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The a16z Show · · 29 分钟

Ben Horowitz谈American Dynamism与AI的未来|The a16z Show

David UlevitchBen Horowitz

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TL;DR
  • A16Z规模超过150亿美元的新一批基金,使技术规模直接转化为一项明确的国家科技责任。 Ulevitch称这是a16z历史上规模最大的一批基金,并进一步将其定义为美国历史上押注美国赢得下一个科技世纪的最大赌注。Horowitz援引Andy Grove的警告称,行业领导者天然继承了决定行业伦理与发展方向的责任;在他看来,a16z的角色是通过投资、政府协同、让公民获得技术以及与盟友协同,帮助美国赢得AI革命。

  • Horowitz关于American Dynamism的论点,建立在持久权利以及创业者确实能“获得机会”的可信承诺之上。 美国的机会并不完美,但创业者可以把一生押在一个想法上,而不必预期成果会被政府任意没收。在他对“self-evident”(不言自明)权利的解读中,自由来自上帝或更高层次的来源,而非政府,因此政府无权将其收回。

  • 美国在将AI纳入政府体系方面一度明显落后中国,尽管ChatGPT也曾挑战“中国整体领先”的主流判断。 Horowitz称,如今美国创业者和愿意改变规则的政府正在快速追赶;他对此感到振奋,并认为当前冲突已经让这一进展变得清晰可见。

  • Horowitz将Anthropic与战争部的决裂解读为一次商业性退出,而非真正的哲学僵局。 Anthropic当时已经被部署,在美国即将开战之际还握有极强的议价能力,因此任何合理要求都可能得到满足,甚至可能拿到超出其应得的条件;但它选择离开交易,也不再回Emil的电话,这在Horowitz看来说明它“想退出这笔交易”(“wanted out of the deal”),只是他不知道原因。

  • Horowitz给创始人的建议,起点是战争与犯罪不会消失这一前提。 员工不应自认为在伦理或地缘政治判断上高于国务院、战争部或情报机构,也不应认定那些冒着生命危险执行任务的人员不该获得最好的技术。

  • 盟友工业化的逻辑建立在能力互补之上:墨西哥负责高质量制造,日本负责机器人、供应链和防务协同。 墨西哥的专业能力可以支持美国再工业化,但前提是让一条“薄边境”获得更高水平的安全保障;日本则可以填补美国机器人供应链的缺口,同时其防务开支已从GDP的0%升至3%,在中国问题上的利益也与美国高度一致。

  • 风险投资正分化为覆盖多品类的规模化平台和高度垂直的专业机构,夹在中间的公司承压出局。 当每年真正有机会做到1亿美元年收入的公司大约只有15家时,小型合伙制机构有其合理性;如今“每一家有意思的新公司都是科技公司”,覆盖所需的不只是规模和共享服务,还需要能够推动重组的集中式权力。

  • 媒体策略已经从尽量不犯错,转向在无限渠道中持续赢得注意力。 成功的创始人或官员必须有趣,同时牢牢围绕一致的信息主线;如果出了问题,Horowitz的处方是“明天做10档播客,把舆论场淹没”(“do 10 podcasts tomorrow and flood the zone”)。

  • Horowitz最大的担忧不是技术雄心不足,而是美国社会对技术的悲观。 他依稀记得一项民调显示,中国对AI持乐观态度的人超过70%,美国则低于30%。他还转述一名日本人士的说法,称日本的创业生态正围绕AI重新启动;随后他给出明确的上行判断:我们将终结交通事故死亡、治愈癌症,并终结当前意义上的贫困。AI就像火,可能造成严重破坏,但它的风险可以被管理,而不必因此放弃其收益。

摘要 · 为研究而整理的核心内容

1. 规模将技术领导力转化为责任

  • Ulevitch称,公司新募得超过150亿美元,构成a16z历史上规模最大的一批基金;他随后又将其定义为美国历史上押注美国赢得下一个科技世纪的最大赌注。面对由此产生的责任问题,Horowitz援引Andy Grove的警告:对于行业领导者而言,“这个行业的伦理和道德,很大程度上取决于你”。

