Ben Horowitz 谈全球科技、权力与影响力之争
- AI模型正成为地缘政治基础设施:它们将介入几乎所有产品,同时把存在争议的历史、伦理与价值观编码其中。 Horowitz警告说,“模型并不客观,它们有自己的观点”(“the models are not objective. They have opinions”),因此模型选择是主权决策,而不只是基准测试或成本比较:汽车、教育和家庭系统中的默认设置,最终都会投射某一方的世界观。
- 威慑越来越取决于创新速度,而不只是军力规模;这正把私营AI、autonomy和网络安全厂商拉进盟友安全体系的核心。 Neuberger以霍尔木兹海峡和红海为例:对手可以部署廉价、由软件构建的系统,而“这些技术如今并不是由政府在打造”。政府获取私营部门能力的通道,以及盟友间的互操作性,因而成为战略资产。
- AI和API让产品需求全球化的速度超过初创公司的组织供给能力,给VC支持的公司制造了商业分发瓶颈。 Raghuram将过去“几亿美元营收”的出海门槛与今天更早出现的国际需求拉动进行对比,但强调当地关系网络和市场结构仍然重要。在经济结构高度头部化的国家,5家或10家公司加上政府可能就是最关键的市场入口,因此先拿到关键关系,可能优于过早铺开全国市场。
- 一个锚定客户可以彻底改写进入市场的经济账:一笔500万美元或1000万美元的机会,足以支撑同等规模的前期国家投入。 Horowitz认为,这正是a16z在盟友、AI导向且高度依赖关系的市场中的优势:政府、企业、投资人和采用进程彼此交织。目标市场包括日本、韩国、中东、墨西哥和加拿大;Raghuram指出,日本、韩国和台湾合计拥有《福布斯》全球2000强企业的15–20%。
- 网络安全是最清晰的双重用途AI机会,也是最棘手的政策陷阱:发现漏洞既能用于修补,也能用于攻击。 Neuberger认为,模型对防守方的帮助可能“大得多”,因为防守方要覆盖广阔的资产面,攻击者却只需要找到一个入口;AI可以“持续、规模化地拧动每一扇门的门把手”。但Horowitz警告,限制漏洞发现能力,也可能阻止防守方审计和修补自己的代码。
- 硅谷不是一套可以直接在线复制的软件;它的护城河来自技术人才、鼓励创业的规则,以及赋予冒险者社会地位的文化。 Horowitz把“互联网能够催生分布式硅谷”的论点称为“轻松话术”(“happy talk”),并警告这种文化“很容易被摧毁”。对投资而言,推论很直接:税制、财产制度、雇佣规则和社会激励,既能扩大创始人与成长资本的供给管线,也能让它突然收缩。
1. 技术已成为国家实力的主战场
Horowitz将a16z的国际扩张建立在“美国优先”的使命之上:只有一个想法的人,在美国拥有“最好的机会”;而美国的经济、文化和军事领导力,都依赖于技术领导力。把盟友纳入这一使命后,a16z形成了3项相互连接的职能——政府关系、全球资本关系,以及推动产品采用的国际市场拓展。
Neuberger基于多年情报系统和白宫经历的判断是:技术已经从外交工具变成“经济增长和国家实力的核心战场”。芯片和药品成分供应链可以成为施压杠杆,电力或供水系统的漏洞也绝不只是普通IT问题。如今的威慑还包括以“创新速度”应对廉价、由软件构建的系统,而这类系统主要来自私营AI、autonomy和网络安全公司。
2. AI输出的不只是能力,也包括价值观
Horowitz的核心判断是:当AI成为“一切事物的界面”,从汽车、冰箱到教育系统,都会建立在模型之上,而模型的判断会因历史、文化、伦理和法律不同而不同。由于这些历史和价值观取决于观察者的位置,“模型并不客观”;部署模型,也是在部署价值观。
Kha提出,让世界运行在“美国和西方技术”之上很重要;Horowitz关于网络空间殖民的框架,则把问题指向信任与政治能动性。Horowitz更愿意投射法治和机会导向的价值观,而不是接受他认为会给人更少机会的默认设置。
最鲜明的商业案例来自墨西哥:Horowitz称,a16z把TelevisaUnivision CEO Alfonso de Angoitia介绍给ElevenLabs。Alfonso的公司拥有丰富的西语内容,但面临全球流媒体平台的激烈竞争;短短几个月内,演员的语调、笑声和表演就能被迁移到法国、波兰等地的新语言中。他说,这次成功随后帮助促成了与Netflix的一笔大额合作。
Neuberger将这个案例拉回审查问题:使用美国模型后,团队不必担心“天安门广场”或中国政府等敏感表述在翻译过程中被改写。她的保留意见同样关键:a16z“非常重视”开源,因为市场上存在不同模型和价格层级;真正的问题在于,用户是否知道底层基础设施保留了原本说出的内容。
3. 产品先全球化,公司跟不上
Raghuram将这条规律压缩为:“产品和技术的跨境速度快于公司的组织速度”(“products and technology travel faster than companies can”)。API让软件一上线就能被全球发现,AI又降低了本地化难度,因此创始人不能再等到营收达到几亿美元才考虑海外市场;B2B和消费产品都会更早感受到国际需求的牵引。
