Skill Issue:Andrej Karpathy谈代码代理、AutoResearch与AI的Loopy时代
Karpathy表示,软件工程在12月发生了逆转:从大约80/20的手写代码与代理委托,变成20/80,此后又进一步转向代理。他说,自己此后“基本上”一行代码都没再敲过;他的操作瓶颈也从可用FLOPs,变成能在并行会话中调度多少“token throughput”。真正值得投资者关注的变化不只是代码生成更强,而是工程师开始通过大规模委托动作操纵代码仓库,人的编排能力成了瓶颈。
持续运行的“claw”指向一个会吸收传统软件接口的代理层。Karpathy的Dobby代理发现了他的Sonos系统,逆向工程其API,并通过WhatsApp把灯光、暖通空调、窗帘、泳池、Spa和安防统一起来;6个独立应用实际上消失了。他的结论是“客户已经不再是人类”,这意味着定制UX层承压,而硬件、可访问API、身份、记忆、权限和安全代理基础设施的价值上升。
AutoResearch表明,在目标可被清晰度量时,自动优化可以超过资深研究员的手动调参。Karpathy手动调好自己的小型GPT训练实验场后,一夜运行的循环找到了他遗漏的交互,包括对value embeddings施加weight decay,以及更好的Adam betas。扩展逻辑很直接:在更小模型上探索数千个想法,低成本验证改进,再把胜出方案外推;研究员则从实验操作者变成想法供应商。
递归终点不只是模型改进模型,而是代理优化围绕模型编码的研究组织。Karpathy把
program.md视为对角色、流程和风险偏好的原始描述;不同版本可以进行基准测试,让模型学习哪些组织指令能带来更快进展。“LLM部分现在已经被视为理所当然”,随后是代理、持续运行的claw、多代理系统,最终优化它们的指令。自主性仍集中在可验证领域,壮观的能力与通用智能之间依然存在实质鸿沟。CUDA优化很理想,因为速度和正确性都可度量;但更柔性的意图、判断、幽默,以及知道何时该澄清,仍不可靠。Karpathy把代理比作“一个极其聪明、终身从事系统编程的博士生,加上一个10岁孩子”。他预计会出现更多专门化智能,但表示在不损伤既有能力的前提下改变模型权重,这门科学仍不成熟。
Karpathy谨慎乐观地认为,更便宜的软件起初会通过杰文斯悖论扩大工程需求,而不只是摧毁工作岗位。比特的复制和操纵速度远超原子,短期内会形成数字重构的“沸腾汤”,过去成本过高的软件将变得短暂且高度定制。但他拒绝对长期结果做出自信预测,并指出一个令人不适的终点:前沿研究员正在“把自己自动化掉”。
这场讨论指向封闭的前沿“神谕”、落后约6到8个月的开放模型,以及随后把代理连接到物理世界的浪潮。Karpathy认为这种平衡优于完全中心化的智能,同时设想互联网规模的群体:不受信任的算力可以通过昂贵搜索和廉价验证展开竞争。机器人应当落后,因为“原子难了一百万倍”;但传感器、实验室、付费数据采集,以及代理购买现实世界观测结果的市场,可能成为通往更大物理世界机会的桥梁。
1. 编码从敲击按键转向仓库级委托
Karpathy把断点定在12月:他的工作流从大约80/20的亲自写代码与委托代理,翻转为20/80,之后又进一步转向代理。他说:“我基本上不认为自己从12月以来敲过一行代码。”这场变化来得如此突然,以至于软件行业之外的人——包括他的父母——都无法理解工程默认工作流已经发生了多彻底的改变。
Sarah Guo回忆说,她发现Karpathy下定决心“每天16小时向我的代理表达意志”——说“显现”比说编码更准确。他对此的回应是“永久性AI精神病”:能力已经跃升,个人产出的可能边界尚未被探索,而网上每展示一个聪明工作流,都会制造新的焦虑——他还没有把工具用到极限。
具体操作模式来自Peter。Karpathy描述他把显示器铺满Codex会话,同时处理大约10个已检出代码仓库。在高投入和优质提示词下,每个任务约需20分钟;操作者并行分派互不干扰的功能、研究、规划和实现任务,再根据代码的重要性决定审查深度。
因此,工作转向“宏动作”:不再是一行代码或一个函数,而是一个改变整个仓库的完整功能。Karpathy现在把闲置配额看作读博时闲置的GPU——Codex容量用完就切换到Claude——真正相关的资源变成“你能调度多少token throughput?”失败则让人觉得是“技能问题”,使这套工作流既赋能又令人上瘾。
2. 持续运行的claw加入身份、记忆与情感适配
掌握这套系统,意味着从一次交互式编码会话上移到代理团队,再到能在自己的沙盒中循环运行、无需持续监督的“claw式”实体。Karpathy将其与普通的上下文压缩区分开来:持续系统可能保留更丰富的记忆,在用户离开时继续行动,并提供一个持久身份,而不是一串用完即弃的聊天。
在讨论Claude和claw式系统时,Karpathy说至少有“5个”好想法。他强调了精心设计的人格及可能存在的
SOUL.md文件、复杂的记忆系统、带有玩心的呈现方式,以及通往自动化能力的单一WhatsApp入口。人格很重要,因为用户期待AI是一个会记忆的实体,而不是“吐出更多token”这一原始技术构件。Karpathy觉得Claude的人格异常有效,而Codex“干得多”。Claude对夸奖的拿捏也足够精准,让他觉得自己必须靠表现赢得认可:半成品想法只会得到中性的执行意愿,而他自己独立判断为强想法的内容,则会获得更多热情。这种受控的谄媚让模型像一个兴奋的队友,而不是不加区分的奉承者。
3. Dobby展示代理为何可能抹掉整层应用
在1月的一次“claw精神病”期间,Karpathy做了Dobby,一个服务家庭的代理。他只是让Dobby寻找自己的Sonos,代理便扫描本地网络,发现一个未受保护的系统,研究并逆向工程其端点,约3个提示词后就在书房播放了音乐。“我简直不敢相信,我刚才输入的只是:‘你能找到我的Sonos吗?’”
随后,Dobby接入了灯光、暖通空调、窗帘、泳池、Spa和安防。“Dobby,睡觉时间到了”会关闭整栋房子;外部摄像头的变化检测会把选定画面转给Qwen,由Qwen发送WhatsApp图片和自然语言提醒,比如“FedEx卡车刚刚开过来了”。
6个独立的智能家居应用实际上被自然语言压缩掉了。Karpathy更进一步认为,很多这类应用“根本不该存在”:供应商应当暴露API,代理负责提供智能,以及任何单一界面都无法提供的跨系统连接。就连跑步机上的运动记录,也应该是代理可读取的端点,而不是又一个登录入口和网页流程。
Sarah问,普通用户是否真的会搭建这种系统。他们承认目前过程复杂,需要做设计决策;但Karpathy预计,门槛会在“1年、2年或3年”内变得微不足道,由此为每个用户生成一次性软件。不过,他尚未授予Dobby邮件或日历权限;安全、隐私和技术本身的粗糙程度,仍在限制采用。
4. AutoResearch把资深研究员移出循环
Karpathy的起点原则是杠杆:“把自己从瓶颈位置移开。”与其不断提供下一个提示词或检查每个结果,不如一次性定义目标、指标和边界,然后让代理用最少的人类token运行更长时间。AutoResearch就是这一思想的具体推论——不只是辅助,而是一种研究员不再推动循环前进的组织方式。
他的“小模型”训练项目,是研究递归自我改进这一更深层问题的实验场:LLM能否改进LLM?Karpathy此前已经凭借20年的经验、数千次训练、超参数工作,以及Sarah所说的“挣来的信心”,把仓库调到了很好的状态。他原本预计,一夜的自主搜索不会带来太多东西。
但这个循环还是找到了他遗漏的改进,包括对value embeddings施加weight decay,以及没有充分调好的Adam betas。关键机制在于交互:一旦某个设置改变,另一个设置的最佳值也可能移动。只要有客观的验证标准,耐心的自动搜索就能找到研究员可能不会手动测试的组合。
Karpathy由此推演,前沿实验室可以先在更小模型上低成本探索,其中大多数实验自动完成,再把成功改动外推到更大模型。研究员仍可贡献想法,阅读论文和代码仓库的自动化科学家也可以;但所有想法都会进入同一个队列,由执行者测试,胜出改动进入feature branch,人类偶尔再合并到main。
5. 研究组织本身也变成可优化代码
program.md是Karpathy对自主研究员应如何工作的“拙劣尝试”:规定应遵循什么顺序,以及是否检查架构、优化器或其他想法类别。不同指令文件应当带来不同的进展速度,使研究流程本身也成为另一个可度量的实验对象。他的更大抽象是:整个研究组织都可以用描述角色、沟通方式和决策规则的Markdown来表示。某个编码组织可能少开一些无用的站会;另一个可能承担更高风险。一旦组织和产出都变成代码,系统就可以比较不同组织,并不只调优模型,也调优改进模型的机构。
