AI的承诺与芯片脆弱性、政策建议与变化中的世界、担忧与反驳
Ben Thompson的核心建议是放宽对成品芯片的限制,包括TSMC的先进制程和Nvidia的顶级加速器,同时大幅收紧对制芯设备及其关键组件的管制。 ZTE和Huawei已经证明,断供会制造足以“催生一个半导体产业”的生存危机;一旦恢复供应,Huawei、ByteDance、Alibaba和DeepSeek会立即回到TSMC和Nvidia,哪怕中国继续并行推进国产化,也会削弱这种紧迫感。
政策目标不是永久遏制技术,而是再争取10至15年,让两个超级大国继续依赖台湾。 Ben认为,双方对TSMC的共同依赖曾构成“相互确保摧毁”的威慑;如今的政策让美国继续依赖台湾,却推动中国走向自给自足,消除了中国不去攻打一座距离本土海岸仅70英里的岛屿的一个理由。
TSMC是整个AI技术栈底层那个隐形的单点故障。 Nvidia理论上可以被替代,但AI进步仍依赖台湾的先进制造;疫情期间1美元电动车窗芯片的短缺说明,微不足道的单价背后可能是巨额固定投资、不可替代的工艺知识和数年的建设周期。Andrew Sharp说,拿掉TSMC,“所有人都会完蛋,所有这些进步都会陷入停滞”。
代价是中国可能获得与美国相当、甚至更强的AI系统。Ben接受这一痛苦风险,并认为DeepSeek已经削弱了“强大AI可以被遏制”的前提:扩散和力量平衡最终可能比垄断更稳定。 他更难接受的是第二个牺牲——严格的设备管制可能让中国在10年、20年、30年或40年后取代西方供应商,成为全球主导者。
一套完整的设备封锁必须覆盖EUV光刻机之外不到100种不可或缺的组件,并协调美国、日本、荷兰和德国。 例子包括Zeiss的EUV投影光学系统、精密掩模台和射频等离子体发生器。EUV仍是那道真正的墙:SMIC如今可能通过DUV四重图形化,以盈利方式生产演进版7纳米芯片,据报道Huawei的良率已从20%升至40%,但中国没有EUV设备。
美国的本土化政策瞄准了半导体经济学中错误的一端,而且规模远远不够。 CHIPS Act补贴供给,而Ben认为必须支持客户和产量;“为500亿美元沾沾自喜”忽略了这可能需要一项万亿美元级的计划。即便Intel的18A制程很强,相比TSMC的2纳米,对Apple或Nvidia的优势也不足以让它们值得切换。
Andrew最强的反对意见是,恢复芯片供应未必会改变Xi Jinping对台湾的判断,也未必能阻止中国国产化;但眼下削弱中国仍可能具有战略必要性。 Ben承认,如果中国率先实现AGI,他的建议可能会“灾难性地”错误,但反驳说,激进遏制可能制造攻打TSMC的“现在不做就永远没机会”动机。两人最终都指向本期令人不适的结论:每一种可行政策,都是用一种生存风险交换另一种。
1. 地理位置让台湾成为结构性冲突点
Ben先谈自己的客观性缺陷:他2003年抵达台湾时原以为只待1年,最后待了22年,并在那里建立了生活和家庭。这既让他“有理由听取、也有理由驳回我的观点”——他可能带有台湾至上主义偏见,但也因此持续关注这一问题数十年。
那趟最初的航班上,China Airlines的航线图显示没有任何通往中国的航线;旅客必须经由香港转机,而香港当时是全球最繁忙的航空通道。政治之下,是一个始终存在的事实:一座以华人为主的岛屿,距离一个幅员巨大的国家唯一的海岸线仅70英里;用Ben谨慎的说法,两者“我认为从技术上讲仍处于交战状态”。
他的检验标准刻意排除情感因素:如果美国只有一条海岸线,而一个地缘政治对手控制着正对这条海岸线的一座岛屿,“我们会觉得这是个问题”。民主、芯片和意识形态都在加剧风险,但他2020年关于“芯片与地缘政治”的论述,起点就是那张地图。
2. 芯片断供催生了原本想遏制的中国半导体产业
故事从ZTE开始。Ben承认,ZTE违反了向伊朗发货的限制。由于美国技术嵌入全球芯片生产的各个环节,华盛顿可以拒绝向ZTE供应芯片,并迫使外国晶圆厂配合;这种能力背后是美国的军事力量和消费市场准入,实际上让这家公司停摆了大约1年。
Ben当时警告,这种杠杆会带来代价高昂的长期反应。中国自大约1950年代或1960年代起,就一直未能成功打造封闭式芯片产业;与此同时,日本、韩国和台湾通过加入全球产业链实现繁荣。只要中国企业还能以接近边际成本的价格买到芯片,重建整个产业栈在经济上就毫无意义。
半导体行业的商业模式解释了原因。Bob Noyce所在的公司——Ben认为当时可能仍叫Fairchild Semiconductor——可以用1美元制造一颗芯片,却以25美分卖出,因为利润来自在巨额前期成本之上拉升产量,而不是最大化初始单片利润。组装环节因廉价劳动力迁往香港、台湾和新加坡,最终更广泛的制造链也随之进入台湾。
Andrew强调,制裁也让北京集中资源,推动数十亿美元补贴和设备采购。Ben的区分更为尖锐:补贴只是推动供给,而ZTE以及大约2020年的Huawei制造了生存级别的客户需求。当中国最重要的科技公司面临毁灭时,“我们已经被锁定”;产业必须把另一条供应链拉出来。
3. 一颗1美元汽车芯片暴露了TSMC真正的杠杆
疫情期间,汽车制造商像供应链主权国家一样行事,取消了交付。那些廉价的车窗电机芯片看似可以随意替代,但每颗芯片都依赖一座在2002年前后仍属先进制程的晶圆厂;其前期成本早已折旧完毕,产能也没有人会理性地重新建设。
供应商找到了其他客户;当汽车工厂在需求激增时重启,车企只能“排到队伍最后”。这颗看似无关紧要的1美元零部件,随后让价值高得多的生产停摆数周甚至数月,清楚说明芯片价格掩盖了财务复杂性、积累的专业能力,以及无法追回的时间投资。
Ben从2020年得出的结论是,美国经济“完全依赖TSMC的持续存在”,因此也依赖台湾事实上的持续独立。计算同样需要信任位于根部的供应方;如果把对台湾的依赖替换成中国的成熟制程、最终再替换成先进制程,就有可能“让中国成为一切事物的根”。
4. 恢复供应可能重新把中国绑定到TSMC
制裁促使中国企业囤积西方设备,使供应商在中国的收入成为可持续需求的误导性指标。制裁也让SMIC可以承受几乎肯定以数十亿美元计的亏损,通过艰难的DUV四重图形化掌握7纳米生产;如果是Intel,除非愿意冒破产风险,否则不可能承受这种损失。
经过大约3年的努力,Ben认为SMIC的演进版7纳米制程已经有可能实现盈利,且速度明显快于前代。Andrew补充了未经证实的报道称,Huawei的良率已从20%升至40%;两人都谨慎对待这些数字,但认为相关产品进入市场,已经说明中国取得了真正进展。
但EUV仍然是“一堵墙”。中国没有EUV光刻机,而TSMC已经从5纳米推进到3纳米,并在当年即将推出2纳米,预计之后还会推出大约相当于1纳米的制程。Ben说,这些名称带有营销成分,但密度、能效、速度和散热方面的改善仍然有意义;中国最终会造出EUV,但哪怕只有1台可供研究,也会让这项工作容易得多。
正因为先进芯片价值极高,Ben预计,只要获得许可,Huawei“明天”就会向TSMC订购最先进制程;ByteDance、Alibaba和DeepSeek也会立即采购顶级Nvidia加速器。中国企业仍会继续追求独立,但“谢天谢地,我们终于有先进芯片了”会把稀缺资金和注意力从晶圆制造转向AI竞争。
Andrew指出,即便Huawei正在与SMIC合作,TSMC仍被指控为Huawei旗下子公司代工,这进一步说明最优质晶圆厂依然具有持续吸引力。
5. 竞争性AI仍建立在一座脆弱的岛屿上
Ben称AI建设潮是资本主义的“金发姑娘时刻”:Anthropic、OpenAI、Google和xAI都在投资;超大规模云厂商和新云厂商吸收产能;开放模型限制了对锁定的担忧;价格下降的同时,投资仍然具有吸引力。据称DeepSeek出现后,H100利用率重新回到极高水平,呼应了中国内部需求的上升。
他也记录了自己观念上的真实变化。Ben此前曾为继续使用熟悉的OpenAI应用辩护,尽管他认为Anthropic在质量上占优;但现在,他认为Grok在通用聊天方面“好得多”,同时仍觉得Deep Research非常惊艳,也依然喜欢OpenAI的应用。
DeepSeek确立了Ben所谓的最低开放模型:能力达到这一水平或更低的模型都已经唾手可得,因此早先像扣住GPT-2这样的谨慎做法显得过时。“末日论者必须适应DeepSeek已经存在的现实”,但他也明确承认,如果他们的前提成立,更广泛的扩散会令人恐惧。
这个繁荣生态之下,有一项比Nvidia更基础的依赖:TSMC。美国看重台湾的民主和制造能力;中国想要这座岛屿,而且按Ben直白的说法,甚至可能接受把它“炸成一片废墟”。这种错位让削弱以芯片为基础的威慑尤其危险。
6. 这一方案明知会牺牲AI独占优势
Ben并不否认拜登时代、也是ChatGPT出现前形成的那个前提:AI芯片关系国家安全。他的建议意味着,中国“将拥有与我们相当的AI系统,而且很可能拥有更好的系统”。他不希望出现这种结果,只是在一个合理但相互竞争的目标之间,把台湾威慑置于更高位置。
他给出的令人不适的类比是核扩散:向苏联泄露机密的美国人是叛徒,但也可以说,他们的行为促成了和平,因为相互确保摧毁确实发挥了作用。同样,一种持久的AI力量平衡,可能比某个国家相信自己能永久控制一项具有超级大国级影响的技术更安全。
这延续了Ben此前关于安全的论证,并不是在否认危险:AI可能根本无法被遏制,DeepSeek让关于控制的含糊说法更不可信,而“我们需要好的AI来抵御坏的AI”。因此,广泛扩散可能是长期唯一可持续的平衡,但Ben把这表述为一种可能,而非确定结论。
对Ben而言,更难接受的是产业层面的让步。切断中国获得所有美国设备的渠道,会给西方制造设备主导地位“盖棺定论”:中国供应商将沿着技术曲线攀升,盟友企业可能夺走被放弃的销售额,而中国最终可能在10年至40年内压低全球现有企业的价格。他已经在心理上接受了AI扩散,但这一牺牲仍然更糟。
7. 设备管制既不可避免,又会自我毁灭
Andrew此前觉得相关讨论缺乏逻辑,因为政策严格限制成品AI加速器,却让上游设备和组件相对暴露。如果目标是保持技术主导地位,那么禁止芯片、却放任制造替代品的工具存在,看起来“坦率说既疯狂又无能”。
他引用的SemiAnalysis方案,是对不到100种关键物项实施更严格的上游管制,而不是把每一颗螺丝和螺栓都列入清单。中国无法进口EUV光刻机,但据称管制遗漏了Zeiss投影光学系统——“头号关键组件”——以及精密掩模台和射频等离子体发生器。
Ben认可商务部为漏洞保留的一种理由:SMIC使用西方设备制造7纳米芯片固然糟糕,但这会延缓中国学习设备制造。文章提出的建议仍然是堵上这些漏洞,明知这会牺牲未来的设备领先地位,以最大化对台湾的依赖,同时放开下游芯片供应。
8. 中国的规模正在打破旧世界秩序
Pax Americana之所以有效,是因为美国可以利用自己的消费市场重建欧洲和日本,放弃一部分制造业,并保障和平。那些规模较小的经济体只能吸收有限程度的慷慨。中国不同:它的地理条件和远大得多的人口,使得在一个由单一慷慨霸主主导的体系内进行类似整合,结构性成本过高。
