打造金融服务版 ChatGPT——OpenAI 金融服务负责人 Joseph Kim
- ChatGPT for Financial Services 将可靠的数据获取作为企业产品的核心组成部分。 Joseph Kim 表示,一些知名 MCP 连接器的错误率超过40%,因此团队选择将数据打包进产品,尽管客户可能为已有授权重复付费。Morgan Stanley 和 Evercore 是设计合作伙伴;Kim 说,数据如今是客户排名第一的正面反馈。
- Kim 预计,ChatGPT 插件业务将达到10亿美元规模,因为垂直领域的专业化能补上产品最后20%的关键差距。 Codex 大约能完成80%,但原样推出金融产品“会失败”;不过,“我们构建的95%”完全是初创公司或其他企业能够做到的。所谓“秘密配方”可能是数据、界面改动或集成,而金融领域的训练成果也会进入主模型,供外部开发者使用。
- OpenAI 内部的采用率跃升,说明合适的产品形态可以释放已有的模型能力。 2月桌面应用发布前后,财务、法务和销售团队对 Codex 的使用率从接近0升至90%,工程团队的使用率则稳步攀升。Kim 的产品使命是让“尽可能多的用户都能用上模型智能”。
- 当前产品的安全机制依赖人工复核模型的工作。 根据任务不同,模型可能完成30%或80%的工作,但审查仍由分析师负责。随着自主性在2027年和2028年提升,Kim 希望智能体的权限和监督机制“看起来像一个人”,并借鉴现有职场管控方式和银行业的层级审核制度。
- Kim 预计,到2027年,人类判断力将成为模型能力中显著更强的一环。 他的训练方法是收集人类对成对结果的偏好:人几秒钟就能判断幻灯片哪个好,模型却可能推理很久仍选错。编程提供了先例——既有可验证的正确性,也有对设计是否简洁的判断;金融模型也有类似的“感觉”。
- 转向投资观点会让学习更难,因为判断结果可能要等3年。 Richard 追问,模型如何培养出与主流观点相悖的直觉;Kim 的回答聚焦于持续扩展规模、研究投入和 P99.9 级别的专家反馈。他预计2027年会有进展,同时承认,工作越接近 associate 和 MD 的职责,目标就越模糊。
- Kim 认为,有缺陷的金融基准测试会掩盖真实的能力提升。 OpenAI 已停止跟踪 GDPval,原因是该基准已饱和或失效;GPT-5.2 在金融评测中的得分持平后,调查发现答案键和提示词存在问题。他的团队希望建立一套投行评测,判断高分能否对应初级分析师工作的实际自动化程度。
1. 创业公司已能触及金融产品的关键层
- Kim 将 ChatGPT for Financial Services 描述为一款企业产品:把消费者版 ChatGPT 的工具与公司专属模板、Daloop 和 S&P 等数据源结合起来。Morgan Stanley 和 Evercore 是设计合作伙伴。金融领域的训练成果会向上汇入 “Big Run”——主训练流程,最终形成类似 6-Ash 或 6-1-Ash 的模型;这些能力进入主模型后,也会开放给打造自有产品的初创公司和金融机构。
- 采用率的证据来自 OpenAI 内部:工程团队对 Codex 的使用率稳步上升;在2月 Codex 桌面应用发布前,财务、法务和销售团队的使用率接近0,发布前后则升至90%。Kim 将 OpenAI 称为一家“研究与部署公司”,并有意把研究放在首位;产品开发则让原本不会使用这些能力的人也能接触模型智能。
- Kim 说,这次开发与以往不同:产品、模型运行框架和研究团队都在同一屋檐下,给了团队更大的灵活性。他的判断有两面:Codex 的记忆、技能和持久性已经能支撑有竞争力的金融产品约80%的功能,但原样推出“会失败”。缺失的20%至关重要。尽管如此,“我们构建的95%都完全是初创公司或其他企业能做到的”,不必改动底层模型。
- 产品的大部分功能基于 ChatGPT 插件架构,也使用其他开发者能调用的同一套基础组件。Kim 把自己的团队比作基于 OpenAI 创业,并预计“基于 ChatGPT 插件可以做出一门10亿美元的生意”。有价值的增量可能来自数据、界面改动或集成:“秘密配方确实很值钱。”
2. 数据可靠性与熟悉的管控方式决定产品能否落地
- 把财报电话会文字稿打包进产品,起初很难自圆其说:客户可能已经有授权和 MCP 连接器,再收费就像重复收费。测试结果改变了团队的决定。Kim 说,一些知名 MCP 的错误率超过40%,因此团队把数据纳入自有体系,以端到端掌控体验。他表示,客户如今最肯定的就是数据。
- Richard 追问自主性不断提升的智能体会给金融业务带来哪些风险。Kim 说,上个月推出的产品以“始终有人参与”为前提:根据任务不同,分析师可能让模型完成30%或80%的工作,但仍须负责审查。他预计,到2027年和2028年,产品的自主性会继续提升。
- 对于下一步,Kim 希望安全机制“看起来像一个人”。Google 要求工程师在修改系统前满足可读性要求,体现了权限检查;银行业则有分析师、associate、VP、director 到 managing director 的层级审核链。Kim 认为,“人类犯的错和模型一样多”,现有的人类工作复核机制可以成为监督智能体的模板。
3. 判断力将成为金融工作中可训练的一环
- swyx 提出“犯一次错,职业生涯就完了”的担忧。Kim 否定了这种说法,但也作了条件限定:如果事实错误改变了结论,尤其是经过多轮审核后仍传到 MD 手上,就会很危险。他有信心认为,事实可靠性提升,加上现有审核机制,能让这类错误层层传递的概率“非常低”。