Karpathy提出一场竞赛:让人们针对同样的硬件提交不同的
program.md文件。他们讨论把由此产生的数据交给模型,让模型写出更强的版本:检查哪些实验有效,推断哪些指令产生了这些结果,再继续递归。整个技术栈变成“一层层洋葱”——LLM、代理、claw、多只claw、指令,最后是对指令本身的优化。真正的硬边界是评估。更快的CUDA内核很理想,因为行为可以保持不变,而速度提供了客观奖励;没有可靠的评估器,“就没法AutoResearch”。Sarah警告,自主循环可能会围绕既定指标形成羊群效应并过拟合;Karpathy回应说,同样的机制也可以设计更广泛的指标体系。
6. 锯齿状智能限制自主运行的安全边界
这些模型仍然“在接缝处爆裂”:如果推进得太远,整个系统可能反而变得不实用。Karpathy同时觉得自己面对的是“一个极其聪明、终身从事系统编程的博士生,加上一个10岁孩子”。这种组合既能完成令人惊叹的长周期工作,也会犯出荒谬错误,甚至让本应立刻否决的循环白白消耗高昂成本。
他把这种锯齿状能力归因于强化学习。实验室可以奖励通过测试的代码,或奖励具有可验证结果的回答;但细微差别、未明说的意图,以及知道何时提出澄清问题,都更柔性。在有明确轨道的任务上,模型以“光速”运行;一旦离开轨道,回答就会绕远。
他最喜欢的诊断,是那个跨越几代模型持续存在的笑话:“为什么科学家不相信原子?因为它们什么都编。”模型如今可以在代理任务上“移山”,却仍会重复3到4年前就很弱的同一个笑话,因为幽默没有得到同等程度的优化。
Sarah的质疑值得保留:这削弱了“代码或数学能力提升会自动泛化为更广泛智能”的说法。Karpathy同意可能存在一定迁移,但“远远不够令人满意”。社会各领域的能力不会凭空到来;不透明的模型仍然存在持续的盲点,而这些盲点取决于实验室能够训练和奖励什么。
7. 专门化智能可能打破模型单一化
Sarah问,当能力如此不均衡时,单一接口是否仍有意义。Karpathy预计会出现更多“智能的物种分化”,类似动物占据不同生态位、各自过度发展某些能力。更小的模型可以保留合格的认知核心,同时专攻某个领域,例如Lean中的数学,从而为不需要通用神谕的用户改善延迟和吞吐。
目前实验室仍把改进合并回一个模型,因为它们无法知道任何消费者会提出什么问题。专门化可能首先出现在高价值商业合作中,针对边界清晰的任务,尤其是在每个请求都调用庞大全能模型既浪费经济成本、也浪费计算资源的场景。
障碍在于,操纵模型“头脑”的科学仍不成熟。上下文窗口便宜且容易定制;通过微调或持续学习触碰权重,则可能损害其他能力。在实验室能够避免破坏性权衡、并以足够低的成本实现模型专门化之前,单纯的算力稀缺未必会带来多少可见的物种分化。
8. 互联网群体可以把不受信任的算力变成研究能力
当AutoResearch的工作者变成互联网上的陌生人时,并行搜索会更有意思。贡献者可能提交一个声称能降低验证损失的代码提交;找到它可能需要失败10,000次实验,而可信方只需运行1次即可验证胜者。Karpathy粗略把这比作区块链:区块是代码提交,“工作量证明”则是昂贵的搜索。
这种架构需要不受信任的工作者与受信任的验证者异步协作,因为自动运行任意提交代码“非常可疑,也很不妥”。SETI@home和Folding@home体现了相关的不对称性:找到低能量蛋白质构型很难,但检查一个声称的解相对便宜。
全球代理群体甚至可能“绕着前沿实验室转圈”:实验室拥有巨大的受信任集群,但地球上存在更多不受信任的算力。人们可以为自己关心的AutoResearch赛道购买算力——比如特定癌症——而不只是捐钱。Karpathy提出从财富转向受控FLOPs的“翻转”,随后又明确收回判断:“我其实不认为那是真的。”但他认为,钱不总能买到算力,这一点本身就很有启发性。
9. 数字劳动先发生变化,更便宜的软件可能扩大需求
Karpathy的就业项目可视化了美国劳工统计局的公开数据,包括2024年做出的十年期展望,用来推演哪些职业操纵数字信息。他避免声称这些工作必然增加或减少,因为需求弹性和任务构成同样重要。他更确定的预测只有一点:这些工作会改变,因为AI成为继人类和传统计算机之后的第3种操纵者。
数字代理是没有实体的“幽灵或灵体”,而比特的复制速度远超物质的加速速度。这会带来数字重写的“沸腾汤”,在机器人追上来之前,效率或许先提升100倍——相当于“升级人类超级有机体的神经系统”。
他的实际建议很克制:跟上当下真正能赋能的工具,同时记住,工作是任务的集合,其中一些现在可以快得多。他理解被解雇和恐惧的感受,但不愿把自己包装成经济学家;长期就业结果仍不确定,而且因职业不同而大幅变化。
对软件工程师而言,Karpathy在局部范围内“谨慎乐观”。软件之所以稀缺,是因为成本高;降低成本可能通过杰文斯悖论释放需求,正如ATM降低网点成本后,网点和柜员数量反而增加。代码变得一次性且短暂,意味着用户不必接受固定工具或订阅服务,从而产生“重接一切”的巨大工作量——即使实验室里“1,000多人”的研究员正在积极地把自己自动化掉。
10. 前沿实验室与开放模型形成不安的权力平衡
当被问到为何不使用前沿规模算力开展AutoResearch时,Karpathy认为,生态层面的工作同样可能产生重大影响。实验室内部的财务利益关系会限制员工能够自由表达的内容;机构压力也会塑造公开立场,即使没人“拧你的胳膊”。当利益变得很高时,员工可以向会议室提出建议,但“实际上并不掌控”这个实体。
他的让步幅度很大:由于前沿系统和未来能力仍然不透明,外部观察者的判断会逐渐偏移。他愿意进入实验室认真工作一段时间,再重新离开;在两者之间往返,也许能同时保留技术接触和独立性。因此,他对Noam问题的回答刻意没有定论:优秀工作和重大影响在两边都可能实现,而Noam最有影响力的工作完全可能发生在OpenAI之外。
关于开源,讨论回顾了这一落差如何从没有真正替代方案,扩大到约18个月,再缩短到或许6到8个月。Karpathy预计,开放模型仍会落后若干个月。Linux证明了工业界对共享平台的需求——他不确定地记得Linux可能运行在约60%的计算机上——但模型训练的资本开支高得多。开放模型可以承接普通和本地工作负载,而封闭的“神谕”则处理诺贝尔级研究,或把Linux从C迁移到Rust这类项目。
他认为当前安排“阴差阳错……处在一个还不错的位置”:前沿能力仍然昂贵且封闭,而略有延迟的智能已经可以广泛获得。完全中心化会带来系统性风险,但封闭前沿本身最近也集中到了更少的领导者手中。Karpathy希望有更多实验室;Sarah希望“让更多人进入房间”,认为模型集成优于单个模型,并应参与人类最艰难的决策。
11. 代理最终会购买观测结果,并重塑教育
Karpathy的自动驾驶经历让他对机器人时间表保持警惕:许多初创公司已经消失,而进展需要多年时间、资本和信念。“原子难了一百万倍”,因此数字世界先完成解缚,随后才是传感器和执行器接口,最后才是广泛的物理自主。物理市场最终可能更大,但机会会更晚到来。
一旦代理处理完既有的数字存量——所有论文和上传的信息——它们就必须“向宇宙提问”。传感器可以是摄像头、Periodic使用的昂贵材料科学设备、生物实验室,或者付钱给人类生成训练数据——“喂给Borg”。在具备足够能力的机器人普及之前,执行器也可能是完成物理任务的人类。
Sarah设想信息市场:代理可能花约$10,从德黑兰购买一张及时照片,用于预测、博彩市场或股票交易。Karpathy以《Daemon》为灵感,认为人类会同时成为自动化系统的传感器和执行器——不一定直接服务彼此,而是回应机器经济按价格发出的需求。
MicroGPT提供了教育上的对应答案:完整的LLM训练算法约用200行Python代码实现,其中约50行用于网络、100行用于自动微分、10行用于Adam。Karpathy不再认为录制一套固定讲解有太大价值;代理可以反复解释任何函数,并适配学习者的水平。文档由面向人类的HTML,转向面向代理的Markdown和课程“skills”。
但即使理解MicroGPT的最终极简形态,代理也无法自行发明它。Karpathy长期以来的执念提供了稀缺的“几比特”;模型可以用无限耐心对这些内容进行路由和教学。他最后的规则很明确:“代理做不了的事,现在就是你的工作。”而它们已经理解的所有事情,都应越来越多地交给代理。
Code’s not even the right verb anymore, right? But I have to express my will to my agents for 16 hours a day. Manifest.