Ben把中国制造业崛起与美国工业城镇被掏空、美国债务爆炸联系起来,同时承认补贴、消费、货币以及台湾元异常疲弱等问题仍存在争论。但从更高层次看,他的回答很直接:“中国就是太大了。”
如果华盛顿相信Pax Americana正在结束,那么特朗普时代看似怪异的现象——关税、在美洲内部采取攻击性姿态、无视欧洲偏好——就没那么奇怪了。一种选择是把美国的战略重心转向亚洲第一岛链;另一种选择是接受中国最终成为亚洲霸主。无论哪种选择,台湾作为岛链的关键连接点,都会成为无法回避的冲突点。
因此,这项政策最多只能争取时间。仅仅“再换10年,或者再换15年”的AI优势和半导体设备领先地位,对Ben来说令人作呕,但等到2025年已经排除了更干净的选项。“现在没有好的解决方案。”
9. Intel需要客户,而不只是补贴工厂
Ben故意提出的极端建议——包括让美国数据中心使用由Broadcom制造、Apple生产的Gaudi AI加速器、开放源代码输出,以及提供版权赔偿——旨在扩大奥弗顿窗口。其不切实际之处反而传达了潜台词:和平时期可能无法修复对台湾的结构性依赖,因此所有创造需求的机制都值得考虑。
在他的叙述中,CHIPS Act有两个失败:它补贴供给,而不是需求;而且“规模小得离谱”。一项500亿美元的计划容易让人自我庆祝,但真正的需求可能是“一项万亿美元级的计划”,让客户愿意承受采用美国晶圆厂的成本和摩擦。
Intel失去的不只是处理器竞争力,随着制程领先消失,它也失去了通向代工需求的桥梁。如果Intel在2010年前后或2013年前后认真发展代工,Apple当时或许愿意承受阵痛,以获得全球最快的芯片。如今,即便18A略好于TSMC的2纳米,这一优势也不够大。
这就是Apple和Nvidia都没有经济理由选择Intel的原因;正如在TSMC可用的情况下,没有理性的人会去建设冗余的成熟制程产能。半导体产业不可能因为政府希望它存在就凭空出现:“你实际上需要客户。”
10. TSMC无法简单移植到美国
从股东角度看,TSMC确实应该在一定程度上尽快撤出台湾。台湾政府的激励不同:它禁止出口最先进制程和N-1节点,只允许出口N-2。美国生产的是标称4纳米的5纳米制程;随着台湾向大约1纳米推进,美国还会增加3纳米,可能称为A16——Ben对名称持保留态度。
这种代差让最先进制程继续成为台湾期待美国防卫的最强理由。Ben罕见地直接认同Trump的指责:台湾政府正试图扣押美国作为人质——“是的,他们就是这样”——因为如果华盛顿要求台湾交出产业、从而不再需要保卫台湾,台北就没有理由配合。
成熟制程多元化在经济上更难看。中国的产能已经把价格压向零,新建一座传统晶圆厂可能永远无法收回建设成本,运营上也可能亏损。但汽车和更广泛的经济仍依赖这些旧节点;而Intel过去通常会改造或出售旧设备,而不是像TSMC那样长期维持成熟制程产能。
TSMC也无法简单接管Intel的晶圆厂。它的晶体管“从分子层面一路都不同”——化学品、尺寸、密度和工艺知识全部发生变化,而研发仍然留在台湾。“其他所有人都有发言权”:台湾、中国、盟友、客户和竞争对手都会限制华盛顿能够提出的要求。
11. 反驳意见让这笔交易没有安全一侧
Andrew怀疑,无限量获得TSMC供应会劝退Xi Jinping,也怀疑这能否阻止中国投入国产化。攻占台湾本身已经意味着巨大成本,但Xi最终可能仍会认为值得;如果如此,美国就应该现在动用一切可用工具削弱中国实力,而不是押注于恢复相互依赖。
他也否定稳定的“门罗主义2.0”。中国过去10年的行为,加上近期在澳大利亚和新西兰周边的军演,都说明压力不会止于台湾;日本和其他太平洋盟友将成为下一个目标,最终影响美国。因此,无论PLA目前是否具备夺取台湾的能力,保卫台湾都服务于更广泛的美国利益。
Ben怀疑,仅仅提供无限量供应就能影响Xi,也怀疑这会阻止中国推进国产化。Andrew说,他在初期冲突中会看好美国,但对消耗战“有些更加悲观”。他还认为,中国的主场优势会随时间增强;而美国若在短期内实现AI突破,等待可能会成为一个“现在不做就永远没机会”的错误。
Andrew对AGI的反对意见是,即使未来出现AGI,它仍然依赖台湾芯片,因此中国可以用导弹瞄准新竹,回应一句:“你的AGI不错。”Ben承认,这一论点可能会错得非常灾难性——中国可能率先获得AGI,然后轻易入侵——但仍坚持,政策制定者不能忽视更严格的管制可能加速一场摧毁TSMC的战争。
Hello, and welcome back to another episode of Sharp Tech. I'm Andrew Sharp, and on the other line, Ben Thompson. Ben, how are you doing?
Feeling—I don't know—
Pregnant. Sheepish.
Oh boy. Yeah, feeling sheepish.
Why?
Because I kind of want to complain—talk about my mental state, feeling tired. And I'm on with a guy with a newborn who is just the wrong person—
I'm here to give you perspective.
—to look for any sort of sympathy from.
Absolutely. Why do you feel the need to complain? Tell me more.
No, not complain. I think it's been very—it's been an interesting week because of the article we're talking about. We're actually launching right into it.
Mm-hmm.
On one hand, I feel very deeply mentally exhausted. And I think part of it is that what I wrote in this article feels so weighty, and there's almost a terror that people actually care and listen to what I have to say about the points in it, which is very mentally taxing.
Taxing, yeah.
That's balanced by the fact that I try to be careful not to get too full of myself and think that what I do matters that much in the grand scheme of things.
Ben Thompson has spoken.
I have to touch some grass. I'm just a blogger, right? At the end of the day. And so I have these conflicting impulses going on, and then I also don't want to tell you that I feel tired.
Indeed.
Well, if you need perspective, we have a newborn. Everyone in my house is horribly sleep-deprived, and last night at 5:00 a.m., every smoke alarm in my house went off because one smoke alarm was low on batteries, and that somehow set off every other smoke alarm. So we were all sleeping peacefully for once, and then the smoke alarms intervened. There's the perspective you were looking for. But I do sympathize with your mentally taxed week here. And that's a good note to get into the article.
1. The Chip Ban Must End
We're going to start with ZX. This is a 2-part email. I'm going to read part 1 from ZX here. He says, “I loved Ben's latest piece, and I particularly enjoyed seeing how his views evolved as he articulated bits of it throughout different podcast episodes, culminating in his final tour de force. The best part was that he actually bit the bullet and put out recommendations, though I can't see decision-makers following through on them.”
I, too, enjoyed watching the evolution of this argument and being part of that evolution over the last month or 2. And I'm happy to revisit this discussion for one more episode, in part because this is arguably one of the most important issues in the world, and not just in tech.
But let's start with you biting that bullet, Ben, and providing recommendations for what chip policy should look like going forward. Per your article, we should be lifting the chip ban in its entirety: 2 nanometers for everybody. Here we go. Tell me why. Tell me how you got there.