他的制衡判断是:“做生意的方式并没有这么快改变。”真正实现规模化,仍然需要身处当地、理解市场结构、合作关系和信任机制的人,尤其是在依赖关系而非单纯交易的经济体中。数字上可获得,不等于拥有可复制的本地销售打法。
进入市场的账本高度集中。Raghuram说,5家或10家公司往往最关键,政府则常常是重要的影响者和买方;Horowitz估算,设立实体、招聘和本地化,可能在拿到第一笔订单前就花掉500万美元或1000万美元。如果第一笔机会本身就值500万美元或1000万美元,创始人就有充分理由提前进入,而不是先为看不清回报的扩张买单。
4. 盟友市场奖励集中式获客,而非全面铺开
这张地理版图同时考量美国利益、盟友身份、AI导向的现代化进程、买方集中度,以及信任关系入口的高边际价值。Raghuram说,日本、韩国和台湾拥有《福布斯》全球2000强企业的15–20%;Horowitz希望同时连接政府、企业和投资人,因为“这些事情并不是彼此分开的”。
Neuberger以日本作为国防案例:日本已经超越战后的和平主义政策,希望建立一支适应当代战争的军队。她将这一进程放在更广泛的军事转型中观察:少数、体量更小但性能极致的平台,与数量更多、成本更低的平台并存。日本希望打造而不只是购买自主舰船和AI,用于一体化战场,同时保留本土能力并建设受保护的供应链。
同一套视角也会改变市场优先级。Horowitz希望借助墨西哥,打造更紧密连接的西半球供应链。Neuberger则将墨西哥的公共安全和国家安全需求——包括沿其漫长海岸线部署自主舰船——与美国利益联系起来,其中也包括经由墨西哥进入美国的芬太尼。沙特的现代化进程和AI基础设施建设则创造了新的切入口,例如在利雅得向政府、企业和投资人引介Adam Neumann的Flow。
Horowitz将此与“产品就是钱”的VC扩张区分开来。a16z等到自己能够提供公司建设网络后才进入市场,目标是填补成长资本和全球化能力的缺口,而不是取代种子轮或A轮投资人;在理解当地生态后,它也可能投资本地赢家。其海外布局首先服务于加速被投公司的国际化,而不是以资产募集为主要目的。
5. AI既能加固网络安全,也能工业化攻击
Neuberger的网络安全案例揭示了AI的双重用途:攻击者和防守者都要先发现漏洞,前者利用漏洞,后者修补漏洞。她个人认为,模型对防守方的帮助“大得多”,因为防守方要保护广阔的资产面,攻击者却只需找到一个入口;但短期内,攻击面仍然庞大且脆弱。
她面对的政策难题在于能力的分发:当能力可以装进U盘时,“出口管制就是笑话”,因此政府和模型开发者需要共同设计安全机制。Horowitz的反驳是,限制网络攻击能力的发布,也可能阻止防守方发现自身代码中的漏洞;模型一旦能够找漏洞,也就能够帮助发动攻击。
Neuberger的比喻是,攻击者可以“持续、规模化地拧动每一扇门的门把手”(“jiggle every doorknob continuously and at scale”)。风险最高的区域包括公开的、第三方的以及无人维护的开源依赖;如今企业承担了更多责任,因为留下不安全代码的代价上升,而修复代码的成本下降。Horowitz对网络安全的长期判断是:它已从恶作剧式破坏,发展到盗窃,再发展到战争;这段在AI出现前积累的“20年代码遗产”,既是风险,也是机会。
6. 硅谷脆弱的护城河:文化加政策
当被问及互联网本身能否催生分布式硅谷时,Horowitz回答:“我不认为这是事实……这只是轻松话术”(“happy talk”)。即使在线数十年,各国在法律、政策和治理方面仍然不同;他希望更多美国政策制定者先听听外国领导人如何渴望拥有硅谷,再考虑在美国本土削弱它。
他认为,前2项要素是能把东西造出来的技术人才——通常可以从强大的理工大学看出——以及让极端风险变得可承受的规则。创业者必须能够成立公司、自由招聘和解雇、承担可行的税负,并持有有价值但缺乏流动性的资产;许多国家并不缺人才,却始终无法形成硅谷。
Horowitz称,挪威引入未实现资本利得税后,“实际上终结了当地的科技生态”。更难的要素是文化地位:有能力的年轻人是否认为创办或加入初创公司值得钦佩,还是社会话语会把10亿美元级别的成功等同于盗窃?这种规范“很难建立”,却“很容易摧毁”。
Kha以世界杯作比:美国能否赢得比赛并不是最重要的,重要的是美国相信自己可能赢——“这是特性,不是漏洞”(“a feature, not a bug”)。结尾的交锋回到“我觉得我能”(“I think I can”),Jen认同这一点:在美国,人们可以相信自己做得到。
When AI becomes the interface for everything, every tool we have and every technology we use is going to be built on these models. The models are not objective. They have opinions. They have strong opinions on things like history, culture, and values. And those are very different depending on where you are.
