20VC:走进 Carnegie Mellon 的 400亿美元捐赠基金|为什么90%的LP不该投VC|多阶段基金的1400亿美元难题|Miles Dieffenbach 揭秘 DPI、TVPI 与非流动性背后的数学
Dieffenbach认为,只有当资产配置者能够持续投到头部10%的管理人时,VC承担的风险才足以获得补偿;低于这一水平,即便做到前25%的回报,也跑不赢公开市场替代方案。 成熟VC年份的净IRR中位数约为8%;即使是前四分位,15年间也只有约15%的IRR、2.5x TVPI和1.8x DPI。以 QQQ 作为 Carnegie Mellon 的 PME,问LP是否因承担VC风险而获得足够补偿,他的答案很直接:“绝对没有。”
Carnegie Mellon 将其400亿美元捐赠基金配置为85%股票、15%固定收益,其中一半资产是私募资产,略低于25%配置于VC。 这使 CMU 相比同类捐赠基金在VC上的超配约为5—10个百分点,但整体私募资产组合在流动性枯竭期间仍能自我造血,且大部分分配来自并购基金。VC今年终于重新实现自我造血,这是自2021年以来首次。
超大基金的隐藏约束在于持股比例:一个规模70亿美元、平均初始持股5%的平台,必须先创造1400亿美元企业价值,才能让LP本金实现倍增。 为了在费用扣除后达到 CMU 的4x净回报目标,Dieffenbach估计至少需要6x毛回报,这意味着接近8000亿美元的退出规模,几乎相当于2021年约8500亿美元的全年退出总值。Harry Stebbings认为未来公司的规模可能大得多;Dieffenbach承认这种可能性,但反问:“安全边际在哪里?”
种子投资仍是一场选股游戏,前提是创始人或想法真正不符合共识;共识种子项目如今已经变成与多阶段资本争夺入口的战争。 Stebbings认为,一支5000万—1亿美元的基金既无法在如今400万—500万美元的种子轮中买到有意义的持股,也无法在约30家公司之间实现分散。Dieffenbach的反驳是,Airbnb、Uber、SpaceX 和 Amazon 起初都很难融资,这为那些能在共识形成前识别“疯狂”项目的投资人保留了潜在护城河。
规模化会让VC品牌在证明自己仍是优秀投资之前很久,就先变成异常出色的收费生意。 一个横跨多支基金、总规模150亿美元的平台,年收费可能达到约3亿美元;而一笔200亿美元级别的世代级退出,对一支70亿美元的基金却几乎没有实质性推动。Dieffenbach愿意为真正的早期投资保留溢价费率,但希望将规模化成长基金转向长期持有型费率——大致是“1%管理费加10% carried interest”,甚至采用基于预算的管理费加10% carry。
非流动性首先是定价问题,并不意味着IPO市场已经关闭。 2022年至2024年,IPO募资额低于2002年至2004年,尽管VC资产规模已经大约扩大了10倍;与此同时,私募卖方仍想要公开市场替代标的无法支撑的估值,比如 Microsoft。如今公开市场重新开始奖励部分成长型公司,Dieffenbach直接呼吁:“现在正是时候,请把你们的公司上市。”
AI可以成为基础性技术,同时制造一场摧毁资本的泡沫,而 OpenAI 对新增融资的依赖正是关键区别。 Dieffenbach表示,OpenAI的单位经济正在改善,但一家每年烧掉50亿—100亿美元、可能背负700亿—800亿美元优先清算权资本堆栈的公司,远不如已经盈利的 Google、Meta 或能够自我造血的 SpaceX 那样掌握自身命运。Nvidia 现在未必估值过高,但在他的情景中,一轮周期性下行若同时带来收入下滑、盈利收缩和估值倍数下降,股价可能回撤约70%。
1. 逆境让风险,而非资产标签,成为出发点
26岁时,Dieffenbach得知自己的淋巴瘤已经恶化到必须在一周内开始化疗。短暂“闷闷不乐”约12小时后,他接受了一位教练的格言——“人生的成功,10%取决于发生了什么,90%取决于你如何应对”——并决定“只要我不停下来,癌症就杀不了我”。4个月后,他痊愈了。
真正持久的改变是视角,而不是变得无坚不摧。他称逆境为“苦难中的美”,认为逆境会塑造更强大的人,也不愿抹去这段经历:“人生是一场难以置信的喜悦,也是上天的恩赐。”因此,很少有职业挫折能够在心理上真正击垮他。
Carnegie Mellon 对其400亿美元捐赠基金也采取同样明确的风险优先层级:85%股票、15%固定收益,其中50%投向私募资产,50%投向对冲基金和流动性证券。在私募资产内部——VC、并购、房地产、自然资源和私募信贷——团队运行的是“最佳选手组合”,把资金投向其认为风险调整后回报最强的领域。
2. 只有进入前10%,VC才值得承担风险
CMU的私募资产组合已经连续3年自我造血,其中并购基金贡献的分配最多,VC拖累最大。因此,私募资产敞口在过去6—7年一直维持在50%左右;尽管分配放缓,VC的NAV仍在上升,只是部分被减值抵消。
VC占整个捐赠基金的略低于25%,接近 CMU 私募资产组合的一半,比同类机构高出约5—10个百分点。捐赠基金通过降低对冲基金和实物资产的配置来抵消这一超配。
Dieffenbach给出的风险对比非常具体:一栋租给 Amazon、租金每年上涨3%的工业地产,有重置价值,也有稳定现金流;一支投资“2—3个人和一个想法”的1亿美元VC基金,可能是市场上风险最高的资产。被问到LP是否获得了足够补偿时,他回答:“绝对没有。”
对于大约1998年至2015或2016年的成熟年份,他给出的数据是:净IRR中位数接近8%,前四分位IRR约15%,前四分位 TVPI 接近2.5x,15年期前四分位 DPI 只有1.8x。CMU用 QQQ 对比VC,只有前10%的管理人能够持续跑赢这一 PME。对于新进入这一领域的资产配置者,他的门槛是:“你认为自己能拿到前10%管理人的份额吗?”
3. 种子经济学把“小而灵活”变成一个狭窄目标
Stebbings质疑LP为何热衷于5000万—1亿美元的种子基金。平均轮次规模为400万—500万美元,想获得有意义的持股,可能需要开出300万—350万美元的支票;如果投向约30家公司,扣除费用前的组合规模就接近9000万美元。小基金因此只能接受更低的持股、更弱的分散,或开出150万美元这种在顶级投资人争抢额度时很难拿到份额的尴尬支票。
Dieffenbach的反驳是,共识创始人和共识想法极难投,因为多阶段机构可以用更低成本的资金基础在种子轮投入500万—1000万美元,把专业种子基金当成“弹片”。他认为仍然存在的突破口是不符合共识的投资:竞争更小,价格和持股都更好。Stebbings反问,即使是非AI公司如今也能拿到很高的价格;Dieffenbach承认:“我希望、也祈祷”资本还没有消灭选股护城河。
权重取决于策略:对于规模化多阶段机构,Dieffenbach估计70%靠获取项目、30%靠选股;对于小而灵活的早期基金,则反过来是70%选股、30%获取项目。CMU实际考察的规模区间大约从8000万美元基金延伸到4亿美元—10亿美元,通常承诺金额从约1000万美元起,但最终决定因素仍是团队、过往业绩和策略匹配度。
4. 出售能力和诚实估值,正在区分管理人与讲故事的人
Dieffenbach将VC的能力拆成5项:找项目、选项目、赢得项目、帮助公司和出售。出售是最新形成的机构能力;他特别提到 Union Square——CMU希望成为其LP——在第8年至第12年主动出售资产方面异常自律。
CMU更偏好现金分配,而不是股票,因为不同LP的出售时间可能造成1%—2%的定价差异。管理人可以立即卖出全部持仓,再分配完全一致的现金经济利益。大多数机构在2021—2022年都没有通过这一考验,但Dieffenbach解释了当时的诱惑:软件ARR中位数倍数一度达到20x,前四分位成长公司达到40x,在市场突然转向之前,再看高2x—3x似乎也有理由。
长期经营的多阶段机构往往是最保守的估值方,即使二级市场报价更高,也常常将证券按低20%—30%估值。自2021年以来,CMU对每个潜在管理人的前10家公司NAV都进行独立承销,依据收入、毛利润和自由现金流趋势,把每个仓位归类为高估、合理或低估。
傲慢会迅速终结会议。把策略说得很容易,或把业绩描述为“桶里打鱼”,意味着管理人忽视了即便是6x净回报基金也极为罕见。CMU在2023年承销的一位管理人仍将 OpenSea 按130亿美元计价;CMU提出质疑后,对方承诺同时修改估值和估值政策。
5. 账外访谈揭示业绩背后的真实团队
对于成熟的 Sand Hill Road 和伦敦品牌,Dieffenbach认为,除了强势合伙人、品牌和与S级创始人的距离之外,很少存在系统性的项目来源;能成为创始人必见的对象,本身就是护城河。小众地域或自力创业市场可能适合自动化获客,但主流VC往往包含“大量运气”:主动出击、引荐,以及参加足够多的会议。他点名 Ali Partovi 是少数真正突出的项目来源高手之一。
选股需要重建投资人在结果变得显而易见之前到底相信什么。Dieffenbach回忆,自己当初觉得 Uber 和 Airbnb 听起来都很荒谬——和陌生人共乘,或睡在陌生人旁边——但 Mike Maples 和 Cyan Banister 等投资人能够“看见未来”。CMU会询问创始人:谁拒绝了他们,谁最早相信他们,以及他们为什么选择那位特定合伙人。
一支新基金通常至少要做20次背调,其中只有5个由GP提供。真正的“黄金背调”来自名单之外,重点不是对策略的看法,而是人际风险、合伙关系和交易归因是否准确。CMU会自行建立合伙人层面的业绩归因表,因为交易负责人退休或离职后,机构可能把那笔胜利重新归到仍在募资的人名下。
合伙关系最常因激励和“谁工作更努力”的认知而破裂。Dieffenbach在过去2年看到的人员变动,比此前8年做LP时更多:富有的合伙人厌倦了破碎的资本结构和迟迟无法退出,而年轻合伙人眼看预期carry蒸发、薪酬可能下降70%。他偏好的“创始人友好”不是回避艰难对话,而是站在彼此关心且目标一致的角度,进行有力度的指导。
6. 一笔VC承诺,是一项25年的长期绑定决定
CMU经常选择等待:新承诺约一半投在管理人的第一支被观察基金,其余跟随其后的1—2支基金,意味着3—6年的关系建设。一支早期基金可能需要15年才能清算,甚至18年;CMU计划至少支持3个年份。因此,Dieffenbach将这一决定描述为一段约“25年的非流动性关系”,时间可能是美国平均婚姻的2倍。
GP应当让LP基础多元化,覆盖捐赠基金、基金会、家族办公室、创始人,或许还包括其他VC机构。最理想的情况是单一投资者占比不超过10%;超过30%时,Dieffenbach会感到不安。不过,对于一支规模5000万—1亿美元的基金,一个高度战略匹配、承诺1000万—3000万美元的锚定LP仍然可能合理。
出售管理公司的部分股权是“巨大的红旗”,因为carry——合伙关系的激励引擎——会转移给一个并未与团队并肩作战的沉默股东。GP跟投同样重要,但 CMU 评估的是这笔钱对每个人分别意味着什么,而不是比较名义金额;Dieffenbach称,这是团队最好的前瞻性量化指标之一。
7. 一个平台可能需要吃掉整整一年的退出市场
Dieffenbach将超大基金扩张追溯到 SoftBank 的首支 Vision Fund。此后,成熟VC机构的规模远远超过了此前持续10年、规模约4亿美元的A轮基金,有时还会配套同等规模的成长基金。假设2010—2017年的回报能够在资本扩张后继续维持,“让我们非常担忧”。
他的案例是一家未具名的70亿美元平台,内部包括10亿美元早期基金、20亿—30亿美元成长基金,以及更大的机会基金。初始持股比例从早期阶段约15%,降至成长阶段的6%—7%,再降至机会基金的2.5%—3%。由于LP按整个基金堆栈的比例投资,其按投入金额加权后的持股比例只有约5%。
70亿美元除以5%,意味着管理人必须投向最终价值1400亿美元的公司,才能仅仅把基金的持股基础部署出去。CMU的目标是4x净回报;扣除早期基金2.5-and-30和成长基金2-and-20的费用后,Dieffenbach估计至少需要6x毛回报。这意味着接近8000亿美元的退出规模,而2021年创纪录的全年退出总额约为8500亿美元:“你需要整整一年的IPO和并购,只为这一家管理人服务。”
