(预览)OpenAI 驾驭世界:基础设施建设与无边野心,更多关于 Sora 与创作的内容
OpenAI 仅凭签下约1万亿美元的基础设施协议,还没有获得“Mag Eight”地位。 Ben 称,基于融资轮次对创始人的追捧已经“开了倍速”:在有人把这些写进历史之前,相关承诺必须先“得到证实并真正付款”。
Ben 认为,AI 热潮“大概率存在泡沫”,但它的 momentum 让参与者几乎别无选择,只能跟进。 他的预警信号是所有人都坚持“这次不一样”;如今他想知道,互联网泡沫时期的市场参与者或高层管理者是否也意识到结局可能很糟,却还是接受自己被“历史潮流裹挟”。
Ben 表示,自己坚持要求 OpenAI 做出取舍,是一个错误。 AI 仍处于“天文数字级、极其庞大的增长”阶段,就像上世纪80、90年代写软件时默认处理器会不断升级一样:“放手去做一切,相信算力会到来。”
表面上的业务铺陈,其实是把 ChatGPT 做成万事万物的 agentic 层。 OpenAI 的目标是打造最多80亿个个人助理,让它们全天候运行于各种设备、邮件、日历,甚至监测睡眠;持续积累的上下文会带来“彻底锁定”,也需要天文数字级的基础设施。
在每周8亿用户的规模下,算力稀缺已经同时构成产品风险和订阅风险。 GPT-5 发布后,Plus 用户可用的思考查询减少,更多请求被导向普通 GPT-5,由路由器决定何时进行思考,这让付费用户觉得自己买到的东西被拿走了。广告支持的服务可以说“退款金额为0美元”,但订阅服务自带一项隐含承诺。
OpenAI 的融资与基础设施攻势,可能既是资金来源,也是竞争武器。 Ben 认为,它可能通过“让自己成为所有芯片最终流入的牌桌”,把边际投资从 Anthropic、Meta 或 NVIDIA 手中吸走。NVIDIA 承诺投入1000亿美元、两周后 OpenAI 又与 AMD 达成协议,推动 AMD 股价上涨40%;Andrew 将此解读为 OpenAI 保持议价权、降低对 NVIDIA 依赖的动作。
1. OpenAI 仍是一场创业公司式押注,而非 Mag Eight 级巨头
Andrew 转述了一位听众的观点:OpenAI 应与最大的科技公司并列,Sam Altman 则应与历史上的商业领袖相提并论。Ben 的第一反应是:“Roshan 先冷静。”
一个月内签下约1万亿美元的基础设施协议,不等于这些协议已经交付。Ben 认为,在赞誉开始之前,这些承诺必须“得到证实并真正付款”。
Ben 判断泡沫的关键时刻,是所有人都否认存在泡沫,并说“这次不一样”。他如今一方面觉得当前市场“大概率存在泡沫”,另一方面又认为参与者别无选择,只能继续前进,甚至明知如此仍被“历史潮流裹挟”。互联网泡沫时代,他还只是青少年,随后进入大学;如今他更直接地感受到其中的生态动力,也在想,当年的市场参与者和高层管理者是否同样接受了结局会很糟。
2. 算力短缺正撞上订阅服务的承诺
Ben 过去的建议是降低 OpenAI API 的优先级,因为其合作伙伴 Microsoft 已经在 Azure 提供“完全一样的 API”,并且早已知道如何服务企业客户。
GPT-5 发布进一步放大了这一批评:OpenAI 减少了 Plus 用户的思考查询,更多依赖普通 GPT-5,再由路由技术决定何时思考。Ben 会忽略很多抱怨,但不会忽略付费用户认为自己买到的功能后来被撤回——“这是个大问题。”
Andrew 指出,OpenAI 已有每周8亿用户。Ben 的回应是,如今每一次面向大众的产品发布,都要求算力出现跃升式增长。OpenAI 越来越像 Apple 一样面临规模问题:技术可能已经存在,但还无法以足够大的规模制造出来并交付给所有人。
3. Ben 对聚焦的要求,过早套用了成熟公司的逻辑
Ben 对 Microsoft 的类比,始于一家 Windows 地位被智能手机超越、必须选择新方向的公司。他此前批评 Steve Ballmer,是因为 Microsoft 推进硬件的逻辑并不成立;公司应该聚焦服务,服务 iOS 和 Android,并把云业务放在首位。Satya Nadella 拆散 Windows 团队,以削弱其内部权力;只有等到“Microsoft 内部没有人再认为 Windows 是公司的未来”,团队重组才重新变得安全。
他现在修正了自己的判断:OpenAI 和 AI 还没有进入那个成熟阶段。就像开发者过去会假设处理器最终会变快,而不是围绕当下的限制做优化一样,OpenAI 也应该相信算力会到位,而不是压缩自己的愿景。
“放手去做一切,相信算力会到来”(“Go for it all and trust the capacity’s going to come”),因此既是对基础设施交易的许可,也是其合理性依据。OpenAI 不是一家销售财务业绩的 Mag Seven 成熟巨头,而是一家销售“梦想和未来愿景”的创业公司——令人兴奋,但“完全可能”以灾难收场。
