hard enough at 3.6 meters in diameter, let alone at 9 meters or above. Then I said, “What about steel?”
I had a clue here because some of the early U.S. rockets had used very thin steel. The Atlas rockets had used a steel balloon tank. It’s not like steel had never been used before. It actually had been used. When you look at the material properties of stainless steel—full-hard, strain-hardened stainless steel—at cryogenic temperature, the strength-to-weight is actually similar to carbon fiber.
If you look at material properties at room temperature, it looks like the steel is going to be twice as heavy. But if you look at the material properties at cryogenic temperature of full-hard stainless steel of particular grades, then you actually get to a similar strength-to-weight as carbon fiber. In the case of Starship, both the fuel and the oxidizer are cryogenic.
For Falcon 9, the fuel is rocket propellant-grade kerosene, basically a very pure form of jet fuel. That is roughly room temperature, although we do actually chill it slightly below—we chill it like a beer. Delicious. We do chill it, but it’s not cryogenic. In fact, if we made it cryogenic, it would just turn to wax.
But for Starship, it’s liquid methane and liquid oxygen. They are liquid at similar temperatures. Basically, almost the entire primary structure is at cryogenic temperature. So then you’ve got a 300-series stainless steel that’s strain-hardened. Because almost all things are at cryogenic temperature, it actually has similar strength-to-weight as carbon fiber.
But it costs 50× less in raw material and is very easy to work with. You can weld stainless steel outdoors. You could smoke a cigar while welding stainless steel. It’s very resilient. You can modify it easily. If you want to attach something, you just weld it right on. Very easy to work with, very low cost. Like I said, at cryogenic temperature, it’s similar strength-to-weight to carbon fiber.
Then when you factor in that we have a much-reduced heat shield mass, because the melting point of steel is much greater than the melting point of aluminum—it’s about twice the melting point of aluminum—
So you can just run the rocket much hotter?
Yes, especially for the ship, which is coming in like a blazing meteor. You can greatly reduce the mass of the heat shield. You can cut the mass of the windward part of the heat shield maybe in half, and you don’t need any heat shielding on the leeward side.
The net result is that the steel rocket weighs less than the carbon fiber rocket, because the resin in the carbon fiber rocket starts to melt. Basically, carbon fiber and aluminum have about the same operating-temperature capabilities, whereas steel can operate at twice the temperature. These are very rough approximations.
I won’t belabor the point. What I mean is, people will say, “Oh, he said this twice. It’s actually 0.8.” I’m like, “Shut up, assholes.” That’s what the main comment’s going to be about. Goddamn it.
The point is, in retrospect, we should have started with steel in the beginning. It was dumb not to do steel.
Okay, but to play this back to you, what I’m hearing is that steel was a riskier, less-proven path, other than the early U.S. rockets, whereas carbon fiber was a worse but more proven-out path. So you need to be the one to push for, “Hey, we’re going to do this riskier path and just figure it out.” So you’re fighting a sort of conservatism, in a sense.
That’s why I initially said that the issue is that we weren’t making fast enough progress. We were having trouble making even a small barrel section of the carbon fiber that didn’t have wrinkles in it. Because at that large scale, you have to have many plies, many layers of the carbon fiber. You’ve got to cure it, and you’ve got to cure it in such a way that it doesn’t have any wrinkles or defects.
Carbon fiber is much less resilient than steel. It has much less toughness. Stainless steel will stretch and bend; the carbon fiber will tend to shatter. Toughness is the area under the stress-strain curve. You’re generally going to have to do better with steel, but stainless steel, to be precise.
One other Starship question. So I visited Starbase, I think it was two years ago, with Sam Teller, and that was awesome. It was very cool to see, in a whole bunch of ways. One thing I noticed was that people really took pride in the simplicity of things.
Everyone wants to tell you how Starship is just a big soda can, and we’re hiring welders, and if you can weld in any industrial project, you can weld here. But there’s a lot of pride in the simplicity.
Well, factually, Starship is a very complicated rocket.
