Ben Horowitz 谈 AI 投资:AI 泡沫、经济影响与 VC 加速
Horowitz 的投资筛选标准是集中式卓越,而不是面面俱到的能力。 反复出现的错误,是在弱点上“过度纠结”,而不是追问创始人或公司是否“在某件事上真正做到世界第一”;“很多事情都还不错”通常反而更差。由于风险投资的结果要滞后 10–15 年,他会在“出手点”评估 GP:看其找项目、赢项目和承保判断的质量,而不是等到投资组合兑现后再下结论。
a16z 通过把投资团队控制在篮球队规模附近来放大判断力。 一位在节目中被指认为 Dave Swanson/Swinsson 的已故同事提出了“五名首发”的类比,推动公司在“软件正在吞噬世界”时进行垂直化;目前7个垂直领域之间的相邻团队会交叉参加会议,全部 GP 每年两次集中相处两三天。其运营原则是,“清晰比正确更重要”才能让组织持续前进,同时明确降低办公室政治的激励。
只有当创业者密度和技术变革足以催生数十亿美元公司时,一个垂直领域才值得获得资本。 Horowitz 拒绝把 ESG 作为单独视角,因为判断一家公司能否做大并盈利已经足够困难,不需要再增加额外标准;American Dynamism 也从宽泛的营销概念收窄为围绕国防、公共安全、能源、采矿和供应链真实变革的基金主张。“我想知道基金的想法是什么……我怎么赚钱?我们有投资人。我们得赚钱。”
公司将技术投资定义为让建设者“真正获得一次人生机会”,而美国竞争力是实现这一目标的机制。 Ben 认为美国必须在经济和军事上取胜,因此必须在技术上取胜;一名初级员工的推动促成了前往墨西哥的会议,讨论边境安全、国防制造和能源。他对文化的号召是:“如果你想改变世界,就必须相信自己能改变世界。”
AI 技术栈正证明自己比三四年前的“巨型大脑”论更为多元,也更依赖具体应用。 基础模型仍是基础设施,但人类行为的肥尾必须按使用场景分别建模:Cursor 使用13个 AI 模型,并在提供 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 选项的同时发布了自己的编程基础模型。这意味着应用复杂度可能成为护城河,削弱对简单基准测试的解读,也让 incumbents 有理由通过并购“收购未来的 DNA”。
估值快速上涨本身并不能决定 AI 是否处于泡沫:采用率、收入增速和需求同样异常强劲。 Horowitz 称需求“非常强烈”,认为即使以 NVIDIA 的增长和盈利来看,其估值倍数在历史上也并不离谱,并将 AI 描述为他见过的规模最大的技术市场。他仍然保留判断——“看看它最终如何发展”——但认为 AI 是一个全新的计算平台,拥有巨大的设计空间,因此未来会出现更多市值达到 $1B 和 $10B 的公司。
精简型公司并没有抹平真正的公司建设伙伴的价值,也未必打破风险投资的持股经济学。 a16z 最近的交易通常仍能拿到20%或更高的持股;拥有特殊创始人的杰出公司可能适用不同条款,但这些企业可能成长得极快,以至于较低持股“也没问题”。面对3,000多家 VC 机构,Ben 表示真正能帮助公司成功的并不多;Speedrun 则因为新工具能让创始人更快把想法变成产品,而更早介入。
1. 世界第一的长板比整齐的能力评分卡更重要
Ben 面对的管理问题不同于经营一家传统公司:许多 GP 都是前运营者,拥有高度集中的非凡能力,因此对于 Martin Casado 这样“可能是过去20年网络软件领域最好的架构师”,他几乎不会直接指导。Ben 的工作在于塑造投资讨论、校准风险、处理冲突和人员问题,以及推动交易完成。
承保判断中最常见的错误,是盯着公司的弱点不放,而不是判断“他们到底有多出色”。真正决定胜负的问题是,他们是否“在某件事上真正做到世界第一”;一家只是“很多事情都还不错”的公司,通常反而是更差的投资。
因此,问责从“出手点”开始:GP 能否找到并赢下机会,以及作出决定时判断质量如何?如果等10年或15年看投资组合结果,期间会容许太多错误,也会错过太多赢家。Ben 还会观察投资人是否持续深入技术;当一个人“耗尽了燃料”,公司就必须作出调整。
2. 小型垂直团队保留对话,清晰度创造速度
一位在节目中被指认为 Dave Swanson/Swinsson 的已故同事在2009年提出,投资团队“不应比一支篮球队大太多”——5名首发——因为投资判断必须保持为真正的讨论。随着软件进入更多市场,垂直化让 a16z 在扩张的同时保留了这种亲密度。
团队连接是刻意设计出来的:AI 基础设施和 AI 应用等相邻团队会参加彼此的会议,公司有面向整个团队的管理会议,全部 GP 每年两次集中相处两三天,议程很少。
Jen 观察到,激励机制鼓励团队争取“交叉地带”的机会,而不是保护各自领地。Ben 说,办公室政治要么被奖励,直到政变和内斗出现;要么就被取消激励,a16z 选择了后者。
