Julian Teixeira,1Password CRO:如何招聘和培训第一批销售
- Julian Teixeira 的核心重构是:销售打法不是一份20页的文件,而是“拆解一场胜仗的解剖结构”,没有技能培养就一文不值——“你招聘的不是接单员,而是销售”。 他强烈主张由创始人从一线写出第一个版本,因为亲自接触客户,是未来识破任何一个你最终要把销售交给的人的关键杠杆。
- 科技销售的底部正在塌陷。 十年来一路向上,让“过去太容易了”,而“那些容易的日子滋生了大量平庸人才”;如今的市场更像20-30年老兵熟悉的环境,许多靠魅力和收入前景入行的人“会直接放弃出局”。Stebbings更进一步认为,大多数销售和销售领导者都不够好,Teixeira回应:“我完全不反对。”
- 1Password在一年内把转化成交的来源结构从约99%入站翻转为54/46、外呼占多数。 外呼成交率只有一半,但单笔金额是2倍;相较约2个季度,周期可能更接近3-4个季度,因为“我们联系的人并没有预先设定想买什么——从一开始就是我们在定义需求”。不主动自建管道的AE:“就是行不通。”
- 组织结构应当跟着客户的购买方式走,而不是服从教条。 当时有50,000家企业使用产品、渗透率不到2%时,猎手—农夫模式有意义;但在多产品、落地扩展的销售动作下,“我们因为过度推动客户一次性买太多,反而丢掉了新业务交易”,因此1Password明年将转向混合模式。公司也没有做行业垂直化:从赢单率、ACV和成交周期看,各行业“差异非常、非常小”。
- 目标和薪酬设计应从团队目标开始(几个月到一年内就会失效),把计划设定为约70%的销售能达标,并让薪酬简单到销售能算清“怎样付得起房贷”,不必做一堆复杂计算。 每次把目标设在看似可实现水平上方20-30%,即使最终未达标,结果也总会比原先“现实”的数字高10%。
- 分层经济性很清晰:企业级ACV为6位数,本月刚拿下第一个7位数客户;中端市场为5万-10万美元;SMB为几千美元至2.5万-3万美元。 大多数SMB动作在计入全部成本后能实现4倍回报,但存在上限,因此1Password正把这批客户导向MSP和分销商,而不是把机器放大10倍。
- 采购环境已经明显收紧:“CFO突然对一切都感兴趣了”,月末折扣施压“彻底失效”,而交易滑坡的首要风险是漏掉采购链条;因此,1Password会给内部拥护者准备好CFO可能提出的问题和答案,“不求任何回报”。
1. 销售打法是胜仗的解剖结构——由创始人写下
- Teixeira讨厌playbook这个词,“因为它代表的东西”:最后通常会变成一份20页的文件,用来“打个勾完成任务”。他的定义是“拆解一场胜仗的解剖结构”:哪些步骤值得重复,才能提高赢单成功率。但这还只完成了一半:“没有正确的技能培养,你的销售打法就一文不值……你招聘的不是接单员,而是销售。”
- 至于由谁来搭建,他强烈主张由创始人完成:必须是创始人。亲自在一线观察客户如何回应销售话术,“这是一个重要杠杆,未来你需要靠它去识破任何一个最终要把销售交给的人”。能力合格的首位GTM招聘者可以承担这项工作,但创始人尽早走上一线至关重要。
- 销售打法“必须从招对人开始”:在正确阶段,需要具备正确的智力、好奇心和纪律性。“没有任何销售打法能解决这个问题。”
2. 别被漂亮履历迷惑,同时招2人,3个月内做决定
- 招第一个人时,“有时候,简历封面很漂亮、在正确时间接触过正确公司的人,并不是你要找的”。真正需要的是谦逊、耐心、低自我、高好奇心——“一个有东西要证明、心里憋着一口气的人”——关注“可能做到什么”,而不是抱怨公司还没有哪些系统。
- 一次招2个人,“绝对关键”。这会制造追赶和竞争,也能提供诊断样本:“如果样本量只有1个,很难判断”失败究竟来自这个人,还是来自结构性问题。
- 你在前3个月内就能知道一个人是否招错。第1周和第2周应该听和学,判断好奇心的标准,是他会不会追问自己不懂的地方,而不是只会“上下点头”。之后要跟随顶尖销售学习、花时间看Gong里的通话,并主动争取额外的1对1培训。
- Stebbings继续追问:到底有多少销售会为了额外的Gong通话主动留下来?“对我来说,一个都没有。”Teixeira承认,今年无需遗憾的流失率“可能在29-30%左右”,公司也已把筛选前移到招聘流程中——“但有些人就是特别会面试。”
3. 先定团队目标,薪酬要让销售坐在餐桌边就能算清
- Lightspeed和1Password最初都采用团队目标:在没有历史数据、还在从零摸索销售产能时,先建立“大家一起扛”的锚点,再通过spiff找出“那堵后墙到底在哪里”。这种方式“只能维持非常、非常、非常短的时间”——几个月到6-7个月——第一年内就要加入个人目标。
- Stebbings质疑,团队目标似乎和让销售彼此竞争互相矛盾。Teixeira的回答是,个人表现仍然会被衡量:“Harry这周卖得比Julian多,你得追上”;团队目标“不是用来掩盖个人表现的”,而是在水平校准期充当薪酬代理指标。小团队里,“你不会想成为那个拖所有人后腿的人”。
- 薪酬设计越简单越好——“销售应该能理解自己会赚多少钱,也能算清怎样付房贷,不需要做一堆复杂计算”——同时要随着公司重点变化而调整,比如转向多产品、多年期交易。
- 拉伸目标的数学逻辑是:计划设定为约70%的人能够完成;“每次我把目标定在自己认为能力上限至少高20%或30%的位置,即使最终没有达成,我们最后也总会比原先现实的数字高10%。”
4. 科技销售的底部正在塌陷
- 科技销售十多年都在“一路向上”;Teixeira认为,今天的世界“更像这个行业里很多20、30年老兵经历过的环境,而很多人还没有准备好”。那些靠魅力和收入前景入行的人,“会直接放弃出局”。他的结论是:“过去太容易了,而那些容易的日子滋生了大量平庸人才。”
- Stebbings直截了当地说:大多数销售和大多数销售领导者都不够好——“我认为自己比面试过的大多数销售领导者更强。”Teixeira回应:“我完全不反对。”
- 要不要裁掉底部30%?关键筛选标准是能力还是意愿。如果产品组合或销售动作变化导致落后,但一个人愿意持续补足训练量,可以接受;真正会掉队的是那些“懒洋洋地把失败归咎于自己以外的一切”的人。
- 从裁员潮中招聘仍然能找到好人才。Stebbings的“Excel数学”框架提醒,底部表现者里可能包括刚加入组织的人,或者只是经历了一个糟糕季度的人。他补充说,要注意整条业务线被关停的情况:如果一个完整产品部门消失,那是产品市场匹配失败,不是个人绩效信号。
5. 外呼成为54%的多数
- 一年前,1Password“可能99%都是入站”;如今,转化成交按来源计算已经是54/46,外呼占优。外呼交易“成交率只有一半,但成交金额是2倍”——“我们联系的人并没有预先设定想买什么;从一开始就是我们在定义需求”。企业级交易平均约2个季度成交,外呼“可能更接近3-4个季度”。
- AE一出培训就必须开始自建管道,不能等到拿到账簿后再做。外呼的核心是“抓住兴趣,在与对方有关的事情上尽快讲到重点”,这项能力也会让第一次发现电话更有效。BDR仍然承担大部分管道,但“不自建管道的AE就是行不通”。
