单人GP:多数新VC基金从一开始就注定难有回报 | Kevin Costa
- Kevin Costa认为,许多新VC基金在结构上就不可能取得超额回报。 他批评的是规模500万至1000万美元、每笔只投10万美元的基金:即使押中赢家,持股也可能太少,基金整体回报仍不过2–3倍。他称这种做法“完全是在浪费时间”(“complete waste of time”),并拿自己设想中的QQQ投资回报6.5倍作对比。
- Belief Capital寻找的是能支撑公司走过数十年的创始人心理特质。 Costa看重韧劲和鲜明的世界观,后者既能吸引人才,也能“让最优秀的人才留在最难熬的阶段”。非典型背景可能意味着人才被低估,但逆境故事和名校履历都不是可靠捷径。
- Belief依据招人质量和产品交付速度等核心经营信号,早期集中下注。 Costa要求首轮投资至少占2000万美元基金的5–10%;后来确认是Matt的生物科技公司Serova,已占基金一期的20%。他把“招人质量”和“交付速度”排在ARR之前,融资条款则是第三个参照指标。
- 帮助创始人,既能改善后续投资判断,也能提高拿到份额的机会。 Costa不再认同“优秀创始人只需要投资人别添乱”的看法:他以Valore参与Elon Musk旗下公司的运营为例,说明深度参与能带来信息优势。Belief能做的,是先让被忽视的创始人“第一次感受到有人相信”,再通过引荐让更强的资本看见他们。
- Costa把互联网视为项目发掘生态,把旧金山视为支持被投公司的据点。 年轻的技术型创始人“都在同一条街上”,这条街就在网上;他通过X、研究论文和他认为人才被低估的高校寻找创始人,包括Oxford和Georgia Tech。他搬到旧金山是为了跟随创始人,而不是转向本地项目源。
- Ark和Serova体现了Costa对“被问题逼着创业”的创始人的偏好。 对Ark而言,一线经历既提供创业动力,也带来直接的产品反馈;对Serova而言,接触癌症患者促使创始人投身个性化疫苗。“他们未必想创办公司,但不得不创办”,概括了这种吸引力;但讨论中也提到了Ark收入地域过度集中,以及战时生存本身的风险。
- Augusta的投资逻辑,始于学习如何在现有企业内部部署AI。 创始人起初拒绝了风投,花了两到三年通过咨询项目落地AI,积累的经验如今正用于大型私募股权投资组合。Costa称AI是“经济的Ozempic”;这套运营知识未来可能延伸到收购资产、改变被收购企业的经济效益。
- José Maria Macedo把风投称为“慢肌型资本主义”,Costa则承认自己早期错过了一个项目。 Macedo将短期账面涨5倍与经得起时间考验的公司相对照,并警告说,忙碌和账面涨幅并不预示回报。Costa说,自己错过了ElevenLabs的引荐,是个错误;他对Belief的野心是成为“创新经济领域的Berkshire”,而回报才是最终成绩单。
1. 小基金可能在选公司之前就已注定失败
Kevin Costa为2000万美元的Belief Capital基金辩护时,首先谈的是持股比例。他认为,新兴管理人互相模仿,纷纷设立500万至1000万美元的基金,每笔只投10万美元。即便押中一个赢家,持股不足也可能让基金最终只赚2–3倍。他的对比刻意说得很直白:“你把钱投进QQQ,就能拿到6.5倍”,还不用费这些功夫。
风投的另一端也让他失望:大型机构若只拿基金规模的约0.1%投资一家种子期公司,实际上就是把创始人当彩票,而LP拿到的回报也不理想。Belief想服务的是那些被忽视、却值得坚定下注的创始人。在此之前,Costa一直用自己的钱投资:19岁开始,靠个人储蓄支持了40多家公司。
Costa称按履历筛人是“思想上的懒惰”,并以Tobi Lütke在德国做学徒为例,说明顶尖人才未必来自Stanford/MIT这类常规人才管道。他承认这些学校也培养了出色的创始人;他反对的是投资人过度依赖它们。那些必须自己争取机会的创始人可能更有韧性,而资金充裕的圈子也可能让人变得不够坚韧。
2. 韧劲和世界观能支撑公司走下去
Costa寻找的两项心理特质是韧性和鲜明的世界观。韧劲很重要,因为创业做AI已成风潮,但能否扛过艰苦过程是另一回事:“接下来30多年,你为什么还要做这件事?”驱动力不必来自重大创伤。六年级老师说某人将一事无成,也可能成为一种持久、甚至不合常理的动力。
世界观之所以重要,是因为招到人才只是任务的一半。Costa举例说,Alex Karp让优秀员工在Palantir艰难前行了5年多。企业本体论本身不一定是鼓舞人心的使命;“我们在捍卫西方”则给了它一个使命。与众不同的创始人,能让团队在打造长青公司的必经挫折中继续投入。
José Maria Macedo质疑,创始人是否很容易把这两种故事编出来。Costa回应说,真正有这些特质的人“根本他妈的不在乎”是否符合投资人的框架:他投过的一位能源领域创始人童年幸福,也没有逆境故事可讲。真正的动机或许要到第四次晚餐才会显现,彼此坦诚带来的心理安全感,比排练好的Zoom路演更能让人看清一个人。
3. 行为细节能检验创始人讲的故事
Costa有时会带妻子参加创始人晚餐,因为他认为妻子能察觉自己忽略的人际和道德信号。一位有潜力的创始人始终对服务员态度轻慢。投资人需要考虑的是:这个人以后会如何对待工程师,又会如何对待高管?如果一位看似出色的创始人后来诈骗,Costa认为,“你投的这家公司,预期价值其实就是零。”
另一位创始人在估值谈判中反复把问题转到短信上,不肯接一个令人不舒服的电话。几天后,Costa把这种回避当成决定性的负面信号。建公司就要面对绩效不佳、给员工制定改进计划,也要辞退员工。他承认创始人未来可能练出这种能力,但对方已经表现出的退缩,还是让他决定不投,尽管其他方面都很出色。
Macedo提出的反例值得纳入考量:Sam Altman曾说自己不擅长冲突;Elon Musk也可能在无意间怠慢服务员。Costa回应说,自我认知会改变投资判断:投资年轻创始人,押的是他们快速进步的“斜率”,包括发现并克服自身弱点的能力。因此,单独一项弱点需要结合成长证据来评估。
Costa还区分了两种情况:没注意到一个人,和注意到了却故意无视。坦言这些判断本身也可能让投资人犯错。更广泛地说,无论投种子轮、成长期还是Pre-IPO,本质上都离不开对创始人心理的判断;关键是识别可观察的行为,而不是笼统地说某人令人印象深刻。“这个创始人特别有棱角”并不足以说明什么,除非讲清楚具体表现。
4. 帮助创始人能为集中投资提供信息
Costa说,自己过去也认同优秀创始人只需要投资人别添乱。Valore改变了他的想法:他提到Antonio Gracias参与Musk旗下多家公司的事务,包括Tesla的产能难题,这种帮助加快了执行,也让他积累了足够信息,能够反复投资。他表示,SpaceX IPO时,Valore持有的股份比例高于Founders Fund。
Belief最有把握的贡献比较有限:在一个人还未显山露水时就下注,再把他引荐给优秀投资人,让下一轮融资更顺利。Costa不承诺能提供变革性的运营帮助。但有用的参与既能改善是否跟投的判断,也能提高拿到热门公司投资份额的机会。Macedo披露自己是Belief的LP。
Costa列出3种后续投资方式:尽可能提高初始持股,之后不再追加;在种子轮和A轮附近继续投资;或等到C/D轮、公司已显现品类领导者地位后再投。Belief偏好早期追加。首轮投资的门槛是至少占基金规模的5–10%。一家公司——Matt的公司——已经占基金一期的20%;Macedo称这是按成本计算的集中持仓。
Costa最看重的后续投资证据是招人质量和交付速度。创始人能否吸引那些本可以自己创业的顶尖人才?团队能否快速交付?他特别指出,自己还没提收入或ARR。之后可以把这些观察和A轮条款清单交叉验证;如果公司已有收入,还可以看ARR倍数。
5. 综合型投资人仍需要信息优势
Costa质疑早期投资人在成长期选股时,能否比Sequoia的Andrew Reed更有优势;Reed每年要看300多家成长期公司。Macedo问这是否意味着应该照着Reed做。Costa区分了成长期投资和A轮投资,也承认自己不够了解该公司的回报,而且照搬策略只要执行得好也可能奏效。难点在于项目份额:如果错过最难投进的两个赢家,整个策略都可能受损。
Costa也反对按行业设投资限制。他认为,数十年来反复取得10–30倍回报的机构往往是综合型投资人;如果受限于既有行业分类,Uber在所属品类尚未诞生前就可能被错过。他承认,包括金融科技投资人在内的行业专注型基金,在某些周期里可以表现出色。他反对的不是某个周期里的成功,而是跨周期持续取得超额回报的能力。
Macedo认为,要判断创始人的决策,投资人也得足够了解所在行业。Costa同意技术说法需要核实,但这不必全在通话中完成。连续追问3到4个“为什么”,就能看出对方有没有真材实料;之后还可以做研究,并找行业专才投资人交流,验证自己不熟悉的生物学或国防领域说法。
6. Belief的总部就在互联网上
