Tom Hulme 与 Stan Boland:从 Jensen Huang 身上学到的经验,以及如何修复英国科技生态系统
英国初创企业最深层的约束,不只是创始人供给,而是每位卓越创始人背后所需的5到10名世界级运营者。 Oxford、Cambridge 和 Imperial 每年合计只能培养约500名计算机科学家或机器人专家;Tom 认为这一产出应提高5倍,Stan 则主张在每张相关毕业证书上直接附带 Tier 2 签证及家属居留权。真正制约可投资机会的,是一个无法留住并持续放大稀缺技术人才的生态系统。
Stan 认为,按英国人口规模本应支撑的水平计算,英国每年约缺少120亿美元的风险投资。 美国基金去年募资约760亿美元;按人口可比口径,英国应为154亿美元,实际仅为37亿美元。Tom 强调的是可投资创始人与运营者的短缺,Harry 则认为资本已经涌入顶尖团队,推高价格、削弱条款;3人都指向欧洲决策缓慢和糟糕的创始人体验。
解决方案应是把资本集中投向潜在的全球冠军,而不是不加区分地给初创企业融资。 总部始于 Cambridge 的 Wordware 如果留在英国,可能以2000万美元投前估值融资500万美元;但它迁往 San Francisco 后,以2.2亿美元投后估值融资3000万美元——这笔资本把公司的预期推向数十亿美元级别。讨论的共同结论是,打造全球第三或第四名只是在制造收购标的;英国需要能够成为全球第一或第二的公司。
规模化后的 British Business Bank 可以每年撬动约40亿美元的基金承诺,并要求私人投资者按50/50比例配资。 Aatish 提议采用灵活的经济安排——养老金可能支付0.5%的管理费、少拿 carry,而 BBB 支付3%、获得更多 carry——这样混合基金仍可围绕“2 plus 20”运转。10年下来,政府可以积累400亿美元的风险基金资产,但 Tom 警告称,幂律回报意味着逆向选择将决定成败:纳税人的钱必须交给最好的管理人,而不是“最差的投资者做最差的投资”。
英国应专注于自身拥有不公平优势的领域:AI 应用、无晶圆厂半导体、硬件、金融科技,以及潜在的国防。 芯片设计约占半导体行业价值的75%,但欧洲在这一市场的份额约为2%;Bristol 仍保有罕见的全定制微处理器能力。相反,英国能源成本可能占数据中心成本的17%,美国仅为4%,因此不加区分地投资基础设施将是一项注定失败的押注。
税制可能正在维持弱公司,同时把那些能够创造复利网络的人才输出海外。 Stan 将分散在5.5万家公司、每年约75亿美元的研发抵免称为“典型的直升机撒钱”,并希望把其中大部分转入主动管理的风险投资;Harry 建议让抵免逐步递减,避免成立10年的受益者变成僵尸公司。两人都把 non-dom 离境视为严肃的领先指标,因为富裕居民同时也是雇主、天使投资人,并会播撒 GoCardless 和 Monzo 等校友网络的种子。
AI 商品化正把争论从基础模型霸权推向应用、品牌、硬件和推理芯片。 Stan 说,模型折旧已经从“几周”加速到“几乎几天”,这强化了中国的制造优势,也利好 Synthesia、Harvey、BYD 和 DJI 等公司。Tom 愿意以3000亿美元收购 OpenAI,因为其约120亿美元的收入年化规模、用户心智和消费品牌正在形成切换成本;Harry 则会把钱投向别处,因为智能体可能通过 API 调用模型,而 Claude 可能“同样优秀,甚至更好”。
10年的乐观情景是,英国成为欧洲的人才磁铁,科技价值达到约5000亿美元,但公开上市或许已不再是合适的计分板。 Stan 更大的国家目标是在20年内达到4万亿美元,并由约1000亿美元的新增资本支撑,同时设立一个公开的“国家代码”。Tom 预计定义下一代的 AI 原生公司会在今天的逆境中诞生,但提醒说,它们可能像 Stripe 一样提供私人市场流动性,而不是在 LSE 上市。
1. 英国的瓶颈,是每位创始人背后的运营人才梯队
Stan 的政策主张建立在实际经营经验之上:他曾帮助 ARM 上市,在多家公司合计融资约3.3亿美元,并以约13亿美元出售企业,其中包括卖给 Broadcom 和 NVIDIA 的交易。Tom 于2014年帮助创立 GV Europe;该机构已在12个国家投资超过50家公司,在英国投入超过5亿美元。
Stan 说,英国目前基本只能留住与自身培养数量相当的 AI 人才,但原因只是流失到美国的人才被欧洲其他地区的移民抵消了。这一持平的净数据掩盖了真正的机会:如果把英国变成欧洲默认的创业地点,英国“可以好10倍”。
Tom 更尖锐的判断是:“每有1名优秀创始人,就需要5到10名世界级运营者。” 卓越创始人可以打破地理规则——Melanie Perkins 在 Perth 建立了 Canva——但一个可复制的生态系统仍需要能够招人、销售、扩大运营,并在之后播撒下一代创业种子的高管。
Oxford、Cambridge 和 Imperial 每年合计只能培养约500名计算机科学家或机器人专家;Tom 希望这一产出提高5倍。Stan 的移民规则同样直接:相关专业毕业生应获得“直接钉在毕业证书上的 Tier 2 签证”,并拥有携带家属的权利,因为许多中国和印度毕业生目前都会前往美国。
2. 资本稀缺与创始人稀缺,构成一条存在争议的因果回路
Stan 给出的对比十分悬殊:过去50年,美国科技行业通过 decacorn 创造了约20万亿美元价值,而英国的2个结果合计约1700亿美元。美国风投机构去年募资约760亿美元;按人口调整后,英国应募资154亿美元,实际只有37亿美元,缺口接近120亿美元。
Harry 的反驳值得保留:一线投资人找不到足够多真正达到全球标准的创始人,而资本则拥挤在显而易见的强团队中,推高它们的价格。他看到融资条件从“3000万美元估值上的500万美元”快速跳到“8000万美元估值上的600万美元”,甚至连清算优先权都被取消,说明太多资金正在追逐太少的卓越供给。
Tom 颠倒了通常的因果关系。他认为,与其等待成功吸引资本,不如让充足资本抬高野心、召唤供给,并以中国持续20年的投入为例;没有这些资本,英国公司会被限制在较小规模,创始人自然会问:“我为什么不直接坐飞机去美国创办公司?”
Harry 补充说,美国融资本身就是更好的产品:创始人反馈称,美国投资人决策快、合作紧密,并能立即理解项目,而欧洲流程要拖上数周。Stan 预计,更多资本与更激烈的竞争将改善这项服务,因为最优秀的创始人会选择最优秀的 VC,而超额回报也会进一步强化这些机构。
3. 资本应集中押注潜在的全球冠军
两位嘉宾都不主张给每家种子期公司融资。讨论的条件是进行有选择的集中:识别那些能够吸收更多资本、又不会因此资本过剩的创始人,让他们招募最好的人才、追求更大的目标。平均分配资金不仅会削弱回报,也会削弱人才密度。
Wordware 体现了 Stan 的论点。它的 Cambridge 训练背景创始人如果留在英国,可能以2000万美元投前估值融资500万美元;但在 San Francisco,他们以2.2亿美元投后估值融资3000万美元。这笔融资迫使公司把目标设定在数十亿美元级别,而 Stan 认为,股权结构的数学甚至可能意味着投资人实际上是在承保一家100亿美元公司。
Tom 认为,AI 正在形成更陡峭的幂律。Wiz 在成立约5年后以320亿美元被收购,相当于以色列 GDP 的约7%;它起步于一支世界级团队,而不是一个已经完全定义的问题,并且从第一天起就获得了大量资本。由此产生的财富可以在员工、创始人与本地投资者之间循环。
Harry 的结论是绝对的:“打造某种全球第三或第四名,几乎没有意义。” 资本不足的追随者通常会卖给美国收购方,导致英国无法留住就业和所有权;而资本密集、赢家通吃的市场,则要求及时向有望成为全球第一或第二的公司开出大额支票。
4. 英国可以在技术栈的顶端与底端取胜
这位专注芯片的嘉宾将技术栈分为半导体与硬件、中间件与工具,以及应用层。欧洲最可信的机会位于两端:拥有欧洲独特防御优势的差异化 AI 应用,以及“附着在金属上的”技术——能够向企业客户出售可量化的架构价值。
半导体设计是最清晰的样本。嘉宾称,半导体价值约75%位于设计环节——NVIDIA、Qualcomm 和 Broadcom 使用的正是这一模式——但欧洲在全球市场中的份额约为2%。制造可以交给 TSMC 等厂商;英国应打造无晶圆厂芯片设计公司。
Bristol 仍保有源自40或50年前 Inmos 的罕见全定制微处理器能力,只要融资跟上,就有机会诞生全球赢家。Tom 认同专业化路径:英国不可能宣称在所有领域都具备专长,因此必须找到不公平优势,再围绕具体地点建设配套的人才、资本与基础设施。
能源暴露了这一模式的边界。一位数据中心运营商告诉 Harry,能源成本占美国成本的4%,但在英国会达到17%;Harry 说,能源还可能占大型模型训练成本的20%。因此,机会在于芯片设计、边缘硬件和应用,而不是假装昂贵的英国电力适合承载所有数据中心。
5. 规模化后的 British Business Bank 可以调动沉睡财富
Aatish 认为,欧洲并不缺钱;养老金、保险公司和伦敦约1100家家族办公室只是对风险投资配置太少。BBB 目前每年向基金投入约4.24亿美元,相对于按人口调整后的154亿美元目标而言,“只是沧海一粟”。
Aatish 提议重置机制:BBB 每年投入约40亿美元,并要求50/50配资。一个正在募集10亿美元基金的管理人,可以预期获得5亿美元的公共资金锚定,但必须从私人投资者那里筹齐另一半。这既能激活准备成立新机构的合伙人,也可能吸引有业绩记录的美国合作方来到伦敦。
基金经济安排应围绕投资者约束灵活调整。如果养老金拒绝支付2%的管理费,可以改为0.5%的管理费、同时降低 carry 参与比例;BBB 则可以支付3%、获得更多 carry;基金的净经济性仍可接近“2 plus 20”。目标是让公共资本与私人资本彼此咬合,而不是要求每个 LP 接受完全相同的条款。
一位嘉宾说,按照政府对公共部门净资产的处理方式,这些承诺可以被确认金融资产,而不是当期支出。按每年40亿美元计算,10年后可形成400亿美元的组合;他称基金中的基金回报低端约为6%,高端可达20%多,但 Tom 坚持认为,必须通过管理人筛选来避免严重的逆向选择。