4. ChatGPT 正被打造为所有平台之上的一层
Andrew 追踪了过去1.5年里每隔3到4个月就扩大的野心:从挑战 Google,到硬件、与 Meta 竞争,再到娱乐和 ChatGPT 内的应用——实际上已经接近操作系统层,并由此追问 OpenAI 是否试图做得太多。
Ben 不接受“把各种东西胡乱往墙上扔”的解读。在足够宽的视野下,这套战略“异常连贯”:成为“万事万物的 agentic AI 层”,也就是“万物的 Windows”。
WeChat 可能是更好的类比。它通过小程序、支付和政府服务,位于手机本身之上,削弱了 iPhone 的平台权力。ChatGPT 的目标也类似:跨越每一种设备和使用场景运行。
终点是打造80亿个个人助理,让它们通过邮件、日历和其他连接器持续积累用户上下文。助理可以全天候运行,甚至监测睡眠;独有的上下文记忆会带来“彻底锁定”。服务这一野心,正是其基础设施需求如此惊人的原因。
5. 对资本的依赖与芯片多元化,正在强化这套战略
Ben 从博弈论角度看待 OpenAI 激进的基础设施和投资攻势:它可能把边际投资从 Anthropic、Meta 或 NVIDIA 引向 OpenAI,从而让竞争对手资金枯竭。通过成为“所有筹码最终落入的牌桌”,OpenAI 可以把自己变成资本的核心目的地;Altman 擅长描绘各个环节如何相互咬合,也愿意“押上一切”。
NVIDIA 的 Jensen Huang 承诺向 OpenAI 投入1000亿美元;两周后,OpenAI 又宣布与 NVIDIA 的直接竞争对手 AMD 达成协议,推动 AMD 股价上涨40%。Huang 表示,他没想到 AMD 会如此兴奋地推进下一代芯片,还说 AMD 会“送出公司10%的股份,让别人来买”,并补充道:“这非常聪明。”Ben 表示,Altman 给他的感觉是,NVIDIA 事先并不知道这笔交易。
背后的机制,是 Clayton Christensen 所说的“有吸引力利润守恒定律”:一条价值链中,通常会有一个差异化瓶颈占据主导,而周边供应商和客户则失去定价权。Andrew 将 AMD 交易解读为 OpenAI 保持议价权、避免过度依赖 NVIDIA 的尝试。
Hello, and welcome to a free preview of Sharp Tech. Hello, and welcome back to another episode of Sharp Tech. I'm Andrew Sharp and on the other line, Ben Thompson. Ben, we’re about 8 hours out from Game 4 of Brewers-Cubs. How are you doing? How are you feeling right now?
A little anxious.
Okay.
The Brewers probably should have put it away last night. Some real missed opportunities, particularly in the 8th inning. Caleb Durbin, you could have dived and scored.
Mm.
Fortunately, the Cubs still suck. So, as the saying goes, hopefully we’ll pull it out. But yes, it would’ve been nice to have this wrapped, dusted, and done with. It’s not great that our alleged number-two pitcher, who I wanted to start Game 2—and I guess I was wrong to want that—was knocked out in the 1st inning.
Oh, boy.
So yeah, we’ve got Fastball Freddy, man—Freddy Peralta. He’s going to carry us through. Confident.
Okay, I like it.
Somewhat confident.
They looked great. They looked great in the first 2 games. I was like, “Wow, maybe the Brewers could actually do this.”
Just a scrappy underdog, smallest market in the Major Leagues, doing the best we can.