Costa不接受把“圈外人”理解成地理概念:住在硅谷,也可能仍在当地社交网络之外。“最优秀的年轻技术型创始人基本都住在互联网上”,他们“都在同一条街上”。Belief愿意去任何地方见他们。他搬到旧金山是为了跟随被投公司;如果他们搬去了韩国,他说自己也会跟过去。
项目来源会变。Product Hunt曾有几年很有价值;如今X占据了他更多注意力。他也会读科学论文,包括Nature上的论文,再去查作者。目标是通过长期参与和对技术人才的真诚兴趣,形成“非对称的信息流”;其中也包括那些研究物理、琢磨想法的毕业生,他们未必马上会创业。
Costa认为,MIT和Stanford的人才池相对贵,Imperial、Cambridge、Oxford、Georgia Tech和Vanderbilt则仍被低估。他接触的大多数人不会变成投资项目。背后的机制是“优秀吸引优秀”:帮助优秀的人,可能会带来更多优秀的人。他强调,应该选择自己乐于长期投入的项目发掘方式,而不是把每次接触都当成一笔交易。
7. Ark既有一线实质,也面临生存风险
Ark是通过一位被投公司创始人和一位投资人介绍给Costa的;两人都提到一位在乌克兰使用无人机的特别人物。“古怪”让他亮起了正面的警觉信号。创始人未必是有魅力的融资高手,但连续追问“为什么”后,Costa看到了不寻常的实质。他把投资人的角色概括为发现这种实质:“你一旦看见了,就再也无法视而不见。”
创业动力很直接:前线有人在死去,无人机和无人地面车辆可以帮助保护朋友和家人。Costa拿它与那些只想拿到YC录取、在LinkedIn上宣布融资的人作对比。接近前线也让创始人了解真实需求;成熟的国防承包商则可能做出脱离实战需求的产品。
同样投资Ark的Macedo问,既然乌克兰公司的产品经过实战检验,为什么它们看起来仍普遍比美国同行便宜。Costa给出了最有力的反方论据:战争带来的生存风险、地域高度集中的国防收入及其周期性,以及公司能否向海外扩张的不确定性。战火中求生,比经营一家硅谷软件初创公司更难;有韧性也不代表公司一定能活下来。
Macedo把更长期的愿景延伸到国防之外,指出农业劳动力短缺可能让自主无人机在未来30年拥有市场。他称Ark的动机是“内生的”:在自己的环境里看到问题,即使身边没有创业者带路,也决定去改变它。这让他印象深刻;但他也承认,从周围创业文化中学到的雄心同样可能成功。
8. 融资能力重要,但不能证明公司能经久不衰
Kevin Costa强调表达能力的重要性:即使创始人有实质,仍可能输给一个能持续吸引融资的竞争对手。Macedo回答:“我不知道。短期内可能是这样。”他接着指出,资本可以支持招聘、制造和增长。两人的分歧在于,融资成功在多大程度上预示着一家公司最终能否成为影响一代人的企业。
Macedo以Bending Spoons收购融资热潮中诞生的公司为例,质疑把融资能力当成公司价值的代理指标。风投是“慢肌型资本主义”(slow-twitch capitalism):公司要花10多年才能成形,而快速账面涨5倍会带来诱人的多巴胺快感。他明确警告,投资人把“投入、活动、交易数量、账面涨幅”误当成回报;他说两者“完全不相关”。
9. Serova瞄准的是语言模型热潮之外的疾病
Macedo把AGI的种种说法,与他认为过去约30年在癌症和阿尔茨海默病治疗上的有限进展作对照。他不认同错过大型语言模型公司就等于错过了所有机会。个性化癌症疫苗是他感兴趣的领域之一。他相信疾病能够被攻克,但也明确表示:“这需要付出大量努力。”
Kevin Costa说,Serova的Matt曾在医院看到失去肢体的患者,其中大多数是因为癌症。他不理解,在AGI的说法甚嚣尘上时,为什么2025年还会有这种情况。Matt先进入Oxford学医,后来退学,与曾任警察的Michael搭档。Costa称赞两人过去12个月的执行力,也认可他们长期投入的决心:这家公司“分量很重,但还没有经过投票检验”。
10. Augusta先学习如何落地AI,再追求规模化
Costa是在X上发现Augusta创始人Rodrigo的。当时Rodrigo刚离开Sword Health,正在为V工作。2022–2023年,Rodrigo认为AI未来20多年的影响被低估了。虽然投资人想给他投资,他起初还是拒绝了,选择花两到三年做咨询和AI落地。Costa认为,这段学习经历构成了公司如今执行能力的基础。
Costa说:“AI本质上就是经济的Ozempic”,能让企业更健康、更精简、更强大。难点在于实际使用——“没人喜欢打针”。Augusta积累的落地经验,如今正用于转型全球一些规模最大的私募股权投资组合。Costa以2026年的视角认为,5年后人们回头看,可能会希望当初也参与了AI在整个经济中的落地。
这些知识未来可能支持一种类似Bending Spoons的做法:收购资产,再改变其经济效益。Costa把这描述为一种潜在扩张方向,同时强调公司仍处早期。另一个优势是公司汇聚了大批年轻的葡萄牙技术人才。在被忽视的地区,一家出色的公司可以先成为优秀人才的明确去处,再带着这支人才队伍走向全球市场。
11. 过度套用创始人框架会造成盲点
Costa错失项目,往往从见面之前就开始:预先认定某个行业没意思,于是连第一次电话都不打。ElevenLabs是让他痛心的例子。他手上有引荐机会,却没有接。“这很蠢。”对一个以创始人为核心、跨行业投资的投资人来说,这个教训尤其扎心:按行业过滤,可能会错过那个足以改变判断的人。
心理框架也可能变得过于决定论。第一次通话里没有显现的特质,可能在更长期的关系中出现。Costa承认自己有时会过度贴合偏好的标准,但不愿把后来估值上涨的公司都说成自己已证实错过的机会。基金成立才4到5年;牛市会让一切看起来都很好。“5年后,或者10年后,我再告诉你。”
不同的生意需要不同的长处。执行密集型业务可能更需要竞争心,而不是非凡的工程能力;体育或游戏能显露这种驱动力。Costa说,如果非要给这种业务找一个Elon Musk式的技术人才,可能就会把合适的经营者排除在外。他仍偏好有30年潜力的公司,但承认短期内这种偏好可能让Belief显得愚蠢。
校准判断时,双方提到Deel的规模扩大后仍保持每周约10%的增长;公司达到200亿美元规模时,创始人仍会在WhatsApp上用1到2分钟回复薪资问题。这些经验来自对沟通和执行的观察,并不是长期深入公司内部得出的。
12. Belief的野心不止于单人GP
《有限与无限的游戏》影响了Costa:他更愿意与少数高质量的人建立深厚关系。关系越深,可信的人脉越可能带来更广的网络“宽度”,因为值得信赖的人会做有意义的引荐。他从19岁进入投资行业起就一直在建立这类关系,而不是试图认识所有GP。这种逻辑也意味着,即使没有即时投资机会或明显的交易利益,仍要愿意几十年如一日地帮助别人。
长期导向并不妨碍激进配置。Belief希望领投首轮,并尽可能多拿股份;Costa坦言,在这个阶段,他们并不特别讲究合作。投进去以后,再通过引荐和广泛合作帮助公司。他认为,既要拿到基金所需的份额,也要避免陷入把每段关系都看成零和博弈的稀缺心态,两者之间需要平衡。
Costa说,一些最好的创始人从公司成立到IPO都选择更少的合作伙伴。Belief希望陪他们走完整段路,并利用早期积累的信息在其他阶段继续投资。他不接受单人GP或多阶段基金这类标签;公司的长期野心,是在50多年里成为“创新经济领域的Berkshire”。但他强调,现在还早,回报才是最终成绩单。
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Some of the best founders started companies for bigger reasons than that. They didn’t necessarily want to start a company, but they had to. People were dying on the front lines, and someone was developing drones and deploying them there to help prevent their families and friends from dying. That’s a very different motivator from, “I want to get into YC and raise a fancy round so I can post about it on LinkedIn.”
AI is essentially the Ozempic for the economy. It makes it fitter, leaner, and stronger. The best young technical founders tend to live on the internet. Sure, you might back an incredible founder, but if they’re unethical or commit fraud, the expected value of the company you invested in is actually zero.
