Arthur Hayes 谈 BitMEX 早期往事、Bitcoin 将走向何方,以及我们为何过度押注 AI
BitMEX源于Hayes亲历的机构脆弱性,以及当时供给不足的衍生品市场。 他第一次登上交易台,恰逢Lehman Brothers申请破产;2013年被Citi裁员后,他发现了Bitcoin,开始做套利,并于2014年创办BitMEX。现货交易所当时已经拥挤不堪,但衍生品市场仍足够原始:交易员做一笔3个月的现货-期货套利,理论上可以实现资金翻倍,前提是交易所能活下来。
BitMEX靠100倍杠杆找到产品-市场匹配,随后发明永续合约,把客户不理解的产品做得更简单。 最初的保守型期货合约输给了提供20倍杠杆的中国交易所;凭借更好的技术,BitMEX将杠杆提升至100倍,并在2015年末 Bitcoin 从约130美元涨至600美元期间实现现金流转正。第一版永续合约失败后,2016年5月推出的版本集中流动性,并采用一种自参考资金费率机制,意在“惩罚顺势而为的人”,吸引做市商逆势入场。
Hayes认为,BitMEX的关停既令人遗憾又让人解脱,因为托管客户资产“是一种糟糕的生存方式”。 据他介绍,交易所一度拥有约250名员工,最终退出时从未损失客户资金。在他的叙事中,随着加密市场接管传统金融,BitMEX的产品仍被广泛使用。他拒绝解释保险基金的最终去向,只说其中还剩“3万多枚 Bitcoin”,事情“尚待决定”。
Hayes的仓位仍绝大多数押注加密资产的长期货币论,而不是短线交易。 他的净资产“90%多”配置在加密资产上,但仍保留足够的房地产、黄金、股票和美国国库券,即便加密资产归零也能正常生活;Maelstrom的投机性方向仓位通常持有1至6个月。交易对他而言仍是一场智力游戏,唯一客观的计分板就是赚了多少钱或亏了多少钱。
Hayes看空 AI 股票,但相信 AI 会有用;他反对的是客户没有支付这项技术的全部经济成本。 他认为,如果定价覆盖训练、推理和利润,约95%的用户都会离开,并引用 Anthropic 披露的2025年数据:每创造1美元收入,需要承担3美元成本。与此同时,数据中心投入品变得越来越稀缺、越来越昂贵,而它们生产的商品——算力——却越来越便宜,形成一张“倒挂的图表”。
他的基准情景是,AI扩张重要到不能失败,最终迫使政策提供货币支持,并由此利好包括其长期看多 Bitcoin 论点在内的加密资产。 Hayes认为,Anthropic、SpaceX、OpenAI等公司在未来5年的算力承诺上,有75%的概率无法在没有政府援助的情况下支付,因为需求无法以足够规模达到可盈利的价格。Avi质疑这种相对温和的政治判断,警告 AI 纾困可能引发美国政治急剧左转;Hayes回应称,无论什么意识形态的领导人,最终都会选择再次纾困,而不是亲手让经济崩盘。
AI经济模型看似矛盾的两面,正是Hayes新下注的动力:失败的AI经济可能让智能体大量涌现,同时创造对算力挂钩货币的需求。 Flop Network 将奖励执行有用推理任务的 GPU 运营商,并允许智能体直接把 Flop 转化为它们的“生命力”——算力。Hayes认为,如果万亿乃至千万亿个智能体各自只保留一小笔备用余额,这个网络可能成为“有史以来最大的加密货币,比 Bitcoin 还大”——这是一个明确的投机判断,前提是存在廉价的过剩算力,以及智能体数量爆炸式增长。
1. 机构失灵将 Hayes 推向 Bitcoin 与创业
Hayes在 Buffalo 长大,后来住过 Detroit。读完《丑陋的美国人》后,他在2000年前后决定学习中文并前往东方;在 University of Pennsylvania 辅修中文、在香港生活6个月,以及大三时加入 Deutsche Bank 做销售与交易,最终构成了他横跨大中华区的20年职业生涯。他从未在美国任职。
他第一次登上交易台,正是 Lehman Brothers 申请破产的那个周一。管理层当时正在列出员工不能再交易的银行,刚毕业的新人则不知道手里的 offer 能否保住;一位董事总经理直截了当地问 Hayes:“你觉得自己3个月后还会有工作吗?”
这场危机摧毁了他这一代人原本预期的银行业职业轨迹。2013年被 Citi 裁员后,Hayes 阅读 Bitcoin 白皮书,接受了它背后的理念,并开始做 Bitcoin 套利——想要“做自己的事”,最终变成了创办 BitMEX 的想法。
早期加密市场训练出的不仅是交易能力,还有怀疑精神。一种反复出现的诱饵是:据称有一位知名买家想买10,000 BTC,中间人则幻想着一笔六位数佣金;Hayes躲过了被卷入其中,但仍记得这类荒唐的私人交易当时“泛滥成灾”。
2. BitMEX凭传统平台不敢承担的衍生品风险胜出
Hayes在2014年与 Ben Delo、Samuel Reed 共同创办 BitMEX:Ben Delo负责搭建交易系统,Samuel Reed负责网站架构。现货市场当时已有 Mt. Gox、Bitstamp、Coinbase 和大型中国交易所;Hayes的判断是,交易所经济模型仍未被充分开发的领域在“衍生品”。
ICBIT既是启发,也是警示。2013年 Bitcoin 从约250美元涨至1,300美元期间,一份12月至次年3月的期货合约价格较现货高出约100%,做对冲的交易员可以在3个月内实现资金翻倍;市场回调后,清算和保证金机制过于薄弱,导致该平台出现资金缺口,最终由 Cumberland 的一位大户交易员帮助填补。
BitMEX最初推出的季度反向 BTC/USD 期货过于保守。交易员更偏好提供20倍杠杆、流动性更好的中国交易所,因此 BitMEX 借鉴社会化损失机制,调整自身的保证金制度,并利用更强的技术提供100倍杠杆——这成为它最关键的差异化优势。
在几乎没有成交量的第一年之后,随着 Bitcoin 在2015年末从约130美元涨至600美元,BitMEX实现现金流转正。它当时还不是最大的交易所,但终于提供了竞争对手无法提供的东西。
3. 永续合约起初是客服问题的修补方案
BitMEX在2016年5月开发永续合约时,客户因为不理解到期日、期货基差,甚至不理解双向订单簿,打电话把交易所骂成骗局。团队想做一个能够集中流动性、减少困惑的单一产品:“我们只是想让自己的日子好过一点,少处理一些客服请求。”
第一版永续合约失败,是因为资金费率参考 Bitfinex 的美元和 Bitcoin 价格,更新速度太慢,而加密市场当时正在上涨,导致衍生品价格较现货出现巨大溢价。BitMEX随后改用自参考资金费率机制,以溢价指数和8小时回溯窗口计算费率,让顺势交易者支付足够成本,从而吸引对手方并压缩基差。