For 3 or 4 months, you’ve been watching the Brewers every single day, so I hope, for your sake, they can at least make it to the NLCS. Then it really is Schlitz versus glitz with the Dodgers on the other end. I don’t have any faith in the Phillies’ ability to win that series, so Dodgers-Brewers would be pretty fantastic.
We have a lot to get to today, and it’s sort of been OpenAI week at Stratechery. Would you agree with that?
I was just looking up Major League payrolls. The Los Angeles Dodgers are number 1, with a total payroll of $350 million.
Yeah.
The Cubs, number 5, at $212 million. So we’re already up against it.
The mom-and-pop Brewers—
The mom-and-pop Brewers, with $122 million, half that of the Cubs. So yeah, we are the underdog. We’re lucky to be where we are. Everything is a gift.
Okay. Well, Brewers against the world. I’m right there with you, arm in arm. Let’s go do it. Let’s shock the world.
But as I said, it’s been OpenAI week at Stratechery, and we’re going to begin with a note from Roshan. He says:
“Ben and Andrew, I think it’s time to officially expand the Mag Seven to a Mag Eight and include OpenAI. They directly compete against Google, Meta, and in the future could compete with Netflix in content, Apple in devices, Microsoft in operating systems and APIs, Amazon in shopping and APIs, NVIDIA and Tesla in robotics. It’s also time to add Sam Altman to the pantheon of great business leaders and value compounders: Buffett, Gates, Jobs, Bezos, Musk, Zuck, Larry and Sergey, and Jensen, and now Sam.”
So, Ben, with that take as the premise, you have written several thousand words about OpenAI this week. You’ve interviewed Sam Altman. It’s a broad question, but how have you updated your thinking on what this company can be?
First of all, I think Roshan needs to relax. Let’s save the adulations for later. It’s one thing to speak to what you’re going to do, even to sign deals—
I was going to say—
To what you’re going to do.
Let’s let him stick the landing before we put him up there with Jobs and Gates.
This is a little bit like how we’re glorifying founders based on funding rounds. This is that on steroids, okay? Yes, there is a trillion dollars’ worth of infrastructure deals that OpenAI has signed in the last month. Let’s have that trillion dollars of deals actually be substantiated and actually paid for, and then there’ll be plenty of time to write the history books.
Yep.
I think the update is that it’s really a fascinating time. I was around in the dot-com era. I was a teenager and then in college, so I was sort of viewing it from afar. I wasn’t in the Valley. I wasn’t in the middle of it.
One of the interesting things about writing Stratechery is that you feel, particularly at this stage in the evolution—12 and a half years in—that lots of people pay attention and care what you think. There’s a certain sort of weight of expectations, or just a weight of everything you do feeling a little more weighty.
Yeah.
And then you remember you’re just writing a blog and no one cares, and you’re actually more invested in the Brewers winning. But it’s interesting to feel these dynamics again, not from the inside. I’m not in Silicon Valley. I’m not in OpenAI, but I do feel them in the ecosystem to a much different degree than I did 25 years ago.
I’ve been saying all along that you know it’s really a bubble when everyone sort of gives up on it being a bubble. That was an intellectual statement, but I wonder if it’s a—
When you say everyone gives up on it being a bubble, they say, “No, it’s not a bubble. This is all working and all rational, and we’re moving ahead.”
That’s when to be concerned.
That’s right. It is different this time. Exactly.
Yeah.
And I’m not sure that’s exactly right, based on how I feel right now, which is that I’m feeling concerned. This is probably bubbly, and there’s also a sense that you really have no choice but to go along with it and just see where it takes you.
Yeah.
It makes me want to go back and talk to more people, particularly people in the markets or in senior leadership at that time of the bubble, to see if they had this sense that they never lost the knowledge and reality that this was going to end badly. It’s just an acceptance that that’s the way it’s going to be. You’re swept along with the tides of history.
This is a broad, roundabout way to answer your question. To take a specific example, I’ve been critical of OpenAI and its API. I’m like, you never have enough compute.
Mm-hmm.
Our issue with the GPT-5 launch is that you really sort of nerfed the Plus level of subscribers, or at least you made them feel like they were nerfed. You drastically reduced the number of thinking queries they had and said, “Go to regular GPT-5. It will think when it’s the right time to think,” using this router technology. Everyone feels kind of screwed, and there were a lot of complaints about GPT-5 that I don’t think were, that I think OpenAI should’ve ignored.