Deterrence is no longer just the size of a military. It's the pace of innovation in reacting to cheap, software-built technology that adversaries may be using, whether they're a country, a criminal, or a terrorist group. And those technologies today are not being built by governments. They're being built by the private sector.
Products and technology travel faster than companies can. So what happens is, for startup companies, usually in the olden days, you didn't care about going international until you had a few hundred million dollars in revenue. Now these companies have to go international sooner and sooner.
The number-one question we often get when we're visiting different countries is, “How do you recreate Silicon Valley locally?”
I don't think that's true, by the way. I think that's happy talk.
We are here to talk international today. For a firm that historically used to be centered in Menlo Park—and we didn't even want to open up a San Francisco office—this is a big change for us. So, Ben, why don't you take us through this announcement around our global ambition and how all the pieces between global affairs, international go-to-market, LP relations, and the global partnership level fit together?
It really starts with America, interestingly. It's been our strong belief that if you drop a person into any country in the world and they don't have the culture, money, or capital resources yet, and they just have an idea of how to make the world a better place, their best shot is in America.
That's a very special thing. A big mission of our firm is trying to preserve that special thing that is America. That means America has to be a leader. It has to be a leader economically, culturally, and militarily. To do that, we have to be a leader technologically. We have to be a tech leader. That's really our role in the ecosystem and in the world: to help America be a leader.
What we realized as we've gotten further along with this mission is that we need to bring our partners and allies into it. It started with the work that you're doing, Jen, with people from around the world wanting to participate in the U.S. technological opportunity. That meant we started getting investors from around the world.
As we went out to see those investors and said, “How can we be a better partner?” we found some interesting things. Every country wants not only to economically benefit from the technology, but also to directly benefit from it. Can you bring it to us? Can we get a chance to use it?
At a higher level, at the government-policy level, people wanted to know, “How can we be a great country for adopting technology, for innovating like you guys are, and for helping push our country into the future?” As we looked at how to step up to that opportunity and be a good partner, we realized that with our country partners, we needed relationships at the government level, the investor level, and the adoption level. That's what these 3 components become.
We've got global affairs, which builds our relationships, led by Anne, and helps us have relationships in the right way with governments ranging from Saudi Arabia to Japan to Mexico. We've had great conversations with all of them.
Then we have people who invest. Sometimes those are the governments; sometimes they're various companies in the government; sometimes they're companies that actually handle government money in the form of pensions. Finally, both the government and the businesses want to adopt the technology, and that's where Raghu's effort comes in, where we have the go-to-market component.
Anne, how much of your decision to join a16z was motivated by this mission, and also by the sense of duty in helping other countries think about the adoption of AI and not wanting to get left behind in AI, like Ben was alluding to?
Very much so. What I saw happen during my years in the intelligence community and then in the White House was technology moving from being a tool of diplomacy and national power to being the arena of it, where the supply chain for chips was not so much a technology issue as a foundational economic and national-security issue. The supply chain for the components that go into drugs, when used by one country to constrain or have an impact on another country, becomes a tool of national power.
A software vulnerability is now not an IT issue.
Yep.
It can be a source of leverage, particularly if that vulnerability is in key parts of your power systems or your water systems.
Yeah. So I saw that shift happen, from tech being either an IT issue or just a tool to the central arena of both economic growth and national power. Quite frankly, from a deterrence perspective—which is the language we talk about between countries in terms of deterring an invasion of a country and maintaining an international system of stability—deterrence is no longer just the size of a military. I think, as we see in the Strait of Hormuz, or as we saw in the Red Sea, it's the pace of innovation in reacting to cheap, software-built technology that adversaries may be using, whether they're a country, a criminal, or a terrorist group.