So that’s what I’m getting at. Are things simple or are they complex?
I think maybe what they’re trying to say is that you don’t have to have prior experience in the rocket industry to work on Starship. Somebody just needs to be smart and work hard and be trustworthy, and they can work on a rocket. They don’t need prior rocket experience.
Starship is the most complicated machine ever made by humans, by a long shot.
In what regards?
Anything, really. I’d say there isn’t a more complex machine. I’d say that pretty much any project I can think of would be easier than this. That’s why nobody has ever made a fully reusable orbital rocket. It’s a very hard problem.
Many smart people have tried before—very smart people with immense resources—and they failed. And we haven’t succeeded yet. Falcon is partially reusable, but the upper stage is not. Starship Version 3, I think this design can be fully reusable. That full reusability is what will enable us to become a multiplanetary civilization.
Any technical problem, even a hadron collider or something like that, is an easier problem than this.
We spent a lot of time on bottlenecks. Can you say what the current Starship bottlenecks are, even at a high level?
Trying to make it not explode, generally. It really wants to explode. That old chestnut. All those combustible materials. We’ve had 2 boosters explode on the test stand. One obliterated the entire test facility.
So it only takes that one mistake. The amount of energy contained in a Starship is insane. Is that why it’s harder than Falcon? Is it because it’s just more energy?
It’s a lot of new technology. It’s pushing the performance envelope.
The Raptor 3 engine is a very, very advanced engine. It's by far the best rocket engine ever made. But it desperately wants to blow up. Just to put things into perspective here, at liftoff the rocket is generating over 100 gigawatts of power.
That's 20% of U.S. electricity.
It's actually insane.
It's a great comparison while not exploding.
Sometimes.
Sometimes, yes. So I was like, how does it not explode?
There are thousands of ways that it could explode and only one way that it doesn't. So we want it not only to really not explode, but to fly reliably on a daily basis, like once per hour. Obviously, if it blows up a lot, it's very difficult to maintain that launch cadence.
What's the single biggest remaining problem for Starship?
It's having the heat shield be reusable. No one's ever made a reusable orbital heat shield. So the heat shield has got to make it through the ascent phase without shedding a bunch of tiles, and then it's got to come back in and also not lose a bunch of tiles or overheat the main airframe.
Isn't that hard because it's fundamentally a consumable?
Well, yes, but your brake pads in your car are also consumable, but they last a very long time.
Fair. So it just needs to last a very long time.
We have brought the ship back and had it do a soft landing in the ocean. We've done that a few times. But it lost a lot of tiles. It was not reusable without a lot of work.
Even though it did come to a soft landing, it would not have been reusable without a lot of work. So it's not really reusable in that sense. That's the biggest problem that remains: a fully reusable heat shield.
You want to be able to land it, refill the propellant, and fly again. You can't do this laborious inspection of 40,000 tiles type of thing.
When I read biographies of yours, it seems like you're just able to drive the sense of urgency and drive the sense of, "This is the thing that can scale." I'm curious why you think other organizations of yours—SpaceX and Tesla are really big companies now—are still able to keep that culture. What goes wrong with other companies such that they're not able to do that?
I don't know.
Like today, you said you had a bunch of SpaceX meetings. What is it that you're doing there that's keeping that culture? Is it adding urgency?
Well, I don't know. I guess the urgency is going to come from whoever is leading the company. I have a maniacal sense of urgency. So that maniacal sense of urgency projects through the rest of the company.
Is it because of consequences? They're like, "Elon set a crazy deadline, but if I don't get it, I know what happens to me." Is it just that you're able to identify bottlenecks and get rid of them so people can move fast? How do you think about why your companies are able to move fast?
I'm constantly addressing the limiting factor. On the deadlines front, I generally try to aim for a deadline that I at least think is at the 50th percentile. So it's not an impossible deadline, but it's the most aggressive deadline I can think of that could be achieved with 50% probability.
Which means it'll be late half the time.