Stebbings的反驳是,结果规模可能大幅复合增长:Microsoft 可能达到10万亿美元,而 OpenAI、Anthropic 和 SpaceX 可能以接近或超过1万亿美元的估值上市。Dieffenbach承认“我们可能错了”,但指出历史上只有11家VC支持的公司实现500亿美元IPO,其中最大的2家是2012年的 Facebook 和2014年的 Alibaba。他更愿意承销一支只需要100亿—300亿美元级别退出结果的基金,并保留其上行空间。
8. Index证明规模可以奏效,但费用数学会破坏一致性
Index 是 Dieffenbach 眼中规模化后最出色的例外。他提到该机构在 Figma、Dream Games 和 Wiz 上拥有重要持股,也投中了 Scale AI 和 Revolut;同时,他称赞 Index 在2021年后仍有无限募资能力,却选择缩小基金规模。“这是我们见过的、最以业绩为导向的文化。”
Stebbings质疑,规模10亿—20亿美元的平台是否被夹在专业基金与 General Catalyst、Lightspeed 或 SoftBank 级别的资本之间。Dieffenbach认为,Index仍有足够资金在种子轮到B轮开出异常大的支票,但又没有大到让单笔胜利变得无关紧要。即使市场上存在更便宜的资本,其品牌仍能吸引一批又一批世代级创始人。
超过这一规模后,算术会变得残酷。一家类似 Figma、价值200亿—250亿美元的公司,10%持股在carry前约值20亿美元,对一支70亿美元基金来说只有约0.2x,这意味着可能需要投中15个 Figma。Wiz 约300亿—310亿美元的退出结果,只为 Insight 的基金贡献了约三分之一,说明一家公司的价值即使相当于“一个国家的GDP”,在超大基金内部也可能只是有帮助。
Dieffenbach并不责怪GP:总规模150亿美元的多支基金堆栈,每年可以产生约3亿美元费用,堪称“历史上创造过的最佳高毛利生意之一”。但投资成熟、团队已经配齐的成长公司,越来越像被动持有的长期公开市场股票。他希望2.5-and-20,或对真正出色的品牌收取2.5-and-30,只保留给核心早期投资;规模化成长基金则转向1-and-10,或基于预算的费用加10% carry。
9. IPO市场是价格问题,不是关闭问题
部署速度应该匹配GP当初出售的承诺。明确承诺2年周期、2年后完成一支基金是可以接受的;但承诺3—4年周期,却在2年内完成部署,就必须解释,因为年份分散很重要。速度更慢本身并非坏事:Dieffenbach称赞 Mark Suster 识别出2021年的过热,并卖出大量组合资产,把 DPI 送进LP口袋。
美国VC募资规模当时正指向2017年以来最低的一年,不过Dieffenbach补充说,最终可能要追溯到2016年。核心原因是流动性:2022—2024年的IPO募资额低于2002—2004年,尽管这一资产类别的规模已经扩大约10倍。互联网泡沫见顶后,QQQ花了13年才回到原点,但随后3年的IPO募资额仍高于最近这轮流动性枯竭期。
Dieffenbach拒绝使用“IPO市场关闭”这个说法;价格才是出清机制。一家ARR为1亿美元、增长15%、刚好盈亏平衡的SaaS公司,不能要求8—10倍ARR,因为投资者可以买到 Microsoft:收入增长14%、盈利增长17%,拥有GAAP利润、强大护城河,每年还回购约1%的股份。LP的不满来自于:他们看着公开市场科技公司持续复合增长,而私募估值却拒绝接受这一比较。
10. Circle说明,VC尾部回报为何会惩罚二级市场卖家
Dieffenbach认为,Harvard据报以10亿美元出售一笔资产、相对于约500亿美元捐赠基金而言,是一次组合换血,而不是投降。一笔据报由 Yale 和 CalPERS 参与、折价约10%的交易看起来极其划算;在不知道GP和资产组合的情况下,他原本会猜接近20%,因为即使 Yale 的组合很强,也必须在供给受限的二级市场完成出清。
CMU自己也差点错过这一课。一支2012年的VC基金持有一项残余资产,13年后其价值低于 CMU 100万美元的内部跟踪门槛,且相对 Circle 上一轮约50亿美元融资,账面折价约30%。Dieffenbach在阅读 S-1、认出资本表上的GP时发现了它;随着 Circle 后来涨到约500亿美元,这一笔尾部持仓可能为一支原本已经实现的基金额外贡献约3个回报倍数。
在讨论中的 Yale 交易里,CalPERS据报买入约5亿美元敞口,并在2个月内因 Circle 获得约1亿美元的账面增值。Dieffenbach承认,CMU在承销这笔陈旧持仓后也可能选择卖出:没人能有把握地预测稳定币会成为最热门的加密细分领域,也没人能预判 Circle 会以约100倍 EBITDA 交易。VC的右尾回报可能在第8年至第13年到来,恰恰是在卖方认定“已经没多少油水可榨”的时候。
CMU的VC组合今年重新实现自我造血,这是自2021年以来首次,但已宣布的流动性仍在延迟:Wiz 还在等待监管批准,Figma 尚未上市,Dream Games 还需要欧洲监管放行。Dieffenbach预计2026年会带来更多现金并帮助募资,但“1年解决不了整个行业的问题”。他给管理人的信息很直接:“请把你们的公司上市。”
11. 中国与AI时代的并购,都有隐藏的利益一致性成本
CMU历史上最好的投资是一支净回报超过20x的中国基金,但如今的门槛已经极高。Dieffenbach提到,美国限制对中国AI、半导体和国防公司的投资,同时还存在结构性冲突:管理人过去通常平行募集美元和人民币基金,但这两类资金如今无法再获得相同的投资机会。
在他引用的比较中,AI约占美国VC交易的70%;如果被排除在这一类别之外,美元计价的中国基金持有什么资产可能发生根本变化。地方政府的人民币工具可能获得美元LP无法投资的资产,形成利益一致性问题;与此同时,许多优秀的中国创始人已经选择美国、新加坡或伦敦。
Google、Microsoft、Amazon 和 Meta 每年合计产生约6000亿美元经营现金流,可能更愿意进行战略收购,而不是做边际回报有限的回购。但一轮12个月的审查可能让快速变化的AI标的失去时效;Wiz 约10%的分手费——讨论中提到的并购交易最高比例——显示了其中的财务风险。这会推动人才收购和IP授权,因为它们能立即带来人员和技术;但 Stebbings 指出,这种替代方案无法取代让 Wiz 值得约310亿美元的收入和客户。
12. AI可能改造GDP,也可能摧毁今天的资本堆栈
OpenAI的单位经济正在快速改善,但Dieffenbach反问,为什么它能在12个月内完成历史上最大的2轮VC融资:“因为他们每年烧掉50亿—100亿美元。”如果AI融资周期发生逆转,而 OpenAI 背负着他所描述的700亿—800亿美元优先清算权资本堆栈,那么对另一笔巨额股权融资的依赖将意味着它无法掌握自身命运。
SpaceX 是反例:Starlink 已经达到“逃逸速度”,公司能够自我造血,二级市场要约收购也不用于为运营提供资金。Google 和 Meta 上市时同样拥有约30%—40%的GAAP经营利润率。因此,Dieffenbach拒绝在5年后把 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 直接称为毫无悬念的万亿美元独立公司;关键区别在于,当资本市场停止配合时,企业能否存活。
他可以想象AI在10年内对GDP产生重大影响,但无法对3—5年内发生这一点作出有把握的判断。OpenAI因为用户生成卡通图片而耗尽 GPU,体现了采用率与生产率之间的差距。超大规模云厂商可能在2024年至2027年投入约1万亿美元资本开支;Dieffenbach推测,美国VC每年投资规模约为1000亿美元,其中可能80%流向AI。如果经济回报需要10年,“那将会非常痛苦。”
Dieffenbach并不认为 Nvidia 就当前业务而言估值过高,但强调的是“盈利峰值和估值倍数峰值”。在周期性下行中,收入可能下降20%—30%,盈利可能下降约40%,约38x的远期估值倍数可能收缩至历史低点附近的24x,从而造成约70%的回撤。他没有预测这一情景何时发生,只是拒绝因为长期AI逻辑正确,就把它视为不可能。
My message here to all venture capitalists is: now is the time. Please take your companies public. I breathe investing. These business models these GPs are creating are some of the best high-margin businesses ever created. My question to any new allocator or investor is: do you think you're going to have access to top-decile managers? Because at that point, with top decile, you are achieving returns above the PME consistently. But below that, even top quartile, you're not.
Miles, dude, I'm so excited for this. Listen, we've been friends for a while, and I'm so excited that we could also make it happen in person. What no one knows is I dragged you around London for a walk last night, and it poured with rain. You were so patient and great, but thank you for joining me, man.
Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to be here. You've had some incredible guests on the podcast, and I'm honored to be one of them.
It's amazing, given the fact that I've known you for a while, and then also, in the research for this, learning more and more about you, because I didn't actually realize this, but at 26 you went through a cancer experience, and you're a cancer survivor now. It's pretty unbearable to think about, given the fact that I'm 29. It's just the most incredible strength. How did having cancer and facing your own mortality change your mindset? I've never asked that question to start a show before.
Well, let's dive into it. We'll dive into the heavy and hot. It's a surreal moment when that happens. I think everyone at that age thinks you're invincible. I did. You get that news, and you're in a bit of shock, right?
