The Ezra Klein Show:AI反叛已至
- 数据中心的反对声在不到1年时间里扩散至全国,并跨越党派:支持率从去年8月Heatmap调查中的约四成选民,升至今年5月的七成;地方和州层面已出现100多项暂停建设提案,纽约州州长Hochul宣布冻结1年,DeSantis提出“公民AI权利法案”,Bernie Sanders则呼吁全国暂停建设。 对任何正在为超大规模建设潮做承销的人来说,选址风险已经是一项一线成本——“没人想要它”,是我反复听到的一句话。
- Jasmine Sun 对Wisconsin和Michigan的核心判断是:这不是虚假信息问题,也不是经典的“不要建在我家后院”(NIMBY),而是一场信任崩塌,所有支持建设的论据都会死在“我不相信他们”这句话上。 Marquette民调专家Charles Franklin给出的机制是:争议议题通常是50/50,但数据中心无论距离远近,民调都以70/30反对,因为“没有有力的支持理由”——除了公用事业公司和AI公司,没有其他利益群体,而这两者“已经极度不受欢迎”。
- 交易中的议价权已经从开发商转向地方政府。 2年前,公司还在争取销售税豁免和地方补贴;如今官员表示,“如果今天再做一次,我们根本不需要提供任何补贴”,Sun接触到的所有支持建设者都后悔签署保密协议,而Microsoft在Mount Pleasant的项目预计将在2026年向一个拥有28,000人口的村庄缴纳1960万美元房产税。
- 当地反对者最尖锐的担忧是资产烂尾风险,背后是Foxconn承诺的13,000个岗位最终只剩约1,000个,以及Janesville遗留的3000万美元、至今未修复的GM污染。 当下最现实的警示是:xAI的Memphis Colossus曾把算力卖给缺乏产能的Anthropic,但“下一次可能没有Anthropic来接这个账单”,最后小城镇只能“接下这个烂摊子”。
- Sun怀疑AGI竞赛根本没有终点:没有统一定义,模型能力“极不平滑”,尽管Anthropic在编码上领先,主要实验室也都押注递归自我改进,却没有一家“明显地拉开决定性差距”。 Klein的框架是:是否接受“竞赛”这个比喻,是AI政策中的核心分界线——如果不接受,“让我们更快地奔向坏地方”就不再是一个多么有说服力的论点。
- 暂停建设本身不会减缓AI,只会把算力迁往Texas、Louisiana、Dakotas、Australia、海湾地区的威权国家,甚至太空;同时收紧供给,让只有资金最雄厚的买家能够获得前沿能力。 在需求已经超过算力、且“前沿正在关闭”的情况下——最好的模型“并不向所有人开放”,既有安全原因,也有定价原因——限制建设只会进一步分化受益者:“可能我的老板会拿到超级智能,然后把我的工作自动化。”
- 值得关注的是这股奇特的跨阵营联盟:DeSantis与Max Tegmark一起参加AI圆桌,Bernie Sanders与Eliezer Yudkowsky合作拍爆款视频——“我不会把孩子送去那个多元伴侣家庭参加玩伴聚会,但我可以组建联盟。” 与此同时,中国几乎没有出现类似反弹(宿命论式决定论加定向监管);Sun则称美国反弹是中共“心理战”的说法“荒谬”,因为报告引用的那些推文“每条只有两次浏览”。
- Klein对行业自我诊断的结论是:“这不是营销问题。” 你们面对的是有问题的技术……是产品问题。如果失业先于癌症治愈到来,“在政治上,这不可能成为一个能够被保护的均衡”;而Sun认为,硅谷正在迟到地发现民主制度存在摩擦:“买下一场选举其实非常难。”
1. 反弹已经全国化:围墙外的人怎么看
- Klein的开场判断是:数据中心让共和党人与民主党人在其他议题都做不到的地方站到了一起——反对者比例从去年8月Heatmap调查中的约四成,升至今年5月的七成;地方或州层面已有100多项暂停建设提案;Hochul以电网压力和电费承担者成本为由,冻结纽约州相关项目1年;Sanders则希望全国暂停建设,“给民主一点追赶的时间”。
- 超大规模数据中心现场到底是什么样?“我感觉自己身处Eden……你只会看到这片葱郁的景观突然变成一座没有窗户的工业园。数据中心非常丑。” 当地人会以每小时70英里的速度开车经过现场——Port Washington的数据中心只需约1分42秒就能驶过。声音则是持续的嗡鸣、蜂鸣和震动,听起来“非人类”。
- 组织者包括全职主妇、退休高管、农民和职业环保人士——“女性很多,整体相对更偏左,但当然也有不少偏右的人”。
2. 混凝土浇下去之前,保密协议已经毒化了整个流程
- 运作机制是:地方议会签署保密协议,不能透露这里建的是数据中心、客户是谁,甚至不能透露耗电量——但耳语还是会传出去。一位建筑工会副主席引用爱尔兰谚语说:“3个人之间要想保守一个秘密,唯一的办法就是杀掉其中2个。” 地方官员反复说的是:“我们签了NDA,所以没法在社交媒体发酵之前抢先解释。”
- 公司为什么要求签NDA?Sun的回答很直接:“我想不出什么好理由”——他们“只是觉得这样更容易,万一后来改变主意”。Microsoft已经停止使用NDA,其他实验室的算力团队也在考虑照做。她采访的所有支持建设者——无论是工人还是AI开发者——都“后悔签了NDA”。
3. 水是最醒目的符号,真正的账单是电
- Sun纠正了关于用水的说法:如今的新建项目几乎都是闭环系统,像空调一样循环用水,用水量“只相当于高尔夫球场的一小部分”——而Janesville项目旁边就有一座高尔夫球场。但水仍然成了象征:“他们就建在五大湖旁边。如果不是想把湖水抽干,为什么要在那里建?”
- 电力才是“真的问题”:芯片和低延迟互联需要大量新增发电能力,短期内“可能是天然气”,即便运营中的数据中心相对清洁,争议也会转移到背后的发电厂。
- 两位嘉宾都提到,抱怨往往会先于证据出现:一段YouTube视频消耗的水量超过一次ChatGPT查询,但在那场讨论中,真正少吃肉的人却不多。Klein说:“有时候人们就是不喜欢某个东西,然后再去寻找理由为这种厌恶辩护。”
4. “我不相信他们”:信任崩塌如何逆转议价权
- 支持建设的理由确实有实质内容,Sun甚至在为自己阵营反驳:Microsoft在旧Foxconn厂址上的项目预计将在2026年向一个拥有28,000人口的村庄缴纳1960万美元房产税;当组织者把就业机会说成骗局时,她个人“很恼火”——500个可能达到六位数年薪、并提供学徒通道的岗位,持续2年至6年,“足够让人组建家庭……买下一套房”。
- 但每一项承诺都会撞上同一堵墙:水处理——“我不相信他们”;电费保证——“自2022年以来,DTE基本每年都在上调我们的电价。他们为什么偏偏今年就不涨了?”;就业——“我不相信他们。他们有庞大的公关团队,想说什么都可以。”
- 权力平衡已经倒转:2年前,公司还在争取GPU销售税豁免和地方补贴;如今官员说,“如果今天再做一次,我们根本不需要提供任何补贴”,开发商则开始寻找友好辖区,只拿出“一颗圣诞树挂件那么大”的社区利益协议。
5. Foxconn的幽灵:泡沫恐惧与资产烂尾问题
- 创伤记忆非常具体:Foxconn曾向Mount Pleasant承诺13,000个制造业岗位,拿走数亿美元基础设施投入和补贴,最终只交付约1,000个岗位,随后“因为合同没有正确设置”而撤出。Janesville那座有百年历史的GM工厂在2008年关闭,留下3000万美元污染物和永久性化学物,令这块棕地永远无法出售。“最后谁来接这个烂摊子?这是我反复听到的问题。”
- Memphis的Colossus就是眼下的案例——“xAI始终没有真正起飞。人们实际上没有像Elon以为的那样频繁使用Grok”——它后来得以把算力卖给快速增长、却没有建设足够数据中心的Anthropic。“完全可以想象这样一个世界:xAI决定把重点放在太空……而可能没有Anthropic来接这个账单。”
6. 丰裕度测试:数据中心没有支持阵营
- Klein用他的“丰裕”框架提问——“我们需要更多什么,以及如何得到它?”——结果发现AI公司连第一个问题都答不上来。反对太阳能的人也使用同样的手段(Facebook群组、挤满人的市政厅、规划分区争议),但太阳能背后有利益群体;Janesville的GM工厂曾雇佣7,000人,而且人人都要开车。数据中心唯一的支持者是“公用事业公司和AI公司,而这两者已经极度不受欢迎”。
- Marquette Law Polls的Charles Franklin解释了70/30:有争议的议题在双方都有理时通常是50/50;但数据中心的反对是跨党派的,也与距离无关——“这不只是NIMBY,而是你不希望任何人的后院出现数据中心……没有有力的支持理由。”
- 对于旧金山最常见的反问——这些人难道不用ChatGPT吗?——答案是会用:“我用它起草过邮件,或者做过一个梗图。” 但他们看到的只是一个小工具、一件玩具,不是汽车、能源或住房那样的必需品,因此没有任何东西足以解释“这些巨额估值”。
7. AI民粹主义:Saline Township是民主制度的缩影
- Sun的定义被Klein认为很有影响力:AI“不仅是一项普通技术,也是一项需要抵抗的精英政治工程”。人们最典型的抱怨不是它没用,而是:“为什么要把它强塞进我们的喉咙?” 她的强判断是:“即使不存在关于用水的虚假信息,人们也会同样愤怒于这些数据中心。”
- Saline的故事是:镇议会以4比1否决Stargate项目的重新分区申请;开发商随后以“排斥性分区”为由起诉这个只有几千人的小镇;最终双方和解——“行,那就给消防部门和几所学校几百万美元。” 对居民而言,这是一种“小写d民主遭到的深刻侵犯”:一笔根本不对称的交易,“随后会把你的现实生活改造成这些科技公司替你决定的世界”。
- Klein进一步指出,高管们会作证说“不能只由我们来做这些决定”,转头却把“数量惊人的金融炮火”倾泻到所有说不的社区。Sun补充了金钱带来的悖论——“数字越大、金额越大,人们就越怀疑,而不是越不怀疑”;Abdul El-Sayed攻击Haley Stevens时最受关注的一条内容,就是她从APAC、DTE和制药公司拿了多少钱。
- Anthropic也不能置身事外:它一边警告“到2030年将有50%的白领岗位消失”,Dario的文章还提出了“由智力较低者组成的下层阶级”;另一边却在构建它认为可能取代就业的编码、银行和设计代理。“他们确实没有一个好答案,因为他们的商业模式从根本上就是建立在他们所说的那场颠覆之上。”
8. 下层阶级命题:人类可能输掉再培训竞赛
- Sun在《Times》文章中描述了硅谷的永久下层阶级情景:AI和机器人接手人类能够做的任何工作,劳动者失去全部经济议价权,资本则支付机器劳动。她访谈中最触目惊心的发现是:“我没有听科技行业任何一个人告诉我,他们相信AI会降低不平等。” 有些人会说,“底线会抬得很高。”
- 她自己的判断更谨慎:她不认为下层阶级是最可能的结局——“AI实际上非常不平滑,而人类工作极其复杂,也极难自动化”;大多数末日预言者“实际上没有做过足够多的真实工作”。但速度让她担忧:资深软件工程师目前表现很好,也喜欢云端编程,可该领域的招聘和职位发布都在下降;“我们真的认为人类软件工程师再培训的速度,会快过下一个模型在软件工程上的进步速度吗?”