Yep.
And those technologies today are not being built by governments. They're being built by the private sector. Whether that's AI systems, autonomous systems, or cyber-defense systems, they are being built in the private sector.
So, certainly from a U.S. perspective, we need to ensure that we have relationships between government and the private sector to leverage that for our own economic growth and as a force for good on the world stage. But also, with our allies, we build together, we fight together, and we ensure that together we can have the advantages of that—and, to the extent that our technology also represents our values—
It's important that the world run on American and Western tech. Yeah, actually, that's a great point on the values point, because, Ben, you've said before, no country wants to get colonized—
In cyberspace, right? Particularly because AI is now just getting built in the 6-block radius—
In San Francisco. Say a little bit more about that.
When AI becomes the interface for everything, every tool we have, every technology we use, and every kind of system we have—from your car to your refrigerator to your education system—is going to be built on these models.
The models are not objective. They have opinions. They have strong opinions on things like history, culture, ethics, and values. By the way, those are very different depending on where you are. The history of wars, the history of a country, its laws, and whether that country was a good actor or a bad actor are all very different depending on where you're getting the information from.
If you believe, as I do, that, for all our flaws, our fundamental values and ideas about everything from the way our economic system works to the rule of law have resulted in basically the best opportunities for humans in the world, then you want those values to be projected onto the world more than you want to be the recipient of some other values. Those values may have been good at a time or may have some merits, but overall, they don't give people a real opportunity.
Giving people a chance—that was the premise of the original announcement we did for our fund announcement earlier this year, and the importance of that, particularly extending that chance to America's allies as well. Raghu, I want to get you involved on this as well, because portfolio companies are increasingly going international way sooner. They're multi-country, multi-channel, and multi-product way sooner in the life cycle. How much of this is also accelerated by what's happening in AI, and just the ability to push out software updates immediately?
The reality is that products and technology travel faster than companies can. If you have a great product, everybody learns about it very quickly, instantaneously. You can access it through APIs wherever in the world you are, and you can build on top of those things.
So what happens is, for startup companies, usually in the olden days, you didn't care about going international until you had a few hundred million dollars in revenue, and so on. Now these companies have to go international sooner and sooner.
While the products are being discovered internationally sooner, to Ben's earlier point, it's also easier to adapt these products for local markets thanks to AI. As AI becomes the interface, it's much easier to localize and internationalize these products. But in order to capitalize on the opportunity at scale, things don't change, right? I mean, you still have to be in-region.
You still have to understand the market structure of the region that you want to operate in. You have to understand partnerships, and you have to build relationships. Lots of other countries have very relationship-based economies, not transaction-based economies. So it's this interesting blend where the technology moves really fast, but the way you do business hasn't changed that fast.
Yeah. Actually, a really great example of what Raghu was talking about: when we were in Mexico recently, we were meeting with the CEO of TelevisaUnivision, Alfonso de Angoitia, who is a great friend of the firm and one of our global partners. We were asking, “Gee, what are your struggles?” One of his challenges is that he really faces heavy competition from some of the global streamers, like Netflix or Disney, which have this U.S. technology that's very powerful.
However, he has this unbelievable Spanish-speaking content, but it was hard for him to get it to play on a global basis because it's in Spanish. It's a Mexican Spanish accent, which is different from an Argentinian Spanish or Colombian Spanish accent. He was like, “How should we solve this?” And we're like, “Well, we've got this great company, ElevenLabs. They can help you with it.” We put them together, and in a couple of months he was in France and Poland and all over the world with this incredible technology that had his actors basically acting exactly as they normally do, with their right kind of intonations, their right laugh—everything—but in different languages.
And he recently, based on that success, got a big deal with Netflix. And so here we have something where we can bring our partners, who have a great product that's culturally local but really, really interesting, and make it a global product by not competing with their allies but partnering with their allies. I think that's a lot of what the program is about.
And I want to tie what Ben just said back to the values point, because people often ask us, “Chinese open-source models—how do you compare and contrast?” So in that case, they didn't have to worry that when the content was dubbed into different languages, if the speaker said something sensitive about Tiananmen Square or sensitive regarding the Chinese government, using an American model, that content would be translated and changed along the way. They knew it would be true to what was said.
And that's what we mean when we talk about American values: not censoring, not injecting political will into how these models operate, in the way that one would contrast. Now, open source is something we deeply value because at the end of the day, there's all different kinds of models and all different kinds of price points, clearly. But that's really a good example of what we mean when we say American and Western values reflected in the models that we deploy around our infrastructure.