All right. Hi, everyone, and welcome to another episode of the Emerging Managers podcast. I’m José Macedo, and today I’m excited to be here with Kevin Costa, founder and general partner at Belief Capital. Kevin got into tech at 17, helping build Forto, the Berlin logistics startup, and then joined La Familia, now part of General Catalyst, where he worked on Deel and Stoke Space at the seed stage. Alongside all that, he’d been angel investing with his own savings since he was 19, investing in more than 40 companies, including Bland and Superpower.
Last year, he finally took the step and turned that into Belief Capital, a $20 million solo GP fund backing young technical founders before anyone else will. He’s backed companies like Ark, Augusta Lab, and Seroba, which are already in the portfolio. What I really like about Kevin is that he has one of the best founder lenses I’ve seen in Europe. He surfaced multiple companies that I ended up backing personally, and he thinks about founders in a way most VCs don’t. So I’m really excited to jump into that with you today, Kevin.
Amazing. Pleasure to be on.
To start with, do you want to tell us a bit about yourself? I gave a brief intro, but maybe you could put it in your own words, because I think for many people it might be the first time hearing from you.
Yeah, for sure. I grew up in the middle of nowhere, on the outskirts of Lisbon, Portugal. It’s actually not too far from where you are, probably.
Which is where I am now.
Yeah, exactly. There wasn’t much going on in Portugal, not much of an ecosystem. I grew up addicted to video games, so I played way too much. That’s how I started meeting interesting people on the internet, which is essentially what we do for a living, I believe. We nerd-snipe interesting talent on the internet and then partner up with them. That’s sort of our job.
My mom’s Portuguese, and my dad is German. I spent some time in Germany after Portugal. I thought Portugal was boring, then found out Germany was even more boring. That’s how I stumbled into tech when I was 17. I got lucky and was exposed early on to the startup world, back when everyone said I was a loser for going into startups. I got lucky to be exposed to a very fast-growing company in Germany, and then got to see a bit of the other side early on.
Over the years, I kept seeing young technical people who were sort of my peers, and whom no one really wanted to underwrite, starting to build very interesting companies around 2019 and 2020. I saw the rise of companies like Deel and Stoke Space, and put all my savings into them, for better or worse. Over the last 6 to 7 years, I’ve put all my personal capital into backing companies. That was really the ethos, and sort of the predecessor, to what Belief is now. So that’s a bit about me.
Why do a $20 million early-stage fund? You were working at La Famiglia, a pretty big fund. You presumably had offers from other funds. Why do your own $20 million fund, and how do you beat the big guys?
1. The Case For A Smaller Fund
I think the one thing I kept seeing was a lot of my peers and other people starting funds over the last few years. It’s become this common, cool new thing to do. I think a lot of people set themselves up structurally for failure because they want to do it simply because it’s the cool new thing.
Most people look around, see what everyone else is doing, and try to mimic that. The outcome ends up being a lot of the same: $5 million to $10 million funds, $100,000 checks, a spray-and-pray approach, and hoping for one company to stick out. Even if one does, you have such low ownership that structurally you can only get to a 2x to 3x return at the firm level, which is a complete waste of time, in my view. You could put your money into the QQQ, get a 6.5x, and not do any of the work.
I kept seeing that, with everyone basically doing the same thing. At the same time, I kept seeing young founders who were underserved by venture. A lot of the large firms treat them like lottery tickets, deploying 0.1% of their fund into a company at seed and indirectly treating it as a lottery ticket. On the other side of the spectrum, the LPs in these firms get subpar returns.
I wanted to build something completely different, specifically around the thesis of backing undiscovered talent that I still think is completely mispriced. Not necessarily the Silicon Valley mold of kids, but underdiscovered and underpriced talent.
Yeah, maybe talk a bit about that, because I think you have a very unique view on founders.
Yeah.
So maybe you can talk a bit about that.
2. The Outsider Founder
Thank you. Look, I think we talked about this: if you look at some of the largest companies, you see founders like Palmer Luckey, who went to Palm State College, not Stanford or MIT. You see Tobi Lütke, with a random German apprenticeship. You see Steve Jobs at Reed College. Elon was at Penn. All of these incredible founders aren’t in the Silicon Valley mold, and the list goes on and on.
Yet if you look at most venture firms, they use intellectually lazy ways of screening for talent. They’ll say, “Okay, we’re going to look at ex-Palantir people, or the Stanford and MIT kids.” There are some great founders from those places; I’m not saying nothing comes out of those ecosystems. But I think they’re overdetermined relative to what actually produces incredible outcomes.
Some of that probably stems from my childhood. I grew up in the middle of nowhere, wasn’t an insider, and wanted to find kids like me who I thought had much more talent and make them legible to capital. That’s mostly what we look for. I think some of the founders we just talked about have much more grit because they come from non-obvious backgrounds and have something to prove.
For better or worse, people from more privileged backgrounds get money thrown at them. They have it softer. It’s not their fault, but the ecosystem makes them softer by default. If you grew up in the middle of nowhere, had no venture funding, and had to really fight for it, I think you have much more resilience and grit. We tend to think those profiles are much more interesting.
And what do you look for exactly? How do you find out that someone has grit? Presumably, you’re looking for an outsider from the beginning, right? Is that your first test, or what do you look for in them?
Not necessarily. We look for 2 psychological traits, which we don’t find too often. If we do, we’re happy to put up to 5% to 10% of the fund into a company at the super-early stage.
What are the 2 psychological traits?
Trying not to leak too much alpha. One of the things I just touched upon is that we try to screen for resilience and grit in a world where everyone wants to build an AI company and gives up after 2 years because it’s actually really fucking hard. As Elon says, it’s like chewing glass.
I think the biggest issue now is that tech as a percentage of GDP has become very, very large. It’s no longer a niche thing; it’s just become a job, essentially. So you have a lot of tourists. That’s one thing we try to screen for.
Normally, it can appear as some type of event early on, like childhood adversity, although I want to say again that it’s very overdetermined to some extent.
Yeah.
And also very performative, I would say. It’s nuanced how you actually find those things out. It’s not on a Zoom call, and I don’t think it has to be a big trauma or some major event that happened. For a lot of people, including some of the names I mentioned, it’s super nuanced, and we never talk about that nuance.
Maybe it was the one teacher who told you in sixth grade that you weren’t going to amount to anything, and that’s still lodged in your head. Those nuanced things that happened to you can be the irrational drive. I don’t think you have to have had a huge childhood trauma.
Yeah.
You look at Zuck, you look at Bill Gates, who grew up in a quite wealthy environment but was bullied in school. It was his slight, nuanced chip on his shoulder that led him to build the behemoth that is Microsoft today. I think it can be very nuanced, but it’s something you screen for: in a world where everyone wants to build a company and gives up after 2 years, why would you do this for the next 30-plus? There aren’t too many people building companies for 30-plus years.
Yeah.
So that’s one.
So grit is one. What’s the other?
The other one dates back to the fact that there aren’t many people building companies for 30-plus years.
Mm-hmm.
There are a lot of short-term traders. We can talk about the trader mindset in venture, but it’s about having some kind of strong worldview. I can give you an example.
Yeah.
If you look at Alex Karp, why did the best talent stay at Palantir when the company wasn’t going anywhere for 5-plus years? It was because of Alex Karp’s strong disagreeability and strong worldview, which led him to attract some of the best talent and keep that talent through the inevitable ups and downs of a generational company.
Everyone talks about the first part, attracting the best talent. No one talks about the second part: keeping the best talent through the hard parts of building a generational company. All generational companies go through hard parts, and it’s about the stickiness of attracting and keeping the best talent. These magnetic founders, with an incredibly strong worldview of the future and how their company fits into it, do incredibly well.
I don’t think every company needs a SpaceX-type vision, because that’s just not the case. Palantir, I would argue, is quite a boring company, per se. They’re building an ontology, which is, to some extent, integration for larger enterprises to develop or implement AI. But Alex managed to create this vision of “We’re defending the West, and we’re protecting the West,” and people get behind that vision.
There are very few people who can rally talent and keep that talent through the tough times. Those are some of the high-level things I look for, but I try not to leak too much alpha.
Is that because you’re worried about founders reverse-engineering what you’re looking for?
Yeah, to some extent. A lot of what I said has nuance, and there will be a lot of founders who don’t fit the mold. We always like to put things into buckets, and that’s where you make the most mistakes in venture. You always have to be quite open to it, so I try not to be too deterministic, although we do have some frameworks.
What’s some of the nuance? A lot of people will say the same things, right? They’re looking for founders with independent visions, people who are gritty, and so on. Can you think of an example? You said Zoom calls aren’t good; maybe you’re meeting them in real life. What questions are you asking? Most founders, I think, will at least have a manufactured story that fits these 2 points. It’s become widespread enough that every founder—or most of the good ones you’ll meet—will have a story about how they were gritty and a story about their worldview that sounds unique and disagreeable. They’ve answered the Peter Thiel question. How do you tell the real ones?