- 联系客户前的最低标准是“证明你真的在乎”:研究对方正在谈论和关注的事情,程度“几乎接近跟踪”,而不是向1,000个人群发模板,指望其中10个人回复。
- 2024年外呼仍然可行,但难度更高;AI“实际上应该让它容易很多”,因为它能大幅加快研究速度。但它不会“自动驾驶,然后把线索塞满你的收件箱”。
6. 猎手—农夫只是一个阶段;组织结构跟着客户购买方式走
- Teixeira加入时,1Password已经获得50,000家企业客户,但渗透率不到2%——一群狂热用户把产品带进了工作场景。如果只采用一种销售角色,这批客户会被农夫持续经营,却永远没人做外呼,因此公司刻意制造了猎手和农夫之间的摩擦。明年两者将重新合并为混合模式:面对多产品组合和落地扩展型客户,“我们因为过度推动客户一次性买太多,反而丢掉了新业务交易”。
- 他对两类人的刻画是:农夫会“探索全部4个角落”,建立连接,主动倾听能力“强得多”;猎手则拥有“快速抽动”的肌肉,“试图跑赢一大群争夺同一只瞪羚的狮子”——有时速度太快,反而把钱留在了桌上。
- 公司有意不做行业垂直化:医疗、银行、消费等行业在赢单率、ACV和成交周期上“差异非常、非常小”,也没有哪个细分市场已经饱和。顺序是先做客户分层——SMB和企业级客户的购买方式完全不同;目前先按区域拆分,之后再做行业垂直化,“让我们走得更深、更广”。
7. 分层经济性:6位数企业级ACV,SMB回本4倍,但存在上限
- 针对Matt Plank那句被Stebbings引用的话——5,000-25,000美元ACV是“SaaS公司走向死亡的地方”——1Password的企业级交易在6位数,本月刚拿下第一个7位数客户;中端市场为5万-10万美元;SMB则从几千美元到2.5万-3万美元。
- SMB动作被刻意做得很轻:交易型、高速、由入站驱动、低触达客户成功;“大多数客户在计入全部成本后能带来4倍回报”。为什么不把它放大10倍?“总有一个触及上限的时刻”:单位经济性会封顶,因此1Password正把这批客户转向MSP和分销商——持续放大10倍“越来越没有意义”,这也是公司需要尽早走向上层市场的重要原因。
- 客户成功团队的薪酬应与净美元留存率挂钩,并与AE的激励部分重叠。在他的模型里,客户成功团队是“客户眼中值得信赖的顾问,而不是只想把更多产品硬塞给客户的人”;AE则严格聚焦收入——无论如何,“该完成的工作都要完成”。
8. 卖问题,产品只是证明
- 针对Stebbings“如果还要教育买方,就别做了”的融资类比,他给出的部分反驳是:真正的错误在于把销售锚定在产品上。要绑定客户的问题,“你的产品只是证明你所谈论的解决方案是真实存在的”。没人否认资历薄弱是问题,争议在于如何解决。
- 如果客户真的不在乎怎么办?他的类比是:“这就像我告诉你,离你嘴6英寸的麦克风可能会让你得癌症——你会说,行吧,反正什么东西都可能。”销售的工作是把问题放进客户已经优先考虑的语境中,比如员工安全、降低威胁,而不是“试图创造一套新的优先级”。
- 交易滑坡背后最常见的遗漏风险,是没有端到端梳理采购流程——“总会有某个预算委员会成员突然冒出来”。把一笔50万美元的交易卖给一个经理,而预算持有人根本不知道这些对话正在发生,“是一个巨大的红旗”,因为人本来就不擅长回去在内部重新兜售商业逻辑。
- 因此,1Password会训练内部拥护者在公司内部完成销售:提前预判CFO的问题,并把答案交给他们,“不求任何回报”。如今CFO无处不在:“CFO突然对一切都感兴趣了”;即使1Password已经盈利,也持续做成本合理化,追问“我们正在用的另一件东西,能不能以同样的成本做到80%?”
9. 每周检视,人工预测——不允许出现意外
- 无论哪个客户分层,管道检视都按周进行:SMB每天跟踪节奏,并与上月、去年做模式匹配;企业级则落实到账户层面——“要赢下这笔交易,哪些事情必须为真?我们本周推进了多少?”汇总流程是:AE周一盘点 → 一线负责人追问并检查数据卫生 → 二线负责人复核 → 与直属下属、市场和FP&A一起进行预测会议 → 高管摘要。
- Stebbings提出质疑:“我们能不能直接招那些我们信得过其管道的AE?……感觉每个阶段都有一个把关人。”Teixeira回答:“遗憾的是不行……销售里牵涉太多情绪——‘我刚和Harry聊得很好,我觉得他会买。’”但这种纪律也能改善士气管理:检视频率足够高,“就不应该有任何意外;如果出现了,说明你漏掉了什么”。结果不好时,要指出做得好的地方,坦率说清哪些不起作用,“攻击问题,而不是攻击人”。
- 技术栈包括一套能伴随公司扩展的CRM——“我很早就在这里实施了Salesforce;以前也做过CRM迁移,特别痛苦”——以及尽早部署的Outreach和Gong,再加一个销售赋能工具,可能是Flockjay、Highspot或Seismic,在正确阶段呈现正确内容。更新的工具是Momentum,能判断客户情绪,并逐通电话给出建议。针对Stebbings问Gong为何“在方向盘前睡着了”,Teixeira说自己是Gong最早的50家客户之一,希望下一个工具能“通过现有渠道工作……通过Slack推给我,填进Salesforce”,而不是再增加一个登录入口。
10. 遗憾、钦佩,以及已经失效的战术
- 他在1Password提到的一个遗憾是:作为一家盈利企业,在很多公司都陷入困境、手上又有现金的时期,本应“更激进地投资产品和工程”,无论是自建还是收购;但公司选择了谨慎或折中的路线。
- 今年最令人印象深刻的销售策略,“可能是Wiz”。令人印象深刻的不是增长本身——“如何成为一家10亿美元公司的打法已经相当清楚”,包括国际扩张、多产品和合作伙伴——而是他们“可能”需要在压缩的时间里把收入从0推到5亿美元,过程中要完成的变革管理周期。
- 正在消亡的战术是:“这个折扣月底到期”——“这已经彻底失效”。采购部门已经看穿这一套,会等到月底最后一天,让销售“极度、极度焦虑”,剩下的交给绝望情绪。
- 他领导一支远程销售团队,但强调面对面互动的价值:在线下见面15分钟内,“你就能看出谁在投入、谁真的在场、谁是在胡扯”。他想念“在办公室走动……咖啡机旁的闲聊”,目前正通过建设卓越中心来找回其中一部分。
I think of it as breaking down the anatomy of a win: what steps should one be repeating to have a higher rate of success in winning deals? That’s just part of it. Without the right skills development, your playbook isn’t worth shit. You’re not hiring people to take orders; you’re hiring them to sell.