It was so abnormal to me when they told me I had lymphoma. I said, “Oh, great. What's lymphoma?” I thought it was a cold. I didn't even know what it was. They said, “It's cancer, and it's progressed quite substantially, and we need to start a chemotherapy process here within the week.”
Like most people, I sulked for about 12 hours, went home, was mad at the world, and didn't want to speak to anybody. Why me? I woke up that next morning, and one of my college football coaches had a great quote that really stuck with me: “Success in life is 10% what happens to you and 90% how you react to what happens to you.”
I took that running. That next day, I said, “I'm going to attack this. I can't change the situation I'm in, but I can change how I react to it moving forward.” I basically said, “Cancer can't kill me if I don't stop moving.” So I started a pretty insane regimen of workouts. When I would go in and get my chemotherapy, that was my R&R. That was my recovery period. I'd get out, and I'd start that again. Flash forward four months, I was cancer-free, and I have been so ever since.
Do you remember the moment you were told you were cancer-free?
Yeah. It was crazy because I got in there. You get a scan right before, and then you go into the office, and I waited two hours in the office after the scan. Usually, it's about 30 minutes. I'm sitting there thinking, “I might be biased toward negativity. It's got to be bad news if he's waiting two hours.” He came in with his arms wide open and gave me a big hug. It was pretty incredible.
Wow, that must be the most special moment.
Yeah, it's special. Looking back on it, everyone's had adversity. You've had adversity in your life. A lot of people do. Everyone does. No life is perfect. But there's beauty in the struggle, right? That makes you who you are as a person, and it builds you into a stronger person. The trials of life are many, and I wouldn't change anything.
Did it set a benchmark of shit that now makes everything else seem kind of okay?
Oh, I mean, the perspective you have moving forward after that is one of the great blessings of it, right? Life is an incredible joy and a blessing, right? There aren't many things that can take me down mentally at this point.
How on earth does one go from surviving cancer, beating the odds—amazing—to the endowment model?
There we go.
I mean, it's a pretty smooth transition for me. Give me credit. I do want to start with laying the landscape and framework for how CMU operates and is structured today. If you think about a construction that's easy for everyone to understand, what does that portfolio construction look like for CMU today from a top-down perspective?
From a top-down perspective, we manage $4 billion on behalf of the university. Starting at the highest level, we think of equity and fixed income as the 2 parts of the endowment. 85% of the endowment is equity, and 15% is fixed income. That is our allocation, and we manage to that on a quarterly basis.
One step below that are the sub-asset classes within it. Our target is for 50% of the portfolio to be in privates. That's a mixture of venture capital, private equity, real estate, natural resources, and private credit. The other 50% is hedge funds and liquids, which are public equities and fixed income. That is the top-down management of the portfolio.
Within that private bucket, we have free rein into the underlying allocations. We call it a best-athlete portfolio. How do we find the best risk-adjusted returns globally across all of those different private asset classes so we can have the best risk-adjusted return for the portfolio?
When you look at it today, how has that makeup changed over time in terms of where the private commitments lie?
Yeah.
So, from a liquidity perspective, we've been fortunate compared to most endowments, where that private equity book has been self-funding the past 3 years. Our distributions have paid for our capital calls over the past 3 years.
The sub-asset classes within that have had very different performance. Our buyout portfolio, our private equity portfolio, has contributed the most to those distributions. Venture has been the largest detractor of those, but it's been self-funding, right? So our private equity book, at that 50% number, has stayed relatively consistent for the past 6 or 7 years. As distributions from venture have slowed down dramatically over the past 3 years, venture has risen as the NAV has risen, but there have been markdowns along the way as well.
So, when you think about commitment to venture as a whole, what is the percentage commitment to venture as a whole of the endowment?
For us, venture globally is a little less than 25% of the total endowment, so almost half of that private equity book.
How does that compare to others like you?
I'd say we're overweight venture by, call it, anywhere from 5 to 10 points versus most other endowments of our size. We're underweight hedge funds and real assets, which would be real estate and natural resources. On privates as a whole, we're right on par with most endowments, plus or minus 5 points.
When you think about all of those different asset classes that you can allocate to, how do you think about opportunity cost? I think you said it before, which is a unit of return per unit of risk.
We take everything from a lens of risk first. When you think about the different private asset classes, you've got real estate, natural resources, private equity, and venture capital, which is a mixture of growth and early stage.
Take real estate, for example. You could have an industrial building that does a triple-net lease, with rents being paid by Amazon. Those rents increase 3% a year. It's a very stable asset. There's a replacement cost to that asset. It's not nearly as risky, and so the returns will compensate for that. It is not as risky of an asset, right?
Venture—picture early-stage venture—it's a $100 million fund investing into 2 or 3 people with an idea. It could be a completely new idea. It could be an idea going against big incumbents. The company is not going to be profitable when they start out. It's probably the riskiest asset class you could have. So you want to get compensated—you need to get compensated—for the risk you're taking within that asset class.
Do you think LPs are getting paid for the risk that they are taking investing in venture?
Absolutely not.
Why not?
We take a very hard look at the data that comes out of the asset class. There's really good data from about 1998 to today. You look at the median IRR for the asset class over that time period for mature funds, right? We'll look at the 10- and 15-year returns for every one of those vintages, stopping at 2016, as that's going to be the closest to a mature vintage you're going to get.
The median IRR is about 8% net for that asset class, and the top quartile is a bit higher, at 15%, but the MOIC is about 2.5x, right? The big difference is when you look at those performance numbers on a DPI basis. We'll stretch that from 10 to 15 years. Top-quartile DPI for 15-year-vintage funds from 1998 up until 2015 is 1.8x.
When we think about those underlying asset classes and our public equity portfolio, we have a public market equivalent for every private asset class we invest in, right? For real estate, it could be VNQ, Vanguard's REIT index. For our buyout portfolio, it could be a small- and mid-cap value index. For venture, it's the QQQs, the Nasdaq-100, and that's been the best-performing PME globally over the past 25 years.
When we think about “absolutely not, you're not getting paid for the risks that you're taking,” and a statement that you said to me before, which is 90% of LPs shouldn't be investing in venture, who should and who shouldn't, then?
That's the million-dollar question. I think you need to have a frank conversation with—say you're a new endowment or a new family office, and you say, “We want technology exposure.” You've got 2 options. You could do that through the public markets, or you could do that through the private markets.
My question to any new allocator or investor is: Do you think you're going to have access to top-decile managers? At that point, top decile, you are achieving returns above the PME consistently, but below that, even top quartile, you're not. That is the question, and I think most people, clearly by the data, especially as a new entrant to a mature asset class, are not going to have top-decile access.
That instantly suggests, though, that you're working on historical, lagging data, which is obviously their prior returns, not a first-time fund or smaller micro-funds that are in their first vintages. That is where we see a lot of family offices and even smaller endowment funds playing today. How do you think about that?
A strategy that a lot of people are taking is first-time funds and smaller funds, as the incredible performance of the now-multistage venture firms has allowed them to scale. We spend time in that space as well, but it is a place that is quite risky. New funds, small funds, and a hypercompetitive part of the market. There are thousands and thousands of managers: specific seed funds, angel funds, and operators.
You know what I find funny? Sorry, I want this also to be an open and free discussion.
Yeah.
I find it really funny how all LPs love $50 million to $100 million seed funds, and when you actually run the math on average seed-round sizes, that's the worst place to be. The average seed round is $4 million to $5 million. To write a check with ownership, you need $3 million to $3.5 million. If you want enough diversification, you need 30, and so you need $3 million to $3.5 million checks. Well, that's $90 million. You're not going to have that with a $50 million to $100 million fund. It's impossible.
So then you either have subscale ownership or subscale diversification, or you do what everyone does, which is that they end up writing tweener checks, like $1.5 million checks. It is fucking hard to get a $1.5 million check into a $3 million to $4 million seed round when the best in the world want it. Put $50K in, but $1.5 million? Mm-mm.
My response to that would be: Consensus seed deals—either a consensus founder or a consensus idea—are extremely hard to play in because the multistage firms have all planted a flag at seed and have essentially said, “We're going to— all these seed funds are our shrapnel. We're going to blow your model up at a much cheaper cost of capital than you, and we can deploy $5 million, $10 million checks at seed when the model traditionally was $2 million to $3 million.”
But if you're doing nonconsensus founders and nonconsensus ideas, those rounds are usually noncompetitive, and that shows up in price and ownership. So I'd say that's the question I would pose back.
Do you actually see that in your portfolios? Because I don't actually know what is nonconsensus anymore. The rounds that were in the old days, they're kind of not now. Find non-AI deals, but non-AI deals are still priced incredibly rich. Actually, when you push now, it's impossible. It's such a mature asset class; I don't think you have that luxury on price.
The true moat of early-stage venture capital is the picking skill. You look at some of the most incredible companies that have ever come out of the venture asset class: Airbnb, Uber, SpaceX, and Amazon all struggled mightily to raise their seed rounds.
To your question, is there so much capital available at seed today that that's never going to be the case moving forward? I hope and pray not as an allocator to the space. I still believe there is a moat around picking, but we'll see.
So, unpack for me. Do you think venture's an access game or a picking game? You're in some of the best brand names. Is it access or is it picking?
I think it's both.
You have to weigh it out of 100.
Oof. Weigh it out of 100. I would say if you are a multistage firm that is deploying large checks at scale, 70% access, 30% picking. If you are a small and nimble early-stage fund that is trying to break the mold, I'm going to say it's 70% picking. I'll flip it, yeah, 30% access.
So, we mentioned multistage funds getting seed. We mentioned the seed firms, which are $50 million to $100 million. Well, I don't like them. What do you like? When you see a fund come through the door, where are you like, “That's straight down the fairway for me size-wise, geo-wise”? Hit me.
For us, the sweet spot is dependent, first, on the GP's skill set and what they've done previously. For us and our commitment size—which at the low end is, call it, $10 million—we'll do an $80 million fund at the low end. At the high end, anywhere from $400 million to $1 billion, right? In that range, dependent on the skill set and the track record of the team.
It's very much dependent on the people: what they've done, what they've proven, what they want to do with this fund, and the pattern matching and diligence we can do against that.
We said about access and picking.
We spoke before this about the pillars of venture. I'd love it if you could just unpack the pillars of venture, how you think about them, and where you place more and less emphasis.
Yeah. So the five are sourcing, picking, winning, helping, and selling. Selling is going to be the newest of those five, I think, for the asset class as a muscle as a whole.
Do you think your managers have been good at selling over the past decade?
Some yes, some no. Union Square broadly—and we're not an investor there; we wish we were—but I think they've perennially been the best at selling. They've got a very strict protocol that they run through, from years 8 to 12 on those funds and with those founders, to let them know that they are going to be active sellers.
Do you think managers should distribute shares, stock? Do you think Sequoia is right that, with the evergreen fund structure, they are best placed and have asymmetric information? How do you think about that?