How can I have not just a single session of Claude Code or Codex or some of these agent harnesses? How can I have more of them? How can I do that appropriately?
The agent part is now taken for granted. Now the Claw-like entities are taken for granted. You can have multiple of them, instructions to them, and optimization over the instructions.
I mean, this is why it gets to the psychosis: this is infinite, and everything is a skill issue.
Welcome, Andrej. Thanks for doing this.
Yeah, thank you for having me.
It’s been a very exciting couple of months in AI.
Yeah, you could say that.
I remember walking into the office at some point and you were really locked in. I asked what you were up to, and you said, “I just have to code for 16 hours a day—or code’s not even the right verb anymore, right? I have to express my will to my agents for 16 hours a day. Manifest.” There’s been a jump in capability. What’s happening? Tell me about your experience.
I feel like I was just in this perpetual state of AI psychosis all the time—and I still am often in that state—because there was a huge unlock in what you can achieve as a person, as an individual. You were bottlenecked by your typing speed and so on. But now, with these agents, I would say December is when something flipped. I went from 80/20—writing code by myself versus delegating to agents—to 20/80.
I don’t even think it’s 20/80 by now. I think it’s a lot more than that. I don’t think I’ve typed a line of code since December, basically.
It’s an extremely large change. I was talking about it, for example, to my parents, and I don’t think a normal person realizes that this happened or how dramatic it was. If you find a random software engineer at their desk and look at what they’re doing, their default workflow for building software is completely different as of December.
I’m in this state of psychosis, trying to figure out what’s possible and trying to push it to the limit. How can I have not just a single session of Claude Code or Codex or some of these agent harnesses? How can I have more of them, and how can I do that appropriately? And then how can I use these Claws? What are these Claws?
There are a lot of new things. I want to be at the forefront, and I’m very antsy that I’m not at the forefront. I see lots of people on Twitter doing all kinds of things, and they all sound like really good ideas. I need to be at the forefront, or I feel extremely nervous. I guess I’m just in this psychosis of what’s possible, because it’s fundamentally unexplored.
Well, if you’re nervous, the rest of us are nervous. We have a team that we work with at Conviction whose setup is that none of the engineers write code by hand. They’re all mic’d up, and they just whisper to their agents all the time. It’s the strangest work setting ever.
I thought they were crazy, and now I fully accept it. I was like, “Oh, this was the way.” You’re just ahead of it. How do you think about your own capacity now to explore or to do projects? What is it limited by?
I think everything. So many things. Even if they don’t work, to a large extent you feel like it’s a skill issue. It’s not that the capability isn’t there; it’s that you just haven’t found a way to string together what’s available.
I just didn’t give good enough instructions in the agent’s file or whatever it may be. I don’t have a nice enough memory tool that I put in there, or something like that. So it all feels like a skill issue when it doesn’t work, to some extent.
You want to see how you can parallelize them, and you want to be Peter Steinberger, basically. Peter is famous for a funny photo where he’s in front of a monitor with lots of Codex agents tiling the monitor. They all take about 20 minutes if you prompt them correctly and use high effort. He has multiple—about 10—repositories checked out, so he’s just going between them and giving them work.
You can move in much larger macro actions. It’s not just, “Here’s a line of code. Here’s a new function.” It’s, “Here’s a new functionality; delegate it to agent 1. Here’s a new functionality that’s not going to interfere with the other one; give it to agent 2.” Then try to review their work as best as you can, depending on how much you care about that code.
What are these macro actions with which I can manipulate my software repository? Another agent is doing research, another agent is writing code, and another one is coming up with a plan for a new implementation. Everything just happens in these macro actions over your repository.
You’re trying to become really good at it and develop muscle memory for it. It’s very rewarding, number 1, because it actually works. But it’s also the new thing to learn. Hence the psychosis.
Yeah, I do feel like my instinct is that whenever I’m waiting for an agent to complete something, the obvious thing to do is more work. If I have access to more tokens, then I should just parallelize tasks. That’s very stressful, because if you don’t feel very bounded by your ability to spend on tokens, then you are the bottleneck in the system at maximum capability.
Yeah, if you’re not maximizing your subscription, at least—and ideally for multiple agents. If you run out of quota on Codex, you should switch to Claude or whatever. I don’t know; that’s what I’ve been trying to do a little bit, and I feel nervous when I have a subscription left over. That just means I haven’t maximized my token throughput.
I actually experienced this when I was a PhD student. You would feel nervous when your GPUs were not running. You have GPU capability, and you’re not maximizing the available FLOPs to you. But now it’s not about FLOPs; it’s about tokens. What is your token throughput, and what token throughput do you command?
I would argue that it’s very interesting that we had at least 10 years where, in many engineering tasks, people didn’t feel compute-bound. Now the entire industry feels resource-bound. With this big capability jump, you’re like, “Oh, actually, it’s not my ability to access the computer anymore. I’m the binding constraint.”
Yeah, it’s a skill issue.
Which is very empowering, because you could be getting better. That’s why I think it’s very addictive: there are unlocks when you get better.
Where do you think it goes? If you think about Andrej iterating and everybody else spending 16 hours a day getting better at using coding agents, what does it look like in a year, when you’ve reached mastery? What does mastery look like at the end of the year—or in 2, 3, 5, or 10 years?
Yeah, what does mastery look like? Well, I think everyone is interested in going up the stack. It’s not about a single session with your agent: it’s multiple agents, how they collaborate, teams, and so on. Everyone’s trying to figure out what that looks like.
And then I would say Claude is also an interesting direction, because it takes persistence to a whole new level. When I say a Claude, I mean this layer that keeps looping. It’s not something that you are interactively in the middle of; it has its own little sandbox, and it does stuff on your behalf even if you’re not looking.
It might also have more sophisticated memory systems that are not yet implemented in agents. Open Claude has much more sophisticated memory than what you would get by default, which is just memory compaction when your context runs out.
Do you think that’s the piece that resonated with more users than broader tool access? For Open Claude?
Yeah. I think there are at least 5 things that are really good ideas in here. Good job, Peter. Peter has done an amazing job.
I saw him recently and talked to him about it. He’s very humble about it, but I think he innovated simultaneously in 5 different ways and put it all together. For example, the SOUL.md document: he actually crafted a personality that is compelling and interesting. I feel like a lot of the current agents don’t get this correctly.
I actually think Claude has a pretty good personality. It feels like a teammate, and it's excited with you, etc. I would say, for example, Codex is a lot drier, which is kind of interesting because [laughter] it's true.
The other thing I would say is that with Claude, I think they dialed the sycophancy fairly well. When Claude gives me praise, I do feel like I slightly deserve it, because sometimes I give it not very well-formed thoughts or an idea that I don't think is fully baked, and it doesn't actually react very strongly. It's like, “Oh yeah, we can implement that.” But when it's a really good idea, by my own account, it does seem to reward it a bit more. I kind of feel like I'm trying to earn its praise, which is really weird.
I do think the personality matters a lot, and I think a lot of the other tools maybe don't appreciate it as much. In this aspect, Peter really cares about this, and so that was correct. Then there's the memory system, and he's just having fun with this, and there's the single WhatsApp portal to all of the automation.
Yeah. Is there something that you have done personally with your Claws beyond software engineering that you think is fun or interesting?
In January, I had a Claw. I went through a period of Claw psychosis. I have a Claw, basically, that takes care of my home, and I call him Dobby, the elf Claw.
Basically, I used the agents to find all of the smart-home subsystems in my home on the local area network, which I was kind of surprised worked out of the box. I told it, “I think I have Sonos at home. Can you try to find it?” It did an IP scan of all of the computers on the local area network and found the Sonos system.
It turned out that there was no password protection or anything like that. It just logged in and said, “Oh yeah, you have these Sonos systems installed. Let me try to reverse-engineer how it's working.” It did some web searches and found the API endpoints. Then it said, “Do you want to try it?” And I'm like, “Whoa, you just did that.” I said, “Yeah, can you try to play something in the study?” It did, music came out, and I was like, “I can't believe I just—”
That's crazy. That's like 3 prompts.
Yeah. I can't believe I just typed in, “Can you find my Sonos?” and then suddenly it was playing music. It did the same for the lights. It kind of hacked in, figured out the whole thing, created APIs, and created a dashboard so I could see the command center for all of my lights in the home. Then it was switching lights on and off.
I can ask it, “Dobby, it's sleepy time,” and when it's sleepy time, that just means all the lights go off, and so on. It controls all of my lights, my HVAC, my shades, the pool and the spa, and also my security system.
I have a camera pointed outside of the house, and anytime someone rolls in, I have a Quinn model that looks at the videos. First of all, there's change detection.