Mm-hmm.
Because it’s sort of become widespread enough that every founder, or at least most of the good ones you’ll meet, will have a story about how they were gritty and a story about their worldview that sounds unique and disagreeable. They’ve answered the Peter Thiel question. How do you tell the real ones?
The real ones don’t—I don’t know if we’re allowed to swear, but the real ones don’t—
Yeah, you’re allowed to swear.
—fucking care.
A founder we backed earlier this year is building an energy company. He doesn’t fit into any of these molds. He might not have the manufactured story, and he actually doesn’t care. He’s going to build this behemoth of a company, and if some venture funds don’t have the checkbox of crazy childhood adversity, because he’s actually had a really, really nice childhood, then so be it.
The real ones don’t care about any of the molds or filters, and they don’t care about posturing. The detail is that I would never share what drives us to build belief in a huge behemoth for the next 50-plus years on a Zoom call. I might do it the fourth time we meet for dinner, maybe after a few drinks, and maybe after you share what makes you who you are and what your insecurity is, or what really drives you to build Delphi. That opens up psychological safety in the room for me to potentially open up about what drives me.
It’s nuanced. When I meet someone over dinner, I often bring my wife to meet founders. I think we men are quite good at screening for IQ, raw ambition, horsepower, and that sort of thing. But we tend to be quite bad at EQ, and maybe ethics as well.
That’s under-discussed, too. You might back an incredible founder, but if, in year 6, the company grows like a rocket and the way the founder treated the waiter—which was very nuanced and maybe only my wife would have picked up on—means the person isn’t ethical or commits fraud in year 6, then the EV of the company you invested in is actually zero. You need to screen for these things. All of this is to say there’s a lot of nuance.
Mm.
So, yeah.
Can you think of an example where a founder was extremely close, and you were very excited about them? They passed the grit test, they passed the independent-thinking and disagreeable-worldview test, but then something happened that made you pause or realize they weren’t the real thing?
There are definitely a few. One example is treating the waiter. I don’t want everyone to know—
And what was it exactly? Did he snap at the waiter, or—
No, I think it was nuanced. He was dismissive toward the waiter over a long period of time in this specific case. I didn’t necessarily pick up on it very well at first, but once I started noticing it, it became quite obvious. Then you have to map that onto how the person will lead a company for the next 30-plus years, and how he’ll treat the forward-deployed engineer versus the executive. That was one example, but there have probably been a few more.
Can you think of a few more? I’d be curious to dig into those.
Mm-hmm.
It doesn’t have to be an ethical thing. It could be something that made you realize they weren’t as smart, ambitious, disagreeable, or whatever else you’re looking for as you thought, for someone you were otherwise very bullish on.
Yeah. There was one recently where I think we were very convinced about the founder. One of the points around disagreeableness is that, when we’re trying to negotiate the price or set a valuation for the company—
Mm-hmm.
—it became quite apparent that the founder was trying to push all communication toward text.
And so, rather than jumping on a call and facing the confrontation head-on—which is very uncomfortable—after multiple days of trying to get someone on a call and have that very uncomfortable conversation, which is uncomfortable for both sides, he was always avoiding confrontation. That’s an incredible negative signal, because building a company means doing this every day, right? You have to tell an employee who maybe isn’t performing that he’s on a PIP or might be fired. There’s a lot of discomfort you have to face every day.
Yeah.
And that was very nuanced, because in all the other respects, you’d say he’s incredible. But that was one area where he was lacking. That’s a lack of disagreeableness, or a willingness to push through if you have a strong worldview. Again, I’m not saying he can’t develop those qualities over time, but it’s a no.
And was that one where you said no just based on that? Sam Altman famously says that he really struggles with confrontation, and that the problems people accuse him of being unethical over are actually because he struggles with confrontation. I can imagine Elon unwittingly being rude or dismissive to a waiter, or something like that. It’s nuanced in the sense that if there’s extreme strength, you’ll ignore some of those things.
Mm-hmm.
And, yeah.
The devil is in the details. Sam managed to be self-aware about his unwillingness to confront things, or his dislike of confrontation. I think self-awareness is one piece of it. What we’re betting on a lot with founders, especially younger ones, is that their slope is high: they not only identify their weaknesses, but get better and almost demolish those weaknesses over time. You have to underwrite the slope as well, and I think that might be the case with a few of these founders.
Mm-hmm.
But you mentioned Elon, right? He confronts the truth like crazy, at all times, and that’s very strong. Can he be rude to a waiter? Yes. But I think you have to distinguish between being rude because you’re not aware of someone in the room and being aware of someone in the room but actively choosing to ignore that person.
Mm-hmm.
And, again, there are a lot of failure modes on my side, or on the investor side, that might happen. There’s also a lot of nuance in how you read into that.
As you speak, I feel like this is very much a gut instinct read for you, which you then try to transpose into words and mental frameworks. Is that accurate, or would you say it’s an analytical process?
It’s definitely psychology. It’s trying to understand someone’s wiring. I think all we do is psychology. At the seed stage, at Series C, at pre-IPO, I think everything is founder-driven investing. The rest is kind of cope. A lot of growth investors might tell you, “Hey, this is the Excel sheet and how we project all of this,” but I’d tend to think all of it is just founder-driven investing in the best companies at any stage.
Mm-hmm.
If you look at SpaceX, even a year ago, where was the $20 billion in compute revenue? It wasn’t there, so you couldn’t necessarily have modeled that out. I think you always have to underwrite the psychology of the founder, which is incredibly hard and complex. But there are things that are factual, which you can get to: the ability to face confrontation, the ability to be disagreeable, and a few other things you can nail down. There are signs around all of this stuff.
Yeah.
It’s not just a gut feeling of, “I feel good about it.” Even we have to get better. I hate hearing, “This founder is incredibly spiky. You should meet them.” It’s like, okay, what does that mean? What specifically about him made you interested or excited?
A lot of this stuff is about calibration, right? When you meet a really great founder, you start off with one idea of what a great founder is. Presumably, at 19, you had one idea. Who would you say are the people you calibrate against? Who did you meet and spend time with that really helped you calibrate the way you see founders?
I think a large part of being a very good venture investor is being exposed to greatness early on. That basically calibrates you. If the best founder you’ve ever met is the best founder in the Lisbon ecosystem, you’ll have a local maxima problem. That’s what you think is great, so when you tell me, “I met a great founder,” that will be the bar.
I got lucky, to be very honest, whilst I was at LF[?], seeing the team at Deel grow at about 10% week on week. As the base was getting larger, they were still growing at that rate, and that slope was like, “Okay, well, that’s great.” Then there was the team at Stoke Space, where Andrew was just shipping and shipping and shipping in very short periods of time. That set my bar for what’s great.
Over time, I’ve met other teams that give you a different flavor of what great looks like, because different companies have different founder archetypes that do better. But one of the main things is that you have to meet greatness to know what it is. I think that’s the difference between a very good investor in venture and one who isn’t.
And you got to spend time with them and see them operate. What was the biggest learning from each of them, or the thing that really stood out?
I wouldn’t say I got to spend a lot of time with them. I got to meet the heads of sales at these teams. Even recently, when we got onboarded because we’re looking to run payroll, the founders and founding team still replied within 2 minutes or 1 minute on WhatsApp. These are small things that never change. It’s easy to do when you’re a pre-seed company, but really hard to do when you’re a $20 billion market cap company.
So I wouldn’t necessarily say you need to spend a lot of time with them; it’s more about seeing what the teams do. Just from being exposed to both companies, the way they act and the way they ship, I think you learn a lot about what greatness looks like.
With those two founders, was it mainly the intensity, the speed of building, and responding in 2 minutes? Or were there other big lessons you took away? Where did the differentiated worldview, disagreeableness, or grit come from? Did you hone those frameworks over time by meeting these founders?
Yeah, a lot of trial and error, deploying my own capital over close to 10 years, and learning what specifically I found to be the best predictor. But, yes, I’ve learned about execution speed and a very strong worldview from those teams, as well as relentless execution.
For some other types of companies, relentless execution isn’t the only thing you need. For a company like Deel, that is what you need, and it worked quite well. But the very strong worldview is especially important when you look at companies in general today. There are so many companies, but only 5 to 10 really matter every year, if that. You could even argue it’s fewer.
If you look at the companies or firms with epic returns, 10x to 30x, they tend to back companies that exist and stick around for 30-plus years. If you look at Founders Fund and Sequoia, a few companies yielded most of the returns, and those tend to be companies that endure over very long periods of time and compound even at very large scales. Apple, NVIDIA, and SpaceX are the companies you really want to be involved in over long periods of time.