6. 国防兼具紧迫性、支出规模与军民两用外溢效应
Harry 追问,为什么国防不同于医疗。Tom 解释说,英国仍拥有一个占主导地位的政府买方,而欧洲被各国采购体系割裂;但多个军种和军团都可以成为客户。创新如今被迫发生,且靠近乌克兰既带来紧迫性,也提供了真实的测试环境。
对 Tom 而言,有3个变化最重要:有才华的创始人如今认为国防具有社会必要性;欧洲各国政府面对生存级威胁;资本的兴趣也已经扩大——Anduril 最近以80亿美元融资,并被描述为超额认购。他认为,欧洲有机会诞生下一代主承包商,而不只是成为现有巨头的零部件供应商。
未来5到8年,欧洲的可寻址国防支出可能达到2万亿至3万亿美元,覆盖供应链的多个层级。一位嘉宾提到,网络安全、UAV 和无人机都可能是军民两用产品;DJI 说明了商业化规模硬件如何同时具备战略重要性。
7. 伦敦的上市困境,始于规模化公司太少
Harry 指出,伦敦上市科技公司中只有1家市值超过100亿美元:Sage,一家成立约30年的 ERP 厂商。他的诊断是供给不足——英国公司往往经历股权结构失衡、用错人、产品方向不清、野心不足或增长资本不足,最终在尚未准备好 IPO 之前就被出售。
Harry 还补充了情绪层面的问题。创始人反复听到,LSE 的估值和流动性较弱,包括印花税带来的摩擦;而美国交易所则“铺开红毯”。这些负面故事变成“我们头脑里的 SEO”,进一步强化了选择美国的默认倾向。
不过,上市地点仍是一个不完美的指标。Harry 更看重总部、员工集中地和知识产权创造地,而不是交易所所在地;如果高价值就业与创新仍留在英国,在美国上市也可以接受。Stan 则补充说,本土所有权同样重要,否则最终财富会在海外复利增长。
Stan 提出一个国家目标:10年内创造5000亿美元科技价值,20年内达到4万亿美元,而英国目前约为1000亿美元。他估计,第一个里程碑需要约1000亿美元新增资本,即每年100亿美元;他还赞成设立类似挪威模式的公开代码,让公民能够看到国家科技财富持续积累。
8. 税制变化正在输出具有乘数效应的人才
Non-dom 改革体现了原则与务实之间的冲突。Tom 原则上支持平等征税,但也看到富裕居民正在离开,而他们同时是天使投资人和雇主;他把这些离境视为领先指标,而不是等到滞后的税收数据证明损害后才采取行动。
Aatish 认为,多项政策叠加后的冲击——取消 non-dom 待遇、调整遗产税和资本利得税,再加上私立学校费用——规模已经过大。新居民带着既有财富来到英国,因此英国需要一项让他们能够留下的安排,同时保留足够的公平感,让普通纳税人觉得自己仍属于同一项国家使命。
Harry 说,他听闻财政部的模型实际上是静态的:把税率提高到 X,就计算出 Y 的收入,却没有充分模拟离境和行为反应。嘉宾们并不否认公平问题,但反对假设税纳、资本和就业在规则改变后仍然固定不变。
Harry 以 GoCardless 为例说明乘数效应。来自欧洲和美国的 non-dom 投资了天使轮;公司雇用了数百人,其中一位创始人后来创办 Monzo,另一位成为伦敦 VC,高管校友又创办了更多企业。他说,这种人才与资本循环过去需要5到10年,但更快的公司形成速度可能将其压缩到18至24个月。
9. 被动补贴保住僵尸公司,主动资本则重新配置人才
Stan 认为,许多 EIS 和 VCT 管理人效率低下,因为他们优化的是保本,而不是卓越回报。如果每投资1美元的回报大多聚集在0.80至1.20美元之间,管理人就会被鼓励安全地转手出售公司,而不是让创始人“放手一搏”;他的直接主张是废除这些基金。
他更具争议性的目标,是每年发放给5.5万家公司的约75亿美元研发抵免。除了合资格支出外,计划没有其他质量测试,因此变成“典型的直升机撒钱”:要么把钱给了并不需要支持的公司,要么维持那些本应释放人才与资本的企业。
Harry 为真正高速增长的年轻公司保留抵免,但承认僵尸问题确实存在。他提出的折中方案是按时间逐步递减,让企业不能无限期申领;Stan 则希望把更多预算转入主动型风险投资,在那里投资人会对进展“加倍下注”,也会让失败项目退出。
辅导是金融支持之外的另一块拼图。Tom 经常把被投创始人与经验丰富的运营者介绍认识,并告诉初创企业,永远不要给卓越的天使投资人设最低支票金额:一位投入1000英镑或5000英镑的投资人,可能因为这笔承诺对个人意义重大,而贡献远超金额本身。
10. 随着模型价值转向应用与硬件,中国正在获益
Stan 已改变对中国的看法,因为基础模型如今可以被极快地蒸馏出来。他过去称其为“人类历史上折旧最快的资产”,有效寿命以周计算;现在则是“几乎按天计算”,这会把价值推向应用,以及承载商品化智能的设备。
这有利于 Synthesia 和 Harvey 等应用公司,也有利于中国深厚的制造能力。BYD、DJI 和中国电池产业的专业积累说明了硬件、供应链和规模相互强化后会发生什么;这位专注半导体的嘉宾认为,英国更现实的机会位于更下游一层,即驱动这些产品的芯片设计。
一位嘉宾绘制的 AI 投资地图,本质上是美国和中国的大型集群,外加“欧洲一个个小得可怜的点”。中国持续20年的科技投入打造了如今显现的能力,而美国试图与世界部分地区脱钩,可能反而使欧洲人更愿意与中国建立商业关系。
Harry 的反驳集中在国家安全与互惠风险:中国企业进入西方市场并收集数据,但西方公司却面临限制;根据讨论中的数字,国家补贴可能使车辆价格扭曲8%至25%。Stan 将商业交易对手与中国政府区分开来——Huawei 和 ZTE 曾是他有效的芯片客户——但也承认,政府获取信息和施加影响需要保持谨慎。
11. AI 品牌可以复利增长,但模型与商业护城河仍有争议
Harry 不认同“一人公司做到10亿美元”的论点。AI 让公司变得惊人高效——他举例称,Bolt 在3个月内达到4000万美元收入年化规模——但同样的蒸馏过程也会压缩商业模式,让成功产品被“快得离谱地”复制。
Tom 愿意以3000亿美元估值收购 OpenAI:约120亿美元收入年化规模、1小时内新增100万名 ChatGPT 用户、由记忆形成的切换成本,以及对儿童和老年用户而言都与 LLM 同义的品牌。按约20倍远期收入计算,他看到了异常强劲的消费动能,以及部分受保护的下行空间。
Harry 会把钱投向其他地方。他预计,需求很大一部分将来自通过 API 调用模型的智能体和应用,在这种模式下,延迟、性能和价格占主导,而 Claude 可能“同样优秀,甚至更好”;面向消费者的聊天窗口未必是最终胜出的界面。硬件同样有价值——Nothing 约700万台设备可能成为 AI 的入口。
Stan 说,NVIDIA 并没有被动等待推理主导带来的衰退:公司正在改造 GPU 架构,也可能通过内部研发或收购进军存内计算。他曾为 Jensen Huang 工作,记得他“耳朵非常大”、掌控细节的能力极强,文化“很残酷”,但“并不恶意”——这种执行力足以让适应变化成为基准情景。
结尾的仓位选择体现了这一主张:Stan 选择 uranium ETF,押注核能需求、气候约束和能源生产率;Tom 选择 Rolls-Royce,尽管股价今年已上涨约3倍,他仍预期国防与航空发动机需求继续增长。展望10年,Stan 预测英国科技价值达到5000亿美元;Tom 则期待未知的 AI 原生冠军出现,但认为它们或许不会大规模回归公开上市市场。
$20 trillion of value has been created over the last 50 years by building decacorns in the US. The UK has created 2, worth about $170 billion of value in the UK. So, the lack of capital crimps the ambition of companies, and therefore the best founders go to the States. We need to flood the UK with venture capital.
The biggest challenge is that for every 1 good founder, you need 5 or 10 world-class operators, and I think that's the biggest gap for us. If you look at Oxford, Cambridge, and Imperial, they're only graduating about 500 computer scientists or roboticists per year between them. We should 5x that number. If you graduate in engineering or computer science or something here, you should have a Tier 2 visa stapled to your graduation certificate. Ready to go.
Guys, I am so excited to make this happen. Two of the smartest people, I think, in European and UK venture and startups. I want to start with a little bit of context. Stan, if we start with you and then move to Tom, I love listening to you speak about the UK and where we are. What's the background as to how you got here, and just the quick 1-minute intro on you?