- Klein看到的矛盾是:高管私下告诉他“他们希望这一切慢下来”,但AI行业却在“打一场全面战争,确保我们几乎没有调整时间”——这让它成为“一支相当没有说服力的支持阵营”。
9. 为什么要建设自己害怕的东西:3种理由与一次抛硬币
- Sun把业内人士的自我辩护归纳为3类:技术决定论(“超级智能必然会被造出来……我想让它以最不坏的方式发生”);在乌托邦与灭绝之间下注期望值;以及纯粹的技术着迷。“人们有各种各样自我合理化的叙事……我能理解为什么公众不会特别同情其中任何一种。”
- 这场赌局的极端版本来自Sam Bankman-Fried在播客中的回答——Sun认为那可能是Tyler Cowen的说法:用一枚51/49的硬币下注,要么人类福祉翻倍,要么所有人死亡,然后他选择抛硬币。Sun说:“这是个精神变态。” Klein说,愿意抛这枚硬币的人,必须极度低估人类生命的价值。Sun认为这说法有些夸张,但她表示,业内人士会把超级智能赌局描述成90/10或80/20;对于主动选择参与这场事业的人来说,这种风险偏好更容易理解,但“当你谈论的是世界上其他所有人时,完全是另一回事”。
- “为什么Mark Zuckerberg不在自家后院建数据中心?”这个问题对两人都成立:Northern California确实很难建设,但Klein坚持认为更深层的事实是,数据中心“是集中的成本、分散的收益……前提是你相信它有收益”,而社区“感觉自己是某个科技亿万富翁游戏里的棋子”。
10. 没有终点的竞赛,以及反对它的奇特联盟
- Sun拆解了“竞赛”这个比喻:没人同意AGI到底意味着什么,所以“这场竞赛有不同的终点,而且终点还在移动”;模型能力“极不平滑——可以同时在数学上极强、在扑克上极差”。主要实验室都在追求递归自我改进——“现在人们认为,Anthropic拥有最好的编码模型”——但把Anthropic、OpenAI和中国的最新开放权重模型放在一起比较,没有谁“明显地拉开了决定性差距……我不知道这场竞赛是否有终点,而这正是我担心它继续下去的原因”。
- Klein认为,政策分歧取决于你是否相信一场不断滚动、最终通向递归超级智能的竞赛:如果相信,未来1年至3年在定义上就是一切;如果AI只是一项副作用严重的强大技术,那么“让我们更快地奔向坏地方”就不再是一个多么有说服力的论点,而为民主表达放慢脚步“并不疯狂”。
- 因此出现了跨阵营汇合:DeSantis与Max Tegmark一起参加AI圆桌,Bernie Sanders与Eliezer Yudkowsky合作拍摄爆款视频;Sun采访的一位人士说:“我不会把孩子送去那个多元伴侣家庭参加玩伴聚会,但我可以组建联盟。” 数据中心甚至让自由派女性组织者第一次在近10年里,能够与投票支持Trump的邻居就政治问题展开有建设性的对话。
11. 反对暂停建设的理由:资本外流与前沿关闭
- Sun的第一个反对理由是:暂停建设未必会减缓AI,只会把AI迁走——企业已经涌向Texas,并在关注Louisiana、Dakotas、Australia,最终甚至可能进入太空。Klein进一步指出,如果民主辖区把它们挤出去,建设就会流向海湾国家等威权地区,“最终你可能得到更少的整体民主控制”。
- 第二,交易可以被做好:只有数据中心开发商Veridian愿意清理Janesville的棕地,此前一名经纪人花了5年也没能卖掉它;在她看来,拥有现成基础设施、清理后的Foxconn旧址是“净改善”。她提出的解决办法是由州或联邦层面研究公平交易条款,避免出现“一个12,000人的小镇与OpenAI谈判”。
- Klein的稀缺性判断是:“目前看起来我们并没有多余的AI供给。” 因此,收紧算力意味着Goldman Sachs和JPMorgan可以获得前沿能力,而小企业拿不到。Sun将其与“前沿关闭”联系起来:“最好的模型,比如Anthropic的Mythos,并没有向所有人开放”,一部分是安全决策,一部分是定价决策。公众真正害怕的是:“可能我的老板会拿到超级智能,然后把我的工作自动化。”
- 地缘政治层面,Australia、Canada和Europe等盟友正把承载能力当成议价筹码——建设数据中心,换取前沿模型的保证接入权——Sun将这项研究归功于Carnegie的Anton。
12. 中国没有反弹,美国的反弹为何被说成“心理战”
- Sun在中国访问期间发现,那里几乎没有对AI的恐惧,但这并不意味着乐观。她强调,中国的信息环境受到压制,也没有可靠民调;当地人的态度“更接近于:技术是一股无法阻挡的力量”,这与硅谷的决定论惊人相似。在一党制国家,问题不是如何抵抗,而是“我如何利用AI确保自己不掉队”——在残酷的白领竞争中,用“OpenClaw或者其他什么”来提升技能。
- 但中国政府监管了Washington没有监管的领域:禁用许多陪伴型聊天机器人(担心关系、生育率和成瘾);法院裁定“AI能做这个工人的工作”不足以构成裁员理由;强制标注AI生成图片——这些措施至少给了一些人“一点安慰”。
- 针对包括Kevin O'Leary在内的科技精英日益流行的说法——美国的反弹是中国的“心理战”——Sun说:“我觉得这很荒谬。” OpenAI报告引用的那些推文“几乎没有点赞……每条只有两次浏览”。这场反对运动“感觉非常自然”;活动人士分得清闭环和开放环,也只是“自己决定了,我对在社区里拥有一座数据中心没那么感兴趣”。
13. “你们面对的是产品问题”:硅谷发现现实存在摩擦
- 如今高管会问Sun:“我们的营销能不能做得更好?我不明白Waymo为什么这么不受欢迎……我们是不是需要把人们的电费砍掉一半?” 其中“贿赂”这个词出现得让她有些不舒服。Klein的回应是:“这不是营销问题。你们面对的是有问题的技术……是产品问题。人们不会想要那个未来。” Sun谈到Altman时说,实验室过去只向招聘对象和投资人营销——“他们从没意识到,其他所有人也能听见他们在说什么”——而当目标变成“获得政治善意并推动IPO”后,他的口径才发生变化。Klein更细腻的判断是:“人们可以相信自己并不真正感受到的东西”,这正是他们会不计后果行动的原因。
- 价值观存在巨大落差:科技乌托邦是UBI、永生,以及发现全部数学和物理规律;但“如果你对UBI和永生做民调,两者都不算特别受欢迎”。人们想要的是更便宜的商品、更好的健康状况和不那么糟糕的工作,而不是“把Terence Tao装进口袋”;而且“从技术上说,治愈癌症确实比证明数学定理更难”。反复出现的怀疑是:“Peter Thiel会不会只给自己买到永生?” 如果损失先于收益到来,Klein警告说,“在政治上,这不可能成为一个能够被保护的均衡”。
- 两人都在反驳“智能是瓶颈”的谬误。Klein说:“世界充满摩擦”——药物研发仍然需要猴子、老鼠和安全数据。Sun说,AI研究人员的职业经历通常是内部贡献者,工作上下文都存在于代码库里;当你问AI如何解决气候或机器人问题,得到的回答却是“我不知道,它就是会做到”——“这是一种机械降神……我其实觉得很懒惰”。
- Klein最后的框架是:硅谷的世界观来自“亲眼看到不可能的问题被证明可以解决”,Washington的世界观来自“亲眼看到可能的问题被证明无法解决”;如今,发明AI的人“发现建一座数据中心竟然不可能”。Sun对2026年的更新是:2025年1月DOGE的胜利主义已经退潮;Anthropic在白宫遇到的麻烦“主要是关系问题,而不是逻辑问题”——“买下一场选举其实非常难。” 她推荐的书包括Labatut的《The Maniac》、Carl Benedikt Frey的《The Technology Trap》和Priya Parker的《The Art of Gathering》。
完整逐字稿
What is big, ugly, and has united Republicans and Democrats at a time when it has felt like nothing else could? AI data centers.
Last August, a Heatmap News poll found that about 4 in 10 voters would oppose a data center being built where they live. By May of this year, opposition had grown to 7 in 10. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, a Republican, has proposed a new citizens’ bill of rights for AI.
The incentives of big tech are not the same as what’s in the interest of the people and the public.
Senator Bernie Sanders called for a national data center moratorium.
This moratorium will give democracy a chance to catch up with the transformative changes that we are witnessing and make sure that the benefits of these technologies work for all of us, not just the wealthiest people on Earth.