And those yield most of the returns in the industry. I think it’s really about increasing your surface area to be exposed to those companies, and then being the best partner to them over very long periods of time. I think that’s the second part Nolan talks about. We talk a lot about writing early checks into companies, but how about being the best partner for them if you believe the company will stick around for the next 40-plus years?
Yeah.
And so I think that’s the other part.
Yeah. Maybe we can talk about that a bit, then, because you do a really good job at this. All the founders I’ve spoken to really love you. But some venture investors have this view that you can’t do anything for your founders: the right ones don’t need your help at all.
Yeah.
And that it’s kind of just a LARP that venture investors do. It seems like you disagree with that based on your actions, but I’m curious: what do you think a venture investor can do to really add value to a founder, and what do you focus on?
3. Beyond The First Check
Yeah. I think that notion is completely wrong. I actually used to subscribe to it. It’s the Founders Fund-ism: the best founders don’t need your help; just get out of the way. The case in point for why that’s wrong to some extent, though Founders Fund still does fantastically well, would be Valore. Both Valore and Founders Fund are investors in SpaceX and Elon.
Valore has doubled, tripled, quadrupled, quintupled down into the company. They’ve embedded very deeply into all of Elon’s companies, helping with operations, stepping in during Tesla’s production hell, and unblocking a lot of roadblocks. That gave them the asymmetrical information to keep doubling down into the company. At IPO, they have a higher percentage ownership of the company than Founders Fund does.
I think that’s the perfect use case: Elon is a founder who doesn’t need help from anyone. He’s probably the one person who wouldn’t need anyone’s help to get where he is, and he still openly talks about Antonio Gracias and Valore being incredibly helpful—not by helping, but by accelerating the path to him getting there. I think that’s the perfect example of what you should do if you can, because it gives you more information about the companies, which then gives you a better ability to concentrate.
We talk about concentration a lot, but a lot of follow-on decision-making from firm managers I speak to comes down to, “Is Sequoia doing the Series A or the Series B? If so, we’re going to plow in a lot of capital.” I’m being flippant here, but that’s essentially how they make follow-on decisions. I think that’s factually very wrong. Again, you look at the data: a lot of Sequoia’s follow-on rounds end up not being good follow-on investments, so it’s probably not the best mental model for how to do those.
I do think there’s value you can provide. The best founders probably don’t need you; you won’t be consequential most of the time. But I do think the best founders appreciate you being early and being the first glimpse of belief. If you help accelerate their path, that gives you the ability to know when and if to follow on, and, second, the ability to get the allocation in the most wanted companies.
Mm-hmm.
The most wanted companies.
It’s a good point. I never thought of it that way. What do you do, then? Antonio Gracias is a seasoned operator. He really stepped in with a bunch of Elon’s companies in that sense.
Yeah.
What do you think your biggest value-add can be, and what do you focus on?
Yeah. Again, I tend not to like to overpromise, especially in a live format. But for us, if you look at some of the companies we’ve backed, we were the first glimpse of belief in them when they were in the middle of nowhere, not in the Silicon Valley mold. The best thing we have done, and still do, for them is make them legible to really good investors and really good capital.
I think the best thing you can do is be the first glimpse of belief in someone, and then bring them to some of the best folks along the way—in other words, help make the next round easier. I think that’s what most investors can do well. The really good ones do that really well, and for the rest, the value-add stuff is very incremental. We try to do a lot, and it is a big part of how we’re going to build belief, but I don’t want to overpromise.
Mm-hmm. Yeah, you talked about this in your previous answer: how being value-add helps you concentrate because it gives you more data to evaluate a founder. How do you think about concentration?
Yeah.
Are you mostly doubling down on a company once you’ve made the first investment and seen them execute? Or will you put a large percentage of your fund into a company before seeing the founder operate? And after seeing them operate, how concentrated do you go?
Yeah. Follow-on investing, or concentration, is one of my favorite topics because I think there’s a lot of intellectual laziness in the industry. I talk to some of the people I arguably think are among the best pickers and investors out there. There are three schools of thought on follow-on investing. One is: don’t do it. Just get as much entry ownership as possible from the beginning. Basically, don’t deal with it.
The second is that you do it early, at the seed and Series A, when you’re close to the team and pay a lower entry price. The failure mode here is a false positive. Again, a lot of Sequoia’s Series A investments end up not being good follow-on investments. The third school of thought is to plow into companies at Series C or D, when you know they’re category-defining, and avoid the false positive.
I can talk about how we see it at Belief. We’re very concentrated. To answer your question, we’re mostly only willing to write a check if we’re willing to put up to 5% to 10% of the fund into a company at the first check, at the belief stage. That tells you about the bar. One of the companies where we have 20% of Fund I is quite early.
Which one is that?
That is quite early.
If you don’t mind sharing.
Matt’s company.
Oh, cool.
Yeah.
Awesome. Congrats. Twenty percent on a cost basis.
Time will tell.
What gets you to the conviction to put 20% in? Because I know you went—
Yeah.
Mm-hmm. Yeah.
So, to finish the thought: there are three schools of thought. One is don’t do it, one is do it early, and the third is plow money in when you know it’s a category-defining company. What I think is quite interesting for Belief is doing it early. We spend a lot of time with a small set of teams assessing hiring quality, which comes back to what we look for in founders: can they attract the best talent?
Especially in a power-law economy, the best talent can do whatever they want. They can raise money to do their own thing, join a company, or whatever. Hiring quality is crucial. The second thing is shipping velocity. Those two tend to be asymmetrical data points we can get by spending a lot of time with the teams. Note that I haven’t said anything about revenue or ARR. Those are the 2 metrics we look for.
Then you can triangulate those two with a third factor: the term sheet from the Series A fund, and maybe the ARR multiple on that if the company has revenue. Between these 3 things, you can make a really good decision about whether to follow on.
Mm-hmm.
That’s how we do it at Belief. My challenge to a lot of growth investors is that I think it’s delusional to believe that even a top 0.1% early-stage picker here can have an advantage at Series C against Andrew Reed at Sequoia, who looks at 300-plus growth companies and the best of them every year.
And so I tend to think it’s a fool’s errand to think that you can do better here.
Doesn’t that tell you to just copy-trade Andrew Reed? Isn’t that a vote for the strategy we were hitting on before, of just copying Sequoia into these rounds?
At the growth stage, it’s different than at Series A.
Okay. So you think that at the growth stage, copy-trading Sequoia or whatever is a viable strategy, actually?
I don’t know their returns too well. There are individuals within the firm who are notoriously very good.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I think it is actually well—
Notoriously very good.
I haven’t checked either.
Yeah.
Someone told me there was a fund whose thesis was to copy-trade Sequoia and a handful of other Tier 1s into rounds: if they were in, you’re in. They actually did pretty well, which was surprising to me, but interesting. An interesting data point.
Yeah. No, it does well if you do it well. But again, this is the thing: if you don’t get into the 2 companies that are the hardest to get into, because even Sequoia had to fight really hard for that allocation at Series A and B, your returns go out of whack. If you don’t have the Apple or Nvidia allocation, but you have all the other companies—
Yeah, that’s fair. And you’ve invested in companies across defense, biotech, and health. By the way, I’m an LP in your fund. I feel like I should have said that in the intro, but full disclosure. You’ve invested in companies across all these areas, and I know your biggest, most concentrated position is a biotech company.
Mm-hmm.
Obviously, you’re not a specialist investor in any of these areas. To what extent do you try to understand the sector and the business? Are you looking at the competitors and trying to understand the technical differentiation and all of that? To what extent do you need to do that as a founder-driven investor?
4. An Internet Native Firm
I think you can get there. We’re completely founder-driven. Sector-specific funds tend to be quite stupid. If you look at the last 50-plus years and the most generational firms in terms of returns, the firms that spin out 10–30x fund returns back to back tend not to be sector-specific. You couldn’t have caught Uber in a sector-specific fund; the sector didn’t exist. You couldn’t have caught Airbnb in a sector-specific fund; the sector didn’t exist. The list goes on and on.
I think it has worked for some firms, where throughout cycles you can make great returns. In fintech, for example, there was a cycle where some firms had incredible returns. But in terms of the duration of returns and the resilience of those extraordinary returns over time, generalist firms tended to prevail.
We normally just try to look for these 2 psychological traits, and that’s really it. It can be a team building cancer vaccines or a team building defense. With defense, for example, once you ask 4 “whys” and drill down into someone, making the first call very uncomfortable, I think you can get a high degree of fidelity on how technical someone is and how well they’ve understood their space.
I’ve asked 3 or 4 “why” questions of a lot of Silicon Valley teams building in defense, and at the third “why,” they crumble. I don’t think you necessarily need to be a biotech expert or a defense expert. You need to be really good at understanding psychology, understanding the individual, and seeing if there’s truth.
But the “whys” will eventually get down to hard, first-principles answers about the technology, right? If you drill down enough into the “whys,” your position is that they should be able to explain it simply enough that you can understand the rationale without being an expert in the sector.