Well, I don't know how long ZX has been a reader, but in many respects, it goes back to the very beginning of Stratechery, when I was writing about Intel right off the bat. I wasn't, in that context, necessarily thinking about or referring to Taiwan, but maybe it goes back to that. It goes back to—
Mm-hmm.
—my first flight to Taiwan in 2003. I'm sitting in the back of a China Airlines flight in a middle seat, traveling from L.A. to Taipei, talking to the girl next to me, and we're asking, “Is this a Chinese airline or a Taiwanese airline?” You pull out the in-flight magazine, and it shows the route map, and there are 0 routes to China. That was before there were any sort of links. You had to go through Hong Kong to get to China. And actually, at that time, Taipei to Hong Kong was the busiest air route in the world because there were so many Taiwanese going into China via Hong Kong.
It's the only way in. Yep.
Yeah. “Well, guess it's a Taiwanese airline.” So maybe, initially, that makes all my takes about Taiwan and China suspect because I was that ignorant in 2003. Then again, 2003, scarily enough, was 22 years ago.
I was going to say. Got a couple—
And—
—decades under your belt since then.
And I've been thinking about the Taiwan issue pretty much nonstop since then. I came to Taiwan thinking I'd come for a year. Immediately, within 2 weeks, I remember calling my parents and saying, “Yeah, I'm going to be here for a few years. This is great.” And 22 years later, here I am sitting here.
That, too, is a reason to both listen to and dismiss my argument. It's hard to imagine a geographically related issue that I would struggle to be completely objective about. I have a life and a family here, and also a reason to pay attention because I care a lot.
You're on the ground.
And—
Yep.
My biases would certainly be to be a Taiwanese absolutist. I've been to China. I admire China and what they've done. I have 0 desire to live in China, and I like Taiwan just the way it is and would—
Mm-hmm.
—I would prefer that things don't change. But looking at that route map back in 2003, there's just a really fundamental geographic reality beyond the fact that this island was ethnically Chinese, 70 miles—
Mm-hmm.
—off the coast of China, and had 0 flights. It's the fact that China has one coastline, and there is an island 70 miles off it that is—if you separate everything, you take away Taiwan's democracy, you take away chips, you take away geopolitical considerations—you can just look at a map and realize there is a structural issue here where a very large country has a very small country with which it is avowedly—I think technically—still at war. That's a structural problem.
That was in 2003, when China was not the China of today. It was on its way, I think by and large because of decisions that were made in the 1990s in particular, but it was not yet what it is today, where it dominates global manufacturing. It has a rapidly modernizing military.
Military, yeah.
It has a huge fleet of missiles bristling along the coastline, as it were. I think a strength I've had in my analysis is an ability and willingness to put myself in someone else's shoes. While not agreeing with or endorsing what they think, I try to think, “If I were in this situation, what would I think?”
Mm-hmm.
If the US were in this situation and we had a large landmass, a large economy, but 1 coastline, and a geopolitical rival controlled an island in the middle of that coastline, we would have a problem with that.
We would have a problem.
That's not to say the US controls Taiwan per se, but this sounds kind of trivial: an aspect of this discussion, at the end of the day, comes down to geography.
And to this point, with ZX being a longtime reader, I don't remember when I wrote the article “Chips and Geopolitics.” I think it was probably in the late 2010s, basically saying, “Look, there's a big problem brewing here, and it comes down to geography.” And that's basically where we're at. That is the genesis of this entire discussion.
Well, along those lines, when you wrote “Chips and Geopolitics,” you didn't come out and say, “We shouldn't be banning chips.” You were sort of hinting at it here and there, and then this article was the most explicit you've been in prescribing a different course than the US has chosen over the last 4 or 5 years.
For me, I'll be honest, you kind of lost me with some of the earlier discussions when we were talking about the chip ban over the last month or 2, and I really liked the way you articulated your argument in this piece. So explain more about why you think we should be lifting the ban on chips. You also advocate for strengthening the ban on chip-making equipment, which I think is a very important piece of what's put forth here.
2. How The Chip Ban Started
Okay. “Chips and Geopolitics” I wrote in 2020. The issues with the chip ban really started under Trump with ZTE, even though most of it was codified and put into a larger initiative under the Biden administration.
ZTE was a Chinese phone maker that violated a prohibition against shipping to Iran, which is definitely true. I mean, it's not like—
There are a lot of these discussions, particularly when it gets to international politics, and this has been a framework for a lot of dispute, I think, over the last few years. On this podcast, we're going to request that our users understand that not every time am I going to come out and say, “Yeah, this is morally wrong.” We're—
This isn't a discussion about morals. It's a discussion about reality, and ideally those two are not incompatible, but if there's one arena where they often are, it is international relations. So, just sort of that caveat up front, ZTE could have been—let's assume they're utterly and completely guilty.
Right.
The problem is the U.S. did have the capability to basically kill ZTE: “You're not getting chips, and, oh, by the way, because we control essential technology that goes into chipmaking around the world, we're also banning anyone who makes chips from selling them to you, and we're the United States and we can do that.”
Mm-hmm.
Why can the United States do that? The United States can do that because we basically control the world militarily, and we control the world economically via our consumer market. And so it was a valid and credible threat that basically killed ZTE for kind of a year. I don't know to what extent—and I wrote this at the time—but this is going to set in motion a response that in the very long run is going to be problematic for lots of reasons.
China's always had a drive to build its own chip industry, since the '50s or '60s. Honestly, you could make a case that it was a mistake all along, whereas, say, Japan—of course chips are important, so they plugged into the worldwide chip industry and carved out a huge niche.
Right.
Much of that was sort of taken by South Korea, but Taiwan is a similar thing. They plugged into the global supply chain, and the whole reason we're in the situation we are is because of that. China didn't do that. China's like, “No, we need to do the whole thing ourselves.”
We do it all. Yeah.
And they failed miserably for lots of understandable reasons. It's a very hard thing to do. You need volume, you need customers. You go back to Bob Noyce at what I think was still Fairchild Semiconductor. He brings out a chip that cost them a dollar to make, and he sells it for 25 cents. Why did he do that? Because he realized that the actual cost of chipmaking is all upfront.
The way to get to profitability is not to sell a chip at a profit; it's to drive volume such that the profitability on a per-chip basis—the bar to clear—drops precipitously to our marginal cost. The marginal cost is the actual materials in the chip, which are negligible; it's the electricity and the workforce that actually puts it together, which Fairchild had exported to Asia.
Mm-hmm.
The semiconductor industry was the tip of the spear when it comes to globalization. They wanted those workers—
Cheap labor, yeah.
—in Hong Kong; that was the first place they went. It quickly spread to Taiwan and Singapore, to be out there literally hunched over on a bench connecting wires. That's how assembly of chips actually worked. And guess what?
Mm-hmm.
Brutal work. When you had a component you wanted to sell for 25 cents, you didn't want to be paying an American worker $2.50 to do it. And so, from day one, this has been built into the system of how semiconductors work.
And guess what? It turned out that—and this goes back to our trade discussion from last year—this is another example of where, in the long run, cheap labor was exported first, but then everything else sort of followed it in over time. And so we started out with Taiwanese and Singaporeans and Hong Kongers assembling the chips, and we ended up where actually the whole thing just happens in Taiwan.
Right.
China was not a part of that, and they would never have been a part of it as long as they could keep buying the chips that they need.
Mm-hmm.
It's so hard. And this is a critical point: You don't—just because the government wishes it—make it happen. You need—and, by the way, this is a lesson that the U.S., I think, is going to learn or is in the process of learning. This is the Intel lesson. Just because you—
Yeah.
—you can make 18A looks like it's going to be a great process. That's not enough. You actually need the customers. What goes into getting customers is very complex. You need the volume. And China was never going to have that, and ZTE was the first step in creating the demand.
You pull a semiconductor industry into existence. It has to be demand-driven. ZTE set the conditions for not the government pushing a semiconductor industry into existence, but industry pulling a semiconductor industry into existence, and that's how it has to happen.
Mm-hmm. I mean, it had also focused the government on this area and motivated them to start pouring billions and billions of dollars into it every year.
I know, but I think—
It's funny, I was laughing about it.
I think that most people have that perspective from you. I don't really share that perspective. And I know Bill and I sort of argued about that a couple weeks ago. I think the role of government and subsidies in pushing—and, by the way, this is a very valid critique of any ideas I have about Intel in this article.
The symmetry between the U.S. government and Intel and what China is trying to do with its chipmaking industry does make me smile, because both countries are sort of fumbling around in the darkness trying to create alternatives to TSMC. But you're saying private demand is essential if you actually want to move forward and make progress.
I'm saying semiconductors are so difficult, it's so hard, and when you can just go elsewhere and buy what you need, and you can buy it at basically the marginal cost of production if necessary—which is practically zero—I just don't think it's viable to build a second semiconductor supply chain in any sort of open market.
That's fair, but from what I understand, the ZTE ban triggered a lot of purchases of, let's say, chipmaking equipment in anticipation of future sanctions and export controls on all of this. And so it accelerated it in that respect.
Right.
That's all I mean.
No, for sure. That absolutely happened, and then the Huawei thing happened, I believe, in 2020. I think that might have been what triggered Chips in Politics, actually: the same ban being extended, or a similar ban being applied to Huawei.
Mm-hmm.
Huawei—now you're dealing with the big fish, like the most important company in China. Or maybe the most important company; I don't know, it might be the most important company in China.
It is, in many respects, the technological arm of the Chinese government. It is a private company. The ties, I think—all the U.S. concerns about Huawei, I think, are totally legitimate. And also, Huawei deserves tremendous respect and is probably still underrated by technologists, by people in the U.S.
They've done incredible stuff. Did they completely wholesale rip off Cisco routers? Yes, they did. But morals don't matter. Reality on the ground matters. And in this—don't clip that: “Morals don't matter.” Of course they matter, but this is why I gave the caveat up front.