There are over 100 local or statewide moratorium proposals across the country. And here in New York, Governor Kathy Hochul, not usually thought of as a hardcore populist, just imposed a 1-year moratorium on data center construction.
These hyperscale AI data centers consume enormous amounts of power, truly threatening to outpace our grid’s capacity, and they drive up costs for local ratepayers. And I refuse to let those costs be passed on to New Yorkers who already pay too much for their utility bills.
So I wanted to get into the fight over data centers. How much of this is really about water or electricity or aesthetics, and how much is about AI itself and the companies that are behind it?
My guest today is Jasmine Sun. Jasmine has been doing excellent coverage of both the unusual culture inside AI companies and the anger that is building against them in the rest of the country. She just finished a reporting trip in the Midwest, talking to the people organizing against these data centers, and I wanted to hear what she’d learned.
Jasmine Sun, welcome to the show.
I’m so excited to be here.
So you just got back from a reporting trip in Wisconsin and Michigan covering the fight over data centers. Let’s start with what you see when you’re near a data center. What does it look like?
1. Why Data Centers Feel Different
I think one of the most important things about rural Wisconsin and rural Michigan is how beautiful it is. I felt like I was in Eden. I felt like I was in paradise. It’s incredibly lush, incredibly green, and as you get closer to a data center, you start to see more power lines, you start to see more towers, and eventually you just see what looks like an extremely large, flat warehouse.
You see this sort of verdant landscape give way to what is a windowless industrial park. Data centers are very ugly. I didn’t appreciate this until I started standing in front of them, getting near them, listening to them.
People will time how long it takes to drive past a data center on the highway going 70 miles per hour. In Port Washington, I think it’s about 1 minute and 42 seconds. The size of these things—
That’s long on a highway.
It is a long, long ride. These hyperscale data centers are huge. They are massive. And so I think the aesthetic questions—whether this is what I want my state, my community to look like—are really salient to people.
You mentioned hearing them.
Yes.
What do they sound like?
Oh my gosh. I mean, they sound like humming, buzzing, whirring. Every once in a while, you’ll hear a rattling.
Residents who live next door to some of them say they’re producing noise that’s not only annoying but debilitating, like this right here.
But again, they’re windowless. There are not that many workers inside. So they produce very mechanical sounds. They are inhuman, as a lot of folks would say.
So you spent a lot of time with people organizing against data centers. Who were they?
You had stay-at-home moms, retired executives, farmers who didn’t like the impacts on their land, and activists—professional activists with environmental groups in the state. It was an interesting mix of people, but a lot of women, relatively more left-leaning, though definitely some right-leaning folks as well.
So 1 question I’ve heard people ask is, how different is this from other kinds of industrial installations? There are a lot of things that are built all over the country that you wouldn’t necessarily want to be right next to. Are data centers unusual in this, or are they, from fracking to industrial agriculture, just the latest version of it?
It’s a good question. It’s one I had and thought a lot about before I went. I’ve talked to city officials who are confused by this question: We had a chip fab here, we had an auto plant here, we had a fulfillment center here, and nobody cared as much. Why are data centers so much more unpopular than, say, solar farms, which also faced local opposition in places like Michigan?
And so I think while the quality-of-life concerns around this thing—that it’s loud and annoying and ugly and consumes resources—are very similar to other industrial projects, there must be some reason that opposition is so much more severe and widespread, even beyond the communities where the data centers are literally being built.
And I think that question has a lot to do with AI, with the AI industry, and sort of the way that people feel about these companies and these projects.
When I read your reporting on this, when I’ve talked to people involved in this, it always feels to me that there are sort of 3 layers of concerns that are converging—
Mm.
—into what we call the data center backlash.
Mm-hmm.
There’s process. Then there are direct impacts—the environment—
Mm-hmm.
—water, electricity—and then there’s AI itself. And maybe let’s go through them 1 by 1.
One thing that I have been hearing a lot of—
Mm.
—and that I’ve seen in your reporting as well, is the anger over how these processes are going, and in particular, the use of NDAs.
Yes. Oh my gosh.
Which is not that common, right?
Yeah.
I’ve covered a lot of—
Yeah.
—what does it take to build a housing development, and you don’t tend to hear a lot of, “The city councilman got put under an NDA.”
Right.
So what is happening with these NDAs?
Yeah, I mean, this is also something that really surprised me, and I think the NDAs that—
I should say nondisclosure agreements.
Right.
Yeah.
2. The NDA Backlash
The nondisclosure agreements have really inflamed the amount of local opposition that you see. Basically, what would happen oftentimes is there would be some sense starting in city council that maybe a big development project was going to show up, but because of the NDAs, the council members would not be able to disclose that it was necessarily a data center, who the customers were going to be—a company like OpenAI or a company like Anthropic or whoever—or even the size of the project. How much electricity is this actually going to consume?
But whispers would start to get around. I was talking to a vice president of a construction union, and he was saying, “There’s an old Irish saying that the only way to keep a secret between 3 people is to kill 2 of them,” which I thought was hilarious. He was saying that when these developers show up, they talk to the general contractor, the general contractor talks to all their subcontractors, and the subcontractors talk to all their workers.
Yes, maybe everyone is signing NDAs at every part of that process, but whispers get around. As soon as whispers get around, you start to get social media posts and rumors. And the city council, because they are beholden to these NDAs, loses the ability to get ahead of the social media narrative. That was something I repeatedly heard from these local government officials: “We could not get ahead of social media because we had signed an NDA,” and rumors started getting around.
But why do the companies want these NDAs signed?
And people started asking questions. I think they didn’t think about it. They didn’t realize there would be a backlash. They just thought it would be easier in case they changed their mind. These companies sign lots of NDAs with their own workers and with anyone who works with them. I don’t think there’s a good reason.
Microsoft has actually decided to stop using NDAs because of the level of backlash. I’ve heard from people managing compute at some of the other AI labs that they are thinking of making the same decision. One thing that surprised me is that all of the pro-data-center, pro-build people I spoke to, whether workers or AI developers, regretted the NDAs. They all think that they made the situation much worse.
3. The Energy Cost Is Real
What is the impact of a new data center on water usage and water availability in a town?
They do require some of it, obviously, primarily for cooling the data centers, because these chips and servers run really hot and they need air-conditioning. The thing that’s gone a bit wrong in the water debate, I think, is that today’s new data centers are almost all closed-loop systems—closed-loop in the same way that air-conditioning is closed-loop—which means they’re recycling the water within the system, and they use a fraction of the water that golf courses use.
In fact, in places like Janesville, Wisconsin, we would often see a literal golf course right next to the data center site. But they do use some, and it has become a very sticky icon of these things’ resource consumption. A lot of folks I talked to in Wisconsin and Michigan would say things like, “They’re building right by the Great Lakes. Why would they do that if they weren’t trying to drain the lakes? Why would they do that if they didn’t need all this fresh water?”
And so your view is, at this point, the technology has changed such that water is not as big of a deal as maybe it actually was a couple of years ago. I think the next thing people have heard a lot about is energy usage.
Yes.
So walk me through that.
The electricity consumption issue is real. Data centers do, in fact, use an incredible amount of electricity. These chips and servers that are processing gigantic mathematical calculations to make AI work require tons of energy. All these chips and clusters are talking to each other. You need the interconnections to be really fast. In order to get a ChatGPT answer really quickly with low latency, you need these super-fast connections. All of that is powered by electricity.
So we are talking about a really, really significant amount of new electricity that is going to require new generators and new power plants. It’s probably going to be natural gas in the near future. Once the data center is fully operational, there is not a ton of air and water pollution, assuming that everything’s working correctly. They are relatively clean facilities.
But a lot of folks are concerned about the electricity use. They’re saying, “Yeah, maybe the data center doesn’t use that much water. Maybe the data center doesn’t pollute that much, but what about all of these new power plants that they’re going to build in order to power it?”
When the tech companies come into these towns and begin talking to the city council members, when they begin talking to the community, what are they promising on the one hand? “This is why this will be good for you.” And what are they asking for on the other?
4. The Benefits Fail To Land
These things do provide an incredible amount of tax revenue. In Mount Pleasant, on the old Foxconn site, which ended up being bought out by Microsoft, they saw, “Oh, there’s all this infrastructure already here. Why don’t we build a hyperscale data center on this unused, industrially zoned land?”
Microsoft is on track to pay $19.6 million in property taxes in 2026. This is expected to continue for many years. Again, this is a small village of 28,000 people, so there are really meaningful property tax benefits.
And I do think it’s frustrating when anti-data-center organizers say that the job creation is a myth, because I think that 500 maybe six-figure jobs for folks who go through apprenticeships but maybe don’t need college degrees, and that last 2 to 6 years, is enough time to build a family. It’s enough time to buy a home. I think it’s super meaningful, and when I talk to technicians and workers, clearly it was extremely meaningful work.
One of the things that was the most surprising to me when I talked to data-center activists was that they responded to so many of the pro arguments with, “I don’t believe them.” This company says that they are going to treat the water with chemicals in it so that it doesn’t flow into the lakes. People would say, “I don’t believe them. I don’t think they can do it.”
The companies would say, “We are going to cover the cost of our own electricity grid build-out. We are going to ensure that rates do not go up for all Michiganders.” A lot of folks would say, “I don’t believe them. DTE has raised our electricity rates basically every year since 2022. Why would this be the year that they decide not to do it? I do not believe them.”
They would say, “We are going to create 500 jobs, and some of these will stick around after the data center is built.” People just said, “I don’t believe them.” It was really clear to me that data centers are showing up in an environment of extremely low trust in both governments and corporations, to the extent where the pro arguments almost do not land because people just aren’t interested in anything an outside tech company is going to tell them. They say, “They have big PR teams. They can say whatever they want.”
One thing that became really obvious to me when I talked to both people at the AI companies and local officials is that 2 years ago, no one thought the data center backlash was going to be like this. These companies were, in fact, looking for things like whether the state had a sales-tax exemption, as Wisconsin does, to ensure that they didn’t have to pay sales taxes on their very expensive chips and GPUs.