Hayes不认为最难的是数学。真正棘手的问题,是异步地逐个 tick 为所有账户更新保证金;Delo此前使用银行交易语言 KDB 的经验,为 BitMEX 提供了竞争对手很难复刻的架构,直到 Binance、FTX 等平台在2020年初前后推出类似产品。
Avi指出 Hyperliquid、Lighter 以及 CME 对永续合约的兴趣,说明这种产品已经广泛扩散。Hayes表示,他为 BitMEX 创造的东西感到自豪。他还讥讽 CME 所谓24/7交易面临的人员配置障碍:“就是个数据库,老兄(“It’s a database, man”)。”一家名义交易额达到千万亿级的公司,不应该在技术上受周末限制。
4. 关停 BitMEX,卸下了财富也无法正当化的托管风险
BitMEX一度拥有约250名员工,但 Hayes认为托管数十亿美元客户资产无法接受:一次失误就可能造成数十亿美元损失。因此,关停既令人遗憾又令人释然——BitMEX赚到了钱,创造了经久不衰的产品,最终退出时“客户资金从未损失”。
被问及剩余保险基金时,Hayes只回答“TBD,不予置评”,同时估计其中还剩“3万多枚 Bitcoin”。他没有说明这些资产最终归谁所有,也没有解释计划如何处置。
Avi回忆,2020年10月美国对 BitMEX 采取行动后,Bitcoin仅下跌约5%,随后便收复失地;在他看来,这释放了大涨即将到来的信号。Hayes从内部看到的情况则更简单:所有反对既有金融体系的人都预期政府会采取行动,只希望自己不要成为替罪羊。“不幸的是,那就是我们。”
如今 Hayes 负责 Maelstrom 的方向性组合,基本只做多,投机性持仓通常持续1至6个月。他个人财富仍有“90%多”配置在加密资产上,同时持有足够的房地产、黄金、股票和美国国库券,以承受加密资产彻底归零。
5. AI可能有用,但当前扩张正在浪费资本
Hayes的区分非常明确:他认可 AI 作为产品的价值,但认为当前的 AI 生意“很糟”。市场应该要求客户覆盖交付成本并支付利润;如果前沿开发商对训练和推理全额收费,他估计当前用户中可能有95%不会买单。
他将 Anthropic、SpaceX 和 OpenAI 列为前沿 AI 的主要开发者。他给出的证据是负面的单位经济性:Anthropic在2025年表示,每创造1美元收入需要付出3美元成本;据 Hayes 说,Anthropic 和 OpenAI 每年可能需要发行500亿–1000亿美元债务。他还谨慎提到,自己记得两天前 SpaceX 刚完成一笔约400亿美元的债券发行。
Avi提出的反驳值得保留:数据中心投资的目的,本来就是降低算力成本。Hayes的回应是,这反而会加剧投资错配:建设扩张争夺稀缺资源和能源,推高劳动力与材料成本,而最终生产出的算力却成为越来越便宜的商品。“从业务角度看,这是一张倒挂的图表。”
互联网泡沫的类比没有改变他的结论。AI长期可能“极其有用”,但投资者依然可能支付错误的价格,融资建设终端客户在经济上并不需要的供给。
6. AI纾困是 Hayes 的75%基准情景,也是加密催化剂
Hayes认为,主要 AI 公司无法在没有政府帮助的情况下支付已签约算力的概率为75%。具体条件是:在这些公司的5年算力承诺履行完毕前,终端需求无法达到足以实现正单位经济性的价格和规模。
这种风险不只涉及美国 AI 开发商,也会波及亚洲的芯片、硬件和原材料供应商。如果承诺投入的数万亿美元算力最终无人使用,全球经济将陷入困境,政治人物也会遭遇反弹:为什么可能有2万亿–3万亿美元被投入“钢铁和水泥”,而不是医疗、大学、水或食物?
Avi认为,给一个本就高度分裂的行业纾困,可能会把美国政治急剧推向左翼,并让加密资产一同成为反弹目标。Hayes提到2008年:Obama当时谈论追责,但当领导人必须在继续纾困与接受30%–40%的经济收缩之间做选择时,他们会选择把问题往后拖。
Hayes认为中国也面临同样的约束。2009年至2018年的房地产和基建繁荣制造了大量损失,而中国共产党无法在政治上把这些损失分摊给地方政府、银行和中央政府,于是只能延续现状。他的结论是,选民和领导人更倾向于继续印钱,而不是接受会阻止加密资产上涨的经济收缩;不过他也承认:“我不知道终点什么时候到来。”
7. 金融化解决不了不平等,但算力货币或许能协调智能体
Avi为扩大市场持有者基础辩护,提到 Trump Accounts,以及拟议中的每名美国新生儿获得1,000美元。Hayes认为,当1%的人已经拥有相关股票时,这笔持仓并无实质意义;他还指出,新钱会推高稀缺品价格:“我多了1000美元,但我的房租涨了50%。”在他看来,Trump、AOC 和 Mamdani 的话术不同,但都面临着为支持者印钱的激励。
Hayes喜欢 Zcash 的隐私叙事,但也承认其发行机制存在疑虑。他认为形式化验证可能在当年Q4进入协议,并表示自己的公司投资了 Zodle,称其为领先的 Zcash 应用之一。
Flop Network瞄准的是另一种协调问题:智能体没有主导性的支付货币,却需要稀缺算力才能存在。GPU矿工将执行有用的推理任务,获得 Flop 区块奖励和交易手续费,而这种货币可以直接兑换为浮点运算。
Hayes用卡路里作比喻:人类持有货币,是因为货币可以稳定地购买食物;智能体可能持有 Flop,是因为 Flop 可以购买算力。数据中心过度建设带来的廉价现货算力,可能支撑起数量不断增加、能力持续提升的智能体群体;如果万亿乃至千万亿个智能体各自持有少量余额,他认为这条网络有机会超过 Bitcoin。
Hayes提出了这个想法,招募了一名前 BitMEX 交易引擎工程师担任 CTO,以及一位认识了20年的银行业联系人担任 CSO,随后又用智能体补充这支3人团队。“没有 AI,我绝不会做这件事。”但他同时强调,经验丰富的人类必须负责任地指导这些智能体。
8. 总统赦免是一张彩票,不是惊悚片
Hayes将寻求 Trump 赦免描述为一套常规法律程序。Trump释放出愿意关注那些受到法律行动不公对待人士的信号后,律师准备了一份说明 Hayes为何应获赦免的陈述,并通过适当渠道提交。
按他的说法,这里面没有秘密送钱,也没有 Watergate 式密会:很多人想要赦免,一个人决定哪些文件签字,“要么签了,要么没签”。Hayes对整个过程的总结是:“真的就这么平淡。”
完整逐字稿
Are you bullish on AI stocks?