We're getting grace from the audience, yes.
ZTE maybe could have been a one-off. Once you went after Huawei, we're locked in. It's not—
Mm-hmm.
—just that the government—it's not about just pushing and dumping dollars and the government wanting this to happen. It's a very deep-rooted, deep-felt belief that we on the demand side are going to make the sacrifices necessary to pull this into existence, not because we're patriots—and this isn't to deny the patriotism of Huawei or anyone else—but because our very existence depends on it.
Turns out that's a pretty good incentive to make things happen.
Right.
And so you have the Huawei example, and then you have the Biden administration basically formalizing all this and making it broadly applicable.
And tethering it directly to AI, because Huawei had transgressed in various ways leading up to those sanctions, and then ZTE, you mentioned, was violating the sanctions on Iran. But the Biden controls were passed, A, before ChatGPT, and B, targeted on the AI sector, recognizing that this was going to be critical to the future of geopolitics and national security.
That's right, that's right. And, by the way, all legitimate points. I think that's a key part of this discussion and why it was so hard to write. I can talk a lot. I can pontificate. I'm happy to give life advice about trade-offs and your priority stack and what goes on top. Actually facing them in the face, looking them in the face, and saying, “Yes, your arguments are legitimate, and I am trading them away in my advice,” is hard to do.
And you're wide open to attack, because it's like, “Oh, this, X, Y, Z.” I'm like, “Yeah, you're right. It is true.”
Yeah.
The implication of giving China access to leading-edge chips is that they will have AI systems on par with ours and very well may have better ones. Do you want that to happen? No.
Indeed.
I don't want it to happen.
Well.
But that's why there's this broader context. And what I would just say about this journey that ZTE is talking about is, I think I actually quite clearly articulated the core takeaway of the article I wrote this week when the Huawei ban happened. The ZTE one, I'm like, look, we're creating the conditions for a competitive industry that I don't think would have existed otherwise. That was half of it.
The second half, which I did write in that update after Huawei—turns out it's worth reading the daily updates—sometimes I don't actually put it in a free article until 5 years later, is that we are significantly diminishing the deterrent factor of TSMC with this action.
Yeah.
3. TSMC Is The Deterrent
Right now, we are in a world where the entire foundations of society, for both the US and China, are dependent on Taiwan. And, by the way, this was radical in 2020, and 2020 actually validated the point. Because you had the COVID crisis. You had all the automakers, which are probably the easiest example. What do they do? They're used to ruling the roost, right? They're the integrators. They make the engine. That's the most important component, at least before EVs.
There's a whole supply chain that serves them. So COVID happens, and they call up all their suppliers and say, “Freeze all deliveries for the next 2 months,” or whatever it might be.
Mm-hmm.
And they just have to take it. What else are they going to do? The entity at the nexus of the supply chain gets to call the shots. And that's what the automakers did. Among those suppliers, they maybe go down the priority list of suppliers. How do they organize the priority list of suppliers? Well, how much does this component cost?
They probably had a deep discussion with their transmission supplier. It's a very expensive component. It's difficult to do. “Yeah, I understand it's going to be tough for you. Let's figure this out.” When you get down to the parts that don't cost very much, you just send out an email. They can deal with it.
Mm-hmm.
The problem is that those parts that don't cost very much included these $1 chips for doing power windows, right? Who cares? It's a dollar chip. The problem is, that dollar chip's existence is downstream of massive investments made years and years ago. It's built on a fab that was cutting edge in 2002, and there's no competition for it because you would never build another old fab.
But it continues to run because all the cost was just building the fab. The marginal cost of that chip is practically 0, so that's why you only have to pay $1 for it. But there's this real fundamental mismatch that is hard for manufacturers like the auto companies to really internalize: this chip may be shockingly cheap, but what goes into that chip existing is incredibly complex and has not just a significant financial component in its creation, but a significant temporal element, in that it had to be created at a particular moment in time, which was far in the past.
And guess what? When you just mindlessly shut off all your suppliers—
They go find other customers.
No problem. It's a commodity. We'll sell it to someone else.
Yeah.
And then you start up your factories 2 months later, or a month later, or whenever it was, and demand is skyrocketing—
And they're back of the line, buddy.
Because suddenly—okay, we'll put you back in line, at the back of the line. And now you thought you were king of the hill, and actually this little $1 chip has completely destroyed your business for weeks or months on end.
Right.
And that's just being at the back of the line. If TSMC were destroyed, it would wreak havoc throughout the US economy and the global economy, in part because of these trailing-edge issues, and obviously the leading edge is its own story there. But yes, all of this was highlighted in 2020 with COVID, and as AI becomes more central to the story of the future of the economy, the leading edge is just as important.
Well, it's not just that; it's all of it.
Yeah.
The lesson of 2020 should have been that our economy is, to a shockingly greater degree than anyone realized, utterly dependent on the continued existence of TSMC, and by extension, the continued independence of Taiwan—de facto independence.
Mm-hmm.
So I have to be careful with my words here.
Sure.
And the alternative is that we have a total dependency on China for these components. At the end of the day, the level of trust that's entailed in computing is very large. This gets back to the UK and Apple bit that we talked about earlier in the week. We had this whole discussion about it.
At the end of the day, you can talk about encryption all you want; you are placing total faith in the maker of your device. There is a level of trust entailed in computing. Someone has to be root, and what we are shaping ourselves up for is making China root of everything.
Making China root of everything in the trailing edge is the concern in the short and medium term. Is that right?
Well, and in the long term, for the leading edge, this gets to—
Right.
This gets to this whole point, which is: we've set China on the path, going back to ZTE and Huawei. First, we created the clear need to build a second supply chain. Then, number 2, we created the clear sort of demand and incentives.
Along the way, it's not just that there was, “We could kill you”; it's that as long as China's dependence on chips is just as large as ours is, and they ideally get all those chips from Taiwan, there was a real mutually assured destruction aspect to Taiwan's existence. Who knows, maybe after 2020, the US threat wouldn't be credible, but: “You want to invade Taiwan? We're going to bomb those fabs on the way out.” And you're not going to have access to all these chips either, because we're not going to have them either. Honestly, maybe it's fair to wonder if that threat was credible, but at least it was possible, right? No way, no one's going to get access.
Mm-hmm.
And we're not there yet, but we've set ourselves on a path for China to build self-sufficiency. And to your point, they got a head start. The immediate response to ZTE and Huawei was to buy as much equipment as they could. This sort of clouded the whole discussion: these companies are lobbying the Commerce Department, saying, “Oh, look, this massive percentage of our revenue comes from China.” Well, yeah, because they're buying equipment that's going straight into storage.
Mm-hmm.
Because they know it's looking like they might not get access in the long run, so what's the actual real number? It's sort of hard to tell. But we also have to figure out how to make all these components on our own, which is an insane thing. It's insane economically. There's no reason for an Apple or an NVIDIA to go to Intel. None. It doesn't make any sense. It doesn't make any sense for any company to build trailing-edge semiconductor capability that can support the car industry. No economic sense. Why? You can just go to TSMC and buy it.
You go to TSMC and get your chips fabbed. You only do that for national security reasons, but even then, it's almost impossible. The one way to make it happen is: I literally don't have chips. I'm Huawei; I don't have chips. My existence as a company is dependent on this happening. Suddenly, you have a possibility—
So SMIC, let's talk.
4. China Builds Chip Independence
And so the US created those conditions. They created the conditions for China to become self-sufficient. Again, they're not self-sufficient yet. Even these Ascend chips that SMIC is making—we're getting reports now, and, you know, we talked about it, so it shouldn't have been a surprise—they're doing 7 nanometers. It was almost certainly unprofitable.
Now we're 3 years on, or something, and it sounds like they may be profitable now, which is totally plausible. I think that's believable. They've had 3 years to figure it out, to do this crazy quad patterning. And, by the way, they lost almost certainly billions and billions of dollars along the way in a way that Intel understandably could not have borne with their 10-nanometer problems.
If they kept at it long enough, they probably would have gotten it, but they would have gone bankrupt in the process. Well, guess what? A way to not go bankrupt is to have no choice, and here the government funding does make sense. You’re going to be backed up.
Yeah.
You’re going to figure this out. And now they probably are making 7-nanometer chips in very evolved versions of them that are probably much faster than the old 7-nanometer chips. They’re probably doing it profitably.
And Huawei’s yields are apparently improving as well. They had 20% yields that are apparently up to 40% now. Who can say how real those numbers are? But it’s reasonable to assume that there’s real progress being made, and it’s reflected in some of the products that Huawei’s been bringing to market.
But we’re now 30 minutes into the podcast, and your take is that we should lift the chip ban and try to recreate the conditions that existed in 2017 and bind China to TSMC once again going forward. Is that right?
5. The Ban Must Be Reversed
Yes. So the Trump administration, again, I’m not sure the ZTE and Huawei bans were fully thought through in their implications, so that’s a negative check mark.
Mm-hmm.
On the positive side, the one really important thing they got done, and the single most important chip regulation—or convincing or jawboning—was EUV. There’s not a single EUV machine in China. Now, this does not mean China will never make an EUV machine. It’s been invented once; it can be invented again.
At some point, they will figure out how to make an EUV machine. But I think it is still reasonable, even with SMIC’s impressive progress with DUV machines and quad patterning and all these sorts of pieces, and their willingness to not worry about yields, to believe that at some point there’s just a hard wall.
You need to figure out how to get that beam of light that does the actual etching small enough to go down to these small dimensions. The light is still wider than the actual size of these chips, but DUV is a bridge too far.
Chips are infinitesimally small, so yeah.
Yeah. And so I think EUV is a wall, and China does not have an EUV machine. If they know an EUV machine exists, they know in broad strokes how it works. At some point, they will make one. It would be a lot easier to make one if they had even one in the country because you could actually see what it is.
