为什么投资者正在为AI时代重新思考一切
Jen KhaDavid GeorgeAram Verdiyan
- 这是David George职业生涯中第一次,资本本身会复利式放大一家公司的优势——让幂律比过去10–20年的科技投资周期更为极端。 他的解释是:过去的失败模式是把钱砸在人头上(“雇1000个人”),最后淹没在协调问题里;如今“可以把美元砸向算力,而算力能让产品和企业变得更好”,背后是Aram Verdiyan所说的“无限的推理需求”。3家前沿公司——SpaceX、OpenAI、Anthropic——对应的潜在企业价值合计为3.5万亿美元至5万亿美元;Jen表示,在SpaceX上市前,许多LP及更广泛的机构配置者群体对SpaceX的敞口都很小。
- 在3,000家美国VC机构中,只有20家在20年间持续实现3x净回报,而过去10年的Cambridge平均风险投资回报仅为1–2x。 David据此对LP组合的结论是:应集中配置这15–20家机构;持有50–70家基金的LP组合不可能跑赢平均水平,而在1–2x回报下,“还不如投私募股权”,至少不用承受10年的锁定期。持续胜出的机构每个投资年度都能拿到定义品类的公司,并在后期基金中将其配置到5–10%以上的仓位,让单家公司就能贡献全基金回报。
- AI的TAM是劳动力,而不是软件;美国在劳动力上的支出约为软件的40倍,因此把AI称为“软件的下一次演进”远远不够。 AI在4年内做到1000亿美元收入,SaaS用了15年,同时直面30万亿美元GDP;Aram承认:“我长期、持续低估了这些结果能够达到的规模。”
- 增长信号从未如此难以辨别:有些公司一个月内从0做到500万美元ARR,却没有续约周期;有些客户群彼此倒卖,甚至那根本不是ARR,只是乘以12。 这样的公司每49家里才有1家是真的——Cursor曾在约300万美元ARR时融资约4亿美元,即使在其被SpaceX以600亿美元收购的公告发布当天早上,市场还在说它已经死了。George的判断依据不是财务分析,而是他屏幕上的便利贴:“市场是否在要求你提供更多产品?”
- ChatGPT之前的软件公司群体已经被困住:2021–22年以25–32倍EBITDA估值完成的2000亿至3000亿美元软件LBO,如今“价值可能只有当初的一半”,这正推动私人信贷市场出现赎回。 目前只有15–20家公众SaaS公司的交易倍数高于10倍收入,而增长率每增加1个百分点,价值相当于EBITDA增加3个百分点。解决方案——Intercom由创始人主导、重建AI原生业务——本质上是“自毁现有业务”,目前仍是一个n-of-one案例;通过运营合伙人给企业外挂AI,“就是行不通”。
- LP和GP的激励完全相反:GP错过下一个Facebook会被解雇;“LP投了IBM不会被解雇”,很多时候不投也不会。 错过前沿模型,只会让配置者略低于基准、但仍保住工作,这解释了敞口差距。Aram的判断是,AI应当成为“核心或超级核心”配置,而不是卫星仓位;CalPERS如今正在追回失去的时间,将公开市场配置从91%降至58%,将风险投资/成长投资从9%提高至43%。
- 扩散才是看多逻辑:美国企业每名员工每月在AI上的中位数支出为12美元,而前1%的企业达到7,000美元。 George为传统SaaS提出的最强辩护是,编程可能只是“一个假动作”——它有完美文档、可验证、可模拟,而“大多数业务任务不具备这3个特征”;但考虑到采用率差距,以及他们见过的增长最快的公司——在可能仅有1000万至3000万用户的基础上,每月新增收入超过大型科技公司——他仍然“超级超级超级看多”。
- 下一波100万亿美元市值将来自机器人(10年内“规模会超过语言模型”)、自动驾驶(美国实际运行的Waymos不到10,000辆)、医疗(占GDP的18%,几乎尚未开发),以及解决供给瓶颈。 如今的聊天机器人只是消费级AI的“拟物化版本”。Aram认为,需求不是约束——“美国不是没有发电能力,而是接入电力的速度不够快”:真正的瓶颈在许可审批和输电,而其他国家每年部署的可再生能源产能是美国的10倍。
1. 资本如今会复利式放大优势——幂律已变成系统性力量
- Jen Kha对本期节目的概括是:幂律“过去只是风险投资这个小作坊式行业的一项特征,如今已经变成系统性的”,而3家前沿模型公司——SpaceX、OpenAI、Anthropic——对应的潜在企业价值“在3.5万亿美元至5万亿美元之间”。在SpaceX上市前,许多LP及更广泛的机构配置者群体对这些公司几乎没有敞口。
- David George解释幂律为何比过去10–20年的情况更极端:规模报酬递增一直存在,但“这是我职业生涯中第一次,可以把资本投入一家公司,并让它复利式放大自身优势”。过去摧毁初创公司的经典方式,是给它砸钱、雇1000个人,最后陷入协调成本;如今“可以把美元砸向算力,而算力能让产品和企业变得更好”。
- Aram Verdiyan从需求端解释这一变化:“推理需求是无限的。” AI在4年内做到1000亿美元收入,SaaS用了15年,“而我们的渗透率还远未到头”。结果规模也随之重估:头部10%的结果从约100亿美元升至约400亿美元,“等Anthropic、再到OpenAI上市时,很快可能就是1000亿美元”;上一轮周期新增的25万亿美元市值,本轮应当会超过。
2. TAM是劳动力,而不是软件——而且不是零和博弈
- George谈规模时表示,美国经济在劳动力上的支出大约是软件的40倍,因此“把它等同于软件,说它只是软件的下一次演进,远远不够”。劳动力不会消失,只会被重新发明。Aram从医疗行业举例:医疗IT每年规模为600亿至1000亿美元,但AI直接打入理赔、计费、行政等任务本身,而这些属于一个1万亿美元的行业,因此AI的TAM可以达到传统SaaS的10倍以上。他承认:“我长期、持续低估了这些结果能够达到的规模。”
- 他们的法律顾问讲了一个扩张性案例:“我喜欢Harvey。我的客户现在都觉得自己是律师了……自从AI出现,我的计费小时数反而只增不减。”
- 对于最终是哪一层技术栈胜出,George给出的诚实答案是:“我不知道,市场会大到难以想象。我认为一切都有可能奏效。” 他明确反对零和解读:开源获胜不等于实验室输掉。但在任何单一品类内,幂律都极其残酷:赢家拿走绝大多数份额,“第二名只能捡残羹冷炙”。与之对应的是对亏损的容忍度:他们最好的早期基金亏损率约为60%,成长基金为10–20%;“如果我们没有亏钱……就说明承担的风险还不够”。
3. 3,000家机构、20家持续赢家:获取、配置与中间地带的消亡
- Aram的数据是整期节目的锚点:3,000家美国风投机构中,只有20家——不足1%——持续实现3x净TVPI,需要在20年间连续做出3到4只3x净TVPI基金。这些持续胜出的机构“每个投资年度都能持续拿到定义品类的公司”。Cambridge数据显示,过去10年的平均风险投资回报为1–2倍:“你还不如投私募股权。投公开市场肯定更好,也没必要把资金锁定10年。”
- 仅有名牌还不够:早期基金必须持有足够仓位;后期基金则必须把最好的公司配置到5–10%以上,让单个仓位就能贡献全基金回报。“后期基金的回本数学过去并不存在,现在存在了。”
- 讨论中的结论是“中间地带消亡”:高度专业化、拥有深厚领域专家的早期AI基金表现良好,全栈平台型机构也能奏效——覆盖种子轮直至IPO;“除此之外的中间地带……都很难竞争”。Eddie的一条推文被现场读出:大型VC基金的兴趣“来自创始人,而不是LP”——创始人想要的是能够伴随公司扩大规模、覆盖全生命周期、并帮助获得客户和招聘人才的品牌。George描述的飞轮是:领域专业能力赢得交易,700名运营资源员工(管理费再投资而来)改变结果,而强力的客户背书带来回报的持续性。