Yeah, so I joined a company called Acorn, a computer company based in Cambridge, back in 1997. It owned 40% of this company called ARM, so I helped get ARM public and then figured out what to do with Acorn. I set up a chip company out of Acorn, which got venture funding. We raised $30 million of capital and sold that company to Broadcom for about $640 million about a year and a half later. It was an amazing deal.
I did a second deal in the chip space, where I built a company and sold it to NVIDIA, and did a third deal in the AI space. I've serially founded, run, and then sold companies, raised about $330 million in venture capital, and sold them for about $1.3 billion. So, that's what I've been doing for the last 25 years.
Well, I'm here just to learn from Stan. That's the reason I'm here. Tom, what about you?
So look, I won't give a long bio, just a really quick one. I helped set up GV in Europe the year you started 20VC, in 2014. We've now done over 50 companies and invested in 12 countries. We just broke through half a billion dollars in the UK alone with our investment in Isomorphic Labs last week, and I'm passionate about making the European ecosystem as vibrant as possible. I'm keen to discuss that.
I want to discuss it in a way where we're going to cite the problems and then cite the solutions. I don't want to be Debbie Downer and just do the problems, but I also want to be pretty granular on the solutions.
I think for me, the biggest problem is actually talent supply and not being a magnet for the best developers in the world. London or the UK isn't anymore where I think it maybe once was. Do you agree that we have a fundamental talent problem today in the UK?
I think we've got a bit of a talent problem in the UK. I don't think we're the magnet that we were or that we could be. It's quite interesting, actually, if you look at where talent is being born in AI across Europe and where it lands in terms of where it stays. The UK is minting about the same talent it's keeping, but that is net-net, actually.
We're losing talent to the US, and we're recovering some of that from other parts of Europe. Net-net, we're about the same, but we could be 10x better, frankly. That's the key point: we ought to be making the UK the magnet, the place to set up a company in Europe. All that talent that's leaving the UK and other parts of Europe to go to the States—we ought to be capturing it and building companies here.
I'd say we're losing a bit of it.
Yeah, I think of it in terms of engineering talent, and then I think of it in terms of founding talent. How do you think that differs? As you said, net-net for deep AI engineers, my worry is whether we actually have an exceptional founder supply that maybe other countries do. That's the difference I think about from my perspective.
I completely agree. I think we're rate-limited. It's the biggest rate limiter, actually: the supply of founders and the supply of operators. The great thing about founders is that they'll smash through walls to build stuff. You have Melanie at Canva, who built that business in Perth, Australia—no right to build a $50 billion business in Perth, but it can be done.
If you gave me the choice to have more Nicholas Zennströms, Demis Hassabises, or Stans, I would absolutely take that. I think it could only be a good thing. The biggest challenge is that for every 1 good founder, you need 5 or 10 world-class operators, and I think that's the biggest gap for us. That's the rate limiter.
To Stan's point, if I just look at engineering talent, we've got 3 of the best 10 universities on the planet here. If you look at Oxford, Cambridge, and Imperial, they're only graduating about 500 computer scientists or roboticists per year between them. We should 5x that number. There's a huge demand. I don't see why we aren't increasing it.
To Stan's point, we can do a better job of making it appealing for the most entrepreneurial talent to come into the UK and maybe retain the talent that does study here and becomes expert.
The 2 big exporters of talent in the world, I think, are China and India. The majority of the graduates there have decided to go and work in the States, frankly. Even if they come to university here, they're typically not staying. They come here with pretty much no intent of staying. In fact, we're not really welcoming them either.
If you graduate in engineering or computer science or something here, you should have stapled to your graduation certificate a Tier 2 visa and rights to stay, as well as the right to bring your family across. Just make the UK the place that people want to come to. That's what we should be doing.
I love that. Can I build on that? I think you become what you measure, and the government is measuring a lot of lagging indicators. We invested in Stripe in 2017, and one of the things that struck me is that the Collison brothers were tracking a KPI. They were tracking the number of Series A companies that transact online and that were using Stripe, and the number was phenomenal. It was in the high 80s percent.
Taking Stan's idea, our government should actually be looking at the people who are graduating and asking what percentage are choosing to stay. That is the leading indicator. Great founders focus on leading indicators, not lagging ones.
Totally agree with you. You mentioned attaching the Tier 2 visa to the graduation ceremony ticket. Is there anything else that we could do to make sure we have a high talent-retention number for great engineering and founding talent?
I think the second big factor is money, which I'm sure we're going to talk about in a second. Money is—there's no structure to this. Yeah. I think money is the great attractor of talent as well. Part of the reason that people will come to the UK, come to London, or come to the Golden Triangle is the fact that they can get funded here.
They can not just get funded at pre-seed and seed, but at Series A, Series B, and Series C, through the growth phase as well, and in fact keep the company here. The constraints that come from a lack of capital are also a factor.
The model in the UK has really been, "Let's build early-stage companies, get them to a certain point, and then flip them to America." A lot of founders might be thinking, "Why don't I just skip that first stage? Why don't I just jump on a plane and form the company in the US?"
Why do you think we have a lack of capital in the UK?
I disagree with you, so I'm intrigued why you think we have a lack of capital.
You just need to look at the numbers. The numbers say that the model to copy is the US. The US is so obviously successful in technology. $20 trillion of value has been created over the last 50 years by building decacorns in the US. The UK has created 2, worth about $170 billion of value in the UK. So, we're 2 orders of magnitude off the US.
The US is a model to copy, and if you look at how much venture capital was raised by US VCs last year, it was about $76 billion. Pro rata to population, the UK should be at $15.4 billion. UK funds raised $3.7 billion last year, so we're short about $12 billion in venture capital.
I absolutely hear you. But as a day-to-day venture investor on the ground trying to find companies and great people to invest in, there is simply not the supply of entrepreneurs if I were to keep my bar as high as it needs to be to build great companies and deploy that money.
I think there's a chicken-and-egg situation here. Traditionally, the way to think about this is that you create momentum by building successful companies. The idea is that capital flows to places where it gets a return. Therefore, you create a track record of building companies here, and capital will flow to the UK. That's the causality.
I think the causality is actually the other way around. If we put capital in place here, great companies will rise to the occasion, and the supply of companies will come. The reason I say that is that there's a country you can look at where this is true, and that country is China.
Twenty years ago, China had pretty much nothing in technology. The Chinese studied the US model and put huge amounts of capital in place, and now China is clearly global number 2 in terms of technology.
You look at the amount that's invested in AI, for instance. There are only 2 countries really investing in AI: the US and China, and the European investments are diddly-squat. You almost can't see them; they're that small. The net result is that we've got a very successful Chinese tech sector.
I think the goal should be that the best capital gets concentrated in the best companies. China is an amazing example: you get concentrations of talent and then concentrations of funding taken to an extreme there.
I think one of the data points that makes this so difficult is that none of us would think all companies should get funding. The real challenge is that, if you ask any founder—and by definition, at seed stage, maybe the majority shouldn't get funding—when they don't receive the funding, they think it's a funding gap. I don't think what we should be doing is necessarily just evenly distributing capital across the whole market. I actually think that's damaging for talent concentration as well.
Instead, we should have sophisticated people who say, "These are the companies that can win. These are the companies that can actually absorb more capital because the founders are great. They're not going to be overcapitalized. They'll then bring in the best people, and maybe they can just be more ambitious."
I've got a good example of this, actually. There's a company I've invested in called Wordware—a good name-check for them. There are 2 guys who studied computer science in Cambridge. They could have set up a company here, raised probably $5 million on a $20 million pre-money valuation, and built a set of tools for LLM prompt engineering. But they went to San Francisco instead. This is Philip Kazer.
They ended up raising $30 million on a $220 million post-money valuation. Those investors are expecting them to build a business worth $2 to $3 billion. That's 10x. So, even better. I think those investors are expecting him to build a $10 billion business. At 10% ownership, you need a billion dollars. But the fact is, they've got the capital to do it really well.
That stratospheric raising of expectations is part of the US playbook. The provision of capital behind founders with energy and enthusiasm does work. I completely agree, Tom, that concentration really matters: the ability to put a large amount of money at the right point behind founders who have the energy, intellect, pivotability, and coachability is absolutely critical. It's the part that's missing, I think, in the UK and in Europe as a whole.
I don't think we need more money. I'm seeing every day the most inflated prices, and it's because you see this concentration of capital to obviously good people, like your Wordware, where you can get a $5 million round at a $30 million valuation, and then Lightspeed and General Catalyst come in and suddenly it's $6 million on an $80 million valuation. It just goes nuts.
I see the complete removal of liquidation preferences now, and it's because we don't have the supply. The capital concentrates and just inflates in a way that's much more significant than in the US. I think we have this fundamental talent problem, and then we have a narrative problem based around the behavior of venture investors in Europe.
If you speak to Filip, he'll tell you that it was super fast in the US. They totally got him and gave him a great experience. In Europe, it takes weeks, the partners aren't there, and they're slower. We have a very bad customer experience for founders in Europe, which I think makes it a less attractive funding product than the US.
I think that's certainly true. My solution would be: let's increase the amount of capital here, and the best founders will seek out the best VCs. The best VCs will generate outsized returns, and they'll be able to raise the next round of capital. You will gradually, and hopefully quickly, ratchet up the performance of venture in Europe.
Actually, the thing that has scared me historically, when people have talked about, for example, government investing in startups, is that I think it's an incredibly difficult thing to do. I don't know if I'm any good at it still, because the feedback loop is probably a decade. It's the worst learning loop ever.
The important thing is to make sure that, if there is more capital in the system, it's deployed by the experts.
Correct. It would be an absolute disaster for the government to be making direct investments in companies. There's no way they can do it.
If we want to get really spicy, though—and Tom's seen my Twitter, and I don't give many shits anymore—most of the British Business Bank's portfolio is just dire. These funds should not be in existence. The question is: do you have the right to win? Do you have the right to find companies, pick them, win them, and help them get better? The majority are honestly dire, and they will not do well. Government money will be wasted.