But this specific issue, where you have paying customers who feel like they paid for something and had it taken away from them, is a big problem. That’s one of the challenges of a paid business model. If someone’s getting it for free through ads, it’s like, okay, fine, we’ll give you a refund of $0. Deal with it.
Right.
Google could get away with that with a lot of stuff. OpenAI—this is one of the challenges of a subscription model—is that there is an implicit sort of promise that can really blow up and resonate on social media or wherever it might be if you don’t live up to it.
Why are you devoting so many of your resources to this API business when Microsoft is your partner? They have the exact same API in Azure, they’re good at serving enterprise, so partner with them and you can sort of do it.
Right. With the GPT-5 launch, the reason they had to limit and nerf some of the thinking queries for Pro users was because they had limited resources—limited compute resources.
That happens just constantly, right? They’re constantly short on resources, and who knows what technologies they have internally that are not released publicly. They’re starting to get a bit of the Apple problem.
Mm-hmm.
With Apple and the iPhone, there are things they can’t launch because they have to be able to make them at scale.
Yeah.
Actually, I wonder how much that’s the case with the—
They’re serving 800 million weekly users at this point.
Right.
Like, the scale is pretty astounding.
And so if you roll it out, it’s like, you just have it—it’s, everything now is a step change in terms of necessary capacity. You don’t just get to—
Mm-hmm.
—gradually sort of ramp it up. I mean, I wonder if this is the case with the Air too a little bit. I feel like we’ve gotten inundated with more iPhone Pro commercials than ever. Maybe it’s because the Brewers are in the playoffs, so I’m just really locked in on TV these days. I swear I see an iPhone Pro commercial every other commercial. I haven’t seen a single commercial for the iPhone Air at all, which is the greatest iPhone Apple has ever released.
Maybe you need to hold it in your hand to appreciate that sense. Maybe it’s also the case that, from Apple’s perspective, the iPhone Air being a slow burn—being something that sort of starts seeping its way into consciousness—is a good thing, because maybe they wouldn’t be able to make enough of them if they made as many as they can of the Pro.
Mm.
The inventories in the store don't support that, to be clear. But I can imagine that they probably had the Air idea for a while, but it took a while to feel like they could confidently ship it and serve it and all those things. They have volume. Now, that might be totally wrong. Maybe it's super trivial, and I think there's probably still inventory at the Apple Store right now.
Yeah.
It's just to illustrate the point about ChatGPT and their capacities.
But it is interesting. They're not actually pushing it all that hard with the Air.
Not at all. There's no pushing.
But that's a digression. But yeah.
Yeah.
I have not seen a single Air commercial. Every time I talk to you about the Air, though, it feels like I'm getting an iPhone Air commercial, so I'm all set.
But that was why the Air is amazing, because that's what Apple used to get all the time, right? Any Apple customer would be raving about their products at every opportunity.
You gotta try this. Yeah.
Oh, still love it. Still in love. I love it. Even though I've had a few baseball games since then, if you've noticed the lack of cameras, that's fine. I'll survive. But if you have small kids, like you, you should have a Pro. It's totally worth it. So you obviously should get a Pro, you should get one every year, because it—
There you go.
It just makes so much difference.
I'm resting easy.
Battery life is still off the charts with my Pro over here.
As another aside, as part of the home-screen reorganization, I've had Twitter in my dock for ages, and I stuck it in a folder. Man, I should have done this a long time ago. It's incredible.
Healthy choice.
Yeah. It's so much less of a just-one-tap thing that I'm sucking away time on Twitter. It's actually pretty amazing. So, I endorse that. Dude, it was replaced by ChatGPT in the dock.
Okay.
There's a rational view of this API argument for normal businesses that is correct. And I went back to Microsoft, which I think is an interesting analogy. In my career of writing about Microsoft, it has always been in the context of Windows being eclipsed by the smartphone, then the necessity of Satya Nadella demoting the importance of Windows internally at Microsoft. He actually split up the Windows team. That team actually came back together a couple of weeks ago. I haven't mentioned it in the daily updates. I haven't had a chance to get to it. But it's fine now, because no one at Microsoft thinks Windows is the future of the company, right? There was a necessary interregnum where, yeah, you're so historically powerful internally, we have to split you up so you can't be running a coup on the rest of the company.
Mm-hmm.
And now they've accomplished that. It's clear what the future is, and actually, it is useful to have you all together, so let's get you all together there.