4. 后期品牌建立在早期的控球权之上
- George自称“非常有偏见”:“我们的业务始于早期,也终于早期。” 成长基金的获取能力、信息和关系都由早期业务导流而来。Aram从LP角度表示认同:“作为一家新进入市场的后期机构,很难直接开出5亿美元支票”;后期5–10%的集中仓位之所以存在,是因为早期品牌在多年前就建立了与创始人的关系。
- Jen提出了种子前阶段的共存逻辑:当估值低于2000万–4000万美元、基金规模低于1亿美元时,小机构可以在大平台之前赢下1到2轮;大平台则会理性地在7家看起来相似的AI初创公司之间等待,直到能够领投某个品类赢家的A轮或B轮。Aram赞同共存,提到健康的种子轮关系、他们自己更大笔的种子投资以及Speedrun。他说,创始人“非常希望继续处在这个品牌的轨道上”;机构“可能最终并不投资,但至少必须理解整个版图”,才能做出明智的后期投资决策——这就是控球权的逻辑。
5. 增长迷雾:真实ARR与误导性ARR
- Aram表示:“AI实际上让我们的工作比以往更难。” 融资轮更大、节奏更快,而增长信号令人困惑:一家刚从加速器出来的公司声称“一个月内从0做到500万美元ARR”,却没有续约周期;有时客户就是自己的同届公司,“这甚至不是ARR,只是乘以12”。这样的公司每49家里才有1家是真正特殊的公司,拥有几百万美元真实ARR,并最终成长为下一个Cursor。
- Cursor是典型案例:约300万美元ARR时融资约4亿美元,曾遭到广泛嘲讽——“甚至在收购公告发布当天早上,人们还在说Cursor已经死了。我说,他们刚刚宣布要被SpaceX以600亿美元收购。”
- 当一家公司的销售历史只有几个月,George的做法是:“你不可能靠财务分析完成判断”——需要依靠创始人判断和客户质感。他屏幕上的便利贴写着:“市场是否在要求你提供更多产品?” Harvey是一个完整案例:早期商业客户品牌很强,但“使用情况并不好……很一般”;推理模型出现后,局面“彻底反转”,客户从担心幻觉变成“每一家客户都在要求律所使用这款产品”。“所有人都能做客户群分析……但理解市场的质感、理解客户真正想要什么——这才是做出决定的方式。”
6. LP激励、集中配置与流动性问题
- Jen指出配置者落后的结构性原因:GP“可能因为错过下一个Facebook、下一个Uber而被解雇”——遗漏本身就足以让人丢掉工作;但“LP投了IBM不会被解雇”,甚至完全不投也可能不会被解雇。错过前沿模型,结果只是略低于基准,但工作还在。因此Aram的配置立场是:AI“不是卫星仓位,而应当是核心或超级核心”。
- 组合构建的结论是:3,000家机构中只有20家赢家,LP应集中配置15–20家;持有50–70家基金的组合不可能跑赢平均水平。Aram强调仓位大小同样关键,David举了一个典型失败案例:LP找到正确的基金,却只投了1%——“很好,你赚了10倍。它给你的基金贡献了10%的回报,但完全没有改变结果。” CalPERS“众所周知地错过了数十亿美元”后,将公开市场配置从91%降至58%,将风险投资/成长投资从9%提高至43%。
- 对于流动性的质疑及其反驳是:独角兽会保持非上市状态10年以上,而IPO并不等于现金分配,尤其是在持股10–15%的情况下,上市后还要再等12–24个月以上。但“你会希望3、4年前就卖掉Stripe、Databricks吗?答案无一例外是否定的。” Anthropic在2021年获得首轮投资,“5年后即将上市”。George讲述Fund I的经历:第16年,他们向所有LP提供其种子阶段Stripe仓位的流动性,“每一位LP都说不,我们宁愿让它继续复利”;最终基金在第17年退出。
7. ChatGPT前时代的清算:被困住的SaaS、LBO与私人信贷
- George对公开市场的判断是:目前只有15–20家SaaS公司交易在10倍收入以上,“过去曾经有几十家、几十家”;而且几乎都出现了AI驱动的增长加速。他们的数据显示:“公开市场里,增长率每提高1个百分点,相当于EBITDA提高3个百分点”,这与2021年对盈利能力的关注完全相反。
- 被困住的那批公司来自2021–22年:当时软件LBO总额为2000亿至3000亿美元,负债超过2000亿美元,平均按25–32倍EBITDA成交;“这些公司今天的价值可能只有当初的一半。这正是私人信贷市场出现赎回的原因。” Aram向George提出假设:一家2016–21年投资年度的公司,增速30%,在风投账面上按10–20倍估值,Silver Lake如今已对它失去兴趣,而一年前还会感兴趣。George坦率回答:“现在完全没有定论……我们对这些公司也有大量敞口”,不过其公司约95%的NAV都位于正在加速的那批公司中。
- 扭转局面的模板非常残酷:Intercom请回创始人,重建AI原生业务并实现规模化——“这几乎等于自毁现有业务,而这在私募股权里非常难做到。” George向创始人击掌:“你做到了,伙计……但目前还是一个n-of-one案例。” 他也警告私募股权不要给AI贴标签:“把Sears放到网站上,并不会让它变成Amazon”;如果只是外挂AI客服代理,却不改变工作流,客户就会流失,NPS下滑会跟随收入下滑,债务还会让这个螺旋进一步复利。Aram说:“你不能只是派一个运营合伙人过去,然后说我们给它加上AI。”
8. 1%的扩散率,以及下一波100万亿美元市值的来源
- George为变化缓慢提出的最强辩护值得保留:编程可能只是“一个假动作,对吧?编程有完美文档……可验证、可模拟。大多数业务任务都不具备这3个特征”,因此AI扩散到其他知识工作可能需要更长时间。但同一组数据也让他“超级超级超级看多”:美国企业每名员工每月的AI支出中位数为12美元,前1%的企业达到7,000美元;最先进的银行可能也只达到人力成本的1%。这些是“我们有史以来见过的增长最快的公司”,它们依靠可能仅有1000万至3000万用户,每月新增的收入就超过大型科技公司,而美国有1.5亿名劳动者。
- 被问到下一家100万亿美元市值公司时,George没有正面回答(“那可能还要经历2个科技周期”),但列出了尚未开发的空间:消费级AI目前的聊天机器人只是“拟物化版本”,原生版本会主动替我们完成工作;“我们在机器人领域几乎还没开始,但我认为机器人在10年内会超过语言模型”;美国实际运行的Waymos不到10,000辆;占GDP18%的医疗行业,无论医疗服务交付还是药物研发,都几乎还没有被开发。
- Aram在结尾补充说,瓶颈在供给而非需求:芯片和模型上游的能源、电网及数据中心。“美国不是没有发电能力,而是接入电力的速度不够快”——许可审批、输电和监管都是约束,而其他国家每年部署的可再生能源产能是美国的10倍。这里能够创造的机会“不是100亿美元、不是500亿美元,而是1000亿美元以上”,也正因此,“这不是互联网泡沫,也不是Covid——增长信号是真实的,不是短暂的收入”。Jen最后总结:“机器时代到了。让我们把机器带进来。”
完整逐字稿
We’ve looked at the data from 3,000 venture capital firms in the U.S. Only 20 have achieved consistent 3x net returns over the last 2 decades.