  • Horowitz的逻辑链条从机会通向国家实力:让人们“获得机会”能够释放其贡献,美国更先进的技术赢得了工业革命,而美国能否赢得AI革命仍是“一个开放的问题”。

  • Ulevitch追问:美国技术主导地位为什么应该让所有人受益?Horowitz因此谈到“we hold these truths to be self-evident”(我们认为下列真理不言自明)。在他的解读中,权利源自上帝或更高层次的来源,而非总统或国会,因此政府很难将其撤销。

2. 政府追赶暴露企业地缘政治的边界

  • Ulevitch介绍称,American Dynamism成立超过4年后,目前已经进入第2支基金,投资方向位于先进软件与硬件的交汇处,目标是重建国防工业基础、制造业以及相关的上游能力。

  • ChatGPT出现前,主流判断认为中国在整体AI领域拥有显著领先;Horowitz称,ChatGPT让人们意识到美国可能已经取得领先,但中国在将AI纳入军事、官僚体系及其他政府系统方面的优势确实存在。真正出乎意料的是美国追赶的速度,背后既有愿意行动的创业者,也有准备改变规则的政府。Horowitz称,当前冲突让这一进展变得可见,也让他重新看到希望。

  • Horowitz对Anthropic争议的判断十分直接:“那笔交易不是因为哲学分歧而破裂。”Anthropic已经被部署,在美国即将开战之际还拥有非同寻常的议价能力,因此任何合理要求都可能得到满足,甚至可能得到超出其应得的条件;但它找了一个问题作为离场理由,也不再回Emil的电话,这表明它“想退出这笔交易”。

  • 对于动机,他保留不确定性——“究竟是员工的问题、Dario的问题,还是其他什么原因”;但他否认外界所称的伦理冲突框架。战争部拥有大量规章制度,Horowitz称,任何违规都有“100%的概率”泄露,因为“华盛顿没有秘密”。

  • Horowitz给创始人的建议,始于战争与犯罪仍将持续这一现实。他认为,员工不应以自己的判断取代国务院、战争部或情报机构的判断,也不应拒绝让那些冒着生命危险执行任务的人员获得最好的技术。Ulevitch将相反的冲动称为“廉价道德主义”(“dime-store morality”)和“凭感觉搞地缘政治”(“vibe geopolitics”)。

3. 盟友工业政策从能力互补出发

  • Horowitz坦言,A16Z还没有“完全想明白这件事”。创业生态需要一个前提:政府不会任意拿走创业者毕生的成果;在他看来,这种条件在全球都十分罕见。他点名瑞典和以色列,称两国拥有强大的科技创业能力。

  • 墨西哥拥有高质量制造业能力;Horowitz认为,一些在墨西哥生产的美国汽车,在“很多方面”优于中国制造。他称,这种伙伴关系也意味着帮助墨西哥提升安全水平,因为美国与墨西哥之间连接着一条“薄边境”。

  • 日本既热衷机器人,也拥有能够填补美国机器人供应链缺口的制造能力。Horowitz称,日本防务开支已从GDP的0%升至3%,且其在中国问题上的利益与美国高度一致,这为A16Z、旗下被投公司以及美国本身都创造了机会。

4. 风险投资分裂为平台巨头与专业机构

  • A16Z成立之初,一项研究显示,每年创立的公司中,最终能做到1亿美元年收入的只有大约15家。随后“软件正在吞噬世界”,AI又进一步扩大了可投资公司的范围,直到几乎每一家有意思的新公司都变成了科技公司。

  • 组织规模扩大就必须重组,而“重组本质上是权力的再分配”。共同控制的合伙制机构很难推进这种变化,因为权力被重新分配的人可以阻止变革;Horowitz认为,集中式控制让A16Z得以持续调整。

  • 他对市场结构的判断是:大型机构将覆盖每一个技术类别,专业机构则集中于AI基础设施、生物、加密或游戏,处在中间地带的公司正被挤出市场。Ulevitch形容,A16Z的600多人被拆成小团队,共享平台服务,整体上由一种有效的“仁慈独裁”统领。