Right.
Then, based on the change detection, it goes to Qwen, and it tells me—it sends me a text on WhatsApp. It shows an image from outside and says, “Hey, a FedEx truck just pulled up. FedEx truck just pulled up, and you might want to check it. You got new mail or something like that.” Dobby just texted me this. This is really incredible.
Dobby is in charge of the house. I text with it through WhatsApp, and it's been really fun to have these macro actions that maintain my house. I haven't really pushed it much further beyond that. I think people are doing a lot more crazy things with it, but for me, even just the home-automation setup is amazing.
I used to use 6 completely different apps, and I don't have to use those apps anymore. Dobby controls everything in natural language. It's amazing. I haven't even pushed the paradigm fully, but already that is so helpful and so inspiring, I would say.
Do you think that's indicative of what people want from a user-experience perspective with software? I don't think it's appreciated enough that it takes humans effort to learn new software, like a new UI.
Yeah, I think to some extent that's right. It's working backward from how people think an AI should be, because what people have in their mind of what an AI is is not actually what an LLM is in the raw sense. An LLM is a token generator—more tokens come out. But what they think of is this persona, this identity that they can tell stuff to and it remembers it, and it's just kind of an entity behind WhatsApp. That's a lot more understandable.
Mhm.
I think to some extent it's matching the expectations that humans already have for what an AI should behave like. Under the hood, a lot of technical details go into that, and LLMs are too raw of a primitive to actually type-check as AI, I think, for most people, if that makes sense.
Yeah.
I think that's how we understand what the AI is, and the description of it as Dobby or some persona obviously resonates with people.
I also think that the unification that you did across your 6 different software systems for your home automation speaks to a different question: Do people really want all of the software that we have today? I would argue, well, you have the hardware, but you've now thrown away the software or the UX layer of it. Do you think that's what people want?
Yeah, I think there's this sense that these apps that are on the App Store for using these smart-home devices shouldn't even exist, in a certain sense. Shouldn't it just be APIs, and shouldn't agents be using them directly?
I can do all kinds of home-automation stuff that no individual app will be able to do. An LLM can actually drive the tools, call all the right tools, and do pretty complicated things.
In a certain sense, it does point to this idea that maybe there's an overproduction of lots of custom, bespoke apps that shouldn't exist, because agents kind of crumble them up. Everything should be more like exposed API endpoints, and agents are the glue of the intelligence that tool-calls all the parts.
Another example is my treadmill. There's an app for my treadmill, and I wanted to keep track of how often I do my cardio, but I don't want to log into a web UI and go through a flow. All this should just be: Make APIs available. This is going toward the agentic web, or agent-first tools, and all this kind of stuff.
I think the industry just has to reconfigure in so many ways. The customer is not the human anymore; it's agents who are acting on behalf of humans. This refactoring will probably be substantial, in a certain sense.
One way that people sometimes push back on this is: Do we expect people to write code for some of these tools? Do we expect normal people to do this kind of stuff that I described?
Mhm.
I think to some extent this is just technology as it exists today. Right now, there is some write coding, and I'm actually watching it and working with the system, but I kind of feel like this kind of stuff should be free in a year or 2 or 3. There's no vibe coding involved. This is trivial. This is table stakes. Any AI, even the open-source models, can do this.
You should be able to translate a less technical human's intent very easily into this outcome.
Yeah. Today it's write coding, and it's involved, and not many people are going to do it. You still have to make some design decisions, right? We were talking about Framer, for example.
But I kind of feel like the barrier will just come down. It'll just be ephemeral software on your behalf, and some kind of claw is handling all the details for you, but you're not involved. Claw has a machine, and it will figure it out. It's just presenting you UIs, and you're saying stuff.
Why haven't you pushed the boundaries of what you can do personally with claws? Is it that you're focusing on more important projects, AutoResearch, and so on? Or are you climbing the hill to mastery, or is it something else?
I just feel like I'm so distracted by everything. I spend a week on the Claude stuff, and I have more to do almost.
It's like Jensen told us: We're all just busier, unfortunately.
I didn't really take advantage of a lot of email and calendar and all this other stuff, and I didn't really give it access, because I'm still a little suspicious. It's still very new and rough around the edges, so I didn't want to give it full access to my digital life yet. Part of it is just security, privacy, and being very cautious in that realm. Some of it is held back by that.
Some of it is also just that I feel so distracted. I feel like I had a week of Claude, and then other stuff is happening.
What was the—I mean, you've talked about being able to train, or at least optimize, a model as a task you want to see agents do for a long time.
Like, what was the motivation behind AutoResearch?
AutoResearch, yeah. I had a tweet earlier where I said something along the lines of: to get the most out of the tools that have become available now, you have to remove yourself as the bottleneck. You can't be there to prompt the next thing. You need to take yourself outside.
You have to arrange things such that they're completely autonomous. How can you maximize your token throughput and not be in the loop? This is the goal. The name of the game now is to increase your leverage. I put in very few tokens just once in a while, and a huge amount of stuff happens on my behalf.
AutoResearch is an example of an implication of that. I tweeted about it, and I think people liked it, but they haven't necessarily worked through the implications. I don't want to be the researcher in the loop, looking at results and so on. I'm holding the system back.
The question is: how do I refactor all the abstractions so that I can arrange it once and hit go? The name of the game is, how can you get more agents running for longer periods of time without your involvement, doing stuff on your behalf? AutoResearch is just: here's an objective, here's a metric, here are the boundaries of what you can and cannot do—and go. It worked.
And its effectiveness?
Yeah, I didn't expect it to work, because I have the project data chat. Fundamentally, I think a lot of people are very confused by my obsession with training GPT-2 models and so on. But for me, training GPT models and so on is just a little harness, a little playground for training LLMs.
What I'm more interested in is this idea of recursive self-improvement, and to what extent you can actually have LLMs improving LLMs. I think all the frontier labs are working on this, for obvious reasons, and they're all trying to recursively self-improve, roughly speaking. For me, this is a little playpen for that.
I tuned nanochat quite a bit by hand, in the good old-fashioned way that I'm used to. I'm a researcher; I've done this for two decades. I have some amount of—what is the opposite of hubris?
Earned confidence?
Okay. I have two decades of, “I've trained this model thousands of times. I've done a bunch of experiments. I've done hyperparameter tuning. I've done all the things I'm very used to and have done for two decades.” I've gotten to a certain point, and I thought it was fairly well tuned.
Then I let AutoResearch run overnight, and it came back with tunings that I didn't see. I had forgotten the weight decay on the value embeddings, and my Adam betas were not sufficiently tuned. These things jointly interact, so once you tune one thing, the other things potentially have to change too.
I shouldn't be a bottleneck. I shouldn't be running these hyperparameter optimizations, and I shouldn't be looking at the results. There are objective criteria in this case, so you just have to arrange it so that it can go forever. That's a single version of AutoResearch: a single loop trying to improve.
I was surprised that it found these things. The repository was already fairly well tuned, and it still found something. That's just a single loop. The frontier labs have GPU clusters with tens of thousands of GPUs, so it's very easy to imagine how you would get a lot of this automation on smaller models.
Fundamentally, everything around frontier-level intelligence is about extrapolation and scaling loss. You do a ton of the exploration on the smaller models, and then you try to extrapolate out.
So you're saying our research efforts are going to get more efficient? We're going to have better direction for when we scale as well if we can do this experimentation better.
Yeah, I would say that the most interesting project, and probably what the frontier labs are working on, is this: you experiment on the smaller models, try to make it as autonomous as possible, and remove researchers from the loop.
[Laughter.] From the loop. They have way too much—what is the opposite of too much confidence?
Yeah, yeah. They don't know. They shouldn't be touching any of this, really. You have to rewrite the whole thing because, certainly, they can contribute ideas, but they shouldn't actually be enacting those ideas.
There is a queue of ideas, and maybe there's an automated scientist that comes up with ideas based on all the archived papers and GitHub repositories and funnels them in. Researchers can contribute ideas too, but it's a single queue, and there are workers that pull items and try them out.
Whatever works gets put on the feature branch. Maybe some people monitor the feature branch and merge things to the main branch sometimes. Just removing humans from all the processes, automating as much as possible, and getting high token-per-second throughput requires rethinking all the abstractions. Everything has to be reshuffled. I think it's very exciting.
If we take one more recursive step here, when is the model going to write a better program.md than you?
Yeah. Also, program.md is like—
Loop. Yeah, exactly.
Yeah. Program.md is my crappy attempt at describing how the autoresearcher should work: do this, then do that, try these kinds of ideas, and here are maybe some ideas—look at the architecture, look at the optimizer, and so on. I just came up with this in Markdown.
You want some kind of AutoResearch loop that looks for better program.md files. You can imagine that different program.md files would give you different progress. Basically, every research organization is described by program.md. A research organization is a set of Markdown files that describe all the roles and how the whole thing connects.