They were often looking to build in places that might even offer local subsidies to the companies for building in that area. I think that a lot of the balance of power has shifted as local opposition has ramped up. Now it’s the case that I’m hearing from some local officials, “If we did this again today, we wouldn’t have to offer any subsidies,” because now there is so much local opposition that the developers are really looking for where there is going to be a local community and a government that are friendly to their project.
How can we have a Christmas-tree-ornament’s worth of community-benefits agreements? The nature of these deals, and how much they are skewed toward communities versus the AI developers, has really changed.
5. The Foxconn Warning
One of the things that came up a lot in your reporting, and that I thought was interesting, was the fear that this is a bubble.
For sure.
And what’s going to happen is your community will agree to something, and then in the middle the bubble’s going to pop—
Right.
—and you’re going to end up with a half-finished data center or one that is not being kept up correctly, or something where the promised benefits don’t emerge. You were in Wisconsin, which had a very, very bad—
Oh, my gosh, yeah.
—experience with Foxconn—
Yeah.
—which seems to be structuring the way people are thinking about at least some of this. So talk to me a bit about that set of concerns.
Absolutely. In terms of what people in these communities with these data centers feel when they see the projects come in with their gigantic, $2 billion investment—these gigantic numbers that are being dangled—it feels like a bubble to them. One, they’re seeing news articles saying maybe AI is a bubble.
We don’t know it’s a bubble, but it could be. Two, you do have experiences like Foxconn, where you have a big tech company show up in a very small community—in this case, Mount Pleasant, Wisconsin, a city of about 28,000 people. It’s not very big, but it gets hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure investment and tax subsidies from the town, promises 13,000 high-paying manufacturing jobs, and then pulls out because the contract wasn’t set up correctly. They decided they didn’t actually want to build a bunch of flat-screen TVs in Wisconsin.
The town is left on the hook, having invested all of this money in the grid and in roads. They got, I think, 1,000 jobs in the end. Foxconn is still paying back all of this accumulated debt. Experiences like that have really soured people on the question of when an outside big tech company comes in and promises these gigantic numbers, all of these jobs, and all this tax revenue for technology that a lot of people don’t see, don’t feel, or find personally extremely useful—not at the levels of these valuations. They have a lot of questions about whether, if the bubble pops, they’re going to be the ones left with a stranded asset in their community.
I mean, in Janesville, Wisconsin, it was famously the site of this 100-year-old GM plant, which was the centerpiece of the community and employed a ton of people. When GM left during the financial crash in 2008 and the plant closed down, not only did it devastate the community from a work perspective, but they also left $30 million of contamination and hazardous waste in the middle of the city that has never been cleaned up. There are forever chemicals in there. This is why developers have not been able to sell this brownfield: There’s so much waste that GM never cleaned up.
I think that people worry about what happens if the AI bubble pops, if maybe it doesn’t pop and the data center developers just decide, “Never mind, we want to build elsewhere. Never mind, this data center isn’t good enough. We have newer, better technology.” Who’s going to be left holding the bag? That was the question I heard over and over again.
But this is something that I do think is in people’s minds.
Yeah.
Right? You bring this in, and right now you’re at this time of very, very high valuations.
Right.
And if AI demand isn’t quite what you think—
Right.
—or even just the company that was behind this particular data center—
Totally, yeah.
—is not part of the winner’s circle—
Mm-hmm.
—in a couple of years, what you’ve got is this giant box—
Yeah.
—that’s not going to continue being valuable. Whatever the promised benefits are from it—tax revenue, et cetera—yeah, maybe they show up for a while.
Yeah.
But what if, in 5 years, they’re gone and you’re left with this infrastructure? It’s like they can leave Janesville—
Right.
—with no real concern. They’re not there. Their people don’t live there, right?
Right.
But if you’re in Janesville, you do live there.
Yes. Yeah.
And it’s just a real concern.
You see things like this with Elon’s giant Colossus data centers, right, that he built out in Memphis.
Mm-hmm.
Right?
And what makes people feel better about a new construction project in their town than calling it Colossus?
Oh, yeah.
An unnerving touch for the people.
I mean, usually the thing that happens is they give them very cutesy names like Project Cannoli and The Barn, and they try to make them sound as friendly as possible. But with Colossus, xAI never really took off. People were not, in fact, using Grok as much as Elon thought they were going to be using it. In that case, he was able to get a really good deal selling the compute capacity to Anthropic, which was growing like crazy and had not built enough data centers on its side.
But you could totally imagine a world, as you say, where xAI decides, “We’re going to focus on space. We don’t care about AI anymore.” Maybe there’s not an Anthropic to pick up the bill because Anthropic has built enough of its own compute capacity. There is an open question about what happens in that world.
6. The Missing Pro Constituency
So, I wrote Abundance last year with Derek Thompson—or published it. One thing I’ve been asked by a lot of people is, what is the Abundance take on a data center?
Yeah.
The beginning of that book has this line: “The question is, what do we need more of, and how do we get it?”
Mm-hmm.
And I think the question here that has been so hard—
Yeah.
—for the AI companies, for the people trying to build data centers—is actually getting people to believe they need more of them, right?
Right.
When you’re talking about building affordable housing—
Mm-hmm.
—when you’re talking about building an array of solar panels—
Right.
—or wind turbines, there’s a pretty legible argument—
Yes.
—for why you need that, right? People still may not like it, but we need homes—
Yeah.
—because we need places for people to live. We need solar panels because we need clean, renewable energy.
Mm-hmm.
How much is this a normal kind of—I don’t even exactly want to call it NIMBYism—but a normal kind of “I don’t want the industrial infrastructure built in my backyard”—
Mm-hmm.
—because what am I going to get out of that? And how much of it is actually something that is more related to people’s feelings about AI, which is, “I don’t want this built here because why would I want to pay the cost for a thing that I don’t want there to even be more of in the first place?”
This, I think, was one of my big motivating questions going into this trip: Is it, quote-unquote, “normal NIMBYism”? Is it about AI? Is it about something else? I spent time both looking at polls and trying to talk to people about whether they would be excited if this was a chip factory, which would use a lot more water and pollute a lot more. Would you be excited if it was a solar farm, also maybe acquiring agricultural land and turning it into industrial use? Would you be excited if it was a million other things?
I talked to Nick Bagley, who you’ve had on your show, about whether this is just proceduralism. We talked about the solar farms example, where the opposition used very similar tactics to the data center opposition. They were organizing in Facebook groups, packing town halls, talking about the local impacts and the importance of farmland and the visions for their communities. There were zoning fights, of course.
But, like you say, with the solar farms, you do have a very clear pro case. You have a faction, a group of people, a constituency—people who care about the environment, who want renewable energy, who understand that, yeah, maybe it sucks to have it in your backyard, but you can take one for the team because this is important for our planet. You don’t really have a pro faction with AI.
It’s the same with the auto plant, right? You have one. You have maybe 7,000 workers in the old GM plant in Janesville who all have families who really care about them, who see that as a constituency. Everyone drives a car. They see their car as essential. I think the fact that it’s creating these tangible outputs really matters.
I don’t think that data centers have a compelling pro constituency besides the utility companies and the AI companies, which are already incredibly unpopular. I went in and asked these organizers, “Do you guys use AI? Do you find it useful?” This was one of the top questions that my friends in San Francisco wanted me to ask: Are these people using ChatGPT, and they don’t even realize that the data centers are how they can use it?
What I found was that a lot of these folks did say, “Yeah, I’ve used it to draft an email or make a meme.” They’re not denying that AI might have any possible utility at all, but they clearly didn’t see it as essential in the way that cars, energy, and housing are essential. They clearly saw it as kind of a widget, a toy. Maybe there are these risks, maybe there’s the job stuff, but fundamentally they were like, “This thing is not that useful. I don’t really see in my personal life how this could justify these gigantic valuations.”
I was talking to, for example, Charles Franklin, who runs the Marquette Law Polls in Wisconsin, and he was explaining that usually you see 50/50 polling on issues where you have a strong anti case and a strong pro case. The only reason you’re seeing this 70/30 bipartisan opposition to data centers, no matter whether you live near a data center or you don’t—which means it’s not just NIMBYism; it’s that you don’t want a data center in anyone’s backyard—is because there is no strong pro argument for it. There isn’t even a fight that’s really going on. “Nobody wants it” was the phrase I heard over and over.
7. AI Populism Takes Shape
You have a very influential definition of AI populism, where you call it a worldview in which AI is viewed not only as a normal technology but as an elite political project to be resisted.
Unpack that for me.
The phrase that you hear a lot from AI critics is, “Why is this being shoved down our throats?” With ChatGPT, it’s not that people are saying there is literally no use for ChatGPT. People are saying, “Why are you forcing me at my job to use AI to do something worse when I could do it better?”
I think that a lot of the public backlash to AI that has risen over the past 6 months is not explained by people thinking that the technology has no use at all. It’s not explained by them being worried about specific technical properties of LLMs that might lead to rogue AI or misalignment or whatever, which are the sort of safety arguments. It’s AI as sort of an avatar for a small group of Silicon Valley billionaires’ ability to impose their vision of the world onto everybody else without their consent, and I think that’s also what I hear echoed in these data center debates.
It’s not just, “It’s going to use this much water or that much water.” I frankly think that even if there was no misinformation about water use, people would be just as angry about the data centers.
Yeah, I consider the water—I don’t want to say the water issue is fake. What I will say is, there was a debate online a while back about how much water a ChatGPT query consumed. And somebody was like, “If you really care about water, are you eating beef?”
As someone who doesn’t eat meat, I thought this was quite good. You could really save a lot of water by going vegetarian, and relatively far more than by not using ChatGPT. Relatively few people in that conversation were giving up meat. But—
Or giving up YouTube videos.
Or giving up YouTube videos.
YouTube videos use more water than a ChatGPT query.
Which is to say that I think sometimes people don’t like a thing—
Yes.
—and they’re looking for reasons to justify that dislike.
Yeah.
But what’s actually happening at the base is they don’t like the thing.
Right.
And the data centers, as you’re saying, I think speak to this AI populism question even more precisely, because the issue with AI itself is that I think people’s relationship to it is very complicated, right?