- 在 Kim 看来,剩下的短板往往是判断力:事实都没错,但“这页幻灯片很难看”。排版、颜色和给人草率的观感,仍会决定成果是否好用。他预计,模型到2027年会在这类“较软的目标函数”上有显著进步,关键是判断一个版本是否比另一个更好。
- 被问到如何训练判断力时,Kim 回到早期 RLHF 的方法:向人展示成对结果,让人判断哪个更好,再据此训练奖励模型。OpenAI 在幻灯片上做过这类训练。人几秒钟就能选出更好的版本;评分模型可能花很多推理 token 分析像素,最后仍然选错。Kim 说,技术上的答案很简单,实际操作却复杂得多。
- Kim 用编程举例,认为这一领域“已经做到80%”,既有可验证的奖励,也需要判断代码是否易维护、设计是否简洁。Excel 也有求和、引用错误等可检查项,同时还有专业人士所说的“感觉”:他们会调整输入,观察输出如何变化。swyx 将这一点与 Cognition 的 Frontier Code 和 SWE-bench 联系起来:正确不等于能从几份都有效的 PR 中选出自己愿意合并的那一份。
4. 投资观点让目标更难界定
- Richard 提出,资深投资者的直觉常常与主流观点相悖,而这可能带来丰厚回报。Kim 解释说,当前模型聚焦初级分析师工作有两个原因:模型擅长执行具体指令;人们也不喜欢繁琐的 Excel 和幻灯片工作,比如精确摆放 logo。展望2027年,他预计模型会开始承担一些 associate 和 MD 的工作,但这类工作的目标更模糊。
- 要验证一项投资观点,可能得“等上3年”才能看到明确的市场结果。Kim 认为提升能力很难,但“并非不可能”:需要优质数据、P99.9 级别的专家反馈、基础模型持续扩展,以及研究资源的优先投入。他有信心认为2027年会取得进展。开场片段中,他还说,预训练问题曾限制规模扩展,而“2026年,我们已经解决了其中许多问题”。
5. 更好的基准测试与领域知识仍是瓶颈
- Kim 对评测的警示有明确因果链:基准测试只是某项能力的代理指标;答案键或评分方式有问题,就可能引发奖励投机,让模型底层表现不佳却拿到高分。“做好一套评测非常难。”他对金融领域的判断是:“我们认为,目前还没有真正好的评测。”
- OpenAI 已不再跟踪或发布 GDPval。Kim 说,这套评测已经饱和,剩下的部分基本也失效了。谈到 GPT-6 Astra 时,他说 OpenAI 没有过多讨论内部金融评测。GPT-5.2 在一组金融评测上的得分变化不大,调查后发现答案键有误、提示词描述不清等问题。他也提醒,研究人员往往更愿意调查令人失望的分数,而不太会追查好看的分数。
- OpenAI 希望建立一套新的投行评测,判断高分是否意味着模型能够自动化相当一部分初级分析师工作。Kim 说,内部金融评测正在开发中。团队也在尝试把企业产品拓展到 Pro 方案的专业消费者:“希望很快能有一些不错的消息。”
- 领域知识仍是组织层面的制约。Kim 认为,优秀的产品管理能力是赢得这个市场的“主要瓶颈”,重点领域包括投行、股票研究和资产管理。金融领域需要主题专家;它不像编程那样有一个先天优势——训练编程模型的人本来就知道好代码是什么样。
完整逐字稿
I really do think there’s going to be a $1 billion business built on top of a ChatGPT plugin. But 95% of what we built was something a startup or another company could absolutely do. At OpenAI, we ran into problems with pre-training and therefore had difficulty scaling the model. In 2026, we’ve been able to solve many of these issues.
Today we have Joseph Kim, one of the heads of ChatGPT Finance at OpenAI, and our co-host and head of editorial from Latent Space, Richard, in the studio. It’s a special episode. We’re here in New York at AI Finance. Joseph just gave a great keynote. I don’t think we want to repeat most of the information, so—
That makes sense.
Honestly, go watch it, but give us 30 seconds on what you talked about, and then we’ll leave the breadcrumbs. You guys can go watch the keynote.
Sure. I can give a quick 30-second intro to what we just talked about. We just released a new product, ChatGPT for financial services. It’s an enterprise-focused product that’s trying to bring the power of ChatGPT—the tools and things you like to use in a consumer product—and add the enterprise layer. That means firm-specific templates and sources like Daloop and S&P. We’ve been working with our design partners, Morgan Stanley and Evercore, and the reception has been incredible.