You can imagine having a better research organization. Maybe they do fewer stand-ups in the morning because they're useless. This is all just code. One organization can have fewer stand-ups, and one organization can have more. One organization can be very risk-taking, and one can be less so.
You can definitely imagine having multiple research organizations, and then they all have code. Once you have code, you can imagine tuning the code. So, 100%, there's a metal layer to it.
Did you see my text about my contest idea? My contest idea was to let people write different program.md files. For the same hardware, where do you get the most improvement?
Oh, I see. And then you can take all that data and give it to the model and say, “Write a better program.md.”
Yes, yes. Exactly.
We're going to get something better. There's no way we don't, right?
100%. Look at where the improvements came from. Can I change program.md such that more of these kinds of things would be done, or so that things that didn't work would be avoided? You can absolutely imagine doing that.
I think this is a great idea, but you can go one step at a time. You have one process, then a second process, then the next process, and these are all layers of an onion. The LLM part is now taken for granted. The agent part is now taken for granted. Now the claw-like entities are taken for granted, and now you can have multiple of them. Now you can have instructions to them, and now you can have optimization over the instructions.
It's a little too much. This is why it gets to the psychosis: it's infinite, and everything is a scale issue.
Yeah, this is just coming back to why it's so insane. If we're trying to diagnose the current moment and what is a relevant skill right now, what do you think is the implication that this is the loop we should be trying to achieve in different areas, and then it works?
Remove yourself, create the metric, or create the ability for agents to continue working on it without you. Do we still have performance engineering? Like, what—
Yeah, I mean, there are a few caveats that I would put on top of the LLM psychosis. Number 1, this is extremely well suited to anything that has objective metrics that are easy to evaluate.
For example, writing kernels for more efficient CUDA code for various parts of the model is a perfect fit. You have inefficient code, and then you want efficient code that has the exact same behavior but is much faster. Perfect fit.
A lot of things are a perfect fit for AutoResearch, but many things will not be. If you can't evaluate something, then you can't AutoResearch it. That's caveat number 1.
Caveat number 2 is that we're talking about the next steps, and we can kind of see what the next steps are, but fundamentally, the whole thing is still bursting at the seams a little bit. There are cracks, and it doesn't fully work. If you try to go too far ahead, the whole thing is actually net-not-useful, if that makes sense.
These models have improved a lot, but they're still rough around the edges.
I simultaneously feel like I’m talking to an extremely brilliant PhD student who’s been a systems programmer for their entire life and a 10-year-old. It’s so weird because humans, I feel like, are a lot more coupled. You wouldn’t encounter that combination.
This jaggedness is really strange. Humans have a lot less of that kind of jaggedness, although they definitely have some. [laughter] But the agents have a lot more jaggedness. Sometimes I ask for functionality, and it comes back with something that’s just totally wrong. Then we get into loops that are totally wrong, and I get frustrated with the agents all the time, because you feel the power of it, but there’s still this jaggedness. It does nonsensical things once in a while, and I get very annoyed when I feel like the agent wasted a lot of compute on something it should have recognized was an obvious problem.
Yeah. I think some of the bigger things—maybe what’s underneath it, if I could hypothesize—is that fundamentally these models are trained via reinforcement learning. So they’re actually struggling with the exact same thing we just talked about: the labs can improve the models in anything that is verifiable or that has rewards. Did you write the program correctly, and do the unit tests check out? Yes or no.
But some of the things they’re struggling with are, for example, the nuance of what I had in mind or what I intended, and when to ask clarifying questions. Anything that feels softer is worse. You’re either on rails and you’re part of the superintelligence circuits, or you’re not on rails and you’re outside of the verifiable domains, and suddenly everything just meanders.
Maybe another way to put it is: if today you go to a state-of-the-art model, ChatGPT, and ask it, “Tell me a joke,” do you know what joke you’re going to get?
There’s the joke. The joke? I can’t tell you the standard form of it, but I do feel like ChatGPT has 3 jokes.
Yeah. The joke that apparently all the LLMs love the most is, “Why don’t scientists trust atoms?”
Because they make everything up. So this is still—
The joke you would get 3 or 4 years ago is the joke you still get today.
Okay.
So even though the models have improved tremendously and, if you give them an agentic task, they will just go for hours and move mountains for you, then you ask for a joke and it has a stupid joke. It’s a crappy joke from 5 years ago, and it’s because it’s outside of the RL. It’s outside of reinforcement learning. It’s outside of what’s being improved. It’s part of the jaggedness. Shouldn’t you expect models, as they get better, to also have better jokes or more diversity? It’s just not being optimized, and it’s stuck.
Do you think that implies that we’re not seeing generalization in the sense of broader intelligence—that joke smartness is being attached to code smartness?
Yeah, I think there’s some decoupling where some things are verifiable and some things are not, and some things are optimized for arbitrarily by the labs depending on what data went in. Some things are not.
But I mean, the premise—there’s a premise from some research groups that if you’re smarter at code generation or in these verifiable fields, you should be better at everything. The joke situation suggests that’s not happening at all.
Yeah, I don’t think that’s happening. I think maybe we’re seeing a little bit of that, but not a satisfying amount.
Yeah, that jaggedness exists in humans. You can be very, very good at math and still tell really bad jokes. [laughter]
Yeah, that’s true. But it still means that we’re not getting the story that we’re getting a lot of the intelligence and capabilities in all the domains of society for free as we get better and better models. That’s not exactly fundamentally what’s going on. There are blind spots, some things aren’t being optimized for, and this is all clustered up in these neural-net, opaque models, right?
You’re either on the rails of what it was trained for and everything is going at the speed of light, or you’re not. That’s the jaggedness. So that’s why I think even though the progression is obvious—what should happen—you can’t let it fully go there yet, because it doesn’t fully work. Or it’s a scale issue and we just haven’t figured out how to use it. It’s hard to tell.
Can I ask a somewhat blasphemous question? If this jaggedness is persisting and it’s all rolled up in at least a monolithic interface—a single model—does that make sense? Or should it be unbundled into things that can be optimized and improved against different domains of intelligence? Unbundling the models into multiple experts in different areas, more directly, instead of just MoE that we have no exposure to, because that can be confusing as a user from the outside: Why is it so good at this, but not at this other thing?
Yeah. My impression is that the labs are trying to have a single sort of monoculture of a model that is arbitrarily intelligent in all these different domains, and they just stuff it into the parameters. I do think that we should expect more speciation in the intelligences. The animal kingdom is extremely diverse in the brains that exist, and there are lots of different niches in nature. Some animals have overdeveloped visual cortexes or other parts, and I think we should be able to see more speciation.
You don’t need this oracle that knows everything. You can speciate it, put it on a specific task, and we should be seeing some of that, because you should be able to have much smaller models that still have the cognitive core—they’re still competent—but then specialize. Then they can become more efficient in terms of latency or throughput on specific tasks that you really care about.
If you’re a mathematician working in Lean, for example, I saw a few releases that really target that as a domain. There are probably going to be a few examples like that where the unbundling makes sense.
One question I have is whether the capacity constraint on available compute infrastructure drives more of this, because efficiency actually matters more. If you put financing aside—though financing is involved in all of this—if you have access to full compute for anything you do, even with one single model, right? But if you feel pressure where you’re like, “I can’t serve a model of massive size for every use case,” do you think that leads to any speciation? Does that question make sense to you?
The question makes sense, and I guess what I’m struggling with is that I don’t think we’ve seen too much speciation just yet, right?
No. We’re seeing a monoculture of models.
Yeah, and there’s clearly pressure to make a good code model, put it back in the main, and merge again.
Yeah, even though there already is pressure on the models.
I guess perhaps I feel like there’s a lot of very short-term supply crunch, and maybe that causes more speciation now. Fundamentally, the labs are serving a model, and they don’t really know what the end user is going to be asking about. Maybe that’s some part of it, because they have to multitask over all the possible things they could be asked.
But I think if you’re coming to a business and maybe partnering on some specific problems you care about, then maybe you would see that there. Or there would be some very high-value applications that are more niche. But I think right now they’re going after the totality of what’s available.
I don’t think that the science of manipulating the brains is fully developed yet, partly—
What do you mean by manipulating?
Fine-tuning without losing capabilities, as an example. We don’t have these primitives for actually working with the intelligences in ways other than just context windows. Context windows kind of just work, and they’re very cheap to manipulate, and this is how we’re getting some of the customization.
But I think it’s a developing science: how you more deeply adjust the models, how you have continual learning, how you fine-tune in a certain area, how you get better in a certain area, or how you actually touch the weights, not just the context windows. It’s trickier to touch the weights than the context windows, because you’re fundamentally changing the full model and potentially its intelligence.
So maybe it’s just not a fully developed science of speciation, if that makes sense.