  • Horowitz把“权力”视为提供给创业者的一项能力,帮助他们弥补无法接触国会、关键监管会议和大型CEO的劣势。与之配套的文化约束是“做一流的生意,而且只能用一流的方式来做”:准时、响应迅速、诚实、尊重,而不是奉行强者对弱者的行为逻辑。

5. 媒体供给过剩奖励有趣,AI悲观情绪威胁普及

  • 旧媒体时代的策略强调防守,因为渠道稀缺、形式受限,一次失言几乎会永久存在。如今渠道和形式都不受限,Horowitz称,优先级已经不再是避免每一个错误,而是“变得有趣”。

  • Alex Karp是这一模式的典型:有娱乐性、难以预测,但始终坚持亲美立场。一次错误可以通过“明天做10档播客,把舆论场淹没”来覆盖;但底层信息仍必须保持一致。

  • Horowitz最大的担忧是美国社会对技术的看法。他回忆称,一项民调——他认为——显示,中国对AI持乐观态度的人超过70%,美国则低于30%。他还转述一名日本人士的说法,称日本的创业生态正围绕AI重新启动。

  • 他对恐惧情绪的反驳是明确的:“我们将终结交通事故死亡”,治愈癌症,并终结我们所理解的贫困。他用火作比喻:火可以烧毁一座村庄,也可以为房屋供暖、烹饪食物;技术的负面影响同样可以与它带来的收益并行管理。

Over 70% of people in China are optimistic about AI and less than 30% in America were optimistic about AI.

We have placed the largest bet in American history on the proposition that this country will win the next century of technology.

We won the Industrial Revolution and we did that cuz we had superior technology and here we are on the dawn of a new technological revolution, the AI revolution. Every interesting company that gets started is a technology company now. America does give everybody a chance and entrepreneurs can really count on that.

If America loses its technology edge and its dominance, then the entire world will lose as well. What makes the American system irreplaceable for the world at large?

Everybody's in the same game, but the rules of the game have changed. And what I mean by that is

David Ulevitch

We’ve had a lot of excellent discussions. We’ve talked a lot about policy, but we’re actually going to start this more on the venture capital and technology side. You recently shared a blog with us that the firm has raised over $15 billion in a new set of funds, the largest in a16z history. What do you think are the new obligations that come with that kind of scale? We are the largest venture capital firm in the world. How does that tie into the mission?

Ben Horowitz

My old mentor, Andy Grove, said to me, “Ben, when you’re a leader in an industry, then the whole industry—the size of it, the ethics of it, the morality of it—kind of depends on you.” I remember thinking, when he said that to me—he was running Intel at the time—I thought, “Wow, I’m glad I’m never going to be the leader of an industry, because that’s a lot of responsibility.” But here I am. Here we are.

And I think for us, you have to take a step back and say, “Okay, for the technology industry, and particularly for new technology companies, what does it need to be?” You have to think about it on a large scale. The way we’ve been thinking about it is: if you go all the way back to humanity, what’s important for humanity? What advances humanity?

It really comes down to: do people have a chance to contribute? Because when people have a chance to contribute, they can have an impact, and then they can advance the state of things for everybody. There’s really been no country in the world that comes close to America at giving people a shot, giving them a chance to succeed.

It’s not a completely equal chance. Some people are born rich, some people are born poor, some people have better genetics, some people live in dysfunctional families, and so forth. But it’s a chance. In most countries, people don’t have a chance, or they have a very small chance, a very slim chance. That ends up being really important.

If you think about why America has the influence it has today—from a military standpoint, from an economic standpoint, from a cultural standpoint—it comes back to the fact that we won the Industrial Revolution. We did that because we had superior technology. Here we are on the dawn of a new technological revolution, the AI revolution. Are we going to win? Are we going to have that influence? Are we going to be able to give people a shot and continue to advance humanity? I think that’s an open question right now.

When I think about our role in the industry, it’s: what can we do to help America win technologically? That’s everything from what we invest in to how we integrate into the government and make it accessible to all the citizens, and integrate with our allies and so forth. It’s a big mission. It’s a lot of work. And it’s why we have American Dynamism and the conference and everything.

David Ulevitch

You have said that the American way—giving people a shot—means that if we lose this technology race, if America loses its technology edge and its dominance, the entire world will lose as well. What makes the American system irreplaceable? Why is our technological dominance not just good for America, but actually good for the world at large?