You think about what outbound really is: it’s about captivating interest, getting to the point quickly, and saying something that matters to the individual you’re speaking to. That in and of itself is valuable. Even if all you’re getting is an inbound call, that makes you more effective at that first discovery call, that first meeting.
Julian, I am excited for this, dude. I’ve been looking forward to this one for a while, so first, thank you so much for joining me.
Likewise. Thank you for having me, Harry. This is great.
Not at all. I want to start with your entry. You started in marketing, and I think it’s a really interesting entry point. How did your entrance from marketing impact how you think about sales today?
It was really interesting. On the one hand, it didn’t prepare me at all for what sales could look like, but on the other hand, I learned to appreciate very early on that, when done right, marketing could really serve as the guardrails for repeatable success in sales. Aligning the outside-looking-in perception of the company and the brand with what the field is presenting is critical to establishing that trust and credibility. That was my appreciation as I went into sales: understanding that, when it’s done right, it can be really effective.
You had 10 years at Lightspeed. It’s a phenomenal amount of time, and you were also incredibly accomplished in terms of position at a young age. What are the biggest sales leadership-specific takeaways for you from 10 years at Lightspeed during that period of hypergrowth?
It was a long journey, and the company I joined at the top of 2011 was not the company I left halfway through 2020. I learned very early, and at every stage, that connecting with people was the key to motivating them and keeping them engaged. Building and scaling companies is hard work. You’re taking people through some really, really hard changes, so the ability to connect with them on a very personal level and understand what motivates them was really what helped me through the hardest changes.
1. How to Create and Master a Sales Playbook
Julian, people are used to going through change and then living with it for extended periods of time. But the reality is, when you’re part of a scale-up or startup, the thing you implemented 3 months ago can very well go stale shortly thereafter, and people get a lot of fatigue with that. They like for things to remain constant and consistent, and that’s just not the case when you’re scaling rapidly.
You were leading all sales and go-to-market for Lightspeed a year pre-IPO. Did you have any imposter syndrome? It’s a big role at a young age.
Loads of it. I still make eye contact with it today. I was always fortunate to have been surrounded by people who believed in me more than I believed in myself.
Does imposter syndrome make you better or worse?
I’d say it’s the constant pursuit of more and better. I look to people who are more successful or who have accomplished more than I have in a shorter timeframe, and that’s my bar. Being in this constant state of “good isn’t good enough” just keeps you grinding.
Listen, I have it too. I was about 12 years old when I raised my first fund, and I definitely felt that. It’s what drives me to go up and work at 2:00 a.m. when everyone else is going to bed. I actually think imposter syndrome is good.
I want to dive right in, though. We always hear in sales, “Sales playbook, sales playbook.” What is a sales playbook to you? First, how do you define it?
I hate the term because of what it stands for. It usually ends up looking like some 20-page document that you use to check a box. I think of it as breaking down the anatomy of a win: what steps should one be repeating to have a higher rate of success in winning deals? That’s just part of it. Without the right skills development, your playbook isn’t worth shit. You’re not hiring people to take orders; you’re hiring them to sell.
What do you mean by the skills-development element, and how do you think about that in relation to sales playbooks?
The playbook has to start with hiring the right people, with the right level of intellect, the right level of curiosity, and the right level of discipline. It’s from that base that you develop skill and industry knowledge, and then start applying the winning formula to close deals.
That might mean deciding whether a proof of concept is appropriate or not, at what stage in the cycle, how and when to get the executive team involved, and things like that. But it’s got to start with having the right people for the right phase of the journey. No playbook is going to solve for that.
Before we dive into the who, in terms of the what and the when, should the founder be the one to create the first sales playbook, or can you bring in a head of sales to do it for you?
I believe strongly that it’s got to be the founder. There are definitely situations where that maybe isn’t the case, but I think you do yourself a disservice as a founder by not being able to get on the front line and get firsthand exposure to how customers are reacting to whatever it is that you’re pitching or selling.
2. Lessons on First Sales Hires
I think that’s an important leverage point that you then need to call bullshit on anyone else that you’re ultimately going to trust sales to in the future. A capable go-to-market first hire can certainly do that, but getting involved as a founder early on is critical.
We now need to hire our first go-to-market person. Julian, you’re an angel in my company. I don’t know what to look for. Should I go for a tenured sales leader, or should I go for junior reps? What do you advise me on for that first GTM hire?
I’d say that, if you’re very early on in your journey, you need somebody who’s going to have humility, patience, low ego, and high curiosity. Sometimes the person with the fancy cover at the front of the book, who’s touched the right companies at the right times, is not what you want.
You want somebody who has something to prove, has a chip on their shoulder, and is motivated to build something greater than anything they’ve ever been a part of. You’re largely looking for somebody who’s going to be patient, not somebody who’s going to blame a lack of success on all the things the company doesn’t do or doesn’t have.
They should be the type of person who’s going to focus on, “What’s in the art of the possible? What can we do? How do we push the envelope further?” That’s the kind of person I think of as a salesperson.
There’s a company I advise for that started off with founder-led sales and is now staring down the barrel of making that same decision: who should that first salesperson be? Ultimately, they landed on an individual who had found success at other companies but felt like they had something to prove. They felt, “I want to be in the driver’s seat now. I want to see it created from A to Z,” and they love a good underdog story.
Should we hire 2 at a time? Everyone always says, “Hey, you want to hire 2 at a time and pit them against each other.”
Absolutely. I think that’s critical. Having someone to chase and creating that sense of competition is really important. It also gives you a good barometer to understand, “Are there patterns or things that are getting in the way of these individuals succeeding, or is it really linked to the person?”
If your sample size is 1 of 1, it can be really challenging to draw that conclusion.
How do we think about target-setting for them? We’ve got these 2 new reps now. I’m the CEO, but I’m a young founder and quite naive. How do I think about goal-setting and targets for them?