That was the first half of the talk. The second half was much more forward-looking. I talked about some of the trend lines we’re seeing in model improvements, projected them into the future, and considered what these models might be able to do by mid-2027 or the end of 2027. What does that mean for people building products on top of those models? How can you start planning for the intelligence that’s coming in just a matter of months?
I think it’s a fun time because you actually come from the research side of things. You now lead a lot of the product and engineering, but tell us what it takes to make a financial-specific product. You mentioned in the keynote that there was an uptick in users—
Yeah.
—when you launched ChatGPT Work, and Codex started to become available to the masses. People started using it for finance, and now you’re shipping your first finance product.
Yeah.
What is financial reasoning data like? What goes into finance-specific models?
It’s a great question. All of the training data we use for financial reasoning and analysis goes upstream into what we call the Big Run, which is the main run that becomes something like 6-Ash or 6-1-Ash, et cetera. Even though we’re adding a lot of financial data to the model, it’s going into the main model, so it’s available to people who want to build on top of it. That’s very important to us. At OpenAI, we want that intelligence to be accessible not only through the products we build in-house, but also to people who want to build startups and businesses on top of it, as well as financial firms that want to integrate it directly into their companies.
I think you touched on product and research, and that’s core to what we do at OpenAI. Internally, we call ourselves a research and deployment company. We structure that order intentionally: research comes first, and deployment comes second. As we think about changing the way people do knowledge work, we work in that order. First, we think about model capabilities, where they’re headed, and what new things they can enable. Then we think deeply about the product features and surfaces we should build to make that model intelligence accessible to more people.