Yeah.
I have myself a very complicated relationship to AI. I’m not sure I think it’s a good thing for society the way it’s going. I don’t want my kids using it. I know they’ll be using it. Maybe it’ll make things better, but I really don’t know. I think that the costs are going to be very, very high for us relationally and economically. And so I’m very conflicted.
Mm-hmm.
But do I want to live next to a data center? Yeah, no.
Yeah. It’s totally different.
That’s easier.
One of the most interesting things—
Somebody is just making you do that.
Yes. Going to this—back to back, I went to this Abdul-Bernie AOC rally in Lansing, Michigan, and then I went and saw the Saline activist the next day. I was researching how the Saline Stargate project happened.
It was really interesting to see these echoes of the populist message manifest in the specific project. When I’m at this rally, people are talking about the oligarchy. They’re talking about corporate billionaires, whether it’s big tech or big pharma or DTE, the utility companies, paying off politicians in order to screw the people over. That’s why you need the people to come together and to get money out of politics, to prevent DTE from donating to these super PACs and paying off Gretchen Whitmer or whatever.
Then when I learned how the Saline data center saga played out, what happened was the Saline Township City Council, unlike a lot of city councils, actually voted 4-1 against rezoning their land for the data center. So this was a case where local government said, “This is not our vision for our community. It’s not worth it to us.”
What happened was, the data center developers sued Saline Township, a town of a few thousand people, arguing, “Wait, no, this is exclusionary zoning. You can’t have no industrial use in your entire township.” When a town of that size is getting sued by a giant AI data center developer, they just settled. They were just like, “Fine, give us a few million for the fire department and for some schools, and this fight is not worth it to us.”
But that to people felt like a profound violation of little-D democracy. It felt like the dark money in politics story, which is, you have some very rich companies show up with a bag of money to your politicians. They don’t tell anybody else what’s happening. The politicians aren’t allowed to tell their citizens and involve them in the decision-making process. And they themselves work out a deal, a deal that is fundamentally asymmetric because of the amount of money on one side, that will then transform the image of your community, your lived reality, into the world that these tech companies have decided for you.
And so I think that the data centers in that sense are a very visceral microcosm of the way that a lot of people feel that AI is showing up in their lives.
I would also maybe even take that a little bit further. I think that the way that not all of the AI companies—but many of them—have acted, and I think Anthropic has largely been a good actor here, has opened up such a chasm between what they say and how they act under pressure that one should be incredibly, incredibly skeptical of them.
And what I mean by this is that Sam Altman and all these different people, in congressional testimony and in interviews, will say, “It should not just be us making these decisions. There should be a real, deep, small-D democratic role here in how AI rolls out, in what effects it has on communities and how it is governed.”
And then when a community or a politician who is representing a community tries to say, “Well, we don’t want this data center here—”
Yeah.
“—or we want to impose these regulations,” we have watched repeatedly these companies turn tremendous amounts of financial artillery—
Yes.
—against whoever is standing in their way, right?
Yeah.
And use the expertise, the money, and the power they are amassing to short-circuit that democratic voice.
Yeah. A couple things. One is that I think one big gap I noticed between Silicon Valley and the folks in these communities I was talking to is that Silicon Valley does tend to think that money solves all problems, that if you just make the check bigger, everything’s going to be okay.
And I think people have a sense that I’m being bribed. This corporation is not offering me a free lunch or whatever. There is going to be something that I’m losing here. In fact, sometimes the fact that the data center deals were bigger or the amount of political spending was bigger actually just makes people more suspicious.
In the Abdul race, his number-one hit on Haley Stevens is how much money she is getting from APAC, from DTE, from pharma, whatever. So one is just that I think we’re in a political environment where making the numbers bigger and the amounts of money bigger makes people more suspicious, not less.
8. The AI Underclass
Another one I’ll quickly mention is I don’t even think Anthropic should be left off the hook for things like labor market impacts, right? They are the ones simultaneously warning that we might see 50 percent of white-collar jobs lost by 2030. This is really important to us. We’re freaking out about it.
Dario has written in his essays, “We might see an underclass of people of lower intellectual ability,” and they are building the agents. They are building the coding agents, the banking agents, the design agents that they know are going to displace jobs, or at least they believe are going to displace jobs.
And I think that people feel that hypocrisy as well, which is, if you are so worried about the inequality, why are you building the agents to do it? When I ask executives and researchers and whoever at Anthropic this question, they don’t really have a good answer, because it is true that their business model is fundamentally premised on the disruption that they say they are causing.
You did a big piece for The Times on the very widespread belief in Silicon Valley that they will create this underclass.
Yeah.
What does the underclass mean to them?
The idea of a permanent underclass caused by AI is basically a world where any job a person can do, either AI or a robot can do for them, which means that workers lose all the economic leverage they have, and capital owners—people with money—can simply pay machine labor to do all the work instead of paying workers. What that means is anyone who earned their living by working is no longer able to do that. You end up with a world of runaway inequality, where the rich get richer and the working class gets poor. Maybe they get some welfare checks, but fundamentally, it’s a loss of economic mobility in a society.
And when I ask folks in Silicon Valley, “Do you think by default AI is going to increase or decrease inequality?” I have not yet heard anyone say it will decrease inequality or keep it the same. They might say the floor will get really high. They might say AI will bring the cost of consumer goods down, and so people’s lives are going to get cheaper and everyone will be super healthy, so it’s okay. But I have not heard a single person in the tech industry tell me that they believe that AI is going to decrease inequality. In fact, many people are very worried that instead, most workers will lose their leverage and be on a kind of permanent welfare in the far-off future.
I’m pretty skeptical of this vision, although I don’t rule it out, right? It might happen, although I just don’t think AI is going to be quite as revolutionary as a lot of these people think, and will not diffuse into the real world as easily. But the thing you’re going to need to adjust to any major technological change is time. And also, the AI industry is in an all-out war to make sure we have as little time for adjustment as possible.
Yeah. I mean, look at the job postings—
And I just find it hard to unknot that.
How many enterprise salespeople are OpenAI and Anthropic hiring in order to convince companies that they can replace their workforce—or maybe not replace it, but expand their workforce with agents instead of humans, right? They are having these sales conversations trying to persuade people of these questions.
I don’t think that a permanent underclass is the likeliest economic outcome that we’re going to get. I think AI is actually just really jagged, and human jobs are super complex and super hard to automate. And most of the folks who are predicting economic apocalypse haven’t actually worked enough real jobs to know how complicated and multifaceted most jobs really are.
But I definitely agree on the speed point. I think that Alex Dimas, The Economist has made this point very well. One thing I think a lot about is that people say, “Well, humans can adjust. Humans can reskill. They can retrain. They can just do the new jobs that we’re going to develop instead.”
You look at things like software engineering, where people will often say now, senior software engineers are doing great. They love cloud code. Junior software engineers have been mostly replaced, and you see hiring and job postings are down in that sector. Well, do we think that a human software engineer is going to reskill or upskill themselves faster than the next model is going to get better at software engineering?
That’s the question that I really wonder about: If AI progress outpaces humans’ ability to reskill, retrain, upskill, and adapt, then I’m not really sure what there is going to be left. There will be some jobs left, but it’s going to be a really, really painful adjustment.
I have had so many people at the top of these companies—the very tippy-top—tell me they wish all this would slow down.
Yeah.
I’m sure you have had them say this to you, right? But in this world where, in their unguarded moments, they will say they wish all this was going slower, one way to slow AI down is to constrict the number of data centers you can build.
Yeah.
You’ve done as good reporting as anybody on just how conflicted people even working for these companies seem to be about what they are building.
Yeah.
And yet they’re in this competitive race to build it as quickly as possible. And so it makes them a pretty unconvincing pro-AI faction.
Oh, absolutely, yeah.
It’s like we’re building the thing we’re telling you to be afraid of, and we need to build it as fast as possible, even though we sort of admit that it’d be better if the whole thing was slowed down.
It’s very confusing.
It’s a weird argument.
Yeah. It’s so confusing. I remember when I sat down with Abdul El-Sayed, the Michigan Senate candidate. He cited Dario’s 50 percent white-collar job-loss stat probably, like, 5 times in the 30-minute conversation. He was like, “They’re saying that there’s going to be recursive self-improvement, and it might kill us all.” Yeah, I get why you would not want to make this thing go faster.
This is true for data centers, but it’s true for any other way that you might slow AI down, which is that everyone only wants to be slowed down if they can guarantee that the other companies—that the Chinese labs—are going to slow down with them. So long as that’s not true, they are going to keep racing.
And I think for that reason, the thing that I hear when I talk to people at the companies and data center executives about the build-out is, “How much money do we need to give these cities to let us build a data center? Tell us how to bribe them better. Tell us what we can do.”
And so when I talk to them about the build-out, I’m not hearing any sort of personal moral reckoning with slowing AI down. I’m hearing, “How do I make the bribes bigger? How big do they need to be?”
So then how do you reconcile what many of these executives, many of these AI company workers are telling you about their fears of creating an underclass—
Mm-hmm.
…about their fears of losing control? I mean, we just saw the situation where OpenAI’s model was breaking out of a sandbox—
Yeah.
…in order to sort of cheat on its evaluation, right? So the AI safety people are very worried, right? The safety teams in here clearly don’t have full control or even understanding of what they’re building.
How do you reconcile, if you reconcile, the way the AI companies talk when they are giving voice to their fears, or the people at them talk when they’re giving voice to their fears, and their pretty profound hostility to anything that would slow down how fast we are building this thing whose consequences they freely admit they cannot predict?
Yeah, it’s fascinating, because just on a very personal level, when I talk to people at these companies, I just think, man, if I thought this thing might have a 10 percent chance of killing us all or taking everybody’s job, I wouldn’t work on it. I wouldn’t—
Yeah, I would not build that.
I personally could not morally justify taking that chance. And when I talk to people who are not in the San Francisco AI world, they feel like I do. They’re just like, “Why would you do it?”
