MetaDAO is a compelling liquid VC-style opportunity with limited downside and significant upside potential. It stands out as a category creator, the first ever implementation of futarchy uniquely enabled by crypto.
Before diving deeper, I acknowledge the several constraints to this pitch for some readers. It’s a small-cap and highly illiquid token, TAM/monetization/business model is anyone’s guess, could be a failed experiment, may take years to realize potential, the list goes on. Nonetheless, I pitch it to readers both to highlight a genuinely innovative crypto experiment that is still relatively under-the-radar and as well as a longer-term liquid VC style investment in an underlooked category that some may be looking for😊
MetaDAO is a project that pushes the boundaries of cryptoeconomics in governance. It is the first practical implementation of futarchy, a governance structure that uses market forces to determine policy implementation. MetaDAO itself is a DAO responsible for developing futarchy markets and uses $META as its reference asset.
MetaDAO raised a $2.2M round in August 2024 led by Paradigm and a roster of angel investors, most of whom are builders in the Solana ecosystem. $META started relatively decentralized, initially bootstrapped via airdrop and capped pre-sale. The token is fully floated, with an estimated 20,198 tokens circulating and 687 tokens in the DAO treasury and multisig.
Historical market cap of $META:
To provide context, let me briefly introduce futarchy. Futarchy, introduced by Robin Hanson in 2000 in his working paper "Shall We Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs?", proposes using prediction markets to drive decision-making in organizations. While implementation details can vary, the futarchy process broadly follows these steps:
MetaDAO implements futarchy through conditional vaults. Each proposal has a conditional market where trades are settled only if the proposed action is taken. For example, trades in the pass market only clear if the proposal passes and are reverted otherwise. The same applies to fail markets. Each proposal includes Solana Virtual Machine (SVM) instructions that are executed if the proposal passes.
Example of pass/fail market on MetaDAO:
Imagine Lido DAO is considering a decision to distribute 80% of revenues to tokenholders. All $LDO tokenholders have three days to vote on this proposal. If the proposal passes, distribution is automatically activated.
As a $LDO tokenholder, you might believe that if the rev share is turned on, the value of $LDO will rise to $2. But if not, you think $LDO will only be worth $0.50. To take advantage of this, you could buy $LDO in a market that assumes the proposal will pass, betting that the price will go up to $2. At the same time, you might sell $LDO in a market that assumes the proposal will fail, betting that the price will drop to $0.50. If the proposal passes, you’ll profit from your bet that the price will go up. If it fails, you’ll profit from your bet that the price will go down.
However, other $LDO holders might disagree with you. They might think it’s too risky to turn on the rev share right now, fearing it could attract negative attention from regulators. If most people believe this, they might sell their $LDO in the market where the proposal is expected to pass and buy in the market where it is expected to fail. This collective action will influence whether the proposal passes or fails. Overall, market forces should elicit the correct response.
Now consider real examples from MetaDAO’s track record. The DAO once had 99K tokens in its treasury for future expenditures. However, the low-float, high-FDV dynamic deterred market participants from buying $META and participating in the DAO. And, as some members noted, it could also encourage the use of $META for expenses, increasing potential selling pressure.
Therefore, a proposal went up to vote on burning all the treasury-held $META, which voted through. In retrospect, this decision likely value-accretive. Yet, the co-founders themselves admittedly did not want this proposal to pass. And its hard to imagine any other DAO to push a vote like this through.
A table of prior proposals and outcomes are presented below. Interestingly, DAO has repeatedly rejected unfavorable dilution of the token price while approving initiatives that have likely drove recent price appreciation – such as token burning, bringing in Colosseum and Paradigm, aligning co-founder incentives, etc.
High-quality team and community. Due to the bootstrapped nature of $META, along with financialized governance, the DAO has cultivated a highly engaged community. Contentious proposals like Proposal #7 (Pantera acquiring $50K of $META) will have community members ape 6-7 figs into “Fail” market to express their opinions. Founders proph3t and Kollan House are cryptonative with a strong network within the Solana community. Their incentives are also aligned due to Proposal #16. A $5B+ valuation outcome for $META results in a $500M payout.
Tailwind of prediction markets and event-betting. MetaDAO benefits from the growth of prediction markets. Proph3t, MetaDAO’s co-founder, shared that Polymarket’s increasing adoption in mainstream circles gave them a boost during fundraising conversations. "If we see Polymarket as a machine, then it made sense to me that we’d want to use a truth machine to make decisions."
Polymarket TVL
Even after the U.S. election, prediction markets will likely continue to grow through the cycle. Adjacent verticals, online gambling and sports betting, are also secular growers. While MetaDAO is not directly a prediction market, it nonetheless benefits from the increasing awareness of the utility of prediction markets and financialization of events/decisions.
Next wave of Solana protocols. We’re seeing a wave of Solana protocols decentralizing, most recently with Jito, Drift, Jupiter, and Kamino, and in future with a whole spate of new Solana projects. These are all immediate addressable markets for MetaDAO, and also helps give $META “Solana beta.”