Ben 通过与“出手点”的人交谈来保持信息灵通,因为组织真正的知识就在那里,而不只是掌握在他们的经理手中。作为创始人,他也鼓励问题出现时直接上报;有些问题他只需14秒就能解决。很多时候,人们需要的不是正确答案,而是清晰度:“只要有清晰度,就可以行动。”
3. 一个市场首先要能成为一只基金,然后才能成为一个故事
垂直领域本质上是面向市场的产品:一群能够打造数十亿美元公司的创业者,必须有明确需求,而专业团队能够为这些需求提供服务。Crypto、bio 和 American Dynamism 的情况有实质差异;进入时机“有一点艺术成分”,进入正确市场也不保证能够赢下市场。
Ben 认为 American Dynamism 是一个很好的营销概念,但要求它建立在真实技术变革之上的“基金想法”。Jen 表示,团队在供应链、国防和政府互动中找到了这种变革,最终聚焦于3个核心垂直领域。Ben 拒绝将 ESG 单独设为标准,因为额外的“做好事”要求可能扭曲投资问题:这家公司能否成为一家巨大的、盈利的公司?
更广泛的目标,是让人们“有机会”作出贡献,而不是承诺乌托邦式的平等。Ben 将过去250年财富、寿命和人口的增长,与自由市场、资本主义和法治的兴起放在一起讨论;如今美国必须通过技术取胜,进而在经济和军事上取胜。一名初级同事的信念促成了关于边境安全、国防制造和能源的墨西哥会议。
4. 应用层行为并未被基础模型完全吸收
AI 正在威胁每一家 incumbent,因此 Ben 预计会出现大量并购:企业要想生存,就必须“收购未来的 DNA”,重构自身的运营方式。
三四年前,人们预计基础模型会变成“能够比任何人在任何事情上都做得更好的巨型大脑”。Ben 认为事实并未完全如此:大模型提供了关键基础设施,但每个使用场景仍包含一条人类行为的肥尾,应用必须对其进行非常深入的建模和理解。
Cursor 是他反复强调的例子:它针对编程及程序员交互的不同环节使用13个 AI 模型,随后又发布了一个可以替代或补充 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 模型的编程基础模型。这一方法获得了强劲采用,说明应用复杂度并没有被最大的 GPU 训练模型完全吸收;因此,基准测试可能误导判断,不同的视频使用场景也可能需要不同模型。
5. 前所未有的需求让泡沫判断更加复杂
Ben 不会断言最终会有多少赢家——“我们还不知道接下来究竟会发生什么”——但他把 AI 定义为一个计算平台,而不是单一产品周期。正如互联网催生了 Meta、Netflix、Amazon 和 Google,AI 更大的经济影响和“巨大的设计空间”可能支撑更多市值超过 $1B 和 $10B 的公司。
Jen 提出了估值焦虑;Ben 的反驳是,客户采用和收入增长都属于需求的一部分,而他认为这种需求此前从未出现过。相对于自身增长和盈利,即使 NVIDIA 的估值倍数也“在历史上并不疯狂”。他的结论仍然保留余地:这是一个“勇敢的新世界”,需求“非常强烈”,“看看它最终如何发展”。
对于精简型公司能够保留更多股权,Ben 表示,a16z 最近的投资通常仍能拿到20%或更高的持股。一些拥有非常特殊创始人的特殊公司是例外,但这些企业可能成长得如此之快,以至于较低持股“也没问题”。
超过3,000家 VC 机构并没有消除差异化:“VC 很多,但真正能帮助你把公司做成功的非常少。”a16z 也在更积极地投入 Speedrun,因为 AI 工具让创业者可以更早地把想法转化为产品,使公司能够在初创企业符合风险投资标准之前就介入。
You know, if you want to change the world, you have to believe you can change the world. What you’re really trying to find is whether they’re literally the best in the world at a thing, and that’s always the thing that’s worth investing in, as opposed to, “They’re pretty good at a lot of things, and I can’t figure out what they’re not good at.” We just have a higher concentration of talent here than is probably possible in a company, in terms of sheer IQ.