Right now, clearly, the power law is more extreme than it has been in the last 10 to 20 years of technology investing.
AI is attacking every facet of the GDP: transportation, labor, services, capital, and coordination. There hasn’t been a technology paradigm that hits $30 trillion in GDP at the same time.
What do you think is going to be the next $100 trillion market cap company?
Elon has talked publicly about Grok bot. On Sam’s side, he’s talked about Astra and some of the long-running capabilities that are going to come out soon.
1. Why Power Law Is No Longer Just a Venture Thing
Something fundamental has changed in how value gets created. The power law used to be just a feature of a cottage industry in venture capital, and now it’s systemic throughout. In particular, the 3 frontier model companies—SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic—represent somewhere between $3.5 trillion and $5 trillion of potential enterprise value.
Shockingly, before SpaceX went public, a lot of our LPs and also the broader institutional allocator community didn’t have a lot of exposure to it. Today, we’ll talk about why portfolio construction and asset allocation may have changed, why the power law is not limited to the venture capital industry, and particularly where and how value actually compounds today.
David George, Aram Verdiyan, thank you for joining me.
Great to be here. Thanks for having us.
2. Every Venture-Backed IPO Combined: Where Does It Go From Here?
Thank you for having us here.
Awesome. Okay, DG: If you add up every venture-backed IPO from the last 6 years—all of them together—where does it go from here?
Right now, clearly, the power law is more extreme than it has been in the last 10 to 20 years of technology investing, probably going back to the emergence of the network-effect-driven consumer companies. There are many reasons why that’s the case.
Increasing returns to scale have always been a dynamic in our business. Obviously, it’s well covered how a network-effect business can have increasing returns to scale, but so can software businesses. They can take different forms, but brand reputation in the market and the accumulation of resources all provide competitive advantages. That’s still the case.
Right now, especially with the labs, for the first time in my career, you can take capital and throw it at a company, and it compounds their advantage. How do you screw up a startup? Throw too much money at it, have it hire 1,000 people, and then create all these coordination issues, overhead issues, and dueling priorities. It gets messed up because you can’t hire enough people to do enough things fast enough.
Now that’s not the case. You can throw dollars at compute, and compute can make products and businesses better. To me, it’s not terribly surprising that the power law is more extreme right now. Economies of scale are a very real thing in the AI market, and I think that will continue to be the case.
So, Aram, first of all, you’re not just one of our longtime LPs at a16z. Incidentally, it’s been exactly 10 years since you were actually an employee of a16z. For your 10-year anniversary—since it was last year—I’ve brought this gem back.
Oh, my God. This is amazing. Why do you still have this? This is amazing.
We dug into the catacombs, and we made this extra-large version just for posterity. I can’t believe that I got this from the catacombs.
Incidentally, during the last 10 years, a lot has changed in the world. If you remember, at that point in time, people were bellyaching about fund sizes being too large back then.
3. Rethinking Portfolio Construction from a Blank Sheet
And you had one at a billion. I remember.
The first one at a billion. The first venture fund. Exactly.
A lot has happened since then. How do you think about your venture portfolio juxtaposed against your private equity one, and then just generally asset allocation? We were talking about this on the way in. If you were to start from a blank sheet of paper again, knowing what you know now, how would you have constructed it differently?
Let’s take venture today. We’ve reached $100 billion in revenue in AI. It took SaaS 15 years to get to the same point. AI did that in 4 years, and we’re not even close to anywhere in terms of the penetration of demand.
The reason DG is saying you can throw capital at it—that’s a function of unlimited demand for inference. We’re at a point where AI is attacking every facet of the GDP: transportation, labor, services, capital, and coordination. There hasn’t been a technology paradigm that hits $30 trillion in GDP at the same time.
You have the fastest-growing technology hitting all parts of the GDP. As an allocator, it’s hard not to make the case that you should be core or super-core in some shape or form. It’s not a satellite position.
I’m very biased, but if you just think about the shape of the markets and how they’ve changed since I started my career in private equity and growth equity—that was 18 years ago—this was a cottage industry, and now it’s not.
I talk about this all the time, but our asset class is $5 trillion to $6 trillion of value. The dynamics around companies staying private longer aren’t going to reverse.
You had that insight in 2019 when you left GA. It’s venture-like outcomes in late stage, which is now happening.
So it’s no longer just early stage, and you IPO when you have $100 million in revenue.
The top-decile outcomes, I think, used to be $10 billion, and now they’re like $40 billion.
Or soon to be probably $100 billion by the time Anthropic and then OpenAI come out.
And look, this makes sense, right? The last cycle created $25 trillion of new market cap, and a bunch of that went to the incumbents. But a lot of it went to startups, and each one of these subsequent waves gets bigger than the prior one.
Our expectation is that you take the $25 trillion, and it’s going to be a larger number.
Yep.
I’m constantly confused about the TAM of AI. I’d love your thoughts on this. Take healthcare. Healthcare spends $60 billion to $100 billion on healthcare IT per year, but AI is hitting actual labor and the value of tasks being performed in healthcare. That’s claims, billing, and administration. That’s a trillion-dollar industry.