Mm-hmm.
I mean, reverse engineering is a specialty of the Chinese economy, generally speaking.
Yeah. And again, this is where, in the empathetic mindset, we reverse-engineered a lot of stuff from England in the 1800s and 1900s, right? This is what it is. We’re in the real world here.
Yeah, I was not being derogatory there. They’re unbelievable at what they’re able to accomplish.
Right. And so you have this sort of wall, and I think that wall is still meaningful. We went to 5 nanometers. Then we’ve gone to 3 nanometers. This year, we’re coming out with 2 nanometers. In a few years, it’ll be basically 1-nanometer equivalent. They’re starting to change the names.
There’s a bit where all this is marketing speak, but these are meaningful shifts. The chips become exponentially smaller, which means you either get way more efficiency or way more speed, or some combination of the two. They run cooler. There are just lots of unalloyed goods and positives, and the entire computing industry and history is based on this process continuing.
We’re still talking about a pretty massive gap that is set, in the long run, to continue to expand for quite a while. And so all the talk about what China has done to have good-enough chips, as far as these Ascend AI accelerators go, the reality is they’re still pretty substantially behind what comes out of TSMC, and there’s a real, significant wall between them and overcoming that.
Again, I think they will get over that wall. It’s still going to take some amount of time, and in that amount of time, the gap is going to continue to widen.
Mm-hmm.
And so despite all these factors, despite the fact that every company in China knows they need their own supply chain, despite the fact that this is a priority for the government and they’ll funnel all this money, I still think this wall is so significant and the benefits of super-powerful chips are so massive.
All the reasons why these chip regulations exist—because we don’t want China to have them for fear of what they will do with them—is exactly why I think that if the chip ban went away, Huawei can talk all they want about the great progress SMIC has made. They’ll be first in line for TSMC’s leading edge tomorrow.
Yeah.
And ByteDance and Alibaba and DeepSeek and everyone else, they’re buying NVIDIA chips tomorrow—the top-of-the-line ones, if they can. And again, the response here is, “Yes, but they will also then be building their own.” Yes, they will, but I think it matters whether your life depends on it versus, “Oh, yes, we should also be doing this thing in parallel.”
Semiconductors are so hard and so difficult that this will meaningfully blunt China’s progress in actual semiconductors and in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, because so much energy and money and focus will go to, “Oh, thank God, we finally have advanced chips. By the way, we need to build AI. Let’s buy from TSMC.”
Yeah.
Is this an ideal situation? If my recommendation is one that would have been better in 2015, 2016, or 2017, maybe I should have come out more full-throated. I should have been yelling from the rooftops then to say, “We are going down the wrong road. This is where it plays out.” I think that’s a totally fair critique.
Mm-hmm.
But this is the reason I felt I had to write this now. And, by coincidence, that Bloomberg report came out about the Trump administration probably strengthening chip controls. You saw this was going to be the natural reaction to DeepSeek. You saw, “Oh, they’re catching up as it is. We need to crack down harder. We need to do it more.”
And my takeaway is, look, no, this is our last chance. Honestly, all the opening part of the article about AI was probably a distraction from getting to the main point. Part of it was that I’ve been trying to write this article for so long, it was hard to get me off the mat to do it, and that was an easy way to get started.
Then it was 2:00 in the morning. I’m like, “I can’t rewrite this and edit it. It’s just going out the way it is.”
You voiced that complaint earlier, and I disagree. I actually think it was an important way to frame the discussion of TSMC and its importance to the American economy, because it’s easy to overlook that, for all the hype around everything that AI is going to do, everything that AI makes possible today, and what it might make possible tomorrow, all of it is still reliant on NVIDIA, which is still reliant on TSMC.
If you take TSMC off the map in some sort of invasion scenario, everyone is screwed and all this progress grinds to a halt. I thought it was important to make that point on the way into the discussion of why it’s important to protect TSMC, think about incentives here, and think about the most effective ways to deter China from invading Taiwan. So I liked the intro more than you did.
6. AI Competition Changes The Tradeoff
I appreciate it. Thank you. That’s exactly it. Honestly, I think the AI industry, just from a broad perspective, is a phenomenal endorsement of capitalism. People want to complain about, “Oh, we need top-down state control,” and so on. This is actually an amazing example of how private industry can do things more effectively and efficiently than a centralized, top-down system can.
We’re in what I called the Goldilocks moment. We sit here on this side and ask, “Is it actually economically sustainable to be building these leading-edge models that people can distill and quickly catch up to?” It’s a fair question, but it’s an open enough question that it’s happening, and it’s happening on multiple fronts.
Anthropic is getting investors and investing. OpenAI is getting investors and investing. Google is investing. We have multiple companies. We have xAI coming out of nowhere. And by the way, I love Grok. It’s making me question some of my assumptions.
On one hand, my point about OpenAI controlling the consumer interface and mindshare is really important. I think that still holds.
Mm-hmm.
For me, I was going on about how I could see why people think Anthropic is a little better than OpenAI, but I like the OpenAI app, I’m used to it, and I’m sticking with it.
You’re a Grok guy, huh?
Deep Research is still amazing, but Grok for just your general chatbot is so much better, in my estimation.
And so, yeah, but which is great. There's massive competition happening here. It's not enough competition to make people stop investing, so we're getting the best of both worlds. Meanwhile, we have prices being driven down to nothing. We have these open-source alternatives that are coming along.
We have all these hyperscalers that are making these decisions. We have the neoclouds that are coming up and absorbing capacity, if you want. I just saw something on Twitter about how H100 utilization is back to being sky-high after DeepSeek, which we saw in China as well.
And you have companies that are always wary of getting locked in to these companies. At worst, there's an open-source option if we always need to go in that direction. Llama obviously has been a player in this regard, too. They have a big challenge in front of them. We're not going to see anything, I think, until this LlamaCon. But what they have from a reasoning model—and can they—
LlamaCon. My God.
Really get back in the game.
Okay.
Again, terrifying if you're worried about AI doom, and so I'm just acknowledging that. We'll get people emailing about it. We don't have room to get into that right now, other than to say the doomers have to adjust to a reality that DeepSeek exists. I called it the—
Mm-hmm.
The minimum open model—that is the level that's just available to anyone. Being precious about anything at that level or below is, by definition, crazy, right? You go back to GPT-2 not being released because it was too dangerous. Fast-forward a very short amount of time, and here we are.
And it's all working.
And there's a single dependency, which is even more than NVIDIA, which I think could be overcome. It is TSMC. And TSMC—that's why I started with the island. It's why I started with that in-flight magazine.
The other problem is that you have this mismatch of interests between the US and China. The US, of course, wants to support Taiwanese democracy and is economically dependent on TSMC. China doesn't care at the end of the day about—
Mm-hmm.
Either. They want Taiwan, and if it's bombed to smithereens, that's fine. They'll still take it and be happy about it. And that's a mismatch of desire and motivations that I think is very problematic in the long run.
Long term.
And it just worries me to accentuate that. China already wants it more, and if they take away incentives not to do it, that just makes the situation worse.
Yeah.
And so, yeah. I don't know. So do we give them a—
Well, no. That's what I like about your argument. I'm not sure I agree wholeheartedly, but I thought it was a compelling case. And to your point on China's willingness to buy from whoever is fabbing the best chips, we've had indications over the past couple of years. It occurred to me while you were talking: TSMC has been accused of fabbing for Huawei subsidiaries over the past few years.
So even as Huawei is working with SMIC and having all this success with the Ascend chips, clearly or allegedly, there's still some appeal to working with TSMC. Another feature of the Chinese market is that it is unbelievably competitive. A company like ByteDance, a company like Huawei—everybody is going to be vying for the best chips—
Yeah, no one is—
If only—
No one is compromising their products—
To stay ahead.
That's right. That's right.
Exactly. And that's important to keep in mind: it may be a communist country, but it is very, very capitalist and cutthroat in a lot of respects.
7. Equipment Controls Need Tightening
In terms of some of the previous debates that we had, I think one of the problems I had talking through it with you is that we were talking about the chip ban and chip loopholes in general terms. What the chip ban has entailed over the last several years is really 2 things. On one hand, we're banning actual chips, and on the other hand, we're banning chip-making equipment.
Some of the loopholes that exist on the equipment side have been pretty maddening to me, just as a matter of coherence. If you're worried about protecting this advantage and protecting America's long-term technological dominance—which had been one of your stated concerns when we were talking a couple of weeks ago—the fact that you would ban chips and highlight the importance of this area, and then not ban some of the critical chip-making equipment and make sure you cut out the knees of the PRC chipmakers, just strikes me as frankly insane and incompetent.
That was the piece of your article that also resonated with me and is important to consider in tandem with the idea of lifting any of the bans. We're also talking about closing some of the massive loopholes on chip-making equipment, and that is crucial.
Yeah, you put your finger on what I think most people who object to or get their hackles raised by this article are offended or bothered by: the trade-off I'm implying from AI—that basically we're giving China the tools necessary to build their own AI systems.
And yes, that is wise up front, and it's a painful trade-off. It's also one that you can go back to—I mean, there are long debates about nuclear—
Mm-hmm.
Clearly, there were people in the US nuclear program who basically just gave it to Russia for whatever reason, whether they were a communist or whatever it might be. You can also look back in the fullness of time and make an argument that those people were traitors and also did more for world peace than almost anyone.
Hm.
Because—and this is hard; again, I almost feel my skin crawling making this point because they were traitors.
It's a real common-room bit of logic, but yeah, you could certainly make the argument in retrospect.
Mutually assured destruction worked.
Mm-hmm.