There are a lot of VCs, but very few who can actually help you succeed as a company. Being one of those, I think, is still quite a special position.
So I’m going to start with more about how you manage the firm, and particularly the lessons that you’ve learned over the years, obviously extrapolating lessons as a founder as well, and then how we think about running the firm on a day-to-day basis.
The first question I’ll start off with is from your book, but it’s relevant to this conversation, in part because when you wrote that, in technology businesses, you rarely know everything up front. We’re sitting in this massive AI wave right now, and it’s still incredibly early.
Yeah, but the difference, of course, between a mediocre company and one that’s magical is often the difference between letting people take creative risks and then holding them too tightly accountable.
There are many ways we could take that question, but maybe first start with how you manage a group of GPs. What’s different about managing GPs versus a company, and what’s the same?
It’s pretty different from a company. With a company, there are functions and very specific outputs that you’re driving toward. The people in the company are different, too. We just have a higher concentration of talent here than is probably possible in a company, in terms of sheer IQ.
If you look at Chris Dixon, Martin Casados, Alex Rampel, and so forth, these guys have all run companies. It would just be very hard to have that many people with that high an IQ on an executive staff. If you have somebody like Martin, who is probably the best architect in networking software in the last 20 years, plus a really talented investor and so forth, I’m not really telling him or giving him that much direction.
I’m more helping him understand the process—how the process of the conversation affects the process of investing, how you work your way to the right answer, and how to take the right amount of risk. The biggest mistake we make is getting too wrapped around the axle about some weakness that a company has, as opposed to focusing on what they’re great at and how great they are.
It’s not as though everybody is great at something. You could talk yourself into being great at something, but what you’re really trying to find is whether they’re literally the best in the world at a thing. That’s always the thing that’s worth investing in, as opposed to, “They’re pretty good at a lot of things, and I can’t figure out what they’re not good at.” That’s generally a much worse investment.
It’s about orienting around that, helping think through the platform and the personnel, figuring out how to deal with conflicts, how to close deals, and that kind of thing. So it’s very different. I would say it’s also about understanding when people run out of gas. To be good at investing in technology, you really have to be deep in the tech, and I think it’s very possible that as people get older, they get less into it sometimes. At that point, we’ve got to make a change.
But sticking with the topic of GPs, how do you also think about accountability? One question that has come up is when to promote the right people and when to manage out the right people. Ultimately, the vertical leaders are making decisions, but you’re also making decisions—you and Marc are making decisions at the firm level as well. What’s your thinking and framework, and how has that evolved over the last 16 years?
I think it’s evolved a little, but the main things are kind of the same. I think it’s dangerous in VC to wait for the outputs because they’re so far out—to wait and see whether somebody has a great portfolio after 10 or 15 years before deciding what to do with them.