The TAM of AI can be 10x-plus bigger than traditional SaaS or healthcare IT. What is that value? What’s the economic value of a task that’s being performed? That’s the TAM you’re looking at. Then there’s some capture rate that the AI company will take, but we have no idea how big the TAM can get.
To your point, you look at every wave, and the incumbents are 10x smaller over time. It’s hard to estimate it, but I can tell you this for myself: I’ve been chronically wrong about how big these outcomes can get.
Yeah, same here. Labor—I mean, if you just look at how much of the dollars spent in the U.S. economy go toward labor versus software, it’s something like 40 times more.
That doesn’t mean, importantly, that labor is going to go away. I think labor is just going to get reinvented, and we’ll end up with a reimagination of the tasks that humans do. But I think that’s actually the whole point of AI: You’re going after this different thing. To equate it to software and say it’s the next evolution of software is far too limiting.
Our legal counsel says to us often, “I love Harvey. All my clients think they’re lawyers now, and they can actually spar with me on topics where they would have probably said, ‘I don’t really understand this. I’m just going to defer to you.’”
So my billable hours have only gone up with the advent of AI. All those use cases are massively, massively underappreciated, and we still don’t even know—
They’re expansionary. That’s the whole point.
And then there was this whole thesis that frontier labs were going to cannibalize the apps. Which layer was going to win? It turns out everyone is sort of growing.
A friend of mine did a podcast where he described it as, “Everything is going to work.”
I describe it slightly differently, but we get questions all the time from LPs. They ask us which layer in the stack is going to work.
Which layer in the stack?
Which layer in the stack is going to work? I’m kind of like, “I don’t know. The market is going to be so big. I think everything might work.”
There are going to be a lot of companies that don’t work, and there may be idiosyncratic categories that don’t work. But by and large, it’s far too limiting to think that if open source does a good job, it’s bad for the labs, and vice versa.
We try to remove ourselves from thinking in a zero-sum way like that.
Yeah, exactly. Why do people think it’s going to be winner-take-all? The last era of technology was probably winner-take-all in a lot of categories, but this feels categorically different because we’re reunderwriting a lot of the fundamentals.
4. Why This Era of AI Is Categorically Winner-Take-All
So maybe extract it out. Yeah, look, “winner take all” is an interesting way to describe it because, if you look at the market cap growth of all the leading technology companies, there are many, many that were successful. It wasn’t winner take all.
There’s an important distinction: We very much believe in the power law within a given category. The winners will capture the vast majority of the market share and market cap, and second place is playing for scraps.
But I think we’ll see a massive expansion in the number of categories that we have. If you go back 20 years, CRM was not really a category. I mean, it was small. It was Siebel Systems and things like that.
Now it’s a massive category. I think the same thing will happen. We’ve seen it in every technology market that we invest in. Again, our approach is that, in our business, we can tolerate loss. If we’re not losing money in a given fund on a given amount of investments, we’re not taking enough risk.
If you look at our best-performing venture funds over time, I think the loss rate is 60%—
Or so.
—on early stage.
Yeah.
On early stage. At the growth stage, the loss rate will be lower, but it’s probably going to be in the 10% to 20% range. And that’s appropriate because—
With that, you’ll get investments that we make that return 10x or more. If we’re doing a good job, we’re backing the leading company in every category that is a credible category. If the category works out well, then we do a great job. If the category doesn’t work out well, that’s okay. That’s the risk that we live with.
5. Why Consistency Matters More Than Ever in Venture
Yeah. Yep. Yep. Embedded in that is also timing because, Aram, you and I lament this. A lot of people think things are overheated in that moment in time, and then you look back in retrospect and it turns out everything was actually quite cheap. But there are aberrations in the market where it’s probably actually true.
I know you advise a lot of your LPs on the importance of consistency in venture capital, probably more than any other asset class, because you just never know when these technologies can come out. Maybe walk through that, because there are a lot of institutional allocators out there who don’t have access to a lot of the frontier models now. They’re trying to play catch-up, and in some instances they may be introducing adverse behavior that’s too reflective of things being too frothy. Unpack that for us.
Yeah, I mean, the extremeness of the power law that DG talked about is important. If you, as an allocator, have not had access to the top 5 to 10 companies over the last 5 to 10 years, you’re significantly behind in terms of returns.
Let’s take a step back. We’ve looked at the data on 3,000 venture capital firms in the US. Only 20 have achieved consistent 3x net returns over the last 2 decades.
Sorry, say that one more time. 20 firms?
Less than 1%.
Wow.
Consistent 3x net returns.
That’s incredible.
You don’t need 7 or 8 funds in those 20 years. You need 3 to 4 3x net TVPI funds over a 20-year period. We found only 20 firms that have done that.
Wow.
Consistency in venture is really, really hard.
But what’s interesting is that the consistent ones consistently had access to the category-defining companies every vintage.
Yeah.
There are exceptions, and by the way, just having the logo is not sufficient. If you’re early stage and you have a large fund, you need to own enough of it. If you’re late stage, DG, I’m curious if you agree: sizing is really critical.
Yeah.
Venture-like returns are possible in late stage, but your best company should be 5% to 10% or more of your fund. That way, you can actually return the fund on a single company. Fund-returning math in late stage didn’t exist before. It does now.
Yeah.
We’ve found that the right portfolio sizing and the firms that consistently have gotten access are in that top 20 out of 3,000. If you don’t have them, there’s a huge dispersion of returns. If you don’t have those companies, you’re getting the average venture return. If you look at Cambridge data, the average venture return over the last 10 years is 1x to 2x.
You’ll do better in private equity. You’ll definitely do better in the public markets. You don’t need to lock up your money for 10 years.
Yeah, for sure. I just pulled up a tweet from our friend Eddie, who posted this morning. He said, “Interest in big VC funds has been driven by founders, not LPs. Founders, more often than not, want the brand that can scale, be a life-cycle investor, and help land customers and hires. LPs have slowly followed along, but most are still dragging their heels because it’s counter to conventional wisdom.”
Yeah. The outcomes are larger, so funds can be larger. There are some exceptions among those 20. There are some small firms that are focused on niche vertical markets—
—or they’re playing at a stage that’s much earlier than the bigger firms, where there isn’t a lot of competition with the bigger firms. The problem with that strategy is that you have to stay consistent in terms of fund size and strategy. If you start getting bigger over time, then you bump into the big firms, and I think it becomes really, really hard to stay consistent.
Yeah. Yep. Death of the middle.
Death of the middle of the middle.
We said we were going to drink every time we said “death of the middle.”
I’m very complimentary of many of our peers in the venture ecosystem. But this “death of the middle” thing—
How do you define it?
What’s the middle? I think what you described—highly specialized funds, some of the ones that were very early to AI with deep, deep, deep domain experts—have done a pretty good job. They’ve done a good job, and sometimes they can move fast, get into things, or take shares of deals that we want to do. That’s a reality.