Terrific.
And I wrote about this early with Microsoft. I left Microsoft on June 30th. On July 2nd, I was out with a series of 3 articles on how Microsoft was just screwing up. Steve Ballmer didn't know what he was doing, in part because he needed to make a choice. He had the context that Windows was everywhere and could do everything. That was downstream of Windows' dominant platform position. They were an enterprise company. They got the consumer market for free. They were dominant horizontally, vertically, everywhere. They had the whole thing.
Mm-hmm.
And he was in the middle of this big push on devices, this vertical business model that didn't make any sense to me, and I'm like, “No, you need to focus on services. You have to serve everyone. You have to serve iOS. You have to serve Android. Your focus has to be the cloud,” et cetera, et cetera. Of course, I was completely right. Satya Nadella completely agreed with me. He was in the services business. He knew what was going on. That was the trend—the company had to make a choice.
Yeah.
And I think an error I've made is insisting OpenAI make choices, and they're not in that stage of a company. AI isn't in that stage of technology. It is in astronomical, massive growth. There was a time you could have made the argument in the ’80s or ’90s that you needed to make better choices in your software development because processors aren't slow enough to do what you want, and the answer was, “That's a waste of time. Processors are getting faster. Assume they'll get faster and develop accordingly.”
The analogy to OpenAI is: yes, you're low on capacity. You're going to be low on capacity no matter what you do. Go for it all and trust the capacity's going to come. That gives you not just the permission but the argument to go and make these infrastructure deals. You're painting this massive vision. And this is why OpenAI is not a Mag 7. This is the startup mentality writ large at an astronomical level. You're not selling your financial results. You're selling a dream and a vision of the future and asking people to fund it.
Mm-hmm.
That is where they are. It's just weird because they're so big and so impactful, which speaks to why they get the money. You can make the Mag 7, Mag 8 argument, but that's not how they're operating. They are operating like a startup, and it's pretty thrilling to watch. It also has that sense of, “This is very well gonna end up in a disaster.”
Crazy.
But whatever, we're all in. Here we go.
Well, and it's kind of dizzying to keep track of because, watching over the past couple of years, there was that initial phase when ChatGPT launched, took the world by storm, and the immediate reaction was, “Oh, wow, this company is the first threat to Google in 15 years, and maybe they're going to be competing with Google a couple of years down the line.” But then over the last 1.5 years—
That's what they do with every one.
It's like, yeah, exactly. We see the ambitions broaden every 3 to 4 months in various ways, and now I'm not even sure how to contextualize OpenAI in the context of big tech companies because they're trying to do everything. They're doing hardware. They're competing with Google. They're competing with Meta. They're doing entertainment. All of it. And now they've also integrated apps into ChatGPT, and it's like its own little OS layer. All of it is pretty insane to watch. And I wonder whether they’re trying to do too much and should be more focused. But it sounds like, for right now, just let it breathe—
No, this is what I mean.
—and see where the adventure takes us.
This is me leaning into the bubble: no focus, do it all. But the thing is, a lot of people are characterizing all these deals as them throwing spaghetti against the wall. I don't think so.
Mm-hmm.
I think it's remarkably cogent and clear if you expand your aperture sufficiently to see what they're going for, which is to be, yeah, the agentic AI layer for literally everything. That's why—
Yeah.
—I called it the Window. And maybe that was understating it: it was the Windows of everything. You put the WeChat analogy in this rundown, and that's probably actually a better analogy in some respects, where we talk about WeChat in China. WeChat diminishes the iPhone's power because it's such a dominant app, and it has all the mini apps in it and all the ways you interact with everyone, the way you pay, the way you interact with government services. It's all in this one super app, and that's—
Mm-hmm.
—that is also a good analogy, and it captures the sitting-on-top-of-everything-else aspect. I'm actually kind of annoyed I didn't include that in my article. I think Windows is—
Yeah.
—a better reference point for people in the US, but there are aspects of the WeChat analogy that are more applicable. And yeah, go for it. Why not? I've given up. Go all in. Even in the back of my head, I'm like, “This is going to end badly. You should probably focus. You should do X, Y, Z.” It's like, nope, this is the stage of evolution here.
Everybody's rowing in the same direction here.
Yep.
Even if they're going over a waterfall.