It really did. And is there a level of arrogance in not thinking through what it actually means for 1 country to control what some people would argue is analogous to nuclear weapons in terms of being a superpower and having the capability to dominate other entities when it comes to AI?
Is it actually, in some respects, more sustainable in the long run that AI is diffused generally? And by the way, that's kind of been my argument about the whole safety issue. It's not that I dismiss the safety issue. It's that I don't think this is containable in the way that there's a lot of hand-waving about—that we're going to actually limit this and control this—and I think DeepSeek really hammered this point home.
AI is coming. We need not just AI; we need good AI to defend ourselves against bad AI. This is that same argument writ large: a balance of powers may be the only long-term sustainable way about this. So anyhow, I haven't even responded to your point yet. So that's—
Mm-hmm.
That's part number 1. That's trade-off number 1. Trade-off number 2 is arguably more painful and does, in some respects, go against the argument that you said I'd made previously.
Saying we're going to block all US semiconductor equipment from China is putting the kiss of death on our semiconductor manufacturing industry in the long run, or at least our dominance of it, because China will go down that path. Some number of allies may or may not decide, “Hey, if the US is sacrificing this, we'll just sell to China.” That's actually going to be bigger and larger in the long run, and we can take over these areas that the US has dominated.
You're setting yourself up for 30 or 40 years—or maybe a shorter 10 or 20 years—where—
Mm-hmm.
It's not just that China has its own semiconductor manufacturing equipment, but also now they're selling outside of China to the world and undercutting us, basically doing to our semiconductor equipment manufacturers what China has done to every other industry. We've seen how that has gone.
And that, in many respects, is the grace that you would give to the Commerce Department for all these loopholes, which is: you know what? China making 7-nanometer work with almost exclusively American—or Western, I should say—equipment, yeah, that sucks, but it's also a good thing because that means they're not making their own semiconductor equipment and they're not moving down that learning curve to do it.
This is the other big trade-off that is in this article, and this is the consequence of writing this article in 2025 versus writing it in 2017—
Mm-hmm.
—or whenever it might have been written. I think that the value and importance of maximizing Chinese dependence on Taiwan is significant enough that, at this point, we've waited so long that it's not just that we're sacrificing a world where we dominate AI and no one else does.
And by the way, I think this is where DeepSeek should change some minds in that regard. But also, we're sacrificing the long-run dominance of our semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.
And that, at least for me, is actually an even more painful pill to swallow. The AI one, it's not that it's a big deal; it's that I've already resigned myself to that fact mentally.
Mm-hmm.
The second one, for me personally, is in many respects a more difficult trade-off to make.
Yeah. The state of the export controls now is full of holes, and SemiAnalysis last year wrote:
“Current sanctions are strict downstream on AI accelerator chips and similar. They are looser upstream on equipment to produce these chips and nonexistent for components of that equipment. This strongly incentivizes and enables China to develop an indigenous capability in manufacturing equipment, eventually rendering sanctions toothless. Instead, restrictions should be stricter upstream, tight on equipment and tighter on its key components.
“For example, current controls prohibit exports of EUV scanners into China, yet they do not restrict EUV optics from Zeiss. This makes no sense. ASML and any chipmaker using EUV can tell you that projection optics are the number 1 critical component. While it is not practical to control every nut and bolt, certain items obviously must be. Where to draw the line? There are fewer than 100 critical components from specific suppliers that should be restricted, including EUV projection optics, precision mask stages, and radio-frequency plasma generators.”
So having read that piece, when you were talking about lifting the chip ban and relaxing the chip ban a month ago because you were concerned about the long-term industry, that's where I thought: Are we still going to be selling all the components that allow them to work on developing their own chipmaking industry? It is a lot more coherent if we're closing those loopholes and then saying, “Keep buying from TSMC for the next 10 to 15 years, and then let's see where we are.”
The other aspect of the argument that is tricky is, in order to actually control the flow of chipmaking equipment, America would have to work with Japan and Tokyo Electron, the Netherlands, and ASML—
And Germany.
—and Germany and Zeiss. Whether the US can do that effectively is an open question. That's what the Bloomberg story this week was focused on: Trump officials meeting with Japanese and Dutch counterparts to discuss tightening these export controls. The Biden administration tried that, and they were unsuccessful at convincing ASML and Tokyo Electron to get on board. But we'll wait and see how effective the Trump administration can be and what sort of carrots and sticks might play into that process. I think that's one of the biggest questions of 2025 as they try to craft their policy in this area.
8. Pax Americana Is Ending
Yeah. The biggest question, zoomed out, is really: What is the structure of the world in 20 years—or shorter or longer, or what it might be? And this is where I think, who am I to be making pronouncements about this? I'm a tech blogger. My concern is that I'm just thinking way too much about things and spouting my opinions. But it's sort of inescapable at this point and with these geographic considerations.
We've operated, and decisions have been downstream from, 25 years as the US global hegemon. Before that, it was the West versus the communist world, and the West was dominated by the US. So the US has basically dominated its economic and technological sphere since the end of World War II.
I've been thinking, just big picture: What went wrong? What are the issues that we ran into? And I think, big picture, all this worked for the US. The US was like, “We're going to leverage our consumer market to rebuild Europe, to rebuild Japan, and yes, it's going to cost us some degree of manufacturing.” But there's only so much of that that Japan or Germany can actually absorb because they're just smaller countries compared to the US. The US is by far the biggest country in this coalition, and so there was a lot of latitude to be generous in a way that Pax Americana was deeply generous to the rest of the world. In exchange, we're going to be policemen and we're going to guarantee peace. That worked.
The problem with China is China's just too big. That's really the issue. It's not that we can't get into the specifics of the debate—that China overly subsidizes its export industry and insufficiently pushes its consumer market, and that's the real problem. All those can be right in various ways in discussions, but at some point you zoom out far enough, and it actually goes back to the map. China is a very large country.
By virtue of that, when and if they ever got their shit together, they were going to be in a structure where the dominant US dollar heavily favors external production of goods and importing to the US. This is a whole TSMC bit. We've talked about currency and all the bits that go into it. The dollar's not just strong; it's also particularly strong against the Taiwanese dollar in a way that maybe doesn't make total economic sense, which is a big advantage for TSMC.
But China enters into this system and it just got too expensive. It's too expensive, and the US—it's not an accident. We could point to politicians and DOGE and all this stuff, but it's not an accident that the debt exploded in conjunction with Chinese growth and the takeover of this. It's not an accident that where US manufacturing really went away and where all these center towns got devastated was in the context of China.
It's just so big that a system predicated on one country being generous just wasn't sustainable when that generosity was flowing to an entity that wasn't just of equivalent size geographically, but was actually much larger in population. And so there's—this is why structure matters. Is this actually sustainable in the long run?
Again, it's always hard to know exactly what Trump is doing. But there's an Occam's razor explanation for a lot of the weirdness, where the weirdness makes sense in the context of Pax Americana and the US being at the center. But if you're actually thinking about a world where that's over, then a lot more stuff makes a lot more sense.
Things like tariffs that we've talked about. Things like really being aggressive within your continued sphere of influence, which is the Americas. Things like really just not caring what the Europeans say or do and telling them the way it's going to be. If you're living in the Pax Americana world, that seems absolutely bizarre. If you're thinking, actually, this whole thing is going away, do you want that to happen to you, or do you want to aggressively go there on your own?
And this also ties into the China-Taiwan thing. The US stepping back from Europe, one way to think about it is: Pax Americana can't control the whole world, but it's going to continue to exist. We're just shifting from Europe to Asia, and so we're going to double down on defending Taiwan and defending the first island chain—the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan.
You think about the first island chain, and that gets back to my point. China sees it as a chain as well, a chain they don't like very much, right? But maybe that's one solution. In that solution, Taiwan is a real flashpoint because that's the most important link in the chain.
The second one is depressing, and I'm not necessarily saying this is a good thing, but it's a potentially realistic view: China is becoming so large and so powerful that it's inevitable they're going to be the Asian hegemon, and that by definition has to include Taiwan. We can debate these points, but the implication in terms of TSMC is exactly the same. There's just no world where this isn't the critical flashpoint going forward.
Inevitable problem, yeah. And so the goal in that scenario is to—
It's buying time.
—create economic incentives that help you buy time. Yeah.
It's buying time. And that's really it: There is no more disgusting trade-off to make than to say, “I'm going to trade away AI, or trade away our semiconductor equipment manufacturing, just for 10 more years, or just for 15 more years.”
Mm-hmm.
But that's the problem of waiting until 2025. I don't feel great about it. That's why I'm tired. It's tiring. It's not that it's physically tiring; it's tiring to force yourself to consider and make trade-offs that feel terrible.
Well, I'm tired too. I'm right there beside you, so it's all good.
For a much more legitimate reason.
ZX, part 2. I just enjoy this email.
“Implicit in the essay is Ben's skepticism that we'll get to AGI in the near term, and in the long term, Taiwan will become a part of China. It's understandable why he doesn't say that explicitly. In that world, it's rational to empower Chinese AI in exchange for long-term US semiconductor manufacturing competitiveness. But if one takes seriously the sincerely held belief in big AI labs that we will get to AGI in the next few years, which will result in a step change, then allowing Chinese AI to access the best chips is insane.”
From an AI safety perspective, this will intensify the AI race even more and increase the probability of doom, which he writes as p(doom). I'll just note for the record that the worst part of me working in tech now is that all you nerds use message-board terminology with a straight face on a regular basis. You even dropped p(doom) in your article this week. It's horrible stuff.
But ZX continues: “Maybe the Straussian reading is Ben is advocating for policies that will likely fail, as the structural forces against U.S. semiconductor manufacturing are just too great, but in the process will bring us closer to the pre-2018 world where both the U.S. and China depend on Taiwan, nobody is incentivized to go to war, and Taiwan can be Taiwan, and Ben can continue to stay in Taipei.”