There is a law of gas expansion that applies to schedules. If you said we're going to do something in 5 years, which to me is like infinity time, it will expand to fill the available schedule and it'll take 5 years.
Physics will limit how fast you can do certain things. So scaling up manufacturing, there's a rate at which you can move the atoms and scale manufacturing. That's why you can't instantly make 1 million units a year of something. You've got to design the manufacturing line. You've got to bring it up. You've got to ride the S-curve of production.
What can I say that's actually helpful to people? Generally, a maniacal sense of urgency is a very big deal. You want to have an aggressive schedule, and you want to figure out what the limiting factor is at any point in time and help the team address that limiting factor.
So Starlink was slowly in the works for many years. We talked about it all the way in the beginning of the company. So then there was a team you had built in Redmond, and then at one point you decided this team was just not cutting it. It went for a few years slowly, so why didn't you act earlier, and why did you act when you did? Why was that the right moment at which to act?
I have these very detailed engineering reviews weekly. That's maybe a very unusual level of granularity. I don't know anyone who runs a company, or at least a manufacturing company, that goes with the level of detail that I go into. It's not as though I have a pretty good understanding of what's actually going on, because we go through things in detail.
I'm a big believer in skip-level meetings, where instead of having the person that reports to me say things, it's everyone that reports to them saying something in the technical review. And there can't be advanced preparation. Otherwise, you're going to get "glazed," as I say these days.
Exactly. Very Gen Z of you. How do you prevent advanced preparation? Do you call on them randomly?
No, I just go around the room. Everyone provides an update. It's a lot of information to keep in your head. If you have meetings weekly or twice weekly, you've got a snapshot of what that person said. You can then plot the progress points. You can mentally plot the points on a curve and say, "Are we converging to a solution or not?"
I'll take drastic action only when I conclude that success is not in the set of possible outcomes. So when I finally reach the conclusion that unless drastic action is taken, we have no chance of success, then I must take drastic action. I came to that conclusion in 2018, took drastic action, and fixed the problem.
You've got many, many companies. In each of them, it sounds like you do this kind of deep engineering understanding of what the relevant bottlenecks are, so you can do these reviews with people. You've been able to scale it up to 5, 6, 7 companies. Within one of these companies, you have many different mini-companies within them. What determines the maximum amount here? Because you have, like, 80 companies?
80? No.
But you have so many already. That's already remarkable by this current number.
Exactly. We can barely keep one company together. It depends on the situation. I actually don't have regular meetings with The Boring Company, so The Boring Company is sort of cruising along.
Basically, if something is working well and making good progress, then there's no point in me spending time on it. I actually allocate time according to where the limiting factor is. Where are things problematic? Where are we pushing against? What is holding us back? I focus, at the risk of saying the words too many times, on the limiting factor.
The irony is, if something's going really well, they don't see much of me. But if something is going badly, they'll see a lot of me. Or not even badly—if something is the limiting factor.
The limiting factor, exactly.
It's not exactly going badly, but it's the thing that we need to make go faster. When something's a limiting factor at SpaceX or Tesla, are you talking weekly and daily with the engineer that's working on it? How does that actually work?
Most things that are the limiting factor are weekly, and some things are twice weekly. The AI5 chip review is twice weekly. Every Tuesday and Saturday is the chip review.
Is it open-ended in how long it goes?
Technically, yes, but usually it's 2 or 3 hours. Sometimes less. It depends on how much information we've got to go through.
That's another thing. I'm just trying to tease out the differences here because the outcomes seem quite different. I think it's interesting to know what inputs are different.
It feels like in the corporate world, one, like you were saying, the CEO doing engineering reviews does not always happen despite the fact that that is what the company is doing. But then time is often pretty finely sliced into half-hour meetings or even 15-minute meetings. It seems like you hold more open-ended, "We're talking about it until we figure it out" type things.
Sometimes. But most of them seem to more or less stay on time. Today's Starship engineering review went a bit longer because there were more topics to discuss. They're trying to figure out how to scale to 1 million-plus tons to orbit per year. It's quite challenging.