If you want this to go to truly gifted individuals who will invest it wisely, then we should see real concentration of capital into 3 to 5 players in the UK, because honestly, I think that's the number that is really good.
A couple of quick reactions. Firstly, I don't think it needs to just be 3 to 5 players in the UK. It can be global funds. I think you have some of the best. Secondly, the best funds have proven themselves over multiple vintages now. They're oversubscribed, but I would hope that UK plc could get into those funds.
I would say that, firstly, no large fund of funds has ever lost money. From an investment perspective, I think the government ought to be willing to take a much bigger risk on fund investments here in the UK.
I think the British Business Bank puts something like $424 million a year into fund investments, which is a drop in the ocean compared to the $15.4 billion that we ought to be investing. That number needs to be 10x in my view.
Secondly, I think there is a venture talent pool that can be energized. Below partner level in a lot of these firms, there are a bunch of people at principal level who could be interested and willing to run a new fund, and would do a bloody good job at it.
I also think we're at a time when US partners would consider coming to Europe if the capital was available. There is talent in Europe, and valuations are lower. If you could put the money in place, I think we could not only release some homegrown talent from venture firms, but also imagine some of the leading partners in US firms coming to London or the UK to get this economy really moving.
Sometimes in my head I think, "How many friends do I want to lose in one single show?" My question to you is that I don't agree that prices are better here, honestly. For the best companies, like your Wordware, if they were to stay, they're just super high. They're so inflated. I think—just a quick thought on—
No, no. If I look at where we sit today, some of the best deals are overpriced. I think it's often because they're the ones with the traction, and they're therefore somewhat de-risked.
There are 2 things that make this a really difficult thing to answer. We talked about lagging indicators. The first is that we're working against sources of capital that were raised in the past. These are often not brand-new funds, and they were often raised in a zero-interest-rate environment. The cost of capital has gone through the roof, given the current interest-rate environment, and I think that's going to get worse, if anything.
The fact that a lot of these funds are giving out so many stock grants means you basically need to hit a 20% IRR to break even. These numbers are really high. I actually think there's probably going to be less money in the market for venture in 2 years than there is today.
The second thing is that, with classic machine learning, I think we're overfitting to history. I don't think we know what the biggest companies will look like going forward, so it's very difficult for me to say that the returns profile funds got from investments 10 years ago will be the same going forward.
My belief is that AI is creating a real power law, far more than we've ever seen before. The job to be done is going to be being in those handful of global champions.
If you look at Israel, I think it's an interesting example for us at the moment. It's an amazing story: recently, the Wiz acquisition was $32 billion. That's about 7% of Israel's GDP. A lot of that is actually flowing back to Israel, and it will create this multiplier effect.
That business was basically built in 5 years. It was assembled without actually having a clear problem identified. They just got a world-class team and capitalized the business really well on day 1.
I think the businesses we want to build look more like Wiz, and so we should concentrate capital into the best founders. Can that be done from the UK or Europe? Hell yes. What we do often at the moment is say, “Be close to your customer.” We say, “Go to the US because the market size is roughly an order of magnitude bigger than it is in the UK.” We’re not saying give up the US market. Absolutely go to the market, but build a global business on day 1.
Yeah, I think that’s right. I think it’s almost pointless building a number 3 or number 4 in the marketplace today. If we’re going to undercapitalize businesses and build businesses that are number 3 and number 4, it’s not what we need, because those businesses have got no choice but to be sold to US companies.
We’re never going to create companies here that stand up on their own 2 feet and generate the jobs growth and the diffusion of wealth that the country desperately needs. So I think we’ve got to concentrate on companies that could be global number 1 or global number 2, which does require big checks to be written to those companies at the right point.
Can I give another example of this? In a way, we’ve got a problem that we’re subscale in the way we’ve described it. I agree with that. The other place where I think our relative size hurts us is in subscale pension funds, for example. You’ve got 90 local pension funds.
Actually, a policy that I was really excited about, which I think the chancellor mentioned last year, is this idea that they should be aggregated so that they can have a world-class investment office. They can do something like Yale, like when I do LP calls for emerging managers.
Thanks, dude.
You’re very welcome.
Tom had to do like 10.
I think it was more.
Literally, I just told you about the 10.
No, I did do a few. The thing that’s stunning about the US firms, and then the really sophisticated ones here, like Wellcome Trust—just phenomenal investors—is that they understand the power law. They understand that they’ve got to build relationships for the long term, and they can actually have world-class analysts inside those firms. You can’t expect a tiny fund to do that.
So this idea that we might aggregate 90 local pension funds in the UK to enable them to think more like Yale, rather than just replicating the asset split, I’d be really excited about.
I thought it was so interesting that you said it doesn’t make sense to build these number 3 or number 4-tier players in a market, because I’ve been in venture for 10 years now. A lot of the job has been, “It’s like HR platform X, but in Europe it’s Y.” Actually, you can build billion-dollar, $2 billion, or $3 billion companies on the back of that.
Where can the UK and Europe then be a number-one market leader and beat the US and China?
Well, I think if you think of it as a stack, from semiconductors and hardware up to the applications layer, then I think it’s easier for Europe to think about building at the bottom of the stack or at the top of the stack. I think it’s quite hard for Europe to build in the middle of the stack.
I think AI application companies that are solving a particular problem, particularly if there’s a defensive moat that exists in Europe, are obviously a good place to start. At the bottom of the stack, I think something that’s close to the metal—semiconductors that are solving a particular problem—happens to be somewhere where we have the expertise to do that. It happens to be a B2B sale where we get paid for the value of the architecture that we put down and the utility it delivers.
I think it’s easier to think of the top and bottom of the stack as the places where we can build those companies. It’s not necessarily where we’re focused, but it is where we should be focused. Whereas if you’re building some middleware layer or some tools layer, I think it’s a little bit easier to imagine doing that in the States than doing that here.
I think the interesting thing with Aatish’s argument is that I really agree with it. I like the idea of focus and specialization. One of the things that concerns me is this idea that we can be experts at everything.
Instead, I think we have to understand our unfair advantages. If, for example, the bottom of the stack, the infrastructure layer, is somewhere we can be world-class, we’ve certainly got the technical talent. Then I think we have to build the whole ecosystem and structure it and say, “Actually, in this one location, we’re going to be effective.”
We then have to do second-order things. We have probably the highest electricity or energy costs in the whole of the Western world in the UK, which just does not enable you to do a great job of this. It doesn’t even enable you to do a great job of training foundation models. If the blended cost of training a large language model is 20% energy, we’re already kind of losing.
The important thing is to say, “Actually, what are we going to be world-class at, and where are we going to be?” We have some advantages. One of the things that’s interesting—we’ve done it in this conversation—is that it’s easier to aggregate everything at the national or continental level. In truth, we should be honest that London is incredibly different from the rest of the UK.
Building a startup in Europe is doing it on ultra-hard mode. We’ve talked about it before, but if you do it in London, it’s slightly easier mode at the moment because of the talent and because it’s where the investors are. So we have to start to acknowledge that, lean into it, and actually have these pockets of specialization.
Yeah, I think that’s right. I wasn’t so much thinking, by the way, of building lots and lots of data centers on expensive energy costs, because that would be nuts right now, obviously. I was more thinking about the chip design layer.
So, not even chip fabrication, but chip design, which is where 75% of the value in the semiconductor space is. NVIDIA, Qualcomm, and Broadcom are all basically semiconductor design companies that sell chips, but get them fabbed by TSMC or whatever. That’s the model that we ought to be playing in. We have something like 2% of that global market in Europe. It’s insane, honestly.
In the fabless space, we must be building successful fabless companies, I think. Europe—and, in fact, the UK, in Bristol, as it turns out—happens to have this full-custom microprocessor design capability that stems from the creation of Inmos 40 or 50 years ago, which is kind of unique, actually. There are probably only 2 places in Europe where you can do that, and Bristol happens to be 1 of them.
I think it’s plausible to build companies in this space that are global winners. You’re right that we do need to put much larger checks into those companies, but that’s the reason why we need more venture money here: to be able to write those checks.
It’s interesting that you said that about the cost of energy. I was speaking to the CEO of one of the largest data center providers in the world, and he said, “Harry, in the US, my energy costs are 4%. In the UK, if I set up today, it’s going to be 17% in total.” I was pushing and pushing, and he said that. I thought, “All right, fine. You do you.”
My question to you then is: when we look at that and we look at the money that’s needed to fund it, where does that money come from? I understand your argument around the scale and the scale of cash needing to change. How do we fund the 450 million that BBB does invest to whatever we want to call it—$2 billion, $3 billion, $4 billion?
Well, firstly, I think Europe has a lot of money, actually. So I guess the first thing to say is that Europe’s got a lot of money, obviously in pensions. We talk a lot about pensions. It’s got a lot of money in family offices that are locked up all over the place, actually. So Europe is not capital-short; it’s just not investing in this particular asset class.
The job, I think, of BBB is to create that asset class at speed and to play an enabling role in doing that, essentially. My suggestion would be that we get the government to increase the amount that British Business Bank puts in. We may need to uprate the quality and talent in BBB to be able to do this, but BBB puts like 4 billion a year in and would require a 50/50 funding ratio. The GPs have to raise matching money; otherwise, BBB doesn’t participate, but it can be 50%.
If I want to create a billion-dollar fund, I know I’m going to get half a billion from BBB, and I’ve got to raise the other half a billion. Raising the funding ratio to 50/50 would be a good start.
Then I think we’ve got to be creative, which I guess is another call to action for BBB, about how we split the fees and split the carry between the different LPs in the fund. At the moment, there’s a lot of hand-wringing and anguish about the fact that pension funds won’t pay a 2% fee. I would say, “Fine, let’s do it on a 0.5% fee then.”