I'm glad I got a smile out of you there. So, Ben, do you have a comment on that Straussian reading? “Straussian reading” is another big tech-guy phrase these days. In the real world, we just call that subtext. But do you have thoughts on what ZX had to say there?
Well, I think the Straussian reading was popularized by Tyler Cowen, who is quite influential in Washington, D.C., so I think you've been swimming in those waters—
There you go.
A local guy.
George Mason's finest.
Absolutely. Shout-out Tyler.
—longer than you might think. I don't think he originated it, but he's very closely associated with it. Maybe he is; I don't remember. It goes back to Leo Strauss, anyhow.
Leo Strauss is the originator, yep.
No, but I can't remember if Leo Strauss invented “Straussian reading” as a phrase, or—
Ah.
—I think it might have been Tyler referring to Leo Strauss. Whatever. We can come back to it. Maybe someone will email us the etymology of “Straussian reading.”
Yeah, we'll settle it on the mailbag episode. Don't worry.
Yeah. Straussian reading is basically what is actually being said here. And that's why I want to be upfront: I'm clearly not objective here. The challenge with Straussian reading is that sometimes these things are intentional and sometimes they're unintentional, right?
Mm-hmm.
To what extent am I motivated by wanting Taiwan to stay exactly the way it is? Very fair question. But with the Straussian reading, I think I'm pretty explicit. Well, no, the Straussian bit is having the whole way to revive Intel. That's where this article arguably went off the rails. There are a lot of crazy proposals I put in there, in part because it's such a hard problem.
There was an aspect of me making a choice: Let's expand the Overton window very wide and just throw stuff out there, knowing not all of it—
The U.S. is going to build a data center with Gaudi AI accelerators made by Broadcom and Apple. That sounds stupid, right, in isolation.
The reason it's in there—let's indemnify for copyright. The reason it's in there is just to emphasize—
And everything's open source.
—we have to pull out all the stops here. Everything needs—
Yeah.
—to be tried. And implicit in the absurdity of some of the recommendations, the unlikelihood of them happening, is perhaps the deep-rooted concern that none of it is going to work, that we are just structurally dependent on Taiwan, and outside of a war, that's not going to change. So let's do everything possible to avoid that war and preserve the status quo as long as possible.
Mm-hmm.
It's a fair point. That might be right. And then I talk about the Trump administration and this shift. Is this an ongoing shift away from Pax Americana to a multipolar world? It may be, and it very well may fail, just because these shifts don't happen because you want them to. Just like you—
Yeah.
—you don't create a semiconductor industry because you want it to. It has to be pulled into existence. Do new world orders happen because you want them to, or do they get pulled into existence by breakages of the old one?
Right. On the Intel point, we didn't really talk about that because, on the other hand, I said I'm happy to discuss the chip ban because it is one of the most important issues in the world. I could not stomach another hour-long discussion of how to revive Intel.
My takeaway from that section of the article was that subsidizing demand in various ways is what's going to be critical to onshoring leading-edge production. Absent a war scenario that removes TSMC from the equation entirely and creates that demand organically—and very painfully, I might add—in any peacetime scenario, if the U.S. government is serious about creating onshore leading-edge manufacturing, the government is going to have to be both creative and really, really aggressive—
Yep.
—if we're serious about enhancing Intel's capabilities.
Yeah, the problem with the CHIPS Act is twofold. Number one is the one we've talked about, which is—and I agree with Trump—it's subsidizing supply, not demand. It's on the—
Mm-hmm.
—wrong side of the equation. The second problem is that it's dramatically too small. I'm sorry, pat yourself on the back over $50 billion. We're talking about a trillion-dollar initiative.
Well, and that's what I appreciate. In terms of the prescriptions that you offer for U.S. chips, at the risk of not doing a Straussian reading here, I think the chip-making effort in this country may fail because the government is unlikely to be reading Stratechery. But the recommendations themselves reflect an understanding of how the chip industry actually operates and how companies like NVIDIA would actually behave. I feel like that particular understanding has eluded U.S. bureaucrats over the last several years as they nominally take this problem seriously, but also haven't really committed full-bore.
Now you're causing problems for me, Andrew. I'm trying to come on here and say that I'm just a blogger.
What's that?
The way it comes from—I know this is being read. The terror is that people do actually follow my advice.
Well, then I hope it's heeded.
And then what verdict do I hear? But I think the broader point—you're right. This isn't the conversation about Intel.
Yeah.
That's in there because it needs to be in there. Some people got fixated on that, like, “Oh, this doesn't make sense,” and so on. I'm like, yeah, that's my whole point here: to impress upon people what a hole we're in. There are no good solutions right now.
And you also wrote about trying to subsidize demand three years ago, and the government still hasn't really taken action on that front. That's where people need to sense the urgency and act.
And that's the whole Intel problem. Everyone's fixated on Intel having lost its lead on the leading edge. The reason that's problematic is because that was the reason for them to get demand whenever they built a foundry.
If they built—if they went the foundry route meaningfully—if they did the Pat Gelsinger plan in 2013, or even better in 2010, or even better when they realized they missed out on mobile, the reason why, say, Apple would go there and endure all the pain and figure it out is because they wanted the fastest possible chips, and Intel had the capability of making the fastest possible chips.
In a world today where they have nothing, there's no reason to go to Intel. And even if 18A is marginally better than TSMC's 2-nanometer process, the gap isn't nearly significant enough in the way it was a decade ago. That's the cost. The cost isn't just that Intel's chips being inferior to AMD's chips has been a big problem for them. The other cost is that they lost their bridge to being a foundry when they lost their process edge.
Another thing to address here: everyone is like, “No, we just need to get TSMC to build more in Taiwan—build more in America.” From TSMC's pure corporate perspective, and from a responsibility-to-shareholders perspective, that's exactly what they should do. TSMC should be hightailing it out of Taiwan to a certain extent.
The problem is that the Taiwanese government isn't stupid, and there's a reason why the fastest chips in the U.S. right now are 5-nanometer. They call them 4-nanometer, but it's an evolution of 5-nanometer. They're building 3-nanometer. The 3-nanometer process will come online once TSMC is down to 1-nanometer, or I think they're calling it A16, or whatever it might be.
Basically, the Taiwanese government has said you cannot export the leading edge and the N-minus-one node. N-minus-two, you can do that. Why are they doing that? Because the number one reason the U.S. will come to Taiwan's defense is for that reason.
TSMC, yeah.
It—and so, of all the things Trump says when he complains about the Taiwanese government trying to hold the U.S. hostage: Yes, they are.
That's exactly what they are doing. They're not stupid. It is the number 1 reason why the US comes to Taiwan's defense.
Now, as part of this, you mentioned the trailing edge. I think it's a huge problem. The trailing-edge situation is tough, especially now because China is doing it. This is a terrible market.
Mm-hmm.
Prices are going to zero. It's not just that building a trailing-edge fab would never make its money back; it's probably going to lose money on an ongoing basis. The economic realities of this are pretty dire.
Well, especially once China develops more trailing-edge capabilities and makes it less economical for anyone else to operate in that market.
It's already happening. It's already happening.
Yeah.
There are just total price crashes in this area, and that's going to continue. So, again, it's the same thing: almost all of that is in Taiwan.
Mm-hmm.
TSMC's been building that for ages, and we don't get any of that from Intel. The way Intel worked is that, as soon as they moved on to the next process, they shut down the old one and repurposed as much of that equipment as they could and sold off the rest, because they made their money by earning high margins on the front end. TSMC, interestingly, has shifted to that.
Yeah.
One thing that's been really interesting is that they've taken 5 nanometers and converted some number of those lines to 3 nanometers. The problem is that, when it comes to your window in your car, you don't need a 3-nanometer chip. It's not worth the cost. You can have an old chip; it's fine.
And so it's a challenge filling them, especially because there's so much demand for leading edge. They've built so many 3- and 5-nanometer fabs. Those are not going to stay filled. They're actually adopting a much more Intel approach to what they're doing out of necessity. That's just the price of being on the leading edge, and it's been a really interesting transition for TSMC.
I think one of the big mistakes TSMC made was underpricing 5 nanometers and underpricing 3 nanometers—not just because they could, since they were the only players, but also because you're not going to make as much money in the long run. You're not going to make all this cash flow off depreciated assets. They're not going to be filled. You're going to have to repurpose the equipment, so you have to charge more money up front. Just from a pure analyst perspective, that's been a really interesting thing.
But if TSMC takes over Intel's assets, you don't just make them work. You have to completely—
Mm-hmm.
Restart the whole thing. An Intel transistor is different from a TSMC transistor all the way down to the molecular level. The chemicals are different. The sizes are different. The density is different. Everything is different. It's not a trivial thing.
So you rebuild it, you get the equipment or whatever it might be, but all the R&D is still in Taiwan. All the government limitations and regulations are still there. And why would the Taiwanese government agree to letting the US—
Export that.
Yeah, the US is like—
Yeah.
“We need your chip industry so that we don't need to defend you anymore.” It's like, wait, what? Why?
So I admire TSMC greatly—
I mean, it strikes me as—
But, like—
—a good idea that you're just sort of spitballing with in a conference room. But yes, thinking through—
Everyone else gets a vote.
—the logistics of how that would work.
Everyone else gets a vote.
Yeah.
The enemy gets a vote, right? In this case, Taiwan's not the enemy, but they get a vote, and China gets a vote. We don't just get to make stuff happen because we demand that it happen. Maybe we could 15 years ago, but we don't get to do that now.
Yeah. Well, speaking of everyone else getting a vote, I had various counterpoints and concerns in the wake of reading your article.
Oh, wait, we've gone long.
I will say—
Do you want me to give you the—
No, no.
I'll give you a 30-second answer to each of them.