We like them to distribute cash versus stock. The reason being, if they distribute stock to us, there is sometimes a time lag between when we sell it and when others sell it, and so there could be a 1% to 2% pricing discrepancy versus them distributing cash. Day one is quite easy. They sell that entire book immediately, and they distribute that to all their LPs equally.
Do you think the last generation did a good enough job selling in the 2021 and 2022 vintage?
Clearly not. I think that's a pretty easy one. The one thing I'll say is that the reason it got so crazy was that the public markets were pricing growth assets for an 18-month period at—you know, the median ARR multiple for a software company was 20 times, and if you were a top-quartile grower, it was 40 times. Everyone looked at their models and thought their company was going to be worth 2 or 3 times what it was in 3 years. You had public-market comps to support your reasoning for holding stock, but that all changed very quickly.
Do you believe managers' books? We all come back with these prices in terms of the marks on our books, which is where we mark our portfolios' latest valuations. Do you think managers are accurate enough in how they price their books?
Certain ones, yes; certain ones, no.
Who's the best?
Usually the multi-stage firms—think your perennial firms like Excels or Sequoia. They're taking very aggressive discounts on basically all of their securities. Even if it's a great company that is maybe achieving an even higher price on the secondary market, they're still going to hold that at a 20% to 30% discount.
But 2021 caused us to create new muscles in regard to underwriting as a group as well. For any re-up or any new manager we diligence, we'll look at the top 10 company NAVs within that general partnership. We'll underwrite those companies ourselves, and we will, on a rough approximation, determine: Are these assets extremely overvalued, undervalued, or fairly valued?
I think my biggest worry is that we've got a generation of marked books where they're like, "Oh, it may not be the 5X fund. It might be the 2.5X fund." I'm worried that it's not even going to be that. Do you think there's a realization among LPs of, bluntly, the dire nature of some of the books?
Look at the data. A top-quartile TVPI is 2.5X. Top-quartile DPI is 1.8X.
One thing that really pisses me off, because I do some LP checks when I meet managers, is, "Listen. I don't know if we're going to do an 8X, but we'll definitely do a 6X." And I'm like, "Do you know how hard it is to do that?"
Brutal.
Anything that managers say in the early meetings with you where you're like, "Oh, no, just don't say that"?
I've had a few manager meetings where folks come right out and proactively say how easy what they're doing is, how much great access they have, and the great performance that they will have. They say that the market they play in is just like shooting fish in a barrel. That is always, to me, like, "We're going to stop this call early." It's just the kind of hubris. This is one of the most competitive asset classes in the world, and we look at everybody's returns. We see how hard it is, like you said, to achieve a 6X net fund. So that's definitely a big one.
Starting at the start of the—I'm jumping around so much, but I love this. Fuck it. We said about the five pillars. Starting at the start of that process, we've got the access element, or the sourcing element. How many managers do you actually think have proprietary sourcing where you're actually like, "Ah, I see. They see shit that no one else does"?
The premier funds on Sand Hill Road and in London, such as yourself—
Well played. Thank you.
You're welcome.
Yeah.
I think there is no systematic sourcing strategy. The partners and the brands are so strong, and they're so networked in the S-tier founder community. They're just going to be a first call for a lot of these firms.
I think if you are doing a more esoteric strategy, such as bootstrapped companies in Australia or some of these tertiary markets—in Pittsburgh, right?—you can build automated CRMs to maybe track some of those companies that are going to be off the radar of your traditional Silicon Valley firm. But I think for those more traditional firms, the brand and strength of the partners mean that there isn't much of a systematic sourcing strategy there.
The thing is, when you are such a tier-one brand name, you just become a de facto meeting in the fundraising process. Before I sign the term sheet, I'm going to go to Index, Accel, Sequoia—you name your firm. But you just want to be one of the flagposts.
I'll always remember Pat Grady saying a brilliant thing to me. He's so humble, which is why I love him so much. He said, "People think we're so successful. Harry, pretty much every software company that goes public, we've missed—that we're not in—because we do see a lot. That's on us." I thought that was, A, incredibly humble, but B, the flagship. They see everything at some point in the journey.
100%. Those partnerships have clearly stood the test of time.
When you think about proprietary access where you actually buy it, who stands out most to you?
On the sourcing side?
Yeah.
Well, I mean—
I'd say the Partovi's—Ali Partovi. The dude is in, like—
Yeah, that fund is incredible.
What the fuck?
Cursor.
What the fuck?
A few others, yeah.
Amazing for him. I'm so pleased for him, but that stands out to me. Any for you?
It's become such a crowded market. There are so many alternatives. You've got South Park Commons, you've got Ali Partovi and his network, you've got YC, you've got Techstars, and you've got a thousand seed funds.
Outside of maybe a few like Ali, I think sourcing broadly—and now I'm willing to be wrong here—but I think there's a lot of luck in sourcing. You're just hustling. You're going out, you're getting emails from friends, you're getting emails from partners, and you're taking as many meetings as you can. You're on a call with a Harry, and he's like, "Wow, Harry is fucking unbelievable. I'm going to dive into this." That's the magic of venture, right? That's how I see most of it.
I agree with you, which is why in some respects I do think it is a young person's game, because it's about pounding the pavements—
Yeah.
—being there, showing up at 7:00 a.m. That takes youth in a lot of ways. Picking is the next element. Difficult to unpack in a lot of ways. Who do you think is the best picker that you know?
I love the way Mike Maples discusses picking—the way he thinks about companies that are going against the grain of the universe and are inherently not going to be super attractive or super hot because it is against the grain and dysfunctional against the way our human minds work today.
I'll never forget when I first heard of Uber. I thought it was the stupidest idea I'd ever heard. That's how you know I'd be a bad venture capitalist. I was late in college. I'm going to get in some random person's car and they're going to drive me somewhere? Same with Airbnb. I'm going to go to some random person's house and I'm just going to sleep in their bedroom? This is the craziest idea ever, right?
Those are the people and investors—Cyan Banister, another one—whose ability to see into the future is something that not a lot of people can do. It's a superpower.
How do you unpack whether someone's a good picker? Is it just looking at track record?
I think it's looking at track record, understanding the true thought behind what they were thinking when they made that investment and when they met that founder. Then we speak to founders, and so we want to hear their side of the story as well. What was that pitch like with the broader community? They'll usually tell you, "No one would even pick up the phone for us. No one would respond to our emails." Cyan or Harry sat down, and they had a blink in their eye and saw the idea.
They believed in us before everyone else did. We really want to understand the depth and granularity of those stories.
Do you often get bad references?
Yes.
Do you?
Yes.
Wow.
The way we think about referencing, when we do a new fund, we're looking for at least 20 reference calls, right?
20 reference calls.
We'll take 5 from the GP, which are the worst references we'll get, right?
Yeah. Miles was great.
Well, yeah, exactly.
Miles was great. Yeah.
And by worst, I mean they're going to be patting Harry on the back, right?
He's also the godfather of my children.
Right. Exactly.
He's my best friend from school.
So those references we don't spend too much time on. The golden references are the off-sheet references. Thankfully, venture is such a networked community that if you spend enough time in the asset class, you're able to build those networks pretty quickly.
Do you give a shit about other people's perspectives on other GPs, like venture to venture? Does that make much—
Perspectives on strategy, not so much. We're very much trying to find interpersonal risk and partnership risk. Those are 2 things that we're really digging into. We want to know: are they a good person? Have they created a bad persona among other people? Have they wronged others in a pretty malicious way?
Then we want to understand the partnership dynamic—things that they will never tell us on a phone call. We could ask them bluntly, to their face, “Is there any risk in the partnership? Does Harry like Sally? How is the mesh?”
They'll say, “Oh, it's incredible. This is the best partnership ever. We love each other. We sit down every day. We've never disagreed on a deal.” We spend a lot of time trying to understand that partnership risk.
What is the number one reason you think partnerships break down?
Incentives. Incentives and who's working the hardest. Those are going to be the 2 every time.
Do you think we have a generation of venture firms where the partnerships are staying together for the kids?
I personally think you've seen partnerships…
Implode?
The amount of change you've seen in partnerships over the past 2 years is the most I've seen combined in my 8-year history as an LP.
How do you justify that? How do you reason that?
I think there are a lot of reasons. First, folks who had made a lot of money didn't want to deal with the crap that you're dealing with today: 3 years of no liquidity, dealing with broken cap tables, dealing with founder transitions. It's just a lot of hard, gritty work that, if you made a lot of money, why do it?
Second, if you are a newer GP, you were promised a certain amount of compensation for your role, and part of that was variable carried interest. That carry has evaporated as performance has come down. Now you're getting paid 70% less than what you thought you were, so why not start fresh? Why not start with a new book, or why not start my own firm?
Why not start your own firm? We're seeing a lot of spin-outs too. Do you love spin-outs? I think they're drastically overrated.
Yeah. We historically have not done many, if any, spin-outs. Call it your tier-one, clean spin-outs. Kevin Hartz at Astar is a new partner of ours, and he was at Founders Fund for a few years. He wasn't there that long. He was still—
And he was kind of tinkering on the side.
Yeah.
We both love Kevin. He wouldn't mind.
Yeah.
He was always a founder.
Yeah, exactly. We traditionally have not done many spin-outs.
When you think about getting a good read on that, time helps. How do you think about your willingness to write checks fast versus the need to build the relationship over time, with the knowledge that they might scale if you wait 3 funds?
It's a risk we take openly. I'd say half of the new funds that we commit to, we will not invest in right when we meet them. We'll spend a 6- to 12-month period and invest in their fund that year. For the other half, we'll take either 1 fund or 2 funds into the future. So, over 3 to 6 years, we'll build that relationship over time.
The way we think about it is, if you're an early-stage venture fund, it's going to take at least 15 years for that fund to be wrapped up—probably 18 to be fully done, with all positions liquidated. When we back a new manager, we want to back them for at least 3 funds. Call it 25 years of an illiquid relationship. It's twice the length of an average marriage in the US. I don't know what marriages are like here in Europe, but—
I think we're less. I think we're 7.
Yeah, probably less.
Yeah. It's the one thing we're more proactive than Americans in.
Congrats.
You know what's fascinating about that, given the duration you mentioned there, is also LP churn. LP churn is fricking real right now.
Yeah.
Oh my God. How should GPs think about LP churn?
First, it's good to have a relatively diversified LP base, which protects you from that. So, a mixture—but not everyone can choose their LP base, right? Sometimes it's, “Take whatever—”
Money's money at the end of the day.
Yeah, money's green. In a best-case scenario, you've got a mix of endowments, foundations, family offices, founders, maybe a couple of GP checks from venture funds—a mixture of folks who are aligned to your long-term vision.
Inherently, stuff's going to happen. Folks are going to have a liquidity crunch. A family office's family is going to say, “Fuck venture. We don't want to play in this asset class anymore.” You're going to have some things come up. Being open to that and trying to still be as good of a partner as you can is pretty important.
How much is the right amount in terms of concentration from your biggest investor?
Anything more than 30%.
30%?
Mm-hmm.
Wow.
Yeah.
I'll never forget Mickey Malcher, I think it was, telling me 10%.