I agree that you don’t need to be a sector expert. But even if you’re a founder-driven investor, it’s useful to understand the sector somewhat so you can judge some of the founder’s decisions, right?
Yeah, but I don’t think that has to happen on the call.
Okay.
You might learn something about biotech on a call that I don’t understand, through a consensus check. I can speak to some of the best biotech investors, who are close friends, and try to get their point of view. I can do research on my own. I can sense-check the proof of work to some extent. But what you want to get on the call is just a sense of how much substance is really there. Mm-hmm.
Interesting. And your conviction to concentrate is based on your founder read again: seeing them execute over time, deciding who you rate higher, and traction to some extent. That’s basically how you decide?
There are a few trends. Some of the best founders, over the life cycles of their companies, are choosing fewer partners from inception all the way to IPO. If you’re building a venture product, your product should be about how you can support these founders all the way through. When you find some of the incredible founders, which doesn’t happen too often, you should double, triple, or quadruple down if you have the confidence and the ability to. I think that’s almost part of the product.
Yes, it’s mostly based on these factors, and also the longevity of having spent time with someone and seeing whether they do what they say, and at what level they do it. You can assess from that and be that lifecycle partner.
Yeah.
Yeah. Good, yeah.
You keep mentioning, with some disdain, the Silicon Valley founder or Stanford archetype that’s a bit soft. But you did move to Silicon Valley this year. I’m curious why you did that if you think European founders have it harder and are a better source for you. And how has it been since moving there?
5. Founders Beyond Silicon Valley
Again, I don’t like to generalize, so I want to be careful there. We can back, and have backed, founders in Silicon Valley. There are a lot of incredible founders that come out of the ecosystem. I think generalizing tends to be wrong. It’s not European founders; it’s founders from all over. We don’t care. We back teams in Africa and anywhere else.
But it’s outsiders, right? Your archetype is, to some extent, outsiders.
Yeah, but you can be in the Valley and be an outsider. I don’t know, I’m here. I spend most of my time on the internet here. I don’t go to many of the events, and I’m not super extroverted. I love this one-to-one that we’re having. You can still be an outsider, right?
Yeah.
It doesn’t matter where you are geographically. We moved here mostly because most of our companies, while they don’t start here, eventually move here. If we’re supposed to be a concentrated firm that deploys a lot of capital into a few companies, we have to be close to them to get the data points we just talked about. The joke I always used to make is that if all of our founders had moved to South Korea, I would’ve had to move to South Korea. I think that’s true.
Okay, makes sense. Interesting, because from the companies I know, they…
Maybe we don’t want to speak about it on air, but I’m curious which ones have moved there. Has it affected things? I know the biggest positions in your current fund are founders you didn’t find in San Francisco, and potentially wouldn’t have found there. Maybe you found them on the internet, so potentially you would’ve found them either way—
Yeah.
—and just done a call with them.
Yeah.
But I think you were in London before, right? And—
London and New York, yeah.
—I think—for, yeah, London and New York. So I’m curious: do you think it’ll affect your sourcing? Maybe say a little bit about sourcing as well. How are you mainly sourcing these founders?
Yeah. You touched on the point. Maybe because of the way I grew up, but I genuinely believe this: whilst everyone here in San Francisco says, “San Francisco is the best ecosystem; you need to be here,” people in London will say, “London is the best ecosystem,” and people in New York will say, “New York is the best ecosystem,” I fundamentally believe the best young technical founders tend to all live on the internet.
If you build your firm so that its headquarters are on the internet, and you live online enough to know where those people are, they’re all on the same street, as I like to say, and you’re able to speak to all of them. Again, that means talking the talk in the same way and living on the internet. That’s what I built, and what we’re building Belief to be: our firm’s headquarters are on the internet, and we’re willing to fly anywhere in the world to partner with the best founders. It might be Australia, it might be Africa, it might be here in the U.S.
I genuinely believe that, and that’s what we’ve done. We don’t care whether companies are here in the U.S. or outside of it; they all tend to be internet-native. That’s where we spend most of our time. To talk about sourcing, I like to talk a lot about asymmetrical flows of information. I think that’s a core pillar people should think about: where do I have an asymmetrical flow of information, and how do I really make use of it?
For us, since a very young age, we’ve been chronically online. I’m still chronically online all the time, and we still think there’s a lot of asymmetrical information that comes from doing that. We meet a lot of people. Many of them don’t end up being founders, but we enjoy talking to all these individuals, all these physics graduates. They’re tinkering—
What’s an example? Where are they? Where are the places you meet them online? Is it Discord servers? Is it X? Are there specific groups you’re in?
Yeah, it tends to change over the years. Product Hunt was incredible for a few years. Mostly, it’s X now. I also spend some time reading Nature papers. By reading papers and looking at the individuals who wrote them, you can meet a lot of interesting people.
We also like to spend time in places where we think human capital is mispriced. I always say you have to go where human capital flows are not abundant and where human capital flows are mispriced. In my view, MIT and Stanford might be slightly overpriced, while Imperial, Cambridge, and Oxford are still very much underpriced. Georgia Tech and Vanderbilt are also very much underpriced.
We like to spend time in those ecosystems, where there’s incredible young technical talent, and speak to a lot of people. Most of them don’t end up being investments, but excellence attracts excellence. If you speak to enough great people, and do well by them and help them, things normally come back to you. But you have to play a game that doesn’t feel like work to you. For us, it’s just fun.
That’s cool. All right, maybe let’s talk about some companies, because I think that’ll be interesting too. Let’s start with Ark, which we’re both investors in, for full disclosure. It’s a Ukrainian drone and defense company, right? I think you wrote the first check at the pre-seed and then doubled down as well. They’re doing really well. How did you find them, and what was the process like for getting to conviction?
Yeah. Ark is a defense prime, as you mentioned. We met them because one of the founders we’d backed told us, “There’s this interesting guy in Ukraine deploying drones on the front lines,” or, “There’s this weird guy in Ukraine.” Whenever I hear “weird,” my alarm bells normally ring. It’s a very good signal.
The good alarm bells.
Yeah, the good alarm bells. I heard that and thought, “Okay, very interesting.” An investor of ours also mentioned, “There’s this guy in Ukraine you should meet.” We took a call, and we were quite starstruck by someone who didn’t fit the Silicon Valley mold. He wasn’t necessarily the most charismatic at pitching, but once you drilled into why, he had so much more substance than anyone else.
I tend to find that our job is to be arbiters of substance; we have to find it. Once you see that substance, you can’t unsee it.
What was the substance there, if you remember? What was the thing—the “why” you asked about—that made you think, “Oh, okay”?
For one, the best founders don’t necessarily start companies just because it’s the new cool thing to do. Some of the best founders started companies for larger reasons than that. They didn’t necessarily want to start the company, but they had to. Ark was very similar: people on the front lines were essentially dying, and someone was developing drones, UGVs, and other things, and deploying them on the front lines to help prevent their families and friends from dying.
That’s a very different motivator than, “I want to get into YC and raise a fancy round so I can post about it on LinkedIn.”
Yeah. On the motivation, I totally agree. He’s a very impressive guy. Was there something about the company, or the way he thought about what he was building, that really impressed you? You’ve spoken to a lot of defense startups, I guess, in your time.
Yeah. One thing was the asymmetrical information that comes from being on the front lines. No one else is really on the front lines. You have all these large defense primes building products that aren’t really working on the front lines, so there’s a big cognitive dissonance between what they’re building and what the front lines actually need. He had incredible asymmetrical information about what people actually need.
I have a follow-up on that. Why is this so non-obvious right now? It seems like companies in Ukraine are systematically underpriced versus their U.S. counterparts, despite having, as you say, this asymmetric information from being on the front lines and actually having their stuff tested in production. Why are people discounting that?
If you had to steelman it, is it just that the majority of their revenue is in Ukraine, and people are worried that revenue isn’t sticky? If you had to steelman the case for not investing in these companies, or for them being underpriced versus their U.S. counterparts, what’s the reason?
There are multiple reasons. One is existential risk from being in those countries. The company might not exist if the war hits them quite hard.
Yeah.
Right?
That’s fair.
That’s just an existential risk. By the way, it makes building these companies much harder than building a software company in the Valley. That’s why I think these founders have much more resilience and grit.
So that’s one. The second one is access. To some extent, revenues: can you scale revenues outside your main base? And I think with Ark, it is the vision. It’s not that drones are not interesting. My point of view was that defense is interesting, but if you look at a 30-year horizon, this is already happening all over the world, where drones in China deliver your food. It’s not some guy on a bike.
Guess where there are huge labor shortages? Agriculture. Autonomous drones will, at some point, do the crops in places where there’s just no labor. I think he had a very strong vision on that, and not just defense. But if I were to steelman it, a defense company’s revenue is cyclical to some extent and very much tied to one geography. Can they scale outside of that country?