Instead, the carry that the partners have is higher, and quid pro quo, BBB might pay a 3% fee and the carry for the partners is lower. But net-net, we’re still at 2 plus 20. So let’s be creative about how we do it.
The job is to bring the capital in and make it mesh with public money to mint these large funds that can write these big checks, allowing us to play seriously in some of these sectors that are basically capital-intensive and winner-takes-all. That’s what we need to do, I think, to pull ourselves out of the nosedive that the country is currently in.
I think, where would we get that money from? Oh, well, the government has created its own fiscal freedom to do this, actually. The government is able to treat any investment in BBB money as not borrowing or public spending. It forms part of public-sector net worth, and it doesn't count as current spending because the argument is—and I think this is correct—that what we're doing is building up a financial asset on the government's balance sheet.
If you did this consistently over 10 years, you'd have 40 billion of fund-of-funds investments in venture on the government's balance sheet. The worst-performing funds of funds generate maybe 6% IRR; the best-performing generate mid-20s, so it's always higher than gilt yields.
I would say you could go even further. You could say, “In 10 years' time, we've got 40 billion on the public balance sheet. Why don't we make an offer to the public?” Why don't we offer it to individual pension plans to invest in this stock? So, yeah, we could create a fetcher moment, really, where you privatize.
People in their 20s and 30s should be owning assets in the future of the country, actually. They should be owning those assets, and they should be recycled into making the country more successful competitively. Technology is the place to put it, obviously. That's kind of what we ought to be doing.
I do see it as investing. We're talking about infrastructure projects. We look at Germany's trillion dollars, and I think it's incredibly important. I like the idea that we have a kind of intellectual infrastructure investment that you're describing.
The big thing to design around—and it sounds like you've started to think that through—is the adverse-selection bias. My biggest fear, because there's such a power law of returns, is that you don't want to just end up with the worst investors making the worst investments. Placing an emphasis on those—maybe first supporting first-time funds and solo GPs initially to get going—could make sense, but it's incredibly important for the UK taxpayer to get into the best funds.
I do believe there have to be incentives that UK plc can provide so that the best funds that Harry describes are actually excited to take money from that BBB fund of funds. But Tom, do you think if we put such a system in place and made it plausible and feasible for GPs to go and raise a half-billion-dollar or $1 billion fund here, we'd get partners in US firms with a strong track record to consider coming to London to basically raise a fund here because it can be done here?
So, I think the answer is yes. But again, it sort of speaks to specialization, and I guess the question for me would be: in what areas would you get the best people saying, “It's worth me doing that”? It wouldn't necessarily be in digital health, where the UK has one major customer and no one else.
It would be in places like fintech, where we have a good track record because we're in a great position globally at this point. That's why we've done a disproportionate number of fintech investments. Defense, I think, is an interesting area at the moment, where we're going to have to look more to 3% of GDP spent on defense. So there'll be areas where I think very smart, rational people would make that call. But there are others where it would be a harder stretch, like consumer, where it doesn't really make sense to be outside one of the biggest markets.
Why do you think defense is different from health?
I think in defense you still have 1 primary buyer here, really, which is obviously the MoD. Then you have very splintered and fractured buyers, which is the rest of Europe, and each wants to have its own dominant domestic provider.
Disclaimer: I'm a reservist, as you know, so this is something I'm really passionate about. I'd say there are 3 things happening at the moment that make it significantly more interesting than it has been in the past. The first is that very smart people are interested in doing it because they think it's right. There are people like our peers who are interested in starting defense companies because, for the first time, they actually think there's an existential threat.
The second thing is that, while you do say—you're right—there's maybe a single buyer, it's more complicated than that. In the UK, we have multiple services and multiple regiments within each; each is a potential customer, and they're being forced to innovate at the moment.
The final reason is that, to some extent, we are geopolitically close to a war zone at the moment, and we have a point of view in that war. We occasionally have some of our armed-service personnel at risk. I think those 3 things together mean that, when you look at Anduril in the US and its recent round at $8 billion, which was oversubscribed, it shows you there's an appetite among people and capital to go in there.
I think the UK has interesting talent. The UK is playing its part in Ukraine at the moment. It's an amazing place to test new technologies, and I think it's an opportunity to build next-generation primes here. So, as a category, I think defense in Europe is an important one at the moment, and there's probably $2 trillion to $3 trillion going to be spent over the next 5 to 8 years in Europe on defense, actually—all layers, not just the final product, but components as well. There are lots of layers here.
I agree, and I do think that will forge some dual-use technologies. If you look out there at the biggest defense companies, you could argue that DJI is one of them at the moment. Actually, I think you'll see the same thing in reverse. Some of the technologies, whether it be cyber or maybe UAVs—drones—I think you'll start to see them have other applications outside the military.
When we think about the kind of amazing companies you've mentioned—and we've mentioned some other amazing ones—in the US, there is a market for them to go public. There is a liquidity market that is much more vibrant. In the UK, we have the London Stock Exchange, where a lot of people throw a lot of criticism, and people choose not to list on the London Stock Exchange. To what extent do we need local domestic liquidity markets, or are we in a global world where you can just go to Nasdaq?
I've thought about this a bit, actually. I think it's a supply problem again. The lack of tech companies in London is stark: there's only 1 London-listed tech company worth more than 10 billion, and that is Sage. Sage is a 30-year-old ERP company. It's a very nice company, but as an output of the 20 billion a year that we pump into tech in the UK, to have 1 company worth 10 billion on the stock exchange is not a great outturn, really.
Whilst the US has minted 20.5 trillion of value in its tech companies, we've minted about 100 billion over that period of time in tech. So, firstly, let's accept it's not good. But I think the problem is supply, actually: companies grow to a certain size and they're stunted for all sorts of reasons. It could be quite early on—the cap table's broken, they hire the wrong people, or they have the wrong product-market focus—but it could also be a lack of swinging for the fences, a lack of money to swing over the fences, actually.
The net result is that companies just have to be sold, typically to US buyers. So they never get to the point where they grow and are capable of going public. There's not a big pipeline of companies coming through that could IPO. There's a handful in fintech, maybe, but apart from that, not very many.
So, I think it's a supply problem, actually, and that's why it's really important that we grow the amount of capital here—UK capital that is patient and will put the money in—so we can fund the companies all the way through to eventually going public. Then I think it will be natural to list them.
Yeah, where there's a market for them. I think that could be London, it could be Nasdaq, it could be wherever is suitable for the company.
Agreed. Definitely, the supply problem doesn't help. If we had many more, much bigger companies, we wouldn't see it. I'd give 2 other reasons.
The first is a sentiment problem. I have not spoken to anyone for months who is positive about the LSE or listing, whether it be valuation or perceptions about, for example, the product itself because of the stamp duty driving down liquidity. I'm afraid these stories are kind of like SEO for our minds. We hear the story, we remember it, and there's just a negative sentiment about it.
Most good companies are becoming more open to the US, and they're getting courted very effectively. They have the red carpet rolled out for them. So that's the first one: the sentiment problem needs to be turned around. I mean, you interviewed Julia Hoggett. I don't know your point of view, but the sentiment isn't great.
The other one I'd just point out is that I think it's an easy thing to measure. That doesn't mean it's the best thing to measure, actually. If I'm completely honest, given the choice between picking where a company's HQ is, where the bulk of the employees are, where the IP is generated, or where it's listed, I'm taking the first 3.
They're way more valuable. I know that they're kind of interlinked, but the most important thing is where the economic driver is, where the employees are, and where that value is created. If we do have a period where the very best UK and European companies end up listing in the US, I think that's okay, as long as we have a great platform of big value generation here. I think it'd be okay if the ownership of those companies, when they go public, is predominantly here in the UK, because I really think we've got to set a national goal here for wealth creation.
The UK, really, it's clear—you just look around—and the country is getting poorer. We can't afford all the services that we want.
So what do you mean by a national goal for wealth?
Firstly, I think tech and innovation is really the engine of economic growth here. There's no other engine that we can rely on. If you look at the US, it's created 20 trillion of value over the last 20–30 years in new tech companies. The UK has created 0.1 trillion, so, pro rata, we should have created about 4 trillion. We've created 0.1 trillion, so we're about 4 trillion short of where we should be.
I think we could set a goal and say, “What if, in 20 years, we set a national goal of creating 4 trillion of wealth in tech?” That's obviously a sort of escalating growth in value. Let's say, at year 10, the goal is 0.5 trillion, and thereafter we grow from that point. Growing 0.5 trillion is already quite a big goal for us, given that we've only created 100 billion right now.
It also sets the mindset for saying, “What are we going to have to invest to do that? What do these companies look like? How much capital are they going to need?” They're going to need about 100 billion of capital to do that, realistically. You think, “Okay, that 100 billion—where's it going to come from?” It's going to be something like 10 billion a year that we've got to put in, in addition to what we're currently doing. That's roughly the gap in our venture capital.
SEIS and EIS have been very effective in encouraging more direct investing from individuals.
When I look at my cap table today—or my LP list today—85% of dollars, maybe 90% of dollars, are from the US for me. I'm thrilled and honored to have them, but it is slightly—not alarming, but I think about it—that we'll do very well, our funds will make a lot of money, and all of that will go straight to the US.
That doesn't thrill me for my grandparents, who have pensions, and my mother's got pensions, and everything around us in the UK. Is there anything that could be done to unlock the huge amount of family office and corporate pension fund money to invest directly into funds, whether it's an SEIS for funds or an EIS for funds? Otherwise, they're not freaking moving.
I think the BBB role I spoke about earlier is critical to this. If you look at where the money came from in the US, and the distribution of where that money came from, it's pretty evenly spread across endowments, family offices, pension funds, insurance companies, and so on. It's not just pension funds. There are other sources of capital that we need to energize and create.