That’s such a long time, and you can make a lot of bad investments in that time frame. You could also miss out on a lot of good investments if you don’t put that person in a position to do more. So I really try to look at, at the point of attack, how they’re showing up: how good they are at finding opportunities, how good they are at winning those opportunities, and what we think the general quality is at the time of investment.
Some work out and some don’t, but it’s not all magic. You kind of know how great an entrepreneur Meera is or how great an entrepreneur Ilya is. Those are pretty special people, so if you can win that deal, that means something, whether or not those companies work out.
Maybe just to focus in on verticalization: I think verticalization was probably one of the seminal points in the history of the firm and changed its structure. You and Mark have talked about this, and now, in retrospect, it’s clear that it was the right decision at that point in time.
How do you avoid some of the pitfalls associated with verticalization—strengthening communication across verticals and making sure you still have that connectivity as the firm continues to size and scale?
The most important observation—and this was a conversation Mark and I had with Dave Swanson, the late great Dave Swinsson, back in 2009—was what Dave said at the time. He said an investing team shouldn’t be too much bigger than a basketball team. A basketball team has 5 starting players, and the reason for that is that the conversation around the investments really needs to be a conversation.
I always had in mind that any investing team really shouldn’t be much bigger than that size. How do we maintain that? The only way to do it is to verticalize. The other thing that was happening simultaneously in the industry was that software was eating the world, so we had to get bigger in order to address the market. But I didn’t want teams to be bigger than a basketball team, and that led to the vertical structure.
I think, in effect, the most important thing is that those teams should be good. We handle communication across the teams in different ways. If the teams are very close—AI infrastructure and AI applications, for example—we have people from each team going to the other team’s meetings, so there’s good, hardcore connectivity that way.
In addition, we’ve got a kind of management meeting for that group that we do, and then the big thing is the GP off-site. We take everybody away for 2 or 3 days twice a year, with not much of an agenda.
I do think David Haber has this thesis that opportunity lies at the intersection. Everyone not only knows culturally but is also economically incentivized to see everyone win. There isn’t that level of politicking that can be prevalent at other organizations, where it’s very zero-sum and there’s protecting-your-fiefdom-type behavior as well.
Yeah. That’s kind of a cultural idea that we have at the firm. The feedback we get from people who come from other firms is that we have less politics than firms with 10 or 11 people.
It’s just a cultural thing. Either politicking gets rewarded, and then you have everything from coups to infighting all the time, and people don’t like each other, or politicking gets disincentivized. That’s what we have here.
Another point around culture: I’m always in awe of the fact that you always hear the gossip around the firm, even details about minor things, where I’m like, “How do you know that Ben and Marc commented?” You often say that whenever you run something, it’s got to be in the details; that’s the only way to do it.
Maybe I’ll ask the question slightly differently. How do you stay on top of the details? How do you hear all this? How do you find the subtle balance without also micromanaging? I think there’s also the creative process of letting things run their course. How do you balance those 2 things?
If you think about my job, a lot of it is setting the direction and then making decisions when things get into conflict or we’re not sure what to do. If you think about what decision-making is, what makes you good at it, it’s a combination of intelligence and judgment—or judgment, which is a combination of intelligence and knowledge.
So what do you know? And then how smart are you at turning that into the correct judgment? The knowledge in an organization tends to live with the people doing the work, not the managers, I would say. What are the deal partners doing? What are the individual people on the IT team doing? What are the accountants doing? What are the people doing when we go visit LPs?
That’s where the knowledge lives: in talking to people who are at the point of attack, so to speak, or talking to entrepreneurs. So I try to spend enough time in the team meetings, and I just end up knowing a lot about a lot of things. Plus, I’m a founder, so if something gets f’ed up in the firm, somebody calls me. That happens a lot. They’re like, “Okay, I’m going to tell Ben this. He’s not going to like this.”
This is a key thing for leaders: You never want people to think, “Oh, we shouldn’t bother them with that,” because it took me 14 seconds to resolve it. Generally, people aren’t looking for you; they’re just looking for clarity. A lot of what an organization needs is clarity, not correctness. If you have clarity, you can move.