In both the early days of Lightspeed and 1Password, we actually started with team goals. We anchored the team to deliver what was most important for the company and what the company was looking to achieve. That works for a very, very short period of time, but it was important for us to establish an “in it together” mentality while we started to figure out what sort of capacity we could get out of these individuals.
Without any historicals on, “I know that a rep should be able to close this many deals at this value,” you kind of need to figure that out. We would leverage spiffs and incentives to get the most out of people and understand, “Where does that back wall live?” But we focused them on one common goal.
As you think about putting guardrails in place and defining what that comp plan is going to look like, the simpler, the better. Especially in the early days, your rep should be able to understand how much they’re going to earn and how they’re going to pay their mortgage without having to go through a ton of gymnastics.
You should be open to changing the comp plan as your focus as a company changes. Anchor the people who are responsible for driving revenue to the things that are going to be best for the business. Whether that’s a multi-product story or you need them signing multi-year deals, whatever that thing may be, their comp plan should be intrinsically connected to it.
Okay, so we have these reps and these team goals. How fast do team goals break, and when do you need to move to individual goals?
Within the first year. At 1Password, we moved to individual goals.
I mean this respectfully, but I don’t even understand how team goals can work. If we want to have the competitive element between them, you need to have a metric of measurement. If you have team goals, you don’t have the metric of measurement.
We’d still measure them as individuals. I can still sit there and say, “Harry has sold more than Julian has this week. You need to catch up.” But as people are starting to figure out what works and what doesn’t, very early on, having that team goal pushes absolutely everyone.
Especially in a small team, you don’t want to be the one who’s dragging everyone else behind. A team goal isn’t meant to mask individual performance. It’s just meant to give you a proxy for how people get paid, in addition to spiffs and things like that, while you’re trying to level-set and determine how far you should be pushing people at an individual level.
What is acceptable, and what does overachievement look like? That can last anywhere from a couple of months to maybe 6 or 7 months. I’ve seen that be very effective. The last 2 companies may not necessarily work everywhere, but I found it really helped us to ground ourselves and keep momentum: “We’ve just got to get here as a company.”
That’s as opposed to having people either judge or criticize the targets we’ve set or the plans we’ve put in place.
3. Setting Goals and Targets for Sales Teams
When it comes to forecasting, this is great. I’m just pummeling you with quick-fire questions. Do you rather have the unachievable target that we hit 80% of, or do you rather have the achievable target that we hit? How do you think about that stretch?
We typically build plans so that 70% of people can achieve them. It’s got to be challenging enough that it’s forcing you to push boundaries, but we don’t design them so every single person will attain them.
The acceleration is often much greater than the deceleration, so when people are having really strong quarters and months, they can really overachieve. The goal is not to set the bar just low enough so everyone makes it across. It’s got to be a challenge.
4. The Reality of Tech Sales Today
Every time I’ve set a goal that is at least 20% or 30% higher than I think we’re capable of achieving, even when we don’t achieve it, we always end up doing 10% more than the goal that we initially set or thought was realistic. There is a mental element to this that is about pushing people to think creatively and outside of what they see in front of them to achieve a goal.
Dude, 70% hit it and 30% don’t. We chatted before, and you said something about the bottom dropping out of sales. What did you mean by that?
Working in tech sales has been such an interesting proposition for so many years. For the last decade and change, it’s been up and to the right. If you can prove that you’ve got a real solution to a real problem that exists, companies were willing to throw money at it.
I think the world of tech sales that we’re living in today is akin to what it was for many people who have been in this industry for 20 or 30 years, and a lot of people just aren’t ready for it. A lot of people got into sales because they figured, “I don’t really need a degree. I can just find my way into it. If I’ve got some form of charisma or charm, I can probably sell software, and the earning potential is there.”
I think there are a lot of incredibly talented people in tech sales today, but I think many are looking at this and thinking, “Wait a minute, this isn’t what I signed up for,” and are just going to give up and drop out. I just think the mentality around what it takes to be successful, not just in sales but in the world of work in general, has changed.
5. Pipeline and Deal Reviews
Do you think that—I mean this in the nicest way—I don’t think the majority of salespeople are very good. I don’t think the majority of sales leaders are very good. I interview them from doing the shows that I’ve done. I think I’m a better sales leader than most of the sales leaders that I have.
I don’t disagree with you at all. Companies are pushed to scale very quickly. They’re pushed to get capable sets of hands in roles to keep things moving forward. I think it’s been easy for too long, and those easy times have bred a lot of mediocre talent, unfortunately.
Should you then fire the bottom 30% that don’t hit goals?
We look at skill versus will. That’s something we think a lot about. If somebody lacks the skill to meet the needs of an evolving business—whether your product portfolio has changed, your sales motions are changing, and people are catching up to that, and that’s the reason they’re falling behind—that, to me, is acceptable if somebody is willing to put in the reps and the time to get better.
It’s the people who just lazily blame their failures on anything but themselves who, unfortunately, are going to drop off over time.
It’s hard work. Super hard. People who are laid off are often laid off for a reason. Do you hire people from layoffs?
I think there are some good people who have been laid off, but I have to imagine that most companies that have done layoffs have looked at just the bottom performers on the team.
The reason I say it’s not all created equal is that, within that bottom group, you may have individuals who were either new to the organization and still getting their bearings, or they may have had an off month or an off quarter. If anyone is doing Excel math to determine who falls at the bottom, as opposed to taking the time to really evaluate the people as individuals, I do think you can find some good talent that unfortunately fell victim to a layoff.
I always say, look for shutdowns. If you shut down a whole product division and the sales team are gone, that may not have been because they were bad. It may have been that the product didn’t have product-market fit, the product team didn’t work, or so many other things. If everyone’s gone, that’s not really a layoff. Do you see what I mean? Being more nuanced in how you look at it is so important.
Okay, so we have that target-setting and that goal-setting. How quickly do we know when we’ve hired a not-great rep?
Within the first 3 months. In the first 3 months, we’ve got ramp targets, which everybody does, but we look for a certain set of behaviors and leading indicators of whether or not they’re going to be successful over the course of the next 3 months.
How quickly do we expect them to generate pipeline?
From day 1. As soon as you’re out of training, you’ve got an understanding of the product, and you’ve got to get out there and get the reps in.
I come to you—sorry, this is where people love it—and say, “I’m on your team. I’m young and enthusiastic.” What does week 1 look like? How should we spend the first 7 days?
Your first 7 days are about getting set up. I’d say, really, your first 2 weeks are about getting to understand the product, the systems and tools, how the job gets done, and meeting the team. You’re in listen-and-learn mode.
You should be asking a lot of questions about what you don’t understand, not just nodding your head up and down and going through the training. We look for that curiosity in the first 2 weeks. It’s an indication of how engaged someone is and how willing they are to be an active participant in their success, as opposed to thinking, “Someone’s going to give me a headset, a laptop, and a 20-page playbook, and suddenly I’m going to hit my target.”
