Duna Conversations · · 17 min
Duna Conversations - Don't build the back office - Pieter van der Does
TL;DR
- Company size does not make building payments internally the best use of engineering. Pieter van der Does initially assumed the largest businesses would do it themselves, but “it turned out not to be true”; some might still handle their highest-volume payment method directly. Adyen had more than 1,000 engineers and had been building since 2006. Even with 1,000–1,500 engineers and ten years available, he asks, “shouldn’t you use them for something else?”
- The first customer should reveal a reusable product, not become a permanent custom-development assignment. Adyen’s opening was Berlin’s casual gaming industry, where players had to leave games to pay. Germany, the Nordics, and the Netherlands became its first stepping stones. Van der Does argues for solving the merchant’s problem rather than taking build instructions: the risk is that the solution “won’t be reusable,” and customers do not always know what is possible.
- Europe’s fragmented market can force international readiness from day one. The host presents geography as an additional difficulty; van der Does says the Netherlands alone could not fulfill Adyen’s ambitions. Serving a huge US market lets a company postpone international complexity, but postponement “might make it more difficult” to solve later.
- Enterprise sales can begin years before a startup expects to win the contract. Asked whether giant prospects might copy a small supplier, van der Does emphasizes expertise at scale: Adyen was called “the Navy SEALs of payments.” He says specialists can help companies handle costly compliance obligations. At roughly 1½ years old, Adyen approached major US companies to “plant the seed”; they signed 2–4 years later.
- An organization that responds quickly to changing customer problems can outperform a fixed long-range vision. Van der Does points to searches shifting rapidly toward AI and favors “constantly changing” over five- or ten-year predictions. When the host equates this with customers knowing best, he clarifies: customers know their problem, but might not know the best solution.
- Developing specialist talent requires both patient internal learning and openness to experienced outsiders. Smart recruits with cultural fit start slower, then “overtake people from the industry,” van der Does says. But Adyen sometimes became “too extreme” about doing everything itself; experienced bank-account and point-of-sale specialists brought knowledge the company welcomed.
Digest · the substance, structured for research
1. Solve an urgent problem without building a one-customer product
- Van der Does found Adyen’s opening in Berlin’s casual gaming industry, not betting: players had to leave games to pay. In-game payments solved a narrow problem for customers with a “vested interest” in working with them. Germany, the Nordics, and the Netherlands were Adyen’s first stepping stones.
- The product had to carry into the next merchant. Following a customer’s exact specifications risks building something “not reusable.”
- Customers also do not always know what is possible. His advice is to listen to the problem, then develop an answer that might differ from what the customer had in mind.
2. Build internationally and introduce yourself before enterprises are ready
- The host frames Europe’s geography as an extra obstacle; van der Does says starting in the Netherlands meant Adyen could not build only for its home market. A company serving a large US market can postpone international complexity, but that “might make it more difficult” to solve globally later.
- Asked whether giant prospects might copy a startup, van der Does emphasizes expertise at scale: Adyen was called “the Navy SEALs of payments.” He says companies can spend heavily on compliant sign-ups, an obligation that may drain resources without being where they make money. Adyen presented its specialist team early to large merchants, planting a seed at roughly 1½ years in existence; those companies signed 2–4 years later.
3. Unhappy paths change the economics of doing it yourself
- Payments look simple until exceptions arrive. Van der Does’s example: a customer pays for two pairs of shoes, returns one, and shipping costs complicate what the company can reimburse. Trading-name or bank-account changes can create fraud opportunities; ownership changes raise further questions.
- He initially assumed the largest businesses would build payments themselves. “It turned out not to be true.” Some might handle their highest-volume payment method directly, but he says even the largest companies outsource payments.
- Adyen had more than 1,000 engineers and had been building since 2006. Even with 1,000–1,500 engineers and ten years available, he asks, “shouldn’t you use them for something else?”
4. Adapt to customer problems instead of forecasting the distant market
- Van der Does favors reacting in small steps over building toward five- or ten-year forecasts. He says he doubts many people expected searches to shift so quickly toward AI instead of standard Google; even smart forecasters could be wrong.
- When the host calls this trusting customers to know best, van der Does qualifies the framing: “They know best what their problem is.” They might not know the best solution.
5. Grow expertise internally while welcoming outside knowledge
- Van der Does favors smart hires with cultural fit over people from industries where little has changed. They start slower, but once up to speed, “they overtake people from the industry.”
- Yet Adyen had sometimes been “too extreme” about doing everything itself. Experienced outsiders should be able to contribute; he cites colleagues with specific knowledge of bank accounts and point-of-sale terminals.