Then I think there’s large-scale venture, in the sense that we have many product lines and can scale all the way from seed through to when you go public.
I think we have some peers who employ a similar strategy. I’d like to think that we’re the best, but there are a few other folks who do that.
Everything else in between struggles to compete a little bit, for the reasons that Eddie said. What does the founder care about? The founder cares about taking capital from a partner they think can de-risk the outcome for themselves. If you were to simplify it, that’s the simplest way to describe what the founder really cares about.
The founder cares about the partner, right? The governance person. You have to be a good actor in all those things. But there’s a reason why we built up a tremendous amount of resources. That’s why we have 700 employees.
That’s why we take the management fees that we make on our funds and invest them in operating resources, because we think it will, one, bend the curve on the outcome, and two, help us win deals.
When founders select their partners, often, if it’s a hot deal, they’ll have many alternatives. That’s the revealed preference. As Eddie said, we’re doing an okay job with that.
What I agree with him about is that our LPs coming to invest in us is a byproduct of that.
Our business is a flywheel.
The flywheel starts with: Are we deep domain experts? Are we going to have a point of view that is the right point of view?
Can we demonstrate to the founder that we are the right partner for her or him?
If so, we win the deal. If we can help make the outcome better, that’s great.
If we do make the outcome better, there are 2 things that happen. One, our business has persistence of returns, partially because the new founder wants to be around the winners. They care because there’s an important brand, and that has knock-on effects for them.
Secondly, by being a part of the winners and helping them in small ways, we create killer references.
The founders then tell the other founders, “You should work with these folks.”
That’s the way the flywheel works in our business.
One theory—I’m curious to get both of your takes—is to take pre-seed bets. At sub-$20 million, $30 million, or $40 million valuations, with sub-$100 million funds, they can coexist with the big firms because, at the inception stage, say there are 7 AI companies doing roughly the same thing.
I would think a large firm like Andreessen Horowitz would want to wait for a round or 2 until there’s more relative certainty. One thing you don’t want to do is be in the number 2 or number 3. As you said, you have to be in the category winner. You’d rather wait for that round and double down and lead the A or the B.
Mhm.
The small firms can carve out a niche for themselves a round or 2 earlier than the big firms and actually have a right to win. They can do really well and be complementary to the big firms.
Yeah. Do you agree with that?
Yeah. And look, we have very healthy relationships with seed funds across the ecosystem. We also do seed ourselves, right? But pre-seed, for sure—earlier than we typically do.
The seed you would do, I think, is a chunkier, bigger seed, right? Like for a serial entrepreneur.
Yeah, that definitely is our sweet spot. That said, we have our Speedrun program, which we just came from earlier this morning.
I think the market is evolving because founders have such a preferential attachment, as David George was saying, to brands. We get to look at everything, and sometimes it does make sense for us to do the pre-seed and seed. You want that flexibility of capability, and for the founder, to your point, they don’t really care where your focus is. They just want to be in that orbit, and you’ll find the funds to match it.
I think we can coexist in this world, but I also think it’s very important that our business is principally an early-stage business. We have to be first to the pole. We may not actually make the investment, but we have to at least understand the landscape and the market to be able to make informed decisions later on.
I spoke to a few founders at Speedrun today, and they very much are hoping to stay in the orbit long term.
Right. And so this is a new phenomenon. Ten years ago, this was starting to really take shape as more of the early-stage folks started doing later stage and then extending across the stack, but not quite in the way that it is today. David, I don’t know if you would agree with that, but it’s virtually impossible to have this sort of mid-stage business effectively without having the early stage and then also the late stage come behind it as well.
Yeah, I mean, look, I’m very biased, but I think the reason that we’ve been successful as a growth fund is because of our early-stage business. I say that all the time: our business starts and ends with early stage.
That provides us a tremendous amount of advantage at the growth stage in terms of access, information, knowledge, relationships, and so on. I would think that our early-stage partners would probably say that the growth business provides them benefits too, because it allows us to scale up and deepen partnerships with founders over time, and that helps to win deals at the early stage.
Yeah, totally. There are both sides. You can’t only do the early stage, and you can’t only wait until the late stage, either. Your point earlier was that it looks like firms are increasingly converging around a handful of names. That’s probably true because of this power-law dynamic, but at the same time, the majority of those logos, so to speak, we have to get at the early stage. That’s the only way we maintain ball control and participate in the pro rata and then some.
We’re big believers that the strongest late-stage franchises have a huge early-stage franchise attached to them. The ability to win is multiplied when you have an early-stage franchise.
We talked about sizing in late stage. Whatever the size of your late-stage fund is, if you can, at scale, put 5% to 10% of your fund into one of the category-defining companies, the way you could do that is because you had an early-stage franchise that developed that relationship with the entrepreneur and the management team early on. It’s really hard to come in as a de novo late-stage firm and write a $500 million check.
6. How Venture Has Structurally Changed Since the 2000s
Yeah. No, it’s very hard. I’ve lived that world.
How do you think about, from the LP seat, how venture is fundamentally, perhaps structurally, a different job than when you started your career? And how do you think about asset allocation within venture? There are actually sub-assets within venture as you think about portfolio construction as well.
In a very simplistic way, there are 4 ways to do venture. There’s pre-seed and seed, so think sub-$150 million funds. There are 1,000—close to 2,000 today—in the U.S. alone.
Then there’s the messy middle, which we talked about. There are a lot of firms there—hundreds of firms. Then there are the big firms, and then there’s dedicated late stage. So there are 4 ways to play it.
We have done the larger firms for decades now. We’ve done the seed firms. We’ve selectively done a few in the messy middle, and we haven’t done dedicated late stage for the reasons we talked about.
How is it changing?
AI is actually making our jobs harder than ever before. It’s making it harder because rounds are larger in general, they’re faster, and the traction that’s happening in the industry is confusing.
Here’s why it’s confusing: You can have a company come out of—pick your accelerator—and say, “I went from $0 to $5 million ARR in a month.”
There’s no renewal cycle yet on that company.
And they’re raising off of that traction at huge multiples. A lot of times, they’re selling to each other in a cohort, potentially. It’s not even ARR, but they’re multiplying it by 12.
For every 49 companies like that, there’s 1 really special one doing a couple of million in actual ARR that has a huge valuation and will go on to be the next Cursor.
Yeah. It is really tough today to parse out what’s real traction and what’s not. Valuations are really high. This is why the big firms do well. I actually think they can wait, or they have enough relative certainty in the next round to lead that round.
But even then, there isn’t a lot of certainty. When you guys did Cursor, I don’t think there was a lot of certainty. For how many months were people saying Cursor was dead?
Even the morning of the acquisition announcement, people were still saying that Cursor was dead. I was like, “They just announced that they were going to be acquired by SpaceX for $60 billion.”