We don't have the endowment fund pool, that's true, but we do have more family offices. I think there's a lot of money here. There are 1,100 family offices in London.
Blimey.
Yeah, it's a lot. I met every one of them, which is why I think we need an energized BBB that is creative about the structuring of deals to bring those people in and structure them in a way that makes it easy for them to participate in this illiquid, 15-year asset class. The fee structure and the carry structure need to work for them and work for BBB.
You'd end up with LPs that are 50% the national balance sheet and 50% UK-based pension funds, endowments, family offices, and insurance companies.
Listen, I'm spending more and more time with politicians now, and they're all just terrified of getting fired and terrified of headline risk. When I listen to you, I'm like, “Great. I see all of this,” but then I see the Daily Mail headline, which is about how your taxpayer dollars are going to fund Tom or Sarah's venture fund, where they have a Porsche and a nice house in Hampstead, and the concentration of wealth on your taxpayer dollars.
Do you think we're actually being reasonable in thinking we can do that? Do you share my concern about that headline risk?
It is definitely a challenge. I see the challenge. But I actually think we've got to make the case for why the UK needs to change. We're not really fulfilling our potential right now. We've got a lot more to achieve.
It's about raising everybody's sights to build this country to be the best it can be. Let's build this value that's missing in tech, because it's not coordinated right now. This is 20–30 billion a year that we pump in at the front end, per annum, in tech—150 billion over a parliament in university funding for science and tech, in SEIS, EIS, VCTs, R&D tax credits, patent box, and so on. You add all those things up, and what's coming out of the pipeline is—nothing, really.
Some people are making some wealth along the way, but that's not what we want. We're not achieving a national goal, really. If we say, “Let's do this together as a country. Let's build this value and let's energize people,” it's clear to me that active money is the way to go. Passive money is not the way to go.
Active money means that when things are going well, investors double down. When things are not going well, they kill it. We've got to be courageous enough to do that. That does require—I mean, VCs require OPEX cover, don't they? So you've got to basically fund them, really.
I think 2 ideas that Aatish's thoughts remind me of. The first is, one of the things I admire about Sequoia is that its meeting rooms are named after its LPs. I think that's a really interesting thing to remind everyone who they're in service of.
One of the challenges we have in the UK is that we perhaps don't celebrate entrepreneurs as much as we might. If we were able to say to those entrepreneurs that they can tell the story about the wealth they've given back, whether it be through BBB or another vehicle, I actually think the public would see more of the value they're creating.
The second story I think about is the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. Extraordinary business. If you look at their ownership at the moment, it's mind-blowing. But the other thing they do is they effectively have a stock ticker, so that everyone can see in real time what that national wealth is. They have a literal stock.
I interviewed him, and he's literally like, “The happiness of the country does go up and down dependent on the ticker.”
Exactly.
So this is all about just reminding society that some of these great entrepreneurs are building businesses in society's service. I think that's what we've not done.
Great idea, actually. If we have this 4 trillion goal, it'd be a great idea to have a national ticker as we climb our way towards it, wouldn't it?
I think it would glue culture and society a bit more than perhaps you have at the moment, where it's perceived to be haves or have-nots.
Yeah, I think you're right. It's a communal goal to reach together.
You mentioned Norway there. Norway innovated in its tax system, and they seem to misunderstand that these kinds of models are variable: when you change a certain tax rate, you will see people leave. We've seen the removal of non-doms. I'm really worried about this every single day. I have friends saying, “Hey, I'm leaving. I'm leaving. Why are you staying?”
To what extent is the removal of non-doms a massive problem impacting the future of the UK?
I think this is one of those classic cases of whether you want a principled approach or a pragmatic approach. I'm a pragmatist. I do see the brain drain, I recognize it, and I do see that many of the people I know well who have chosen to leave have left. They were also incredible angel investors. They employed a bunch of people.
Do I think everyone should pay equal tax? Yes, in principle, but practically speaking, I'd rather that talent was in the UK. I'm seeing some exceptions to that. I heard about a billionaire VC who I think has moved to the UK recently. You do get some movement back in the other direction, but I would take seriously, again, leading and lagging indicators. I would take seriously the leading indicator of some of the non-doms leaving.
Yeah. One of the challenges with the UK is this tug-of-war between principles on the one side and practicality on the other. The principles have been: you remove non-dom status, change inheritance tax rules, change capital gains tax, put fees on private schools, and then assume that everybody's going to be happy to stay, really.
I mean, yeah, I just think that's too much, actually. The impulse on the system is too much, and we are shooting ourselves in the foot, really. So I agree with Tom that, in principle, as a UK taxpayer, I'd like everybody to pay the same taxes, but I recognize not everybody is at the same starting point. People do come to the country with existing wealth, really, and it can't be fully right to then seek to tax that. Therefore, there has to be some provision that makes it possible for people to stay here and so on. I think it's also part of this thing: if we're serious about building the country to be a country that clearly wants to win, then we better fix this as well, actually.
Well, this is where, for me, pandering to Trump's populism—which is like the Labour government's desire to pander to traditional left-wing policies—is destroying a pragmatic approach to wealth creation and wealth sustenance. All of the things that you said—inheritance tax, capital gains, schools—are, bluntly, pandering to traditional left-wing policy and probably don't even make economic sense. They make absolutely zero economic sense.
I mean, listen, I interviewed—I can't say it live on air, but I'll tell you afterwards—one of the most famous politicians in the country the other day. They said, "We have to get rid of the Treasury because they do not have variable models." So they literally have static models which say, "If you increase the tax rate to X, you will get Y."
Oh wow.
They do not have any variability in what happens with important export of anything. And that is why their numbers say we should do this.
Oh God.
Fascinating, huh?
Yeah, that's not good.
It's terrifying, but it worries me. Do you believe the multiplier effect? I always get the pushback whenever I'm on social. I'm like, listen, it is great having non-doms: they spend in restaurants, they hire people, they buy homes, and they spend in shops. Do you buy it, or do you think that trickle-down economics is a lie that we continuously—
I think there's a bountiful trickle-down effect, but there is also this need for fairness as well, and I think it is just a balance that we've got to strike between the two. People who don't enjoy a privileged tax status and pay full taxes are sitting in the same restaurant as people who do enjoy a privileged status. That's also not right.
We've got to find a balance between the two: how to make it feasible for people to stay here and not be penalized, but at the same time try to be as fair as possible as a country as a whole, because we need to hold hands together on this, actually, as a nation. We need both people who have come from outside the UK and people inside the UK to feel we're on a shared mission together, really. It's got to be somewhat fair at the same time.
I just think the balance right now has probably swung too far in the opposite direction, and we're actually making it much harder to do that.
I'm a strong believer in a Keynesian multiplier effect. In our small world of tech, it's the only part of the economy I know much about, and I see it on a daily basis. Like angel investing in GoCardless: if I look at some of the other angel investors in that business, they were non-doms. They were actually Europeans and some Americans.
The founders of that business built an important company for London, employing hundreds of people. One of the founders left and built Monzo, and another founder has left and is a VC at another firm in London. If you look at the number of senior talent in GoCardless that has gone on to create other businesses, it's an amazing alumni network there. It's an incredible multiplier effect.
That's what we're saying, actually. You've got to have those initial pockets of innovation and growth, and then I do think you get this real multiplier. The good news is businesses are growing faster than they ever have before, so I think those cycles will happen quicker. Previously, it might have been 5 or 10 years before you started to see the best senior operators come out and build a company. Now it might be 18 or 24 months.
Is there any change with SEIS and EIS?
Yeah, I think a lot of these EIS funds are not very effective, and VCT funds are not very effective.
Why is that? I agree with you, but I don't know why.
Because the quality of investment managers is quite low, and because they feel they've done a good job if they get anywhere close to just returning capital. Instead of saying, "Here's an investment—go swing for the fences," it's, "For God's sake, don't lose it." So you take the low-risk return and flip the company as quickly as you can. If I get 80 cents on the dollar back, I'm happy. In fact, all the returns are somewhere between 80 cents and $1.20 on the dollar. It's ridiculous. I think those funds are a freaking disaster, really.
Would you get rid of them?
I have to get rid of them. I also think there's a lot wrong with the UK tax system that is maintaining too many zombies in the UK.
Like what?
The most obvious is R&D tax credits, which is deeply unpopular for me to say. As a founder and a CEO, I'd never say this, by the way, but as somebody who's not currently a VC and who's not currently running a company, I feel free to say what I think is true.
We're currently investing about $7.5 billion a year in R&D tax credits for 55,000 companies per year in the UK. There is no quality check, if you like, on the value that's been created there. All you have to do is prove that you spent the money on something you can loosely classify as R&D, and you get a check from the government.
This is classic helicopter money. Passive money goes to good and bad. If you're going to be brutal, you'd say that either it goes to companies that don't need it, or it goes to companies that shouldn't have it.
In my view, it would be much, much, much better to take that same amount of money and put it into funds and put it into active venture. That way, when things are going well, you double down; if things are not going well, you kill it.
We do end up tying up national talent and national treasure in companies that are never going to be successful globally, that limp on from year to year living on R&D tax credits. I'd much rather see valuations go up, actually, which I know, as a VC, you're probably not very keen on hearing. I'd much rather see that because we end up with the same dilutive effect as we get this free money from the government every year.
By being actively managed, we get to recycle our limited amount of talent and our limited amount of capital into companies that are really going to make a difference. That's one thing we can do.
I say, unsurprisingly, I think tax credits are pretty important. What I hadn't thought about is that I have a sort of biased view of just higher-growth companies at the early stage of their life, where you're investing in the future. I like your point about EIS and SEIS in the same way, because I just think about angel investors. For angel investors, I think it makes sense.