Yeah.
And the fifth one is—
Literally existential risk.
Yeah. Literally, yeah, exactly. Can they not die?
Yeah. Like, actually, though.
Yeah, yeah. Like—
Not like—
Yeah.
…the company die. Yeah, it’s crazy.
Yeah, yeah.
Nice. And I interrupted you while you were going into Ark. I don’t know if you remember what you wanted to say, if there was more you wanted to say about them and why. What got you bullish when you were digging into the whys?
Yeah. I think there are 2 types of ambition. There’s the insular one, where you see something that’s your truth in your environment, and you want to change your environment for the better. I would say that’s Ark’s. And then there’s the very classic sort of ambition, which is nurtured ambition, right? You grow up somewhere, and people around you are founders of X company. Or if you’re in Hollywood, everyone wants to be an actor.
You almost memetically want to do that just because it’s the thing around you. I think it’s very rare to find the first type: you look at your truth and you want to change the future. It’s very insular, and it’s hard. You don’t have any comparison, and you don’t have a cohort of people next to you who have done it before. That’s why maybe companies like, to some extent, even Revolut, were quite insular. Nick was in London. There weren’t too many big companies with a big vision that had done it before.
And he wasn’t surrounded by a lot of people like here. Again, both can be massively successful. But I find that insular type of ambition very striking, and that’s something Ark definitely had and still has.
And on Ark, what do you think? How do you think about a founder who—you’re drilling down to the substance, as you said.
Mm-hmm.
Right? Do they have the psychological characteristics I’m looking for? But there’s also a way in which whatever the opposite of substance is—I guess the form matters too, right? The way you pitch your vision, whether you can communicate it to investors who aren’t willing to go as deep as you are, has some path dependence in your success, especially in venture.
Ian from Cantos said this: “Actually, a really important thing if you’re doing early stage is to think: will they be able to attract, keep attracting funding? Because even if a company can generate revenue, if you can’t attract funding, you might lose to the company that can.” You’re very much trying to get to the truth, but form does have some path dependence on the company’s outcome. It’s hard to deny that. How do you think about that?
6. Building For The Long Term
I don’t know. I’d say in the short term, maybe. Again, I think that’s very much the times we live in, where we conflate funding attracted with impact. At the end of the day, the only thing that matters is whether the company is around in 30-plus years. If there’s a case to be made that raising a lot of money and being very legible to capital doesn’t lead to the best EV in 20 to 30 years, just look at what’s happening with all the companies that raised a lot of money in 2020.
The Airtables and Miros of this world are being scooped up by Bending Spoons. It’s quite ironic, given Bending Spoons wasn’t the company raising a lot of money in the Silicon Valley mold, but now it’s scooping up a lot of the companies that were in the Silicon Valley mold and raised a lot of money. If we were in 2020, you’d be saying to me, “Man, you need to raise more money if you want to be like Airtable. They all have a higher chance of making it.” But in the end, it doesn’t matter.
Either you build a company that generates free cash flow, which you can then reinvest into the company’s growth, or you can go the super-hard venture route. But again, I tend to think that these short-term goals—being incredibly legible to capital and raising the next round—are very short-term. They’re interesting if you’re looking for a 5X markup or things that don’t matter.
That’s why I think younger investors tend not to do well in venture—or investors in general tend not to do well. Everyone is geared toward fast-twitch capitalism, which is fast dopamine hits. That’s more attuned to being a founder, right? You build a product, sell it to someone, get ARR, get the dopamine hit, and rinse and repeat. I think there are a lot of younger investors, but also investors of all types, in venture, and it’s not slow-twitch capitalism.
It can be if you want to generate the quick 5X markup and look very good. But that’s not the point. The point is slow-twitch capitalism, where it takes 10-plus years for a company to really form and become enduring. It’s not super sexy. In the meantime, you might have some dopamine hits, but not always. This is something we have to keep reminding ourselves: there aren’t that many feedback loops.
The main mistake younger investors make is conflating inputs—activity, number of deals, markups—with output returns. The two aren’t correlated whatsoever. So yes, attracting capital in the short term might give you the ability to hire interesting talent or scale up manufacturing. You need it to some extent, but I think we very much overestimate how much that actually leads to the company having generational EV.
Interesting. So next up, do you want to talk about Augusta? You mentioned it as the biotech company, so I’m not sure if you can’t talk about it or if it’s in stealth. Or do you want to talk about Recast? Which one do you think?
Again, we’ve been talking a lot about companies that stick around for 30-plus years. One thing I’ve been thinking quite a lot about is how we keep talking about AGI being here. I think there’s complete cognitive dissonance: you look at a lot of cancers and Alzheimer’s, and we’ve made little progress over the last 30-plus years. It’s still a lot of the same medicine, still a lot of the same efficiency.
Yet we talk about AGI being here, and if you’re not in Anthropic, you’re not going to make it. But if you look at the real world, there hasn’t been much progress. One of the areas I’m most excited about is solving disease and eradicating disease. One of the companies we backed is building personalized cancer vaccines. I fundamentally believe this is something we will fix and solve. It will take a lot of work, but that’s where I think there’s a lot of progress.
Again, groupthink would make you think that if you’re not in one of these large language model companies, you’re not going to make it. Yet there’s so much opportunity. I actually think there’s an abundance of opportunity, but no one wants you to think that, because that’s the strategic move, right? Get everyone to not be agentic with their life so that more power and value accrue to you. It’s sort of the beer strategy, which is fine.
Mm-hmm.
And what did you see with Matt from Serova?
Yeah. Same thing as with Arc. The goal wasn’t necessarily to build a company. Matt got to see a lot of individuals in the hospital who didn’t have their limbs, mostly due to cancer, and thought to himself, “How is it that we live in 2025 and we talk about AGI, yet cancer still hasn’t been eliminated?”
So he got himself into Oxford, studied medicine, dropped out early, met Michael, his co-founder, and they started Serova.
Who also has an insane story, by the way.
Who also—
Co-founder Michael, yeah.
Yes, yes. Matt himself has an incredible story, but Michael as well. And again, both are not in the mold. Michael was a cop. But both know that this is the thing they want to do over the next 30-plus years.
They’ve executed incredibly well over the last 12 months, and I think it’s one of the companies you’ll hear a lot about. Using the voting machine versus the weighing machine concept we talked about, I think it has a lot of weight, but still hasn’t been voted on yet. Those are the companies we tend to find interesting.
Nice. I’m curious about Augusta. I think it’s interesting to talk about because we’re both Portuguese, and I think it’s one of the most exciting companies out of Portugal.
Mm-hmm.
How did you meet them? And also, it’s an AI consulting company. You wouldn’t think this would be venture-scale. I think that’s the first reaction people have when you pitch them the idea, although it’s becoming more consensus. How did you find them, and how did you think about the investment?
Yeah. I found them on X. Rodrigo, the founder of the company, and I bonded over being chronically online. He was a young kid in Portugal who looked up to Daniel Gross, I think. Talk about being chronically online.
That’s how we got to meet. He had just left Sword Health. He was working for V, and it was 2022 or 2023. He said AI was the next big thing, and he wanted to build a company around it. He said everyone was still underestimating how much of an impact this would have over the next 20-plus years.
I sit here today in 2026, and I tend to think it’s still very practical. But if you look at the world around us, I think in 5 years everyone will look back and be like, “Ah, I should have jumped on implementing AI into the economy at large.” Basically, AI is the Ozempic for the economy, right? It makes it fitter—
Mm-hmm.
—and leaner and stronger. The question is: How do you administer it into the economy? Which is actually quite hard. No one likes needles. That’s essentially the challenge of what they’re doing.
At the time, he had a very singular motivation. He could have raised capital; a lot of venture capitalists wanted to give him money, and he said no. He said, “I’m going to build this for the next 2 to 3 years as a consulting company where we’re implementing AI.” But the learnings they gathered over those 2 to 3 years have now led to them implementing and executing transformations in some of the largest private equity portfolios globally.
They’re doing it so well that at some point they’ll be able to do much grander things with it, which could be like a Bending Spoons-style approach: acquire an asset and re-flip the economics. But I think that learning path was very important.
They’re a very insular team out of Portugal. The two of us are Portuguese, and there haven’t been too many teams out of Portugal. I’ve been trying for the last 10-plus years. They’ve monopolized some of the best young technical talent in Portugal, and that’s almost one of the advantages of the company. If you’re in these non-obvious regions, you can almost monopolize some of the best talent because you stick out as the one company in the country.
I think Terra has done this in Africa, and I think that is a very special strategy. Then you can scale that to the world. I’m very excited about what they’re doing. Again, it’s still very early days.
Nice. I’m curious, what are your biggest mistakes in investing? Both mistakes of omission—deals that you didn’t do that you think you should have—and mistakes of commission, deals that you did and think were a mistake in hindsight.