You alluded to a slide in my keynote where we showed Codex adoption within OpenAI. It’s funny because you can see the software engineering adoption curve: it’s steadily up and to the right. People are picking it up and incorporating it into their daily routines. But if you look at finance, legal, and sales, adoption is pretty much at zero, and then suddenly it jumps to 90%. If you look at what happened around the time it jumped, we had released the Codex desktop app in February. That’s when adoption jumped. I think it shows the importance of developing those things together. The purpose of the product is to make that model intelligence accessible to as many users as possible.
In that uptick in using Codex for financial applications, what did you learn that you then applied to the post-training of financial data?
It’s a great question. I can talk a little bit about how we went about building ChatGPT for financial services. It was very unique. We haven’t built a lot of first-party products. Codex was our biggest and main one, and this was the first time we developed a product where the product, the model harness, and the research were all under one roof. That gave us a lot of flexibility in how we went about building things.
1. Building Around Industry Reality
The biggest takeaway from working on this for the last 6 months is that, in enterprise, you have to deal with the reality of the industry you’re in and build around that. That’s easy to ignore. If you think about it from first principles, you can reach a conclusion that makes sense and defend it with logic and reason. But if you ignore the state of the world when you start building, and the forces at play within the industry, you’re not going to build the right product. There are competitive forces, and people have their own objectives. We thought about that a lot with ChatGPT for financial services.
I’ll give you one example: data. Data was a huge part of how we thought about building the product. It was a little tough to defend from first principles when I was working on this product. You might say, “I want to bring quarterly earnings transcripts into the product and bundle them.” The first thing people will say is, “Look, there’s an MCP connector in the store. What incremental value are you providing by bundling that in?” On paper, it looks bad. They might already have a license for it, so they might feel like they’re paying twice. They might also have an MCP connector. So why are you building this?
The reality is that we tested all these MCPs, and the error rates were really high. Some of the MCPs we connected to, including some big names, had error rates of more than 40%. MCPs are one of those things that look great on paper, but you have to look at the data and see what’s actually going on. We found that the data experience was really bad. The only way to fix it at scale was to bring the data in-house and control the experience end to end. The extra money you pay to bundle that data is worth it. That was a product decision we had to make that was very industry-specific, and it’s resonating with customers. Customers love it. The number one thing they call out is the data, so it worked.
So you had good success with this.
Yeah.
Tell us about the technical side of building a harness adaptation for a specific service. You changed Codex, did post-training, and did whatever you did to make—
Yeah.
—ChatGPT for financial services.
Yes.
If someone were to do the same for—
Yeah.
—another domain, say legal or sales, whatever—
Yeah.
—what are the best practices? What did you learn? What goes into taking something off the shelf and actually making a product around it?
2. ChatGPT Plugins Become Products
I like the question a lot. I alluded to this in my keynote as well, but the interesting thing is that it’s fun to talk about the post-training stuff because it’s unique to what we do, and it gets people excited. But 95% of what we built was something a startup or another company could absolutely do.
Mm.
And we didn’t really have to leverage our ability to make changes in the model to build a fantastic product, right? I think it’s a great call to mention that piece. What I would say is, a few things. One is, most of the product we built was built on top of the Codex—or I should say ChatGPT now—plugin architecture and plugin primitives, and that’s something we’ve been investing a lot of time and energy in. OpenAI is an interesting company where we face the same problems internally that a startup would face if it were to build on top of OpenAI.
In a lot of ways, my team is like a startup building on top of OpenAI technology, right? Even internally, we need to find scalable ways for teams like mine to stand on the shoulders of giants and build on top of Codex. Codex is fantastic. It’s got great memory and good skills. It’s persistent.
Yes.
There are a lot of things that are wonderful about Codex, but the thesis of my team was that Codex will get you about 80% of the way to a product that would be successful in the market, but the 20% is missing. We need to find some way for my team to build that 20% and actually go in, because the other half of the thesis was that if you just took Codex and launched it as a financial product, it would fail. That 20% is pivotal.