For sure, the telenovelas are spicy enough. I don't know how much Tiananmen Square needs to be introduced necessarily in the storyline, but you never know at the border crossings, et cetera.
Good point. They keep their audience well enough.
Exactly. Exactly. But this actually is a core part. When Piyush McCormack[?] wrote the article about us earlier this year, he called us a power broker, with power being part of an offering that we enable our founders to tap into for a lot of companies—
You know, starting a Mexico office, for example, is probably not 1, 2, 3—maybe even top 10—on their list, but if they have a deal that we're able to walk in—
—and effectively enable them a shot at winning way earlier in the lifecycle, they might prioritize that. So maybe if you want to riff on that, Raghu, Ben, particularly how that's changed for founders—how they think about international when they have the benefit of being able to go right to the buyers in a much more adept way than figuring out a market from scratch.
Yeah. A lot of markets are very top-heavy, right? So you take any mature business and you say, “How much of your revenue comes from countries like the U.K.?” A significant chunk is going to come from the very, very top companies in the U.K., right? So the reality is, whichever country you look at, it's 5 or 10 companies that matter. And, of course, the government is a big influencer and buyer.
So the example that you gave in Mexico is great, right? I mean, there are a few global companies in Mexico, like the one that Ben talked about, and so it's not worthwhile setting up an office and serving all of the countries, right? But if you could get into the top 5 companies in Mexico, that probably is worth a lot more than setting up a full operation in some other country. So it is the top-heavy nature and the relationship-heavy nature that helps our portfolio of companies, right?
And the thing—there are a couple of other aspects that are important. One is, you're right that Mexico probably isn't a top 10 thing that most companies go into first. And, by the way, that's a terrible shame, because Mexico is our neighbor. From a national security standpoint, how powerful would it be to have a Western Hemisphere supply-chain ecosystem that was really, really well connected? So I think it's kind of bad for the country that it is number 10.
Secondly, to open a country as a company is a very large expense. You have to set up an entity, you have to hire a team, and you have to localize the product. And that's going to be, depending on the country and depending on how committed you are to it, easily $5 million or $10 million just to get to your first deal. And so that is going to delay in your lifecycle when you can go international.
But what if, before you ever put up an entity or ever got started in that country, you had an opportunity—a big opportunity, a $5 million opportunity, a $10 million opportunity—that makes that investment much easier to do earlier? And so we can really enable both our companies and our allies by paving the way for that kind of thing.
A great example is, nobody's going to Saudi Arabia first. However, Saudi Arabia is booming, and there are great opportunities there, and they really need our help in developing the country. They're modernizing, which is incredibly important to the security of the world. Saudi Arabia is going from this kind of tribal, different kind of society, I would just say, to a modern, highly civilized player in the modern world and a full ally of the United States. That transition is really important to succeed.
So we're able to take a company like Flow, Adam Neumann's company, bring them to Saudi Arabia, introduce them to the right people in the government, introduce them to the right people in business, and introduce them to the right investors. It's the optimal place to live if you're an expat moving to Riyadh, helping develop the economy. And it's something that just isn't really possible without an effort like this.
For sure. Maybe let's talk about the geographies we're prioritizing, because there's a handful: Japan, Korea, the Middle East, Mexico, Canada. Are there themes as we think about different countries that make more sense versus others?
Yeah, this is timely. Raghu and I have been debating this. So I would just say, from our standpoint, it's very powerful when they're a strong ally of the U.S., we've got a relationship with the people in government, we've got a relationship with the people in business, and we've got a relationship with the investors. Those things are not separate; they all interact with each other. And if we have that, then we can really, really accelerate the opportunities for them and for us.
I think what I would just say to that point, building on Ben's point—and then I'll turn it over to Raghu—is what's changed so much, as we talked about a moment ago, is that on the global stage, whether it's in the context of countries pressuring other countries via supply chains, there are parts of the world where we have close allies who are now in increasingly tenuous positions.
So if we look at the Indo-Pacific region, China has vastly increased its military and vastly increased the number of nuclear capabilities that it has. Its shipbuilding capability is orders of magnitude greater than that of the United States, and our allies in the region have started responding. Japan has changed its really pacifist policy from the post–World War II period to say it must have a capable military.
Yeah. It wants to build the military to fight today's wars, not yesterday's wars. It doesn't necessarily have the military-industrial base. Now, that cuts both ways. As we know from our own kind of halting steps the United States military has been taking, the number of defense reform policies that have been written in the last 20 years, they all say the same thing, right? Fewer, smaller numbers of exquisite platforms; more, cheaper, larger numbers of platforms, in addition to very exquisite platforms for certain specific use cases.