And I think there are basically 3 rough buckets of rationales that I hear from people, or that I hear between the lines from people. One is this sense of techno-determinism: Superintelligence is going to be built inevitably. There is no way it’s not going to happen. If it happens, I want to be part of it. I want to make my money from it. I want to maybe make it happen in the least bad way. I think that’s a super common answer.
Another is: This technology might kill us all, but it also might be really amazing. It might produce superabundance for everybody. We might be immortal. It might double everyone’s lifespans, cure all diseases, bring the cost of every consumer good—housing, energy, whatever—to near zero, and that would be utopia.
And so I think all the time of that anecdote that I think SBF said on a podcast where it’s—
Sam Bankman-Fried.
Yeah, Sam Bankman-Fried said on a podcast where it was like, if you could flip a coin and there was a 51 percent chance you would double the total amount of human welfare, and a 49 percent chance everyone dies, would you flip the coin? He says yes.
And again, I feel compelled to say: Caveats here. How do you really know that’s what’s happening? Blah, blah, blah, whatever. Put that aside. Take the hypothetical, the pure hypothetical. Yeah. Yeah.
I think this is a hyperbolic example, but I think it’s not actually that far off from what a lot of the people building superintelligence believe, too: that they are basically willing to flip the coin. Maybe we all die, but maybe we’re all immortal, and that, expected-value-wise, cancels things out.
Then the final category is just folks who are so fascinated by the technical endeavor of whether we can build this thing and how to do it that they just aren’t super worried about the consequences or what else might happen. So people have all sorts of self-justifying narratives as to why it’s worth it. Some, I think, are better than others. But it makes sense to me why the public is not particularly sympathetic to any of these.
That middle narrative—I heard Sam Bankman-Fried say that. I think it was on Tyler Cowen’s podcast. And I was like, “Oh, that’s a psychopath.” To actually believe that, you would have to be a psychopath.
Yes.
You would have to have a very, very, very low value on human life.
Yes.
Imagine being the person who flips that coin—
Oh, my God.
—and it comes up wrong.
Oh, Jesus. Yeah.
I’m a parent.
Mm-hmm.
The idea that you would do something that’s 51–49 on whether your kid is doubly happy or your kid is gone—you would never.
Yeah.
You don’t even want to say that out loud.
Of course. I think that’s how almost everybody thinks about it. And again, I think 51–49 is obviously the most egregious example you could think of, and so SBF is very unsympathetic. But when I think about the superintelligence bet, a lot of people will characterize it as a 90–10 bet or an 80–20 bet, and this question of how much is an acceptable amount of either extinction risk or total disempowerment risk—I think people have very different risk appetites.
Silicon Valley is a place that has always prized a high risk appetite. I think that makes a lot more sense when you’re talking about maybe yourself or your company full of people who have opted in to taking a very high-risk endeavor. I think that’s extremely different, obviously, when you’re talking about the rest of the world.
And one thing with the data center debates that I’d always hear is, “I get that these people are making this crazy bet on this technology they think is going to change the world. But why do they have to do it in our backyard? Why is Mark Zuckerberg not building a data center in his backyard?”
So there’s this question of, yeah, you guys are going to create these very tangible impacts and, in their view, harms on specific communities that are not the communities benefiting from this technology. At least, they don’t see the benefits yet. They don’t see the cancer cures. They don’t see themselves getting the million-dollar, $10 million salaries that the AI researchers are getting.
It feels like they are pawns in some tech billionaire’s game, and they do not like to feel that way.
Why aren’t they building it in their own backyards? Why don’t you see a bunch of data centers in Northern California?
I don’t think I need to tell you why it’s so hard to build in Northern California.
But I both think that’s true—that it’s hard to build in Northern California—
Yeah.
—but I also think there’s a truth to the other thing being said: They don’t want them there.
No, they—
Right? I mean, the land is expensive. It would be very hard and expensive to build a data center in the places we’re talking about. But it also gets at a core truth, which is people don’t actually want data centers around them. It is a cost.
Yeah, yeah.
It is a concentrated cost for a diffuse benefit.
Mm-hmm. Yeah.
If you believe in the benefit.
Yeah.
So I think that’s part of it. I want to go back to the first bucket you were talking about, which is the race dynamics.
Yes.
So at the most generous, the thing that I’ve heard repeatedly is what you’re describing, which is it would be better if this were going slower. But I can’t control that because whether I’m at Anthropic or OpenAI or Google or Meta, if we slow down, then our less ethical competitors over there speed up.
Yeah.
And even if you put down legislation slowing down all of America, then it’s China—
Right.
—you know, the CCP—which is going to win the race. I guess one question is: Do you buy this central metaphor of a race that has a ticker-tape line, where at some point somebody passes it and then they have recursive superintelligence and the race is over? Or do you see this more as most technologies, like a linear set of gains? It can be fast or it can be slow, but it doesn’t have that somebody-is-going-to-win dynamic.
Yeah, I find this really confusing. One of the first things that I did when I started reporting more deeply on AI was try to figure out what AGI meant, because a lot of the way that this race has been characterized is: Who will build AGI first? Who will build—
Artificial general intelligence.
—artificial general intelligence first. The first thing I found was that no one agrees on what that means. AGI means everything from AI that can build itself to AI that can do all human jobs to AI that produces whatever amount of economic value. Everyone has these different milestones for what constitutes AGI to them.
What that also means is that the race has different finish lines and moving finish lines. You see the way that these models perform differently on benchmarks: They are extremely jagged. They can be super good at math, and they can be super bad at poker at the same time. They can be amazing at cracking cybersecurity problems but not able to build anything in the physical world.
Because of that, I don’t think the technology is as general as people suggest it is. I also think that means it is much harder to define a finish line to the race, and my sense is that because you cannot adjudicate it, everyone will always feel that they are falling behind on some dimension.
The case that these AI companies are making is that they do believe in this recursive self-improvement. They think that OpenAI, Google DeepMind, and Anthropic are all extremely focused specifically on the question of: Can we build AI that builds itself? Can we build an AI that can train the next-generation model completely from scratch on its own?
In that sense, you get an exponential pace of improvement for whoever can hit that recursive self-improvement curve first. They think that this might lead to that company pulling ahead. Right now, folks think that it’s Anthropic, which has the best coding models, meaning they can code faster, meaning that their next models are even better.
I can see where that argument is, but I’m not sure when we look at the latest Anthropic models versus the latest OpenAI models versus the latest Chinese open-weight models that we see a company pulling ahead that decisively in that way, especially when every single company and lab is using the same recursive self-improvement strategy.
So basically, I don’t know that the race has a finish line, and that’s what worries me about it continuing.
The reason I want to focus on this race metaphor for a minute is I’ve come to think it is really one of the central dividing lines in how you think about different kinds of AI policy.
Mm-hmm.
Whether you think that we are in a race with China to get to the point where one side or the other is going to pull endlessly and decisively ahead because they hit that recursive self-improving level—well, then that means what you do in the next 1 to 3 years is incredibly, incredibly, definitionally important.
Mm-hmm.
But if you don’t believe that—if you believe something more like, yes, this is a powerful technology, a powerful technology that might have a lot of downsides and might come with a lot of social instability, and its effect on a society may not be good—then “let’s run faster to the bad place” is not nearly as compelling an argument.
And all of a sudden, the idea that we should have policy in place that slows things down for more voice and more consideration—it’s not crazy. I guess one place this goes is that I have begun to notice a really interesting convergence between the AI safety people, in a way, and the AI populists, like Bernie Sanders or, in a different way, Abdul El-Sayed, who are getting to not that different places but through very, very different mechanisms.
They’re the AI safety people who actually believe we are in a race.
Mm-hmm.
But they believe that winning that race might bring the end of humanity.
Right.
And so they don’t want to move that fast. If we began to slow down, we would have more credibility for negotiating with China and trying to come up with international treaties and all the rest of it.
And then you have the more AI-populist side, who just don’t want to give all these tech billionaires all this power, who don’t believe this technology will be good for people, and they’re starting to come up with maybe not the policies AI safety people would, but data center moratoriums and things like that.
Yeah.
And so you have this slightly strange coalition. You would not have considered this coalition.
It’s super interesting. You literally have Ron DeSantis doing AI roundtables with Max Tegmark, who’s been one of the leading advocates of pausing and slowing down AI, an MIT professor. And you have Bernie Sanders doing viral videos with Eliezer Yudkowsky, the guy who’s telling us that AI is probably going to kill us all if we build it.
Which is both an alliance that doesn't and does kind of make sense, you know what I mean?
Yeah, totally. I've been spending some time in D.C. this year talking to some of these AI populists, some from the social-conservative right, others from, say, the labor left. This Bannon guy I was talking to told me—he's like, “I wouldn't send my kids over to a playdate at the polycule, but I can do coalitions.” And so I think one of the most interesting political stories going on right now is the sort of strange bedfellows that have emerged.
Even with the data center stuff, I was talking to an activist, and they were saying these were liberal women who had gotten into politics after the 2016 election of Donald Trump. They said that data centers were the first thing that got them to talk productively with their Trump-voting neighbors about politics—the first thing in almost 10 years, which is fascinating to me. In this sense, they felt a really strong sense, almost, of political agency that almost came out of this fight.
I think one of the big questions that folks in AI safety, for example, are thinking about is, do we want to build these alliances with the rising left- and right-populist waves in American culture in order to slow AI down? Maybe it's okay that we have different reasons and different theories for why AI is so dangerous. For one person, it is big model bad. For another person, it's big billionaire bad, big tech bad. And those folks are sort of linking arms in a lot of ways against the AI accelerationists and sort of the folks pushing the race faster.
So I think, listening to this, we've been sort of living in the data center moratorium side of the politics. But what's the other side of it? What are the problems with just saying, “Okay, fine, let's not build any more data centers”?
One, this is not actually the way that you would successfully slow down AI, if that's what you really wanted. If one locality or one state imposes a moratorium, AI companies are very, very happy to go to other states or other countries. They are already flooding into Texas, for example, because it's had such a pro-data-center environment. People are looking at Louisiana, the Dakotas, and Australia. Space, of course, is a current big interest of Elon Musk's because people think that maybe not now, but in 5 years we can just put all the data centers in space and solve the political problems that way. So I'm not really sure that this would stop AI progress that much. It would just shift the data centers to other places that do welcome them.