No, I don't want to go through each one. But I do think, as far as Pax Americana is concerned, the one thing that occurs to me as far as your proposal binding TSMC to the Chinese economy, I'm not sure how much that would actually sway Xi Jinping in the medium term here.
Providing China with unlimited access to TSMC probably won't be enough to dissuade the PRC from doing everything it can to indigenize its chip supply chain. And then, TSMC or no TSMC, taking Taiwan by force is going to entail tremendous costs to the PRC. But from Xi's perspective, it's possible and probably likely that at some point he will decide those costs are worth it.
That's why, if we're talking about the chip ban, it makes sense in the meantime to use every tool that we have to weaken—
To diminish their power.
—China in every way that we can.
Yep.
And the other thing, as far as Pax Americana is concerned, what worries me about the idea that China has its geopolitical sphere, the US has its political sphere, Monroe Doctrine 2.0—the problem with that thinking, in my eyes, based on consuming news about the US and China for the last 2.5 years, and this is also why I don't ultimately think that Trump is going to concede anything on Taiwan, is that the PRC's expansionist impulses won't end with Taiwan if they do ultimately reunify with Taiwan.
I mentioned this at the end of Sharp China yesterday. Palmer Luckey made a similar point on a podcast recently. But if China takes Taiwan, nothing from the past 10 years suggests that that's where it ends. Japan is right there. They were conducting drills around Australia and New Zealand this past week, and I just feel like the next step will be further harassing other allies in the Pacific, and that will ultimately be felt in the US.
And so it's not like there's some stable equilibrium that would be reached if China does reunify with Taiwan, and it's in the American interest to defend Taiwan because of that. That's at least the way I have understood the problem, and I don't know whether we're in a position to credibly deter them from a military perspective. I also don't know whether the PLA is in a position to actually take Taiwan now, and that is a source of ongoing speculation in the foreign policy community.
I'm not really responding to your point, but the point that President Trump is potentially looking at the world that way strikes me as naive.
Maybe. It may be naive to think that if we just hold our ground in Taiwan, that will be enough. There are shades of this in the idea that if Russia invades Ukraine, they're going to invade all of Europe.
I actually didn't know this. Historically, the only times Russia has invaded Europe are when Europe invaded Russia first. So, is there some aspect of self-projection from the European, sort of, Western mindset onto these pieces? Obviously, there's the Cold War era, when the USSR was clearly pushing abroad. So, who knows? You might be right—
Right.
—but it also might not matter when you get to the actual cold, hard calculations of war. War is about manufacturing. Right now, we're not competitive. I think in a skirmish, in a battle, I would heavily favor the US.
The question is what happens when it gets past that initial skirmish and battle into a war of attrition? Then I'm—
Yeah.
Then I'm a little more pessimistic, I think would be a fair way to put it.
The other thing I would say is, I think you mentioned this, but is AGI about to happen? Are we getting to the takeoff point where AI creates AI, and it's going to create these capabilities—military capabilities, whatever it might be—that become dominant? Sure, Ben, all your arguments make sense, just not right now in 2025. The next 5 years are the single most critical time.
Mm-hmm.
So of all the times for us to control the chips, even if it means sacrificing everything else, we just need to control it right now. I don't buy that argument, and not because I don't—
Even if you grant that that's going to happen, we're still dependent on Taiwanese chips. That's what undergirds the AGI, right? So China could say, “Nice AGI you have there. Here are some missiles in Hsinchu.” Right? Like—
What a shame.
So that was fun while it lasted. There you go. So that's objection number 1.
Objection number 2 is—and this is probably the biggest pushback I have on the Biden administration's view—I think it's hard to unpack the Biden administration's approach to chip controls and their AI regulations in general.
I think all of this was influenced by the AI safetyist contingent, which is also this weirdly accelerationist contingent: AI is really dangerous, it's going to kill us all, therefore we must build AI as quickly as possible. It never fully made sense, to be totally honest with you, but I think that had a very heavy influence on the administration. Therefore, we're going to simultaneously regulate AI and impose this chip ban. And yes, there are long-term costs, but it's really important for the next few years.
Mm-hmm.
The issue with that is, from a Chinese perspective, there is the meme “nothing ever happens,” and that meme exists. The thermostatic effect—just things staying the way they are—is extremely powerful. All my concerns, all my worries—you might say, “Ben, you're just being like the people who thought about the worst possible outcomes of COVID, and actually it was just a respiratory virus that, if we had just treated it normally and not thought up the worst-case scenario, we actually would have been in a much better place.” I think that's a very powerful response, and the meme “nothing ever happens” exists for a reason.
China and the U.S. are deeply enmeshed. China and Taiwan are deeply enmeshed. It's not worth it to go to war. The other reason it's not worth it to go to war from a Chinese perspective is that every year that goes on, their relative advantage over Taiwan and the U.S. gets stronger and stronger. Again, Taiwan is off the coast of China. They have home-court advantage, right?
Mm-hmm.
Just as they become more capable, the balance shifts. If we actually believe that AI takeoff is happening—that this AI is coming that's going to be so amazing, it's going to make all these other AIs, it's going to control the world—that changes that calculus. Suddenly it's like, “Oh, it's not that we're getting stronger every year, so we might as well wait. It's, ‘Oh, if we wait too long, the U.S. is back, baby, with the killer AGI,’” and all these sorts of things.
No, that accelerates the timeline. Absolutely.
Right.
The advantages of the CHIPS Act are that you're locking in a technological advantage that will compound over the next 10 years. But to your point about the U.S. not being the only actor, China could potentially watch that happening and say, “Well, it's time for us to take a boat trip—
Now or never.
—that's 70 miles.”
Yep.
You're right. And I think that's the unstated risk inherent to all of this. If we further close the loopholes and comprehensively lock in an advantage and handicap China's economy and technological progress, then we're accelerating a timeline that jeopardizes the future of TSMC, America's entire economy, the safety and freedoms of Taiwanese people, and just the stability of the world order and the entire world.
That's what I took away from your piece, and I think it's just important to keep in mind: that is a real risk. It's often overlooked in the conversations around what the U.S. should be doing and why everybody should tighten the restrictions. There's all this saber-rattling, particularly in the wake of DeepSeek, and it's like, maybe.
Is that the totally wrong takeaway from DeepSeek? Isn't the DeepSeek takeaway that it's not going to work?
Right.
We're not going to limit China?
Well.
You lose me there, too. DeepSeek was working on NVIDIA chips and could just as easily be evidence of how important American chips can be, and a reminder that they're still central to this story—to every success story in AI. We have not comprehensively controlled the flow of those chips over the last several years. So it can kind of go either direction on that one.
Yeah. And to your point, though, that's why I felt like I had to write this article. It's hard to write an article where you know you might be wrong, and if you're wrong, it's sort of catastrophic because, “Oh, no, China has AI. Oops. It's better than us. Sorry about that. Oh, they're invading Taiwan trivially because they got to AGI first,” right? All of these things could be on the opposite side, and I really screwed that one up, Ben.
Number 1, I'm just a blogger. I take no responsibility. But number 2, it was driving me a little batty that I've been talking about this deterrence issue with TSMC and Taiwan and moving from a world where both were dependent on Taiwan to one where we're really dependent on Taiwan and China is dependent on Taiwan for years.
Yeah.
And it feels like no one else brings this up. Maybe I'm wrong, but it's hard to make those recommendations that entail such painful trade-offs. At least I said my part, and now it's to the powers that be to figure out what to do with it. So now I want to go take a nap.
Indeed.
Yes. Have a great weekend, powers that be. Have a great weekend, Ben. I hope no smoke alarms go off during the middle of your nap in the next couple of hours.
Um, but we are coming back on Monday. Lot of great mail coming in the last week or so. People have celebrated my return by writing a lot of great emails, so thank you to the audience. Email at sharptech.fm if others out there have takes, and maybe we'll address them next week. Any final thoughts, Ben, before we sign off here?
No. I almost apologize. I feel like this was a meandering podcast. I think my daily updates came out super late this week. I was working on this on Monday, and then at 6:00 p.m. I'm like, “I gotta—this isn't going to get done.” So I shifted to writing about Apple, which came out super late. And then this came out late.
This is what I hate when bloggers do: no one cares about you. I tell this to writers. You're out there selling a product. I don't like appeals to the audience: “Oh, well, can you please support me? I do this.” No. You do a great product, you put it for sale, and no one cares about you. Everyone has their own life, right?
Yeah.
All that said, here I am talking about myself.
Well.
It's been really—
There's a difference between writing and podcasting. A lot of navel-gazing is—
No, I turn it out every week.
Navel-gazing is—
I turn it out every week. It's not a problem. I love thinking about this. It's great talking to you. I'm so glad you're back. I missed you.
It's just been really interesting, actually. It's been really interesting. There was something about this that took so much out of me, that it's— And maybe that's a reason to—
Well, it's deeply personal.
Yeah, maybe that's why. I don't know. It just—I don't have a take other than it's been interesting to self-observe, to have been writing for so long and doing this for so long, and to almost not have had even this physiological response to doing some writing. I don't know. It's kind of interesting.
Yes. Well, I appreciated the writing. It did build on a lot of the conversations we'd had, and it felt like a couple of the different Sharp Tech episodes—some of the debates with me, some of what you were talking about with Bill last week—it was like the first drafts of what came together on Stratechery this week.
Well, thank you.
And I think you've earned a nap, you know?
Yeah.
You're clearly tortured over there. But I will talk to you on Monday.
A little too full of myself. Need to go touch grass.
You did remind me that people in the government read Stratechery. I was under no illusions that they don't. But they hadn't listened to you to date on the chip industry. Enjoy your weekend, Ben, and we will circle back next week with plenty of mailbag questions and keep it rolling from there.
Talk to you later.