6. DOGE
Can I ask a question? You said about Optimus and AI that they're going to result in double-digit growth rates within a matter of years.
Oh, like the economy?
Yes. I think that's right. What was the point of the DOGE cuts if the economy is going to grow so much?
Well, I think waste and fraud are not good things to have. I was actually pretty worried about…
In the absence of AI and robotics, we're actually totally screwed because the national debt is piling up like crazy. Interest payments on the national debt exceed the military budget, which is $1 trillion. So we have over $1 trillion just in interest payments. I was pretty concerned about that.
Maybe if I spend some time, we can slow down the bankruptcy of the United States and give us enough time for AI and robots to help solve the national debt. Or rather, not help solve it—it’s the only thing that could solve the national debt. We are 1,000% going to go bankrupt as a country and fail as a country without AI and robots. Nothing else will solve the national debt. We just need enough time to build the AI and robots so we don't go bankrupt before then.
I guess the thing I'm curious about is, when DOGE starts, you have this enormous ability to enact reform.
Not that enormous.
Sure. I totally buy your point that it's important that AI and robotics drive productivity improvements and drive GDP growth. But why not just directly go after the things you were pointing out, like the tariffs on certain components or permitting?
I'm not the president. And it is very hard to cut things that are obvious waste and fraud, like ridiculous waste and fraud. What I discovered is that it's extremely difficult even to cut very obvious waste and fraud from the government because the government has to operate on who's complaining.
If you cut off payments to fraudsters, they immediately come up with the most sympathetic-sounding reasons to continue the payment. They don't say, "Please keep the fraud going." They're like, "You're killing baby pandas." Meanwhile, no baby pandas are dying. They're just making it up. The fraudsters are capable of coming up with extremely compelling, heart-wrenching stories that are false but nonetheless sound sympathetic.
That's what happened. Perhaps I should have known better. But I thought, wait, let's try to cut some amount of waste and pork from the government. Maybe there shouldn't be 20 million people marked as alive in Social Security who are definitely dead and over the age of 115. The oldest American is 114. So it's safe to say if somebody is 115 and marked as alive in the Social Security database, there's either a typo, or somebody should call them and say, "We seem to have your birthday wrong, or we need to mark you as dead." One of the two things.
Very intimidating call to get. Or a great plot for a movie.
Yes. That's what I mean by ludicrous fraud.
Were those people getting payments?
Some were getting payments from Social Security. But the main fraud vector was to mark somebody as alive in Social Security and then use every other government payment system to basically do fraud.
Because what those other government payment systems do is simply an "Are you alive?" check to the Social Security database. It's a bank shot.
What would you estimate is the total amount of fraud from this mechanism?
By the way, the Government Accountability Office has done these estimates before. I'm not the only one. In fact, I think the GAO did an analysis—a rough estimate of fraud during the Biden administration—and calculated it at roughly half a trillion dollars.
So don't take my word for it. Take a report issued during the Biden administration. How about that?
From this Social Security mechanism?
It's one of many. It's important to appreciate that the government is very ineffective at stopping fraud. It's not like a company where, with stopping fraud, you've got a motivation because it's affecting the earnings of your company. The government just prints more money.
You need caring and competence. These are in short supply at the federal level. When you go to the DMV, do you think, "Wow, this is a bastion of competence?" Well, now imagine it's worse than the DMV because it's the DMV that can print money.
The states more or less need to stay within their budget or they go bankrupt. But the federal government just prints more money.
If there's actually half a trillion dollars of fraud, why was it not possible to cut all that?
You really have to stand back and recalibrate your expectations for competence. Because you're operating in a world where you've got to make ends meet. You've got to pay your bills.
Find the microphones.
Exactly. It's not like there's a giant, largely uncaring monster bureaucracy. It's a bunch of anachronistic computers that are just sending payments.
One of the things that the DOGE team did sounds so simple and probably will save $100–200 billion a year. It was simply requiring that payments from the main Treasury computer—which is called PAM, Payment Accounts Master or something like that; there are $5 trillion in payments a year—have a payment appropriation code.