Yeah. Best-case scenario, you don't have anyone at more than 10%. But if you're raising a $50 million or $100 million fund and you can secure a $10 million, $20 million, or $30 million check from someone who's aligned for the long term, that still makes sense. But best-case scenario, yeah.
Yeah, I was lucky we did 10% on the back of Mickey. Fantastic advisor. Okay, so I totally get that. We have the 10% there. In terms of stability, I was always taught that endowment funds are the blue chip for stability. Is there a rubric? How do you think about advising managers on stability among different asset classes of LPs?
Yeah, I think you're right historically, with endowments being quite long-term-oriented. The endowment model in the US today has headwinds. In particular, certain endowments are going to start getting taxed. They call it the 8% range. That's 5 endowments. That's a headwind to their model, in a sense. It's not as bad as the 20% that it was going to look like a month ago.
Would you expect them to cut positions, downsize?
It's all going to depend on what they do with their draw.
What does that mean?
An endowment is mandated every year: 5% of the endowment goes to campus to support scholarships, professors' salaries, buildings, and so on. That can range anywhere from 4% to 6%, but most endowments have stayed right at that 5% number forever.
If it turns out we're going to start getting taxed 8%, we could lever our drawdown to 4.5% versus 5%, because the real risk you run as an endowment is eating into the purchasing power of the endowment.
The way an endowment works, you have a 5% draw every year, and then inflation is, call it, 3% for higher education here in the US. To maintain the corpus—the purchasing power of that endowment—you need an 8% return.
Most endowments are targeting an 8% to 10% return over the long term, over 10 or 15 years. When you start getting closer to that number, you run into some real risks. It will depend on what they do with their draw. If they don't reduce the draw, I think venture broadly will be okay. It will still be the idiosyncratic headwind that there's just no capital coming back from venture. That's the headwind to the asset class for LPs re-upping today.
What do you advise managers in terms of closes? First closes, many closes, one close?
I think GPs should be spending the least amount of time fundraising as possible. That's not your job, and you make your money investing. But some people are not as fortunate to just do the one-and-done closes, so I think it's very much dependent on your situation.
Best-case scenario, you have a very crisp timeline. You know, we're going to do our first close here. Lining up your LPs and being sure they're committed to that process, and doing the work on the subdocs and the legal work prior to that, is really important. It's about setting clear timelines.
Do you mind if a manager's ever sold part of the management company?
Yes, absolutely. A massive red flag for us, and I would say most institutional LPs. I'm not going to speak for everybody, but—
No, it is, but it's just one of those things where I see so many first-time GPs bullied into it by one large investor, often a family office, and then really regret it over time. It's the one thing where I'm like, "No, no, no, never."
The magic of a partnership is the carried interest, and you are now giving that carried interest away to a silent partner who is not going to be, like we said, grinding and taking 100 calls a week and working 9/9/6 like you.
Yeah, baby.
How do you— And so, how do you feel when you deliver incredible returns and a silent partner is getting a decent chunk of that carried interest? It's a problem.
How do you think about the rise of multi-stage platforms, dude? You mentioned the 8% to 10% that these kinds of endowment funds, and the endowment model, rely on to keep that kind of corpus the same. Everyone says, "Oh, well, it's going to be fine," because, basically, yes, they will have worse returns being multi-stage funds—8% to 12%, say—but the LPs they have are different now, and that's good enough for them. How do you think about that?
It worries us. The funds are extremely large today, and I think it's hard to assume the same returns you had from 2010 to, call it, 2017. I think Masa and SoftBank—I would put the flag in the ground at Vision Fund 1—were when all the other venture firms saw that as the opportunity to absolutely scale their capital base.
It's wrong to assume the returns you had from those years, when most all venture funds were basically raising a $400 million Series A fund—all the premier funds—and maybe they had a $400 million growth fund attached to it. But the fund sizes stayed basically the same for a decade, and so it worries us tremendously.
Do you think they will post as good returns, then? No.
No. I'll walk you through a very simple math that other LPs can put in their back pocket, but for how we underwrite these big funds today. Simple math, but I'll walk you through it.
This is a live manager; I won't share their name, but this is a manager we underwrote a year ago. This manager was targeting a $7 billion fundraise. What we do is dollar-weighted entry ownership across their different funds. This had a $1 billion early-stage fund, a $2 billion to $3 billion growth fund, and the rest was an opportunity fund. As an LP, most LPs have to invest pro rata across those funds—equally, as a percentage of the fund across those funds.
Inherently, your smallest check is going to be to that early-stage fund. Your largest checks are going to be to the growth and opportunity funds. What we do is look at the early-stage fund. This fund, call it, had 15% entry ownership; the growth fund had about 6% to 7%, and the opportunity fund had about 2.5% to 3% ownership.
We dollar-weight that across the funds, and then we look at our check: What is the average entry ownership our check is getting within those funds? This fund was about 5% across those vehicles, dollar-weighted. The very simple math there is $7 billion divided by 5%, which is $140 billion, right?
That's the enterprise value. That is the market cap of the companies—the size of the companies they are deploying that fund into: $140 billion. For us, when we do a venture fund, our target is a 4x net. That's our goal. These funds—the early-stage funds charge 2.5 and 30, and growth funds charge 2 and 20—so you're going to need at least a 6x gross to get a 4x net on that fund.
$140 billion times 6, you're close to $800 billion of market cap needed to return a 4x net for those multi-stage funds. For reference, in 2021, the best exit year of all time, there was $850 billion-ish of market cap exit value from that year. You need an entire year of IPOs and M&A just for this one manager. Clearly, it's going to be broken up over numerous years, but that's a staggering number.
My counter to you there would be you're assessing performance today on the current outcome size, not projecting forward to what it could be in 10 years' time. In other words, now we have 9 or 10 $1 trillion companies. We didn't have any 10 years ago. The outcome sizes are so much bigger than they've ever been.
If we project forward a decade, there's a very real chance that Microsoft is worth $10 trillion, and actually, we have 50 trillion-dollar companies. If that's the case, we could see that play out.
It could. We acknowledge that we could be wrong, and SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic go public at $1 trillion valuations.
What we look at—and like I said, this is backwards-looking data—but we'll give you a few data points. There have been 11 venture-backed $50 billion IPOs—11. The 2 largest venture-backed IPOs ever were Facebook in 2012 and Alibaba in 2014.
So we've gone a decade, through one of the greatest venture bubbles of all time, in 2021, and we still haven't had a bigger exit than we were getting in 2012 and 2014. My guess is that a $100 billion IPO over the next 10 years is still going to be a generational outcome. The question I throw back is: Do you think there are going to be 10, 20, $100 billion-plus IPOs? I do not think so. You look at the trillion—
Well, I think there'll be 10, 20, way more, actually, $100 billion-plus outcomes, because what I'm finding so worrying right now is, bluntly, there are so many exciting companies that I would love to be a part of, whether it's your Anthropic, whether it's your OpenAI, whether it's your SpaceX. I can't get access to them given the extension of private markets. These are all companies that would be in the $100 billion IPO price range.
Oh, Stripe, SpaceX—
For sure.
OpenAI—those are all $100 billion companies today, for sure.
But where does the rubber meet the road there? At some point, the liquidity can has to be passed to someone who goes, "Fuck it, I need it."
Yeah. And even still, 2021 is a good learning opportunity. Most, if not all—except maybe Palantir and a few others—of these very large 2021 IPOs are still down significantly from that price today. These were the greatest venture assets of that vintage.
To say that it's a guarantee that OpenAI is going to be worth $1 trillion in 5 years, there is a lot of risk involved in that. What we posit back to our team is: What is the margin of safety that great investors Warren Buffett and Benjamin Graham coined these terms—what's the margin of safety we want when investing in a fund, given what we have to believe in to achieve our desired return?
I would rather not have to believe in $800 billion of market cap IPOs and M&A transactions to get a 4x net, versus other funds where maybe we have to believe in—maybe it's a $1 billion fund, but its entry ownership is 10%, and we have to believe in $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 billion, right? Anything above that is where you get the real alpha.
It's hard for us to imagine, on these very large multi-stage funds, having that kind of alpha.
Who is the single best performer to you at scale?
Index, I think they have to be. In a market that is as bad as you hear in the news and from all the folks on the podcast, the performance they've delivered and are delivering into the future is unbelievable.
They're the largest shareholder in Figma, the largest shareholder in Dream Games, the largest shareholder in Wiz, and the second-largest shareholder in Scale AI and Revolut. It's unbelievable. I give Index all the credit in the world for not scaling. They even reduced their latest fund size after the 2021 era.
I give them a ton of credit for not aggressively scaling. They could raise as much capital as they want to, and they don't. They are the most performance-driven culture that we see, and so I give them a ton of respect for that.
Danny has been unbelievably good to me since I was very, very young—18 or 19 years old—which I think is a testament to him helping the next generation amazingly. My question to you on the back of that is: Do you think they're in for a hard time?
I'm not singling them out, but the funds that are in that $1 billion to $2 billion range, where they're sizable but they're not that sizable—when you're General Catalyst, Lightspeed, or SoftBank, your cost of capital is just, to throw out a $10 million check, "Thanks for the coffee." When you're in the Index range, you're not one or the other. You're in the middle ground. How do you assess and think about that?
I absolutely think they will continue to survive and thrive at that range. I think you have enough capital to write big checks, right? So you can participate in the abnormally large seed, Series A, and Series B rounds. You have enough capital, and it's a limited amount where you can still drive extreme parallel outcomes within the fund.
And I think the performance-driven culture and what that brand stands for—being the backer of some of the most generational companies of all time. You had Vlad on the show recently. You should ask him why he went back to Index for his new math company. He could have gone to probably a cheaper source of capital and gotten funding from Masa at SoftBank or General Catalyst, or you name it.
Because Mickey told him to fuck off.
He probably could have gone to a cheaper source of capital and raised from Masa at SoftBank or General Catalyst, or you name it.
But just to be clear, you don't actually inherently believe in that fund-size range. You actually just think Index is so good.
What do you mean?
You don't love the $1 billion to $2 billion fund sizes. You just think Index is so good that they'd make anything work.
Well, most people, right? Most funds can't raise $1 billion or $2 billion, so most are inherently going to be in the lower end. And then the ones that can have had good enough performance. Most of them scale.
Have they? Most of the big funds have not got great performance.
I think so. We've looked at all of their returns. These people deserve to raise larger funds, right? They've produced really strong performance.
So when do you say, “Enough's enough. I'm out. It's too big. It's not my game”?
First, we lean on the math. Even if you own 10% of a generational $20 billion outcome, which is still going to be generational—Figma is a generational company. It's probably going to— we'll see where it prices—call it $20 billion to $25 billion.
If you're GC, their last fundraise was $7 billion. Say you own 10% of Figma, which is a generational company: $2 billion. They're going to take 20% of that. I mean, you've returned, what, 0.2x? You need 15 Figmas. It's mind-boggling to me.
My favorite was also Wiz, which was obviously a $30 billion or $31 billion outcome—the GDP of the country.
Yeah.