The second thing is, I actually do think that there are ways for these deals to be good. Not every community should want a data center. I think that many of them may discuss it and say, “This isn't what we want. We don't need the tax revenue that badly.” But in a lot of the cases with these sites that I visited, like the old GM site in Janesville, Veridian partners, the data center developer, was going to clean that brownfield up. They were the only ones willing to do so. I talked to a real estate broker who had tried to sell that site for 5 years, and he couldn't do it because not a single other commercial buyer wanted to clean up all of this hazardous waste. Only the data centers were willing to do that.
Or with Mount Pleasant and the Foxconn site, right? They had already cleared all this land. They had built all this infrastructure. Putting a data center there was a net improvement for the community, mostly, in my opinion, from an economic perspective, from the perspective that there was nothing going on there anyway.
So I think that there are ways to do these deals right. There is enough money in this industry that a lot of communities will decide it is economically beneficial for them to bring in these jobs and bring in this investment. But I think that the ways that the data center deals have been done nearly guarantee the amount of public backlash that there's been.
And the thing that will probably fix it, I suspect, is either a state-level streamlining, where someone does the research, probably at the state level, maybe at the federal level, to figure out what is the fair way to do these deals. How do we ensure the communities get the most transparency, the most benefit out of data center deals when they happen? So it's not case by case, and it's not so asymmetric, with the town of 12,000 negotiating with an OpenAI or whatever.
I would add 2 other things to that that I'd be curious to hear your take on. One, you mentioned data centers moving toward other localities, and those localities are not randomly selected. They're localities that are going to impose fewer conditions. So maybe that means fewer environmental conditions, but in the case of maybe a UAE or some of the Gulf states that are interested here, you're looking at more authoritarian countries, right? So I've heard a lot of people worry about that.
Yes.
Or Elon Musk in space. In a sense, if you make it so data centers cannot go into places where there is more democratic control, you might end up with less overall democratic control. The other thing, and I do think this is significant, is that there is right now more demand—
Hmm.
—for compute than there is compute.
Yes.
You know, people talk a lot about a bubble, but we do not look to have excess AI supply at the moment. And if demand keeps rising because the coding agents get better and all the rest of the things we know that are happening, but you are constricting the supply of compute, then you end up with more inequality in who can afford it.
So a Goldman Sachs or a JPMorgan—a company with a lot of money to buy compute—is going to have a lot of it, and then ordinary users, small businesses, et cetera. If you believe AI is important and powerful, and I believe it is important and powerful, then you have a problem where you have created much more stratification in who can afford it. How do you think about those dimensions of it?
I think that where you build the data centers, a lot of folks are starting to look at building AI infrastructure as a form of geopolitical leverage, right? Some countries, like Australia, Canada, and countries in Europe, are thinking, “Actually, maybe the way for us to get a slice of frontier AI, for us to negotiate with the countries where the best AI is being developed, like the U.S., in cases like cybersecurity access, is to say, you know, we'll build your data centers here. We'll actually welcome you in, and in return, maybe you guarantee us access to the frontier models.”
So I think that we should look at AI infrastructure as a point of leverage that both states and countries have. And as you mentioned, if local moratoriums in the U.S.—if domestic moratoriums or something like that—lead to giving that leverage and negotiating power to authoritarian states, that's probably something the U.S. should be really worried about.
On the other hand, there are folks like Anton [?] at Carnegie who have done work on this, asking, can we give our allies, can we give our democratic allies, negotiating leverage through them building out compute? The second thing that you mentioned about pricing is interesting because I do think one of the big macro trends in AI right now is the closing of the frontier. It's the fact that the very best models, like Mythos from Anthropic, are not being opened to everybody.
That is both a safety decision, as in we don't want to give really powerful cyberweapons and bioweapons to a bunch of bad actors or just unknown actors. It is also a pricing question: The best models are really, really expensive to run. They don't have enough compute to run them, and so we're going to have to charge a lot of money or only give them to the biggest corporations.
And I think that's a reason that startups are worried, that countries outside of the U.S. are worried, that normal people are worried. Maybe we get superintelligence and it can achieve all of these amazing things, but I'm not going to get it. Maybe my boss is going to get the superintelligence and they're going to automate my job, but as a worker, as a consumer, I'm not going to be able to do the same thing.
So I think it's also a really good point that if we don't continue the compute build-out, we do see a world where it is the folks with existing capital and access—probably big corporations in the U.S. and the U.S. government—that are going to have access to frontier AI and all the benefits that it confers.
9. The China Backlash Question
You were in China for a trip reporting on AI. Was there much political AI backlash and ferment there, from what you could see?
I was super interested in this question on this trip because I was finishing my Times piece on the permanent underclass while in China. I was basically asking everyone I met there, whether they were engineers at the labs or my family members who were normal middle-class people in Shanghai: Are people worried about AI and jobs? Are people worried about AI and social instability?
I think the answer is not as much. I caveat this, of course, with the fact that the information environment in China is obviously suppressed. You can't dissent in public on social media nearly as much as you can in the U.S. You don't have good polling, so it's hard to understand the actual level of social discontent in China.
But I would say that, for the most part, people were not as terrified of AI as they are in the U.S. There are a few explanations for this. Some people say that China is more techno-optimistic than the U.S. is. I don't love this explanation, mostly because the thing that I heard was not exactly optimism. It was not exactly, "Yeah, we're going to get the cancer cures and the superabundance."
It was something a lot closer to: Technology is a force that cannot be stopped. It actually, in some ways, reminded me more of some of these Silicon Valley beliefs that the future is predetermined, that when the state decides something like AI is a national priority, it is going to march forward. As an individual, there's not much you can do to resist, especially in a one-party state, in an authoritarian society. There is no culture of resistance, really.
Rather than thinking about, How do I prevent AI in my workplace or in the world? that's not really something that a lot of people in China think about. It's: How can I use AI to make sure I don't fall behind? In an environment that already has crazy levels of white-collar competition and white-collar unemployment, if you're not upskilling yourself with OpenClaw or whatever, there are a million people in line behind you who are going to get on the bus.
At the same time, I think that the Chinese state takes a pretty different approach from the U.S. when it comes to AI regulation and technology regulation in general. China has passed laws banning many kinds of companion chatbots because they're worried about relationships, fertility rates and addiction. China has made court rulings that say AI replacing a worker's job, or being able to do a worker's job, is not a good enough reason to lay off a worker.
You have regulations that require all AI-generated images to be labeled, and you'll see the "Made with AI" language on all of the AI-made ads in China. There's also a sense that some Chinese people have that their government is more likely to look out for the social and labor downsides relative to the U.S. government, which has thus far been pretty laissez-faire, especially at the national level. That gives some people a bit of solace as well.
There's been some reporting that China and Russia are pushing anti-data-center—
Oh, yeah.
—memes and social media bots.
Yeah.
It's hard for me to tell what scale that is, but it has been very much picked up on by—
Yeah.
—people like Kevin O'Leary, the Shark Tank guy, whose big data center project has faced a lot of backlash. Do you buy the growing view among at least some tech elites that the data center backlash is a Chinese psyop?
I think this is ridiculous, to be honest. I read the OpenAI report that was saying, "This is all a CCP plot," and it pastes in the accounts and the tweets that are doing the psyop.
Mm-hmm.
These tweets have no likes on them. They have 2 views per tweet. I'm not doubting that some clever CCP propaganda person has attempted to inflame the anti-data-center sentiment. I have not seen evidence that any of this is working.
I think it feels very organic. I also tend to be personally a little suspicious when you just cast your political opponents as being misinformed. I think there's a way in which people use foreign influence to avoid thinking about the fact that there are people they live with in society who do not agree with their vision of the world.
When I talk to these data center activists, for example, they are actually much less TikTok-addled and misinformed than I think people like to caricature. A lot of them understand the basic facts: What's the difference between an AI data center and the old kind of data center? What's the difference between a closed-loop system and an open-loop system?
Most of these people are not just misinformed. They have personally decided, "I'm not that interested in having a data center in my community, even if it pays some property taxes."
10. The Marketing Problem
So you talk to people in the AI companies and talk to them about this backlash.
Mm-hmm.
I know they're very worried about this, right?
Yes.
I've talked to them about this. What are they learning from it?
I do think that this year, in 2026, AI executives and AI researchers have started to take the public backlash a lot more seriously than they have in the past. I've heard executives ask, "Can we do better in marketing? I don't understand why it is that Waymos are so unpopular."
I've heard executives ask, "What do you think are the deals that we should be making? Do you think we should just be mailing checks to every house that lives near a data center project? Will that fix things?" Or, "Tell us how to make a better deal. Do we need to cut people's electricity prices in half? Would that work?"
Unfortunately, the word "bribe" gets used a lot more than I am personally comfortable with. I think that when you are framing the thing you're doing, even jokingly, as bribing communities into putting a data center there, I don't think you're starting off on the right foot. People can feel when they are being bribed. I've heard these people say, "These companies are bribing us."
So there's a little bit of examination. The thing that I don't think is being examined as much as I want it to be, though, is: Are we building a technology? Are we building a product that is helping people?
Yeah, the version of this I have heard is: We have a marketing problem. Maybe we should stop saying aloud so often—
Yes.
—that our technology might take everybody's job and has a 10 percent chance of upending or destroying humanity altogether. What has not been clear to me, even as they begin to move away from that messaging a little bit, is whether or not they no longer believe that.
Again, my personal view is that I don't think it's going to take everybody's job. But to the extent that they do believe that, or at least take that very, very seriously, I keep hearing them say that we have a marketing problem.
Mm-hmm.
And I keep saying, when I talk to them about this, that if you believe the things you have been saying, and in fact the things you have told me personally, you don't have a marketing problem.
Yeah.
You have a problematic technology.
Yes.
You have a product problem.
Yes.
People are not going to want that future.
Yeah. I mean, I would make some distinctions between—
I would too.