Yep. Last question on verticals. We have 7 verticals today. One topic that has come up is: How do we know these are the right verticals? And maybe give some examples of vertical ideas that you’ve resisted starting—ideas that sound good on this premise but either don’t have the right technological legs or even the entrepreneurial capability around them, and that we’ve decided not to pursue.
They’re really designed around the market and where the entrepreneurs are. We try to match up to that: If there’s a big cluster of important entrepreneurs who are going to create multibillion-dollar companies, do we have a team that’s going to win those deals? Different categories end up having fairly different needs. The needs of a crypto entrepreneur, a bio entrepreneur, and an American Dynamism entrepreneur are very, very different. You have to have a product that matches that market.
In picking markets, you want to not be too early and not be too late, right? So it’s a little bit of an art. I think what we’ve seen is that I’m very confident those are the right markets because there’s lots of very interesting activity in all of them. Now we’ve got to perform in each market. It’s not a given that just because we show up and we're Andreas and Horowits, we’re going to win that market. We have to evolve the team, evolve our thinking, and make sure that we win. But I think the markets we’re in are pretty clearly very good markets.
We’ve had a few markets pop up that people have proposed and that we haven’t pursued. I don’t think we got that serious with them, but the other one was ESG kinds of things—cleantech, green energy, and this and that. We thought the right lens on that was much more American Dynamism, because it wasn’t weirdly constraining and was much more oriented around the economic outcome, as opposed to “do good by doing well,” or whatever the phrase is. Those things can lead you into very weird decision-making.
Investing is hard enough without introducing criteria other than whether this thing is going to be a giant company and make a lot of money. You want to have a focus on that. I think the beauty of American Dynamism would be that it’s maybe good for America or whatever, but there are so many opportunities in that space. The U.S. really does have to modernize the way it does defense. We really do have to get much better intelligence in public safety to keep everybody safer. We’ve got to solve the energy problem, and we’ve got to solve the rare-earth-mineral mining problem.
There are very good problems to go dig into. If you look at something like, “Okay, we’re going to come up with an alternative energy source or an alternative fuel,” will any of those work? Maybe. So we never did ESG.
Yeah, I remember, actually, as you were going through that. Very early on in our discussion around American Dynamism, I remember you pushing the team and asking them, “Hey, is this a marketing message, or is this real technological, transformative change?” They went and did the work around it, and it was very clear, now in retrospect, that there was real tech change happening, especially on the supply-chain side and the defense side, and in how people actually engaged with the government.
Oftentimes, when people ask us this question, it’s both a combination of whether there’s a real technology change, because that’s when you make and generate venture returns, and whether the entrepreneurial talent is actually there to build it. Ben Horowitz
Yeah, ADA is a good marketing idea. When they presented it internally, they presented the marketing idea, and I was like, “Well, I want to know what the fund idea is. How do I make money? We have investors. We’ve got to make money.”
It’s a great marketing story, but we’re not doing all that. The fund is going to be less than the marketing in terms of its focus. It’s going to have a tighter focus.
Then we ultimately zoned in on 3 core vertical areas where there was actually a tech change happening. Maybe switching gears: Mark and I believe the best thing society can do for a person is give them a shot—a shot at life, a chance to contribute, a chance to do something larger than themselves, and a chance to make the world a better place. That's the best they can do.
Can you elaborate on this and how it’s driving how we are evolving as a firm, particularly looking ahead as people think about a set of funds that are deployed over the next 2 to 3 years but ultimately have an impact over the next 10 to 15? How do you think about that as you think about leading the firm?
I think it’s important to put the work that people do into context, and we’re in a super-special position. What I wanted to get at was, if you take a step all the way back and say, “What’s been good for humanity?” historically, what’s been good for humanity is when people have a chance to do something larger than themselves, contribute and look.
There are many systems and ideas like, “What if we could make utopia? What if everybody could be equal?” This and that, and you know, that’s ended up doing the opposite. If you look at the history of communism or what have you, it’s kind of everybody having an equal chance of getting no shot. That’s much more what occurs.