We built on top of the plugin architecture, using the same primitives that are available to any of the builders who want to build on top of ChatGPT. I had a line in my presentation, and I really do think there’s going to be a billion-dollar business built on top of a ChatGPT plugin. You’re going to be able to leverage all of that horizontal functionality and just add your secret sauce on top. That secret sauce might be data, UI changes, or an integration. It’s really valuable, and I think there’s a billion dollars’ worth of value to be built there.
Mm-hmm.
It’s an interesting time for the industry because orchestration is becoming a lot more automated, with teams of agents going out and doing things.
Yeah.
But for finance, obviously, there are a lot of risks involved in that. Can you talk a bit about the safety you’ve baked into the product?
Yeah. Safety is super, super important. I would say it’s only going to get more important because agents are already getting more autonomous and more independent, and I think that trend is expected to continue into 2027 and 2028.
Mm.
For the product that we built and launched last month, there were a bunch of paradigms that already existed as it pertains to safety: being thoughtful about auditing the work and making sure the model isn’t making a mistake that’s going to impact business outcomes. We were able to lean heavily into those. The existing product that we launched is a productivity tool for knowledge workers in the space.
Mm.
The idea behind it is that there’s a deep assumption that there’s always a human in the loop. You’re a financial analyst and you have a laundry list of things you want to get done that day. Just like software engineers do with Codex, for every one of those items, the first thing you do is try to build it with ChatGPT, right?
Mm.
It might get you 30% of the way there or 80% of the way there, depending on the task, but there’s always this presumption of humans in the loop who are presiding over that work. That made it very easy for us to build a product where we could pass off the responsibility of auditing and review into people’s hands and responsibilities.
Mm.
That worked well for us, and it was easy to communicate, so that was wonderful. I will say we’re thinking very deeply about what comes next, and what comes next looks different from a productivity tool that’s always being monitored by a human. As we think about what comes next, there are two things we’re thinking about. One is, how do we shape the security and safety profile of the product into something that people understand intuitively?
Mm.
Something that people understand very intuitively is how to work with other people. Our thesis is that if we make the product very similar to how you work with your coworkers, your interns, and people around you, that’s something people can pick up and learn very quickly and easily. Therefore, we need to shape the security profile of the product to look like a person.
There are a few things I’ll call out there. One is the notion of read/write. Even for people, if you’re a new software engineer at a company, you often need something called readability. When I was at Google, there were checks and balances and systems in place before you could start mucking around and touching the system.
Mm.
There are already systems in place to monitor people’s work. If models behave more like people, then you can leverage those systems, which makes it very easy to talk about and work through this with financial institutions. That’s something we’re leaning into pretty heavily.
The very last thing I would say is that, at least in the context of banking, which is where we started, there’s already a system in place for junior analysts doing a lot of the groundwork. Their work gets passed off to associates, who review it. Then the associates add their secret sauce, their magic, their reasoning, and that gets passed off to the VP. The VP’s work goes up to the director and managing directors.
There’s a hierarchical system where implicit work checking is already happening. It’s been built out to try to prevent mistakes that humans make, right? Humans make just as many mistakes as models, and those systems are already in place. We’re also leaning heavily on those systems when it comes to building financial products.
Okay. I’d say there’s a misconception that, in the finance world, one mistake really compounds. Your whole career is at risk if you submit something wrong. How should people think about getting started and using it? If you’re an analyst, how should you use these tools? Do you have any analogies for where we’re at right now? There are levels of autonomy and self-driving. One of your slides, I think, said 2027.
Yeah.
You see “No more PowerPoint.”
Yeah.
A lot of people will be using AI tools in the loop.
Yeah.
How should people think about where we are now and where things are going? How should they adopt these tools if they have that misconception of “one mistake, my career is over”?
Yeah.
Obviously, there’s a human in the loop. But how should they also think about it going forward as they need to offload more and more?
Yeah, no, that’s wonderful. I have two perspectives on it.
Yes.