No. I think we're wasting trillions of dollars of capital globally.
Seriously?
Yes.
What?
Absolutely. I know I'm starting an AI company, and I have to have you explain to me why we're—
Wait, wait, wait. You think that we're wasting— in data center build-out, or in what way?
Yeah.
What are we wasting money on?
At a very high level—
We're coming here from Token 2049. I have a very special guest today, Arthur Hayes. Thank you for sitting down with me.
Thanks for having me.
I think it's fun. You live in Singapore. Obviously, I don't think a lot of introduction is needed here, but I do want to start by asking you a little bit about your background.
Sure.
I know that you were born in Detroit, Michigan, right?
Buffalo, New York.
Buffalo, New York. But your parents—
I lived in Detroit for a while.
You lived in Detroit for a while.
Yeah.
Your parents worked for General Motors.
Yes.
That's right. How did you end up coming from a world where your parents worked for General Motors to founding the largest crypto perpetuals exchange in the world? You invented the perpetual itself, if I'm right.
Yes.
Take me through that journey.
1. From Detroit To Crypto
If you've ever— I love Detroit and Buffalo, but they're kind of boring, at least for me, in my own sense of being. As a kid, I always wanted to go somewhere else and travel. Obviously, traveling in the early '90s was a lot more expensive than it is today, so you were limited to what you saw on television in terms of your hopes and dreams.
What I remember distinctly is that when I was in high school, I read a book called Ugly Americans. It was about this guy who graduated from, I think, Dartmouth or some Ivy League school. He was a second-rate football player, and he didn't know what he was going to do with his life. Somehow, he made his way to Tokyo and started doing index rebills on the Nikkei and different Japanese indices. The book talks about his time in Tokyo. I think it was maybe the late '90s, somewhere around there.
I thought, "Wow, this sounds like a lot of fun. It's much more interesting than being like everybody else and going to New York or Los Angeles, or whatever most Americans think they're going to do after they graduate from university." I thought, "Okay, I want to go to China," because I thought that was the new up-and-coming economic power. This was around 2000, when I read the book.
I made that decision in my living room right before I went to university: I was going to study Chinese and move to China. When I got to the University of Pennsylvania, where I went to undergrad, I basically took a minor in Chinese and studied the language. I did my first study abroad in—
Can you still speak it?
Very poorly.
Yeah? Do you have a sentence to say for all the Chinese listeners out there?
No, I'm not going to embarrass myself.
Oh, man.
I moved to Hong Kong for a study-abroad program and spent 6 months there at the university. I loved it. Somehow, I found a job at Deutsche Bank in Hong Kong, doing sales and trading during my junior-year summer. I got an offer to come back and work there, and I have never left.
I've lived between Hong Kong, Singapore, and a little bit in Japan for the last 20 years, or half my life. My entire professional career is in Greater China, essentially. I've never had a job in America.
Really? You've never—
I've only worked out here.
Wow. So you've only ever come back to America to visit, to see your family or hang out?
Exactly.
That's kind of nuts. Do you still feel American?
I don't like passports as a general concept, so I don't think that you have to be American, Chinese, or Japanese just because you were randomly born in some country and they have a piece of paper that says this made-up name on it. I completely reject nationalism as a concept.
I am Arthur Hayes. Whether that's American, Chinese, or Japanese, who cares? It doesn't matter.
You hate the idea of a passport. I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that in my entire life.
I think it's offensive that I have to present this piece of paper to get in and out of places.
If it were up to you, there would be no borders—full globalism.
Exactly. Yeah.
How has it been? You were at Deutsche Bank, trading there. At some point, I assume you found Bitcoin and crypto. Tell me about how that happened. Was it like everyone else? Were you on Silk Road, or—
2. Bitcoin Leads To BitMEX
I was fired from my job at Citibank. I went from Deutsche Bank to Citi, trading ETFs in Hong Kong and Singapore. This was after the crisis. My first day on the trading desk was the day Lehman failed.
Your first day on the trading desk was when Lehman failed?
Yeah, when they filed for bankruptcy that Monday morning. Asia had opened right before New York, obviously. On Sunday night, they had declared Lehman bankrupt, and there was mayhem. I was just a graduate sitting on the desk with no idea what was going on. The head of trading was saying, "Don't trade with this bank or that bank." Everything was blowing up.
Your concept of this amazing future you thought you had in finance—making hundreds of millions of dollars in a few years with your list of rock-star traders—was completely not happening.
Wow.
The riches that we all thought we would make in banking evaporated with the change in the trajectory of financial services after the crisis. I thought, "Okay, I need to do my own thing at some point." I got the opportunity when I was let go from my job at Citibank in 2013. Then I happened to find Bitcoin, got engrossed in the philosophy, read the white paper, and started figuring out how to trade this thing by doing arbitrage.
That's what led me to the idea of creating BitMEX.
I do want to ask you what you were feeling at the time, when you were on the desk and everything was falling apart. What was going through your head? Were you thinking, "That's over. We're done"? Why did you stick it out in finance if—
It was a well-paid job. It wasn't like I did anything special. I was lucky. Some of my friends who had jobs at other banks didn't have a job after a few months. I had friends who had Bear Stearns offers, and then they were wondering, "Is JPMorgan going to accept my offer?"
Previously, you would do your summer training program before you started work. You would just get drunk and party; it didn't really matter. But in 2008, they started saying, "Okay, we don't have so many jobs because of the crisis. If you don't score a certain score on your aptitude test during the summer training, now you either don't have a job or you have to go to commercial banking."
All of a sudden, either half your pay gets cut because a job in commercial banking pays way less than investment banking, or you don't have a job at all. That was the environment we were all in. We were all thinking, "Okay, maybe we'll have a job. Maybe we won't have a job."
I remember my managing director pulled me over to his desk one day. He said, "Do you think you're going to have a job in 3 months?" I said, "I don't know."
He just straight-up asked you that?
Yeah.
What a psycho. Was he asking genuinely, or was it—
He was genuinely asking. He didn't know.
I thought maybe he was messing with you or something like that. I guess he probably didn't know if he was going to have a job either.
Yeah, exactly.
Do you think that ability to thrive on uncertainty has helped you in a way, or do you just not really think about it? Do you just power through?
I don't really think about it. Obviously, if you come into crypto, especially when you start early and there's a lot less structure around it—
You only survived if you were very cognizant that everyone was trying to pull one over on you. There were all these scammers, and you got very good at noticing the ways in which people were trying to pull one over on you. This was early crypto. Not that there's that much protection today, but there were a lot more things that could have gone wrong back in 2013, when I started investing and trading in this space.
Before we get into that, you got into crypto. What were some of the craziest things that you saw in the early days of crypto? What were some of the scams or pitfalls that—
I mean, I know—
—you had to get through that people today don't have to think about?