You really want to enable contribution. The rise of America coincides with the rise of a free-market, capitalistic, rule-of-law system. If you look at the history of the country and the history of humanity, the rise in wealth, lifespan, and the population size of the Earth all grew spectacularly in the last 250 years. America has been very important in that.
America today is still, I think, very clearly the country and the system where people are most likely to have a shot—a real shot—at life. We’ve done some things to screw that up and so forth, but that’s certainly still the case. For America to maintain its importance in the world, it has to win economically. It has to win, which means it has to win technologically. It has to win militarily, which means it has to win technologically. Our job is to help the country win technologically.
It’s not only important for us; it’s important for the country, and it’s important for humanity. For our people, it really helps them go, “Okay, these things matter. Creating these opportunities matters.” To give you an idea of some of the things it leads to, Jen and I were just in Mexico. A lot of that was catalyzed by a junior person on the team saying, “What we’re doing is so important, and we need to help with this alliance. We need to help secure the border. We need to help with our own defense manufacturing. We’ve got to help with energy. I’m going to get this meeting.”
Then we got the meeting. If you want to change the world, you have to believe you can change the world. That’s a lot of what it was about.
It seems like Little Tech M&A is opening back up. What’s your view on whether that is here to stay and whether that might actually expand to larger opportunities as well?
AI is such a disruptive phenomenon that every company, every incumbent, is under threat from AI in general. A lot of the ways that you deal with the threat is that you just acquire the DNA of the future.
And so I think there's going to be a lot of M&A because I think that people need to reconstruct how they work if they're going to survive. So if you go back, say, 3 or 4 years, I think people believed that the big foundation models would be these giant brains that could do anything better than anybody. It has not played out quite like that.
The way it's played out is that the big models do provide a very important infrastructure that all of our companies end up building on to some extent. But often, for any particular use case, the long tail of not only scenarios, but the long tail—or the fat tail, I should say—of human behavior ends up itself being something that you have to model and understand very, very well.
If you look at Cursor, Cursor consists, as I think of it, of 13 different AI models, all of which model different aspects of how you program, how you speak to a programmer, et cetera. Those models end up being very important—so important that they in fact released their own foundation model specifically for programming and coding. So they have a coding model that you can swap in place of Anthropic or OpenAI if you want, or you can use the OpenAI or Anthropic models with their other set. That has gotten great adoption.
It's kind of going, well, maybe the application behavior is actually, in some ways, more important than having the biggest model trained with the most GPUs. It's not clear exactly how that plays out, but currently I would say that the complexity of the application itself is very high and is not subsumed in the foundation model. I think these things are not as straightforward as they appear, and the benchmarks can be misleading.
I think this is also showing up in every aspect of AI. We've seen a great post that Justine Moore from our team did on how there's no god vid level video model, which I would encourage you to read. It gets into how different use cases end up needing different models, which is, again, not what we thought 4 years ago.
For sure. Yeah, that actually goes back to what I started this webinar with: your quote from The Hard Thing About Hard Things, “In technology businesses, you rarely know everything up front.” So as folks are figuring out everything that's happening in AI, the calibration of benchmarking is changing, and also the expectations around the utility of those things are changing. But also, the founders that are building them are changing.
It is a very fun time, to say the least, but also one in which we're learning in real time. That can sometimes be deeply unsettling, I think, for folks who may be anxious about where valuations are, and the market and the environment as a part of that.
Okay, I am going to switch gears to the future of VC investing, which is very related. Some believe leaner, more efficient businesses will allow founders to retain more of the cap table. Do you worry about that at all when it comes to ownership and what you've been working with GPs on in terms of expectations of ownership in this new environment?
I think that what we've seen is we're getting pretty good ownership. If you look at a lot of the recent investments, we're at 20% or better. There are ones where we don't get to that level of ownership, but those companies get so valuable so fast that it's been fine. There have always been special companies with very, very special founders at a moment in time where, okay, that is what it is.
But for us, for a lot of the core infrastructure things, the core applications, and so forth, the ownership has been pretty reasonable.