They're making themselves the table where all the chips go in. And I also think there's an aspect of the aggressiveness here that might have the potential to starve out competition to a certain extent, where, for every marginal dollar of investment, would you rather put it in OpenAI or would you rather put it in Anthropic? Would you rather put it into OpenAI, or would you rather invest in Meta or whatever it might be?
Mm-hmm.
Would you rather put it in OpenAI, or would you rather put it in NVIDIA? That’s where the real value-chain battle is, I think. There’s a lot happening there. Sam Altman is very good at game theory. He’s very good at sketching out how this stuff all links and ties together, and he’s willing to risk it all.
Yeah.
And that’s exactly what’s happening.
I mean, you talked to Sam Altman this week, as I said, for your interview. You only talked to him for about 40 minutes, and you covered a ton of ground in that interview. I was very impressed.
Well, this is the third time I’ve talked to him, the second time I’ve talked to him one-on-one. I’ve learned my lesson. Usually, for an hour-long interview, I need to prepare 20 questions or so, which is probably good, and I won’t get to all of them.
Yeah.
With Sam, I had 30 minutes, so I knew to prepare about 40 questions. We actually got an extra 10 minutes, and I went through all the questions, I’m pretty certain.
Well, it was very solid, and there were a lot of different threads that you discussed that I wanted to follow up on here. I’m going to read some quotes from Sam, and you can just riff and take it in any direction you want.
On the infrastructure build-out, he said, “When we are done with this new set of deals and get to explain, ‘Here’s where we’re going and why,’ I think it will all make sense. People may say it’s too ambitious, it’s too risky, whatever, but at least why we’re doing the stack that we’re doing, I think, will make sense.”
As far as the stack of investments and announcements—
I mean, I’m confused about what else he’s going to announce. I thought that his interview, what I wrote this week, was pretty clear. Again, I think all these investments are very cogent. They are looking to be the AI for everyone.
Okay.
Whether in a business context or a home context, you’re going to have your ChatGPT. That ChatGPT is going to continually gain contextual knowledge about you and what you’re interested in. You can use these connectors, where you get your email and your calendar in there.
But this is the worst it’s going to be, as we say again and again. You’re going to have this companion. It’s going to be total lock-in because it knows so much about you that no one else does. You’re going to use it everywhere. Right now, if you have 8 billion people in the world, OpenAI’s goal is to have 8 billion personal assistants that are on their platform and that you interact with and use basically 24/7.
Mm-hmm.
Why 24? The AI is going to monitor your sleep and give you feedback about it. That’s what they’re building. It’s omnipresent, everywhere, with you on every device and every platform. Wherever it might be, they’re going to sit on top, and you’re going to pull them with you everywhere.
That is what gives them leverage in the market. To achieve that is going to require astronomical amounts of—
Unbelievable amounts of infrastructure.
Yeah.
And so what’s interesting—I mean, the most entertaining sequence was the investment from NVIDIA into OpenAI. $100 billion was committed by Jensen Huang, and then two weeks later they turned around and, on Monday, announced the deal with AMD, NVIDIA’s direct competitor. That led to a 40% jump in AMD’s stock, all part of the frothy atmosphere that we all inhabit right now.
But in terms of what they’re trying to do with—
By the way, did you see what Jensen Huang had to say about this on CNBC the other day?
No. What did he say?
He was like, “You know, I’m really surprised that AMD was so excited about their next chip. It seems surprising they’d give away 10% of their company for someone to buy it, but hey, it’s very clever.”
Just a great—
I did get the impression—
Great passive aggressiveness there.
I did get the impression from Altman that NVIDIA did not know about this deal before it happened.
Mm-hmm.
Well, strategically, they’re trying to lock in their pricing power, or OpenAI’s leverage, in terms of not being too reliant on NVIDIA.
Okay, so you have a value chain—
With that—
You have a value chain in anything.
In terms of not—
Right. Well, you have a value chain in anything, and the most profits, there’s... I wrote an article ages ago, “The Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits,” in the context of Netflix. That phrase, “law of conservation of attractive profits,” is a Clayton Christensen phrase.
It’s basically the idea that in a value chain, you have different suppliers. Say you have 10 companies in a value chain. Usually, one company comes to dominate that value chain by virtue of becoming the bottleneck in the chain. They have the key piece, and everyone around them has to supply them or has to be their customer.
Those people around them lose pricing power because they’re dependent on this one thing that is highly differentiated and can’t be competed with.
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