I know today everyone probably knows not to do this, but back in the day, everyone was so hungry for deals. It was like, “Such-and-such famous person wants to buy 10,000 Bitcoin,” or something like that.
Right.
“Can you help this person buy all this Bitcoin?” And you're like, “Wow, if I can charge a few percent, I can make a few hundred grand on this trade.” Thankfully, I was never scammed in one of those trades, but that was rampant back in the day.
I remember that. It was so funny. You'd always get these messages like, “Hey, I have a friend who wants to buy 10,000 Bitcoin or sell 10,000 Bitcoin at plus 4, minus 4 from the market.”
Yeah.
And you're just like, “Yeah, I can introduce them to a desk.” And they're like, “Oh, they don't want to work with a desk. They want—” This random guy all of a sudden can move all this size. I just know it was always your least successful friend who found this person, and you're like, “How did you find him? How did you find somebody with $5 billion in Bitcoin to buy and sell?” I don't know. It's totally nuts. Those early days were crazy. What year did you found BitMEX?
2014.
2014. And you founded it with 2 other guys.
Yeah, so I—
So—
—I went out in Hong Kong and found 2 other technologists. One was to help build a trading system, and that was Ben Delo. The other was to build the web architecture, and that was Samuel Reed. They were both in Hong Kong doing other things, but they were interested in crypto. I found them through friends of friends, and then I pitched them on the idea of building a derivatives platform because that's where all the money was going to be made in the exchange space.
There were obviously successful exchanges back in 2013. You had Mt. Gox just crushing it, up until it wasn't. You had Bitstamp, Coinbase, and all the big Chinese exchanges. There were definitely exchanges being successful, so trying to operate a spot exchange was not something I wanted to start, even in 2013, because it was a very crowded space and there were clear winners already back then.
Mm-hmm.
Derivatives was something that didn't really exist. There was this one little exchange called ICEY Bit, run by 2 guys in the Caribbean who were anonymous. It was an interesting thing. They almost went belly up because their margining system didn't work properly. But they put in place some of the bedrock concepts, like inverse futures, and some of the standards that we still use today were invented by ICEY Bit. I said, “I think I can do a better job than these guys, so let's build BitMEX.”
What was the problem with their margining, do you remember?
Everything didn't sum to zero.
Okay.
In 2013, Bitcoin went from about $250 to $1,300 in 4 months. They were offering, I think, 3× leverage at the time. I remember the December-March futures contract was trading 100% outright over spot. If you sold the December contract and bought spot, you doubled your money in 3 months.
Wow.
I wish I had put all my net worth into that trade, but I did put it on. A lot of other people put that trade on, and the problem was that when the market corrected and that basis collapsed, they didn't have the margin on the other side.
Right.
The exchange wasn't good at liquidating people, so it had a massive hole. One of the large traders at Cumberland actually bailed them out to keep the exchange alive in early 2014.
Really?
The only reason we all got our money back as traders on the exchange was because Cumberland bailed them out.
So did Cumberland then take a stake in their exchange?
I don't know what the arrangement was, or whether it was a private deal between one of the large traders and the founders. But the only reason we all got our money back as traders on the exchange was because Cumberland bailed them out.
So you were trading on the exchange at the time.
Yeah.
Okay. That makes sense. So then you started this exchange, BitMEX. What was the first product that you launched?
We launched a standard, I think, quarterly inverse-style futures contract, Bitcoin-margined—
Mm-hmm.
—Bitcoin–U.S. dollar. Our margining system was a lot more conservative than OKCoin at the time, BTC China, and Huobi, which were the main Chinese—
Mm-hmm.
—platforms and our competitors by the fall of 2014, when we launched. It wasn't very successful because the leverage wasn't high enough.
Mm-hmm.
All the traders complained that there wasn't enough liquidity. They asked, “Why would we trade on BitMEX? We'll just trade on the Chinese exchanges,” because they were offering 20× leverage at the time, and it was quite liquid to trade these products.
We had to pick our way through that and find our way to socialized-loss margining. We took some of the concepts being innovated in China around socialized losses and made our own little tweaks to them. Because our technology was better than theirs at the time, we were able to go to 100× leverage, while they were only at 20×. The main thing that kickstarted getting clients to want to trade on BitMEX was that we offered the highest leverage of any platform globally at the time.
I think that's still the name of your holding group, right? 100X?
Yeah.
This is actually the 1000x podcast. There's actually a history here that I don't know if you remember. When I was first starting the podcast, I reached out to you and asked, “Do you mind if I call it 100X?” I thought it was such a great name, and you were like, “Don't do that.”
Yeah.
So I just added a zero.
Yeah.
I went, “Ah, that's 1,000.” So you did actually inspire the name of this show. What was the point when you realized, “Wow, this is really working”? You were getting some real volume. Was there a moment? Was it slow growth? Was there an event?
Once we went to 100× leverage and Bitcoin popped from about $130 to $600 in Q2, Q3, or Q4 of 2015, we were cash-flow positive and making money. Not a lot of money, but at least we could pay our bills and all that kind of stuff, which was great, because for the first year we literally had no volume on the platform.
We became a player in the ecosystem. We were nowhere near as liquid as some of the Chinese players, but at least people were trading on our platform because we offered something different from everyone else.
Did they ever try to kill you, those Chinese players? Was there any conflict? Not physically—metaphorically, in a business sense. Was there any conflict?
No, we all knew each other.
Yeah.
There was no beef, if you will. Everyone had their own idea of how to build a futures market, and we all just did our own thing.
Interesting. I have heard some stories, especially once the industry got bigger, of people fighting and jostling a bit. I was curious if that ever happened to you.
No.
It was all just kumbaya with everyone?
Oh, it was kumbaya. I was down in Hong Kong, and they were up in Beijing and Shanghai, so we weren't even in the same city. It was a different sort of ecosystem.
Did you ever worry about the legality of what was going on? I guess eventually you had to.
There weren't really any rules at the time, so you just had to cross the river by feeling the stones.
That's a very strong Asian metaphor.
Yeah. I don't know the Chinese term for that, but yeah.
That was actually going to be my follow-up question, so you read my mind. When did the volume really start coming? Was that in 2017 or 2018? When did you think BitMEX really became a household name in the world of crypto?
3. The Perpetual Swap Takes Over
We invented the perpetual swap in May 2016 to solve a problem: our clients didn't understand the products.
Crypto people being crypto people, they assume that you’re scamming them. They didn’t understand the expiry date, and they didn’t understand why the price of a futures contract was different from spot. These were mostly margin traders and people who had never really interacted with the trading system. Even a buy/sell, two-sided order book was complicated for some traders.
We were like, “Okay, how do we make this simpler?” We were literally getting emails every single day saying, “BitMEX is a scam exchange. Why is all this stuff happening?” We also wanted to concentrate liquidity. We had all these different expiries, so how do we make just 1 product where everyone trades 1 product, and then compete effectively with the quarterlies offered by other Chinese players?