And it returned a third of Insight Partners' fund.
Yeah.
And you're like, “I'd be really pissed if I was the guy that led Wiz.” And I'm like, “Oh, well, thanks for the third.”
I'm sure he's happy enough that he still did it.
Listen, I'm sure he is, but I'm just like, “Ah.”
Yeah.
So you go back to core math.
We go back to core math. What we really try to understand is this: this is more qualitative, but at some point, the alignment breaks, in our opinion, between the GP and the LP.
Let me put this clearly. I don't ever blame a GP for raising bigger funds. I love incredible business models. I study, I live, I eat, I breathe investing. These business models these GPs are creating are some of the best high-margin businesses ever created, and they're stacking funds.
Think of a firm that has raised $7 billion in this fund. They raised $5 billion in their prior fund. They raised $3 billion before that: $15 billion of capital. They're charging full fees on all of that, right? So they're making, call it, $300 million a year in fees.
For often, like, 5 or 6 partners, where 80% of that fee stream goes.
Yeah.
So really, you're trying to understand whether the magic bond has been broken between GPs and LPs?
Yeah. We really try to understand whether the magic bond has been broken between GPs and LPs, which leads us to think that the fee structures need to change to accommodate that.
Why do you think the fee structures need to change?
Because when you're investing at that size and scale—when you're a fund that big—you are inherently setting up for $100 million checks into very well-established, well-run, well-oiled companies. You are essentially acting as a long-only public-equity investor, right? You're not actively managing the company. They've got their own HR team. They're doing all their own hiring. They've got a 20-person product team and a 10-person BD team. This is a well-oiled machine.
These are what public companies would have been 10 years ago. You're charging 2 and 20 on basically passive investing, right? You're not actively managing most of those positions for most of the time.
I don't think that early-stage managers are actively managing, and I don't think they should be. I work with many, and when they actively manage, they do not make the right decisions. They push managers to do things they shouldn't do. They push them to go enterprise before they should, push them to do more products, push them to scale faster and take on more cash because they want markups. I think you want passive.
Yeah, but you still need the fees for that in a $400 million fund, right? You need a team to go out and meet all of these people.
100%.
You need an office to bring these people in. With a $400 million fund, Harry, you're not going to become a billionaire off of that, right? You're not.
No, sadly.
Sadly, yeah. If you had $15 billion in AUM, which, God bless, I hope you do someday, you're going to become a billionaire off that fund, off those funds, right? That's the difference. You need that capital as a true early-stage venture capital firm. They're utilizing it.
But I get you totally. Fundamentally, leverage is everything, and these firms can raise the money without changing the fees. So why don't they just go, “Dude, thanks for the advice. Fuck you”?
Yes. Absolutely.
So we're never going to get this fee structure changed?
Do you puke when you see 3 and 30?
Yes.
Yeah.
Yes.
And that's nuts.
Yeah. It's remarkable, right?
But you suck it up and pay it.
But this is the one—Renaissance Technologies, the best hedge fund of all time. They were so good that, at one point, I think they were charging 60% or 70% carry and 20% management fees, and they kept increasing it. They kept increasing carry and increasing management fees to incentivize their LPs to get out of the fund because they wanted all the capital for themselves.
The performance was so good that people would pay them whatever they wanted to be in that fund. What's hard for us to understand today is that, when you look at the performance data on a $7 billion fund, you don't think, “God, we will pay whatever we need to get into those funds.”
Our hope is—and the hedge fund industry went through this cycle after the global financial crisis—that there were thousands upon thousands of hedge funds, and they were all charging 2 and 20. Performance was incredible for a very long period of time. All the funds increased competition, returns came down, the global financial crisis happened, and you had a complete bottoming out of the hedge fund industry, which obviously gave rise to these incredible multi-strat hedge funds. But fee structures changed dramatically from 2005 to 2007, then from 2010 to 2013.
What will fee structures be in venture in 10 years' time?
If you're raising that early-stage fund, the core $500 million Series A fund, charge us 2.5 and 20. If you're good enough, 2.5 and 30—we're okay with that, right?
But those growth funds that are really for scaled businesses, that are mature assets, should be charging long-only public-equity fees, which are 1 and 10. If you really love your LPs, it would be 0 and 10, or budget-based, based on the team. But 10% carry—that's the number for a passive long-only investor.
Going back to the size, when we scale out of you, so to speak, is there ever a case for LPs where it's like, “You know what? You've made us so much money before. Even though we may not believe in it, we're in for loyalty”?
I think certain LPs, yes. Us, no. We are in an extreme performance-driven culture.
But if a fund does you a 6x or 7x net, which is amazing, and then they raise a big-ass fund, which most would do after that great number, do you ever go, “We've got to come back, and you should have done a 6x or 7x net for us”?
It depends. It depends on how different that fund is and how different the strategy is. It very much is dependent on the situation.
How do you think about this? I have a lot of LPs who are like, “I want to be in X brand name.” And I'm like, “That's not the best risk-adjusted return. There's an opportunity cost to your cash. I think you should be in one of these 3 names.” And they go, “No, no, you don't get it. I don't care about the performance. I just want to be in Andreessen, Sequoia or Index.” How do you respond to the brand-driven nature of LP allocations?
I get why. I think it goes back to an incentive problem in the LP industry. From me personally, I could be your janitor here at the 20VC offices, and I'm going to be the best janitor you've ever had. These are going to be the cleanest floors you've ever had. This is going to be the cleanest table you've ever had.
If my name’s gonna be on it and I’m gonna be a part of it, I am gonna put my 150%. But maybe there are certain people who are incentivized to park capital in brand names that won’t get them fired, right? No one gets fired for buying IBM, right? That’s the classic quote. That’s a problem.
For you, is it easier for you at CMU to get a check done into an X brand name versus saying, “Hey, I love Cyan. I’m gonna go out on a limb and get Long Journey in”?
We have an investment committee that we go to for approval. That’s our governance committee, and we write a detailed memo for any re-up or any new name in the portfolio, and we gotta present our merits and concerns.
But we’ve educated our governance, which is such an important part of any LP that’s wanting to get into venture: having the proper governance set up to allow you to take these very long-term bets. We educate them on the math, the risk-adjusted return of the funds, and the fee structures. And so, they’re very understanding of our strategy and how we think about the world.
Do LPs not realize that some managers are doing $30 million, $40 million, $50 million a year in fees in terms of what’s going back to them at the large multistage? And do LPs hate it?
I think certain LPs choose to just not even think about it, frankly. And so certain LPs, such as ourselves, I will never blame you, Harry, for raising $10 billion. I will never blame you for doing that, and I’ll never blame a GP for doing— I’ll never bash a GP, saying, “Oh, how dare you?” Right? It’s the market. You’ve obviously done something well enough that’s allowing you to raise that capital. It’s our choice to determine: is that the right place, risk-adjusted, for our capital?
But you’re not gonna write me $1 billion.
No.
Dude, come on.
No.
Come on.
No.
I thought we had such a good rapport.
I think not enough people see this as a game of levers. And what I mean by a game of levers is, like, you can have a smaller fund, but deploy it more quickly and actually play that lever game to just amass the fee game and the AUM game. How do you think about temporal diversification? We saw a real shift from 3-year deployment to 2-year deployment. How do you think about that?
I think it’s very important. It all stems from what that GP told you they were going to do. If they told us, “Hey, this is a 2-year fundraising cycle. We’re investing it in 2 years,” and they come back to us 2 years later, we’re okay with that. We underwrote that, right?
But if this is a 3- to 4-year investment period, and you told us it was gonna take 3 to 4 years, and you come back in 2 years, then we’ll have some questions for you, and we’ll want to work with you to understand why. What’s the reason? Because time diversification is extremely important.
What happens if they’re slower? Is that bad?
No, I don’t think so.
’Cause a lot of people say, “Oh, play the game on the field.”
Play the game on the field, right. I think certain folks would have bear-hugged their GPs today for not playing the game on the field in 2021. We’re not investors, but Mark Suster—I give him all the credit in the world. He’s been in the game for a long time. He saw 2021 as an insane period, and he strip-sold a majority of his portfolios and his funds for a very good price.
DPI in the pocket. All of his LPs are bear-hugging him for that. Brutal market. Tough market.
Isn’t it a brutal market?
Yes. You look at the data, both at European venture fundraising and U.S. fundraising. We’ll see what Q3 and Q4 look like. But in the U.S., this is gonna be the lowest year since 2017.
Same.
So it goes back a bit further, maybe to 2016, but it all goes back to liquidity.
What’s the takeaway from that? Is it the lack of liquidity? Is it the concentration of capital to a few names that have scaled and just eaten up more of those dollar allocations? What is the conclusion from that?
A lot of different reasons. I think the main reason is liquidity. From 2002 to 2004, you had more dollars raised in the public markets from IPOs than you did from 2022 to 2024, and with an asset class 10 times the size.
And just for reference, the dot-com bubble took 13 years from the peak of the dot-com bubble to get back to par on your public equity position in the Qs or the Nasdaq. That was a real downturn. It makes 2021 look like pennies. And you had more IPOs raised in the 3 years following that.
Something clearly is broken in the industry, given how bad the liquidity was over the past 3 years. And I think what really frustrated LPs is that you watch the public markets continue, especially as the factor exposure to technology has done tremendously.
I am not ever a believer that the IPO markets are closed. It’s purely a function of price, right? That is the problem. Folks paid significantly too high prices during the peak. Growth has slowed down. There’s not much of a market for a $100 million ARR SaaS company growing 15% with break-even free cash flow when you can buy Microsoft growing top line at 14%, growing earnings at 17%, with real GAAP profits, buying back 1% of the company every year, with the strongest competitive moat in the world.
People get frustrated when it’s like, “Oh, no one’s gonna give me 8 times ARR, 10 times ARR for this business.” We’re like, “Look at the alternatives—what investors could invest in that’s of a similar factor to your company.”
I think PE’s not coming to save us like everyone thinks it will. I think people also always have lower expectations of what it takes to buy good companies. Like you said there, you need to be a 20% grower and profitable, and there are so many companies where they’re bluntly at 10% and not profitable. That’s a tough spot to be in.
Well, yeah, we look at the data.
How close do you get to the underlying portfolio companies?
Very close. We ask for trending revenue, trending gross profit, and trending free cash flow for the top 10 NAVs of every fund we underwrite.
Does every LP do that? No.
No, definitely not.
So when you look at that, do you think you are able to predictably tell good managers in real time?
Yes.
Really?
Because they’ve got great assets.
Even though you have the ones like Circle, say, where for years it’s like, “Eh, eh, maybe?” Like, okay.
Yeah.
And then it turns into an absolute freaking monster.
There’s always going to be an extreme-distribution, right-tail outcome in these funds that is gonna be impossible for us to underwrite, right? And that’s the beauty of venture capital. So we acknowledge that.
Our valuation of the company, we know it’s probably gonna look quite different 3 to 5 years down the road, but we just wanna know: are these good fundamental businesses that are growing in value and that give us conviction that these are gonna be real, durable businesses one day?