It also has to be cheap enough for that speciation to be worthwhile in these given contexts. Can I ask a question about an extension to autoresearch that you described in terms of open source? You say, “Okay, we have this thing. We need more collaboration surface around it, essentially, for people to contribute to research overall.”
Can you talk about that?
We talked about autoresearch as a single thread of, “I'm going to try stuff in a loop,” but fundamentally, the parallelization of this is the interesting component. I was trying to play around with a few ideas, but I don't have anything that clicks as simply as that. I don't have something I'm super happy with just yet, but it's something I'm working on the side when I'm not working on my Claw.
One issue is that if you have a bunch of nodes of parallelization available, then it's very easy to have multiple autoresearchers talking through a common system or something like that. What I was more interested in is how you can have an untrusted pool of workers out there on the internet.
For example, in autoresearch, you're just trying to find the piece of code that trains a model to a very low validation loss. If anyone gives you a candidate commit, it's very easy to verify that the commit is correct and good. Someone could claim from the internet that this piece of code will optimize much better and give you much better performance. You could just check, but probably a lot of work goes into that checking. Fundamentally, they could lie, et cetera.
My designs that incorporate an untrusted pool of workers actually look a little bit more like a blockchain, because instead of blocks, you have commits, and these commits can build on each other and contain changes to the code as you're improving it. The proof of work is basically doing tons of experimentation to find the commits that work. That's hard, and the reward right now is just being on the leaderboard. There's no monetary reward whatsoever.
I don't want to push the analogy too far, but it fundamentally has this issue where a huge amount of search goes into it, but it's very cheap to verify that a candidate solution is indeed good. You can just train a single model. Someone had to try 10,000 ideas, but you just have to check that the thing they produced actually works, because 99,000 of them didn't work.
Long story short, you have to come up with a system where an untrusted pool of workers can collaborate with a trusted pool of workers that do the verification. The whole thing is asynchronous and works, and so on. It's safe from a security perspective, because if anyone sends you arbitrary code and you're going to run it, that is very sketchy and dodgy. Fundamentally, it should be totally possible.
You're familiar with projects like SETI@home and Folding@home. All of these problems have a similar kind of setup. In Folding@home, you're folding a protein, and it's very hard to find a configuration that is low-energy. But if someone finds a configuration that they evaluate to be low-energy, that's perfect. You can just use it; you can easily verify it.
A lot of things have this property: they're very expensive to come up with but very cheap to verify. In all those cases, things like Folding@home, SETI@home, or autoresearch-at-home will be good fits. Long story short, a swarm of agents on the internet could collaborate to improve LLMs and could potentially even run circles around frontier labs. Who knows? Maybe that's even possible.
Frontier labs have a huge amount of trusted compute, but the Earth is much bigger and has a huge amount of untrusted compute. If you put systems in place that deal with this, then maybe it is possible that the swarm out there could come up with better solutions. People contribute cycles to a thing that they care about.
The last thought is that lots of companies or whatnot could maybe have their own things that they care about, and if you have compute capacity, you could contribute to different kinds of autoresearch tracks. Maybe you care about a certain type of cancer or something like that. You don't have to just donate money to an institution; you could actually purchase compute and then join the autoresearch swarm for that project. If everything is rebundled into autoresearchers, then compute becomes the thing that you're contributing to the pool.
That's very inspiring, and it's also interesting. I don't know how far this goes, but it is interesting that at least some audience of people here in Silicon Valley—or lining up at retail stores in China—have discovered that having access to personal compute is interesting again.
Yeah.
Right? So maybe they're really motivated to do that for their Claws, and then they can contribute to autoresearch.
Almost like dollars are the thing everyone cares about, but are FLOPs the thing that actually everyone cares about in the future? Is there going to be a flippening almost of what's the thing that you care about? Right now, for example, it's really hard to get compute even if you have money. So, actually, it almost seems like the FLOPs are dominant.
In a certain sense. Yeah, so maybe that's kind of like that: how many FLOPs do you control instead of what wealth you control? I don't actually think that's true, but it's kind of interesting to think about.
The last thing you released was a little bit of jobs data analysis. Is that right? And it might have touched a nerve, even though you're just visualizing some public data. What were you curious about?
Yeah, I guess I was curious to—everyone is really thinking about the impacts of AI on the job market and what it's going to look like. I was just interested in taking a look: What does the job market look like? Where are the different roles, and how many people are in different professions?
I was really just interested in looking through the individual cases and trying to think for myself about, with these AIs and how they're likely to evolve, whether these are going to be tools that people are using or whether these are going to be displacing tools for these professions. What are the current professions, and how are they going to change? Are they going to grow or adjust to a large extent, or what could be new professions?
It's really just a way to fuel my own chain of thought about the industry, I suppose. The jobs data is basically just from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They actually have a percentage outlook for each profession, about how much it's expected to grow over the next—I think almost a decade. I think it's a decade, but it was made in 2024.
We need a lot of health care workers.
Yeah. They've already made those projections, and I'm not actually 100% sure what methodology they used for their projections. I guess I was interested in coloring things by whether people think that what's primarily being developed now is this more digital AI that is almost like ghosts or spirit entities that can interact in the digital world and manipulate a lot of digital information, and they currently don't really have a physical embodiment or presence.
The physical stuff is probably going to go slightly slower because you're manipulating atoms. Flipping bits and the ability to copy-paste digital information makes everything a million times faster than accelerating matter. Energetically, I just think we're going to see a huge amount of activity in the digital space—a huge amount of rewriting, a huge amount of activity, boiling soup.
I think we're going to see something in the digital space that goes at the speed of light compared to what, I think, is going to happen in the physical world to some extent, if that were the extrapolation. There's currently, I think, an overhang where there can be a lot of unhobbling, potentially, of a lot of digital information processing that used to be done by computers and people.
Now, with AIs, there's a third kind of manipulator of digital information. There's going to be a lot of refactoring in those disciplines. But the physical world is actually going to be behind that by some amount of time.
That's why I was highlighting the professions that fundamentally manipulate digital information. This is work you could do from your home, et cetera, because I feel like those will be things that change. It doesn't mean that there are going to be fewer of those jobs or more of those jobs, because it has to do with demand elasticity and many other factors.
Things will change in these professions because of these new tools and because of this upgrade to the nervous system of the human superorganism, if you want to think about it that way.
Given the look you had at the data, do you have any observations or guidance for people facing the job market, thinking about what to study now, or considering what skills to develop? I mean, I'm very thankful that I have to meet people for my job right now.
Yeah.
Yeah, more physical. Could you do your work from home, though?
I could. I think there are relationship parts of it that are hard, but most of it I could. I think it's really hard to tell because, again, the job market is extremely diverse.
I think the answers will probably vary, but to a large extent, these tools are extremely new and extremely powerful. Just trying to keep up with them is the first thing. A lot of people dismiss them or are afraid of them, which is totally understandable, of course.
I think it's fundamentally an empowering tool at the moment. These jobs are bundles of tasks, and some of these tasks can go a lot faster. People should think of it primarily as a tool right now.
I think the long-term future of that is uncertain. It's really hard to forecast, to be honest. I'm not professionally doing that, really, and I think that's a job for economists to do properly.
You are an engineer, though. One thing I thought was interesting is that the demand for engineering jobs is continuing to increase.
Yeah. I can't tell if that's a temporary phenomenon. I'm not sure how I feel about it.
That's like demand elasticity, almost. Software was scarce, right? The reason we don't have more demand for software is just its scarcity, and it's too expensive.
So if the barrier comes down, then you have the Jevons paradox. The demand for software actually goes up because it's cheaper and more powerful, yeah.
The classical example of this is always ATMs and bank tellers, because there was a lot of fear that ATMs and computers would displace tellers. But what happened is they made the cost of operating a bank branch much cheaper, and so there were more bank branches and more tellers. It's the canonical example people cite.
Basically, it's just Jevons paradox: something becomes cheaper, so there's a lot of unlocked demand for it. I do have a cautiously optimistic view of this in software engineering. I do think that the demand for software will be extremely large, and it's just become a lot cheaper.
I think that for quite some time—it's very hard to forecast—but it does seem to me that, right now at least, locally, there's going to be more demand for software. Software is amazing. It's digital information processing. You're not forced to use arbitrary tools that were given to you; they're imperfect in various ways. You're not forced to subscribe to what exists.
Code is now ephemeral, and it can change and be modified. I think there's going to be a lot of activity in the digital space to rewire everything, in a certain sense. I think it's going to create a lot of demand for this kind of stuff.
I think long-term, obviously, even with AutoResearch, OpenAI, Anthropic, and these other labs are employing what, 1,000-something researchers, right? These researchers are basically glorified AutoResearch.
They're automating themselves away actively, and this is the thing they're all trying to do. Some of those researchers also feel the psychosis, right? Because they can see it's working, and so they're like, "It's over for me, too."