Ben Horowitz

I think a lot of things go into it, but to me it always comes back to a line in the Declaration of Independence that is very well known, but also underrated: “We hold these truths to be self-evident.”

What does that mean? Well, it means that these truths didn’t come from us. They’re truths. They are self-evident. They came from a higher thing. They came from God. We didn’t make these rules. We didn’t give you these rights. We didn’t give you this freedom. It came from something else.

That’s really, really important, because it means that if I’m the president, if I’m Congress, no matter who I am, I can’t change it, no matter how much I want to change it. There are many who would like to change some things, who think they know better.

David Ulevitch

We’re going to talk about that.

Ben Horowitz

Yeah, and that is the thing. But because of that, the freedoms that you have in America are really, really protected to a degree that they’re not in any other country, and they’re very hard to lose.

We’ve seen this with free speech, where countries are like, “Well, maybe that’s not such a good idea anymore.” But if it can’t be taken—if it didn’t come from people, it can’t be taken away from people. That’s been very, very powerful and very persistent, I think, over the entire history of the country.

It’s really unique. There aren’t other countries that have quite as strong a version of that.

David Ulevitch

Absolutely. It’s now been 4-plus years since we launched the American Dynamism practice. We’re on our second fund. You and Mark have been incredible supporters of this effort of investing in the national interest at the intersection of advanced software and hardware, rebuilding not just the defense industrial base but manufacturing and all the precursors that go along with it.

What’s been the most surprising thing you’ve learned about investing at the intersection of national security and venture capital? Along with it came a big presence in Washington. What do you think the biggest learning has been?

Ben Horowitz

It’s been interesting because if you go back to pre-ChatGPT, the conventional wisdom was that China had this big AI lead on us. Then ChatGPT comes out and says, “Oh, well, maybe now we have a lead on them.” Then things will evolve from there.

But the thing that was true about the old, incorrect idea was that they were way ahead of us in integrating their AI technology with their government—on a military basis, on a bureaucracy basis, in all facets. When we started, we were coming from, I would say, very far behind in that area.

The thing that’s been surprising, though, is how fast we’ve been catching up. I think that’s been really heartening, both from the number of entrepreneurs who want to help and the willingness of the U.S. government to say, “Hey, we’re interested in these new technologies. We’re interested in these new companies. We’re not stuck in our ways. We’ll change the rules if we have to.”

That’s been amazingly fruitful, and I think we’re seeing it in the current conflicts that we have. It gives me great hope that if we keep at it, we’ll be very strong going forward.

David Ulevitch

I agree. I think this is a moment of optimism, to see just how quickly things can shift when there’s a sense of urgency and a sense of change-makers. I want to talk about AI and policy. We had Emil Michael earlier, the Under Secretary of War for research and development and CTO of the Department of War, here. He was obviously in the news talking about Anthropic over the last week.

But this isn’t a new issue. It may have bubbled up to the mainstream news in the last week, but this has been an ongoing issue. Let’s talk about Anthropic and AI directly, head-on, right now. Then we’ll talk more broadly about policy in Washington.

Ben Horowitz

To me, the thing about the whole Anthropic kerfuffle that nobody’s really said out loud, but is the obvious thing that happened, is that if you understand deals, particularly software deals, you realize that that deal did not fall apart because of philosophical differences. It fell apart because Anthropic wanted out of the deal.

You know that because they had all the leverage. They were already deployed. We were about to go to war. Nobody’s ever had more leverage than that in a software deal. So anything reasonable that they would have asked for, they would have gotten—probably even beyond what they should have.

But the fact that they found something they could walk away on and then didn’t return Emil’s calls—for whatever, the 3 calls, and then the call to the administration, or all those things that happened—it’s just: why would you not return the call if you wanted in the deal?

They just wanted out of the deal. I don’t know why they wanted out of the deal, whether it was an employee thing or Dario’s thing or what have you, but that’s what happened. I think the fact that it’s getting reported on like there was some ethical conflict...