How did you analyze Yale and Harvard selling their venture portfolios?
I think there are a lot of factors that go into it, one being the headwinds we talked about to the endowment model. But you look at Harvard selling $1 billion. It’s a $50 billion endowment. I mean, $1 billion—it’s not like some monumental thing for them. That’s probably just a refresh of the portfolio.
But I think there are real lessons learned. I mean, there was an article out today about Yale and CalPERS. CalPERS was the buyer of a piece of Yale’s portfolio, and I was on the phone with our CIO this morning.
Just take a step back. We had a venture capital fund that we committed to in 2012. This fund was in its tail life, 13 years old. We hadn’t looked at this fund in 3 or 4 years. There was 1 asset left in the fund. It was basically fully realized.
We have a great analytics team and an analytics system that tracks our underlying portfolio companies, but the companies have to be over $1 million in NAV for us to see them in our system. And so this company wasn’t even showing up—Circle, the company we’re talking about—in our system because it was below $1 million.
Fast-forward: the manager was holding it at a 30% discount, plus or minus, to the last-round valuation. I think their last priced round was around $5 billion, so they were holding it at a $3.5 billion-ish valuation. And you look at Circle, and it’s a $50 billion company today.
This is a 13-year fund that is essentially gonna do an extra 3 turns on the fund in its 13th year. Unbelievable. And so the article with Yale and CalPERS was that CalPERS bought a very large piece of their portfolio, part of which was General Catalyst, and Circle was the largest position in that fund.
And you saw it on TV, no? Or you saw—
No, I was reading the S-1.
Yeah.
My son woke me up one morning, and I was up early. I’m reading the S-1 just for fun, and I’m looking through the cap table and I see our GP on there, and I’m thinking, “Oh my gosh.”
And so I go and start looking through the quarterly reports.
And essentially, in a 2-month timeframe, I think it said in the article they bought $500 million, and you get a $100 million write-up from Circle alone. That's the risk of selling secondaries as a long-term venture investor: you're going to have these crazy right-tail outcomes in the fund that could come to fruition at years 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.
I said to Chuck, I'm not that smart, right? But we would've underwritten Circle if we were looking to sell that fund a year and a half ago, and we probably would've sold. Who would've guessed that Circle was going to trade at 100 times EBITDA in the public markets, and that stablecoins in a year and a half were going to be the hottest sector in crypto? You could not have predicted that. So I'd imagine Yale probably did the same. They probably underwrote that, and they're like, “There's probably not a lot of juice left to squeeze here.”
I have friends at Yale who I'm crying for, and I have friends at CalPERS who I'm crying for with happiness.
Well, I'm sure Yale will do well. It's a fantastic team with a great portfolio. But it just goes to show the risk of these fat-tail outcomes in these funds.
Dude, 10% discount, I think, was the reported number. How did you analyze that? Higher than you thought? Lower than you thought?
Much higher than I thought.
You thought it was higher? You thought, “Wow—”
No, sorry. Much lower than I thought.
I think it's a good deal for them.
No, it's a great deal.
Yeah.
That's what I meant. Yeah, sorry.
Yeah, so it's lower than—
Fantastic. Lower, yeah.
Yeah.
Fantastic deal. Not knowing the underlying GPs in that fund and not knowing the mix between buyouts, real estate, or venture, I would've guessed 20%. Yale's got incredible management in its portfolio, right? So they'll have some pricing power. I would've guessed 20%; that would've been probably the number that I would've put on the board.
Do you think we will see many more of these large institutions doing strip sales of their venture portfolios?
I'm not sure. Certain ones with real liquidity needs, I think they'll have to, right? And so that'll be a forcing function. But still, there's not a ton of secondary capital out there that's going to be able to swallow all of that NAV, right? So if every billion-dollar endowment comes out and says, “We're selling 10% of our venture book,” the pricing there—it's a supply-and-demand market, right? There are only so many buyers.
You talked about the liquidity problem and that being a driver in terms of the brutality of the fundraising market. Scale AI, Dream Games, Figma, Revolut, secondaries, Circle, CoreWeave, Hinge Health, which IPO'd, Chime. Are you just drowning in distributions now?
We are thankful to say that we're now self-funding in our venture book this year—
Woo-hoo.
Which is—
I think that's—
Give us a round of applause. I mean, it's the first time since 2021.
So that's a positive. But on the flip side, there's still a lot of liquidity that, sure, has been announced, but the Wiz deal, right? That's going to be a Q1 2026 event, right? That's got to go through FTC approval. Figma hasn't gone public yet. Dream Games, as stated in the article, they've got to get European approval for—
Do you think—
For that deal.
2026 will be a year where that liquidity really hits?
Yes. And what's exciting me is—and this is a crazy statement, right? It's not that I agree with this statement, but—
Come on, it's just me and you.
Yeah, exactly. For the longest period of time, private-market capital was cheaper than public-market capital, which is the most mind-boggling statement as a fundamental investor ever. It's hard to fathom that, right? But that was the case. That is why the best companies in the world didn't go public: because you could get a cheaper cost of capital, you didn't have to do quarterly earnings calls, and you didn't have to go through all the hoops to go public. Why would you go public?
We speak to founders. We understand why they don't want to go public. But the public markets are now pricing risk very differently than they have over the last 3 years. You look at Circle, Nebius, CoreWeave, Palantir, and Cloudflare—these are all businesses trading at extremely healthy multiples. So my message here to all venture capitalists: now is the time. Please take your companies public.
My question to you on the back of that is, Rory O'Driscoll from Scale always laughs at me and goes, “My favorite thing about Harry,” he goes, “Yes, so what about me?” And I specialize in that. So what about me?
Okay.
If we have this liquidity dropping in 2026, does that mean in 2027 you'll have a load of LPs flush with cash coming back to the venture asset class going, “Let's fund some more funds”?
Inherently, it will help, clearly. And particularly as maybe folks take back—
But is the needle moving on that, really?
I mean, it's been such a dearth of liquidity over the past 3 years that 1 year isn't going to solve the industry's problem, right? So we're going to need multiple years of really good liquidity to get back to a normal state. There's still a lot of wood to chop here. But it'll help, right? Undoubtedly, absolutely.
Do you love thematic funds like every other LP does?
We are agnostic. We do not have a mandate or a rule saying, “We're only going to do thematic funds,” or, “We're only going to do generalist funds.” We're a best-athlete portfolio. So when we find really great partners aligned with us for the long term, who we think have an incredible skill set that aligns with what they're trying to do in the fund, whether that's a generalist fund or a sector-focused fund, we'll do it.
Inherently, we've done 1 new sector-focused fund over the past 3 and a half years. So it hasn't been a huge part of our portfolio, but we are absolutely open to it.
What was the best-ever-performing fund you've been a part of?
We had a fund out of China that produced over a 20x net return to LPs.
Wow. I hope you sent them a Christmas card.
We did, yeah.
How do you think about China?
It's a very high bar for us today and a very hard place to invest. There are a couple of really big headwinds. One is the U.S. executive order mandating U.S. dollars can't go into artificial intelligence or semiconductor-related companies or defense companies there, which we completely understand and align with.
But the big problem—what's so unique about the China venture capital market that maybe a lot of founders or LPs who haven't spent time there don't know—is that in China, these GPs raise USD and RMB funds alongside each other, and these RMB funds are from local governments and municipalities. Most of the time for the past 15 years, since the China venture industry has been around, those funds were pari passu. They mostly invested in the same securities.
That isn't the case today, especially now that U.S. dollars cannot go into these AI companies, which I think, the last time I checked, 70% of these deals in the U.S. are AI companies. I mean, it's everything. And so that's a big alignment issue, right? What are we getting exposure to in that fund? That's a big worry.
Totally agree and share that. Super interesting. I'm actually more bullish on China than most people give credit for.
Yeah, we've got incredible partners there that we've had for a long period of time, that are extremely hardworking, extremely smart, and have been great partners to us. It's a hard market today, and frankly, a lot of the best Chinese founders have chosen to raise elsewhere, whether in the U.S., Singapore, or London. It's a tough place.
We mentioned the liquidity. The thing that's also weird and paradoxical to think through is that you mentioned the public-market players just having absolutely ripped. You see Meta throwing out $14.9 billion for Scale. It's like 45 to 50 days of free cash flow. It's really not very much for them. Google's buying Windsurf. Well, it's like a rounding error. They put $3.5 billion into Ray-Ban at the same time, and no one—
Yeah.
—paid any attention. My point being, we have these opposing worlds of liquidity starvation or drought, and then the glut of these public-market players who are playing with market caps that are $2 trillion. How do you think about that?
If Wiz gets approved, every other large Magnificent Seven company is going to see a green light in regard to making big, splashy acquisitions again, which is a good thing. You look at Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta combined—they're doing $600 billion of operating cash flow, just cash coming off the company every single year.
I think they would much rather make very strategic acquisitions than buy back 50 basis points of the company, right? The big worry that I think those companies see today from our purview is that the AI landscape is changing so rapidly that the 12-month period it could take to go through a review and get that acquisition done means that company could be obsolete in 12 months.
Dude, you saw this with Windsurf. It changed a lot in a couple of months.
Yeah. Lots of great, hot AI companies have been very hot, and then they’re not hot. Stability AI—lots of companies have gone through these waves, and there will be many more.
You look at the Wiz deal: there’s a 10% breakup fee there, the largest breakup fee ever for an M&A transaction. Say that someone else wants to do a $30 billion acquisition of Perplexity, and Perplexity says, “We have to wait 12 months.” Their board is going to recommend a 15% breakup fee. Now, will those big companies risk a $4 billion or $5 billion breakup fee and 12 months in which this company might not be what it was 12 months ago?
I think that’s the reason these folks are acting so fast with regard to taking top talent, licensing the IP, licensing the technology, and getting these people building within our company on day 1.
I think it’s the smartest maneuver around it, but it only works when the people and the tech are the assets, not the revenue and the customers. In Wiz’s case—
Yeah.
—the revenue and the customers are the asset. Don’t get me wrong, the team and the technology are too, but—
It also helps that it’s not an AI company.
Sure. But without the revenue and customers, it’s not worth $31 billion.
No.
I do want to ask: you said to me before that OpenAI could still be a zero. When you think about that, what did you mean by that?
The way we think about it is that we spend a lot of time on unit economics. From what we see with OpenAI, unit economics are improving rapidly, which is great to see. But still, when you take CapEx into account, why has OpenAI raised 2 of the largest venture capital rounds ever in a span of 12 months? Not because they want interest income from the cash on the balance sheet. It’s because they’re burning $5 billion to $10 billion a year, right?
In my opinion, the music will stop eventually. This would be the ultimate anomaly if a bubble did not pop in AI. You look at past historic, incredible technological moments: the railroad, cars, electricity, steamboats, and the internet. Every single one of those had a bubble that popped. Every single one impacted the equity markets at that time.
Inherently, for the long term, it’s a good thing. It shows that this AI thing is real, and people are going to overinvest. I would find it extremely anomalous if there were not a bubble that popped here.