Tell me if I’m wrong: $3 million ARR and a $400 million round, or somewhere around there?
Yeah, something like that.
A lot of people would say, “That’s crazy. Why did they do that deal?”
Yeah. Well, look, founder judgment is a very important thing. Getting to know founders over time, spending a lot of time with them, seeing how they think—I’d like to think that, especially, my early-stage partners are pretty good at that.
Secondly, it is hard to parse out real versus misleading traction. And misleading in the sense that you can’t take a market signal from it—not that anybody’s intentionally misleading anyone.
There’s probably some of that too.
Yeah, there’s probably some of that too. But I go back to—
I love it when people help redefine what ARR actually means. This is a very helpful PSA.
This is always helpful, yes. But I come back to this question: Is the market demanding more of your product? That is always the question. I have that posted on a note on my computer screen.
How do you know that when the company has only been operating or selling for a couple of months?
You’re not going to be able to do it with financial analysis. You’ll have to do it by really understanding the customers and talking to them.
One of the things that I said about Harvey over time, as an example, is that they did a really good job commercially in the early days because they were smart. They were a research-plus-lawyer combination. They got some momentum, and some high-profile law firms signed up early on.
But the usage was not very good. If you looked at the actual deployment, it looked mediocre compared with some other software firms.
From a retention standpoint—
Not retention—usage of it.
Now fast-forward to the post-reasoning-models period, and that totally flipped. You could see the absolute takeoff in adoption. A bunch of different things happened at the same time: Lawyers got much more value out of the product, and you could see it in usage and engagement.
Because it was high-utility usage and engagement, it almost became a flip from what was previously, “We’re scared of things like hallucinations,” to, “No, no, no, every client is actually demanding that the law firms use the product.”
I think we look for markets like that. We try to catch them early—earlier than we did at Harvey. That’s the kind of signal we look for. You have to go lay it down. Everyone can do cohort analysis, and everyone can look at renewal data, but understanding the texture of the market, what the customers actually want and need, and what their alternatives are—that’s how you make the decision.
That’s why it’s so important to have the early-stage business, because they’re the deepest in the technology and the products. They obviously saw it in Cursor, and they’ve seen it in many other things.
Jen, what’s the biggest pushback? I mean, you’re the most prolific fundraiser I know.
You could be very gainfully employed at this firm.
I agree that you are a prolific fundraiser.
7. Are We Catching a Falling Knife? LP Sentiment Today
What's the biggest pushback you're getting from LPs on the state of AI and the state of venture?
A lot of it is worries around whether we're catching a falling knife here: the timing of the market, where we are, whether things are overheated, and so on. We talked a lot about this at the outset, around valuations and what the potential of the market is, but I do get a lot of sentiment from LPs that their job is also about to fundamentally change.
You mentioned earlier one aspect of it: AI making it more challenging to evaluate opportunities and funds. But the other aspect is that the LP historically has not been incentivized to actually embrace change in some respects. This is very much a job where the end goal is somewhat diametrically opposed to the risk tolerance of the GP, and this is just the mechanics of the industry.
But I oftentimes say a GP can get fired for missing out on the next Facebook or the next Uber. That's the error of omission, and that's fireable.
But LPs, on the flip side, only get fired if you invest in a bad manager. So, in some respects, the incentive outcomes are actually completely opposite of the GP's.
You don't get fired for investing in IBM if you're an LP.
Exactly. And in fact, you don't potentially even get fired for not investing at all.
Yeah.
If you miss the frontier models, back to your first question, as an LP, you're kind of along the benchmark, right?
Maybe slightly below the benchmark, and you're keeping your job.
Right, right. And that's fascinating.
And also, for most folks—and I'll leave fund of funds out of the equation because it's a different piece—but for a lot of folks, the upside actually is not that interesting for them. So, the pitch of, like, “Hey, you're going to miss out on this next potential generation”—the incentive misalignment is actually quite direct.
So, where do we go from there in terms of the LP role? I think we also have an important role and function. We oftentimes talk about, in the context of our job as leaders of the venture capital industry, how we have to help folks understand where the future is going.
Part of that is understanding how to infiltrate not just within their venture capital allocation but across their entire portfolio. That, I think, is way more interesting than just saying, “Hey, you might miss out on this next generation of returns,” or “the optimization of the next frontier model,” or one or two power-law companies.
Access, selection, and sizing are what LPs do. So, access—you could argue you have the data to figure out who has done well historically. Out of those 20 firms out of 3,000, you're not going to see consistency. Maybe half of them are consistent.
But the LP's job is also to find the next firms, as well as continue accessing those. So, 1 is access, 2 is selection, and 3 is portfolio construction and sizing. That's critical from an LP standpoint, because if you have an asset class where 20 firms out of 3,000 do well, you should concentrate in those 15 to 20 firms pretty consistently.
When I see a portfolio with 50, 60, or 70 venture capital firms, it's very hard for me to imagine that the overall portfolio can generate better than the average. And again, I'm going back to the average in venture. That's just not compelling enough for the illiquidity relative to any of the other asset classes—public markets, private equity.
Private equity can probably get you 1.5 to 2x net without the lockup, without the risk you're taking on. You talked about a 60% loss ratio. PE doesn't have that, right? PE has other problems we can talk about today when it comes to AI software, but portfolio construction and sizing for an LP is critical.
I've seen too many times an LP or an allocator find an interesting fund, actually get it right, and put 1% of their fund into it. Great. You 10x-ed it. It returns 10% of your fund. It does not move the needle at all.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Where do you all think we are today in that evolution Jen was talking about, in terms of the appropriate percentage of overall capital allocated to venture and growth compared to private equity, public markets, real assets, credit, or whatever it is?
Yeah, this is hard for me to answer because all I do is venture growth, so I would be biased to say it should be supersized.
We like that answer, though.
Look at the public markets today. We vibe-coded something that created a great way for us to assess the AI resiliency of public companies, and now we're doing that on the private side, and it's helping us hugely in our growth equity portfolio.
But in the SaaS public markets, there are only 15 to 20 companies, max, trading above 10 times revenue, which is an insane number because it used to be dozens and dozens a few years ago. Every one of those companies, for the most part, is showing acceleration of growth from AI. You're either in monitoring, security, deployment of agents, and so on.
So, it goes back to the same principle: if you are in some shape or form tied to AI, which is the fastest-growing facet of all the elements of GDP, then you should supersize it in your portfolio. That will have impacts in the public markets.
Even private equity today, when they're doing a new investment, they're looking for something that's AI-native. They're not looking to buy a workflow software company growing 10% that's seat-based. That's just not happening. They're looking for the system of record that can show acceleration with an AI-native management team.
Yeah. So, that connective tissue of AI is actually across every asset class today.
Yeah. And one of the strongest ways to play it is probably through venture.