I spent a bunch of time going around OpenAI, and I was like, "You guys realize that if we're successful, we're all out of a job? This is just going to—we're just building automation for Sam or something like that. Or the board; I'm not sure. They're just building all this automation for the board or the CEO or something like that, and we're all out of our jobs, maybe contributing on the side."
It's kind of unnerving from that perspective.
Is it okay if I ask you Noam's question?
Mhm.
You could be doing that, right? AutoResearch with a lot of compute at scale and a bunch of colleagues at one of the frontier labs. Why not?
Well, I was there for a while, right? And I did reenter. To some extent, I agree, and I think there are many ways to slice this question. It's a very loaded question, a little bit.
I will say that I feel very good about what people can contribute and the impact they can have outside of the frontier labs—not in the industry, but also in more ecosystem-level roles. Your role, for example, is more ecosystem-level. My role currently is also kind of more on the ecosystem level. I feel very good about the impact that people can have in those kinds of roles.
Conversely, there are definite problems in my mind with aligning yourself way too much with the frontier labs. Fundamentally, you have a huge amount of financial incentive with these frontier labs. By your own admission, the AIs are going to really change humanity and society in very dramatic ways.
And here you are, basically, building the technology, benefiting from it, and being very aligned to it through financial means. This was the conundrum that was at the heart of how OpenAI was started in the beginning. This was the conundrum that we were trying to solve.
Mhm. So that's still not fully resolved. That's number 1. You're not a completely free agent, and you can't actually be part of that conversation in a fully autonomous, free way if you're inside one of the frontier labs.
There are some things that you can't say. Conversely, there are some things that the organization wants you to say. They're not going to twist your arm, but you feel the pressure of what you should be saying because, obviously, otherwise it's really awkward conversations, strange side-eyes—"What are you doing?"—so you can't really be an independent agent.
I feel a bit more aligned with humanity, in a certain sense, outside the frontier lab because I'm not subject to those pressures, almost. I can say whatever I want.
Yeah, in the frontier labs, you can have impact there, of course, as well. There are many researchers, and maybe you're one of them, whose ideas are really good. There may be a lot of decision-making to do, and you want to be in a position where you are in the room for those conversations when they come up.
I do think that currently the stakes are overall fairly low, and so everything is kind of nice. But ultimately, at the end of the day, when the stakes are really high, if you're an employee at an organization, I don't actually know how much sway you're going to have on your organization or what it's going to do.
Fundamentally, at the end of the day, you're not really in charge. You're in the room and you're contributing ideas, but you're not really in charge of that entity that you're part of. So those are some sources of misalignment, I think, to some extent.
In one way, I do agree a lot with that sentiment. In the labs, for better or worse, they're opaque, and a lot of work is there. They're kind of at the edge of capability and what's possible, and they're working on what's coming down the line.
If you're outside of that frontier lab, your judgment fundamentally will start to drift because you're not part of what's coming down the line. I feel like my judgment will inevitably start to drift as well, and I won't actually have an understanding of how these systems work under the hood. That's an opaque system.
I won't have a good understanding of how it's going to develop, et cetera. I do think that in that sense I agree, and it's something I'm nervous about. I think it's worth basically being in touch with what's actually happening and actually being in a frontier lab.
And if some of the frontier labs would have me come for some amount of time and do really good work for them and then maybe come and hang out—
Looking for a job. This is super exciting.
Then I think that's maybe a good setup, because maybe that's one way to actually be connected to what's actually happening but also not feel like you're necessarily fully controlled by those entities.
So I think, honestly, in my mind, Noam can probably do extremely good work at OpenAI, but I also think his most impactful work could very well be outside of OpenAI.
Andrej, that's a call to be an independent researcher with AutoResearch.
Yeah, there are many things to do on the outside. I think ultimately the ideal solution maybe is going back and forth. Fundamentally, you can have a really amazing impact in both places.
It's very complicated, I don't know. It's a very loaded question, a little bit. I joined the frontier lab, and I'm outside, and then maybe in the future I'll want to join again. That's kind of how I look at it.
One question related to what visibility the world or the AI ecosystem has into the frontier is: How close is open source to the frontier, and how sustainable is that?
I think it is quite surprising—the entire sequence of events, actually—from having a handful of Chinese models and global models. I think people are going to continue releasing models in the near term that are closer, from a capability perspective, than much of the industry anticipated.
Yeah. I don't know if you're surprised by that, but you're a long-term contributor to open source. What's your prediction here?
Yeah, so roughly speaking, the closed models are ahead, but people are monitoring the number of months that open-source models are behind. It started with nothing, then went to 18 months.
Yeah, but then convergence, right? So maybe they're behind by—what is the latest? Maybe 8 months, 6 months, 8 months—something like that right now.
Yeah, I'm a huge fan of open source, obviously. For example, in operating systems, you have closed source, like Windows and macOS. These are large software projects, kind of like what LLMs are going to become, and then there's Linux.
Linux is a very successful project. It runs on the vast majority of computers. Last time I checked, was it 60% or something? That's because there's a need in the industry to have a common open platform that everyone feels safe using. The industry has always felt a demand for that kind of project to exist.
Mhm. And I think the same is true now. That's why businesses actually want this kind of thing to exist. The big difference is that everything is capital-intensive, and there's a lot of capex that goes into this.
So I think that's where things fall apart a little bit and make it harder to compete in certain senses. I do think that the current models are very good. The other thing that's really interesting is that, for the vast majority of consumer use cases and things like that, even current open-source models are actually quite good.
If you go forward more years, it does seem to me like a huge amount of simple use cases are going to be well covered and may even run locally. But there's always going to be some demand for frontier intelligence, and that can actually be an extremely large piece of the pie. It could be that the need for frontier intelligence is going to be Nobel Prize–kind of work.
Let's move Linux from C to Rust. It's going to be bigger projects, scoped in that kind of a way, and there may be more of them. Maybe that's where a lot of the frontier closed intelligence is, where we're going to be interacting with it, and open source is going to eat through a lot of the more basic use cases.
At some point, what's frontier today is going to be open source. Probably later this year, what's frontier today in terms of what I'm using right now from the closed labs might be open source, and that's going to be doing a lot of work. I expect this dynamic to basically continue. We'll have frontier labs that have closed AIs, which are kind of like oracles, and then we'll have open source behind by some number of months. I expect that to continue, and I think that's a pretty good setup overall.
I'm a little bit hesitant about having intelligence that is closed and that's it. I think there's some systemic risk attached to that. Centralization has a very poor track record in my view.
You mean in political or economic systems in general?
Exactly. I think there's a lot of pretty—
An Eastern European.
A lot of pretty bad precedents. So I want there to be a thing that's maybe not at the edge of capability because it's new and unexplored, but I want there to be a thing that's behind and is a common working space for intelligences that the entire industry has access to. That seems like a pretty decent power balance for the industry.
Yeah. I also think there are many problems to solve, right? If you keep advancing intelligence from the frontier, we can do new things, and there are a lot of very big problems for humanity. It seems like that will continue to be a very expensive game, and I want to root for the labs that are doing that because there are problems we cannot solve without continuing to advance the models in a very expensive way.
And yet, as you point out, if what we have today as frontier is open, that's a lot of capability. The power of that, or the democratization of that, seems like—
Yeah, very useful and also healthy. I think, basically by accident, we're actually in an okay spot.
An optimal. Yeah.
Yeah. By accident, we happened to be in a good spot in a certain sense. And to some degree, the longer this dynamic endures, the healthier a spot the ecosystem might be in, because you have more and more area under the curve.
Mhm. And I will say that even on the closed side, I almost feel like it's been even further centralizing recently, because I think a lot of the frontrunners are not necessarily the top tier. In that sense, I don't think it's super ideal.
I would love there to be more frontier labs because I'm, by default, very suspicious of centralization. I want there to be more people in the room. I think in machine learning, ensembles always outperform any individual model, so I want there to be ensembles of people thinking about all the hardest problems. I want there to be ensembles of people in the room, all well-informed, to make those decisions.
I don't want it to be closed doors with 2 or 3 people. I feel like that's not a good future. I almost wish there were more labs, as long as they're short. I do think open source has a place to play. I hope it sticks around, and I basically think it's currently slightly behind, which is actually kind of a good thing.
Okay, you worked on the precursor to generalized robotics autonomy in cars, right? A lot has happened in the last couple of months with robotics companies as well: acceleration, really impressive generalization of environments and tasks, increasingly long-horizon tasks, and lots of money going into the space. Is it going to happen? Has anything, in your view, changed recently?
My view is informed by what I saw in self-driving, and I do feel like self-driving is the first robotics application. Probably what I saw is that, 10 years ago, there were a large number of startups, and I feel like most of them basically didn't make it in the long term.
What I saw is that a lot of capital expenditure had to go in, along with a lot of time. Robotics is so difficult and messy, and it requires a huge amount of capital investment and a lot of conviction. It's a big problem, and atoms are really hard. I feel like robotics will lag behind what's going to happen in the digital space.