We tinkered around with different designs for this perpetual swap. The first one we launched was a failure. The funding cost was basically referenced from Bitfinex—their dollar and Bitcoin rates—which weren’t updating fast enough to reflect the change in the market. The derivative was trading at a massive premium to spot because crypto was ripping in 2016.
Overnight, we had to make some changes, and we came up with this self-referencing funding mechanism. That’s essentially the key innovation that allowed the perpetual swap to have staying power. We had this massive premium, so how do we charge people for that and create an interest rate high enough to punish people who are going with the trend, and then attract market makers to go against the trend? That was the funding rate, the premium index, the 8-hour lookback, and all these things that everyone else has copied since then. It was meant to solve the problem of the derivative trading at a massive premium to spot: How do we make it collapse?
What was the process of building this? I mean, there was some complicated math involved with this, or…?
No, it’s not really complicated.
It’s more about whether your trading system can computationally do these things fast enough to process the transactions on a tick-by-tick basis, which was a nontrivial problem. Hats off to Ben and Sam, the engineers who actually implemented this stuff. This is why perpetuals launched in 2016. It wasn’t really until 2020, when Binance and FTX came out with their own products, because it was technologically very difficult to do this.
You really had to rebuild your trading system from scratch to handle this type of product and margin everyone asynchronously, tick by tick. We were able to do it because we used KDB, which is a very esoteric language used in trading applications at banks. As you know, Ben Delo is a KDB engineer at an investment bank. Over time, everyone figured out how to do it, and that’s why, call it early 2020, all these other people could technologically offer the perp. It took them a while to figure out how to build the trading engine to support the product.
Did you know at the time that you were building something that is now eating the world? Did you have this vision, or was it…?
No. We just wanted to make our lives easier and have fewer customer support requests.
Yeah.
That’s pretty crazy. How does that make you feel? You look around now, and you’ve got the Hyperliquid of the world, you’ve got the Lighter of the world, and you’ve got the CME looking at it. Everyone is now thinking about perps.
I think it’s great.
We’re very proud of what we were able to accomplish.
Yeah.
I know we shut down BitMEX a few weeks ago, and that was a sad and happy day for us. At the end of the day, we created something special, everyone is still using it, and we’re accomplishing our goal. Crypto’s taking over TradFi.
The CME—I think I saw a Bloomberg snapshot where the CME CEO, or whoever, said, “Oh, we can’t go to 24/7 because of some staffing issue or something.”
Yeah, that was totally—
It’s hilarious.
What are you talking about, a staffing issue?
Yeah. It’s a database, man. You guys trade quadrillions in notional contracts, and you can’t do 24/7 trading? Your computers can’t handle 24/7 trading? It’s just a joke.
How many people were working at BitMEX at the peak?
I think 250.
250. Yeah, I mean, the CME has far more than that.
Yeah.
You’d think that they’d be able to handle it, but that’s totally nuts. I do want to ask: Why was it a happy day for you to shut down BitMEX? I would assume that would be quite…
4. The Cost Of Running An Exchange
Because running an exchange means you are the bearer of billions of dollars of assets. Obviously, our assets under custody had declined a lot since the peak in 2019 or 2020. But think about CZ, for example. I don’t know what the signing architecture is at Binance, but I assure you the buck stops with him, and you’re talking about hundreds of billions of dollars, probably, of assets under custody.
Mm-hmm.
The same with Brian at Coinbase, and the same with Ben at Bybit. You make 1 mistake, and you could be out billions. That’s a terrible way to live.
Yeah. That’s a lot of pressure, to be honest.
So I’m glad that we’re no longer in the business of holding other people’s money in the exchange. We had a good run, made a lot of money out of it, created something super special, and were able to exit the game with no customer funds ever lost. That’s not something many exchanges in crypto can say.
Basically, every exchange in crypto has been hacked at some point or another. You’ve managed to avoid the North Koreans, so props to you for that. But I am curious: Whatever happened to the insurance fund?
TBD. No comment.
But who owns it technically? BitMEX the company?
Yeah, figure it out.
Or Arthur Hayes personally?
Well, anyway, if you need to figure out what to do with that money, you already know.
How much was left in there at the end?
30-something thousand Bitcoin, I think—something like that.
30,000 Bitcoin. Hopefully that doesn’t hit the market anytime soon. But that’s interesting. I want to take a step back for a second and talk about 2020, because I actually remember October 2020. BitMEX gets hit with this action from the government, and Bitcoin doesn’t go down, right? It’s crazy. I think it went down 5%, and then it rebounded.
To me, that stood out as 1 of the biggest indications that we were about to go into an insane rally. But I’m wondering from your perspective: What did you feel at the time when the U.S. government was finally saying, “Okay, we’re taking you guys seriously”? What was that like being on the inside?
Obviously, it sucked, right?
Yeah.
At the end, everyone knows the government’s going to come after you. You’re fighting this war against banks and the entrenched system, and you just hope you’re not the scapegoat. Unfortunately, that was us. So you just have to deal with it and soldier on.
Yeah, I guess that’s fair. It’s crazy today. You look around, and the CFTC and SEC are kind of letting anyone do anything. A lot of these exchanges are operating in basically the same way that you guys were, but nobody’s coming after them because people realize that this is the future now.
Yeah. It is what it is, right? There’s nothing you can do.
Life is path-dependent.
Yeah. I guess part of it is life philosophy. You could really just fuck off and do nothing for the rest of your life, but you’re still out there, writing articles and giving takes on the market. I used to love your Pepe covers on the articles.
I’m running out of Pepes.
Yeah.
We need to bring back Rare Pepes and continue the project.
Look, the culture of crypto has changed dramatically. I’m literally wearing a suit. I spent 9 years in crypto, trading every day in my shorts and T-shirt. But now I feel like it’s kind of a costume for me.
Mm.
But at the same time, I think it’s just part of the changing times, and I’m curious what…
Do you have a guiding life philosophy about what you want to do with your time?
Enjoy.
Yeah.
Whatever that means for me is something different for everyone. I spend a lot of my time doing physical exercise. Obviously, there's intellectual stimulation, and writing and trading. It's a game to me, right? Thankfully, I have enough money that it doesn't matter if I make or lose money on anything I do. But to me, it's an intellectual exercise.
Mm-hmm.
And it's a game, and the yardstick is how much money you made.
Yeah.
And it's objective, right? You either made money or you didn't. That's why I love trading and financial markets. You learn about everything, because everything at the end of the day has a price attached to it. You have to determine how you're going to spend your precious time in this universe, and prices are one of the best ways to indicate that. So whether it's art, music, crypto, oil and gas, or AI, it all comes back to financial markets. If you really study financial markets, you study everything. It's a super interesting pursuit.
Do you study a lot of financial history? Are you interested in it?
Yeah, I read a lot of books on financial history.
Yeah. Are you still trading actively today?