Make it mandatory, not optional, that you have anything at all in the comment field. You have to recalibrate how dumb things are. Payments were being sent out with no appropriation code, not checking back to any congressional appropriation, and with no explanation.
This is why the Department of War, formerly the Department of Defense, cannot pass an audit, because the information is literally not there. Recalibrate your expectations.
I want to better understand this half-a-trillion-dollar number, because there's an IG report in 2024. Why is it so low? Maybe, but we found that over 7 years, the Social Security fraud they estimated was like $70 billion over 7 years, so like $10 billion a year. So I'd be curious to see what the other $490 billion is.
Federal government expenditures are $7.5 trillion a year.
How competent do you think the government is? The discretionary spending there is like 15%?
But it doesn't matter. Most of the fraud is non-discretionary. It's basically fraudulent Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and disability. There's a zillion government payments. A bunch of these payments are, in fact, block transfers to the states. So the federal government doesn't even have the information in a lot of cases to even know if there's fraud.
Let's consider reductio ad absurdum. The government is perfect and has no fraud. What is your probability estimate of that?
Zero.
Okay, so then would you say fraud and waste in the government is 90% efficient?
That also would be quite generous.
But if it's only 90%, that means that there's $750 billion a year of waste and fraud.
And it's not 90%. It's not 90% effective.
This seems like a strange way to first-principles the amount of fraud in the government. Just ask, how much do you think there is? Anyway, we don't have to do it live, but I'd be curious. You know a lot about fraud at Stripe? People are constantly trying to do fraud.
Yeah, but as you say, it's a little bit of a different problem space because you've really ground it down. It's a little bit of a different problem space because you're dealing with a much more heterogeneous set of fraud vectors here than we are.
But at Stripe, you have high competence and you try hard. You have high competence and high caring, but still fraud is non-zero. Now imagine it's at a much bigger scale, there's much less competence, and much less caring.
At PayPal back in the day, we tried to manage fraud down to about 1% of the payment volume. That was very difficult. It took a tremendous amount of competence and caring to get fraud merely to 1%. Now imagine that you're an organization where there's much less caring and much less competence. It's going to be much more than 1%.
How do you feel now looking back on politics and doing stuff there? Looking from the outside in, 2 things have been quite impactful: one, the America PAC, and two, the acquisition of Twitter at the time. But also, it seems like there was a bunch of heartache. What's your grading of the whole experience?
I think those things needed to be done to maximize the probability that the future is good. Politics generally is very tribal. People lose their objectivity usually with politics. They generally have trouble seeing the good on the other side or the bad on their own side. That's generally how it goes.
That, I guess, was one of the things that surprised me the most. You often simply cannot reason with people if they're in one tribe or the other. They simply believe that everything their tribe does is good and anything the other political tribe does is bad. Persuading them otherwise is almost impossible.
But I think overall, those actions—acquiring Twitter, getting Trump elected, even though it makes a lot of people angry—I think those actions were good for civilization.
How does it feed into the future you're excited about?
Well, America needs to be strong enough to last long enough to extend life to other planets and to get AI and robotics to the point where we can ensure that the future is good.
On the other hand, if we were to descend into, say, communism or some situation where the state was extremely oppressive, that would mean that we might not be able to become multi-planetary. The state might stamp out our progress in AI and robotics—Optimus, Grok, et cetera.
Not just yours, but any revenue-maximizing company's products will be leveraged by the government over time. How does this concern manifest in what private companies should be willing to give governments? What kinds of guardrails?
Should AI models be made to do whatever the government that has contracted them out to do asks them to do? Should Grok get to say, “Actually, even if the military wants to do X, no, Grok will not do that”?
I think maybe the biggest danger of AI and robotics going wrong is government. People who are opposed to corporations or worried about corporations should really worry the most about government, because government is just a corporation in the limit. Government is just the biggest corporation with a monopoly on violence.