I don’t think there is. In fact, if you wanted somebody to use your AI safely, nobody has more rules than the US government, particularly the Department of War. And by the way, since I’m speaking to a Washington crowd, you know this: if you were to break those rules, there’s a 100% chance it’s going to get leaked to the press immediately. There are no secrets in Washington. So the whole thing was a little bit surreal for me to watch, at least at this point.

David Ulevitch

But what do you think? Is there anything that founders should be thinking about—people who want to sell to the government or work with the government? How should they approach it inside their own companies? Maybe Anthropic is a one-off—

Ben Horowitz

Yeah.

David Ulevitch

But you and I have been in Silicon Valley long enough to know that these issues tend not to come up and go away. They tend to stick around. What would you say to the founders who want to build for the national interest but are still coming from a Silicon Valley mindset? What do they need to think about? How should they talk to their teams? How can they build the products that are needed for our government to effectively have the best and most capable technologies?

Ben Horowitz

Yeah. It’s interesting. When I spoke to the firm about it the first time, when we started American Diamond Minerals and so forth, I said, “Look, you can have whatever geopolitical views you want to have, but the world is what it is. It’s not as if everybody has agreed on peace worldwide, and it’s not as if everybody has agreed never to commit a crime. We do have crime, we do have war, and we have these things.”

Then you have to think about the people we grew up with who have gone into the military and risked their lives to save our lives. Are you making the call because you’re ethically superior and know more about geopolitics than the people in the State Department, the people running the Department of War, and the people running the intelligence agencies? Are you going to decide that the people who are sacrificing their lives, putting their lives on the line to protect us, don’t get the best technology? I’m not doing that. I’m not doing that.

You don’t have to work here if you want to do that. That would be crazy—to think you know better than the State Department.

David Ulevitch

Yes.

Ben Horowitz

Yeah, I mean, we have this issue. As we’re board members of these companies, the founder or CEO will call us and say, “I have some employees who don’t think we should do business with this country or that country.” And it’s like, “Are you the State Department? Do you know better?” That’s crazy. And by the way, what a slippery slope to go down. You don’t want to be in that position.

David Ulevitch

Yeah, these issues are complicated. They really are complicated. I think that this dime-store morality that companies come up with—it’s like vibe geopolitics.

Ben Horowitz

Right, that’s right.

David Ulevitch

Okay, so we call it American Dynamism, but it is more than America. It’s about America and her allies. You have spent a lot of time—I know this because sometimes I join you, but I also get a little bit of visibility into your travel schedule—you’ve spent a lot of time on the road internationally.

A lot of foreign leaders come to you and say, “We want a startup culture. We want American Dynamism. We want to reinvigorate a startup community, do manufacturing, and build for defense.” How do you think about exporting our capabilities, our advantages, and our culture to these other countries, especially ones that we may have supply-chain dependencies on and that are our allies—particularly ones connected to us, like Mexico, Canada, and Latin America? How can we take American Dynamism abroad?

Ben Horowitz

It’s an interesting question. I don’t have a full answer because we haven’t entirely figured it out, but I’ll say this: America gives everybody a chance, and entrepreneurs can really count on that. If you’re going to bet your whole life on an idea and build something, you really have to believe that the government isn’t just going to arbitrarily take it away from you at any point. There are very few countries that have that going for them. So we are reasonably unique.

There are a couple of places that have great technology entrepreneurship. Sweden is one, and Israel is one. But it’s pretty rare around the world. Having said that, there is great expertise in things that we need help with, particularly when it comes to industrializing.

In Mexico, they have really good, high-quality manufacturing expertise. In some ways, I think the American cars that come out of Mexico are better than Chinese manufacturing on many fronts. So they do have talent, they are partners, and they want to work with us. We need to help secure that country because it’s a border, but it’s not a thick border—it’s a thin border. We have a lot of people vacationing down there and whatnot, so that’s a real thing.

Similarly, Japan has always loved robots, and they’re really good at manufacturing. We have a big deficit in the robot supply chain, so we’re working with them. At the same time, they just went from 0% of GDP to 3% of GDP spent on defense. We have a lot of defense companies, and their interests and our interests are very aligned when it comes to China. I think there are some great opportunities, both for us as a firm and for our companies, and then for the country in working with allies around the world.