But to your point, on the R&D tax credit, what I don't see is these kinds of zombie companies that have been claiming it for a decade and actually aren't necessarily building for the future. Maybe we should start to take time into account, like they do in the US with capital gains tax, and start to taper off R&D tax credits to avoid what you're describing.
Yeah, we're running at roughly 2 times the rate of the US. If you look at 4 big differences between the US and the UK, one is the retention of talent and the need to keep people in the country. The second is that the quality of mentoring at the very early stage needs to be ratcheted up a lot higher here, and I think it just needs more coordination.
The third is the excess of support in the UK for companies that are not making it, that limp on forever. The fourth is the massive shortfall in capital. I don't feel I've got quite the agreement I expected on this, but I think we just need it here, actually. We need to flood the UK with venture capital. That's what we need to do.
My takeaway from this show is that we just need to put Aatish in for the BBB lead and let him run it.
I'm not sure I'm a banker, to be honest.
I think you'd do a brilliant job. That's why you're qualified. You're literally interesting. You mentioned the mentoring there, and you said there are ways that we could do it. How do you think we could do it and increase that level of mentoring?
I agree with you. One of the things we do is, whenever we're making an investment, we will often bring in other founders from our network, people that we've worked with before. The value-add from those people, partly because they've got experience and partly because they're paying it forward, is unbelievable. I totally agree.
I always say to founders, "Never have a minimum check size for amazing angels." There are some who can only do $5,000, or some at $1,000, and you can do that with angel syndicates. That is just as valuable, and often they'll give more because it means more to them, so I really always push on that.
Obviously, we have Project Europe now, and I spend a lot of time with Kitty, the CEO.
Congrats.
Thank you.
We love it. That is very kind. I'm so pleased that you're in it.
Stan, you're not allowed.
Tom can't be.
No, he's not.
He's not stopped asking me about it for a year.
Yeah. Tom's heard it all.
My question to you is: Kitty always tells me that the biggest enemy of talent in the UK is quant funds. I was like, "I'm sorry?" And she goes, "Yep, quant funds." They go to the universities, source the best talent, and throw 250k at them straight away. The best engineering talent is just going straight to quant funds, and quant funds are much better recruiters than anyone else.
How many people work in quant funds, though? Is it a big number?
A member of our family works at a quant fund, actually, and is paid a lot of money, I think, to do something very similar. But there can't be that many people, so it can't be the biggest drain on talent.
Maybe not, but probably 1,000.
Yeah, which is 2 years' worth of full computer science and robotics graduates, which is quite a lot. I mean, 1,000 more people in the ecosystem would probably be a pretty significant needle mover.
There's definitely competition from that for the smartest quants. I think one of our jobs is to make startups even more appealing, celebrate the successes, and actually show the alternative. I think EIS, like the sort of Entrepreneurs' Relief, is a wonderful example of something that can maybe tip that balance, because often the economics from a quant fund are income tax. I think things can be done.
What would you do with Entrepreneurs' Relief to make championing entrepreneurship better?
I'd expand it.
It's limited to like £1 million or something. It was taken down.
Exactly.
For those who don't know, what is Entrepreneurs' Relief, and what does it mean?
Entrepreneurs' Relief is the ability for you to get preferential tax treatment if you've grown a company. I actually think making capital gains exempt for entrepreneurs could maybe tip that balance when you're comparing against quant funds, if that's the competition.
I do want to touch on the wider world around us in 2 ways. One is the US, and the other is China. Again, this wonderful politician that I interviewed the other day said, "You know what? We were an afterthought for the US, and now we're not even that." In a wider-world perspective, what does not even being an afterthought mean for us and what we need to do?
We do actually have, as Tom was saying, universities that are globally great universities. Cambridge is not that different from Stanford. It may be a little bit smaller and a bit less funded, but the quality of research that we're doing here is as good. So there is raw talent here.
I do think London is a really great city and a great place to live and work. It's probably the best city this side of the Atlantic and arguably the best city in the world to do this. I think it's a great place.
Do you think London's got worse? Everyone says the crime, the lack of public services, or the poor quality of public services. Do you think London will revert back to London in the '70s, which is grim, gloomy, and has no growth?
It could if we let it, but I think it's possibly not as shiny and smart as it was. I still think it's a pretty good city, and there are lots of good things to like about London.
Are you concerned that Labour will let it get to that deplorable state in the next 4 years?
I don't think they will, but I would like to see them move more quickly on policy changes and action than they're currently doing. That's certainly true. But I think they will listen and change, actually, so I'm optimistic about our ability to get change.
I think London's a special place, and I feel lucky if I compare living here to other places. It's the multiculturalism and the diversity, but actually it's just an interesting place to live. The fact that I can jump on a Lime bike, come over to do this in the afternoon, have a meeting at Number 10 shortly thereafter, and go to the European headquarters of a big brand—I could do that all on a Lime bike. It would take 5 flights to do it between those stakeholders in the US.
Actually, that proximity effect adds a real richness to life. Does it have its challenges? Yes. But there's an incredible pool of talent, so I think the petri dish for continued growth is there.
My word, if that's a standard afternoon, you're a very important person, aren't you? Jesus Christ.
I just popped down to Number 10. I popped down to a global CEO.
Only sightseeing. Wow.
I was mainly sightseeing. I just barely managed to get through the emails.
Lime Bikes is actually a portfolio company, so I'm just driving up the revenue—constantly cycling around on it.
Yeah, exactly. I'm going to expense it to your show.
Thank you so much. I'm going to get Brad to sponsor it.
That's amazing. Final one before quickfire: China is changing faster than ever. Tom, you said before, when we were walking around the block, that China is the thing you've changed your mind on.
I've changed my mind on China a lot. Strategically, I think they're in an amazing position for the obvious reason that I think more countries are open-minded to working with them, given what's happening in the world.
But I think there's a less obvious reason, and that is partly as a result of DeepSeek. More broadly, we've learned a lesson in the last 12 months: foundation models can be distilled relatively quickly. When I was on your show last time, I talked about how foundation models were going to be the fastest-depreciating assets in human history—weeks. It's almost days now.
If you live in a world where foundation models are commoditizing really quickly, then you ask where the value accrues. I think the value accrues at the application layer. We're invested in companies like Synthesia in London and Harvey in the US at the application layer.
I also think it accrues to hardware, and if I look at hardware, China is so much better than the rest of the world at manufacturing, hardware, and value-add. I think those devices are actually going to be the conduit for commoditized AI.
In that world, I've probably gone from being excited about US dominance in foundation models to some extent, to thinking that maybe the value is also going to accrue in the hardware layer. That's somewhere where I think we're playing catch-up.
I completely agree. The hardware layer is just sitting above the semiconductor layer, and I think the one that we can play in is the semiconductor layer.
I also think China is in a really good position, partly because it has made this very significant, continuous investment in startups and venture over the last 20 years. As a result, if you look at a bubble chart, if you like, of where investment is going into AI, and you color-code it for the US, China, and Europe, it's basically the US and China, with these tiny little dots for Europe. Europe is really missing.
It's the US, with China sort of chasing its tail, and I also think the geopolitics of America trying to dislocate itself from the rest of the world will put China in a much better position geopolitically as well. I think Europeans are going to be much more open to working with Chinese companies and doing business in China than they were even a year ago.
I do think things are changing, and it's probably not good for the US, but that's what I think is happening.
Do you think we should be open to doing business with them?
I do. I've sold a company to Huawei, actually. I spent about a month working for them, I have to say, because they didn't give me authority to buy a box of pencils after they bought the company, so it was interesting.
This is a country that doesn't allow our companies in there. They put their companies in ours. They acquire data on all of our consumers. We don't know where it goes. Every single piece of data that a Chinese company has, the Chinese government has authority to acquire at will.
I think all that's probably true. But they are commercial as well, so you can do business in China. When I ran this chip company, our biggest customers were in China. Our biggest customers were Huawei and ZTE.
It was easier to get them to do a deal with you and sell product to them than it was with a US or European company. You had to negotiate pretty hard on price and stuff, but nevertheless, they were willing to engage, and we built some really good relationships with them.
On a personal level, I think people are actually pretty decent, and I think that you can do business with them. The Chinese state is something different, and you've obviously got to be wary of that. But I think there's a lot of scope for us to do a lot more business in China than we're currently doing.
Do you agree?
If I look at the talent and the areas that they have decided to focus on, they're all important. Battery technology—BYD is a force to be reckoned with.
DJI is a force to be reckoned with.
You mentioned BYD. Do you not worry about the Chinese subsidization of their car industry and what it's doing to the European car markets? I mean, the German car market is being destroyed by BYD and Chinese cars. It's because the Chinese government is subsidizing between 20% and 30% of their car production.
Well, it feels a little bit unfair. Is it subsidizing BYD? Is it BYD itself?
I mean, there are variable different ranges, but it's anywhere between 8% and 25%. It's certainly cornered the market in some of the rare materials that are necessary for batteries, and I think it's got scale and the ability to compete, really.
So, in that sense, the German car industry has got other challenges. One of the other businesses I sold was to Bosch, actually, so I'm vaguely aware of what it's like working in a large German company. They have their own challenges.
Did you buy your own pencils?
Not really. I'm not the fourth acquirer, so he can buy a rubber.
I love stationery. I absolutely love that.
Listen, guys, I want to move into a quick-fire. I'll say a short statement, and you give me your immediate thoughts. Does that sound okay?
Yeah.
Okay. So, Aatish, what do you believe that most people around you disbelieve?
I think that things like R&D tax credits ought to be curtailed, and we should put the money into a lot more venture. That's a really unpopular thought, actually, but I still think it's right.
Mine would be that I keep hearing people talk about the first 1-person, billion-dollar business already being created. I think that's absolutely ridiculous. On the one hand, companies are growing faster and more efficiently than ever. Bolt now has a $40 million revenue run rate in 3 months. They're going to grow incredibly quickly, but I think we've seen distillation of foundation models. We're going to start to see distillation of business models and businesses.