A question around just the VC landscape today: when you and Mark started the firm 16 years ago, there weren't nearly as many VC firms. There are now 3,000-plus VC firms running around. There is still this rate limit of great entrepreneurial talent, but increasingly there are more sources of capital flooding in, whether that be on the retail side or elsewhere.
How do you see the power dynamics between LPs, GPs, and founders evolving as you think about the future of the firm? Is there anything you're doing at the firm to prepare for that?
Well, I think it's still very hard to build a company. If you're just an engineer, an AI researcher, and you've invented something and you're jumping into the world, it's a very competitive world. Having a financial partner that can help you build the company—does the initial valuation matter more than the partner?
I think most entrepreneurs who are smart realize it's a partner. There aren't that many good ones. There are a lot of VCs, but very few who can actually help you succeed as a company. Being one of those, I think, is still quite a special position.
The one area where we're upping our emphasis is this kind of entrepreneur who's just starting something and doesn't quite yet qualify for VC money, with our Speedrun accelerator. One of the reasons why we're emphasizing that so much now is that, with the new tools, it is possible to convert an idea into a product much more easily than it has been in the past.
We just want to make sure that we keep a very, very close eye on that. The brand is translating into that accelerator. We're just getting a lot of talent in there, and so that phenomenon is something we want to make sure we're on top of.
Building on the earlier question about being multiple winners in AI, why did prior cycles of technology not play out the same way? Why were there only Google, Amazon, and a small number of concentrated winners in those product cycles, compared to what you think about in what's happening in AI?
We don't know quite what's going to happen yet. But I would say AI is a new computing platform, so you have to look at how many winners there were who built applications on computers. That's the order of the size of what this is.
In the internet era, if you say, “What are all the businesses that got built on the internet?” it was actually a reasonably large number of businesses—from Meta to Netflix to Amazon to Google and so forth. Those were very, very spectacularly huge winners.
I think in AI, the products are having an even bigger economic impact. I think there are going to be more companies that are worth over a billion dollars and over $10 billion than in the last era, from what we've seen so far. It's a very big design space. It's an enormous design space, like one we've never seen before in technology.
Nobody's asked me this yet, but I've gotten a lot of questions about the AI bubble. I think one of the reasons why people are so worried about it being a bubble is that the valuations have gone up so fast. But if you look at what's going on underneath in terms of customer adoption, revenue growth rates, and so forth, we've never seen demand like this.
We've never seen valuations rise like this, but we've never seen demand rise like this either. We are in a bit of a brave new world, at least from anything that I've seen in my career. We'll see how it plays out.
Even the NVIDIA multiples aren't outrageous, particularly when you look at the growth rate and the size of the earnings and so forth. They're not historically nuts, to the point where people would be claiming a bubble like that. People think, “Is that growth fake? Is it this?” From what we're seeing, no—the demand is very intense.
We'll see how it plays out, but I think this is a bigger technology market than I've ever seen. We'll see how many companies actually win it.
I'm going to ask you a few fire-round, lightning-round questions, Ben, and then we'll close out here. What will be your most-played song on Spotify rap this year?
I think it's that Young Thug song, Do you know how it feel to see your face on the news? called you a boohoo. Yeah, it's that one really touches me, like particularly crunch.
I love it. I will say I think “Follow the Leader” is going to be one of my most played.
Yeah, that's a great song.
Wrote the piece and also saw Rock in person early this year at your event, and then also—
George Clinton. It's been fun to dig back into the database of songs that I've never really listened to.
Yeah, no, that's an all-time great song. Indeed. What's one AI tool that you use every day?
For sure, Grock and Chat GPT I use every day. I've also been playing with Vio and Nana Banana a lot on a daily basis. Those are the big guys.
Okay. And because we asked Marc, we have to ask you: do you plan to be cryogenically frozen?
No.
Same answer as Mark. Do you plan to go to Mars? Same answer as Marc as well, despite your background. All right.
Look, I'm trying to stay healthy so that we don't have any generational transfer, but I don't necessarily believe in living forever. I don't. It's my destiny.