So as Japan thinks about building a capable military in order to deter aggression in the region, it is looking to partner with new firms building autonomous ships, building AI for an integrated battlespace, and they want to build with us. They don't want to just buy, because they have their own capabilities they want in their own country and their own supply chains to protect.
So I think part of that is thinking about those regions of the world. I talked about one in the Indo-Pacific region that covers Australia as well. Certainly, the Middle East has been an area of American interest for a long time. Israel is an incredibly capable ally with a capable military and intelligence community. The UAE is as well.
Saudi Arabia is modernizing and thinking about AI infrastructure—how it builds an innovative, entrepreneurial innovation base—in order to compete globally. And certainly, when we think about Latin America, when we think about fentanyl coming into the United States, it comes in via Mexico. So public safety, national security, and how autonomous ships can help along a vast Mexican coastline are not only important to our ally and to the stability of Latin America; they're important to us as well.
So I think that's at least the national security lens we bring to some of our partnerships in American dynamism or in the AI infrastructure space.
Yeah. It's the reason Ben and I have been debating this: there are so many sides to it that you've got to bring it all together. Mm-hmm.
First, to Anne's point, it has to make a lot of sense from the point of view of America's interests, right? And that is abundantly evident in all these countries. These governments are very AI-forward, and they're putting in policies that are very modernization-centric, whether it's in defense or across the economy.
Thirdly, they are all top-heavy economies. I mean, when you look at the top companies, you are actually having global influence. For example, of all those Northeast Asian countries that you talked about, I think 15% to 20% of the Forbes Global 2000 are across Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
And then lastly, the way business is done in these countries is very different from, let's say, the UK or some English-speaking country, right? So the value-add that we can provide to our startups and the value-add we can provide to these countries is so much higher than in other places.
Yeah. So when you put it all up and score it out, that's why we go into these countries.
Yeah. Some of these countries are also leapfrogging, where they didn't have to deal with the prior technology.
Exactly. In Saudi, you go through the visa entry, and it takes 30 seconds—30 seconds to go through the visa entry, which is unbelievable. Here, you get stuck behind, unfortunately, a very long line, increasingly for a number of different reasons.
It's a different kind of approach to how you think about incorporating technology in everyday life, but it's not evenly distributed. So what are ways we can accelerate that in different avenues? That is also the opportunity that a lot of these countries are seeing as a huge leg up.
It's very different, though, when we think about international prioritization compared to maybe other VC firms. The typical way that other VC firms have done international has always been investment-driven versus actually thinking about the portfolio companies and what they would like to do internationally.
So maybe speak a little bit more about that contrast and, quite frankly, why, for the first 10 years of the firm, it was very rare that we even did an international deal outside of not just the US, but even outside of Silicon Valley.
Well, I think we've always looked at investing through the lens of what we bring to the table. As a result, if you think about what we try to do for a company, we really try to help them network to the right talent, the right customers, and the right expertise. And that is very hard to do in multigeographies.
Even San Francisco and Menlo Park in the early days, we were like, "Let's just have a really good product for this, and then we'll expand from there." Whereas I think other VCs think of the product much more as the money.
And so, if the product is the money, then the international strategy is, "Okay, we'll find a team of investors in, say, the UK, and we'll help them raise money. Then we'll take a percentage of their winnings for helping get them their product." That makes sense in that model.
I think it doesn't make sense for us because our whole thing is, how do we help you build a better company? How do we accelerate your opportunity or growth and so forth? So we needed to get to a certain level of size and stature for that to make sense in more regions.
But now that we are, it starts to make a lot of sense. And I think, in our role in investing, we don't look at it as, "How do we snatch up the opportunities in Sweden or Japan or Saudi or the UAE?" We look at it as, "What is your ecosystem missing in terms of capital and expertise to go global, and is there an opportunity for us to plug in?"
We don't want to displace their A-round and seed investors necessarily. We want to say, "Okay, if you've got companies that are emerging as real global companies, then that's where we can really step in and help."
If we're already in the country, already doing a lot of business, and already understanding them and their entrepreneurs and so forth, then we're in a great position to do that. But we would do that directly. We're not raising money for somebody who's not part of our firm, our culture, or our mission and having them go run a play. That's just not us.
Also, so much of the time, when you think about these entrepreneurial ecosystems, what they're oftentimes missing is growth capital. They actually have a great talent base on the early-stage side, but they're kind of missing that component to actually go global, and they become a localized success versus actually thinking about global ambitions.