I would expect these really successful businesses to get copied ridiculously quickly. I think this idea that you're going to have a sort of moat that enables 1 person to deliver $1 billion of revenue a year is a myth.
What is the distribution of value in the foundational-model landscape in 5 years?
My big one here is that I've changed my mind. I thought OpenAI was a foundation-model company. I now think it's a consumer company. It's at a $12 billion run rate or something.
My thought here would be that it's going to aggregate to the application layer, and brand is really important. They signed up 1 million ChatGPT users in an hour last week, it was announced. Brand is incredibly important. The application layer is important.
Then I think hardware, as I mentioned, is important. This is one of the reasons we invested in Nothing. We believe they've got 7 million devices out there that are potentially conduits for their AI.
Yeah, I think that might be right. The value is going to be balanced up at the application layer, but I also think there will be value at the hardware and semiconductor layer below, because it's plausible that LLMs are not the end of the story here in AI.
There are some obvious limitations to what LLMs are going to be able to do, so there's more innovation to come. That's going to change the models, it's going to change the math that we have to do, and so on.
Some of the things that are going to be constant—we're still going to be doing very large matrix-vector multipliers at high speed in silicon. I think that's the sort of thing where we can build a competitive, long-term advantage. I think there would be value accruing—perhaps even more value accruing—to companies like NVIDIA, which I think will be big. At the application layer, exactly as you say, I think there'll be value accruing there.
How about inference at the edge as well? That's something you understand better than me.
Yeah, these models are lighter, so more and more could happen on-device.
Yeah, that's true. But with that is coming a lot more chain-of-thought reasoning and a lot more test-time compute. The token generation is still going up, actually. I still think there's going to be a large amount of silicon required to do high-performance inference, even at the edge. So, there's a lot of scope in inference.
You know what I just can't get? I can't get how, if we all appreciate the shift in focus from training to inference, Jensen and NVIDIA are just sitting there going, “We're going to get screwed because our architecture means that we're not optimized for inference.” That is not happening. Jensen is not just saying, “Fine, we'll just enjoy the training era while it lasts.”
So, help me understand: where am I missing this?
They're making a bunch of architectural changes to GPUs to make them better and better for inference. There is a lot of architectural change going on there. It obviously wouldn't be a big surprise if we saw Jensen starting to adopt and reinvent himself as an in-memory-compute company. That wouldn't really surprise me; he'd be working on that.
Whether he does that organically and internally or through some sort of acquisition remains to be seen. But I think it's certainly likely that he's got the resources and the cash to move the organization, or build an organization, in pretty much any area he wants.
One thing about Jensen—I spent about 1.5 years working for him—is that he definitely pays attention to and listens to the market. He's got very big ears and tracks what's happening with enormous scrutiny. I do think we've got to expect NVIDIA to be tracking in the direction of becoming more efficient at inference.
What's your biggest takeaway from working with Jensen?
Firstly, he's a good human, so that's good. One of the world's richest people is actually, I think, a good person.
He is, however, a bit of a control freak. Many a time, we're just about to give a presentation to a major customer, and Jensen wants to go through the deck. We'll change the product name, schedule, pricing, resources, and everything on the fly, with 10 minutes to spare before the meeting.
He's quite hard to work for in terms of his desire to have command of detail and to be in control of the most important variables in the company. But, in a way, as a founder, I do respect that.
Within NVIDIA, we used to have Jensen at the top, and we had a layer of people whose job was to buffer everybody else in the company. This buffer layer would deal with Jensen, which was great.
Human shield.
A human shield. There were people below that who could actually get on with stuff.
I obviously like the guy, and he's an incredible communicator.
We always hear about his direct reports. I don't have direct experience with them, but he has so many—like 50 or 60—and it sounds great when you hear him talk about the 50 or 60. We never hear from them. Is it good for them?
Well, it's a brutal culture, I'd say.
Yeah, it is.
But in a way that is not malevolent, if it's possible to imagine that. He will tear people apart in public over things that they haven't got command of or that he thinks they're wrong about. He will rip them to shreds and leave them whimpering in the corner to lick their wounds.
But I think he then forgets it and hopes that the exercise will have resulted in some improvement in the way the person thinks and acts. It's not for everybody, that style of management, but honestly, you've got to admit it's worked. He has done an amazing job—an unbelievable job.
Would you buy OpenAI at $300 billion? Yes or no? Why?
Yes. If you look at it as a consumer business, I think it has extraordinary momentum, and it's only just started integrating moats. Historically, there have been no switching costs, one of the most important moats of a business. But now people have started using it, and I actually think the memory is helping people stick.
If I look anecdotally at my kids at school, for them, LLMs are ChatGPT. They're very well placed. Do I think the same thing about my mother on the other end of the age spectrum? Yeah. They own brands, so it's incredibly powerful.
It doesn't mean I think it's the best GenAI investment, but if I were sitting independently, do I think it's a good investment? When your downside is somewhat protected and they're at a $12 billion run rate—let's say it's a 20-times forward multiple—I think it's a reasonable place to put money.
Yeah. I think a lot of the demand on these foundation models is going to be through APIs, used by application software. Those APIs are going to be driven by latency, performance of the model, and so on. Things like Claude are as good as, if not better than, OpenAI's models.
Given that agents are going to be calling APIs, that demand will be driving a lot of demand here. It's not obvious to me that the consumer chat interface is the winning interface. It seems to me that the API interface, with applications calling agents, might be a bigger interface. So, I'd probably put the money elsewhere.
Both are good answers. Would you?
I would.
Yeah, I would. I always love businesses where everyone thinks they're reaching the top, and then actually they're just reaching escape velocity.
I think the same with Revolut right now. People think a $45 billion or $60 billion new round is pricey. I would buy the hell out of Revolut right now. But I totally agree with you in terms of introducing the moats and the memory. I think the memory is so important. You go back and they remember what you did in the past. I'm always doing past searches; I'm always going back there.
And actually, I do. It's so funny. For every single show, I put the prompt into Grok, Perplexity, and OpenAI: “You can buy and hold 1 public stock for 10 years. Which one do you pick?”
I mean, I'm so concentrated in tech. I'll avoid tech stocks and say a uranium ETF. I have concerns about the costs of energy for productivity. I think climate change is real. I think the best source of energy going forward is nuclear fusion and potentially fission, and SMRs are going to be important.
I think it's the most predictable, cleanest energy source we have. I'm not betting on 1 individual company; that's difficult to do. So, I think if I take an ETF in uranium, I might enjoy the upside of the market because it'll be needed.
Love that. What's yours, Dad?
Yeah, I probably would avoid tech as well, actually, for the same reason. Probably Rolls-Royce, actually, because I do think defense is going to be a big kicker in terms of demand.
So, the aero-engine business—and I mean, it has actually gone like a rocket this year anyway, that stock. I mean, it's gone like 3x this year. But I actually think we're at the beginning of a journey, and I think it could be much bigger because, as a European aero-engine vendor, I think it's going to see high demand, actually.
Yeah, and you might catch fission as well.
You might—fusion.
Fusion.
Yeah. No, fusion.
You can snap your fingers and change 1 thing about the UK tech ecosystem. What would you change?
Well, I think flood it with venture capital. Seriously, I think that's the 1 lever we can pull that will make a big difference. Everything else will take time and stuff, but I do think a lot flows from capital availability.
I love that. I would say sentiment at the moment. I think there's more—this question is being asked so much that it becomes a drag. What's the most underinvested but exciting area today?
Yeah, you, Tom—you do this for a living. I'll go hardware.
I'd go 1 level below semis. I think semiconductors fit into the hardware that Tom's talking about.
Which politician do you most respect and admire, and why? Given your specialization?
Yeah. So, I'm going to stick to the UK. At the moment, no one in the current government really fills me with enormous enthusiasm. I think Patrick Vallance is a useful guy who's trying his best to make an impact on the UK.
But he's not really a politician; he's doing the job of a politician right now. I do think, in the current government, Darren Jones has the potential to be great.
Final one, guys: 10 years' time, where is the UK, and how many $10 billion companies will we have on the LSE then?
Yeah, I think we will get the UK pointed in the right direction. I think it will require some government embracing of the challenge and a lot more communication by government on what we're going to do and how we're going to do it.
But I think we're approaching a point. We're about a year into this current government, with 4 years to go to the next election. Things have not gone well, I think it's fair to say, and I think we're approaching a point when they've got to recognize a change and make some changes.
I think we are going to see some changes that will be positive, and assuming that happens, I think in 10 years' time we will have achieved this $500 billion valuation in tech. The UK will be seen as the magnet in Europe in which people come to build these companies. So, that's what I think we're going to achieve. I'm an optimist.
I think sometimes the best companies grow from adversity. I think partly because of the concentration of talent, they'll just aggregate more than they have.
So, I don't know—1999, was it Salesforce? And then you have Airbnb and Uber in 2008. I think we'll look back, and the companies that are most impactful in the decade will have grown in the UK. They won't be names we know today because these companies are growing faster than ever.
So, they'll be AI-native, incredibly fast-growing businesses, and it's not clear to me they'll list at all. If you look at the trend direction there, we spent a lot of time assuming listing makes sense, but some of our best portfolio companies, like Stripe, aren't listing anytime soon, and they're finding ways to deliver liquidity.
So, I wonder whether we'll even be talking about whether they did or didn't list in the UK.
God, that's opening up a can of worms. I mean, you could spend another 2 hours on that, but I cannot thank you both enough for joining me. It's been such a fantastic discussion. Honestly, you were the 2 people I most wanted on YouTube because I think it's such a different perspective you both bring. So, thank you so much for doing it.
Thanks for inviting us. We've enjoyed it.
Loved it. Really fun.
Thanks a lot. Amazing, guys. Thank you so much.