7. Learning From Investment Mistakes
As a whole, we always focus on the mistakes of omission. They tend to be around preconceived notions that lead us not to take the first call with a founder because we think the space isn’t interesting. Again, it’s the sector-specific mind, which I should always get out of. We all still make mistakes, though, so there have definitely been cases where I should’ve just taken that first call.
Is there a particularly painful one that you’re remembering?
I think I had an introduction to the ElevenLabs team at the time.
Oh, wow. That is a painful one.
Yeah.
And what about once you’re on the call?
I think it got flagged to me, and I was like—
You just didn’t think voice was interesting?
No, no, no. I didn’t take the call. It was stupid.
And once you’re on the call, is there one you remember where you misjudged? I’m curious also if there’s a class of mistake that you tend to repeat, like a leak that happens repeatedly.
Mm-hmm. Specifics, definitely—
Let me think about it.
The whole point around nuance in the beginning is that we tend to overdetermine these frameworks and psychological traits. To some extent, that’s been one of the mistakes we’ve made, and we’re much more attuned to it now. Hopefully we won’t, but as you know, we might still make mistakes as we go.
We look for these traits way too much, when they might not be there. They might not be there on the first call; they might only be there after you’ve met someone for a long time. Overfitting to the criteria or framework we set ourselves has definitely been a mistake sometimes.
Is there a specific one where you think you passed on someone, or a founder who has ended up being great, because you overfit?
That’s the thing with venture. Potentially—
Yeah.
The thing is, we’re 4 or 5 years in. It’s early. Some of these companies—
Mm.
—might look interesting now, especially in a bull market. Everyone is getting marked up, and so it might look like a mistake. Time will tell. I’ll tell you in 5 years, or in 10.
Okay.
Yeah.
Okay. And in the mistakes of commission, is there a mistake you think you make? Maybe there’s overfitting there too. You didn’t mention intelligence or clock speed in the things you’re looking for. Maybe it’s obvious that those need to be there. But is there a way you can over-index on grit or disagreement? I’m curious. Maybe there isn’t anything that comes to mind.
Yeah, for sure. There are a lot of business models and companies where, especially in the short term, we’re talking about execution-driven businesses. Think about Deel in the beginning: Do you need a lot of horsepower to execute on an execution-heavy business that can scale to hundreds of millions or billions of ARR?
Even with the implementation of AI, now that we’re talking about it, do you need an incredibly high IQ? Probably not. Screening for that in a business that’s just ops-driven might be the wrong move. You should actually look for competitiveness, for traits like just wanting to beat someone early on. That might come through in sports, gaming, or whatever it is that person has done at a young age.
That might be the higher-fidelity answer to whether you should invest or not, versus it has to be Elon Musk, if you see what I mean, from an engineering perspective.
Mm-hmm.
We definitely have some of those, yeah.
So you’re saying you tend to look more for founders in industries that don’t require that as much? Because I guess in many of the companies you’ve backed, it actually does require that, right?
Yeah.
Like, pretty high—
Yeah.
—clock speed.
Yeah. We tend to—again, we’ve made a lot of mistakes, and there are companies we should probably be in to some extent. But we tend to think the 30-year companies are more interesting. Time will tell. In the short term, we might look very stupid.
Mm-hmm.
If—
Okay.
Interesting.
And you do have some companies that are sort of in the Silicon Valley mold, right? I’d say Superpower is very much a darling at this point, no?
Yeah, but it wasn’t initially, right?
It wasn’t initially.
I mean, Max is an Australian founder. He has a very interesting strategy for acquiring talent. In the beginning, he used a strategy similar to Augusta and to what a lot of our teams do, which is monopolizing some of the best talent from Australia and bringing them over. In a world where everyone here in the Valley leaks a lot of their talent to the next company, bringing over some of the best talent is quite smart from a visa perspective, because you’re actually tied to the company. And second, you just have incredible loyalty because you brought someone from another country to the US to work on this super high-growth company, plus you’ve given them equity. What we’ve seen there is much higher loyalty and trust, which matters a lot. It’s not only about attracting the talent, but keeping the talent.
Mm-hmm.
But I’d say it wasn’t that obvious. Definitely, they’re in the mold now. But if you look at their talent, it’s not necessarily only—
Mm-hmm.
—talent from here.
Maybe moving on now to some more personal stuff. People have incredibly nice things to say about you. To what extent is that something you try to optimize for, just being super helpful to everyone? And is there a way in which doing that costs you? Do you have to be helpful to founders you’ve passed on? I’m curious if you’ve ever felt that being helpful costs you deals or something else.
8. Playing The Infinite Game
Yeah, it’s funny that you mention that. I believe wholeheartedly in it. We’re in the Valley, where everyone talks about paying it forward and playing the infinite game. I was lucky to read a book called Finite and Infinite Games, which you might know, and I think it has shaped a lot of the way we think about conducting life in general, personally, but also while building Belief.
You must play infinite games with a few high-quality people over very long periods of time, and you’ll do fantastically well. Selfishly, on the personal side, there are a few people who really matter, and you go very deep with them. Through that depth with a few people, you actually have more width, ironically. If you want to get to someone or somewhere, because you have depth within your circle, you actually have greater reach.
The counterpoint would be to know everyone, talk to everyone, and be networked with everyone at a very high level. I tend to think you want to optimize for the complete opposite. But what we’re trying to do is sometimes lead first rounds into companies, so we’re not super collaborative. We don’t care who else is in, and we want to take as much of that first round as possible. In that sense, we’re not too collaborative; we tend to be quite aggressive.
But over long periods of time, companies take 30-plus years, and I think it’s shortsighted to think that you can’t introduce two people. People are very shortsighted in life, and specifically in venture. What you want to do is compound over 30-plus years, because that’s how generational companies compound over long periods of time. I think you need to do that from a very young age, and it will come back to you.
We’re early on there, but I think you also need to balance that with what you want to get. There is a balance. One thing I dislike is people being too zero-sum in their thinking, too focused on scarcity. That’s why the future we envision is one of abundance. I don’t know if that answers your question.
Sorry—no, yeah, it does. I have a follow-up, actually. You’re really good at being collaborative once you’ve invested in a company. It seems like you introduce them to a lot of people, including some tier-one investors. I think it’s one of the best things an emerging manager can do. How have you built those relationships? Have you done that consciously, and are you nurturing them? How do you think about relationship-building with some of the firms, like later-stage firms?
I’ve been lucky to be exposed to this world since the age of 19.
Okay.
So I’ve built a few deep nodes since early on. Those few deep nodes and friendships have led to a lot of width, ironically. Again, it’s not like we’re talking—
Mm-hmm.
—to all the GPs of all the firms. As you know, I like to stick to a few people I can go quite deep with.
Mm-hmm.
But through that, if we build our relationship in a very good way, I should be able to come to you and say, “Hey, Ze, I really want to get to X person. I’m pretty sure that you’ll pull your weight there.” I think that makes a lot of sense. That’s always how I’ve approached it, and I think over long periods of time, that really compounds.
Nice.
So, yeah.
Okay, last question, and then we’ll end it. It’s been really interesting. You talk a lot about infinite games and thinking on 30-year time horizons. In your ideal world, what does Belief look like 5, 10, or 30 years from now? Do you eventually want to be a multi-stage firm, able to lead growth rounds and things like that as well? Do you see yourself doing public markets at some point? I’m curious what the vision is.
It’s early days. One of the things is, even if we look at Elon and SpaceX making life multi-planetary, that was a large vision, but it wasn’t the vision from the get-go. The vision from the beginning was, “We’re going to shoot up a rocket into space, take a picture, and attract more funding to NASA.” Big things start small.
Having said that, I do believe there’s a new product that founders want, from inception all the way to IPO. You ask, “Do you want to be a multi-stage firm?” We don’t care about any of these labels. We reject any label. We just want to be the best investment firm there has ever been, and I think there’s an opportunity to do that.
If you look at the last 50 years and what Berkshire did, it’s incredible. Now, as tech is becoming a larger percentage of GDP, I think there’s an opportunity to become the Berkshire for the innovation economy. I think that means doing early stage really, really well, but also leveraging some of the asymmetric information you get to deploy at other stages, with the ultimate goal being returns.
That’s essentially the scoreboard, while helping some of the best founders and supporting them in a different way that no one else has. We’re doing this for the next 50-plus years. We have a very long arc of ambition.
But it’s still early days in the journey. I tend to reject labels like “multi-stage firms” or “funds.” When people say, “You’re building a cool fund” or “a solo GP fund,” it’s like, no, that’s wrong. We’re just trying to build the best investment firm ever.
Very cool, man. Thank you so much for joining. I think people are going to really enjoy this. And yeah, I really enjoyed the chat, and I’m excited to keep investing in Belief and seeing you crush it over the years.
Exciting. Thanks for the time, and yeah, see you soon.