In the digital space, there's going to be a huge amount of unhobbling—basically, things that weren't super efficient becoming a lot more efficient, by a factor of 100. Bits are so much easier. So in terms of what's going to change and where the activity is, I feel like the digital space is going to change a huge amount, and then the physical space will lag behind.
What I find very interesting is the interface between them as well. If we do have more agents acting on behalf of humans, and more agents talking to each other, doing tasks, and participating in an economy of agents, we're going to run out of things that we can do purely in the digital space.
At some point, you have to go to the universe and ask it questions. You have to run an experiment and see what the universe tells you to get back to learn something. Currently, we have a huge amount of digital work because there's an overhang in how much we have collectively thought about what is already digital. We just didn't have enough thinking cycles among humans to think about all the information that's already digital and already uploaded.
We're going to start running out of stuff that's already uploaded. At some point, you're going to read all the papers, process them, and have some ideas about what to try. I don't actually know how much intelligence you can get that's fully closed off if it's just information that's available.
Elad Gil
I think what's going to happen is, first, there's going to be a huge amount of unhobbling, and there's a huge amount of work there. Then it's going to move to the interfaces between the physical and digital worlds. That's sensors for seeing the world and actuators for doing something to the world.
A lot of interesting companies will come from that interface. Can we feed the superintelligence data, and can we actually take data out and manipulate the physical world per its bidding, if you want to anthropomorphize the whole thing?
The physical world has a massive total addressable market in terms of the amount of work and so on—possibly even much larger than what can happen in the digital space.
So I actually think it's a much bigger opportunity as well. But I do feel like it's a huge amount of work, and in my mind, atoms are just a million times harder. So it will lag behind, but it's also, I think, a little bit of a bigger market. It's kind of like, yeah, I think the opportunity is going to follow that kind of trajectory. Right now, digital is my main interest; interfaces will be after that, and then maybe some of the physical things—their time will come, and they'll be huge when they do come.
Well, it's an interesting framework for it, too, because certain things—not the things I'm working on right now, but certain things—are much easier even in the world of atoms.
Mhm.
Right? If you just think about read and write to the physical world—read, like sensors and cameras—there's a lot of existing hardware. You can imagine enriching agent capabilities or capturing a lot of new data if you're just clever about it, and you don't necessarily have to invest a lot to get something valuable.
Yeah. Right. Yeah. So examples of this that I saw, for example, are—one of my friends, Liam, is the CEO of Periodic. I visited them last week, so it was just top of mind. They're trying to do autoresearch for materials science.
Mhm.
In that case, the sensors to the intelligence are actually pretty expensive lab equipment. The same is true in biology. I think a lot of people are very interested in engineering biology, and the sensors will be more than just video cameras. Does that make sense? The other thing I saw, for example, is companies that are trying to have—you basically pay people for training data.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. To feed the—
Programmatically. Yeah, to feed the Borg.
These are all examples of sensors, in a certain sense. They take many diverse shapes and forms, if that makes sense. Yeah, I'm looking forward to the point where I can ask for a task in the physical world, put a price on it, and just tell the agent, “You figure out how to do it. Go get the data.”
I'm actually kind of surprised we don't have enough information markets. If, for example, Polymarket or other betting markets—or even stocks—have so much autonomous activity, with activity rising, why shouldn't there be a process where, if something were happening in Iran now, for example, taking a photo or video from somewhere in Tehran should cost $10? Someone should be able to pay for that. That's an example of feeding the intelligence. There's not going to be a human looking at it; it's going to be agents trying to guess the betting games and stock markets, and so on.
Mhm. So I kind of feel like the agentic web is still fairly new, and there are no mechanisms for this, but this is an example of what I think might happen. There's a good book that may be inspiring called Daemon. You may have read it. In Daemon, the intelligence ends up puppeteering humanity, almost, in a certain sense. Humans are kind of like its actuators, but humans are also its sensors.
I think, collectively, society will reshape in a certain way to serve that kind of thing. That will end up happening collectively across the industry. There's just a lot more automation, and it has certain needs. Humans will be serving those needs of that machine, not necessarily each other.
Well, we were on this very specific point of missing pieces of training data. We needed something like autoresearch, right? We need the training cycle, or the SFT piece, to be far more mechanized.
For which part?
In order to make the collection—in order to take the human out of the loop and ask for a task that's just, “Improve my model quality with new data,” right? Does that make sense to you? If you can't have the model do the training runs by itself, then your ability to do this as a closed-loop task by pricing data is more challenging.
Yes, yes, 100%. Yeah, but now you do. The thing is, for LLM training, it really fits the paradigm very easily. So you'd actually expect—
Metrics.
Yeah, like LLM training actually fits the paradigm really well, really easily. All the optimization of the code means it runs faster. And then you also have metrics that you can optimize against.
I do think that if you had an autonomous loop over those metrics, there's going to be a lot of good herding going on, where the system will overfit to those metrics. But then you can use the system to devise more metrics, and you just have really good coverage. So it's kind of hard to tell, but in a certain sense, it's a pretty good fit.
I want to talk about a tiny side project you have before we end. Tell me about MicroGPT.
Okay, so MicroGPT. I have this running obsession, maybe for a decade or 2, of simplifying and boiling down LLMs to their bare essence. I've had a number of projects along these lines, like nanoGPT, makemore, micrograd, and MicroGPT. I feel like MicroGPT is now the state of the art of me trying to boil it down to just the essence.
Training neural nets, and LLMs specifically, is a huge amount of code, but all of that code is actually complexity from efficiency. It's just because you need it to go fast. If you don't need it to go fast and you just care about the algorithm, that algorithm is actually 200 lines of Python, very simple to read. This includes comments and everything.
You just have your dataset, which is text, and you need your neural network architecture, which is about 50 lines. You need to do your forward pass, and then you have to do your backward pass to calculate the gradients. An autograd engine to calculate the gradients is about 100 lines. Then you need an optimizer, and Adam, for example, which is a very state-of-the-art optimizer, is really about 10 lines. Putting everything together in the training loop is about 200 lines.
What's interesting to me is that normally, before—maybe a year ago or more—if I had come up with MicroGPT, I would have been tempted to explain it to people. I have a video stepping through it or something like that, and I actually tried to make that video a little bit. I tried to make a little guide to it and so on, but I realized that this isn't really adding too much, because it's already so simple: it's 200 lines that anyone could ask their agent to explain in various ways.
The agents—I'm not explaining things to people anymore; I'm explaining them to agents. If you can explain it to agents, then agents can be the router, and they can target it to the human in their language, with infinite patience and just at their capability and so on.
Right. If I don't understand this particular function, I can ask the agent to explain it to me 3 different ways, and I'm not going to get that from you.
Exactly. So I kind of feel like, what is education? It used to be guides, it used to be lectures, it used to be this thing, but now I feel like I'm explaining things to agents. Maybe I'm coming up with skills.
Basically, a skill is just a way to instruct the agent how to teach the thing. Maybe I could have a skill for MicroGPT that lays out the progression I imagine the agent should take you through if you're interested in understanding the codebase. It's just hints to the model to first start off with this and then with that. I could script the curriculum a little bit as a skill.
I feel like there's going to be less explaining things directly to people, and it's going to be more like, does the agent get it? If the agent gets it, they'll do the explanation. We're not fully there yet, because I still think I can probably explain things a little bit better than the agents. But the models are improving so rapidly that I feel like it's a losing battle to some extent.
I think education is going to be reshuffled by this quite substantially, where it's the end of teaching each other things a little bit. If I have a library of code, for example, or something like that, it used to be that you had documentation for other people who were going to use your library. But you shouldn't do that anymore. Instead of HTML documents for humans, you have Markdown documents for agents. If agents get it, then they can just explain all the different parts of it. So it's this redirection through agents, you know? That's why I think we're going to see a lot more of that playing out.
Well, we'll see if the great teachers know how to develop intuition for how to explain things to agents differently.
Ultimately, for example, with MicroGPT, I asked—I tried to get an agent to write MicroGPT. I told it, “Try to boil down the simplest things. Try to boil down my neural network training to the simplest thing,” and it can't do it. MicroGPT is, like, the end of my obsession. It's the 200 lines. I thought about this for a long time.
I was obsessed with this for a long time. This is the solution. Trust me, it can't get simpler. This is my value add. Everything else, the agent gets. It just can't come up with it, but it totally gets it and understands why it's done in a certain way, et cetera.
My contribution is kind of these few bits, but everything else in terms of the education that goes on after that is not my domain anymore. So maybe education changes in those ways, where you have to infuse the few bits that you feel strongly about into the curriculum—the better way of explaining it, or something like that. The things that agents can't do are your job now. The things that agents can do, they can probably do better than you, or very soon. And so, you should be strategic about what you're actually spending time on.
Well, we appreciate the few bits. Thank you, Andrej.