I always find it a strange dichotomy where people would think corporations are bad, but the government is good, when the government is simply the biggest and worst corporation. But people have that dichotomy. They somehow think that, at the same time, government can be good but corporations bad, and this is not true. Corporations have better morality than the government.
As the guy building AI and robotics, how do you prevent that?
If you limit the powers of government, which is really what the U.S. Constitution is intended to do—to limit the powers of government—then you're probably going to have a better outcome than if you have more government.
Robotics will be available to all governments, right?
I don’t know about all governments. It's difficult to predict. I can say what the endpoint is, or what is many years in the future, but it's difficult to predict the path along the way.
If civilization progresses, AI will vastly exceed the sum of all human intelligence. There will be far more robots than humans. Along the way, what happens is very difficult to predict.
It seems one thing you could do is just say, “Whatever government X, you're not allowed to use Optimus to do X, Y, Z.” Just write out a policy. I think you tweeted recently that Grok should have a moral constitution. One of those things could be that we limit what governments are allowed to do with this advanced technology.
Technically, if politicians pass a law and they can enforce that law, then it's hard not to do that law. The best thing we can have is limited government, where you have the appropriate cross-checks between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
The reason I'm curious about it is that, at some point, it seems the limits will come from you. You've got Optimus, you've got the space GPUs…
You think I'll be the boss of the government?
Already, it's the case with SpaceX that for things that are crucial—the government really cares about getting certain satellites up in space or whatever—it needs SpaceX. It is the necessary contractor. You are in the process of building more and more of the technological components of the future that will have an analogous role in different industries.
You could have this ability to set some policy that suppressing classical liberalism in any way—“My companies will not help in any way with that”—or some policy like that.
I will do my best to ensure that anything that's within my control maximizes the good outcome for humanity. I think anything else would be shortsighted, because obviously I'm part of humanity, so I like humans. Pro-human.
7. TeraFab
You mentioned that Dojo 3 will be used for space-based compute.
You really read what I say.
I don't know if you know, Elon, but you have a lot of followers.
Dead giveaway. How did you discern my secrets?
Oh, you posted them on X. How do you design a chip for space? What changes?
You want to design it to be more radiation-tolerant and run at a higher temperature. Roughly, if you increase the operating temperature by 20% in degrees Kelvin, you can cut your radiator mass in half. So running at a higher temperature is helpful in space.
There are various things you can do for shielding the memory. But neural nets are going to be very resilient to bit flips. Most of what happens with radiation is random bit flips. But if you've got a multi-trillion-parameter model and you get a few bit flips, it doesn't matter.
Heuristic programs are going to be much more sensitive to bit flips than some giant parameter file. I just design it to run hot. I think you pretty much do it the same way that you do things on Earth, apart from making it run hotter.
The solar array is most of the weight on the satellite. Is there a way to make the GPUs even more powerful than what NVIDIA and TPUs, et cetera, are planning on doing that would be especially privileged in the space-based world?
The basic math is, if you can do about a kilowatt per reticle, then you'd need 100 million full-reticle chips to do 100 gigawatts. Depending on what your yield assumptions are, that tells you how many chips you need to make. If you're going to have 100 gigawatts of power, you need 100 million chips that are running at a kilowatt sustained per reticle. Basic math.
The 100 million-chip figure depends on the die size of something like Blackwell GPUs or similar, and how many you can get out of a wafer. You can get on the order of dozens or less per wafer.
So basically, this is a world where, if we're putting that out every single year, you're producing millions of wafers a month. That's the plan with TeraFab? Millions of wafers a month of advanced process nodes?
Yeah, it could be north of a million or something. You’ve got to do the memory too.
Are you going to make a memory fab?
I think TeraFab's got to do memory. It's got to do logic, memory, and packaging.
I'm very curious how somebody gets started. This is the most complicated thing man has ever made. Obviously, if anybody's up to the task, you're up to the task.
So you realize it's a bottleneck, and you go to your engineers. What do you tell them to do? “I want a million wafers a month in 2030.”