If folks agree that a bubble will pop eventually, and you do not have control of your own destiny, and you’re sitting at OpenAI with a preference stack—what’s their preference stack today? $70 billion or $80 billion? If stuff hits the fan and no one’s willing to write you a $40 billion equity check anymore because the capital markets have completely gotten smoked, what happens?
Do you think there is a chance that happens, though, honestly? When you look at SpaceX—
SpaceX is self-funding. They don’t need cash. That’s what I mean. You look at Google and Meta: when they went public, Google and Meta had 30% to 40% GAAP operating margins. These were the most profitable companies ever. They had complete control of their own destiny, right?
Whatever happened in the capital markets, it didn’t matter. They could not be killed. SpaceX cannot be killed. Starlink has reached escape velocity. That’s a very high-margin product. They do not need cash. They’re doing secondary tender offers. OpenAI needs cash.
Will OpenAI and Anthropic be independent companies in 5 years’ time?
To say, “Slam dunk, these are going to be trillion-dollar companies 5 years from now,” there is a lot that can happen within that 5-year period. We would say there’s still a good amount of risk in both of those businesses.
Masa has talked about this before, about AI’s impact on global GDP. If it hits 10% GDP productivity growth, then it’s about $10.7 trillion of the $107 trillion labor segment. Do you think AI will have that global impact on GDP within the next 10 years at that scale?
10 years gets closer to that. I thought you were going to maybe say 3 or 5, which I’d say no. I think these technological transitions take a pretty long time historically to bleed into GDP, creating industries.
OpenAI is obviously an incredible company, but they burned up all their GPUs in April because people were making emojis. They were making cartoon figures on the app. That’s not a GDP-boosting product.
Clearly, they’re making inroads, but all these things take time. I think the problem is that time is not your friend. Take the hyperscalers, for example. You look at 2024 to 2027 estimates, and it’s $1 trillion of CapEx they’re putting into the ground. Then you add on venture and industry investing. Say the run rate is $100 billion here in the US, and 80% of that is going into AI companies.
Now, not all of those are going to be CapEx-intensive. Maybe some of those will be application companies. But that’s a lot of money. To invest that sum, if this does not come true for 10 years, there will be a lot of pain.
But we spoke about Nvidia. This is why we pushed back on your thoughts on Nvidia when you said that it was too highly priced. If you believe AI, you buy Nvidia.
I do not think that it’s too highly priced for the business today. One of the benefits of our roles is that we’re generalists, so we get to invest across buyouts, hedge funds, real estate, and public equities. We get to witness some of the best investors in the world, across the world.
A man from your hometown, Chris Hohn, is one of the most incredible investors of all time. He thinks a lot about peak earnings and peak multiple, which is a common theme, obviously, in the public equity industry.
But Nvidia is a cyclical business at the end of the day. You look at their historical financials over the past 20 years. Essentially, every 3 years, they’ve had extremely negative year-over-year revenue growth. Now, it rebounds, but this is a hardware-inventory, cyclical business.
Back to my question: if folks agree that an AI bubble will pop at some point, and the largest buyers of these GPUs are advertising-driven companies—Google, Meta, and Amazon, which now has a very large advertising revenue line—and advertising is also a cyclical business, and you have a global downturn, there is a really plausible scenario in which revenue drops 20%. I think that would be conservative: 20% to 30%.
Then earnings could drop 40% if they don’t react on their OPEX quickly enough. I looked this morning, and they’re trading at 38 times forward earnings. Maybe it drops to a trough multiple of 24 times, which has been a trough multiple for Nvidia. You just blink, and you’ve had a 70% drawdown.
To think that’s not a possibility in the future, I wouldn’t say that. I’m not going to guarantee that’s going to happen in 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years, but I think it’s a possibility.
One final thing I want to touch on before we do a quick fire is founder-friendly. Everyone loves to say how founder-friendly they are and how founder-friendly their GPs are. How do you think about the founder-friendly tag in venture today?
My background comes from sports. I played football growing up and in college, and I was used to hard coaching. You don’t love it in the moment. You don’t love a coach MF-ing you, screaming at you, telling you that you’re playing terribly, and telling you that you need to do this better and that better.
But it’s better for you, and you know it’s coming from a coach who wants the best for you. They don’t want you to fail. They’re incentivized for you to do the best work possible. I love getting coached hard.
I told our CIO, Chuck Kennedy, when I first joined that he shouldn’t have hired me to begin with. In my mind, there was probably a good chance I wouldn’t make it 6 months, but I was going to try my best. I told Chuck, “I need you to criticize me. I need you to coach me hard.”
He looked at me with crazy eyes, like, “I’ve never heard anyone say this to me in my life.” But I love hard coaching.
No founder is going to be perfect. Founders are going to have weak spots. If you can have people who are, from a loving perspective, close to the business and can supplement certain weak spots and bend the trajectory of a company even a bit, why wouldn’t you? Why wouldn’t you push for that?
Those are going to be tough conversations, but tough conversations aren’t bad things. When we’re sourcing and doing reference work, that’s not something we try to dig out.
We want the most founder-friendly GPs. That's not something we source for.
I'm so glad. Thank God. I'm sure mine would not say I'm the most founder-friendly. Harry says 996. I'm so tired.
I'm so tired.
I'm so tired.
I want to go to sleep.
Dude, I want to do a quick fire with you. I'll say a short statement, and you give me your immediate thoughts. Which venture firm charges 3 and 30 and shouldn't?
Any fund that raises over $4 billion. I think that's a pretty easy answer.
There are firms that do over $4 billion—
No, no, no. Excuse me—on their growth funds, right? So the early-stage funds—
But they do 3 and 30 on growth funds?
No, no. They're charging 2 and 20. I don't think they should charge that. I think a core early-stage fund, if they have produced incredible returns over the past 15 or 20 years, deserves 3 and 30.
What's the biggest lie GPs tell LPs during fundraising?
Oh, that's a great question. I would say, “Miles, this is the perfect fund size for us. We want to be a Union Square or a Benchmark. $300 to $400 million—this is the perfect size. We're never going to raise a bigger fund.” I hear that, I kid you not, at least every other intro meeting I take with a firm.
And it's 99% bullshit?
99.9% bullshit. Yeah.
What's one red flag in a GP that others keep ignoring?
I would go back to alignment. We talked about LPs looking the other way, but alignment is—
GP commitment is one form of alignment. Sorry to interrupt you. How do you guys feel about that?
It is. Yeah. It's a very important data point for us. The nominal number is not as important to us as what that number means to that person. That's very important to us. Frankly, we have 2 quantitative data points, outside of fund size and past returns, that are the best forward-looking indicators for future returns of our funds. One of them is GP commitment. It is an important factor for us.
Who is the most underrated emerging manager today?
He'll probably raise a bigger fund, but I'll say Kevin Hartz at Astaris. I think they've done fabulously well as a partnership.
What do you think makes him so good?
Kevin, please, if you're listening to this, do not use this to raise a billion-dollar fund. What's interesting about that team is, you've got Kevin Hartz, a multiple-time founder who's taken his companies public, been through a lot, and seen a lot. You've got Gotham, who was COO and CFO of Uber. You've got Bennett, who did some incredible deals at Co2. I think it's a very heavyweight, powerful team for a right-sized fund. I don't think there are many of those funds around, frankly. Their ability to have really premier access that traditionally a multistage fund is going to have 99% of, I think, is pretty rare.
When you think about a fund investment decision that was a mistake, what did you not see that you wish you had seen?
The key thing we go back to is people—really trying to understand who the people driving the returns at that fund are moving forward.
Do you think you get accurate attribution?
We've gotten much more sophisticated with our reference work. We build our own attribution tables. That's another huge red flag and lie that we get from managers. It's not an outright lie, but they will give us attribution, and then you have one partner leave, retire, or go to another firm, and you're getting this attribution from this new person who clearly was not the partner on this home-run deal.
We understand why they do it—they have to assign somebody to it—but it could be very misleading to a new LP coming into that fund and saying, “These incredible partners who led these incredible deals are all still here.” Through reference work and longevity, we build our own partner attribution.
Would you rather back a 25-year-old first-time manager or a 55-year-old unicorn founder?
Well, if it's Harry, that makes the decision a little bit tougher. I'd say, in general, we would lean toward someone who has been through multiple cycles and has the scar tissue from that. I'd say we'd probably lean toward the 55-year-old, but we're open to everything.
What did you believe about fund investing that you've changed your mind on? For me, in investing, it was people, market, and product. I used to weigh them equally, and I've completely changed my mind around that. Markets change, products change, and this is for seed. I massively over-index on people.
When I first started, from a first-principles perspective, I was drawn to the data, which we laid out here in the beginning. You can't over-index that data too heavily, similar to what we've talked about. I would go back to, at the end of the day, this is a people-driven business.
You can do all the data work you want, which is important, clearly, as we've stated. Really lean on the qualitative reference and people work, and speak to founders. We don't take a lot of founders' time, right? They have a lot of better things to do than speak to measly LPs like us. But really understanding: Why did you choose that partner? Why did that partner choose you? What's that relationship been like? Understanding that dynamic is critical for us.
What fund are you not in that you wish you were in?
Union Square.
Easy one.
Yeah.
What's the wildest GP behavior you've seen in a fundraising process?
I've got one good one and one bad one.
Oh, go on.
Okay. What do you want first?
Start with the good.
The good. Long Journey Mentors, an incredible partnership between Lee Jacobs, Cyan Banister, and Ariel Zuckerberg. We had a celebratory dinner in San Francisco. We got toward the end of the dinner, and somehow we started talking about ping-pong. I'm a pretty good ping-pong player, and I brought up that when I was in college, I won the Pennsylvania State Ping-Pong Championship, which is true. I did.
Lee immediately said, “There's no way you're a better ping-pong player than me. I'm a really good ping-pong player.” So Cyan said, “Well, we need to settle this.” It was around 9:00 p.m., and we had just finished dinner. I said, “Yeah, I mean, I don't know how we do this.” She said, “I'll find a ping-pong bar.” Cyan got on her phone, found a ping-pong bar, and we all went to a ping-pong bar at 9:30 p.m. in San Francisco. Lee and I played ping-pong for about an hour.
Who won?
I won. Yeah.
And then you wrote the check.
Yeah, exactly.
If he beat you, the check was canceled.
Yeah, and we got a discount on management fees.
That is unbelievable. I also love the Americans. You're like, “9:00 p.m., dinner was finished.”
Yeah.
So in Europe, that's when you start drinks.
Just starting.
That's so funny.
Yeah. The bad one—this one forever stands out—was that we underwrote a manager in 2023 that was holding OpenSea at $13 billion. That one was—
And you questioned them on it?
Yeah, obviously.
And they came back?
They said, “We're going to revise our valuation policy, and we're going to revise that mark.” That was a crazy one. Yeah.
Dude, that is absolutely wild. Listen, I so appreciate having you in the studio. I so appreciate the friendship. This has been so much fun to do, so thank you so much for joining me, man.
Thanks for having me. This has been a blast. We could talk about it all day.