Yeah.
Well, even the exits, though. We were talking about Silver Lake potentially buying Workday, for example—doing more provocative things in private equity when you have the capabilities to potentially infuse them and bring them into the future as part of that.
The other version of it is that exits in venture now way exceed private equity. I was looking this up last night. In private equity this year, the biggest exits are the buyout of EA, which was around $50 billion, and Medline, which is around $50 billion.
Cursor—let's exclude the IPOs—the M&A sale to SpaceX was way bigger than that. And so, the problem with that is—
You look at the pre-ChatGPT vintages in private equity: you would have paid, I don't know, 15 to 20 times EBITDA for a software asset that's growing 10% to 20% max.
Yeah.
If you look at the public markets today, that asset is trading at 2 times revenue.
Yeah.
And the problem is not just that the valuation might be low. There might not be a buyer for that company, because if you're looking at a software company today, the first thing you think about is: What is the terminal value? Is it resilient from AI?
The best way to show that is organic growth acceleration. Our data shows 1 percentage point of growth in the public markets is equivalent to 3 percentage points of EBITDA.
Yep.
So, by the way, it's funny because in COVID everyone was like, “We need to be profitable.” It was the inverse, and now it's the opposite.
No, no. In 2021 it was the inverse. Post-2021, it's basically fully aligned with risk, right? Correlated with risk in the public markets.
Exactly. Unfortunately, a lot of those private equity deals aren't growing fast enough. They're not showing that acceleration, and they may not have the management teams to revamp the business.
What Intercom did is a great example: bring the founder back, revamp the whole business, create an AI-native product, scale it, and then sell. It's almost like you're suiciding your existing business, which in private equity is really hard to do.
It's really hard to do. I just spent a little time with the founder, and I went up to him at an event and gave him a big high five. I said, “You did it, man.”
You did. This is the thing that's really, really hard to do. You know, it's an N of 1 right now.
8. The Legacy SaaS Problem: What to Do with the Old Book
There are a bunch of really good founders who are capable with those businesses, in the public and private markets, who I think are going to take a crack at it. So, we'll see.
Yeah. Maybe on that thread, though, DJ, we also sometimes get the pushback that folks who have been in venture and allocated to venture might have a similar problem: they have legacy SaaS businesses as well. What's the balance between how you think about the historical stuff?
Let me ask you that question. I'm going to piggyback off of Jen's question to you. You've got to pick a 2016 through 2021, pre-ChatGPT vintage software company that was fine but doesn't have those AI-native features anymore. It's not accelerating; it's growing at around 30%. On the venture books, it's at 10 to 20 times revenue. It can't go public anymore. No one cares to take that public.
Yeah.
Silver Lake has no interest in that company anymore. They would have a year ago, but they don't.
Yeah.
What happens to that company?
You know, look, it's like—
We have a lot of exposure to those companies, too. So—
I would say it's very TBD, right? I was with one of our CEO founders this weekend, and he was like, “Give me the straight scoop. What do you actually think is happening?” He actually said to me, “Don't give me a podcast answer,” which is ironic.
I think both things can be true: AI is the biggest generational change that we've ever seen, and it's going to transform industries. There will also be some enduring value in software companies that are able to adapt.
Part of the thing that we're monitoring, which makes us extremely bullish about AI, is actual diffusion into the real economy. If you were to paint the bullish scenario for regular software and for a slower pace of change, you would say, you know, coding's been hit, but that's kind of a head fake, right? Coding is perfectly documented. It has perfect data, it's verifiable, and it's simulatable.
Most tasks in business do not share those 3 attributes, and so maybe the diffusion into other knowledge work beyond coding will take a lot longer. That would be the case to make for the software companies. Some of them will evolve, have AI solutions, and change their business models. I think that's a must, but that would be the case for why maybe it's a little bit overblown.
I think if you look at the way that a lot of the public SaaS companies have reacted over the last few months, there's a little bit of a growing realization in that. All that makes me super, super, super bullish on AI, though. If you look at our portfolio, we have some of those companies, but about 95% of our NAV is not in those companies. It's in the companies that are growing very fast, accelerating, et cetera.
The median company in the U.S. is spending $12 per employee on AI per month. The top 1% of the data set that we've seen is spending $7,000 per employee on AI per month. Not only have we had limited diffusion beyond coding, but if you just look at the shape of who is consuming tokens and actually getting real value out of AI today, we're super early.
The most cutting-edge banks are probably doing 1% of headcount costs on AI tools. The reason this makes me very bullish is that these are the fastest-growing companies we've ever seen, like, of all time. Again, they're adding more revenue per month than the megacap tech companies, and yet it's probably on the back of adoption by 10 million users, maybe 20 million, maybe 30 million max.
There are 150 million workers in the U.S., and I think AI is going to transform the way we do a lot of work.
Wow.
CalPERS famously lost out on billions of gains by not investing in their backyard. They're making up for lost time now. They've converted their portfolio from 91% public to 58%, and venture and growth from 9% to 43%. There's probably some balance in between those things, but they're leaning hard into it.
There's going to be a lot of value still that's going to be accreted in some of these historical companies. I was sort of joking around about bending. That was probably a great outcome for Airtable, outside of the fact that they're going to actually spin off the hyperagent piece of the business and do really interesting things with that. But in the scheme of things, I think there are going to be a lot of homes for a lot of things. This zero-sum thinking is probably the pitfall that we would advise against.
9. Why "AI Private Equity" Isn't a Panacea
So we've talked about venture and growth, private equity, and public markets. By the way, the composition of all of those has radically changed over the last 10 years. We've also had the emergence of entirely new categories that are available in the private markets, like private credit. Do you have a view on the outlook for those on a relative basis—
In software in particular?
Yeah, I'd say in technology.
The vantage point we have is looking at private credit, which resides in a lot of private equity software portfolios. That's hundreds of billions.
Mhm.
I'll give you 1 statistic. You look at 2021 and 2022: about $200 billion to $300 billion in LBO software transactions happened, with over $200 billion in debt taken out. The average valuation for those software deals was over 25 to 32 times EBITDA. Those companies today are worth probably half that.
The reason you're seeing redemptions in the credit markets in private credit is exactly that. They're looking at the public markets. You've had the SaaS apocalypse. It's been a massive correction in software, and you can see a contraction in valuations, which means the leverage ratios have gone up dramatically.
If you are a software company that is somewhat not resilient to AI, I think you're challenged both in terms of your equity position and credit as well.
By the way, even the AI version of private equity is not completely insulated. We oftentimes talk about how just because you put Sears on a website, it doesn't make it Amazon. You have to have the benefit of building Amazon from the studs, logistically, to make it Amazon. It's not just the website.
In a lot of instances with the private equity-backed companies that are now just infusing AI, we've seen it in some of our companies as well. The peer competitor is like, “The first thing I'll do is, of course, hire AI customer service agents,” because that's an easy, low-hanging fruit.