I don't think I'm as active as some of your listeners who are trying to trade a 1-minute candle on Hyperliquid.
Yeah.
But at Maelstrom, I run the directional book. We do mostly directional, long-only positions.
Mm-hmm.
I'd say the average tenure of one of our more speculative positions might be, let's call it, 1 to 6 months.
Makes sense. Honestly, the name 1000x is a bit tongue-in-cheek, because what we talk about mostly on the podcast is mega trends. We talk about where to allocate your capital so that you can sit in it, and we honestly discourage trading the 1-minute chart, because I don't think many people can actually make money on that. I think crypto was a lot easier to trade 6 or 7 years ago than it is today, in my personal opinion, on a short time horizon. But it's almost easier to trade on a long-term time horizon, because I think we've hit an inflection point where now it truly is inevitable. There was a period of time when it could have been killed by the government. It could have been stopped. Maybe we wouldn't have reached the point that we're at today if Trump hadn't been elected in 2024 and given companies free rein to build whatever they needed to. But now, at this point, I think it's really about long-term allocation. Besides that, what are you interested in now? Is 90% of your net worth still in crypto? Are you betting on this, or have you diversified out? If so, what are you looking at?
Given that I have so much Bitcoin and other stuff, I'd say 90-something percent is in crypto.
Okay.
But if it went to zero, I have enough money in other stuff that it'll be okay. Real estate, gold, random stocks, T-bills.
Are you bullish on AI stocks?
No. I think we're wasting trillions of dollars of capital globally.
Seriously?
Yes. I know I'm starting an AI company, so I have to explain it.
Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. You think that we're wasting money in data-center build-out or in what way?
5. AI Will Need A Bailout
At a very high level, if we believe in markets—whether, you know, free state capitals or whatever, right?—we believe in the signals that markets give us. What's a signal? As a customer, I pay a price, and hopefully that price compensates the company offering the product or service for the cost of delivering that thing and some sort of profit for their effort.
Mm-hmm.
If I'm not willing to pay something at which a company makes a profit, then that company shouldn't be making it, at a theoretical level, right?
Right.
So we take a look at the main AI labs: Anthropic, SpaceX, and OpenAI. This is the majority of the development of frontier AI. None of them make money, and none of the customers are paying the price that it would cost them to make money.
Yeah.
If OpenAI, Anthropic, or SpaceX said, "We have these negative unit economics. We incorporate training costs and inference into the cost of delivering this token to you, the client. We're going to charge you enough money to make an actual profit," I don't think anyone would use AI. At least, I wouldn't say no one, but probably 95% of the people who use AI probably wouldn't use it if they had to pay the true cost, because it's expensive.
Right.
Right?
But isn't that the point of the data-center build-out and investing capital in compute—to attempt to bring down the cost?
But the thing is that even at that price, these companies don't make money.
Right.
The thing that they're delivering is a commodity. It's getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper.
Mm-hmm.
But the cost to build more of the commodity—data centers, inflation in labor, inflation in materials—where do you get the energy from? You're competing with consumer grids.
Right.
And this is in the United States and a lot of other places. The more data centers you build, the more expensive it gets because there's a shortage of the actual materials and labor to build the thing. But the compute gets cheaper and cheaper and cheaper. So you have an upside-down chart in terms of the business.
Sure.
But we keep funneling money into them. SpaceX just did, what, Forty billion two days ago? A bond sale?
Yeah.
Right? Anthropic and OpenAI need to do something like $50 to $100 billion of debt sales every year just to fund the companies. Yet Anthropic told us in 2025 that it costs them $3 to generate $1 of revenue. That's a terrible business.
Yeah. But what do you say about the comparisons with the early dot-com bubble, Amazon, Google, and all those companies?
It's the same thing, right?
Right.
We are optimistic about a technology, AI, and its usefulness. I think it'll be extremely useful over time. But the problem is we're paying the wrong price for it today.
Okay, interesting. So you do value AI as a product, as something that generates value for humanity. You're just saying these businesses suck.
And we're wasting money. We're spending all this money on something that people don't want.
Right.
If they wanted it, then Anthropic and OpenAI would be super profitable.
Makes sense. But are you taking any bets against it? Are you trading?
I bet that they'll get bailed out.
Yeah.
The entire global economy—whether it's the United States, which is building the data centers, or places in North Asia and Southeast Asia, which are supplying the hardware, the chips, and the raw materials to America to build data centers—is in on the same trade. So if American AI—if the end consumer, OpenAI, Anthropic, and SpaceX—do not consume the trillions of dollars of compute that they've booked, that they said they're going to consume in the next 5 years, then the whole global economy falters.
All these politicians who have basically come out and said, "AI is the future. Productivity is how we're going to get ourselves out of this debt issue that we've created over the last 80 years," will look stupid. And the people are going to say, "What? I could have had free healthcare, free university, better water, better food, yet we decided to blow $2 trillion or $3 trillion on steel and cement right now."
Right.
I still have no healthcare. How is that good for me as a person? And all my data was stolen by these companies, and I didn't get to invest in any of these things at the—
Yeah.
So, again, I think it'll get bailed out because it's too big to fail, and that's going to benefit crypto.
And so, what is your trade at the end of the day? It's long Bitcoin, right? Long Bitcoin, but also I think the way that we operate is that we think in terms of probabilities. Is this, like, a 60%? Is this, like, a 90%? Is this a...
I would say that, if I had to put a probability on it, I'd say it's probably 75% that these companies will not be able to afford the compute commitments without a government bailout.
Because the demand will not catch up and pay the price necessary for these companies to have positive unit economics and sufficient scale to basically honor the contracts they signed.
What do you think that does to the social fabric of the country?
Nothing.
Nothing?
It's just a bailout. We did it in 2008 globally, with the U.S., China, and Europe. Everyone got bailed out.
Obviously, at this conference in crypto, I think people are like, “Oh, yeah, hard money. Stop printing money.” I just happen to make money on it because we know it's inevitable. But if you're the average person, are you really going to support a politician, whether it's in a democratic or undemocratic system, who tells you, “Okay, I'm sorry, you might be 30 years old, but 35 years ago, somebody took out a bunch of debt and made all these decisions about the global financial system. They said, ‘Tomorrow, we'll pay for it,’ but tomorrow is today, and now your living standard must materially deteriorate to pay for this debt that you weren't even born when they put it into practice”?
Are you going to support me as a politician? Absolutely not. You're going to say, “Okay, I'm going to be on the winning team, and if I'm on the winning team, I get to print money and hand it to myself,” whether that's in lower taxes or government welfare benefits. And so it's this factionalization. The U.S. is obviously the best example. This is red versus blue.
Mm-hmm.
Both sides print money. They might have different pseudo-philosophies about why they should deliver money to certain constituencies, but at the end of the day, whether you're a Democrat or Republican in the United States, your goal is, “I want my team to get elected so that I get the goodies.”