That’s what the first 2 weeks look like. The steps you take after that—whether that’s reaching out to top reps on the team to understand what they’re doing, shadowing calls, spending time in Gong, or seeking out more training and 1-on-1 time—all of these are really important indicators to me that say you’re engaged and you’re in it.
I totally agree with you. I just have the question of how many are like that, where they stay late to listen to extra Gong calls, seek out the extra learning after hours, or research the latest AI tools they can use to have more pipeline generation. For me, it’s none.
Maybe I’m hiring the wrong people, and I’m in the UK.
It happens. It’s certainly not the case with everyone, but this year our non-regrettable attrition is probably in the realm of 29% to 30%. We come to that conclusion rather quickly. We’ve started putting a lot more emphasis, especially at scale, on the hiring process and how we vet that out early on, even before they’ve started.
But some people are just great interviewers.
Okay, so we have the 2 weeks of listen and learn. After that, we’re expected to do pipeline generation straight away. When do we speak to customers first, especially if we’re selling to enterprise?
You’re speaking to customers nearly straight away, and that can come in varying forms. Either you’re joining a call, listening in, and interjecting where you feel you can, and slowly taking the training wheels off, or, from day 1, you should be able to go out there and have a conversation.
This is well before we’ve given you a book of business and well before we’ve given you any leads. You’ve got to get out there.
Okay, so I’ve got to get out there.
6. Outbound Prospecting and Pipeline Generation
Yeah, it’s tough.
As an AE, you expect me to generate my own pipeline. How do you think about me generating my own pipeline versus relying on demand gen?
The difference I see is that you’re going to identify companies and individuals within a company that fit squarely within our ICP, and you’re going to reach out to them cold. You’re going to try different approaches to reaching out, whether that’s on LinkedIn or via email.
You’re going to start establishing those connections early on. Some of your emails are going to be crap, and some of your outreach just isn’t going to work. You’re going to get no responses, but you’re going to have to develop the muscles very quickly to say, “How do I get Harry’s attention?”
It’s certainly not an email in his inbox that I walk away from and wait for a response on that’s going to get him. How do I tap into what Harry gives a shit about and what’s relevant to him in that moment?
Some of it is borderline stalking to understand what Harry’s talking about, what he’s interested in, what he’s surfacing, and who he’s following, and then try to get into that. Before you even reach out, show that you give a shit. Show that you’ve done some research and that you’re not just blasting off a template to 1,000 people, hoping that 10 of them get back to you.
That’s the muscle that ultimately ends up making you far more effective before I’ve handed you a lead, an opportunity, or a meeting that I’ve paid real dollars to go out and generate that you just blunder.
Do you believe outbound is still a viable strategy in 2024, with the proliferation of AI tools and the immense supply side of content that we’re able to shift now? Is outbound viable?
I think it’s viable. I think it’s gotten a lot harder, but it is viable. The easiest part of my day is marking a whole bunch of emails as unread in my inbox that are clearly people trying to sell me stuff. If it’s not a priority, it’s easy to move it out of the way.
I think AI should actually make it a lot easier. Think about the amount of time it would take for you to do proper research and discovery on a company before reaching out. AI can accelerate that dramatically.
I don’t think AI is necessarily going to work on autopilot and fill your inbox with leads and responses, but I think it could help outbound prospecting become a lot more effective. BDRs and AEs can do a sharper job at prospecting with a lot less effort.
If an AE is meant to generate their own pipeline, what the fuck are BDRs doing?
I think outbound prospecting becomes a team sport, especially when you’re selling into high enterprise and when you’re selling across mid-market.
For AEs, it’s a matter of keeping some of those muscles sharp. Think about what outbound really is: it’s about captivating interest and getting to the point quickly with something that matters to the individual you’re speaking to. That in and of itself is valuable, even if all you’re getting is an inbound call. It makes you more effective at that first discovery call and that first meeting, so it’s an important muscle that people need to exercise, period.
7. Hunter vs. Farmer Sales Models
I also think there’s a certain amount of appreciation and gratitude that you have when you’ve got a BDR working their butt off to generate pipeline for you. If you understand what goes into getting that meeting set, you’re going to treat that opportunity accordingly. I still expect the majority of pipeline to be generated from the BDR team, but AEs who don’t self-generate just doesn’t work. I think it does them a personal disservice over time.
It makes me think of the hunter analogy, and I’m fascinated by it. How do you think about the hunter-versus-farmer analogy and knowing what structure you want at what stage?
Ultimately, it depends on how your customers are buying. I’ll give you a concrete example. We started off with the hunter-farmer model at 1Password. The main reason was that, when we landed here and started building the team, the company had already acquired 50,000 businesses that were using our product, but we had less than a 2% penetration rate within those businesses.
These were fanatical users who were bringing our product into the workplace. If all we did was have one flavor of sales individual, they would favor expanding across the base and likely be a lot less efficient with any inbound demand. They certainly wouldn’t be pushing themselves to go out and generate outbound demand.
Early on, we decided to create that friction on both ends: “We’re going to have a team of hunters and a team of farmers.” Today and going into next year, we’re actually bringing those functions back together in a hybrid sales model.
The reason is that we now have a multi-product portfolio. Our customers are landing and expanding with us far more, and what we saw was that we were actually losing new-business deals because we were pushing too hard to get too much upfront.
Now we’ve aligned the sales motion and model to how our customers buy, and we’re taking a far more segmented and territory-based view to how we split the team.
Do you agree that you never want your farmer against someone else’s hunter?
I think it depends on the context. Farmers are a lot more patient. They’ll really take the time to explore all 4 corners and build a meaningful connection. They’re a lot more curious, and I’d say they’re way better active listeners.
Hunters are used to operating in an environment where they’re trying to outrun a whole bunch of other lions for the same gazelle. You’ve got this fast-twitch muscle that’s working at all times, and sometimes you might miss something. Sometimes you might hurry and leave money on the table.
8. Compensation and Specialization in Sales Teams
It really depends on the context. One will always tell you that the other’s job is much easier than theirs.
Should customer success be comped for upsells?
Yes. I think customer success should be comped on net dollar retention. They’ve got a role to play in the process, and I think it’s important that there’s overlap between how they’re compensated, how the AE is compensated, and ultimately how I’ve seen that model be successful in the past.
That’s when both are working together to serve the customer. I know there are really polarizing views on CS, and I’ve heard a few folks on the show bash it, but ultimately the body of work needs to get done.
Whether you’re in the camp of saying, “One person should do all of it,” in which case they’re naturally going to be able to handle fewer accounts, or you sit there and say, “Actually, I want a cleaner division of labor, and I expect individual capacity to be much higher,” I think you get to the same net result.
In our world, customer success is an impartial person who the customer sees as a trusted adviser, not as somebody who’s just trying to cram more product down their throat. They’re ultimately thinking about how the customer is using the product, what more benefit they could be getting, and playing the role of orchestrator by bringing the right people in at the right time.
The AEs are strictly revenue-focused.
How do you think about the specialization, or verticalization more importantly, of sales teams? 1Password is a horizontal product, which is amazing because you can serve so many different people, but also difficult because you can serve healthcare, banking, consumer—you name it. I like verticalized sales teams. How do you think about sales teams?
I think there’s a time and place, and again, it will vary from company to company. We’re not verticalized today. The main reason is that we looked at our success across every vertical. We looked at win rates, ACV, and time to close, and found very, very little difference across these different segments.
We have yet to reach any sort of saturation in any one segment, really. We’re not yet at the stage where we need to hire individuals who have built a career selling to specific verticals and have deep vertical and specialized knowledge. We’re absolutely going to get there.
Our journey is such that we’re looking at segments first and foremost because SMBs buy very, very differently than large enterprise companies. Territory-based splits are where we’re at right now, making sure that we’ve got the right people, right language, right time zone, and so on and so forth.
The next step will be to verticalize the team so that we can go deeper and wider.
I had Matt Plank at Rippling on the show recently, and he said that $5K to $25K ACVs is where SaaS companies go to die. How do you feel about that, and what’s your ACV today across the different segments?
It varies by segment. Enterprise ACV is—I’d say enterprise deals for us are in the 6 figures. We actually landed our first 7-figure customer earlier this month, which we’re really excited about. Somewhere between 6 to 7 figures.
Mid-market is somewhere between $50K and $100K, well into the 6 figures. SMB deals will vary anywhere from a few thousand dollars for a very small business to $25K or $30K.
Can you have a sales motion like we discussed with that SMB structure if you’re charging $5K to $15K? You can’t afford the outbound, the AE, and the CS. Can you?
No. You need to be very intentional about where you deploy those resources. Most of our outbound motion right now is invested in mid-market and enterprise because that’s where we get the biggest bang for our buck.
The SMB teams are a lot more transactional. They work on high-volume, high-velocity deals. Most of them pay for themselves 4 times over, even if I load in all costs.
From a CS and onboarding perspective, we rely on low-touch models with smaller customers to get them going. Ultimately, we’ll get someone on the phone to work with them if they need the help, but it isn’t the default switch to the team to unload the whole machine for every single customer and deal, regardless of size.
If they pay for themselves 4 times over, why don’t you 10X them? What I’m trying to get at here is: where is that asymptote of value where you no longer get 4X payback?
I think there’s a point at which you reach a ceiling. Today, that team is largely driven by the inbound demand that we get for our product. As we think about investing in that further, the unit economics need to make sense.
At a certain point, we’re going to have to make a decision: how do we want to serve this segment? Conversations we’re having now are about whether we can start to leverage a different distribution model for that cohort. We’ve recently started working with MSPs and distributors to achieve that.
9. Outbound vs Inbound Sales
There definitely is a point at which constantly 10Xing the investment starts to make less and less sense, which is a big part of why companies need to think about moving upmarket and building that motion early on.
What’s your inbound-to-outbound ratio today on converted deals?
We’re probably just over 50% outbound, so a 54%-46% split. I’ll say that a year ago today, we were probably 99% inbound.
Wow. That’s a big shift.
It’s not just about hiring BDRs. It’s really about getting the sales team to participate in generating pipeline and understanding that the level of intent of these customers is vastly different from when you’re getting an inbound lead.
These deals take longer to close.
What’s the time to close on an enterprise deal today?
There’s a great deal of variance, but I’d say on average, 2 quarters.
2 quarters?
Yeah. We usually think about the pipeline about 2 quarters out. It may be closer to 3 to 4 quarters when we’re generating outbound pipeline.
Outbound deals typically close at half the rate, but they close for twice as much. The person we’re reaching out to doesn’t have a preconceived notion of what they want to buy. We’re defining that from the get-go, so that is the advantage of outbound pipeline generation over inbound.
I’ve always been taught that, when you have to educate the customer, don’t bother. They don’t know, and it’s going to be too hard to sell. It’s like when you’re fundraising: when you have to persuade a VC to invest in the category itself, don’t bother. Is that wrong?
They can believe that they need password management and that it’s really important. Now they’ve got many options, and they can choose lots of them. That’s up to you. But if you’re having to persuade them that password management is important, no mas—I think that in and of itself can sometimes be the problem.
You need to be able to educate them on the problem. If the problem isn’t clear to them or they don’t agree with it, then I’d agree that you’ve got an uphill battle ahead of you.
A lot of companies tend to anchor to their product: “I’m going to explain the product and why it’s different,” as opposed to attaching themselves to the problem, which, if you’ve done your job right, the person you’re speaking to should understand very clearly.
Now you’ve got their interest, and now they’re leaning in. Your product is just proof that the solution you’re talking about is real and exists.
I tend to think that leading with the problem and familiarization with the problem is the most important way to get them to lean in. No one will sit there and disagree that reused or weak credentials are a problem. But how you go about solving that problem is often what the debate is. Don’t start there. Get on the same page with them first about what the problem is, and then get closer to how you’re going about solving for it.
I’d love someone to take the argument against strong credentials. You know what I mean? I disagree. I’m like, “Okay, what if they just don’t care?” I don’t mean that badly, Julian, but I’m just like, “I don’t care about credential strength.”
We get that. The security practitioners that we sell to have a number of different priorities. They’ve got to think about everything. It’s like me telling you that the microphone 6 inches from your mouth is probably going to give you cancer. You’re like, “Yeah, sure, but everything will.”
It’s really about contextualizing what not solving that problem is going to mean for them and connecting with something that they care about. What are they prioritizing right now within their business?
Maybe it’s not credential management, but maybe it is keeping employees safe. Maybe it is minimizing the threats that exist within their company. They may not agree in the first conversation that solving for credential management is going to be the solution to that, but that’s your job as a seller: to guide them there.
The difference for me is not trying to create a new set of priorities or things for them to think about. It’s about tapping into what they already care about, what they’re already prioritizing and thinking about, and working with them in that way.
We have this great prospect, and for whatever reason it doesn’t fully land—or it does land. We need to do deal reviews, a crucial part of a sales process. I’m a young founder again. I don’t know how to do deal reviews, and I don’t know what to expect of my go-to-market team for deal reviews.
How often do you do deal reviews?
We do them weekly. We do pipeline inspection on a weekly basis.
What does pipeline inspection look like from a structural perspective? Can you walk me through it as granularly as possible?
From an SMB perspective, you’re often looking at pacing. You’re looking for pattern matching on what’s going on that month relative to the previous month and relative to the same period last year. Oftentimes, we’re looking at those daily.
We’re also looking at the pipeline. How does a drop in pipeline this week impact us next week? It’s a very, very data-driven approach, and you need to obsess over it. It’s not about reviewing it once a month or once a quarter. It’s about living in it every single day, but sitting down and reviewing it as a team every single week.
As you start to move upmarket, the classic question is, “Enterprise deals take 2 quarters to close. What on earth could we possibly be talking about on a weekly basis?” The reality is that you still need to have some form of objective or goal that you’re working toward, even on a weekly basis.
What outcomes are you trying to drive? What needs to be true as part of this deal in order for us to win it? What progress have we made toward checking off those items this week? How much pipeline have we built?
Even if you’re looking at things 2 quarters or a year out, what does our pipeline look like for the second half of next year, and how are we trending there? We do this inspection weekly regardless of segment, but I’d say the larger the deal, the more focus you’re putting on the account or deal level as opposed to just looking at the sum of how that segment is performing.
It’s really critical. Who’s invited to this meeting? Is it the whole sales team, only leaders? How do we think about that?
I think it will vary based on company size. If your team is small enough, I would get the whole team involved in the process. I think it’s an important part of how you drive accountability as you grow, though, and it’s about creating a cadence.
Every Monday, every AE is going to sit down and look at their pipeline. They’re going to take inventory of what they’ve done that week, how they’ve progressed, what’s fallen out, and what’s moving ahead.
The following day, they’re going to report that to their frontline leader. Their frontline leader is then going to inspect that work, ask probing questions, ensure there’s proper hygiene, and roll that up to their second-line leader.
Typically, by the time we have our weekly forecast call, I’m having it with my direct reports. We’ve got people from marketing and our FP&A team joining us as well, and then we roll a summary to the executive team.
Can I be a bit blunt? Does this not seem a bit ridiculous? I don’t mean that horribly in any way, but an AE rolls it up to a sales lead, who rolls it up to someone else, who rolls it up to someone else. Can we not just get the AE to present in a more direct way?
It feels like every stage is a gatekeeper, and every half hour is half an hour that’s valuable. Is this really how businesses are run today?
I think you reach a certain size and scale where you’d end up having an 8-hour meeting if every AE had to come and run you through their pipeline.
Can we not just hire AEs where we trust their pipeline?
No, I mean, being serious, but say you ask me, “What’s your pipe?” and I give you dog shit. I say, “I’ve got $200K this week, but actually I think I’m going to have a 50% dropout rate, so $100K.” You’re like, “Great, thanks.” It’s all done by message.
Unfortunately not. There are too many moving parts and too much emotion involved in selling. There’s too much that can be driven on a feeling: “I just had a great conversation with Harry. I think he’s going to buy.”
Having someone to keep you honest throughout that process is mission-critical.
I’ve seen so many AI sales coaches where they’re continuously prompting. Really? What makes you think that?
Do you think that will continue to be human-led or AI-led?
I think the landscape is going to change dramatically. We started using a product called Momentum that not only takes notes on the call and sets follow-ups, but also gauges the customer sentiment on that call. It gives you suggestions on things that you could have done, should have done, or didn’t do on a call-by-call basis.
Why has Gong fallen asleep at the wheel?
That’s a great question. I was one of Gong’s first 50 customers, back in the early days. I think they led the charge on siding with the salesperson and saying, “We get what you’re going through, and we’re here to help.”
I think Gong is leaning in that direction. I’m seeing more and more AI in their product, but candidly, a lot of sales leaders I speak to are using it as a coaching tool and as a way to go back and instant-replay calls. Some are using it to manage pipeline.
I think it’s tough. I can spend ages talking about the sales tech stack in and of itself because I do think it’s gotten very, very messy.
My hope is that somebody comes along and says, “Rather than adding another interface or tool that you need to log into to get insight or get work done, I’m going to work through the existing channels and existing products that you’re using and just augment what you’re getting from them.”
I don’t want another thing I need to log into to get customer sentiment. Feed me that through Slack. Populate it in Salesforce. Surface this in the areas where I’m already getting work done.
10. Sales Tech Stack and Tools
Sorry, there are a couple of things. What are the core tools that you think every sales team and leader should be using today? You mentioned the tech stack. Which tools are the “hell yes” tools, regardless of what stage or sector you’re in?
A good CRM to start. I implemented Salesforce early on here. I’ve done CRM migrations before, and it’s a pain in the butt. Just start with what you know you’re going to need to scale and be done with it.
Outreach and Gong were quick to implement at 1Password as well. We leverage both of those. Then some form of sales-enablement tool. There are tons of great ones out there: Flockjay, Highspot, Seismic.
I think inherently you’re going to end up with a lot of collateral and information to feed your sales team. They’ll digest it, and then it goes into a repository that they’ll never reference ever again.
Having a tool that surfaces the right content at the right time for the right opportunity, based on stage and so on and so forth, is pretty important.
11. Maintaining Sales Morale
I totally agree with you. When you’re in those reviews and it’s, “I don’t have much. Notion dropped out. Next one, Rippling dropped out. Yeah, I don’t have much,” how do you maintain morale when sales teams are not performing?
It’s important to see the positive and call it out. When the results are shit, it doesn’t mean that everything is shit. You need to be able to call out the good.
Selling is ultimately a very emotional sport. If you’ve got a group of deflated salespeople out there trying to get people excited about your product, it’s really hard to do if they’re not believing in themselves.
It’s about being positive about the things that have gone right, but it’s also about being brutally honest about the things that aren’t working and getting comfortable assessing that. Attack the problem, not the person, in that scenario.
We do inspection often enough that, if you’re doing inspection often enough, there should not be any surprises. If there are, then there’s something you missed as part of that process. There’s something you didn’t inspect for, a risk you didn’t assess, or something you didn’t call out.
What’s the most common risk people miss that leads to deal attrition more often than not?
More often than not, it’s an understanding of what the procurement process looks like within the company from end to end. There’s always some surprise budget committee or individual who needs to weigh in.
Not going wall-to-wall and understanding what it’s going to take to get a deal done is the biggest mistake I see, and one of the leading causes of deals slipping.
Sometimes things will happen that are completely outside of the rep’s control. I get that. We can only control what we can control, but more often than not, it’s about missing something in the procurement chain or not getting the right amount of value established with the right individuals in the organization.
If you’re attempting to sell a half-million-dollar deal to a manager in a department, and their superior or budget holder isn’t even aware that these conversations are taking place, that’s a huge red flag. People are inherently bad at going back and selling the business case internally.
We actually find that we end up coaching a lot of our reps to do exactly that: not just sell the product to the person you’re working with, but coach them and help them sell it internally.
How do you do that without being so fucking obvious? Let’s say you and I both want 1Password in Notion, Rippling, Vanta—you name it. We both want it. There’s a pack of information that I would use. How do we do it?
The subtle art is not just loading them up with technical jargon, even if they understand it. It’s thinking about the questions their CFO is going to ask them when they try to justify spending on this product.
What are they going to ask? It’s about giving them those answers throughout the process so they’ve got them at the tip of their tongue and can answer right away.
Most of the time, they can’t anticipate what their CEO or CFO is going to ask of them. We give that to them without asking anything in return, knowing full well that they’re going to face that challenge at some point.
Even if we don’t get access to those individuals throughout the sales process—I mean, our CFO often says, “Please don’t have me speak to a salesperson”—we make sure that our champion is armed with the right answers to the right questions and can justify it.
It’s so funny you said that about the CFO.
They don’t want to speak to salespeople.
Are people still buying software like they used to?
No, they’re not. The CFO suddenly has an interest in absolutely everything. There used to be a time when it was, “You’re within your envelope to spend, so I’m not really going to question it,” or, “You’ve presented a logical case for why we need this thing.”
That just isn’t the case anymore. They want to understand because ultimately their boards are holding them accountable for managing spend efficiently.
Even as a fast-growing, profitable business, we still run through cost-rationalization exercises on the tools that we use constantly. We’re looking for overlap across different products. We’re thinking, “Wait a minute, could this other thing we’re using do it 80% as well for the same cost?”
I remember when it was good times. Wasn’t that nicer? It was so much more fun.
I think we’re being a lot more intentional about the things we’re investing in.
What did you not spend money on at 1Password that you wish you had spent money on?
I think we had the opportunity to be a lot more aggressive in investing in product and engineering, whether that was a build-or-buy scenario. We had the benefit of being a profitable business with a lot of cash at a time when many companies were struggling.
I think there was a window of opportunity there for us to substantially accelerate our pace of growth, and we chose to err on the side of caution or take a middle ground. Hindsight is always 20/20, and who knows where we’d be today had we made that decision.
That’s probably one regret I have: not pushing a little bit harder for us to do that as a company.
Listen, I want to do a quick-fire round. I’ve so enjoyed this. You’ve got to understand, we put the schedules together, and that’s fine, but I just want to have a great chat, be interested myself, and learn myself. That’s why I do this show. This has been amazing.
I’m going to say a short statement, and you give me your immediate thoughts. Does that sound okay?
Yeah, let’s do it.
I spoke to many of our mutual friends and some of your friends, and some of these are more personal than normal, which I love. Talk to me about your hair and how many people have cut it.
Only 3. That number is 3 and not 2 because I ended up living in New York for 4 years and needed to find someone there. I’m very loyal in that sense.
I like the ritual of going to the same person—somebody who’s kind of partway removed from the world that I live in, who I can confide in during that 1 hour of therapy. My hair has just become a thing over time, so I only really entrust it to 1 person these days.
You’ve got great hair, by the way. Real volume, which is a line I’ve never said on a show, but there’s a first time for everything.
What is your hotel cadence?
Oh my gosh. I’ve spent a lot of time in hotels.
You like that?
The hotel part is just that, when I’m not in my own bed and I’m not in my own home, I’m sort of out of sorts. It’s a weird one.
I don’t love traveling. The aspects of traveling that I love are getting out there and meeting people face-to-face. I really, really do love that. In a lot of ways, when I’m traveling, it shuts out everything else in my life and I can really focus on work.
Sleeping in hotels is probably my least favorite part.
12. Are Remote Sales Teams Less Effective
Do you buy into remote sales teams?
I lead a remote sales team, but I believe in the importance of in-person interactions. We invest every year in getting every single individual together in one place.
I think it’s important. Within 15 minutes, you can tell who’s engaged, who’s in it, and who’s full of it. You just get that sense.
You lose that ability to hear Julian on the call and close the deal: “We’re winning,” or, “He lost it because of that reason. I should watch out for that,” or, “She’s doing really well. We should actually promote her,” or, “They’re really down. We should actually go for a beer after work with them and make them happy.”
You lose that. It takes a lot more energy and work to seek out what’s going on as opposed to just being in the room and seeing it.
We get our sales teams together at the end of the month and the end of the quarter. It’s a subset of the team; it’s not all of the team. But it’s definitely something that’s top of mind for me as we continue to grow—this idea of building out centers of excellence for our talent so that we get a little bit more of that.
I get a lot of that with our leaders because there are many points during the year when I can interact with them, but I miss that. I miss walking the halls. I miss the casual chats by the coffee machine.
Dude, tell me about a deal you’ve closed where you’ve had to do something outside the box to get it done.
I don’t have a story like that. I’ve heard some cool stories of people giving away their car to a prospect to get the deal done. That happened somewhere in Italy. It was an old boss of mine who told me the story.
Of course it was Italy. Only in Italy: “I gave my daughter—”
“You like the car? It’s yours.”
I don’t have anything like that. The closest is that we’ve definitely tracked down and waited for that last signature from a CEO who was on a flight. We found out which flight they were on and tracked it so we could get them right as they landed.
We’ve done that and gotten deals across the line right at the 11th hour. That’s about as outside the box as it’s gotten.
13. Final Thoughts and Advice
What one piece of advice would you have for a sales leader starting a new role tomorrow?
Find a company where the biggest challenge they have is one you’re actually passionate about solving. Far too many people judge companies based on what they are today, but I’d encourage sales leaders to judge them based on their future potential and the belief that you have the ability to get them to that potential.
That will ultimately yield the most value for yourself personally and for the company that you join. I think that’s a reflection sales leaders should have with themselves every single year as they’re sizing up, “Do I stay or do I go?”
What current sales tactic will continue to reduce in importance over the next 5 years?
“This discount expires at the end of the month.”
I think people are aware that that’s just dead. It doesn’t work anymore. We always grew up with TV ads in the UK—Land of Leather or DFS, sofa companies—and it was, “70% off ends Friday.” Then you’re there on Saturday and it’s, “New sale, just 24 hours.”
It’s a bad thing to be trained on. Even procurement teams have wised up to the fact that, “I’m going to wait for the last day of the month, make the salesperson really, really sweat, and then salespeople start to get desperate and start dishing it all out.”
I think that’s gone by the wayside. There was a time and place for it, but not anymore.
What one company sales strategy has most impressed you over the last year?
I’ve been really impressed with Wiz. I guess it’s a typical answer in the sense that, yes, they’ve grown very quickly, and that’s admirable. But knowing the amount of talent and change-management cycles they likely needed to go through on that journey from $0 to $500 million in revenue over that period of time—that’s the impressive and remarkable part of the story.
The playbook for how you become a billion-dollar company is pretty well understood as far as the typical steps: international expansion, a multi-product portfolio, working with partners, and so on and so forth.
But doing that over a compressed timeframe is the impressive feat that I think Wiz has accomplished. Good on them.
Julian, as I said, I love shows like this where it’s much more natural than it was intended to be. You’ve been amazing. Thank you so much for joining me.
Thanks so much for having me, Harry. This was a blast.