—and different executives, right? One thing that's very interesting to me, thinking about the comms in Silicon Valley, is that for a very long time, these companies were only marketing to potential recruits and potential investors, basically. They were trying to win the vibes on AI Twitter in San Francisco, and I feel like they never realized everyone else could hear them, right? So now they're trying to take it back.
My sense is that Sam Altman, for a long time, part of the reason he was talking about shifting the balance of power from labor to capital and rogue AI and whatever, was also because he was winning points among people who he wanted to work at OpenAI. He had to communicate that he was as AGI-pilled as them. He was as worried about the same safety things as them.
Now that his interest is more in political goodwill and IPO-ing and things like that, he has sort of changed his tune. I think that, yeah, I'm not sure to what extent every AI industry actor has always believed the things they've warned about.
I think people can believe things they don't feel—
Mm.
—if that makes sense. I think a lot of people in the AI industry are in a culture and inside arguments where this set of outcomes feels very real, right? Or looks very real. I think they believe it. I think when they make these arguments, I don't think they're just doing it for publicity points.
In fact, I think it's the opposite. I think when they're now trying to move away from some of these arguments—
Yeah.
—I think it's actually much more of a cynical marketing ploy.
Yeah.
But I think they often believe these things without actually, in their bones—
Mm. Mm-hmm.
—feeling it.
Mm-hmm.
Which is why they act relatively heedlessly.
Yeah.
Or at least, on the set of things they believe, this speculative, notional set of beliefs about what might happen is way less close to their core than their belief that if they don’t build this data center or get this next model out, their competitors or China or somebody is going to get in front of them. They’re much more motivated by the push forward.
Yeah. I think technological determinism is such a big part of it. If I’m trying to think about how my friends in the AI industry would react to this conversation, that’s the thing they would say we are not focusing on enough: They are so sure that there’s no way AGI or superintelligence or whatever it is doesn’t get built, and it is only a question of who builds it.
I think that fundamental underlying belief is what justifies everything else: We have to be the ones to do it. Us pulling back, us stopping, is not going to prevent any of the bad stuff, right?
I agree with that, and I think that’s why the China card in this has been such a destructive part of the argument. I’m not even sure it’s totally untrue. I am completely willing to believe that China and America are in a race for an economically and geopolitically important technology, even if you don’t buy recursive superintelligence.
Mm-hmm.
But the way that has then been used—not to say, “Well, we should enter into international negotiations or something,” but instead just, “We cannot slow down whatsoever, no matter what else we worry about or believe”—I think it has acted as a kind of blackmail. The thing is that it’s not bought by enough people outside of the industry.
But I think the phase of politics we’re in now is out of their control. It is just not going to be the case that they’re going to have the same control over the AI narrative next year that they had 2 years ago. And I don’t really think they know what to do in that space.
Now it’s like, either you’re going to have to start benefiting people, right? If people begin seeing drug cures come out—all these things we’ve actually been promised.
Right.
You could say we’re beginning to see the beginnings of mathematical conjectures. That’s been pretty cool. But we’re not really seeing the gains. And if you start getting the losses before the gains, right? You start getting the job loss, for instance, before the promised superabundance, politically, that’s not going to be an equilibrium you can protect.
That’s one of the things I’m worried about. I do think we’re pretty likely to see—we are seeing—a lot of the social instability before we get the cancer cures, right? Or even with the math stuff.
One thing I notice more and more now is this deep cultural and values gulf between Silicon Valley and the rest of America, the rest of the world. I’m not saying that Silicon Valley is wrong; it is cool to disprove the Jacobian conjecture, right? It is cool. But when you ask a lot of people in the tech industry what their utopia looks like, they’ll say things like, “We have UBI, so no one has to work anymore. We’re all immortal, and we’ve discovered all of math and physics.”
And if you do the polling on UBI and immortality, neither is especially popular with the American public.
We polled immortality.
I mean, it’s been polled. You can look it up. If you ask people what they want AI to do for them, it’s not necessarily having Terence Tao in your pocket. It’s not disproving math, right? They want things to be cheaper. They want to be healthier. They want to not do crappy work so they have more time for the stuff they like.
But I think it is genuinely true that the stuff that is really cool, and also oftentimes technically easier to solve, like math, is not what most people want from this technology. I think it’s also true that it’s literally technically harder to cure cancer than it is, it turns out, to prove math theorems.
And the other thing that I hear from the public when I talk about the cancer cures is, “Yeah, but are they going to just use it for themselves? Is Peter Thiel or whoever just going to buy himself immortality? Am I going to be able to afford immortality?”
My view for a very long time has been that a lot of people in these companies overrate how much of the bottleneck in scientific and human progress is raw intelligence.
And, I mean, this is a point about abundance. But the point of accomplishing anything anywhere is that the world is full of friction.
Mm-hmm.
You want to do drug discovery, and I think we should actually do a lot to make drug discovery easier, make drug testing easier, right? I’ve said this many times before. I would like to see us prepare drug development for a world where AI is spitting out way more promising molecular candidates.
Mm-hmm.
But that’s still a world where you need enough monkeys to test things on.
Right.
Humans to test things on—
Yeah.
—and rats to test things on, right? And you still need to do all the safety data. The amount of the world that is slowed down by “We don’t have any good ideas; we are out of ideas” versus the amount that is slowed down because it is hard to organize things amidst humans, with raw materials, in bureaucracies, in organizations—
Intelligence is important, but it is not everything. I think anybody who’s been in organizations knows it’s actually less than you think it is.
Yeah. Again, I think a lot of these people have been AI researchers for their entire careers. Maybe before that, they were physics PhDs or doing quant trading. These are all kinds of jobs that are IC jobs, individual-contributor jobs, where you’re not necessarily working in big teams, so there’s not a lot of politicking and relational work, and all of the relevant context lives inside a single code base.
For AI to understand what’s going on and explore all this context that’s already been written down—I’m not saying there’s no tacit knowledge, but a lot more of the context is made explicit. These are also places where simply applying more thinking and more intelligence as an individual, as a remote worker in a closet or whatever, might actually find a more efficient algorithm, right?
You don’t actually need to politic your way to a better algorithm. You don’t need to do stuff in the physical world to get that. And so I think a lot of people at these companies don’t really realize how hard that is.
It’s funny because people will say things like, “Yeah, there are electricity costs and energy costs to AI, but AI will maybe solve the climate.” And I ask how. To be clear, I think there are a lot of ways that AI can improve climate science research.
Yeah, building efficiency.
Yes, absolutely.
But at the same time, you ask people, and it’s just like, “Oh, I don’t know. It’s just going to do it,” right?
Yeah.
Or it’s like, “How is AI going to improve robotics?” “I don’t know. AI will figure it out.” You do have this—I find it lazy, actually. One of the things that annoys me about this particular approach is not that I don’t think AI can contribute to all of these problems. I think it definitely can. But what I often hear is a kind of laziness about how it’s going to do that, and it feels like a deus ex machina: It’s super smart. It’ll just figure it out.
I used to say that this was back when Silicon Valley was a more optimistic place than it has been in recent years. The difference between the culture of D.C., where I lived for a long time, and Silicon Valley was that in Silicon Valley, people’s worldview is formed by seeing impossible problems prove possible to solve. And in D.C., people’s worldview is formed by seeing possible problems prove impossible to solve.
I think that is now going to collapse for the AI industry into one worldview because these are people who, give them their due, invented artificial intelligence.
Yeah.
They actually did it.
Yeah.
This is amazing. I cannot believe how good some of these systems are. I’m shocked to be living through this. They were able to do that. That seemed impossible, proved possible, and now they’re finding it’s impossible to build a data center.
Yeah.
That’s what doing other kinds of things in the world teaches you. There are a lot of problems that are not possible to solve, not because you cannot come up with the idea for them—
Mm-hmm.
—but because you’re dealing with the messy realities of societies, of politics—
of values, logistics. And it'll impose a kind of realism, I think, on the issues that it has not always had.
Yeah. I was trying to think about what the difference was between how I would describe Silicon Valley and San Francisco culture a year ago, let's say early 2025, versus now. And I think the number one thing is that Silicon Valley has really woken up to politics. In January 2025, Silicon Valley was feeling very triumphant about DOGE, about Elon Musk, about David Sacks and Shriram in the White House. It kind of felt like they were all in control.
And actually, if you just build these genius technologies and get super rich and have good ideas, you'll just get the political power to enact your vision. And a year and a half later, a lot of those folks are out of the White House. They failed at reducing the national debt and achieving all these other goals that they thought they could just AI their way into solving. Anthropic, for example, has had a lot of problems in its dealings with the Trump administration—fundamentally, very political and very relational problems.
Mm-hmm.
Dario's problem in dealing with the White House was not, I think, that he didn't have good arguments or that he's not very smart or not saying logical things. I think that anyone from Anthropic will admit that these are largely relational problems. And so there's a way where I think democracy and politics are a lot more powerful than these very rich and very smart tech people realize. And there's some optimism to that, I think, in looking at it and saying it's actually really hard to buy an election. It's actually really hard to buy out the whole White House at once.
But it's an interesting moment, I think, for the tech industry to be realizing how important politics really is and how difficult it is.
I think that's a good place to end. Always a final question: What are 3 books you'd recommend to the audience?
Ooh. I think the first one is really relevant to this conversation, which is Benjamin Labatut's The Maniac, which includes a sort of lightly fictionalized biography of John von Neumann and the story of AlphaGo. I think it's very much a sort of halfway novel, halfway nonfiction book about how intelligence is incredibly awe-inspiring and something worth respecting and, at the same time, can lead people to some very dark realities.
My second book is The Technology Trap from Carl Benedikt Frey, which I think is very much about how people's attitudes toward technology and automation depend on the extent to which the benefits of economic growth are shared, to what extent they feel like they're getting a piece of the pie. It goes through a lot of history, much more than just the Industrial Revolution, and so that's shaped a lot of my thinking on some of the economic questions and the populist questions.
And then, finally, Priya Parker's The Art of Gathering, because I do think that the relational stuff is going to become a lot more important than it always was. And I do think that book has helped me become a better host.
She would be so happy to hear that. People should go check out our conversation with Priya Parker. Jasmine Sun, thank you so much.
Thank you so much for having me. This was fun.