Maybe drawing from your experience at VMware, Raghu, about the evolution of company building, how has that particularly changed the ambition for local companies to become global over time?
That's dramatically increased, right?
Yeah.
Previously, like I said earlier, you would not even dream of going global until you were really well advanced. Now, because your product can be there, there's such a universal appeal for it. If you've got a great product, it has such universal appeal, whether it's a B2B or a B2C product, that it behooves you to go earlier.
What is missing is the supporting ecosystem, right? And finding a way to plug into a new country. That's where our new offering really focuses: helping them get a fast start in these regions.
For that, you need to be in the region, have the relationships, build the trust, and build the credibility. All of those things don't happen overnight, and that's where we can provide that.
And then, by spending time locally as well, we get to know the local ecosystem and see the great entrepreneurs from those regions. To the extent to which it makes sense, we fund those and then help them go international, leveraging our network as well.
So businesses in these countries are so much a collective ecosystem rather than an individual company going in and dominating something there.
For sure. For sure.
Maybe speak a little bit more about the prior tech cycles of adoption, and particularly with AI. Anne, this is a great question for you. There are so many nuances around security, and even the debate between open versus closed, that there are considerations of whether it's even viable to build without upsetting the apple cart on what is allowed with open source, given the security nuances.
Maybe speak a little bit more about how you've been thinking about that and advising companies on that delicate balance.
It's a hot topic right now, as you know, and it's a hot topic around the world because, fundamentally, as many technologies are, AI is dual-use.
The first step—let's use cyber as an example—the first step, whether you are an attacker or a defender, is finding vulnerabilities in systems. If you're a defender, you patch them. If you're an attacker, you exploit them.
Models make the step of finding vulnerabilities in code far easier.
Mm-hmm.
Quite frankly, they make the next steps, exploit or defend, easier as well. The economics of cyber defense were broken well before the latest AI models came out. I saw that in the White House, where my nightmare was the ransomware attacks against rural hospitals in America. There wasn't another hospital two blocks down.
So actual Americans' opportunity to access health care was disrupted by, in some cases, state-harbored criminal groups halfway around the world. Right? Infrastructure is very fragile, and the reality is that the models help both.
I personally believe, focused on cybersecurity for a moment, that they help far more in defense because defense is far harder. You have to be defending a broad expanse, and an attacker has to find one way in.
So, as a result, I actually think we are in a difficult space at this moment because there's such a broad attack surface and so many systems that are vulnerable. But I think we will see the opportunity for a much more secure space.
To your point, when I talk with governments or companies around the world, all are grappling with that question. I'll talk about the government side, given we know it can both help. Most countries have 2 missions, right? Defending the country, as well as maintaining its interests overseas.
Given both, how do we ensure that these powerful capabilities don't fall into our adversaries' hands or criminals' hands to be used for that purpose? I think, in the traditional cyber tools arena, we always grappled with this, right? When a capability is on a thumb drive, export controls are a joke. You can't actually control it in that way.
There is real power, as we talked about earlier, in the models that the world runs on being trusted models. When people are using an American model, they don't have to worry that there's an intentional backdoor. As we talked about earlier, they don't have to worry that a chatbot's answers will be framed by censoring to fit a particular political story of an authoritarian government.
So the question for now is: How do we build a degree of safety into models so that they can be used in environments that need that safety? Because the main models are American, we're in a particular position to think through and build that out. I think this is not done by government, and it's not done by the private sector. What it really needs is people who understand the models best from the private sector at the table with folks on the government side who are thinking, "How do we both promote innovation and control for these risks?"—and building out the right set of government policies to enable both the use of the models as well as the understanding of how to protect against the risks that come with them.
Yeah. As our partner Mark often says, technology is the dog that caught the bus. We've never seen this before: countries feverishly demanding the latest versions of the model because they recognize how competitive it is for their economy, their people, and their interests.
This is unlocking all sorts of new paradigms as we think about globalization in a way that feels categorically different from just selling products internationally, right? This is hopefully an opportunity for many of our founders as well.
No doubt. Although it is complicated. For example, from a government standpoint, you'd like to say, "Okay, don't release your model with cyberhacking capabilities." But if you do, and you want to find the vulnerabilities in your own code and patch them, you can't do that without also enabling cyberattacks, because as soon as it can find the vulnerabilities, guess what?
And so you're in a very—
I would say it's an interesting world on that.
Yeah. And I think, to that point, we'll focus on the cyber aspect because that's gotten so much attention with Anthropic's Mythos model, etc.. I think what AI models essentially do, to Ben's point, is allow you to be the first to hack your systems.