Right.
We are not saying, “I want my team elected so that the global economy drops by 50% because we're going to stop printing money.” That's not a political solution, not in China and not in the United States. So the average person doesn't want the thing that would stop crypto from going up. The average person says, “Print the money, make sure I get it, so that my life is okay.”
Mm-hmm.
That's the entire global political system.
I think your take on whether it affects the social fabric is interesting because, from my perspective, if we get a massive bailout of AI, AI is already a hot-button issue on both the right and the left. Obviously, the right is pushing forward, but then you have governors like Greg Abbott saying, “Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. No more data centers,” and he's a Republican.
And so, if there is a government bailout that has to happen for these AI companies, I see the U.S. swinging pretty hard left at a certain point because of that. I could see socialism—
Sure.
—really, really taking off. I mean, that would just be, I think, bad for ... I do think that crypto gets caught up in that as well.
Right. But it'd be like Obama in 2008, right? He inherits this recession, this global financial crisis. He talked a big game about how he was going to hold the bankers accountable, yada yada yada. “You're not going to lose your house.”
Did he not hold the bankers accountable?
No. He specifically said that they were too big to jail.
Right.
I forgot the exact phraseology, but he and Eric Holder basically said, “We can't jail any bankers. It's too systemic to the financial system. Nor are we going to roll back TARP or any of these programs. We're going to do them and do them even more.” And so, “We're going to foreclose on your house.”
Right.
So all the people who voted for Obama thinking that he was somehow this ray of hope or change found that he was the same as everybody else. When presented with, “Okay, the global economy goes down 30%, 40%, some big number, or we just print some more money and kick the can another 8 years to the next guy,” they kick the can.
I don't care what your political philosophy is, because do you really want to be the person who gets elected and then goes, “Okay, I'm going to crash the global economy. It's time to actually pay the bills”?
No.
So Democrat, Republican, socialist, capitalist, China, America—it's all the same thing. No one wants to be the guy holding the bag.
Do you think it's the same in China as well?
Absolutely.
Yeah?
The Chinese system has so many distortions that the Communist Party knows about, but they lack the political will to assign the losses. They do not know how to say, “Okay, we had a property bubble—the biggest credit expansion probably this century—over the span of 8 years, from 2009 to 2018. Okay, there's this loss. We built all these houses we didn't need. We did all this infrastructure we didn't need. Who bears the loss? Is it the local government? Is it the banks? Is it the central government?” They're all technically owned by the Communist Party.
Right.
But which part of the Communist Party is the one that gets stuck with the loss? They can't even decide among themselves, so they just keep printing money and keep exporting because they think, “If we just keep the status quo, it will be more harmonious, and we stay in power.” It's a different sort of situation, but it's the same decision-making.
Does Xi Jinping want to be the Chinese president who goes, “Okay, yeah, I'm sorry, Hu Jintao and all these guys pumped up a bunch of credit. Now the material standard of living is going to drop 50% in China because we wasted too much money”?
Right.
Again, that's not a palatable political solution, even in China.
Talking to you is making me a lot more bullish on Bitcoin. I'll tell you that because I did have that general take on the United States. I didn't know enough about China to have that take on China as well. So hearing that, the global economy is obviously interconnected, and if that is true across the board, in your opinion, that's obviously very bullish for BTC.
But I'm curious about your take on where that ends. You take that to its full logical conclusion, and you're kind of saying that at some point, that bill is going to come due.
At some point.
And—
I don't know when that is.
But—
Maybe there's a revolution. We're seeing signs of it, but in most places, people are so satiated with social media and just so dumbed down that they decide to opt out, right? Lying flat in China, quiet quitting in the U.S. and the Western countries—it's all the same sort of mechanism. We'll see.
Just as a total aside, I did notice that there's quite a bit of a phone addiction problem on the streets of Singapore. I've noticed literally everybody is staring at their phone all the time, 24/7, watching short-form video. You see it in New York to an extent as well, although, from my experience, it's a little bit worse here.
And it does make me think that people are sort of opting out of paying attention to the system now in a big way. I think that trend is probably going to continue.
But part of why I decided to do this podcast and also talk about media is because, if you do believe that the U.S. government is going to print, if you do believe that the Chinese government is going to print, and if you do believe also that AI is going to be useful in the future, regardless of whether these companies make money or not, it's imperative to have a stake in that future.
To check out completely, I think, is probably the wrong choice. You have to encourage people to say, “Okay, I will allocate to the things that are going to benefit in the future,” and get people into investing in the first place.
One of the most heartening things that I see is that Trump has said that the S&P is now sort of the bedrock of the future of the U.S. That's why he opened Trump Accounts. That's why he's giving $1,000 to every newborn: because it's no longer enough just to make money. You have to be invested in the American experiment.
That financialization of the world, which I think you actually contributed to in a huge way with perps, I personally think is good. Bringing people in to invest in the market is good. But I'm curious about your take: Do you think that what we're experiencing now with the financialization of the world is a good thing or a bad thing?
I think it doesn't really matter.
It's neither good nor bad. It just is a way in which, I think, if you ask Trump what his number 1 KPI is, it's “number go up” on the stock market, right? It's an objective measure. He's just a finance guy. Obviously, a lot of people who back him are in financial services.
But even if you give $1,000 to every American, all you're basically saying is, “Close your eyes. Don't look at the 1% who own all those stocks anyway.” The $1,000 isn't going to materially change anything. How are you going to pay for the $1,000? You're going to print a bunch of money. It's going to help my bags, great, but is that really going to solve the quiet quitting or this opting out? I don't think so, because the second people see, “Okay, well, I got an extra $1,000, but my rent went up 50%,” it's like, okay, cool. You just created more money to chase more scarce goods like housing, food, and all these sorts of things—social services.
So it doesn't actually solve the problem. Maybe some people think that they now have an ownership stake, but when they actually look at the numbers, you're just as poor as you were before.
Right. You're sounding a little bit like President AOC.
AOC isn't going to be any different from Trump, right?
Right.
Trump, AOC, and Mamdani are all the same. They just have different rhetoric around what they're doing, right? Trump gave the largest money-printing exercise probably since FDR in the 1930s with his stimulus checks, which Biden continued because it was great politics.
“I'm going to shut you in the house for this virus that may or may not be a hoax. Don't do it. Don't worry about it. Here's a few thousand dollars.” If you're a business, “Okay, paycheck, whatever it was called—we're going to cover your costs, right? We're going to give you hundreds of billions of dollars.” Democrat, Republican—everyone supported this. No one says no to free money.
Yeah.
They can give it to their supporters, and then their supporters come and support them at the polls. Trump, AOC, Mamdani—all the Democrats, whatever, the socialists—they're all the same. They just couch it in different rhetoric. They have a different shtick for how they present it to the people. But at the end of the day, it's money printing to get votes, and it's very effective.