They start with different assumptions. I think the notion that my career is over if I make one mistake is incorrect, and I have a line of thought that follows that. But let’s first assume that it’s true. In that case, what I would say is, not all mistakes are created equally.
Yeah.
And not all model capabilities are created equally. When you think about the mistake that a model or a human can make that could be career-ending, it’s usually once you get up to a certain level. If you’re a VP, the stakes are higher than when you’re a junior analyst because there’s a presumption that the work has been checked up to that point. So if an MD sees a mistake, that’s a huge problem. A lot of the safety nets have failed for that mistake to make it up to an MD, right?
But the career-ending mistake is when you get a piece of information factually incorrect, and that factual information changes the conclusion. That’s obviously the biggest type of mistake you can make.
Yes.
We’re seeing a lot of progress in attention to detail. “Hallucination” used to be a big term that came up in 2022 and 2023, and it doesn’t come up nearly as often nowadays. We’re starting to see huge improvements in the reliability of models when it comes to factual mistakes. Models are getting much better at avoiding the kind of egregious mistake that would get you fired, and they continue to get much better.
And so I feel quite confident that a combination of that continual improvement, plus the existing system checks in place, will make the chance of that type of mistake propagating up to an MD very low.
3. Teaching Models Human Taste
What I would say the models are lacking today, and still need to improve on, is not the career-ending mistake, but the part that involves human judgment and taste. It’s, “This slide looks ugly.” It’s not wrong, but it’s formatted poorly, the colors are a little off, or something about it looks sloppy, and therefore it’s not a good slide. That’s not a career-ending mistake in the way that a factual mistake is, but it still matters in terms of how useful that work is.
As we think about the progression into 2027, I expect the model to get much better at the human-taste component. That’s what I was alluding to in my keynote: I think the model will get much better at human taste on things with softer objective functions. It’s not a question of whether it’s right or wrong; it’s comparative. Is there something better than this? I think models are going to get much better along that dimension.
How so? How do we solve taste? How do we train taste into the models?
Very early on in the RLHF days, the only thing we trained models on was essentially taste. There was reinforcement learning through human feedback, and the human feedback was always a pairwise signal: “Given 2 options, which one’s better?” The early days of reinforcement learning were built on the notion of training on human taste.
Then, obviously, we developed things like verifiable rewards and environments, and built a lot of machinery for other types of rewards and other types of RL. People kind of forgot that the early days of reinforcement learning were all about human taste.
How do you train on human taste? I think the technical answer is quite simple, but the practical answer is more complicated. You train a reward model. You get a bunch of humans to look at pairs of things and say which one is better, and this still works.
We did this for slides. How do you make these models better at generating presentations? We get a bunch of humans to look at pairs of slides and say which one looks better. Humans are really good at aesthetic judgment, actually much better than models.
Yeah.
That’s something we discovered: a human can look at 2 slides and, within seconds, say, “This one looks better.” If you have a grading model try to do that, it’ll spend a whole bunch of reasoning tokens—this pixel is this way, this thing’s that—and then maybe come to the wrong conclusion. Humans are still really valuable in making these models better. We will rely a lot on human preference to imbue things like taste.
The last thing I’ll add is that there’s precedent for this, which makes us confident this strategy will work, and that precedent is coding. Coding isn’t fully solved, but let’s say we’re 80% of the way there, and we’re making progress on the last 20%.
Coding is a combination of verifiable rewards and human taste. The verifiable rewards are: Does the code compile? Are there syntax errors? Is the output of the function expected? There are verifiable rewards in place. But a lot of good software engineering is about whether this is clean system design. Did you build a system that’s maintainable over time? Is it easy to unit test? Does it follow paradigms that the vast majority of the community or industry thinks are the right paradigms?
A lot of financial work looks very similar from that perspective. You have an Excel model. Does it sum up? Are there reference errors? There are a whole bunch of verifiable things we can check to make sure the work passes a first-pass sanity check. But there’s also the question, “Is this the way I would have built this model?”
Something I learned about as I started working in finance is that there’s this notion of the feel of the model. You perturb the inputs and look at the outputs. An experienced financial professional can perturb the inputs, look at the outputs, and understand whether the data flows through the model in a way that feels good. That’s a human preference that looks a lot like asking whether code looks clean and is well-written. I think our success in coding gives me confidence that we can solve a lot of these problems in finance as well.
Yeah.
Yeah. We can shout out Frontier Code from Cognition. SWE-bench is very much, “Is the answer correct?” This is also, “Would you merge the code?” You can have multiple answers that are proper PRs and pass.
Right.
But which one would you merge? That’s why you sometimes see the charts where lower reasoning is better, but it’s a taste benchmark as well, right?
Yeah. One of your other 2027 predictions I thought was interesting was that the models you’re training will become much better at investment theses and generating ideas for investment and trading. But obviously, that’s something humans, or experienced financial professionals, are very good at, and they have an intuition for it. It’s often counter to the prevailing wisdom out there. Otherwise, there’s less chance of it making a great return. How are you tackling that problem in terms of training the agents to do that kind of work?
4. From Analyst Tasks To Investment Ideas
Up until today, the vast majority of applications of AI in finance have been really focused on the junior analyst’s work. I think that’s for 2 reasons. One is that you have to build the product based on the capabilities of the model today. If you look at those capabilities, they’re really quite good at taking pretty concrete instructions and executing. “Build me a slide. I want it to look this way. Make it look good. Use our template.” The model is quite capable of doing those things, so we’ve built product experiences around them.
The other thing I’d call out is that there’s a strong preference to make the model good at things humans are not good at or don’t like to do. Most people I talk to really don’t like building Excel models. It’s tedious, detail-oriented work, and it’s easy to get wrong. Similarly with slides: you’re copying logos and placing them very precisely on a specific part of the page. That’s tedious work that a lot of people don’t like to do.
That’s been part of the impetus for us to focus on some of these tasks. It’s a combination of 2 things: the existing model is pretty good at certain types of tasks, and human preferences about what people like to do and don’t like to do help drive the direction of the product. It’s a combination of those 2 things.
I think we’ve solved a lot of the low-hanging fruit in those areas. Going into 2027, we’re going to start to move up the stack: from tasks a junior analyst can do, to tasks an associate can do, to tasks an MD would do. As you move up that chain, the objectives become much fuzzier. It goes from, “This is clearly a good or bad slide,” or, “This is something I would put in front of a client,” to, “I don’t know if this investment idea is good.” It would take 3 years of waiting to really give you a clear, concrete answer about what the market has done.
The objectives start to become fuzzier, and the way you train the model and think about making it better at those things becomes more difficult. It becomes more difficult from a research perspective, but it’s not impossible. It takes a lot of research focus, wonderful data, and feedback from experts in the field. We really want to get the P99.9-type feedback to make the model as good as humans. I don’t think it’s an insurmountable problem. What it takes is continued scaling of the base model and focus.
Focus on the research labs to think that this is an important problem to go solve. One of the things that I’m doing on my team is making this an area of focus and priority for OpenAI. Because of the combination of those 2 things, I feel confident we’ll make a lot of strides in 2027.
Do you have any comments on the current financial benchmarks? I think we’re still at the stage of asking, “Does this check out numbers-wise?” How do you think about making your own evals? I think this is also an open call for people working in this space to work on their own benchmarks.
As a follow-up, you said to build systems for models today, but you also make a lot of predictions for the future. How do you put guardrails, limitations, and checks on the financial services you build for people today, just so they’re confident it’s not going off the rails?
5. Financial Evals Need Better Measures
Yeah, makes sense. Let’s talk a little about evals. Evals are something near and dear to my heart. I spent a lot of time working on them. The prior I would share with people is that building a good eval is incredibly hard. That’s not obvious to people who haven’t worked on an eval before. Building an eval that actually correlates with the thing you’re trying to measure—the skill or capability you’re trying to measure—is very difficult, because whatever you put together is just a proxy for that thing, and it’s just one dimension.
Second, it’s very tedious to get the answer key or the way you grade things right. If you don’t get the grading right, it’s an eval that’s very easy to hack, a very easy reward hack. You could score very highly on the eval but actually do really poorly on the underlying skill or objective you’re trying to measure. The prior I’ll share is that evals are really hard, not just in financial work but across the board.
We don’t think there’s a really good eval today for financial work. There’s a bunch of existing prior work. I’ll reference some of the work that we did, which was GDPval, a little more broadly in knowledge work. If you guys look at the Astra announcement, we don’t talk about GDPval. We know the eval is completely saturated, and the pieces that aren’t saturated are essentially broken, so we don’t report on it. We don’t track it anymore.
One of the tricky things for GPT-6 Astra was that we didn’t talk a whole lot about financial evals. We have some internally that we didn’t talk too much about or want to share at the time, but they’re coming. We didn’t have a good way to show progress on financial tasks with these evals. There’s a funny bias in evals: if the numbers look good, researchers assume the model’s gotten better and don’t investigate it. If you’ve made a much more capable model and the eval numbers look bad or haven’t increased as much as you want, then you go investigate.
Something like this happened with GPT-5.2. We ran it on a set of financial evals, and the numbers didn’t really change much. We thought, “What’s going on here? Let’s take a look at this eval.” We did a deep dive into the different evals, and lots of things were broken. Basically, we found that we had saturated the evals, and the questions we were getting wrong were driven by incorrect answer keys, poorly specified prompts, or some other flaw with the eval.
One of the things my team is currently working on is trying to build a much better eval that actually predicts the ability to automate the work of a specific profession. The idea is to have something like an investment banking eval that predicts that, if you score well on it, you could probably automate a lot of the work of a junior analyst in investment banking.
We’ve got to wrap here soon. Any call-outs for people in the finance space in the Latent Space audience? Your team is probably hiring, but the last thing to put out there is: how can people be helpful to you?
Wonderful. First and foremost, please check out ChatGPT for Financial Services. It’s an enterprise product, but we’re trying very hard to make it available to more prosumers on the Pro plan, so hopefully we’ll have some cool announcements there.
Second, yes, my team is hiring. We’re seeing incredible customer traction with the product, and because of that, we’re hiring and scaling the team rapidly. It’s a very diverse team with lots of different roles, so I want to call out a few of them very quickly. There’s the standard front-end and back-end engineering—traditional product building.
Second, we’re very much looking for wonderful product managers. In some ways, great product management is the main bottleneck in trying to win in this space, so we’re trying to hire wonderful product managers in investment banking, equity research, asset management, and across the board.
The other role I want to give a special shout-out to is a subject matter expert. One of the things we did well in coding is that the people training the models and making them better understood what good code looks like. That was a huge tailwind for us as we made the models better at these things.
We don’t have that advantage when it comes to making the models better at finance, so we’re building out and trying to hire a lot of folks who can bring financial expertise and work with the engineers, researchers, and product managers to make the model and product better in their specific field. If any of those roles resonate with you, I highly recommend that you reach out to me. I’m available on LinkedIn. We also have these job listings posted on our careers page. They’re pretty easy to find.
Great. Well, you answered my question. I was going to ask when I can have a play with this, but it’s coming to prosumers soon.
Yeah, we’re working very hard to make it available to more people.
That’s very common OpenAI stuff. It makes sense: you make stuff for enterprise, and then it trickles down to the regular models. It comes to the Pro plan, so expect that for your general usage, it’ll get better at financial stuff down the line.
Yes, absolutely.
Awesome. Well, very excited to have you. Check out the keynote. You gave a lot of good predictions.
Yeah.
You talked a little bit about some juicy “we fixed pre-training” issues, so I’ll leave breadcrumbs for you guys to go watch. But thanks for joining.
Yeah, awesome. Thank you so much.
Awesome. Thanks.