David Ulevitch

Yeah, the recent advancements in robotics—we haven’t spent a lot of time talking about them today. I’m sure we will next year, but it really feels like we’re on the precipice of a robotics revolution, and it’s going to be very exciting to see that play out. For sure, a lot of our companies and a lot of our allies will have a role to play.

In a recent deep dive, Packy McCormick did this long deep dive on the firm. I thought it came out pretty well. He described the firm as a power broker using capital and networks to shape markets and influence. How do you view that and balance that power with the need to remain authentic to your founders and to institutions? How do we leverage that power? Obviously, we’re here in DC. How do you think about that responsibility, and how do we use it to advance the state of the art?

Ben Horowitz

What you lack as an entrepreneur is power. You may have a great invention, or you may have built a great technology, but you don’t have the power to call anybody. You don’t necessarily have the power to get the right meeting with the right people in Congress to help get the regulation correct. You don’t have the power to get an audience with the right CEO to buy your product, and that kind of thing.

Power is a feature of our offering; that’s the way I think about it. That’s very different from the culture that we want to have and project internally. As you know, our very first cultural idea is “first-class business and only in a first-class way.” What that means when it comes to entrepreneurs is the ultimate respect for what they’re doing. It doesn’t mean we’re always their best friend or anything like that, but we show up on time, we get back to them in a timely fashion, and we’re honest. We do all the little things to make sure that our overall behavior isn’t, “We’re the powerful and you’re the weak,” because that would obviously be a short ride for our firm at the top.

David Ulevitch

What do you think about people watching us raise so much capital? It happened during a period when the broader VC industry had slowed down fundraising, but we closed very quickly and raised a massive amount of capital. Do you think that signals anything about where venture is going as an ecosystem or an industry? What do you think venture capital looks like today?

Ben Horowitz

This is something that we’ve seen coming for a long time and that we prepared for. If you go back to when we started the firm, there was a study that showed that in any given year, approximately 15 companies would be started that would ever achieve $100 million a year in revenue. The whole idea of venture capital was that you had to get into as many of those 15 as possible, and you really didn’t want to be in anything that wasn’t one of those.

The way venture capital firms were constructed was as these partnerships, in both economics and control, that were small. Why have 100 or 500 or 600 people like we do now if you’re only going after 15 companies? It doesn’t make sense.

But what we saw back then was that, even though that had been true for decades, it wasn’t going to be true anymore because, as Mark wrote—my partner, your partner—“software is eating the world.” What that meant was that there was going to be no industry, no company, that wasn’t going to be better if there was a great software team at its core.

And that’s even evolving now into AI. Basically, every interesting company that gets started is a technology company now. So there are many more interesting companies, and in order to reach them, you had to be able to scale your organization.

Here’s the problem: If you were one of those venture capital firms that started all those years ago, you were likely set up, as I said, as a partnership with shared economics and shared control. If you have shared control, it’s very hard to reorganize. Because, as a CEO, you know this, David: to reorganize, you need a single decision-maker.

There’s no way to reorganize if everybody gets a vote. It’s going to be bad. I could write a whole book just on reorgs, but reorgs are essentially redistributions of power. When you redistribute power, people are mad. If they get a vote, they’re going to foul that reorganization. You can’t scale without reorganizing.

As a result, we’ve been able to scale because we have centralized control. But most of our competitors have not been able to scale. Very few have. So I think what we have now is large firms that can cover all the technological areas, and then specialized firms that say, “I’m a specialist in AI infrastructure. I’m a specialist in bio, crypto, or games, but I’m not doing all of that.” I think the firms in the middle are getting squeezed out.

David Ulevitch

I think that’s right. People sometimes ask me, “How do you work at such a massive firm—600-plus people?” And I say, “Look, we’re actually a bunch of really small teams that leverage a bunch of shared platform services, much like portfolio companies. That allows us to move with urgency while having the might of a very, very large organization behind us.”

I think one of the other things that’s interesting, and people don’t always realize about the firm, is that there are probably more CEOs as general partners inside the firm than at any other firm. And I think all of us recognize having a hierarchy and a benevolent dictatorship is really appealing. You don’t

Ben Horowitz

Yeah, it works. [laughter]

David Ulevitch

Yeah, it works. It makes our lives easy. My job is to focus on American Dynamism. It’s very simple. Martin’s job is to focus on infrastructure and be the best he can be—to figure out what we need. That dynamic is something that these death-by-committee venture firms just cannot adapt to.