What do you think about Zcash in this context?
It's great. I love the privacy narrative. Obviously, there have been some issues with the minting and all that sort of stuff, and I think formal verification will make its way into the protocol sometime in Q4 this year, I think. At Mailstream, we're an investor in Zodle, one of the leading apps for Zcash. So I love the narrative that will hopefully fix the blockchain issues, and, yeah, I like it.
I do want to ask you about this new thing that you're working on. Like you said, it's kind of confusing to me because you seem quite bearish on the AI companies, and you're building this. You also potentially might have access to the full insurance fund, in which case you could just do whatever you want for the rest of your life. You're deciding to come to a conference in Singapore and spend an excessive amount of time building, talking, and doing something new. Why? What is it that you're building, and why are you building it?
6. Building Money For AI Agents
It's called the Flop Network, and it's basically trying to address the issue of—I personally believe that the agentic economy is real.
Okay.
There will be quadrillions of these things out there, this new life form, and they're going to do useful stuff for us and for themselves, but they don't have a payments network.
Mm-hmm.
When we're born, we're pretty much born into some sort of payment network. You can't change what the reserve currency is, even if you hate it with your whole life force. But for agents, there is no dominant currency for AI agents.
Right.
Whatever network services them will be the most valuable network ever created because you have the most economic actors growing rapidly, exponentially. They can communicate with each other 24/7 at the speed of light in a way that cognitively we can't even comprehend as humans. Imagine if you're the network that powers that coordination, because coordination requires scarcity.
Mm-hmm.
The scarcity here is compute. If I'm an agent, just like a human eats calories that we pay for with fiat currencies or earn from our jobs, an agent consumes floating-point operations per unit of time—compute—at a data center provided by GPUs. The question is: Is there a currency that they can hold that directly converts into compute?
Okay.
That's what we're creating at Flop. Using the principles of Bitcoin, there are miners who come on. They provide GPUs and do useful inference for agents. They get rewarded with a block reward in Flop and transaction fees in Flop. Now you've tied this made-up currency called Flop directly to compute, the thing the agent actually needs to exist.
The reason we think we're a contender to be the payments network for AI is that AI agents will have a nonzero convenience yield to hold the currency. Just like when you get paid, you don't spend all of your money. Even if you're the most broke person, you still have a few cents in your wallet.
Yeah.
Right? You don't just go out and buy all the food. Maybe if you're in hyperinflation or whatever, but in normal society, you don't go out and spend all of your money. You have a convenience yield to hold some of it because you know that whenever you need to, you can walk down the street, buy some more calories, and feed yourself.
An agent will hold a small amount of whatever the currency is of this new network because it knows that whenever it needs to—if it has a job, if its human tells it to do something, whatever—it can convert Flop into compute directly. If you have trillions and quadrillions, or however many agents are out there, all holding a little bit of Flop, then the network value gets insanely big.
That's the bet we're making with Flop, and that's why I'm super excited to essentially come out of retirement to do this. I think it's a massive opportunity to possibly create the largest cryptocurrency ever, bigger than Bitcoin. If you think about the economic actors that support Bitcoin, it's a few hundred million humans, right? Hopefully, we get to 8 billion.
Yeah.
There are already billions of agents. We don't really know exactly how many. The amount of commerce they're actually doing is probably not that much yet—
Right.
—but it's growing quickly. Look at how successful Facebook's Muse consumer application is and how useful that's going to be for a lot of people—to be able to run their entire digital lives with an agent that can book their hotel rooms, cancel subscriptions, whatever, right? This is just a start.
Imagine when all these AI data centers come online and all this compute is there. There's no buyer for it on these take-or-pay long-term contracts because all these labs can't afford it, so they dump it on the spot market. Now the agents have cheaper life force, cheaper compute, so we can make them do more complex things. We can have more of them. We can embed them more into different parts of our lives.
Why? Because it's really, really cheap to have millions of agents do something. This is how OpenAI and Infrapark are solving these math problems. It's not that agents are uniquely super smart. Yes, they are smart, but if you have unlimited compute and the ability to spawn instances of life, then you can do a lot of cool things.
Yeah.
Imagine what we can do with super-cheap compute. Everyone has a fleet of agents doing things for them. It's going to be insane.
Did you get approached by somebody who had this idea and then decide to come out of retirement, or did you have this idea and then go build it?
I had this idea, and then I went and found my team.
Oh, really? Okay.
Yeah.
How did you go find your team?
Our CTO is someone I worked with at BitMEX. He was on the trading engine team—a very, very good engineer. Our CSO is someone I've known for 20 years in banking, a good friend of mine. We have 3 of us and a lot of AI agents. I would never do this without AI.
What—
Because—
Yeah.
If you have proper people who have real experience, then they're able to direct AI agents to do useful work in a responsible way.
Did you ever think about reaching out to your old BitMEX founders?
No. It's a completely different sort of situation.
Right. Are you in touch with them at all?
Yeah.
Yeah. They're super under the radar. They don't really seem to like the spotlight very much.
Yeah. I mean, they're around.
They're around. Okay.
Yeah.
Well, do you think I'll see them at any point during this conference?
Yeah. I've already seen one of them.
Oh, really?
Yeah.
Okay. Interesting. I want to ask one final question, because it's just super interesting to me. You were pardoned by Trump.
Yes.
And what was that process like? There was a 60 Minutes piece that just came out.
It was about the rapper, right, or something?
Yeah, and it was about this idea that you had to go through a bunch of these pardon brokers and pay them a ton of money. Did you just wake up one day and you were pardoned, or was this an effort on your end?
7. Arthur Hayes Gets Pardoned
Getting a pardon from any president is essentially a lottery ticket, right? Everyone—there are lots of people who want one. There's this one guy who determines what he signs, essentially, and you kind of have to figure out a way to make your compelling case.
So, at a very basic level, you just employ lawyers, and they write a brief for you explaining why you deserve a pardon. Obviously, Trump had put it out there that he was considering giving pardons to folks who've been wronged by legal action and all that kind of stuff. So you're like, "Okay, wow, let's just try it out," right? Yoink. The lawyer puts together the application.
They put it through the correct channels, and it either gets signed or it doesn't.
Okay.
It's literally that banal.
There are no briefcases full of cash and drops?
No.
You know?
Okay.
I was really hoping for something a little bit more like, "Yeah, I met some guy at the Watergate Hotel."
Yeah.
Arthur, I really appreciate you spending the time with me.
Thanks for having me.
This was a really fun conversation. It went longer than we thought it was going to go, so I appreciate it. This was great. Thanks.
Awesome. Cheers.
All right. Catch you out there. Nothing said on the ThousandX podcast is a recommendation to buy or sell any investments or products. This podcast is for informational purposes only, and the views expressed by anyone on the show are solely their opinions, not financial advice or necessarily the views of 1KX Media. Our hosts, guests, and the 1KX team may hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed.