Peter Thiel: The AI Crisis, Europe’s Decline & the Battle for America
- Thiel sees AI as a possible escape from decades of stagnation, while rejecting the assumption that stopping progress is safe. He has changed his mind “to some extent”: AI might be “bigger than the internet” and restore growth after advances concentrated in software rather than the physical economy. He considers catastrophic AI outcomes unlikely but cannot confidently quantify them; his counterweight is the instability of societies where children no longer expect better lives than their parents.
- Europe’s comparatively relaxed attitude toward AI reflects its distance from deployment, in Thiel’s telling. He points to sharply accelerating Palantir sales to US corporations as evidence of commercial urgency that Europe lacks. His test for European AI sovereignty is Concorde versus Minitel—successful industrial catch-up versus costly technological isolation—and he judges Europe “further behind than Minitel was.”
- Thiel says political extremes reflect stagnation and a broken bargain between generations; housing scarcity is one grievance drawing young voters to Die Linke. He cites the party’s 25% Berlin vote share versus 47% among voters aged 16–24. Döpfner challenges its proposed nationalization of property companies; Thiel agrees it lacks solutions, but argues that identifying neglected problems can itself win elections in societies he calls “gerontocracies.”
- Thiel gives a Democratic socialist victory in 2028 a stated 50% chance, while declining to call it the most likely outcome. His conditional chain: a Republican midterm rout could convince Democrats they will win regardless of nominee, weakening resistance to a far-left candidate. He remains a “Vance partisan,” but fears either Vance or Rubio would struggle; his criticism of Trump’s staffing moves from first-term infighting to second-term appointments of “not very smart, but very loyal people.”
- Thiel thinks persistent borrowing may force a choice between deep spending cuts and much higher taxes. Large welfare states, taxes that feel high to him, and interest rates above zero make continued deficits harder to sustain. Since 2008, governments have chosen to “kick the can down the road”; Argentina interests him because “their past is our future” is precisely the outcome he wants the West to avoid, although Milei’s success remains an open question.
- Germany’s missing cohort of large new companies is Thiel’s sharpest diagnosis of its economic weakness. Among the 50 wealthiest Americans, he says 12 are Gen X or younger and nine made their own fortunes; Germany has 20 in that age group, all inheritors. His suggested explanation extends beyond fear of failure to “a fear of success”—selling rather than scaling businesses—and he explicitly offers no comprehensive answer.
- Thiel’s concrete longevity priority is slowing or reversing deterioration in the brain. He continues investing despite finding biotech “surprisingly difficult,” and offers no named breakthrough when pressed. His ambition concerns the physical person: a computer simulation would not satisfy him because “I don’t think it would be me”; asked whether indefinite life would become boring, he answers that it is “better than the alternative.”
1. AI may end stagnation, while standing still carries its own risks
Thiel has changed his stagnation thesis “to some extent.” His original claim concerned a slowdown since the 1970s: computers, software and the internet advanced while fields involving atoms faltered. Nuclear engineering was already “a bad idea by the 1980s.” The internet mattered without taking civilization to another level; perhaps AI is “bigger than the internet” and can reaccelerate growth.
Döpfner raises warnings about losing control of AI and reports an experiment in which six leading LLMs assigned extinction probabilities between 1% and 10%. Thiel does not know how to assign such probabilities and does not consider them very high. But even “five or ten percent” would be alarming; he accepts, for argument’s sake, that the risk is real rather than insisting it is zero.
The missing comparison, for Thiel, is the risk of no progress. The middle class expects children to do better than parents; when that intergenerational compact breaks, society becomes more zero-sum and politically unstable. AI is no panacea, but he rejects the implicit alternative of a zero-growth world remaining a “peaceful social democratic society.” Precaution therefore does not automatically mean slowing down.
2. AI restraint and commercial urgency are distributed unevenly
Döpfner’s objection to slowing American AI is competitive: China could simply accelerate. Thiel thinks genuine worldwide restraint would require something like a world government with “real teeth, real force”—potentially “a cure that’s worse than the disease.” His provocative example is the Pope’s recent AI encyclical, which he calls anti-AI (while acknowledging that may be too harsh). He argues that China’s Communist Party will not listen, while people in the US might, so the encyclical effectively works for the CCP. He says he is not calling the Pope a communist agent, but a “useful idiot.”
Asked about alleged Chinese campaigns spreading anti-AI sentiment, Thiel says, “I haven’t studied it that carefully.” He is inclined to believe the allegation, but doubts it explains most Western opposition. His stronger diagnosis is self-inflicted resistance: taking rivalry with China seriously should not become an excuse to blame China for problems the West creates itself.
America’s anxiety may also reflect proximity to deployment. Thiel calls the US the place where AI is happening, China a “fast follower,” and Europe “extremely far behind,” while acknowledging a fluid situation. At Palantir, he says US corporate sales have accelerated tremendously as businesses urgently reconsider operations. Europe retains the attitude: “Don’t do tomorrow what you can save for the day after.”
Döpfner compares technology with a knife, usable for cooking or killing. Thiel’s response shifts from morality to competence: a Ferrari can be called “evil” for fuel consumption, whereas a Trabi is simply “bad” at being a car. His contention is that endless good-versus-evil arguments displace scrutiny of institutions and leaders that fail to function.
3. The political center is failing to answer material grievances
Challenged over his 2009 statement that freedom and democracy were incompatible, Thiel describes a hastily written article for a Cato libertarian publication. He says he issued a correction two weeks later and was advocating “depoliticization” and a “de-intensification” of politics. His target was libertarians expecting electoral victories to realize their ideals; he says he was neither proposing removal of voting rights nor predicting democracy’s disappearance.
Thiel sees a trend against democracy without treating that trend as desirable. His historical warning is Germany’s 1932 election: Nazis and Communists together exceeded 50%. Once a majority supports parties seeking democracy’s abolition, “it’s almost too late.” He also cites seven British prime ministers in ten years as evidence that changing leaders does not resolve structural problems.
On Germany, he thinks centrist leaders underestimate the scale of economic disappointment. He cites Die Linke receiving 25% in Berlin but 47% among 16–24-year-olds, whose concerns include expensive rents, difficulty building housing and limited prospects. Calling Western societies “gerontocracies,” he insists those grievances deserve attention even though he does not believe extremist parties can solve them.
Döpfner’s pushback concerns remedies: nationalizing property companies and allegations of antisemitism, pro-Islamism and links to organized crime. Thiel agrees Die Linke lacks solutions, but says talking about neglected problems can win support. He similarly doubts the AfD’s economic answers. Although Ukraine, China and Israel each permit reasonable debate, his judgment is that the AfD is wrong on all three: “You can’t be wrong on all three.”
4. Thiel’s American election concern centers on the Democratic nominee
Thiel defers a definitive verdict on Trump for “10 years or so.” He still reads Trump’s rise as a response to establishment failures on growth, globalization and Middle Eastern entanglements. His staffing criticism is explicit: the first administration recruited people who could not agree; the second overcorrected with loyalty tests, producing “not very smart, but very loyal people.”
His concern is that the Clinton–Obama establishment may face the exhaustion that overtook establishment Republicans in 2016. He describes the Democratic Socialists’ 1982 origins as a fringe organization of roughly 5,000 members. Following Sanders’s 2016 campaign, he says membership grew to 50,000 and median age fell from 66 to 33: an aging organization became a young movement with energy and charisma.
Thiel remains a “Vance partisan,” recalling Vance’s work at Mithril, encouragement to write the book that became a 2016 bestseller, and financial support for his 2022 Senate campaign. He resists overstating his own contribution. But between Vance and Rubio, his pessimistic answer is that either may struggle; the more consequential question is who becomes the Democratic candidate.
A center-left Democrat is probably stronger in a close election, he says; in a landslide, that distinction may cease to matter. If Republicans are wiped out in the coming midterms, Democrats may weaken their firewall against a socialist nominee. Asked whether a Democratic socialist victory in 2028 is the most likely outcome, he replies: “Not the most likely, but let’s say it’s a 50% chance.”
5. Borrowing postpones a choice between taxes and austerity
Argentina fascinates Thiel because Westerners worry “their past is our future”: roughly a century of subpar growth before a serious attempt at reversal. Milei’s success remains an open question, though Thiel thinks he will win reelection a year later because people understand the stakes. He rejects the revolutionary logic that “the worse things get, the better they get,” while worrying deterioration may continue before reform arrives.
Asked whether the West is approaching renewal, Thiel prefers a concrete test: whether Germany will replace Merz. He calls Merz a failure but thinks he could remain for another three years because alternatives lack answers. Further drift is his intuition, not a certainty. Public anger and pessimism have repeatedly proved insufficient to produce what he would regard as positive change.
His fiscal mechanism combines large welfare states, taxes that feel high to him, substantial deficits and interest rates no longer at zero. The options are massive spending cuts, massive tax increases—which he thinks would extinguish growth—or continued borrowing. Since 2008, governments have favored the third. He suspects its limits are approaching, potentially forcing “socialist levels of taxation” or “really tough austerity measures.”
6. Europe needs industries that can catch up and scale
Thiel prefers Europe as a reliable American ally and rejects moral equivalence between the US and China. But from an American perspective, a functional European economy matters more than perfect geopolitical alignment. Europe should build leading industries where it can, and cooperate more closely with America where its technological position is weaker.
His industrial-policy distinction is Concorde versus Minitel. Following America’s supersonic breakthrough in 1947, Britain and France organized a catch-up effort in the late 1960s that he regards as successful European leadership, despite its non-free-market structure. By contrast, France’s attempt at a nationally distinctive internet through Minitel deepened its disadvantage. For AI in 2026, his assessment is harsher: Europe is “further behind than Minitel was.”
Germany’s entrepreneurship problem may involve “a fear of success” alongside fear of failure: founders sell instead of scaling like Musk or Zuckerberg. Thiel’s comparison uses the 50 wealthiest people in each country. In America, 12 are Gen X or younger—born in 1965 or later—and nine made their own fortunes. Germany has 20 in that age group; he says all 20 inherited their wealth.
The significance extends beyond billionaire rankings: large new businesses generate employee wealth and thousands of jobs. Thiel contrasts Germany’s history of building the Mittelstand and major industrial companies with a breakdown he dates roughly to 1995. “I don’t have an answer to that,” he says; explaining the missing scalable companies is the question he would investigate.
7. Independent thinking combines access, distance and breadth
Thiel says he grew up between two worlds: he attended English-speaking schools in America and spoke German at home. Germany remains “part of who I am.” His founder theory similarly emphasizes an “outsider-insider combination”: he and Alex Karp had Stanford Law School access alongside outsider perspectives. He describes himself as, in some ways, an outsider to America and Karp as Jewish, then clarifies the shared dynamic as having both outsider and insider parts. When Döpfner emphasizes outsider advantage, Thiel insists that both sides matter and says people exaggerate the outsider component.
Contrarianism for its own sake merely means looking at consensus and putting “a minus sign in front of it.” Thiel’s goal is thinking independently, helped by interests spanning history, politics, economics, science fiction and psychology. Against Adam Smith’s specialized pin factory, he worries about losing the larger picture: “there has to be room for at least one generalist in a world where everyone’s hyper-specialized.”
His closing example revises his own sense of what is unconventional. When he began speaking about the Antichrist three years earlier, he thought the subject far outside ordinary discussion. Now he thinks many people share the underlying fear of “incipient totalitarianism throughout the world.” His claimed contrarian truth is that people publicly call the idea crazy while “they actually secretly agree with me.”
8. Longevity means preserving the physical person and the brain
Having four young children changes Thiel’s time horizon. His oldest daughter will be 81 in 2100, making the twenty-second century a personal concern rather than an abstraction. Fear of death and aging also motivates his health investments; he finds it strange that ambitions such as curing Alzheimer’s cannot be articulated more widely, given early modern science’s aspiration to conquer disease.
Thiel acknowledges why optimism weakened: Nixon declared war on cancer in 1971, promising a cure within five years; 55 years later, progress remains incomplete. His speculative alternative is understanding biology as information. While explicitly “badly simplifying things,” he contrasts apparently irreversible biological processes with reversible computational ones: if biology could be understood computationally, perhaps those processes could be traversed in reverse.
He sees no clear reason there must be a natural longevity limit, but rejects a simulated upload as personal survival: “I don’t think it would be me.” His “maybe Christian-informed” view ties identity to the body and imagines transformation beyond mere persistence. Transhumanism, he says, “didn’t go far enough.” Against Döpfner’s boredom objection, indefinite life is “better than the alternative.”
Asked for the concrete breakthrough making him optimistic, Thiel names no treatment. He continues investing in biotech despite finding it “surprisingly difficult.” His preferred problem is dementia: finding a way to slow or reverse deterioration in people’s brains. That remains an ambition he wants to tackle in the years ahead, rather than a claimed achievement.
Full transcript
Herzlich willkommen in Berlin.
Danke schön.
Wir kommen nachher noch mal auf Deutschland zurück. Let’s switch to English now. Peter, you have discussed a lot over the last years the problem that, in your view, the West did not deliver enough progress, enough change in technology. You even spoke about stagnation. That is a topic and a term that almost nobody would use these days. It’s pretty much the opposite of what people are discussing. Is there too much acceleration? Is AI progressing too fast? What’s your take? Did you change your mind, or is it still not enough?
I’ve changed my mind to some extent. Let me first articulate the stagnation thesis, which I started articulating twenty years ago or so. It’s always very hard to measure these things because there are so many different dimensions of progress, so many different areas of technology and science. But the basic thesis was that since the 1970s, there had been a slowdown. There’d been progress in the world of bits—you know, computers, the internet, mobile internet, software—but not so much in the world of atoms.
And most of the engineering fields related to atoms were not even successful fields for people to study: mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, aero, astro. Nuclear engineering was already a bad idea by the 1980s. For a variety of reasons, there had been this slowdown. I believed that this broad slowdown in progress—not total stagnation—was an important factor driving a lot of things that were going wrong in our society.
A lot of the politics have become more polarized because when there’s a loser for every winner, it becomes this very zero-sum game, and you get a much worse society. Of course, there were some very deep reasons why I speculated this had happened. But the big picture was that for decades we had something like stagnation.
There was a way that the internet was an important growth driver in the late ’90s. It was bigger than anything else, perhaps, but not big enough to take our whole civilization to the next level. And then I think perhaps AI is bigger than the internet and at least has the potential to re-accelerate growth, with all the good and bad things that come with that. The way I would defend the stagnation thesis is that now that we have AI, nobody disagrees with me that we were in stagnation for decades before.
Yeah, it has been proven in retrospect, definitely. These days, the perception of AI is swinging pretty much between euphoria and dystopia. There was a lot of discussion over the last weeks about the collective warning that Dario Amodei, Sam Altman, and Elon Musk presented, that the monster could get out of control. What’s your take on that? Is it, as some people are saying, mainly a tactical move, a marketing move, or a move to drive expectations down with regard to big multi-trillion IPOs? Or is it truly the fear that AI could get out of control and overrule human intelligence and mankind?
There are many different dimensions to the AI debates and the problems. There are these scenarios that are maybe science fiction, science fiction fantasy. Maybe they’re somewhat more realistic, where, if you have something that in some sense is way smarter than any human being, is there some way it can escape control? We have all kinds of dystopian science fiction movies, like The Matrix and The Terminator.
I don’t think—and I don’t even know how you speak about probabilities of things like that happening—that the probabilities are very high. On the other hand, if the probability is even 5 or 10 percent, that seems pretty bad. So there’s something about the conversation that ends up pushing people very hard in a sort of defensive, precautionary way.
If it’s about probabilities, there was recently an experiment asking the 6 biggest LLMs, “Is there an extinction risk with regard to AI?” The predicted percentage was between 1 and 10 percent. Do you think it’s just because the LLMs are based on human fears, human pessimism, or is it a real point?
Let us, for the sake of argument, say that it is a real point. I’m not—I think it’s hard to argue that probabilities are zero percent or something.
Zero, yeah.
I do think, though, that it doesn’t necessarily follow that you should always go slower and always go in the precautionary direction, because if you do nothing, if there is no progress on any dimension, I don’t think our societies work at all.
I’ve often said the middle class in the US and Europe are the people who expect their children to do better than themselves. The sort of intergenerational progressive compact in our society was that there was progress from one generation to the next: maybe economic progress, material progress, progress in health, and progress in all sorts of softer social dimensions. When that breaks down, I think the whole society starts to derange in very strange ways.
There’s a picture that people implicitly have that the alternative to AI—a zero-growth world where there’s no progress at all—will somehow be this peaceful social democratic society, and I don’t think that’s true. I think the alternative is also far from neutral. I also think there’s some degree to which you can never just turn the clock back.
So, but then slowing it down is just unrealistic, or how could it work? I mean, I don’t get it. If America is slowing down and China is accelerating, we’re just strengthening China, but it’s not—
Yeah. It’s all—it’s—
…solving anything.
…it’s all… Yeah. In theory, you could slow it down if you had genuine, deep cooperation across the whole world. But I think that would require a one-world government with real teeth, real force. The classical liberal part of me thinks that’s almost a frying pan into the fire. It’s a cure that’s worse than the disease.
Of course, you can have fake global government, where governments have a lot of conferences to discuss it, and a lot of somewhat empty statements get put out. And then there’s also the risk that it ends up being slowed down in the West and not in China. The Pope recently issued this AI encyclical, or, you know, I would characterize it as an anti—
Yeah.
…AI encyclical. Again, this is maybe too harsh, but the rhetorical point I have on it is that the Communist Party of China is not going to listen to the Pope. There’s a chance people in the US will. So, in effect, the Pope’s encyclical was working for the Communist Party. I’m not saying he was an agent of the communists, but he was at least acting as a useful idiot for the CCP.
I spoke to two founders of big AI platforms, and both said that they have evidence that the Chinese are spreading anti-AI content, particularly through American social media platforms, but also elsewhere, in order to turn around American sentiment toward more AI skepticism and increase their advantage. Do you see similar things? Is there any evidence for that? Do you believe that? What’s your take?
I haven’t studied it that carefully. I’m inclined to believe it. I’m also inclined to think that’s not the main factor driving it, that it’s mainly what we’re doing to ourselves. There’s a way I’m tempted to say that Greta Thunberg is working for the Chinese communists, and maybe she is, but she’s more of a problem we’ve created for ourselves in the West.
But is Greta’s influence on American sentiment that big? I’m surprised to say—
No, no. I think she’s past—
Okay.
…past her prime. But I think there are so many of these things that we’re doing to ourselves. I’m a very tough critic of China. I think we need to take the competition, the rivalry with China very seriously. And it’s often somewhat too easy—
Yeah.
…to simply blame it on China.
Yeah. But then why is it so negative at the moment in the US? I mean, I really have the feeling that if we are talking to our European colleagues about AI, as long as they are enabled to learn and participate in the journey, they’re actually pretty positive.
In America, it’s very different. People are holding up posters and protesting against AI. It’s almost an anti-cliché of being American. Usually, America is perceived as pro-technology and pro-progress, but in this case it’s a bit the other way around. The next election campaign could, to some degree, even be a campaign about which political party will protect its people better against AI. Why is there such an anti-AI sentiment in America? Do Americans know more about it than Europeans, or has the American mentality changed? What’s happening?
Well, let me give you the pro-US version: this is where AI is happening. The US is where AI is happening, and we can debate how far behind Europe is. In my telling, it’s extremely far behind.
Yeah.
It’s extremely hard to catch up. It’s obviously still a very fluid situation, but, at first order, there’s a lot happening in the US. China is a fast follower, and then Europe is extremely far behind. It’s not felt in Europe. It’s not even felt at the level of corporations.
If I look at something like Palantir, one of the businesses I’ve been involved with for many years, sales to US corporations have accelerated tremendously in the last few years because there’s an urgency to get ahead of the curve and figure out how companies need to be transformed in this new AI age. There’s still much less of that sense of urgency in Europe, where there’s still this inertia: “We can wait. We can, you know, don’t do tomorrow what you can save for the day after.”
Mm-hmm. Do you think, in the long run, AI is going to be good for democracy or bad?
That’s a very big question. I think the place where our democracies are in trouble—and I always prefer saying “constitutional republics,” or our broadly liberal, broadly free societies—is that we don’t have a broad growth story of the future. There’s a sense in which people don’t think things are getting better. Things have become more zero-sum.
I don’t think AI is the panacea for everything, but without that, you’re just going to continue to have these zero-sum parties on the extreme right and left gain ground.
Should we perhaps stop discussing whether AI is positive or negative? I think it’s almost like a knife. With a knife, you can prepare the most wonderful food and have a great dinner. And with a knife, you can kill a person. So if you don’t want killings, you criticize the murderer, but you don’t criticize or ban the knife. Why do we always moralize new technologies? I would say technologies are just neutral. You can use them for good or bad causes, and it depends on us, on what we human beings do with them.
Yes. I’m going to get in trouble for what I’m about to say, but I think we moralize way too much. There’s a question I like to ask: What is the antonym of “good”? The moral antonym is “evil.” The functional antonym is “bad.” A Ferrari is an evil car because it doesn’t get many miles per gallon.
Mm-hmm.
A Trabi is a bad car. It works less well than a golf cart. It’s the former East German car. And so, if you’re evil, you’re at least competent. If you’re evil, you’re not bad, and therefore maybe you’re actually kind of good because you’re at least getting something done.
If you contrast Marlowe’s Faust with Goethe’s Faust, in Marlowe’s Faust, the 16th-century Faust story, Faust is a fake scientist. He’s sort of like a magician, a fake alchemist. It’s bad science, and he goes straight to hell. In Goethe’s Faust, he has a pact with the devil, and he gets his knowledge by morally dubious means. But it still always works out more for the best, and Goethe’s Faust gets redeemed.
I think it’s better to be good than evil. I want to be very clear about that. But perhaps I prefer Goethe’s Faust to Marlowe’s Faust. The moral question in our society is that we have all these good-versus-evil debates, and we’re full of badness. Most of the time, those things aren’t even evil. They’re not even good. They’re just bad.
If 99 percent of businesses, companies, people, political leaders, and business leaders are totally incompetent, that’s the problem we should actually be talking about.
Very few people would say that you are incompetent, but some people, in a very polarized discussion, say you are evil. And if it’s about you being evil, it’s about democracy. Some people portray you as an anti-democrat, and they’re basically all referring to one quote from 2009 where you wrote—
Mm-hmm.
—“I stopped believing that freedom and democracy are compatible.” Can you explain why you wrote it, what you meant by it, and what your thinking is today?
Man, it’s always very dangerous to write things. Writing is a very dangerous activity.
I know what you’re talking about.
The context was that this was an article I quickly typed out one night. I sent it to one of my colleagues and asked him, “Did I write anything controversial in it that I shouldn’t have written?” He said, “No, nothing controversial in here at all.” The meta-level postmortem I had was that the fact I asked someone for a second opinion told me I probably needed to be more careful in my wording.
I did issue a correction two weeks later, so you can still go to the website where I make it very clear that I don’t think anyone’s votes are going to be taken away. I don’t think democracy will go anywhere. What I was arguing for was a certain depoliticization, a de-intensification of politics.
The original article appeared in Cato Unbound, a libertarian online journal. The point of it was directed against libertarians who put too much faith in politics and wanted to change the world by winning elections and doing things like that. I thought these pure libertarian, pure classical liberal ideas—I believe in them. I don’t think they’re easy to win in a democracy. I didn’t say anything that Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, or any of these people wouldn’t have said. But it was not a claim that democracy is going to go away or anything like that.
But isn’t it that sometimes you simply have fun being provocative and stimulating a debate?
I do like doing that. I don’t think that one… I think that one was more deranging than stimulating, though—
It falls into that category.
—it was more deranging than stimulating.
Yeah. So my reading of your personality is that you—
But I always try to push people.
Yeah. But you care a lot about democracy. You’d say you’re not only not an anti-democrat; you’re actually a person who thinks about how to strengthen or save democracy. Are you worried that we’re going down the wrong path these days, with societies polarizing and centrist leadership getting weaker and weaker all around the world? Autocratic systems are basically achieving their goals pretty successfully. An economy in China, which is a kind of authoritarian state economy, is prospering. So if we simply draw a line at the moment, democracy is not doing particularly well.
Sure. But look, I’m not a Hegelian. We can always say there’s a way history seems to be going, there’s a certain trend, and then it’s not morally good. In Hegel, whatever happens, happens for the best.
I think there is a trend against democracy. There’s a trend where these things are in some trouble. What went wrong in Germany in the 1920s and ’30s was that there were 2 anti-democratic parties: the Nazis and the Communists. In the 1932 election, those 2 parties got over 50 percent of the vote. Once over 50 percent of the people vote for parties that want to get rid of democracy, you’re almost too late. You’re really in trouble. And so—
We have a situation in Germany these days where you also have very strong parties on the far left and the far right. In Berlin—
Mm-hmm.
—the Socialists won the election. In Sachsen-Anhalt, a smaller state, the far-right party AfD won the last election in a landslide. More and more is shifting from the center to the extremes. Do you have any ideas about what could be done to reverse that trend? Or is it a trend that cannot be reversed?
I don’t know what you would do if you ran for office.
I don't think I would be a good politician. It's not what I would want to do. I don't have great advice for the political leaders, the centrist political leaders in these countries. I think they systematically underestimate the scale of the problem.
In Great Britain, there have been 7 prime ministers in the last 10 years. Nobody's had a plan for how to turn their societies around. They all think, “Once I become prime minister, that's all I have to do. I have to figure out this complicated internal intraparty game to become prime minister. And once I do that, I can figure out all these problems.” And then there are these deep structural problems.
My technological stagnationist perspective is that there's not been enough progress. The societies have been fraying. The intergenerational compact has broken down, and this is what these things are reflections of. I don't think the extreme parties will solve things, but we need to take it seriously.
Die Linke got 25 percent of the vote in the Berlin elections. Among 16- to 24-year-old voters, it got 47 percent. Eventually, the young people are the people who will be deciding things in your society. That's a very bad trend. I'm making the pro-Die Linke argument because you will not accuse me of being a sympathizer of Die Linke or a communist or anything like that.
So what's the pro argument? Tell me.
The pro argument is, you have to at least take the issues the young people are talking about seriously. There's some problem in Berlin where the rents are too high, and it's impossible to build houses. The young generation finds it very hard to get ahead. It finds it very hard to be successful. Germany, Europe, and some say the United States are gerontocracies. They're societies run for old people.
To take the problem seriously is definitely the right approach, but it also depends on the solutions. The solution that Die Linke proposes here is to solve the rent problem by nationalizing real estate companies and to basically motivate society, very much driven by antisemitism, pro-Islamism, and now, if we look at the images of the party on election night, also with the help of organized crime, clan chiefs. So I think that's where taking things seriously ends.
Well, they don't have solutions.
Yeah.
But all they need to do to win is say, you know—and this is something I often say too—when you ask me what to do about tech stagnation, my simplistic answer is always, “Well, I don't have a comprehensive solution, but the first step is you have to talk about it.” I don't know the exact debate in Berlin, but I could imagine Die Linke saying, “Okay, we don't know if our solutions exactly work, but we're at least talking about the problems. Nobody else is talking about them.”
So what's your take on the other side of the political spectrum, the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland, the far-right party? Is that an alternative for conservatism, or are you worried by that development? How do you see it?
Again, I'm hesitant to speak too much to the specifics of German politics, but yes, I think it reflects these failures of the centrist parties. It reflects a failure to find an economic future for Germany that somehow is inclusive and broad and works for the society as a whole. I don't think they have great solutions. I don't think they know how to balance the budget, either the parties of the extreme left or extreme right.
With the extreme right, there is another issue. It is about foreign policy. The foreign policy concept is basically pro-Putin, pro-China, understanding, anti-Israel, and in parts, antisemitic.
My paradoxical point I told you earlier today is that I think it's important for us to have debates about all 3 of those. I think there can be a reasonable debate about Ukraine, a reasonable debate about China, a reasonable debate about Israel. At the same time, I do think the AfD is wrong on all 3, and that's—you can't be wrong on all 3.
Let's switch to the United States. You were supporting Donald Trump in 2016. Ten years later, how would you analyze his achievements? How would you analyze his failures? Where do you stand today with regard to the last 2 years and then the president's first term?
My facile answer is, you should ask me in 10 years or so, and we'll see in 10 years how it all works out. I still think that in many ways it reflected a failure of the establishment to deal with these long-term problems the US had, with these growth problems, with some of the challenges of globalization, and with the endless entanglements the US had in the Middle East that had not really worked all that well.
Of course, there are all these things where you wish they'd have appointed more competent people. I think the 2 administrations kind of made opposite mistakes. The first administration brought in all these people who couldn't agree, and it was just all this internal fighting. The second administration, I think, overcorrected for the mistake of the first term with all these loyalty tests, and you got an administration staffed by not very smart, but very loyal people.
There are all sorts of ways it can be criticized. But it also reflected a way that things had reached a certain exhaustion, certainly on the Republican side. I worry in the United States that the kind of exhaustion with the Republican establishment that happened with the Bush family, that happened in 2016, we're about to see with the Clinton, Obama center-left establishment.
In the last 3 elections, in 2016, Trump, the anti-establishment person, won the Republican primary. Hillary, the establishment person, barely beat Bernie Sanders. Then the establishment won in 2020 and 2024. I don't know if they'll be able to do it in 2028. The Democratic Party is the more important party. That is the establishment party in the US. The Republican Party is always a little bit the anti-establishment one. So if the Democratic socialists take over the Democratic Party, that's a much bigger deal, and that is, I don't know, the end of America.
I remember very well a lunch that we had in 2016 when I asked you, “Why do you support Trump?” And you basically said, “Because the existing party and the existing leadership are so dysfunctional, it just needs disruption.” That was an interesting thing that I could understand very well. Would you say now, 10 years later, we need disruption again?
I don't want disruption of the Democratic socialist variety. That seems catastrophic. But if I do it not morally, not normatively, just on a descriptive level, I worry that the establishment Democratic Party has failed as badly as the establishment Republicans. So we are going to get this disruption, and there's a risk that the US will shift very far to the left. That's the real disruption we're going to get.
So you belong to those who say the Democratic Socialists of America are a real option. They are a real danger. You once said it's the most energetic and, in a way, the most successful political movement these days.
And so it's young. The history of it was—I looked this up the other day—but the Democratic Socialists of America was created in 1982 as a sort of fusion of these very fringe socialist groups. It was a very small fringe thing, with about 5,000 members. In the 2016 campaign, a legacy of the Bernie Sanders candidacy is the membership of the Democratic Socialists, the cadre of the vanguard, ballooned from 5,000 to 50,000. The median age went from 66 to 33.
So it's like pop culture, by the way.
And so it went from this old socialist people thing to a young revolutionary thing. It has a certain amount of energy, a certain amount of charisma. Again, the establishment Democrats are all lame. They can’t say anything. It’s the same problem with the SPD and CDU people in Germany.
You were an early supporter of JD Vance. You worked with him. You basically saw something in him that other people didn’t see then. Can you describe what it was and why you supported him?
I’m always hesitant to overrate my role in these things. I probably always have a very soft spot for smart people. I thought he was thoughtful, open-minded, and charismatic. He was working for one of the venture funds I had helped start, called Mithril, and then wanted to write this book on the side. I encouraged him to do that. It became a bestseller in 2016, and I helped him out financially when he ran for Senate in 2022. But I’m always hesitant to answer this question because I think it detracts from his achievement in many ways.
The Republicans will make a decision sooner or later about the candidates. The names I’ve heard most often are JD Vance and Marco Rubio. Who do you think would be the better candidate to increase the likelihood that the Republicans would win the next election?
I’m still a Vance partisan. I worry it will be very hard for either candidate to win, so I don’t know. My pessimistic thought is that that’s the wrong question.
So the right question would be—
It’s who’s going to be the Democratic—
If the Democrats—
You know, who’s going to be the Democratic candidate? That’s the right question.
Would a center-left, centrist candidate give the Democrats a better chance, or would it be a DSA candidate?
Obviously, in a close election, a center-left candidate is probably better. If it’s not a close election, it probably doesn’t matter. I think there’s a decent chance it won’t even be close. If the Republicans get wiped out in the midterms this fall, then the Democrats will think they’ll win no matter what in 2028. Therefore, there probably won’t be as strong a firewall against a Democratic socialist winning. I think the Democrats will do well enough in the midterms in a month and a half that they’ll be indifferent to a center-left versus far-left presidential candidate. Then it’s a completely open field, a completely open question.
I had this discussion, this debate, with Fukuyama, the author of The End of History, and he doesn’t fully believe his theories anymore. When I told him there was a good chance Democratic Socialists would win in 2028, he responded with absolute confidence: “No way. Can never happen.” I don’t think history is set like that.
So you think, from today’s perspective, that’s the most likely outcome?
Not the most likely, but let’s say it’s a 50% chance.
That’s pretty high.
That’s pretty high.
You’re a fan of Milei because he’s a disruptor, I assume. Can you describe a little bit what we—what Western societies, what America, but also what Europe—could and should learn from Javier Milei?
I think we’re all fascinated by Argentina because we worry that their past is our future: a century of subpar growth, or decline. It’s a complicated history of what went wrong. Obviously, there’s the Peronist history, with this very charismatic leader who had a lot of bad ideas. In 1900, in 1920, “rich as an Argentine” was still a common expression. That’s sort of gone out of usage.
It’s an open question whether Milei will succeed in turning Argentina around, and whether he will get reelected a year from now. I still think he will, because people understand that this is existential, and you just can’t go back. The problem for all of us is whether there’s any way we can learn from the history of Argentina so it won’t take us 100 years of decline to get there.
I don’t like the accelerationist Leninist idea—more Vladimir Lenin—that the worse things get, the better they get because you get closer to revolution. At the same time, my sense in the U.S. and Europe is that people are upset, pessimistic, and angry, but it’s never enough to lead to positive change. Instead, we just have this drift where you worry things have to get a lot worse before they turn around.
If you had to make a bet today, do you think we’re close to a turning point? What we’re seeing now in America, in Europe, in the West—the stumbling centrist governments, the pretty successful autocrats—is this a healthy warning call, and will we recover, reinvent ourselves? Or is it basically the beginning of the end, and the beginning of a new world order where the autocratic systems are going to prevail?
I think we should always try to think of these things much more concretely, less abstractly. So let me just flip it around as a question to you. Will people get rid of Merz in Germany? It’s a complete, total failure any way you cut it. There’s a decent argument that nothing will happen to him for another three years because everybody else thinks they won’t do any better.
So that’s an indirect answer: you think it’s more likely that—
I’m not sure, but it’s sort of an open question. It’s amazing how robust the Merz thing seems to be relative to how bad it seems to be. I don’t know. My intuition is that things will keep drifting for a long way because the people who replace him don’t really have answers to these problems.
If you frame the macroeconomic problems in a boring macroeconomic way, we have very large welfare states. The taxes feel pretty high to me, and we have very big deficits. Maybe the deficits would be sustainable if you had zero percent interest rates, but interest rates are no longer zero. So there’s a compounding, runaway deficit problem, and you have basically three choices. Do you massively cut spending, which is the Milei answer? Do you massively hike taxes, which would basically completely shut down our societies and end all growth? Or do you keep going with the deficits and kick the can down the road?
For close to 20 years, the answer has been number three. Ever since the 2008 crisis, we’ve just been borrowing more and more money. My intuition is that we’re close to a point where that ends, and then you’re going to be pushed to a very non-centrist solution: either socialist levels of taxation or some really tough austerity measures. The best idea Merz has is just to borrow more.
Why do you care so much about politics?
I don’t know if I think about it too much. I’m not a politician. But it permeates—
Does it make you want to become a politician?
No, never, never, never, never.
Never? A hundred percent excluded?
I’m not sure I’m perfectly self-aware or anything like this, but I’m self-aware enough to know that I’m not electable. It permeates our society. It’s both toxic, but it’s the air we breathe. I have a schizophrenic view on it. I think about it a lot, and then I try to compartmentalize and ignore it as much as possible.
1. Europe’s Place in the Future
What’s your take on the bigger geopolitical picture? Where should Europe be? There’s a discussion about European sovereignty politically, but particularly also with regard to AI and the economy. The two big players are America and China, basically in all areas, not only with regard to AI. One is a very autocratic, authoritarian country. The other one is a democratic country. The authoritarian country is pretty perfect. The democratic country is pretty imperfect. Ten years down the road, who is going to win that race? Not only the arms race in AI, but in the broader context also, the race of systems? And where should Europe be? Neutral?
Such a broad question.
On China’s side as a colony, or a reliable ally of America?
I think it would be best for Europe to be a reliable ally. I always want to push back very hard on the way this often gets framed as a sort of moral equivalence between the US and China. I always find that very offensive.
But let me make a slightly different point. From an American perspective, more important than whether Europe is a super close ally or a somewhat allied but very independent-thinking place is that it’s in America’s interest for Europe to get its act together and be more functional, to get its economy going, and to be part of building the future.
The question is how to do that. In various sectors, if Europe can build up its own industry, or even become a world-leading industry in some things, that would be very good. If it’s further behind, then probably there should be ways to work much more closely with America.
Let me make this concrete. In the late 1960s, you had the Concorde program, which was a British-French, not exactly free-market plan. Supersonic aviation started in the US with Chuck Yeager breaking the sound barrier in 1947. Europe was behind, but it got its act together and caught up and overtook the US. The supersonic aviation industry became a European-leading industry.
That wasn’t a free-market thing, but it was something the US should be fine with and supportive of: Europe doing something. On the other hand, you had something like the French Minitel program of the 1990s, where the internet was supposed to be French. It ended up behind, and you just dug yourself into a deeper and deeper ditch.
If you asked the question about AI in 2026, is it like the Concorde or like Minitel? If we were honest, my assessment is that Europe is further behind than Minitel was.
Unfortunately, I agree. The question is: why is that, and how likely is it that we can change it? What is your analysis? What do you think Europe, or Germany, should do to get back on the map and get its act together?
The “why” questions are always overdetermined and much harder to answer. But on a very specific point, one of the things people in Germany always talk about in the context of entrepreneurship is that there’s a fear of failure.
Mm-hmm.
People are too risk-averse and things like that.
Mm-hmm.
Maybe that’s true, but the dimension I always want to push back on is that perhaps there’s also a fear of success: if you have something that works, you’re not going to scale it to an extreme degree like Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg. At some point, you’ll sell the company or exit, or something like that.
What’s striking is how few great new companies have been built in Germany in the last number of decades. Here’s a statistic I looked up. This is one particular dimension to look at, but if you look at the 50 wealthiest people in the US, only 12 are Gen X or younger—people born in 1965 or later. Most of this money comes from particular companies, and the list is dominated by older people who’ve had more time to compound their wealth.
In Germany, it’s actually more distributed: 20 of the 50 wealthiest people are Gen X or younger. But here’s the difference. In the US, 9 out of 12 of those people made their own money. In Germany, all 20 inherited it. Not a single person did something new, made new money, or built a large, scalable company.
Of course, I’m looking at this from a very extreme angle. But each of those people created thousands of millionaires in their companies and tens of thousands of other jobs, adding to the economy in lots of different ways. Germany used to have the ability to build great new businesses. There was the Mittelstand, and there were also much larger companies built in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and even after 1945.
Something has really broken down since 1995. I don’t have an answer to that, but that’s the kind of question I would try to think about really hard.
2. Germany and the Personal Future
Tonight you’re going to receive the Axel Springer Award. When I informed you about that, you said something very remarkable: “Thank you. I always tried over the last decades to get Germany out of my mind. Intellectually, I did quite well, but I didn’t get it out of my heart.”
Hmm.
Why not? What’s still so German about you, being born in Frankfurt am Main in 1967 and living now for almost all your life in America? Why is there still this emotional affiliation to Germany?
It would be strange if there weren’t. I think it would be much stranger if there weren’t.
But you left Germany when you were one year old.
Yeah, but my grandparents were here. In some ways, I grew up between two worlds. I went to English-speaking schools in America, but spoke German at home. So yes, there’s a part where it’s understandable.
For all these reasons, things have gone somewhat wrong, but it’s also very important for us to find a way to turn Germany around. It’s at the heart of Europe. In some ways, Europe is still at the core of Western civilization. So if there’s a crisis of the—
I’m sorry, but that isn’t—
There’s a crisis of the West, there’s a crisis in Europe and Germany.
Yeah, but you’re shifting back to intellectual analysis.
I know, I always do that.
We were talking about feelings, about the heart.
I know, right. And—
So what do you love about Germany? What is it? I mean, Germany’s past is difficult. We spoke about the present and the future, and that’s also quite difficult. So what do you love about Germany?
It’s just part of who I am. I’m always bad at answering this question. It’s just part of who I am.
Okay. Tonight we will have two of your co-founders, Alex Karp from Palantir and Max Levchin, with whom you founded PayPal. Alex Karp also has a very strong affiliation to Germany. Max has a different history; he’s from Ukraine, but in any case, there’s a European element in it. Do you think these two guys played such an important role in your business life, but also in your personal development as friends, because there is this common European denominator? Or doesn’t that play a role?
It’s probably part of it. I don’t want to overdo it. A lot of the founders of these tech companies are both insiders and outsiders. Alex and I were insiders who went to the elite Stanford Law School. Then I was, in some ways, an outsider to America. Alex is Jewish, where you always have a little bit of that as part of the background, and somehow—
Sorry, I didn’t get it. He is Jewish, but what does that have to do with your background?
No, no, no. It’s a little bit of the outsider.
Yeah, I see. Okay, okay. I see. Yeah.
There’s an outsider part and an insider part. I always say the founders have both the outsider-insider dynamic.
Max was a super-achieving, straight-A student, an incredibly charismatic person, but he also grew up in a poor part of Chicago after leaving Ukraine when he was 16 years old. So it was just this incredible drive.
Being an outsider can really be an advantage.
I think in your case—
Well, I think it’s always both, though. It’s this outsider-insider combination.
Yeah, and insider. Yeah.
People always exaggerate the outsider piece because that’s always, in a way, playing the victim and stuff like that. And there’s also some part where I grew up in Silicon Valley. Very few people did that.
Okay, let’s assume that in this perfect mix of being an insider and an outsider, you’ve developed an overproportional degree of contrarianism. You love to contradict. I think, for me, the word “no” is the foundation of freedom and democracy, so I also love to say no. But in your case, it’s almost an automatic impulse, yeah? As soon as there’s a consensus or people get close to one, you say the opposite.
Okay, so just say no. That’s not true.
No, okay. Don’t.
I don’t think the point is to be contrarian for its own sake, because then you just look at the consensus and put a minus sign in front of it. That’s not that interesting. I think the real goal is always to try to think for oneself. And that’s what I try to do. I don’t think of it as just this reflexively negative thing.
How have you been able to develop that intrinsic strength to listen to your own compass and not be influenced so much by the zeitgeist, by consensus, by the juste milieu? Do you have any explanation for why you’ve been able to develop that superpower?
I’m always bad at self-psychoanalysis, but I’m probably interested in a lot of different things: big-picture history, politics, economics, science fiction and the future, and psychology.
In late modernity, we’re supposed to be narrow specialists. It’s the pin factory in Adam Smith, where you have 100 people working in a pin factory, and everyone’s specialized in one narrow area. It’s somehow very efficient for people to be super-specialized, but you lose sight of the big picture. I’ve always wondered how everything fits together. How do we make sense of all these things?
Maybe it’s just a Renaissance dilettante type of thing that I’m rationalizing. But I tell myself there has to be room for at least one generalist in a world where everyone’s hyper-specialized.
And in that Renaissance spirit of having many interests in many fields of activity, where are the areas of passion and interest that have no professional, pragmatic, or business rationale, that are purely private, personal, irrational? Don’t tell me you don’t have any.
I probably still play way too much chess on the internet all the time. I was a scholastic chess player, and it’s a very beautiful, somewhat dangerously addictive game. It’s probably not equivalent to all of reality, which is what I liked to say at various points of delusion in my teenage years: if you didn’t play chess, you didn’t understand reality. That’s probably too extreme a thing to say.
But there are all sorts of questions that don’t connect directly. I think a lot of these political questions are important. They frustratingly feel largely outside of our power, and I think they do somehow relate to business. In many ways, it might be healthier, and more profitable, not to think about them and just focus on a particular business.
You have four pretty young kids now. To what degree did they change your life? Is there anything you’ve already learned from them by watching them?
It really changes your time horizons on the future. If we’re in this accelerating technological world, or in this crazy world where we don’t know how the world’s going to make it till 2030 or 2035, and you’re in a world of only adults, you can pretend you’re just thinking about it year to year. But my oldest daughter will be 81 years old in 2100, so you start to wonder what the 22nd century will be like.
Talking about time horizons, one of the areas you’re particularly interested in and also investing in is health and longevity. Why is that, apart from a good investment case? I’m also highly interested because I’m a hypochondriac. I don’t know what your motivation is. Is it only the business rationale, or is there also a personal motivation, something to do with the fact that we all have more or less a fear of death?
Yeah, fear of death, fear of getting old, all these things. I’d always push back on that. It’s odd to me that this isn’t more widely shared, and that it can’t be articulated more widely.
The optimism of early modernity, in the 17th and 18th centuries, was that science would relieve man’s estate. Hobbes said that in a state of nature, life was nasty, brutish, and short. We were supposed to make it longer, and maybe indefinitely longer. People like Condorcet, Francis Bacon, and Benjamin Franklin thought you could cure all diseases. It’s a shocking social decline that we’ve given up on that. People don’t even think we can cure Alzheimer’s. Why can’t we at least try to do that?
For me, the discussion about progress has always had two sides. Almost every technological advance has a flip side and a downside. In the case of health, I just don’t see it. For me, it’s the only area where progress is only positive. For centuries, scientific progress and progress in medicine have improved not only our lifespan but also the quality and enjoyment of our lives. In that spirit, could you share with me the most optimistic, visionary case for longevity? What can be achieved? Eternal life?
A hundred and fifty years?
It’s not clear why it shouldn’t be possible. It’s not clear that there are any natural limits. We still have not—there are all sorts of reasons people have become more pessimistic, because certain things have been very hard to cure. Nixon declared war on cancer in 1971 and said it would be cured in five years. It’s now 55 years later, and there’s been some progress, but it’s very far from cured.
AI is accelerating it big time now.
There’s always a question. This is badly simplifying things, but if you think of biological processes as irreversible and information, computational processes as fundamentally reversible, then if you could understand biology as an information science, in theory you could find a way to traverse all these processes. Computers can live forever.
But is it more in the physical sense, where we really reverse the aging process in our bodies and achieve a longer lifespan or even eternal life? Or is it more that at a certain point we’ll be able to download our brains and consciousness and live in a different body or in a different form?
Again, I probably have a very physical, maybe Christian-informed view. I wouldn’t find it acceptable to be uploaded into a computer program that simulated me. I don’t think it would be me. I tend to think our identity is very wrapped up in our physical selves.
And then… But, yeah, no, I think the full Christian vision was, of course, that you were going to have an eternal body, and your soul would also be transformed. One of my friends is an 80-year-old mathematician. He once joked to me that he didn’t know whether there was an afterlife, but he hoped there wouldn’t be because he didn’t want to run into his ex-wife.
I do think that, in some ways, eternal life is very desirable. Christianity always aimed for even more.
But let’s assume—
The problem with transhumanism and Christianity is that it didn’t go far enough. From a real Christian point of view, transhumanism isn’t too weird or too extreme.
But let’s assume that we achieve eternal life. Is it really desirable, or would we be extremely bored because everything is unlimited? Why be ambitious?
I think the answer to all those things is: it’s better than the alternative.
Okay. So—
I don’t think I would be bored.
Good. Yeah, I agree. So what’s the concrete innovation, invention, or investment you’ve seen over the last month or years with regard to longevity that makes you most optimistic?
I keep investing in these biotech areas. It’s surprisingly difficult. There are all sorts of challenges. If I wanted to focus on a single one, it would be trying to do something about dementia: finding a way to slow or reverse declines in people’s brains. That’s the one I’d want to find a way to tackle in the years ahead.
Peter, to conclude, I’d love to ask you a question you ask almost every candidate you talk to before you hire them, or people you find interesting: Tell me a truth you believe that almost nobody else agrees with.
Man, you’re giving me a lot today already. Let’s see. Give me one second.
Take your time. In any case, it’s nice to see that this is also a tough question for you.
There’s always a meta-level version of this. There are all sorts of things you think nobody believes in, and then you realize that actually a lot of people almost do. So maybe it’s contrarian, and then we can debate which one is the contrarian view.
When I started giving these speeches about the Antichrist three years ago, I thought this was an extremely unconventional view, far outside the zone. I would have said that was an answer. Most people would say, “Yeah, that’s a really crazy thing to talk about.” I would now say it’s not contrarian: most people think something like the Antichrist is right around the corner, that we have incipient totalitarianism throughout the world. So it was less contrarian than I thought. But the meta-level truth is that everybody says the Antichrist is a crazy idea, and the reality is they secretly agree with me.
Peter, thank you very much for the conversation.
Thank you.