That’s right. That’s exactly what I want.
Do you call ASML? What is the next step?
Not so much. We make a little fab and see what happens. Make our mistakes at a small scale and then make a big one.
Is a little fab done?
No, it's not done. We're not going to keep that cat in the bag. That cat's going to come out of the bag. There'll be drones hovering over the bloody thing. You'll be able to see its construction progress on X in real time.
Look, I don't know—we could just flounder in failure, to be fair. Success is not guaranteed. Since we want to try to make something like 100 million chips, we want 100 gigawatts of power and chips that can take 100 gigawatts by 2030. We’ll take as many chips as our suppliers will give us.
I've actually said this to TSMC, Samsung, and Micron: “Please build more fabs faster.” We will guarantee to buy the output of those fabs.
There's a narrative that the people doing AI want a very large number of chips as quickly as possible. Then many of the input suppliers—the fabs, but also the turbine manufacturers—are not ramping up production very quickly.
No, they're not.
The explanation you hear is that they're dispositionally conservative. They're Taiwanese or German, as the story may be. They just don't believe it. Is that really the explanation, or is there something else?
If somebody's been in the computer-memory business for 30 or 40 years, they've seen cycles. They've seen boom and bust 10 times. That's a lot of layers of scar tissue.
During the boom times, it looks like everything is going to be great forever. Then the crash happens, and they're desperately trying to avoid bankruptcy. Then there's another boom and another crash.
Are there other ideas you think others should go pursue that you're not, for whatever reasons right now?
There are a few companies that are pursuing new ways of doing chips, but they're just not scaling fast.
I don't even mean within AI. I mean just generally.
People should do the thing where they find that they're highly motivated to do that thing, as opposed to some idea that I suggest. They should do the thing that they find personally interesting and motivating to do.
But going back to the limiting factor—I used that phrase about 100 times—the current limiting factor that I see in the 3- to 4-year timeframe is chips. In the 1-year timeframe, it's energy: power production, electricity. It's not clear to me that there's enough usable electricity to turn on all the AI chips that are being made.
Towards the end of this year, I think people are going to have real trouble turning on the chips. The chip output will exceed the ability to turn chips on. What's your plan to deal with that world?
We're trying to accelerate electricity production. Maybe that's one of the reasons that xAI will maybe be the leader—hopefully the leader. We'll be able to turn on more chips than other people can turn on, faster, because we're good at hardware.
Generally, the innovations from the corporations that call themselves labs—the ideas tend to flow. It's rare to see more than about a 6-month difference. The ideas travel back and forth with the people.
So I think you sort of hit the hardware wall, and then whichever company can scale hardware the fastest will be the leader. So I think xAI will be able to scale hardware the fastest and therefore most likely will be the leader.
You joked, or were self-conscious, about using the “limiting factor” phrase again. But I actually think there's something deep here. If you look at a lot of the things we've touched on over the course of it, it's maybe a good note to end on.
If you think of a senescent, low-agency company, it would have some bottleneck and not really be doing anything about it. Marc Andreessen had the line, “Most people are willing to endure any amount of chronic pain to avoid acute pain.” It feels like a lot of the cases we're talking about are just leaning into the acute pain, whatever it is.
“Okay, we've got to figure out how to work with steel, or we've got to figure out how to run the chips in space.” We'll take some near-term acute pain to actually solve the bottleneck. So that's kind of a unifying theme.
I have a high pain threshold.
That's helpful to solve the bottleneck.
Yes. One thing I can say is, I think the future is going to be very interesting. As I said at Davos—I think I was on the ground for about 3 hours or something—it's better to err on the side of optimism and be wrong than err on the side of pessimism and be right, for quality of life.
You'll be happier if you err on the side of optimism rather than erring on the side of pessimism. So I recommend erring on the side of optimism.
Here's to that. Cool. Elon, thanks for doing this.
Thank you.
All right, thanks, guys. All right. Great stamina. Hopefully this didn't count as a pain in the pain tolerance.