It turns out that if you don't actually build it into the workflow, you start to churn customers very quickly if they're used to talking to a human. For every drop in NPS, there's a direct correlation with a drop in revenue, and then you start to spiral, especially if you have debt layered on top of it.
Sometimes we hear from folks, “I'll just do the AI version of private equity.” It's not a panacea for generating returns, especially when it's so categorically different from a technological perspective to actually infuse that throughout the company.
Yeah, you can't just throw an operating partner at the company and say, “Let's put AI on it.” It just doesn't work.
You need to do it completely differently. If you do have a founder mentality on the management team, it is possible, but the board has to be aligned, and all the investors have to be aligned—
And you do have to make some really hard decisions, the way Intercom did.
Yeah. Yep.
Yeah. So obviously, this is a group that is very pro-venture and growth in this category. Let's talk about the legitimate opposition to it. What is the case for why maybe the risk that you're taking, or whatever it may be with venture and growth, doesn't justify it?
The pushback we get a lot is timeline to liquidity. The average unicorn is private for 10-plus years, typically, and then you've got all these follow-on rounds that are happening pretty quickly, one after the other. You see maybe the same logo in 5 or 6 different funds, and the question is, how do you get out of it?
And so—
An IPO isn't actually a distribution.
It could take 12 to 24-plus months before you actually get liquidity out of an IPO, especially if you own 10% to 15% at IPO. It's going to take a long time if you're in a generational company. So we get that pushback a lot in terms of timeline to liquidity.
Mhm. And then what is the counter to that pushback?
The counter to that pushback is going back to 3,000 firms: 20 do well consistently. If you're in the top 1% of those firms and you have a category winner, you want to make sure that compounds, actually.
Would you have wanted to sell Stripe, Databricks, or any of those other companies 3 or 4 years ago? The answer is unanimously no. Could some of these companies go public earlier? Sure. Anthropic was first funded in 2021, and it's about to go public 5 years later.
Cursor—from first financing to acquisition—is a short timeline. The best venture firms actually have fund-returning liquidity pretty quickly, maybe even quicker than private equity. But that subset of firms is tiny.
Yeah. Yeah. Yep. Actually, very famously, a year and a half ago or so, we went to our Fund I LPs. At that point in time, Fund I was 16 years old, and we had this position in Stripe that we invested in at the seed stage. We asked all of our LPs, “Hey, do you want liquidity out on this?”
We recognized that the job we came to do was now done, 16 years in. “Do you want liquidity back on this?” Every single one of those LPs said, “No, we'd rather let this continue to compound.”
Ultimately, a year later, we decided to make that exit because it was 17 years in. We've got to get this liquidity out. We've got to wrap up the fund, et cetera. But so many LPs—I think it's very specific to certain categories, right? Endowments would prefer to let it run.
Family offices, quite frankly, don't want the money back because they don't want to pay taxes on it. They'd rather have it continue to compound. And so there's specific nuance with each LP group, where it's very hard to paint a broad brushstroke across the board on everyone wanting the same thing. But I also think, to your point—
The very best GPs have manufactured liquidity along the way, particularly in 2021, when a lot of folks didn't take money off the table. I think that was a good sign—the first indicator—and now, in this next cycle, can you actually get some early liquidity out through M&A and then let potentially the winners IPO over time, with the fullness of compounding as well?
Yeah, exactly.
I'm going to end on this note because I thought this was an interesting question that you and Gavin were tossing back and forth on, DG. He didn't want to answer the question of what will be the next $10 trillion company, but he had certainty around what will be the next $20 trillion market-cap company. So I'm going to ask both of you: What do you think is going to be the next $100 trillion market-cap company?
Oh my gosh, here we go. I can't even think in those terms. That's probably 2 tech cycles away, not just 1. It is possible that we have entirely new companies that get created. And I think a lot of the market-cap creation that would drive a $10 trillion outcome or more is in new product areas that haven't yet been touched, right? So—
Yeah.
Like what I talked about: the sort of diffusion of the technology into the enterprise—we're nowhere, right? A year ago, everyone talked about consumer AI all the time. No one even talks about consumer AI anymore. But the end-use case for consumers is not going to be a chatbot interface. That's the skeuomorphic version. We're going to have a native version. It's going to be proactive. It's going to do work on our behalf. It's going to create a ton of value for consumers, and we're kind of nowhere on that. I mean, yeah, there's a billion chat users, but we're scratching the surface.
We are nowhere on robotics, but I think robotics is going to be bigger than the language stuff. I think it's going to happen in the next 10 years.
We are almost nowhere on autonomy, right? There are fewer than 10,000 Waymos live in the US, and way fewer robotaxis. There's a lot of open space for others to build in that area, too. Healthcare is 18% of GDP.
We've done nothing to scratch the surface either on care delivery or drug discovery yet. I mean, there are some companies that are working on it, showing some early signs of progress, but I think the progress that we make there in the next 10 years is going to be massive.
And then we're in this interesting era of reimagining all things in the physical world, from defense to manufacturing to data centers. I look at the confluence of all these trends and I'm like, yeah, it may feel like we've done a lot with AI already. But 10 years from now, we're going to look back and say, “Oh my gosh, those other major areas created a ton of value.”
And so I'm excited. I think the next SpaceX AI or OpenAI are probably going to get created. They'll probably be in those kinds of domains.
Yeah.
I'll add one category that, to me, is both a concern and a huge opportunity. This is a plug for your new fund—the opportunities fund that you did. I think very simplistically about the bottleneck in AI today: It's not demand; it's on the supply side. You've got energy—the grid, data centers—then you've got chips, then frontier models and apps. The US is amazing at the right side of that, so chips and onward. The VC ecosystem supports that well.
The new fund you have is really going to help on the left side as well, because the US doesn't have a problem with energy generation; it has a problem with speed to power. That's permissioning, transmission, and regulation. Other countries are putting out 10x more renewable capacity a year.
10. The Real Bottleneck: Data Centers, Chips & the Machine Age
So that is a real bottleneck, and that means reimagining the data center. You talked about the density being 10x-plus. Well, you can't just repurpose an old data center for a new AI facility. So this is where the new fund you have can create not $10 billion, $50 billion, but $100 billion-plus opportunities as well that can really solve the bottleneck.
And I think that is a real concern because demand is not the concern. I've heard a lot of LPs say, “This is like the dot-com, or this is COVID.” It's not, because the traction is real, and it's not ephemeral revenue like—
COVID.
The bottleneck could be supply, but if you have the right inputs, like the fund that's now backing those companies—next-generation chip companies, memory, et cetera—that's a huge opportunity.
It's time for machine age. Let's bring the machines.
I love it.
All right, let's close on that. Thank you both so much. It was super fun.
Thank you for having us. Awesome. See you.