David Ulevitch

No, definitely. You’ve talked on a recent podcast about how the media landscape has shifted and how reputation can shape markets. We had Alex Karp here earlier today, and he’s phenomenal at going directly to his customers.

How do you think about that shift? It seems like we’re seeing that shift in some ways in the government, with Emil Michael going directly on X. How would you coach founders—and maybe even people in the government—where narrative and trust are paramount, in terms of communicating and thinking about media and communications?

Ben Horowitz

I think the media world has changed, and it can be confusing because you don’t necessarily need to think about it in terms of old media and new media. Everybody’s in the same game, but the rules of the game have changed.

In the old world, the key to a media strategy was defense. The reason defense was key is that there were a limited number of channels, and those channels had very strict formats. If you’re in The New York Times or The Wall Street Journal, you can get a few quotes in, and then you’ll be characterized based on the rest of what you say. If you’re on CNN, you get a short and hostile conversation with a bright light in your face, and so forth.

Because there was a limited number of channels, if you said something wrong, you couldn’t erase it. It was kind of like being on the permanent record. There are many cases of these old-school gaffes, like Howard Dean and so forth, where you can never erase it and never get over it.

In the new world, there are unlimited channels and unlimited formats. The key to winning isn’t not making a mistake; it’s being interesting. If you don’t say anything interesting, it’s not going to get any pickup because there are too many other interesting things out there.

People like Alex Karp and Donald Trump are just an entertaining show. Alex was super entertaining. I was captivated. I didn’t know what he was going to say next. I don’t know if he knew what he was going to say next, but he was really entertaining, and that wins.

If you make a mistake, you just do 10 podcasts tomorrow and flood the zone. It doesn’t matter whether the channel is The Wall Street Journal, a podcast, or whatever. It’s all the same thing now because that’s the way you’re overwhelmed with media. To win, you have to be interesting.

That doesn’t mean you can just be all over the place and not be on message. Alex is always very, very, very consistently pro-America. That’s what you can always count on him to be, and that’s his main message. That’s great, and he’s interesting about it. He has a great knowledge of history and all these kinds of things.

David Ulevitch

Awesome. We have placed the largest bet in American history on the proposition that this country will win the next century of technology. I do feel very optimistic. I think you and I are both optimistic. I think our firm is broadly very optimistic. In fact, I would say that’s ultimately a core value of the firm: being optimistic about the future.

Ben Horowitz

Yeah.

David Ulevitch

But what keeps you up at night? What worries you? What would you ask of the audience, some of whom are founders, some of whom are policymakers, and some of whom are implementers? What worries you and keeps you up at night, and what can we do to help?

Ben Horowitz

Actually, my biggest worry is the perception of technology in America. There was an interesting poll that came out showing that, I think, over 70% of people in China are optimistic about AI, while less than 30% in America, or something like that, were optimistic about AI.

It’s really because we always talk about all the bad things. We’re very focused on the dangers of AI here and not on the positive things. I just spoke to someone from Japan who said, “The whole Japanese startup ecosystem is restarting because everybody’s so fired up about AI. They’re all very positive on it. We love robots.” The Japanese love robots, by the way.

I think we really need to focus on that. Somebody asked me the other day, “What good can AI do?” And I was like, “We can—we’re going to—not just we can, we’re going to end traffic deaths. We’re going to cure cancer. We’re going to end poverty as we know it.” Those are pretty good things.

We need to think about that as much as we think about the AI overlords, mass surveillance, or any of these other things that we worry about. The positive uses of the technology are extremely positive. The negative ones are there, but we can manage them in the same way we’ve managed the negative aspects of every technology, starting with fire, which has very bad consequences. It can burn down your village. It’s horrible. But it also heats the house, cooks your food, and does some very wonderful things. I think we have to get back to that.

Ben Horowitz谈American Dynamism与AI的未来|The a16z Show — 文字稿与摘要 | BidClub