We often use the expression "digital doorknobs." It now allows attackers to jiggle every doorknob continuously and at scale. So your hope for your network is to use those models first to find where you're vulnerable and, frankly, then be able to fix it. That wasn't a tractable problem before.
I think now the models help you, particularly for code bases that were public, particularly if you're relying on third-party code or open-source code. Those are some of the biggest areas of risk, or where there are dependencies on code that nobody was really maintaining.
We're now seeing companies come together and take responsibility for that, because the cost of not addressing insecure code has gone up and the cost of addressing it has gone down.
Yeah.
Which is a good shift from where we were before.
We may finally build secure systems.
Exactly.
Please God.
And more importantly, the process for building new code can incorporate these as well.
It's kind of very tricky from an industry standpoint, because originally cyberhacking was vandalism, right? "Okay, I'm going to mess up your PC." Then, with the internet, it became theft, and now it's war.
That evolution, I think, snuck up on people.
We've seen the great thing when it went from vandalism to theft: The vandalism company, Microsoft, is the one that created all the theft opportunities by putting Windows on the internet when it wasn't ready to be on the internet, because it wasn't built for that kind of environment. With ActiveX and all these kinds of technologies, people could come in from the internet and get right to your machine.
I think we're in a period like that, where we've got all this technology that was built in the pre-AI era that's not nearly secure enough for the AI world. We're going to have to make that transition.
Yeah. There's a 20-year legacy of code that has to be tackled.
Yeah.
Nope.
Many opportunities.
Yes, many opportunities. Yeah.
Many, many.
Awesome. Well, maybe in closing, Ben, I know the number-one question we often get when we're visiting different countries is, "How do you recreate Silicon Valley locally?" They want the ingredients to it. There are a few components to the success that enabled Silicon Valley, but there's also the proposition: What if the internet is actually Silicon Valley, or Silicon Valley is just distributed?
Yeah. Yeah. I don't think that's true, by the way. They think that's happy talk. One thing you learn when you go to different countries is that they're very different. The laws are different, the policies are different, and the governance is different. That's why America has continued to be special. We've had the internet now for quite a long time, and that's absolutely not the case.
I wish we could bring some of our own policymakers on those trips so they could hear people say, "We want Silicon Valley," before they keep trying to wreck us. Not all of our policymakers—many are outstanding—but some really don't like the fact that we have a technology industry.
As we've traveled around, there's a combination of ingredients, and they are a little bit the combination that makes Silicon Valley special and America itself special. The first is that you do need the talent. Talent is most easily seen in whether there's a great technical university that graduates people who know how to build things. That's an essential thing. Many countries have that and still don't have a Silicon Valley.
What are they missing? They're missing the other 2 components. The second is whether you have a set of laws and policies that facilitate entrepreneurship and are essentially good for business. Can you create a company easily? Can you hire people easily? Can you fire people easily? Is there a tax incentive structure that's not onerous?
Can you own—and this is a big one lately, which California is kind of moving against—an illiquid asset that has value, or will it get seized? Norway introduced an unrealized capital-gains tax, and that effectively ended the tech ecosystem there. Those kinds of policies are super important. If they're not right, nobody is going to take the extreme personal and financial risk of starting a company if it's not an environment that's conducive to that.
The third one, which is a combination of everything in a way, is whether the culture is such that young people—the most capable young people, willing to make the biggest contribution—get social-status rewards. Is it cool to either start or join a new company? Very few countries have that. I would say it's really, really good in the U.S. It's clearly good in China, by the way, although they've done a few things to mess it up.
But in most countries, success is frowned upon. You hear a lot of this in the political rhetoric: "Oh, the only way you could make a billion dollars is if you're a thief," which is completely absurd. You just look at the people—almost none of them are thieves. You can't steal a billion dollars; that's a real truth.
It's a great sour-grapes idea, right? It's like, "How did he get all that money? Oh, he's a thief. Okay, I'm not a thief, so I feel much better about myself now." But that's a lot of it, and that's the thing that's so hard to replicate, so hard to build, and so easy to destroy.
It's something that I think we have to be aware of: how special and unique that is in the world. We can try to help other people do it, but we also have to try equally hard not to wreck it ourselves.
Yeah, for sure. It's World Cup season, and there was a great tweet where someone was like, "I think America thinks they could potentially win the World Cup." Maybe they can, maybe they can't, but the fact that America thinks they can is a feature, not a bug.
Yes.
There’s a reason ambition is fantastic.
There’s a reason we all read to our kids. What is it? “The Little Engine That Could.” I think I can. I think I can. I think I can. That’s in America. You can believe you can.
That’s right. That’s right. Amazing. That’s a good note to end on. Thank you all.